21\textsuperscript{ST} CENTURY WARFARE AND PAKISTAN’S MILITARY RESPONSE

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32-FSS-PHDIR/F16

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the PhD Degree in International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI), Pakistan.

Supervisor

Professor Dr Muhammad Khan

September 16, 2019
FORWARDING SHEET

The thesis entitled “21st Century Warfare and Pakistan’s Military Response,” submitted by Mr. Tauqeer Hussain in partial fulfillment of Ph.D. degree in International Relations has been completed under my guidance and supervision. I am satisfied with the quality of his research work and allow him to submit this thesis for further process as per IIU-rules & regulations.

Date: September 16, 2019
Signature: ______________________

Supervisor:
Professor Dr. Muhammad Khan
CERTIFICATION
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the soldiers of Peace, who have rendered their lives to protect the honor, freedom and liberty of the free world. In particular, the findings of this study are manifested in the true contribution of Pakistan Armed Forces with that of more than 80,000 Pakistanis who had laid their lives to ensure peace and security of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The debt of their sacrifices cannot be attributed with few statements of dedication but it is important to remember their courage, bravery and utmost sacrifice, which is why this section is postulated to acknowledge and amount valor of their conduct.

The spirit and strength behind my interest to investigate ‘21st century warfare and Pakistan’s military response’ was vested in the sacrifices of thousands of Pakistanis. Few of them I knew as my students and many others became part of my memory due to their bravery. Their memories had haunted me to explore and document the objectivity behind their sacrifices. I not only acknowledge their sacrifices but also dedicate this research to remember their contributions towards peace and security of Pakistan in particular and the region and the world in general. Thank you very much soldiers of Pakistan for making us proud on your sacrifices.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am highly grateful to my supervisor Professor Dr. Muhammad Khan for his consistent help and support throughout the course of PhD research. Without his encouragement and intellectual support investigating such a qualitative discourse could be of great challenge for me.

Most of my background that helped me to decode the military aspects of this research is predominantly influenced by my work with National Security and War Course (NSWC) which is the highest military course of Pakistan Armed Forces at National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad. I have been consulting literature available in the Sahibzada Yaqub Khan Library of NDU that over the period of time has built my world view with that of necessary scenario building, which had played great role in documenting the sequence of this study. I am also thankful to thousands of Pakistani military officers who being part of NSWC were interacting with me for research endeavors. Directly and indirectly over the span of many years all of them had made me capable of understanding the situational contexts of complex military phenomenon. With limitations of mentioning their names, I would like to acknowledge all of them who have exposed the real Pakistan to me with that of their resilient sacrifices.

I am extremely thankful to my colleagues Dr. Mansoor Akber Kundi, Dr. Manzoor Khan Afridi, Dr. Husnul Amin, Dr. Manzoor Nazer, Dr. Masood-ur-Rehman Khattak, Mr. Inam-ullah Jan for providing healthy environment and required support to complete the task of rigorous academic discourse. I also want to acknowledge supportive role of my female colleagues particularly Dr. Amna Mahmood and Dr. Sadaf Farooq.

I am thankful to my colleagues working in different departments of Faculty of Social Sciences especially Dr. Nabi Bux Jumani for their meaningful support and encouragement.
The Department of Politics and International Relations particularly its staff along with staff of the Dean FSS office and competent and supportive staff of examination department and quality assurance sections have played an important role to complete the complex steps of filing and paper work. I appreciate their timely help and support.

I am highly grateful to my family who at times of difficulty supported my endeavor and provided cushion to carry on with intellectual dream. Especially, being father of three lovely angels Taki Abdullah, Kimaya Tauqeer, and Anaya Tauqeer; who unknowingly stood beside me smiling and sometime waiting for hours to get my response. To bring the light to whole of acknowledgement, I would like to recall exceptional admiration and encouragement of my life partner who has been the most exceptional strength of my journey to explore the unknown. I am in great debt of her care and lively personality.

My brothers Tanveer Hussain Sargana, Naveed Husain Sargana, and Dr. Mujahid Hussain Sargana along with my sister have remarkably pushed me to sustain in academia and help me pursue intellectual journey.

Last but not the least; I am thankful to my father Mehr Khadim Hussain Sargana and amazing mother Shafqat Parveen being the two greatest blessings on my life by the ALLAH Almighty. Their smiles and wishes had made me capable of achieving cardinals of life necessary to upgrade knowledge and knowing the unknown.

Thank you very much for standing on my side as I am obliged and thankful to all of you.

Thank you very much Pakistan for giving me identity and providing the required strength necessary to uphold the emblem of peace and prosperity for myself and for the community of international relations.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABHM</td>
<td>Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABVP</td>
<td>Akhil Bharitya Vidyarthi Parishad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJK</td>
<td>Azad Jammu and Kashmir</td>
</tr>
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<td>AD</td>
<td>Anno Domini</td>
</tr>
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<td>APCs</td>
<td>Armored Personnel Carriers</td>
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<td>APPG</td>
<td>All Parties Parliamentary Group</td>
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<td>ATS</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Squad</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missiles</td>
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<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td>
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<td>AEW</td>
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<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<td>AQI</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda International</td>
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<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Army Public School</td>
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<td>American Broadcasting Company</td>
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<td>Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity</td>
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<td>Before Christ</td>
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<td>BAC</td>
<td>Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation</td>
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<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
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<td>Border Security Force</td>
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<td>British Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>C^4I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence</td>
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<td>C^4ISR</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter Insurgency Operations</td>
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<td>Cold Start Doctrine</td>
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<td>Continental Military Thought</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>Center of Gravity</td>
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<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Common Era/ Current Era</td>
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<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPEC</td>
<td>China Pakistan Economic Corridor</td>
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<td>Central Reserve Police Force</td>
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<td>Central Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>COAS</td>
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<td>Chairman-Chiefs of Staff Committee</td>
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<td>Chief of Naval Staff</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Chief of Air Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Coalition Support Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Response Plan</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>Composite Deterrence Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTD</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Department</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>Chief Minister</td>
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<td>CTF</td>
<td>Counter Terror Finance</td>
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<td>CTDs</td>
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<td>CAFs</td>
<td>Civil Armed Forces</td>
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<td>CNIC</td>
<td>Computerized National Identity Card</td>
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<td>CBS</td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting System</td>
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<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
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<td>COD</td>
<td>Charter of Democracy</td>
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<td>CWC</td>
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<td>CTBT</td>
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<td>CJCSC</td>
<td>Chief Joint Chief of Staff Committee</td>
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<td>DSE</td>
<td>Democratic Army of Greece</td>
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<td>DAE</td>
<td>Department of Atomic Energy</td>
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<td>DRDO</td>
<td>Defence Research and Development Organization</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Draft Nuclear Doctrine</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Director General</td>
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<td>Director General Military Operations</td>
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<td>DCAOs</td>
<td>Defensive Counter Air Operations</td>
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<td>DIS</td>
<td>Directorate of Internal Security</td>
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<td>3D</td>
<td>Development, Dialogue and Deterrence</td>
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<td>EBO</td>
<td>Effect Based Operations</td>
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<td>ELAS</td>
<td>Ellinikós Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Stratós</td>
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<td>EoNP</td>
<td>Elements of National Power</td>
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<td>ELF</td>
<td>Extremely Low Frequency</td>
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<td>ERF</td>
<td>Extra Regional Forces</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>ETIM</td>
<td>East Turkistan Islamic Movement</td>
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<td>ERPGMS</td>
<td>Enterprise Resource Planning Global Management System</td>
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<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Focused Group Discussions</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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</table>
FSD   Full Spectrum Deterrence
FBR   Federal Board of Revenue
FBR   Federal Investigation Authority
FTA   Fair Trail Act
FBISE Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education
FMU   Financial Monitoring Unit
FERA  Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
FIR   First Investigation Report
FM    Frequency Modulation
FCR   Frontier Crimes Regulation
FC    Frontier Constabulary
FATF  Financial Action Task Force
FMCT  Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
FGT   Fast Growing Timber
FIF   Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation
FSL   Forensic Science Laboratory
GHQ   General Head Quarters
GWOT  Global War on Terrorism
GB    Gilgit Baltistan
GoP   Government of Pakistan
GLOCs Ground Lines of Communications
GZC   Gray Zone Conflict
GOC   General Officer Command
GWAT  Global War Against Terrorism
GDP   Gross Domestic Product

HAARP High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program
HuJI  Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
HEC   Higher Education Commission

IOK   Indian Occupied Kashmir
ISI   Inter Services Intelligence
IDPs  Internally Displace Persons
ICBMs Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
IFV   Infantry Fighting Vehicle
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force
IAF   Indian Air Force
IW    Irregular Warfare
IW    Information Warfare
IB    Intelligence Bureau
IED   Improvised Explosive Devices
IM    Indian Mujahideen
IPS   Indian Police Service
IORA  Indian Ocean Rim Association
IWT   Indus Water Treaty
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>Indian Nuclear Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISRT</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISPR</td>
<td>Inter-Services Public Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICGs</td>
<td>Integrated Combat Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEC</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Islamabad Capital Territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITMP</td>
<td>Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat-e-Madaris Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISSI</td>
<td>International Strategic Studies Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<td>IBOs</td>
<td>Intelligence Based Operations</td>
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<td>IMU</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Cricket Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBGs</td>
<td>Integrated Battle Groups</td>
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<td>IRHC</td>
<td>Indian Council of Historical Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>JeM</td>
<td>Jesh-e-Mohammad</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSHQs</td>
<td>Joint Services Headquarters</td>
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<td>JuD</td>
<td>Jamat-ud-Dawa</td>
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<td>JuA</td>
<td>Jamat-ul-Ahrar</td>
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<td>JuD</td>
<td>Jamat-ud-Dawa</td>
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<td>JUI-F</td>
<td>Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl</td>
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<td>JJI</td>
<td>Jamaat Jihadul Islami</td>
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<td>KSA</td>
<td>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>KW</td>
<td>Kinetic Warfare</td>
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<td>KPK</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
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<td>KKH</td>
<td>Karakorum Highway</td>
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<td>LFW</td>
<td>Light Footprint Warfare</td>
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<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Intensity Conflict</td>
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<td>LHAM</td>
<td>Losing Hearts and Minds</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line of Control</td>
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<td>LeT</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Tayyaba</td>
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<td>LED</td>
<td>Light Emitting Diode</td>
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<td>Lok Janshakti Patry</td>
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<td>MNCs</td>
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<td>MDAA</td>
<td>Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement</td>
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<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
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<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMF</td>
<td>Maharashtra Military Foundation</td>
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<td>MCOCA</td>
<td>Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act</td>
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<td>MTCR</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assured Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most Favorite Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRVs</td>
<td>Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles</td>
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<td>MCD</td>
<td>Minimum Credible Deterrence</td>
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<td>MDS</td>
<td>Missile Defence Systems</td>
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<td>MRD</td>
<td>Movement for the Restoration of Democracy</td>
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<td>MQM</td>
<td>Muhajir Qaumi Movement</td>
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<td>Muttahida Quomi Movement</td>
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<td>MO</td>
<td>Military Operations</td>
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<td>SAFRON</td>
<td>Ministry of States and Frontier Regions</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication</td>
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<td>Muttahida Majlis–e–Amal</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
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<td>Medicinae Baccalaureus Baccalaureus Chirurgiae</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
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<td>NCWF</td>
<td>New Concept of War fighting</td>
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<td>NCW</td>
<td>Net Centric Warfare</td>
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<td>NIA</td>
<td>National Investigation Agency</td>
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<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
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<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>National Defence College</td>
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<td>National Defense University</td>
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<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>National Awami Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISA</td>
<td>National Internal Security Apparatus</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
NACTA  National Counter Terrorism Authority
NWA  North Waziristan Agency
NADRA  National Automated Database Registration Authority
NTF  National Task Force
NA  National Assembly
NR3C  National Response Centre for Cyber Crimes
NVDs  Night Vision Devices
NWFP  North West Frontier Province
NRO  National Reconciliation Ordinance
NTFP  Non Timber Forest Products
NISP  National Internal Security Policy
OOTW  Operations Other Than War
OBL  Osama Bin Laden
ODRP  Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan
PBUH  Peace Be Upon Him
PATA  Provincially Administered Tribal Areas
PMCs  Private Military Contractors
PAOs  Proactive Military Operations
PIPA  Program on International Policy Attitudes
PAF  Pakistan Air Force
PAS  Pro Active Strategy
POTA  Prevention of Terrorism Act
POK  Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
PIL  Public Interest Litigation
PMO  Prime Minister Office
PM  Prime Minister
PNRA  Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority
PAS  Pro Active Strategy
PN  Pakistan Navy
PNS  Pakistan Navy Ship
PTV  Pakistan Television
PPA  Protection of Pakistan Act
PPC  Pakistan Penal Code
PMI  Pakistan Manpower Institute
PIPS  Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies
PEMRA  Pakistan Electronic Media Regulation Act
POR  Proof of Registration
PkMAP  Pakistan Milli Awami Party
PECA  Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act
PPP  Pakistan People Party
PPPP  Pakistan People Party Parliamentarian
PT  Physical Training
PMCs  Private Military Contractors
PCs  Peace Committees
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>PAs</td>
<td>Political Agents</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMLN</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz</td>
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<td>PTM</td>
<td>Pashtun Tahafuz Movement</td>
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<td>PSL</td>
<td>Pakistan Super League</td>
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<td>PCB</td>
<td>Pakistan Cricket Board</td>
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<td>RSS</td>
<td>Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh / Rashtriya Seva Sangh</td>
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<td>RAW</td>
<td>Research and Analysis Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAPID</td>
<td>Re-organized Army Plains Infantry Divisions</td>
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<td>RDX</td>
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<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Response Force</td>
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<td>RI</td>
<td>Rigorous Imprisonment</td>
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<td>SCW</td>
<td>Sub-Conventional Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for Social Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asian Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Superintendent Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIT</td>
<td>Special Investigation Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMI</td>
<td>Student Islamic Movement of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
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<td>SORT</td>
<td>Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty</td>
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<td>SFC</td>
<td>Strategic Forces Command</td>
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<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear</td>
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<td>SPD</td>
<td>Strategic Plans Division</td>
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<td>SSC</td>
<td>Service Strategic Command</td>
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<td>SLBMs</td>
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<td>SWA</td>
<td>South Waziristan Agency</td>
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<td>Special Trial Courts</td>
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<td>Suspicious Transaction Reports</td>
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<td>Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan</td>
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<td>SMP</td>
<td>Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEALs</td>
<td>Sea, Air, and Land Teams</td>
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<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
<td>Special Services Group</td>
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<td>SSB</td>
<td>Special Services Brigade</td>
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<td>SNAR</td>
<td>Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation</td>
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<td>SASC</td>
<td>Senate Armed Services Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIM</td>
<td>Subscriber Identity Module</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNCs</td>
<td>Transnational Corporations</td>
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<td>TTA</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSD</td>
<td>Technical Service Division</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>TADA</td>
<td>Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNT</td>
<td>Trinitrotoluene</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSD</td>
<td>Technical Services Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNWs</td>
<td>Tactical Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFR</td>
<td>Theatre Force Reserves</td>
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<td>TJP</td>
<td>Tahreek-e-Jafria Pakistan</td>
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<td>TTM</td>
<td>Tahreek-e-Taliban Mohmand</td>
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<td>TSNM</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi</td>
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<td>TDPs</td>
<td>Temporarily Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USB</td>
<td>Universal Serial Bus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMAAG</td>
<td>United States Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group between India and Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPA</td>
<td>United Progressive Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td>Universal Resource Locator</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>VHP</td>
<td>Vishwa Hindu Parishal</td>
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<td>VKA</td>
<td>Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VoA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>VHP</td>
<td>Vishwa Hindu Parishal</td>
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<td>VIF</td>
<td>Vivekananda International Foundation</td>
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<td>VNA</td>
<td>Virtual Nuclear Arsenals</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCOAS</td>
<td>Vice Chief of Army Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>VUCA</td>
<td>Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War One</td>
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<td>World War Two</td>
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<td>WHAM</td>
<td>Winning Hearts and Minds</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>Working Boundary</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMDs</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTC</td>
<td>World Trade Centers</td>
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<tr>
<td>1GW</td>
<td>First Generation Warfare</td>
</tr>
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<td>2GW</td>
<td>Second Generation Warfare</td>
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Abstract

This study has contested the claim of General Sir Rupert Smith that “industrialized armed forces are ill-suited to the new style of fighting” that he calls as “war among the people”. Though, in his book “The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World” he mainly contextualized the western military experience to fight the war but this study has developed a plea on his claims to contest Pakistan’s experience to deal with the 21st century warfare. Since the very inception of Pakistan, it had been continuously adjusting its military thought with that of changing nature of war. This initially orchestrated a national security discourse that saw direct conventional military threats as the fundamental threat, which later on peddled between conventional to sub-conventional. With dawn of nuclear environment in South Asian security matrix just prior to 9/11 and its immediate fallout under the premise of ‘global war on terror’ had altogether trapped the discourse of national security in Pakistan. Pakistan being a well trained and highly equipped modern military with that of having nuclear capability had been fighting this new war. Therefore, the assumption of Sir Rupert Smith has a direct relevance on Pakistan as well. In other words, due to an amalgamated warfare that included multiple responses from the state institutions of Pakistan made it an ideal point of reference to apply the Smith’s theoretical assumption. Hence, this study had contextualized the overall security dynamics of Pakistan in reference to industrial outlook of its armed forces. Philosophical dimensions of the study made the references about today’s complex and uncertain worldwide security environment, which has never been remained important point of reference for a renewed emphasis on military learning. The reason is rather simple. In the aftermath of 9/11 incident it is now inevitable for conventional militaries to tackle the challenges associated with an amalgamated warfare that has put the people at front. This necessitated the need for a new military approach that should be conducive and helpful to achieve requirements for hybrid warfare with that of conventional and sub-conventional domain. Pakistan’s adversaries know that they cannot defeat it via conventional means. As a result, they have opted to fight unconventionally and asymmetrically. Traditionally, the context of conventional warfare provided great leverage to military strategists to utilize and apply the military power to achieve political objectives. In view of Sir Rupert Smith, today application of massive military power and material force in hand cannot ensure the successful execution of doctrine due to the very nature of its industrial outlook. In other words, fighting sub-conventional war by ruthlessly utilizing maximum military force under the broader guidelines of conventional war doctrines paves the way to ones adversary. Soldiers that are ignorant of the past and unaware of the realities of the present will be ill-equipped for the future. Nations that bluff in national security don’t deserve to survive. Recognizing the significance of the negative impact of this mindset on the application of military power to achieve sustainable political outcomes, the study made a clear reference of Smith’s assumption to investigate Pakistan’s military preparedness in the wake of 21st century warfare. To achieve the rational explanation, this study investigated the major question, ‘has Pakistan dealt with the threats of 21st century warfare effectively or the country is ill-suited to the new style of war?’ To investigate the major question, sub questions have further deliberated the interlinked dynamics necessary to cope up with the debate and analysis of the topic of investigation. To reach out its rational and objective conclusions, the study has used both historical and descriptive approaches to unfold the application of military power to achieve sustainable political goals. It utilized doctrine of ‘utility of force’ proposed by General Sir Rupert Smith and Clausewitz theory of ‘military learning and change’ to understand the mechanics of learning and response within
Pakistan military. The objective investigation and the supporting arguments carried out in the study have nullified the application of Sir Rupert Smith’s assumption that “industrialized armed forces are ill-suited to the new style of fighting”. Pakistan contrary to western militaries such as US and UK; remained far successful in mitigating the ‘war among the people’ with that of conventional threats to its territorial integrity. Pakistan’s vulnerability of fighting this war on its own territory further made the country quite an exceptional example in the modern world that has successfully fought the sub-conventional warfare. Furthermore, Clausewitz theory of ‘military learning and change’ had remained applicable during the course of investigation which overall contextualized Pakistan’s military learning to evolve its response from experience of other militaries with that of her own battlefield skills. Qualitative research paradigm had been adopted to explore the secondary data required to answer the major question with that of sub-questions. Primary data was collected through focused group discussions (FGDs) conducted with relevant stakeholders that included military and non-military respondents/participants.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

“We fought a military war; our opponent fought a political one. [...] The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win” (Kissinger, 1969: 214).

Fighting sub-conventional war by ruthlessly utilizing maximum military force under the broader guidelines of conventional war doctrines paves the way to one’s adversary rather helps to mitigate the very threat. The conflict in the 21st century dominates the very nature of sub-conventional war where contenders have limited options to achieve their objectives. Successful are those contenders that are well prepared and are continuously learning to improve the battlefield tactics. Among the contenders, the dominant and the most powerful, though vulnerable, is the ‘state’ that even equipped with modern technology and well trained military enjoys limited public support. In-fact, state is a political entity and due to the very nature of its institutional approach to combat sub-conventional war makes her more vulnerable to moral, legal, and political constraints.

Contrary to State, the other contender is totally free from any institutional accountability neither it has any responsibility to follow the norms of warfare. Actually, it is an irregular militia that assembles itself into tactical groups, carries absolute hate for laws, and charges its cause with commitment and responsibility while holding no respect for life and property. This makes them revolutionary and more likely to win the hearts of stagnant society, where ethnic, sectarian, nationalistic, and ideological fault lines persist. Unfortunately, such fault lines become an ideal breeding ground and helps the revolutionaries cherish more public support than the State. While bleeding the social order and ideology, such an environment helps execute the tools of sub-conventional warfare that further boost the agony of aggression against the resilience of any
nation. That ends not well for the State but for the forces of sub-conventional war, whose biggest deal is to distract the peace, prosperity, and progress of a sovereign nation.

With this in view, the dimensions of 21st century warfare present a unique outlook to review the traditional military approaches and concepts that deals with the nature of threats. The evolution of military strategy is not at question rather the evolution of threat perception is the main discourse of analysis that requires attention in this research. It is the threat perception which takes the lead towards military learning and evolves a tangible and instrumental response in shape of an accurate doctrine. Starting from the 19th century Napoleonic wars to Clausewitz absolute war that further gave birth to the 20th century concept of total war; the context of battlefield is continuously changing but not the military approach. This shows that the operational aspects of use of force remained intact with the conventional philosophy of conduct of war; whereas, based on the changing dynamics of warfare, the level of threat demanded an unconventional military response.

As a matter of fact, the plethora of literature available on the military history does give a clear indication that the dynamics of battlefield are constantly changing while keeping the context of war intact. This transformation of battlefield dynamics with that of war being a constant factor, makes the Clausewitz dictum so correct, when he wrote, “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means” (Clausewitz, 1984). It is important to realize that the essence of war is purely political and that the application of military power is a mean to an end rather an end in itself. The political end could be to respond against an aggression or to behave like an aggressor. WHATSOEVER are the reasons behind the utility of force, it has to be connected with political objectives, which is only possible if the military doctrine is evolving in continuation of the threat perception.
The shift in the orientation of battlefield has revoked the military doctrines into a new form of war, which is no more conventional in its nature rather sub-conventional. The traditional fighting such as conventional warfare utilizes regular forces equipped with modern weapons with that of orchestrated battlefield where two opponents indulge into an open showdown. The quality and command normally equals the capability of both opponents who through strategic maneuvers attempt to debilitate the defenses of each other. On the other hand, the sub-conventional warfare (also referred as irregular or low intensity war) is a nonexclusive term that includes every single clash that is over the level of peaceful coexistence between the states and below the limits of total war. It incorporates militancy, uprising, intermediary war, small war, limited war, guerilla war, low intensity conflict, and terrorism utilized as methods in a revolutionary confrontation independently or attempted with the help of third party’s hostile intelligence agency.

To better understand the differentiation between the conventional and sub-conventional wars, a pictorial context is given in figure 1.1 (JOC, 2007).

**Figure 1.1: Contrast of the Conventional and Sub-Conventional Warfare**

A fascinating overview of the strategic development of modern fighting that keeps running from Napoleon to the disintegration of Soviet Union, unfortunately highlights an irrevocable paradigm in which strategists conceived the conduct of war through the material prism such as warships, fighter planes, tanks, and medium to long range missiles. These symbols of war have dominated the military strategy so did the conduct of war. The conventional doctrines carry out the concepts of industrial warfare, thus invest a decent piece of energy compromising the very political purpose all the while. Therefore, fighting sub-conventional war such as militancy, uprising, intermediary war, small war, limited war, guerilla war, low intensity conflict, and terrorism by ruthlessly utilizing maximum military force under the broader guidelines of conventional doctrines paves the way to ones adversary rather helps to mitigate the very threat.

General (retd) Sir Rupert Smith in his celebrated book, “The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World” reasoned that the world has gone into another mode of war toward the conclusion of last century. With dawn of 21st century the climax of it entered into new domain that he notice as “war amongst the people”, and that the “Western, industrialized armed forces are ill-suited to the new style of fighting” (Smith, 2008). It is obvious from his writing that the development of the nuclear weapons in 1945 rendered the idea of modern fighting out of date and challenged the very basis of conventional war doctrines to mitigate the sub-conventional war. Though, in the post WWII period the USA and the USSR continued adherence to the concept of old-styled industrial war, due to which one was defeated in Vietnam and the other faced humiliation in Afghanistan.

The ill-suited military approach to deal with aspects of sub-conventional war brought about huge annihilations, for example, for French in Algeria (1830-1962), the USA in Vietnam
(1965-75), the USSR in Afghanistan (1979-89), and exposed serious challenges for NATO forces in the Balkans (1992-2004), and afterwards for the Western coalitions in Afghanistan (2001-to-present) and Iraq (2003-to-present). Moreover, situations around Libya (2014-present), Syria (2011-present), and Yemen (2015-present) are no different rather invoked multifaceted challenges to military strategies which are predominantly influenced by industrial warfare.

When it comes to traditional concepts of military preparedness, Pakistan is no different to the strongest militaries like US, UK, France, and the former Soviet Union; that invested heavily on the symbols of war to materialize the concept of industrial warfare. Pakistan has been facing the threats of both conventional and sub-conventional wars since the very inception from its arch rival, India. Immediately after the 9/11 incident, when Pakistan became part of US-led-alliance on war against terrorism; the threat of sub-conventional war became quite a challenging national security issue.

In contextual view of General (retd) Sir Rupter Smith, Pakistan is no different than the US and UK militaries. It is quite applicable that being an industrialized army Pakistan is also “ill-suited to the new style of warfare”. The industrialized armies are confined with the predominant notions of conventional war, whereas the new war is in fact a sub-conventional war and requires a dedicated response. This study is important to investigate and answer questions like; has Pakistan dealt with the threat of sub-conventional war effectively or the country is ill-suited to the new style of war?

In today’s complex and uncertain worldwide security environment, there has never been a more important time for a renewed emphasis on military learning. The reason is rather simple; in the aftermath of 9/11 incident it is now inevitable for conventional militaries to tackle the challenges associated with sub-conventional warfare. This necessitates the need for a new
military approach that should be conducive and helpful to achieve requirements for sub-conventional war. Pakistan’s adversaries know that they cannot defeat her via conventional means. As a result, they have opted to fight unconventionally and asymmetrically. In other words, military learning is very much alive and well amongst the adversaries.

1.1. Rationale of the Study

Pakistan military has been confronting with the challenges associated to sub-conventional warfare since the very inception of its sovereign identity. The climax of sub-conventional threats that involved Pakistan’s counter-insurgency response was the Indian orchestration of irregular warfare in East Pakistan and Baluchistan. The post-9/11 counter-terrorism campaign that got Pakistan by surprise had to face sub-conventional warfare in FATA. However, the military thinking has always been dominated by external threat for good reasons as it has been manifested through 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 conventional wars with India in addition to a number of near warlike situations leading to extended deployment on the borders. Preoccupied with the realities of external threat, little was done to focus on sub-conventional warfare institutionally to provide framework for planning and conduct of such operations.

Experiences of last two decades of sub-conventional war reflect certain clarity at strategic and tactical levels. Operational level link however, has been missing and is not clearly reflected the understanding of Pakistan military. Though, Pakistan has been selectively applying some elements of various strategies adopted by the US and other countries, but these cannot be fully replicated due to difference of environment, context and nature of warfare. For example, the US may bomb through a country to achieve its own national interests; whereas, Pakistan military has to be very selective and careful in use of force. Likewise, the public support of the host country may or may not matter to the US forces operations, on the contrary this is a crucial and important
factor for Pakistan military before initiating any operation in own area. Therefore, it is important
to document the strategic and operational framework of Pakistan military response during the
conduct of such complex operations.

To unravel the concept of sub-conventional warfare, plethora of data is available and
deals with the specifics of its forms and reasons. To establish the rational of the study, it is
pertinent to mention that the topic under investigation is far from being exhausted as part of a
PhD dissertation. More specifically, the available literature has not fully acknowledged the
domains of sub-conventional warfare and how it has influenced the dynamics of conventional
military strategy. Little work has been done so far to document the experiences and negative
exposures of sub-conventional warfare on military strategy. Whatever has been written, the
literature predominantly inclines towards the Western experiences of dealing with the subject
matter. Ironically, the dynamics of South Asian context of sub-conventional warfare particularly
Pakistan’s response is completely missing from the literature. This study has proved to be an
important milestone to document the experience, exposure, learning, and response of Pakistan
military to mitigate the threat of sub-conventional warfare.

It is generally recognized that due to the emerging global scenario, presence of nuclear
deterrence and exhaustive costs of war in economic terms; the possibility of a full spectrum
conventional war appears remote in the 21st century warfare. Contrary to this, the absence of a
conventional war does allow long periods of tensions and hostilities between arch rivals and
among them one could form an alliance with regional and international actors to annihilate its
enemy. In such a scenario, an ill-prepared and militarily misconceived nation will easily fall into
the traps of sub-conventional war by compromising all its strengths and defense. This peculiar
notion of the rational also augments the very nature of unsettled disputes and deep-rooted rivalry
between India and Pakistan as an ideal executing ground for the flexes of sub-conventional warfare. To trigger the situation; availability of ethnic, sectarian and ideological fault lines further fuel the momentum of sub-conventional warfare. Hence, in such a scenario, the sub-conventional mode stands out as a most likely security threat for the country. Therefore, this PhD study is an important step forward to highlight the nature of threat and how Pakistan military learned and dealt with the situation effectively.

Last but not the least, this research project entails a great professional relevance for career development of the researcher. This study reflects academic aspirations of the researcher in the field of military strategy. Therefore, in-depth knowledge of military strategy along with dynamics of warfare is going to contribute great chances of his success in academia.

1.2. **Statement of the Problem**

The study identifies the changed nature of 21st century warfare from conventional to sub-conventional as primary focus. Traditionally, the context of conventional warfare provided great leverage to military strategists to utilize and apply the military power to achieve political objectives. Today, application of massive military power and material force in hand cannot ensure the successful execution of doctrine due to the very nature of its industrial outlook. If historically experienced, organized, and well equipped militaries such as USA, UK, France, and Russia are failing to fight sub-conventional war then how Pakistan would be successful in fighting this new style of war? Soldiers who are ignorant of the past and unaware of the realities of the present will be ill-equipped for the future. Nations who bluff in national security don’t deserve to survive. Therefore, this study has undertaken the contextual relevance of Pakistan with that of industrialized militaries and contested its military preparedness and response in the wake of changing nature of 21st century warfare.
1.3. Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are:

- to explore the definition and theories of warfare
- to explain and evaluate the concept of military learning generated out of national security and threat perceptions
- to analyze the application of military power in pursuit of political goals
- to compare and contrast Pakistan’s military response to address 21st century warfare

1.4. Research Questions

Following major and minor questions have guided the investigation of the study.

- **Main Question**: Has Pakistan dealt with the threats of 21st century warfare effectively or the country is ill-suited to the new style of war?

To investigate the major question, following sub questions have further deliberated the interlinked dynamics necessary to cope up with the debate and analysis of the topic of investigation.

i. How does doctrine relate to learning within military’?
ii. What is the nature of warfare in the 21st century?
iii. What are the genesis of Pakistan’s military thought and how threat perceptions emanating out of British partition of 1947 had impacted on its security?
iv. What is ‘Hindutva Warfare’ and how it has sponged the Indian military thought to isolate, terrorize and destabilize Pakistan?
v. How satisfactorily Pakistan Army had worked on its kinetic capabilities to ensure its territorial integrity?
vi. Do ‘limited war strategies (CSD)’ and ‘proactive military operations (PAOs)’ of India threaten Pakistan’s territorial integrity?
vii. Why violent extremism took over 21st century Pakistan and how Pakistan’s counter terrorism strategy addressed this threat?

viii. How Pakistan came out of ‘frying pan of territorial integrity’ and ended up into the ‘fire of global war on terror’?

ix. Why generalship matters and were ‘lions led by donkeys’ in the sub-conventional warfare?

x. Has Pakistan effectively applied military power for the achievement of sustainable political outcomes challenged by the ‘new style of war’?

1.5. Significance of the Study

The militaries of Pakistan, USA, and UK have different military strategies and doctrines, yet there are noteworthy likenesses to incorporate an inclination to concentrate on industrial war fighting. Discarding the reality of sub-conventional war under the umbrella of conventional doctrines is somewhat causing greater vulnerabilities for perpetual peace. Recognizing the significance of the negative impact of this mindset on the application of military power for sustainable political outcomes is vital to the advancement of peace and security particularly in South Asia and generally around the globe. In particular, the doctrinal significance in these three militaries and likely in the vast majority of the world should be far reaching; so military leaders and strategist altogether viably think and apply military power in the contemporary conditions in a more successful way. Principles of war such as military doctrines are the best medium of learning along with application of military power. So inspecting and refreshing these ideas and structures in view of the prerequisites of sub-conventional war can possibly improve the security both at regional and international stage. The scope of the study is limited to the context of Pakistan’s military learning, preparedness, and operational readiness to fight sub-conventional war based on its military doctrine, whereas, appropriate lessons will be drawn from Western
military doctrines particularly of US and UK and how they have applied military power to achieve their political goals.

1.6. Theoretical Framework

The sub-conventional warfare is a developing subject, which is presently part of an official Army Doctrine that drives and audits Pakistan army’s operational readiness and professional capabilities. In 2013, this concept was added as a separate chapter in the Army Doctrine of Pakistan. The chapter on ‘sub-conventional warfare’ in the Army Doctrine depicts the guerrilla exercises on the nation's western peripheries and tribal zones, the bombings done by different organizations on law enforcement agencies along with innocent civilians, as the greatest danger to the nation's security. The availability of evidence about the inclusion of sub-conventional warfare as official part of Army Doctrine does suggest its importance but provides no source regarding its evolution as a concept into military doctrine neither gives insights on the operational preparedness. In fact, it is important to mention that the Army Doctrine is an official document for internal use and gives no insight to academic or research community. Therefore, to document the evolution of the concept of sub-conventional war into military doctrine of Pakistan and operational preparedness to mitigate the threat posture arising from the new style of warfare is another important task for this research.

To answer the questions and to document the theoretical baseline of military doctrine of Pakistan, it is important to bring theories of war that shaped the very basic orientation of military learning and change since many centuries. By application of standard but traditional philosophy behind the evolution of military thought, the research would open the dilemma of military learning in Pakistan and help document the use of force to achieve political goals. For that very
purpose, two theories have been considered relevant to unfold the debate around 21st century warfare and Pakistan’s military preparedness.

1.6.1. Theory of ‘Military Learning and Change’ by Carl von Clausewitz

To Carl von Clausewitz military learning and military change were a straightforward issue: If, in fighting, a specific means ends up being exceedingly successful, it will be utilized once more; it will be replicated by others and wind up plainly elegant; thus upheld by encounter, it goes into general utilize and is incorporated into theory. At the end of the day, if something works, militaries will change their principle and their training in like manner. Clausewitz specifically believed:

“If, in warfare, a certain means turns out to be highly effective, it will be used again; it will be copied by others and become fashionable; and so, backed by experience, it passes into general use and is included in theory” (Clausewitz, 2007: 125).

Clausewitz explains three ways of learning that helps the armed forces to upgrade their strategic understanding about the dynamics of battlefield. Among them is historical cases—(involving the history of military engagement as broader strategic learning based on self as well as other’s experience); one’s own battlefield exposure—(front line involvement); and from the experience of different armed forces—(learning from others). In the event of difficulties confronting the military today, Clausewitz military learning approach discovers reply of an imperative inquiry: does Pakistan military had the chance to learn in each of the three of the routes proposed by Clausewitz?

1.6.2. ‘Utility of Force’ by General (retd) Sir Rupert Smith

Smith is critical to the very difference of utility of force by the conventional army in relation to the forces of sub-conventional war. He believes that the soldiers usually behave based on the material strength and power, whereas; the forces of the sub-conventional war enjoy their
adaptive nature with the locals amalgamated under ‘social space’. They are not looking for territorial gains rather political objectives make them more relevant to survive (Smith, 2008). Most of the theoretical conclusions he makes are, “before sending in troops, we should be sure we know what we want to achieve politically, decide whether and how armed force can contribute to that aim, and set up coordinated planning and command structures that allow the military operation to work in concert with diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and other operations towards that goal”. Smith’s work compels that “we live in an era without battlefields… we live in an era of ‘war among the people’… tank battles between opposing armies are less likely to determine the course of a campaign than anti-insurgency efforts, political maneuvering, and dealings with non-state entities”. In the event of difficulties confronting the military today, Smith’s ‘utility of force’ approach discovers reply of an imperative inquiry: has Pakistan dealt with the nature of warfare amicably or the country has fallen prey to new style of warfare?

1.6.3. Relevance of Theories

Doctrine represents the artifact of real threats perceived by the military. Application of Clausewitz approach of military learning and change to current doctrine will expose the strengths and pitfalls of Pakistan’s military learning. The strengths of the military learning would help achieve sustainable political outcomes and the pitfalls call for robust response to the military requirements for sub-conventional war.

The conclusions of Clausewitz ‘military learning and change’ would require an application of the ‘Utility of Force’ in case of Pakistan. Smith in his theory of ‘utility of force’ concludes that, the Western industrialized armies have failed to manage the challenges of sub-conventional war. The application of Smith’s theoretical conclusion that “Western industrialized
armies are ill-suited to the new style of warfare,” entails a dedicated effort to find out the answers pertaining to military preparedness of Pakistan. The application of the utility of force would help investigate the fundamental question of the study: has Pakistan dealt with the threat of sub-conventional war effectively or the country is ill-suited to the new style of war?

1.7. Limitations/ delimitations of the Study

a. Limitations

There are obvious limitations to investigate a topic that brings insights on the aspects of military affairs particularly strategy and application of force along with conduct of war. Such limitations pertain to certain restrictions for researchers working on military affairs particularly in countries like USA, UK, France, China, Russia, Pakistan, and India. Researchers are usually aware of the dynamics of restricted data, which include military documents explaining operational aspects of use of force, doctrinal explanations, and more importantly the threat perception which governs the way application of power is considered to achieve political goals. The above mentioned limitations do have an impact on the investigation of this research but could not bring negative repercussions to limit the scope of the overall study. For example, this research is dealing with the context of traditional military thinking which predominantly emphasizes on the industrial warfare capabilities that applies material aspects of power during the conduct of war. The study questions are critically evaluating Pakistan’s military thinking about application of force in the context of a changing nature of 21st century which is a combination of both conventional and sub-conventional warfare. To answer the questions, most of the information is available in the form of published data. Some of the queries would require
primary data collection that the researcher believes would not fall into the domain of limitations of the study.

**b. Delimitations**

The overall focus of the investigation revolves around, has Pakistan dealt with the threat of 21st century warfare effectively or the country is ill-suited to the new style of war? However, the scope of the research does not carry the mandate to debate the biasness of the literature rather it holds a firm ground to investigate the hypothetical observations that, ‘Pakistan military has learned and adapted to the requirements for 21st century warfare’ or ‘Pakistan military has failed to learn and adapt to the requirements for 21st century warfare’. Hence, to maintain the objectivity, the study has only focused on Pakistan military learning and preparedness to respond to the challenges of 21st century warfare amalgamated with both conventional and sub-conventional war.

**1.8. Operational Definitions of Major Terms**

Following major terms are used in the research investigation to unfold the strategic discourse of the subject matter.

a. **War**: “War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale… an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will, directed by political motives and morality” (Clausewitz 1940: 34).

b. **Military Thought**: “It consists of the aggregate of developments, theories, approaches, perceptions, patterns, and frameworks (paradigms) that belong to a particular era, community, or person (Echevarria & Antulio, 1997).

c. **Continental School of Military Thought (CMT)**: “CMT refers to the waging of war and the multi-dimensional employment of forces in which the principal medium is land” (Echevarria & Antulio, 1997). It is normally used synonymously
with Land warfare in which the land forces seek to manipulate the land environment to their advantage against the opposing ground forces.

d. **Military Strategy**: “It is the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purpose of policy as decided by politics” (Gray, 2010).

e. **Military doctrine**: “Doctrine is defined as the fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application” (AAP-6(V), 1998).

f. **Conventional Warfare**: The traditional fighting such as conventional warfare utilizes regular forces equipped with modern weapons with that of orchestrated battlefield where two opponents indulge into an open showdown. The quality and command normally equals the capability of both opponents who through strategic maneuvers attempt to debilitate the defenses of each other.

g. **Sub-conventional Warfare**: The sub-conventional warfare (also referred as irregular or low intensity war) is a nonexclusive term that includes every single clash that is over the level of peaceful coexistence between the states and below the limits of total war. It incorporates militancy, uprising, intermediary war, small war, limited war, guerilla war, low intensity conflict, and terrorism utilized as methods in a revolutionary confrontation independently or attempted with the help of third party’s intelligence agency.

### 1.9. LITERATURE REVIEW

Sub-conventional war has been identified as the most complex issue which Pakistan presently confronts with and will require significantly more consideration from military leaders and security experts in times to come. The pervasiveness and pertinence of sub-conventional warfare has attracted much consideration and evolved a new thought process that is being highlighted as evolving debate in books, journals, military diaries, and academic periodicals. In addition, the literature on sub-conventional war does indicate gaps in current thinking. In spite of the fact that rebellion and psychological oppression have existed and been contemplated all through written history, the origin of the advanced writing on sub-conventional warfare came to
front in the mid 1960s. These writings are in fact part of the first generation literature on the sub-conventional warfare. The motivation behind such an extensive literature was due to the huge number of uprisings around the globe, the Cold War struggle between the USA and USSR, and political instability in the Third World countries. As opposed to insurgency and psychological warfare, terrorism was the concentration of second generation literature that still commands the developing areas of sub-conventional warfare.

The literature of first generation sub-conventional warfare carries five general themes that distinguish the evolving dynamics of subject matter from each other.

i. The first class of writers who wrote extensively on the subject matter interestingly includes the work of radicals themselves. The works of both Mao Zedong and Guevara have produced an interesting analogy over the Third World insurgencies (Tse-Tung, 1967; Guevara, 2002). Both revolutionists were in fact influenced by the ideological theories of V. I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and Karl Marx. The Maoist approach of insurgency was theorized and acquainted to Western followers by Katzenbach and Hanrahan (Katzenbach & Hanrahan, 1955). The literature that discussed the revolutionaries of the Asian continent was tackled by Griffith, and Atkinson (Griffith, 1966; Atkinson, 1981).

ii. The second class comprises the work of political researchers and sociologists, who extensively worked on the philosophical aspects of the subject matter including theory and practice. These writings particularly exposed the impact of sub-conventional warfare on international politics along with its causes and nature (Osgood 1957; Wolf, 1968). Samuel P. Huntington incorporated the work by highlighting the disdain and disorder in the developing nations (Huntington, 1968). A good discussion on the philosophy of revolutionaries could be find in Arendt work (Arendt, 1963), which distinguishes his work from Chalmers Johnson who specifically wrote on the theory of revolution (Johnson, 1964). Investigations on the behavioral patterns of insurgency that shaped the rebellion character in the radicals include interesting observations of Gurr (Gurr, 1970).
Literature inclusively dealing with the role of military in tackling the revolutionaries and insurgents include writings of Galula, and Paget (Galula, 1967; Paget, 1967).

iii. The third class specifically comprises the work in-terms of case studies on sub-conventional war. Consideration was given to the English involvement in Malaya (Paget, 1967) and Kenya (Clayton, 1976). Paret gave point by point examination of French counterinsurgency in Indochina and Algeria (Paret, 1964), while Trinquieu offered direct accounts of the French understanding (Trinquieu, 1967). There is a plethora of data available on investigations of the insurrectionist in Vietnam.

iv. The fourth classification incorporates works on specific or specialized parts of the military measurement of rebellion. The majority of these managed the American involvement in Vietnam, yet extra consideration was committed to subjects like urban guerrillas (Barclay, 1972).

v. The fifth and last classification comprises of liberal compositions. These writings are very critical to the American way of dealing with counterinsurgency and received limelight to counter Vietnam war developments and, by and large out of the political ‘new left’ (Klare, 1974).

The initial impetus for the second generation of sub-conventional warfare literature took terrorism as the defining variable. The underlying catalyst for the second era of sub-conventional warfare writing was fear based oppression that defined acts of terrorism as ultimate national security threat. After establishing modest theoretical baseline, the second generation literature entered into the phase of application. From the late 1970s, this writing detonated. In the mid 1980s, extended consideration regarding counterinsurgency wound up noticeably apparent, and examiners started to regard sub-regular war as a unitary conjecture.

Similarly as with the original writing of the first generation, second era writing falls along a continuum from the simply hypothetical to the absolutely connected and can be separated
into the different classes: (1) literature dealing with theoretical aspects of warfare; (2) literature dealing application of the concepts of warfare; (3) literature dealing with specialization of the warfare; and (4) literature dealing with the counter insurgency approach.

Among authors managing the expansive hypothetical parts of sub-conventional warfare, the predominant figure is Sam C. Sarkesian, who wonderfully mixes hypothetical and applied examination of the subject matter (Sarkesian 1986; 1985; 1984).

The most vital work on applied parts of sub-conventional warfare has been compiled by security experts instead of researchers and has a tendency to be found in military archives. Countless work managed the definition and fundamentals of sub-conventional war, the military power, structure, and strategies required to manage it (Olson, 1988; Fulton, 1986). Dubik examines sub-conventional war and wider Army war fighting doctrine (Dubik, 1983), while Luttwak inspects the constraints which military strategy and power structure puts on sub-conventional warfare (Luttwak, 1983). Filiberti look to the underlying foundations of US counterinsurgency precept (Filiberti, 1988). The most valuable aggregation of definitions, measurements, and assets for the investigation of terrorism is Schmid’s work (Schmid, 1984). Works which analyzed psychological warfare inside the setting of sub-conventional warfare incorporates writings of O’Ballance, and Lohr (O’Ballance, 1978; Lohr, 1985).

Among many appreciating the understanding of the sub-conventional warfare, there are few who took a step forward and criticized the growing counter insurgency capabilities of the USA. Authors in this gathering have a tendency to be liberal and noninterventionist and contend that the improvement of US sub-conventional warfare capacity is perilous and will energize reckless interference in Third World issues. The best clarification of this position is found in the hypothetical articles and contextual analyses of Klare and Kornbluh (Klare and Kornbluh, 1987).
The sub-conventional war literature did demonstrate that how Clausewitzian thought affected American key decisions during the Vietnam War and in Iraq (Kinross, 2009). The last decade of Cold War drove a few observers to scrutinize the significance of Clausewitz’s idea and its application on sub-conventional warfare (Heerwagen, 2007). Contemporary sub-conventional warfare literature has been facing tough criticism due to its very traditional outlook that includes only US experience and counter insurgency strategies (Downie, 2008).

The significant challenges of sub-conventional warfare in the 1960s and mid 1970s pulled in a portion of the best personalities among researchers and security experts, and therefore mastery on sub-conventional warfare in the contemporary times must be founded on comprehension of this original writing. The literature on sub-conventional warfare has undergone tremendous improvement in the past six decades. The obvious gaps are the specific inclusion of US experience while putting aside rest of the world. When it comes to states like Pakistan, gaps still exist. This research encompasses the mandate not to replicate the kind of examination which previously exists but aims to satisfy the missing links associated with Pakistan’s sub-conventional vision.

The plethora of data on the subject matter does provide basic understanding on the concept of sub-conventional war and how it had impacted on the doctrines of industrialized militaries, whereas, gives no insight on Smith’s proposition with that of its application on Pakistan. Therefore, the dynamics of 21st century sub-conventional war and Pakistan’s military preparedness and response is a domain that requires a dedicated effort to help find answers. Unfortunately, the conduct of the literature related to the role of Pakistan’s military to deal with sub-conventional war is not so positive rather it suggests a narrow minded explanation by labeling the country as a breeding ground for actors of sub-conventional war. In view of the
researcher, this context reflects a deliberate biasness towards Pakistan. With this background of the literature review, the researcher strongly believes and adamantly places his research investigation as an important step forward to find rational answers to check the validity of such narratives. It is important to find scientific answers to the nature of war in the 21st century and how it has impacted Pakistan?

As already mentioned in the ‘delimitation of the study’, the overall focus of the investigation revolves around, has Pakistan dealt with the threats of 21st century warfare effectively or the country is ill-suited to the new style of war? However, the scope of the research does not carry the mandate to debate the biasness of the literature rather it holds a firm ground to investigate the hypothetical observations that, ‘Pakistan military has learned and adapted to the requirements for 21st century warfare’ or ‘Pakistan military has failed to learn and adapt to the requirements for 21st century warfare’. Hence, to maintain the objectivity, the study has only focused on Pakistan military learning and preparedness to respond to the challenges of 21st century warfare amalgamated with both conventional and sub-conventional war.

1.10. METHODOLOGY

It is presumed that before indulging into formal investigation and verification of research findings, the analysis of the researcher has already made unqualified assumptions such as “what a political reality looks like to him, what is possible to know scientifically, and how he can find out about that reality” (Savigny & Marsden, 2011). In the beginning of the research this seems a very straightforward idea with its raw shape but as long as the process of scientific investigation continues such unqualified assumptions becomes crucial for the analysis. Therefore, it is important to explain the assumptions that the researcher will make about his claims to report the analysis that he carries during the course of investigation. This in fact highlights the ontological
and epistemological assumptions of the study. Since this study falls into the domain of security studies, therefore it is pertinent to address questions that highlight the philosophical positions of the researcher.

1.10.1. Ontological and Epistemological Positions

The reasons to mentioned ontological and epistemological positions in the methodological part of this research are very simple. For example, we can answer any question through variety of ways and it is important to adopt a relevant language to do so. Here the concepts like ontology and epistemology play supportive role to discuss ideas and issues that frame the very basic foundations of researcher’s unqualified assumptions. Being the two strong philosophical streams both ontology and epistemology help the researcher to position his understanding through appropriate vocabulary with that of decoding, what is real and how he can discover it. In this context the ontological position of the study demands to address question: what does the real world of warfare look like? The epistemological position would demand to address the question: how can the researchers know what is really happening in the world of military response?

The next figure has shed light on the ontological and epistemological positions of this research.
Table 1.1: Summary of Epistemological Positions and Underlying Ontologies

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<th></th>
<th>Positivism</th>
<th>Interpretivism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A science of politics is possible (and desirable)</td>
<td>• Rejects scientism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Focus upon empirical observation and measurement</td>
<td>• Highlights contingent nature of reality and draws attention to unobservable features such as norms, values and identities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Causal explanation can be provided</td>
<td>• Is normative and aims to be emancipator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Analysis is objective and value-free</td>
<td>• Political analysis is value laden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundationalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-Foundationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundationalism</td>
<td>Assumes a real world exists independently of what we can know about it and that the establishment of a single truth about reality is possible</td>
<td>There are competing interpretations of reality and these are contingent upon our interaction with it</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ontology</th>
<th>Anti-Foundationalism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Interpretivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Reasoning</td>
<td>Hypothetic-o-Inductive → to test theories and hypothetical premises under problem statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Type</td>
<td>Descriptive (explanatory and evaluation research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>Clausewitz theory: ‘military learning and change’/ General (retd.) Sir Rupert Smith theory of ‘utility of force’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods of Data Collection</td>
<td>Mix Method Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source: Researcher’s own illustrations</td>
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At this stage of research investigation, researcher confidently assumes that Pakistan military had been focusing more on the epistemological prism of the issue such as how to counter the emerging threats of 21st century warfare through an appropriate use of force? Whereas, the agents/actors of 21st century warfare had challenged the writ of the State by contextualizing the very ontological domain of the State of Pakistan such as ‘constitution of Pakistan is in contradiction to Islam and therefore Sharia shall be installed’. This philosophical
debate of the methodology does not establish concrete evidence of the ontological or epistemological assumptions for this research rather efforts have been made to better understand the complexities vested in these two philosophical domains of the research. The below mentioned details explains more clearly the methodology undertakings that the researcher has taken into consideration to unfold the dynamic nature of 21\textsuperscript{st} century warfare and Pakistan’s military response.

1.10.2. Research Design

This study uses both historical and descriptive research designs to unfold the application of military power to achieve sustainable political goals.

- **Historical Research Design:** has been used to study and understand past events that offer military perspective related to the study. The topic includes debate that establishes the links of warfare starting from first generation to its changing dynamics in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Therefore, the historical discourse of the subject matter required an in depth analysis of the military strategy along with evolution of the concept of warfare. Historical research designs are primarily used to cater the diversity of the literature and analysis that includes past events. The investigation of the research is somewhat dependant on the historical evolution of the subject matter. Hence, to create synergy and to perform an objective research investigation, historical and near-contemporary accounts such as books; articles; diaries; biographies; letters; reports; maps; photographs; has been collected and analyzed objectively.

- **Descriptive Research Design:** To understand the current status of the subject under investigation, descriptive research design has been used. The significance of this research project is contemporary and unfolds the important milestones that Pakistan military has achieved as exceptional armed forces in the world. The current nature of the study is usually taken care by the descriptive research design. In this very context, the descriptive discourse of the subject matter required an in depth analysis of the military strategy along with its application on Pakistan’s response to the 21\textsuperscript{st} century warfare. Descriptive
research designs are primarily used to cater the diversity of the literature and analysis which includes unfolding events. The investigation of the research is also dependant on the descriptive discourse of the subject matter. Hence, to create synergy and to perform an objective research investigation both qualitative and quantitative research methods are applied. Most of the primary data was collected through observational techniques such as ‘Focused Group Discussions’ that the researcher has conducted over a period of time with both the population living in areas where Pakistan military has conducted the military operations.

1.10.3. Population

Experts of military strategy such as retired army officers, academicians, and researchers were identified as targeted population to understand the technical aspects of warfare, whereas; through focused group discussions genuine efforts were made to bring insights from the population of affected areas.

1.10.4. Sampling

Non Random sampling such as (i) convenience and (ii) snow ball sampling techniques are used.

1.10.5. Instrumentations

Along with ‘Focused Group Discussions (FGD), questionnaires were distributed among the respondents and structured interviews of the experts were taken as instruments of primary data collection.

1.10.6. Data Collection

Mix-method approach such as quantitative and qualitative research methods are used for data collection. It is important to mention that the collection of data pertaining to the
investigation of research questions included both primary and secondary domains. Moreover, the nature of qualitative analysis involved establishing the links between quantitative and subjective discourse; but the researcher emphasized more on the collection of open-ended primary data. This has provided the required endorsement and academic support to the researcher’s own ability to analyze the collected data more rationally and objectively. Also, the below mentioned instruments were deemed necessary to distinguish the data:

- For quantitative data collection, sources such as questionnaires, schedules, population framework for sampling, and interview guide for interviews were developed. It is again important to mention that the instruments mentioned to collect quantitative data, were simultaneously used to collect qualitative data.
- For qualitative data collection, contemporary or near-contemporary accounts such as books, articles, diaries, biographies, letters, reports, maps, and photographs were collected and analyzed objectively.

1.10.7. Data Analysis

For accurate and appropriate analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data, following two analysis tools (software) were used:

- Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) has been used to analyze the quantitative data.
- To organize, analyze and find insights in unstructured qualitative data NVivo software is used.
- It is important to mention that researcher’s own expertise and ability to analyze issues of military strategy and warfare were deemed necessary to streamline the interpretation of the data.
1.11. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

After explaining the requisite foundation to build upon the study on philosophical, methodological and theoretical premises with that of research objectives, questions and literature review; this section has shed light on the academic roadmap of the study to put forward the scientific conduct of the investigation that inserted the required confidence to deal with the subject matter objectively. Therefore, this study has been divided into twelve chapters including Introduction and Conclusion. Below is provided cursory outlook of the organization of the study.

Chapter two ‘Evolution of Military Thought and Contours of Warfare’ addressed the question ‘how does doctrine relate to learning within military’. The investigation was done while incorporating an analysis of the doctrinal aspects of military strategy that are vested in organizational cultures of industrial armies. A controlled debate was placed to better understand the concept of war and how it relates to military preparedness. Explanations of different concepts of war starting from Napoleon to Clausewitz and force preparedness based on their ideas have helped to set the tone of doctrine, strategy and military learning. Questions such as what is doctrine, what is strategy, what is military learning, and how military learning helps to formulate an appropriate doctrine and strategy?; were at the core of analysis in this chapter which used historical research design. To understand relationship between military learning, doctrine, and strategy; few of the most important strategic thinkers such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu along with their thinking were made part of the discussion.

Chapter three ‘The Nature of War in the 21st Century’, made an attempt to address the question, ‘what is the nature of warfare in the 21st century’. Specifically, chapter two made an effort to briefly distinguish the kinetic account of military strategies with the evolving non-kinetic dimensions to better understand the limitations and changing dynamics of battlefield
which has shaped the contemporary outlook of warfare. From ancient to 4GW militaries of advanced countries along with developing nations have travelled a long way that led the power from swords and arrows to icons of war in the 21st century. The complications of the global world with softened borders have ignited the fault lines that have never been used before as ingredients of war. Chapter three forwarded the debate towards kinetic and non-kinetic nature of warfare being the classic variables of 5GW and has shed light on the prevailing context of 21st century hybrid warfare. This in fact helped to shape the premises of Pakistan’s military response with that of nature of war that it has been facing in the 21st century particularly in the post 9/11 scenario of ‘war against terrorism’.

**Chapter four** ‘Pakistan and the Genesis of its Threat Perceptions’ addressed the question of ‘what are the genesis of Pakistan’s military thought and how threat perceptions emanating out of British partition of 1947 had impacted on its security’. Due to the very relationship of a theory, doctrine and its practice at the operational level, this chapter attempted to build an interactive context of this troika by explaining the dynamics of conventional and sub-conventional war that Pakistan has been engaged with since the very inception. To achieve such a complex research task, this section of the study briefly highlighted the debate around, how the concept of war shifted from conventional to sub-conventional? Was it a slow change or happened instantly? Whether such a change was recognized in a doctrine to address the complexity inherent in sub-conventional war? It is important to understand the theory behind the doctrine; if it’s holding the same old context of industrial warfare then how such a doctrine could mitigate challenges posed by the sub-conventional war. This chapter highlighted the core thinking tools in a military thinking that addresses the complexity inherent in the transformation of conventional theater into sub-conventional war. Since the nature of 21st century is complex
and evolving with hybrid nature, therefore, the inquiry of the genesis of Pakistan’s military thought and how threat perceptions emanating out of British partition of 1947 had impacted on its security, filled the gap to build the investigation with that of deliberate exposure to identify Pakistan’s geostrategic compulsions and security vulnerabilities.

**Chapter five** ‘From Conventional to Sub-conventional: Facing the Hindutva Warfare’ addressed the question of ‘what is ‘Hindutva Warfare’ and how it has sponged the Indian military thought to isolate, terrorize and destabilize Pakistan. It is important to understand the transformation of Pakistan military thought with that of its threat perceptions. To settle this transformation, understanding Indian proximity of military modernization with that of its ability to impact on Pakistan’s national security creates the ‘cause and effect’ variability, which Pakistan has maintained under ‘active-reactive mode’. In fact, it is the ‘Hindutva Ideology’ of India which allowed it to utilize both conventional and sub-conventional elements into South Asian security environment particularly against Pakistan. Therefore, understanding Pakistan preparedness and response to changing dimensions of warfare it faced in 21st century are linked with the ‘Hindutva Warfare’ of India. That is why a middle point was necessary to develop to understand the transformation of warfare in South Asia. It helped to evolve the genesis of Pakistan’s threat perceptions from pre-to-post 9/11 security environment.

**Chapter six** ‘Dynamics of Nuclear Threshold and Pakistan’s Force Preparedness’ addressed the question ‘how satisfactorily Pakistan Army had worked on its kinetic capabilities to ensure its territorial integrity’. In this chapter an effort was made to evaluate the readiness of Pakistan to counter conventional threats under traditional mode of warfare that has been the fundamental challenge to its national survival and territorial integrity. Therefore, chapter six made an effort to evaluate the post-1998 dynamics of warfare attached to nuclear threshold and
Pakistan’s force preparedness. Pakistan has taken all necessary measures to ensure peace and stability in the region. To establish deterrence, it has not only strategically increased the nuclear threshold with the development of intermediate cruise and ballistic missiles but also on the eve of Indian military adventurism of limited war, it managed to lower the nuclear threshold by developing tactical nuclear weapons. Since conventional mode of warfare include both traditional military power with and without nuclear weapons, therefore, Indian wish to distinguish between conventional and nuclear threshold massively undermined Pakistan’s territorial security. That is why whether it’s conventional or nuclear threat, Pakistan has only one option to control conflict escalation and that is the use of nuclear weapons. That is why, under the prevailing nuclear threshold, the Indian political thinkers are joining hands with their military strategic pundits who have adopted strategy of pro-active military operations (PAOs) against Pakistan, which provides them an option of limited war scenario practically executing the ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ along with sub-conventional warfare.

Chapter seven ‘The Environment of Indian Pro-active Operations (POAs) and Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy’ addressed the question ‘do limited war strategies (CSD) and proactive military operations (PAOs) threaten Pakistan’s territorial integrity’. The chapter was dedicated to elaborate Indian proactive military operations and answers the question what strategy Pakistan has adopted to deal with the Indian threat of limited war scenario/ pro-active military operations (PAOs) under the nuclear threshold? It is once again important to narrate that the 21st century warfare though brings sub-conventional warfare at the forefront with aspects of evolving 5GW but Pakistan has been unfortunately trapped in both traditional and modern generations of warfare, which include both conventional and sub-conventional. Therefore, it has to get ready and prepare adequate response mechanism in military domain.
Chapter eight ‘The Menace of Violent Extremism and Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Strategy’ addressed the question ‘why violent extremism took over 21st century Pakistan and how Pakistan’s counter-terrorism-strategy addressed this threat’. This chapter took non-traditional approach to elaborate response mechanism of Pakistan as a whole to expose the socio-political vulnerabilities of society that trapped the very structure and fabric of the nation, which was amicably exploited by the non-state actors and hostile intelligence agencies. The legacy of ideological mishandling and later deliberate allowance clutched the glory of Pakistan. Though, militarily remained quite successful in responding any aggression, internal fault lines were somehow compromised. The post-9/11 security environment particularly the shift of war on terror from Afghanistan to Pakistan made the nation prone to ‘legacy of ideological mishandling’. Ultimately it was decided to get rid from violent extremism which was the ideal feed to sub-conventional warfare in Pakistan. The national resolve was the factor of uprooting the comprehensive response mechanism in Pakistan that altogether generated decisive blow to terrorists by utilizing both civil and military instruments.

Chapter nine ‘Crawling Towards Peace: From National Security to Global War on Terror’ addressed the question ‘how Pakistan came out of ‘frying pan of territorial integrity’ and ended up into the ‘fire of global war on terror’. Since 1947 till 9/11, the national security dynamics and military preparedness of Pakistan was more of regional nature and does not have global posturing. During ‘war in Afghanistan’ Pakistan did fight an American war but Afghanistan’s close geographical proximity being the neighboring state and Soviet intensions to excess warm waters ignited the fundamental response of Pakistan to contain Soviet extension. So, it became a mutual war of US and Pakistan. Contrary to Afghan war, Pakistan has no interest neither any role in the 9/11 incident. It was the US that brought the war into Afghanistan under
‘global war against terrorism’ and dictated Pakistan to join the alliance and play a frontline role to facilitate the war. Later on, the so called global war ended up into regional war and took over the whole of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, this chapter attempted to address the international political landscapes that shifted the national security of Pakistan from regional discourse to a more complex global paradox.

Chapter ten ‘Four Generals One War: Posturing the Dilemma of Unconventional Warfare’ addressed the question ‘were lions led by donkeys in the sub-conventional warfare’. Chapter ten contested the generalship of Pakistani military commanders who being at the forefront of national security mechanized the response to fight with the changing dimensions of warfare. When generals make mistakes in war it has catastrophic consequences for the military campaign. Failure in generalship brings disorder in command which inevitably puts the soldiers at risk. The campaign ends up as fighting faulty wars with massive impacts on survival of the state. This had been the case of British military experience in the First World War when its generalship was coded as ‘Lions led by Donkeys’. The poor training and unwise strategic decisions of the generals cost about a million soldiers to British Empire in the WWI, a disgrace the British generals can never get away. Therefore, this chapter contested Pakistani generalship under the notion of ‘lions led by donkeys’. To understand the phenomenon, this chapter therefore is dedicated to expose four generals which included General Musharraf, General Kiyani, General Raheel, and current army chief General Bajwa; who have commanded Pakistan army and fought the blurred war with low intensity context immediately in the aftermath of 9/11. For what achievements and failures these generals must be remembered for, is the main context of this chapter as without decoding the generalship of these four Generals, understanding Pakistan’s resolve against the 21st century warfare cannot be evaluated.
Chapter eleven ‘The Spectrum of Pakistan’s Military Response-An Evaluation’ addressed the question ‘has Pakistan effectively applied military power for the achievement of sustainable political outcomes challenged by the ‘new style of war’. To effectively evaluate Pakistan’s military doctrine and its preparedness, it is important to analyze military operations that it launched to combat the threats looming out of the sub-conventional warfare. Moreover, an evaluation of Smith’s theoretical conclusion that “Western industrialized armies are ill-suited to the new style of warfare,” entails a dedicated effort and highlights the very important answer to find out: Is Pakistan military ill-suited to the new style of warfare? The holistic analysis and application of the Smith’s theory of ‘Utility of Force’ helped the study to understand relevance and readiness of Pakistan’s military doctrine. Sub-questions such as; how many military operations Pakistan army has conducted in response to sub-conventional war?, when and why those military operations were conducted?, what was the main objective and purpose behind those operations?, how the application of military power in each of the operation was used to achieve particular aims?, and what are their results in-terms of achievements or failures?; has been provided through detailed response and analysis.

Chapter twelve ‘Conclusion’ which is last chapter of the study has provided conclusive summary of the research investigation keeping in view the hypothetical and theoretical assumptions. Furthermore, the cause and effect of variables like ‘utility of force’ and ‘political goals’ are summed up to ensure the validity of success or failure for Pakistan’s military preparedness in response to sub-conventional war.

The subsequent chapters of the study are explained, analyzed, and investigated to shed light on the premises, objectives and research questions.
CHAPTER TWO
EVOLUTION OF MILITARY THOUGHT AND CONTOURS OF WARFARE

“Every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would have held its own theory of war”

(Clausewitz, 1984: 593)

2.1. Introduction

Conflicts are adamant so does the phenomenon of war. Militaries whether traditional or contemporary have never abandoned mesmerizing land being the significant and everlasting feature of their experience. This is very true when it comes to the nature of statecraft as evolving thought from ancient to modern (Gray, 2002). The mechanics of land warfare are not only significant but strategic to most of the 21st century militaries. It had played decisive role in history as according to American military strategist Rear Admiral Wylie who noted that “the ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun” (Wylie, 1967). Complementing to this approach, the ‘Australian Land Warfare Doctrine’ had charted out two particular reasons that makes the land warfare as a constant historical phenomenon. The document highlights the significance of land warfare and mentions that, “first, the use of land-based force is an unequivocal action that demonstrates a society’s resolve to achieve a decisive political outcome; secondly, armies retain the unique capability to capture, occupy and hold terrain and to maintain a continuous presence for as long as required” (Army, 2002).

Though important but land warfare is not the only domain of statecraft. For example, John Collin has identified six schools of strategic thought, namely “the maritime, the continental, the aeronautical, astronautical, special operations and the unifying school of thought” (Collins & Kongston, 2002). Three of these basic schools namely land, the air and maritime have largely
been practiced, manifested, and complemented by the special operations, however, more recent schools like ‘astronautical’ and the unifying, are still evolving. There has been an enduring debate about supremacy of maritime, or land or the air power, which remains inconclusive. On the other hand, the military thinkers and practitioners have also varied opinion with regards to the supremacy of various schools of thought. Therefore, no single school of thought seems to dominate single-handedly.

Neither this chapter nor the overall study is aimed at assertion of the supremacy of land warfare over the air or maritime warfare, rather, provides an insight into its evolution and seeking lessons especially in context to Pakistan and nature of response against fundamental challenges to its multidimensional national security. In view of contemporary global and regional landscape, Pakistan must continue to develop and evaluate its military thought. The aim must be to keep focus on future outlook of the battlefield to comprehend emerging threats and mount desired response by exploiting own strengths while negotiating with limitations. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to study the evolution of the military thought, highlighting future projections with a view to draw relevant lessons for Pakistan. Furthermore, this chapter will answer the sub-question of the study, what is the nature of war in the 21st century and how the concept of war relates to learning within military and generates a doctrinal response?

Some of the important terms like ‘Military Thought’ and ‘Continental School of Military Thought (CMT)’ require subjective definition as these two would be used in contextual analysis in subsequent parts of the chapter. In view of Antulio J. Echevarria the term “military thought, consists of the aggregate of developments, theories, approaches, perceptions, patterns, and frameworks (paradigms) that belong to a particular era, community, or person” (Echevarria, 1997). On the other hand the term ‘Continental School of Military Thought (CMT)’ refers to the
waging of war and the multi-dimensional employment of forces in which the principal medium is land (Evans, 2004). It is normally used synonymously with Land warfare in which the land forces seek to manipulate the land environment to their advantage against the opposing ground forces.

To better expose and understand the dimensions of land power with that of war theatre, one must recognize the dialectic between military theoretical dimension and geopolitical dimension of continental thought. Military dimension relates to military theory, concepts, doctrines and organizations, whereas, geopolitical dimension deals with the function that military plays to execute the political statecraft and achieve grand strategic objectives of a state (Adgie, 2010). As Dr. Michael Avans stated that, “the continental military thought involves using an army not as an autonomous element of war but as a component of geopolitics. In the extrinsic dimension of the continental school of strategy, land power becomes an aid to statecraft” (Evans, 2004). This framework will be utilized in subsequent parts of the chapter for assessing politico-military environment in each Era and its impact on land power’s role in achieving goals set by policy. Following important periods on the evolution of military thought have been explained in upcoming sections of the chapter:

i. Ancient Era to End of Thirty Years War
ii. 1st Generation Warfare
iii. 2nd Generation Warfare
iv. 3rd Generation Warfare
v. 4th Generation Warfare
vi. 5th Generation Warfare
2.2. Evolution of Military Thought from Ancient Era to End of Thirty Years War

War has played enormous role to establish sovereignty of mighty leaders, states, and empires over vast territory while shedding unforgettable human tragedy. Throughout history, the instrument of war became fundamental tool for political factions to exercise power. This has manifested disputes on the war theatre that settled the scores of confrontation but also brought changes in the formation and size of the armies (Mark, 2009).

a. Politico Military Environment

During the ancient era, concept of nation state was non-existent whereas city states and dynastic rule was common. Military service was not popular and most armies relied upon mercenaries. However, various advanced polities had a well-developed system of standing armies which were employed to advance and protect the interests of the rulers, dynasties and kingdoms. Besides defending territorial integrity, a major role of armies was conquest of territories for expansion of empires and kingdoms. It is important to note that during ancient era armies did have some concrete philosophical parameters that driven their very strategic understanding. Below are mentioned few of the ancient military thinkers who not only contributed in the military thought rather helped in evolving the modern strategic orientation of the battlefield.

b. Military Thinkers of Ancient Era

Considering continental military thought as an isolated act which is disconnected with the military thought of ancient era will be not only wrong rather promulgate the very nature of irrelevance of the evolution of the subject matter. Military thinkers who had deep impact on the evolution of the subject and also improved the military thought are:

i. Sun Tzu (544 – 496 BCE)
ii. Kautilya (350 – 283 BCE)

iii. Muhammad PBUH (570 – 632 CE)

iv. Machiavelli (1469 – 1527 CE)

c. Evolving Military Thought

Sun Tzu advocated on accuracy of information on enemy, use of terrain, deception, emphasis on espionage and an indirect approach to win war (Tzu, 2008). Kautilya on the other hand emphasized on conventional and guerrilla warfare that clearly categorized the army into various corps with a clear division of roles in war. He also emphasized on hierarchal system for administration of army with clear command and control structure (Kangle, 1965). Between 6th and 5th BC, Greeks and Romans developed the Phalanx and Legions, the core of which was a citizen militia and war remained a direct clash between two opposing armies generally the conventional forces (Connolly, 1998). Islam during the Era of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) introduced the first human code of conduct during War (Aboul-Enein & Zuhur, 2004). Mongols introduced classical employment of heavy horse cavalry consequently projecting terror as a norm in the warfare (Pittard, 1994). With the development of weapons from sword and arches in ancient times to muskets and guns in 15th century, the tactics kept changing. Machiavelli in 16th century re-emphasized on various battle formations and maneuvers to break vigorous cavalry charges introduced by Mongols and disintegrate and slay enemy infantry (Gat, 2001). Military system, therefore developed to a great deal in this era with armies becoming more organized with integrated logistics.

d. Battlefield Dynamics

Due to the evolving nature of warfare and its unfolding tactical developments, the battlefield had following distinct dynamics (Tallet & Trim, 2010):-
i. Wars were largely linear with limited maneuvers conducted through horses (cavalry).

ii. Lances, swords, bows and arrows were the major weapons.

iii. Fortresses were characterized as earlier cantonments.

iv. Spying networks were successfully employed for espionage.

v. Primacy of ground and geographical factors were realized for planning of war.

According to ‘Encyclopedia of World History,’ “the gunpowder revolution began in Europe in the mid-1400s, a development that would permanently transform the character of warfare worldwide” (Upshur, Schroeder, Whitters, & Terry, 2008). This in fact has given rise to first generation warfare.

2.3. First Generation Warfare:

a. Politico Military Environment

Though Europe was relieved from ‘Thirty Years War’ through Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 but conflicts re-emerged soon after and continued till late nineteenth century that caused the continent many changes in its political landscape. In 1789, Europe witnessed the French Revolution but also experienced the rise of Napoleon as a powerful monarch and great military leader. In the aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat and decline of its French Empire, the perpetual rise of Great Britain made her the most powerful colonial empire in the world. Meanwhile, in Asia and Africa, many decisive wars were fought between colonial powers and the native kingdoms and states. Colonial monarchies waged wars for economic ends by hiring local armies through offering them financial and other incentives. Colonialism prevailed throughout the world with British and French leading in Asia and Africa, respectively. The era also witnessed wars of Ottomans within Europe.
b. Thinkers/Theorists

This era massively contributed both in military literature and application of military thought. The volume of knowledge produced in Europe remarkably reflected on the overall understanding on the subject matter with unique strategic outlook (Gat, 2001). Significant thinkers of the time included:-

i. **Vauban (1633-1703):** Vauban has been impactful on military thought particularly “most significant contributions to the art of war were siege craft and the science of fortification” (Ostwald, 2002).

ii. **Maurice De Saxe (1696-1750):** Saxe is famous for his book ‘Reveries’, on mobility, training, discipline and morale. He proposed the idea of exhaustion rather than attrition of enemy. He also gave the idea of smaller combined arms team (De Saxe, 2012).

iii. **Jacques De Guibert (1743-1790):** Guibert developed the idea of the citizen-soldier, advocated professional army, divisional system, and principles of mobility and concentration (Duffy, 2005).

iv. **Napoleon’s Enduring Contributions (1769-1821):** Napoleon brought about following major changes in military to address weaknesses (Hughes, 2012):-

- **Military System.** He introduced the concept of conscription (recruitment). He laid emphasis on training, intelligence, mobilization, transportation and logistics.
- **Re-organization.** He re-organized infantry, cavalry and artillery. Realizing the problems of move, logistics and employment, he grouped divisions into Corps as a balanced all arms force.
- **Campaign Planning.** Napoleon linked maneuvers with battles forcing enemy to fight at the culmination of maneuvers. He planned his combining movement, shock tactics and firepower, directed against enemy’s center of gravity. In offensive operations, Napoleon successfully employed Strategic Envelopment, Strategic Penetration and Central Position.

v. **Henri Jomini (1779-1869):** Jomini had a significant contribution towards the development of military thought that includes (Jomini, 2017):-
• Introduced the operational level of war.
• His concepts of ‘lines of operation’ and ‘decision-making rules’ have been surprisingly durable.
• Emphasized on domination of zone of operations and relegated the importance of enemy’s destruction.
• He ignores larger political context for which war is waged and considers concept of war as professional and operational domain of the military commanders.

vi. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831): Clausewitz is considered as pioneer of modern military thought. His salient contributions are (Clausewitz, 1976):

• He conceived war as a political, social, economic and military totality.
• He emphasized that war is nothing “but a continuation of policy by other means”.
• He gave strategic framework of “ends, ways and means”.
• He proposed the trinity of people, military and the government, the three vital factors for the outcome of war. In guerrilla warfare, people part of the trinity takes precedence over the other two.
• He preferred defence as stronger form of warfare, until superior relative strength is achieved.
• He re-emphasized on the concepts of centre of gravity, and gave operational cycle and the culminating point, which are relevant even today.

c. Evolving Military Thought

Training and discipline were weak links. Infantry battalion was the basic tactical unit whereas 4 to 6 infantry battalions composed a brigade, with a Division introduced as largest fighting unit in 1760. However, increased fire power gave new strength to the defense, making war protracted and costly. Napoleonic wars and military thought of Jomini and Clausewitz had substantial impact on military systems. Military system was also deeply impacted by the introduction of conscription, which led to increase in size of the armies. Strategy of offensive operations followed the principles of mobility, concentration and destruction.
d. Battlefield Dynamics

Due to the evolving nature of warfare and its unfolding tactical developments, the battlefield had following distinct dynamics:-

i. The First Generation employed “line-and-column tactics, where battles were formal and the battlefield orderly” (Manaise, 2007).

ii. Mass manpower and extensive use of guns became a norm of battlefields.

iii. Logistics including field medical care and other war services became increasingly organized.

iv. The First Generation created a “military culture of order that distinguished military from civilian. Uniforms, saluting and military rank were introduced to reinforce the culture of discipline and order” (Manaise, 2007).

v. The rifled muskets and breech loaders rendered the “old line and column tactics obsolete and suicidal” (Manaise, 2007).

vi. Re-organization of infantry, cavalry and artillery with well-defined roles helped to increase battlefield efficiency.

vii. Grouping of forces into Corps as a balanced all arms force efficiently addressed the problems of move, logistics and employment. It also embodied the concept of smaller combined arms teams.

2.4. 2nd Generation Warfare

a. Politico- Military Environment

The dawn of 20th century saw acute application of military strategy with massive technological maneuvering. By 1911 this led to forced modifications into Britain’s military thought that wanted to maintain balance of power on the European front. This involved deployment of British military on the European territory under a continental strategy merged with geopolitical approach. The complications of the battlefield expected massive deployment of forces by the British from 1916 to 1918 with an exposure that they have never experienced in
history. This traumatized the British way of fighting the World War-I since importance of land warfare brought new dimensions into the overall force posturing. Though, British maritime maneuvers being the superior sea power played decisive role in the World War but the battlefield glory convincingly occurred on land. During this period the world was driven by colonial powers of Europe in Asia, Americas and Africa in which various resistance wars were fought against colonialists. While inland Europe enjoyed relative peace till the dawn of 20th century. However, with the onset of 20th century, many wars started to erupt in Europe as well, of which major being Balkan wars and WW-1. The Ottoman Empire was defeated and many Middle Eastern states including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Iraq emerged following Sykes-Picot agreement whereas Balkans also got independence from the Ottomans and Austro-Hungarians (McCarthy, 2001).

b. Evolving Military Thought

Industrial revolution had a profound impact on continental warfare and resultant military thought.

i. Till early 20th century, improved musket, breech loading rifle and machine guns made frontal infantry assaults suicidal especially when protected with trenches and field fortifications and weapons technology favoured the defensive.

ii. Increased weapon ranges extended the battlefield.

iii. Telegraph brought new dimension to command over large distances and mould public opinion during conduct of war.

iv. The invention of steam engine and railroad revolutionized the mobility system of growing armies.
c. Battlefield Dynamics: World War–I Period

According to John Shy as quoted in ‘Makers of modern strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age’, “the Great War shattered many things and none more than military theory” (Paret, Craig, & Gilbert, 1986). Therefore, the battlefield dynamics of the WWI exposed the following learnings:

i. Trinity of bullet, spade and wire gave birth to stalemate and defence became a stronger form of warfare.

ii. The war saw enhanced impact of firepower with incompatible tactical mobility leading to millions of causalities.

iii. Wars of maneuver converted into trench warfare as a result of domination of spade, rifle, machine gun and artillery.

iv. In the last year of the Great War as Baily ushered that “a key technical breakthrough was the advent of long range indirect artillery fire that made possible the engagement of targets” outside immediate battlefield (Bailey, 2003).

v. The icons of war and massive mobility in the deployment of forces brought the overall climax of military theory quite closure to technological advancements of the 20th century. As exposed by Evans when he wrote that “by the time of the 1918 Armistice, new indirect artillery methods, armored vehicles and combat aircraft, in conjunction with modern combined-arms techniques, were beginning to restore vitality and mobility to land warfare” (Evans, 2004).

2.5. 3rd Generation Warfare

a. Politico-Military Environment

Germany lost WW-I with heavy price in 1919 through Treaty of Versailles. Nationalism gained popularity in world politics from Europe to Asia. On the outbreak of WWII in 1939, Nazi Germany had gained unprecedented territorial gains in Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland and France apart from neutralizing low-lands of Europe while Japan had occupied parts of China and
Korea. WW-II extended to all Europe, Asia and Africa and in the greatest war of mankind, the axis forces led by Nazi Germany were totally defeated and annihilated after atomic attacks on Japan by USA in August 1945 (Sulzberger, 1985). While naval power had an important role in these wars, the victories were decisive on land. The aftermath of WWII announced the former Soviet Union and United States as global powers along with ruined European states like UK and France. China being ally in the WWII got favorable impetus to its political relevance in the evolving order. The eruption of WWII gave birth and vindicated Mackinder’s geopolitical views under Heartland Theory that he published in 1904. According to Sir Halford Mackinder, “whoever controls Eastern Europe controls the Heartland”. This infact brought the context of “world dominance” alive and powerful nations like Germany during the WWII and Soviets in the Cold War attempted to apply the Heartland Theory (Bassin & Aksenove, 2006).

The theory became a dominant geo-political prototype and mostly dominated the war strategies of Cold War rivals from late 1940s to late 1980s. This evidently influenced United States policy of containment against the former communist Soviet Union while giving birth to collective security alliances with emergence of NATO and Warsaw Pact, respectively (Walters, 1975). The war strategy of NATO predominantly followed US continental strategy to culminate Soviet expansion in the Eurasian heartland with deployment of forces particularly in Western Europe (Sloan, 1988). Furthermore, Korean War, Arab Israel wars, Indo-Pak wars and other conflicts against colonialism pointed towards growing importance of land forces as an important tool of statecraft (Evans, 2004).

b. Developments in Inter World Wars Period (1918 – 1939)

This Era saw the most important conceptual breakthrough in the form of “Rise of Operational Art in Europe”, that provided “formal recognition and refinement of an operational
level in the wars” (Evans, 2004). Contributions of renowned military thinkers such as Helmuth Von Moltke include:

- **Helmuth Von Moltke (1907-1945):** He was the pioneer of staff system, military appreciation and military methodology. He made contingency planning for mobilization, and gave the concept battle of ‘encirclement and annihilation’ (Balfour & Frisby, 1972). Moltke had also evolved a two front war doctrine against Russia and France.

Few other important developments included:

- **Theory of Blitzkrieg:** The concept was based on psychological warfare and the appreciation of the lines of communications and logistics. The objective of any Blitzkrieg mission was to target enemy’s critical vulnerability to target its ‘Center of Gravity’ (CoG) through maneuvers (Cohen, 1996).

- **Deep Battle Theory:** Soviet deep battle military theory was aimed at inflicting “a decisive strategic defeat on enemy’s logistics and renders the defence of their front impossible or irrelevant” but its success was highly dependent on combined arms cooperation at all levels (Glantz, 2012).

c. **Application of Military Thought in World War-II (1939-1945)**

It is mostly assumed that the eruption of the Second World War was due to the failure of League of Nations particularly the unsettled disputes of the WWI gave impetus to a larger conflict (Taylor, 1996). Germany pursued the continental strategy, supported by naval forces acting as an ancillary to the land forces. Britain and the US realized that a Continental army had to defeat the Germans in France and on the North Western plains of Europe. It remained for the Allies to win the war, in the long run, Germany was beaten by superior land forces and most of
those land forces that came from an even greater continental power, the Soviet Union. The most prominent concept of Blitzkrieg was developed and employed by the Germans.

d. Evolution of military thought Post World War-II

The aftermath of Second World War witnessed the evolution of nuclear theories at a rapid pace whereas conventional military thought rather progressed slowly. The conventional domain therefore, remained dependent upon some of major breakthroughs in military thinking of pre WWII period. Prominent post WWII thinkers include:

i. **Theory of Mechanized Warfare by JFC Fuller (1878-1966):** JFC Fuller emphasized the concept of mechanized warfare and emphasized on employment of tanks to create “Strategic Paralysis”, in offensive operations. He devised the most efficient methods for using tanks both in attack and defence (Reid, 1978).

ii. **Theories by Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970):** Liddell Hart documented the concepts of indirect approach and mechanized and mobile warfare (Hart, 2008). Key themes of his assertion are:
   - Dislocation of enemy’s psychological and physical balances not his utter destruction.
   - Coordinated use of aircraft and tanks which became the basis for the concept of German Blitzkrieg.


iv. **Richard Simpkin (1921-1986):** Emphasized maneuver warfare under modern technology. He identified the role of helicopter as the work horse of modern battlefield (Simpkin, 1985).
e. Cold War

The Cold War between the two powerful rivals gave impetus to massive defense spending and forced United States and former Soviet Union in conventional and nuclear arms race. The overarching context of deterrence gave rise to the conception of total annihilation thus justified the very application of proxy wars. Therefore, the competition and military confrontations during this period were characterized not by the employment of total war strategies rather by limited and asymmetric warfare through proxies. Some of the important concepts developed during Cold War period include:

- **The Refined Deep Operations Theory:** The Deep Operations theory conceived by Tukhachevskii and applied during WWII was refined from its original concept (Simpkin, 1985). The introduction of BMP\(^1\) saw a resurgence of “Slashing Attack” as an alternative to heavy break-in, while BMD\(^2\) (a lighter version of BMP) made possible the concept of ‘Desanty’; Vertical envelopment with Mechanized Airborne Forces, having both mobility and firepower (Glantz, 2013). The third development was the introduction of Operational Maneuver Group, the biggest tank numbers i.e 500 of them, complementing the battlefield nuclear weapons that could be maneuvered as a single entity. To offset the disadvantage of shortage of infantry, a second echelon in the shape of Mechanized Division was introduced (Glantz, 2012).

- **Air Land Battle:** The ‘Air Land Battle’ concept was introduced in 1982 and refined in 1986 (Leonhard, 1994). The concept tried to weave into a

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\(^1\)“The BMP-1 is a Soviet amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicle. BMP stands for Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty meaning ‘infantry fighting vehicle’. The BMP-1 was the first mass-produced infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) of USSR”.

\(^2\)“The BMD-1 is a Soviet airborne amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicle, which was introduced in 1969 and first seen by the West in 1970. BMD stands for Boyevaya Mashina Desanta literally ‘Combat Vehicle of the Airborne’. The BMD-1 was used as an IFV by the Soviet Army's airborne divisions”.
whole, “close operational interaction between air-ground forces, combined arms, fire support, electronic warfare, deception, intelligence and maneuver” (Jordan, Kiras, Lonsdale, Speller, Tuck, & Walton; 2016). Its application was seen during First Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm).

- **Follow on Forces Attack:** The concept was initially formulated in 1979 by NATO with the aim to target Second Echelon forces of enemy simultaneously, to address numerical disadvantage in tanks, guns and men. It uses high technology weapon systems “with increased range and greater accuracy to target and attack the follow on forces” (Diver, 1990).

**f. Post-Cold War**

The aftermath of the Cold War particularly ‘Operation Desert Storm’ of 1991 deeply impacted on the military thinking of the Post-Cold War period. These military learning’s were also in line with strategic exposures of the Cold War that proposed new strategies to be adopted for future battlefields. These changes included emphasis on combat readiness, high end technology, manoeuvre, air mobility, night warfare, C⁴I, space and Battle Space Management (BSM) systems. The important imprints of Gulf War on the Continental strategy included (Dunn, 1997):-

- The force structure and weapon systems in developing countries and their ability to engage developed states in mid to high intensity conflict became questionable.
- The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) proved instrumental in success of Gulf War and had a profound impact on Continental strategy leading to development of Net Centric Warfare (NCW).
- Most theorists saw devastating success of the ‘Operation Desert Storm’ in the Gulf as a justification of the benefits of joint war fighting, which paved the way for further refinement of the concept and execution.
- The joint warfare concept became extensively written topic such as Harry G. Summers stated that “the legislation was ‘long overdue’ and credited it
with attaining unity of effort in the operation (Summers, 1997). Furthermore, Robert H. Scales wrote that “Desert Storm raised the execution of joint warfare to an unprecedented level of competence” (Scales, 1997).

g. **Sub-Conventional Warfare**

Evolution of sub conventional warfare can be traced back into "American Revolution" or "Revolutionary War", as they are used interchangeably. Insurgency, asymmetric war, low intensity conflict, proxy war, operations other than war (OOTW) and the recent war on terror are some of the forms of sub conventional warfare. Given the limitations nuclear technology and political developments have imposed on conventional war, the world has now started recognizing this form of warfare as a persistent phenomenon.

2.6. **4th Generation Warfare**

Cold war was also characterized by proxies and guerrilla warfare like Malayan insurgency, Algerian and first Russo-Afghan War but could not develop beyond traditional guerrilla warfare. However, post cold war era witnessed enhanced focus on sub-conventional warfare which gave birth to formal recognition of 4GW.

4GW is a kind of irregular warfare (IW) which according to Dobson “favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will” (Dobson, 2012). In a simpler way, 4GW is the use of non-state actors or militant groups against a state (as a proxy of other state or indigenous) for meeting political ends.
Contemporary military thought, therefore has been evolved on the basis of conflicts and war studies in the recent years. Most of the post Gulf War-I of 1991; major wars and conflicts have been fought in tandem of conventional and sub-conventional mainly due to:

- The initiation of war mostly being the conventional due to the distinctive edge of RMA driven militaries choking the weaker opponents.
- Weaker sides adopting sub-conventional or insurgency to offset space lost to stronger more advanced armies.

Hence, the military strategy and more decidedly the military thought developed simultaneously in both domains, however lately dominated by scholars of sub-conventional warfare. Some of the contemporary continental military thoughts prevalent in the leading countries are as under:-

A. Military Thought in Conventional Domain

a) Chinese Military Thought

- The Chinese concepts of “People’s War” (renmin-zhan-zheng) and “Active Defense” (Ji ji Fang Yu) have long been two fundamental components of Mao Zedong’s traditional military thought where by the Chinese professes defense as a transient phase with the ability to switch over to counter offensive being the ultimate objective.

- Traditional Chinese military thought is marked by high tempo military operations supported by sound intelligence and deception.

- There is a visible change and transformation in their hierarchical mindset in sync with developing technologies.

- In “Applying Military Strategy in the Age of the New Revolution in Military Affairs”, Li Bingyan opines that “modern military thought should absorb the new methodologies such as systematology, cybernetics, synergetics, mutationism,
information theory, dispersion theory, function theory, intelligence theory, optimality theory, homology theory and fuzzy theory” (Bingyan, 2004).

- The ever changing global environment has consolidated the complexities of ‘information age’ in favor of military strategy which is efficiently using it as a special way to de-code the pattern of the decision makers with ability to disrupt the strategic direction of opponent.

b) **US Military Thought**

Military thought is evolving through a set of varying concepts and ideas. No single thought however can be attributed to US military thought. Some of the significant characteristics of US military thought depicted by Colin S Gray (Gray, 2012) include:-

- Culturally challenged
- Technology dependent
- Profoundly regular
- Impatient, aggressive and offensive
- Focus on firepower
- Logistically excellent
- Highly sensitive to casualties

i. **Shock and Awe Theory of US Way of War:**

The concept of shock based operations in fact penetrates into enemy’s mind and his decision makers while creating shock and awe. According to Lieutenant Colonel Shanahan, “we need to perfect an approach that combines physical attack and information operations to get and stay inside our enemy’s decision cycle; to confuse, shock, and frighten their leadership and (or) populace to the point they make inappropriate responses or collapse into inaction. The information age has given us the tools to accomplish such attacks. The challenge is to figure out
exactly how we use the precepts of shock-based warfare to defeat our enemies” (Shanahan, 2001).

ii. Ground Offensive:

US military thought advocates synthesizing all the forces and capabilities, i.e., through jointness and networking, while information operations and massive firepower shape the battlefield, the ground forces fight a hi-tech net-centric RMA driven ground offensive to achieve set objectives (Cordesman & Wagner, 1996).

c) Russian Way of War

Russian military thought has long been attributed to deep maneuvers and operational art. The Russians believe in injecting maximum forces at the point of application in an un-relentted momentum (Harrison, 2001). According to Russian military expert Evgeny Krutikov, Russian military thought has evolved mainly during the 20th century which has deeply impacted on its doctrine. He has referred three tenets of Russian military thought in his article “Russia’s military tactics have advantages over US and NATO tactics,” which he believed are applied in sync at all tiers. Below are mentioned the tenets--:

- “First, the Russians are clearly aware of the fact that in a war people are killed and there is no practical sense to slow down when conducting offensive operations because of every wrecked tank. Oscillations ultimately lead to defeat and, consequently, to even greater losses”.
- “Secondly, support and reinforcement should be given to those units and those directions which achieve success instead of the Western practice of reinforcing those which are in trouble”.
- “Thirdly, the Russian side attaches great importance to the massive support for the offensive by artillery and recognizes that for the foreseeable future; Moscow may not be fighting in places where it has air superiority” (Krutikov, 2016).
B. Military Thought in Sub Conventional Domain

Although the writings on sub-conventional warfare and counter insurgency operations (COIN) of famous military theorists like David Galula (Galula, 2006) and Robert Thompson (Thompson, 1966) still stand relevant, nevertheless the sub-conventional military thought has also evolved over the period of time. Sub-conventional military thoughts of few of the leading military theorists are explained below:-

i. American Military Thought

- **Collin Gray’s Theory of COIN**: Collin S. Gray emphasizes that the new warfare will be COIN driven. Even if the military has achieved success through hi-tech military, it will require a well framed COIN strategy to consolidate the gains. He emphasis that “specifically, the undoubted significance of culture—public, strategic and military—in war, warfare, and strategy, recognized today as never before in recent times. Obviously for COIN to be successful, cultural education is not merely desirable, it is literally essential. Recognition of the importance of culture is a part of the answer to the question of how to be effective in war against irregular (and regular) enemies” (Gray, 2012).

- **Dr. David Kilcullen’s Three Pillars of COIN**: Dr. Kilcullen contends that overarching goal in COIN is to control the three pillars which are of equal importance and are vital for return of the system to normality (Kilcullen, 2006). Pillars of his model are:-
  
  b. Political: “Includes mobilization, governance extension, institutional capacity and social reintegration”.
  c. Economic: “Humanitarian assistance, development assistance, resource and infrastructure management and growth capacity”.

- **Light Footprint Warfare (LFW)**: According to Goldsmith and Waxman, “President Obama’s rejection of ‘boots on the ground’ approach and his devotion to small-tread, clandestine, and often long-distance warfare gave rise to the
concept of Light Footprint War” (Goldsmith & Waxman, 2016). US forces under Obama practiced it in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. It is the kinetic prong of sub-conventional warfare in which military actions are undertaken remaining “largely out of public view, often from a distance, and in many cases with limited threat to forces”. Drones, air strikes, clandestine operations by Special Forces and cyber-attacks are some of the methods used in LFW.

ii. British Military Thought

Similarly UK Army 77 Brigade group is configured to carry out information operations through digital operation section and media content sections to shape favorable environment in support of both conventional and sub-conventional war (Antill & Smith, 2017). The evolution of British experience had impacted on its transformation (Crawshaw, 2012).

iii. Russian Military Thought - Gerasimov Military Doctrine

Russian experiences during conflicts of Chechnya and Ukraine have transformed its military thought to sub-conventional domain. They believe in the power of people’s opinion and in the appropriate response in both force and dialogue domains. According to General Gerasimov, fault lines of modern warfare are changing. He says “in the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. Application of force is contingent upon the protest potential of the population” (Sputlink International, 2017).

iv. Israeli Military Thought - Martin Van Creveld

Some of the emerging thoughts of Martin Van Creveld on contemporary and future warfare include (Van Creveld, 2009):-
• Operational strategy is caught in dilemma with nuclear weapons on one side and low intensity conflict on the other.
• The monopoly of violence in future will no longer remains with state - various groups will exercise this monopoly.
• Future conflicts will be small wars (LIC), primarily driven by religious and ethnic reasons and will be fought in cities by insurgents with basic weapon with high degree of terror and propaganda.
• Concept of ‘Just War’ will form the basis of future wars.
• The COIN forces will have to become intermingled with each other and with civilian population. Motivation will play the decisive role.

2.7. Major Findings:

Recent US engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq and Syrian conflict indicate that these conflicts have transformed the continental thought quite significantly. Although, kinetic operations were highly effective, lack of understanding on cognitive domain and misinterpretation of geo-political factors dragged US and its allies in a perpetual protracted conflict. Major findings of these case studies in military and socio-political domains are as under:-

a. Military Domain

Superior military thought coupled with integrated employment of high end systems offered US and its allies, a clear victory in kinetic domain through following concepts:-

• **Jointness:** Seamless battlefield fusion in which all three services contributed towards achievement of common military objectives with network centric capabilities.
• **Shaping of Battlefield:** Eliminated enemy’s critical capabilities like high value targets and command and control networks to overwhelm the adversary.
• **Effect Based Operations**: US and NATO targeted critically chosen targets like hostile leadership, to achieve desired effects.

• **Extensive Use of Thermal Imaging**: Extensive thermal imaging used to lit up the pitch dark battlefield for targeting of enemies.

• **Shock and Awe**: Employed overwhelming power, dominant battlefield awareness and maneuvers, to destroy adversary’s battlefield perception and will to fight.

b. **Socio-political Domain**

Where US actually failed to achieve the desired ends was the non-military domain. Major inferences include Conflict zones with multiple sectarian, ethnic groups and tribal societies, ground forces must be well cognizant with local ethno-sectarian sensitivities.

• Violation of local customs and norms by operating land forces can be damaging in a media/social media savvy environment.

• Wars are becoming dirtier, messier and unfettered, lack ethics and thrive on extreme terror with women and children recruited.

• Identification of strings behind non-state actors (NSAs) is important and targeting their narrative, support from populace and financial streams, are critical to combating them in kinetics.

• Private Military Contractors (PMCs) may fill some voids but can also undermine credibility and acceptability.

• International alliances may not last and may change with tides of war and emerging geo-political environment.

• While hi-tech RMA may succeed in overcoming conventional resistance, in the end however, it will be people centric political and local dimension which will prevail.

• For any military operation, a clear and realistic exit strategy must be devised beforehand.
2.8.  5th Generation Warfare

It is important to highlight that the 4GW is evolving though Pakistan had started fighting this war immediately in the aftermath of 9/11 episode. This research makes the point that Pakistan is the exceptional country which had not only transformed its conventional military doctrine to address sub-conventional warfare but has been quite successful in defeating the low intensity conflict. 5GW is in fact amalgamation of the political, economic, social, military, cultural, ideological, linguistic, sectarian, and ethnic fault lines that under hybrid nature exploits the social space against the state. Enemies are no more interested to enter into conventional or sub-conventional physical confrontations rather separately operate against the vulnerabilities of the state to strip apart the gaps prevailing in the nation.

In this chapter an effort has been made to initiate a brief account of military history to better understand the limitations and changing dynamics of battlefield that has shaped the contemporary outlook of warfare. From ancient to 4GW militaries of advanced countries along with developing nations have travelled a long way that led the power from swords and arrows to icons of war in the 21st century. The complications of the global world with softened borders have ignited the fault lines that have never been used as ingredients of war. The next chapter under kinetic and non-kinetic nature of warfare has shed light on the prevailing context of 21st century warfare that will shape the premises of Pakistan’s military response with that of nature of war which it faced in the beginning of 21st century.
CHAPTER THREE
THE NATURE OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY

“To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”.

(Sun Tzu, 2008)

3.1. Introduction:

The global environment in post World War II could not sustain continuation of kinetic application to resolve conflicts mainly due to loss of life, cost of waging war vis-à-vis the benefits. The rise of bipolar world spear headed by USA and erstwhile Soviet Union was immediately confronted with yet another challenge to find new ways and means to secure interests under the overarching military capabilities. Consequently, Cold War continued on quasi battlefields between the two rivals, relying mostly on indirect application till disintegration of USSR.

The non kinetic means are usually referred to indirect means with an ability to entail the capability to impairment of adversary’s will without use of kinetic force (Teo, 2008). It is not a new notion as the means employed have been used with varying forms and intensities. In the Muslim history, events leading to conquest of Makkah are also regarded as an appropriate example to understand the use of non kinetic means in the truest sense. In the recent past economic meltdown of Indonesia (Budiman, 1999) or more specifically the Arab Spring may be regarded as a modern concept of using non kinetic means (Howard, 2013), which presently is referred as Non Kinetic Warfare (NKW).

The term NKW has initiated a debate that how warfare can be classified as non lethal and how non kinetic means can be included in warfare (Clemis, 2009). Understanding of this paradox is possible if one rises above the conventional and physical dimensions of war and conflict.
Furthermore, use of military in post 9/11 environment and a decade long war against terror in Afghanistan and Iraq has also not delivered which has induced a fresh thinking on the increasing relevance of NKW.

Contemporary global environment is fully charged with nuclear weapons that provides no space for direct war between powerful nations. Therefore, securing of national interests is likely to be pursued through use of indirect means, which gives a new dimension to national security and character of future conflict. The 21\textsuperscript{st} century concept of warfare has finally distinguished itself from the threshold of total war by categorically inducing to non-kinetic warfare as a separate domain. The argument is that due to the very nature of drastic impacts of total war under the umbrella of nuclear weapons; utility of conventional methods of combat are deemed unnecessary. Therefore, it gives impetus to the very idea and utilization of non-kineticism.

This chapter explains in detail what is meant by non-kinetic warfare. Major emphasis is given to explain different dimensions of non-kinetic warfare which includes both civil and military implications for a country. This chapter also highlights cyber warfare, information warfare, insurgency, terrorism, guerilla warfare, and sub-conventional war as domains of 21\textsuperscript{st} century warfare. The very purpose of this chapter is to develop a conceptual ground to investigate the argument that the 21\textsuperscript{st} century war is a modern warfare and requires a new understanding of combat.

3.2. \textbf{Relationship between Kinetic and Non Kinetic Actions}:

The scope of the indirect means of warfare is broad in nature and involves series of complex challenges for a nation. Desired comprehension on the conceptual aspects of NKW necessitates an understanding of war, conflict, kinetic and non kinetic domains. For example, war could be defined as, “the use or threat of use of violence between organized groups aimed at
achieving definable politico-military objectives directly through warfare and war-fighting or through gaining sufficient leverage by military and / or other means [of coercion] for favorable bargaining” (Zaidi, 2010). This definition of war includes direct application of military machine which propagates and necessitates the usage of icons of warfare such as use of tanks, fighting jets, conventional and nuclear missiles, etc. Under such instrumentation of war if a conflict arises, the end game may call doomsday before time. What further necessitates the importance of understanding overall dynamics of warfare also includes defining the conflict, which could be concluded as, “a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to or an opportunity for advancing their needs, interests or concerns” (AIPC, 2018).

Whatsoever are the means of warfare and nature of conflict, the post WW-II phenomenon of war has brought new changes in the dynamics of battlefield. The interests states pursue are complex and application of political means backed by direct military operations has brought no fruitful results. Hence, the notion of non kinetic domain of warfare comes into context. As of now no formal acceptable definition or detailed explanation is available in international military publications or doctrines. Though, the ‘US Air Force Doctrine Document-2’ is the singular document which has made an attempt to explain the concepts of Kinetic and Non-Kinetic actions. The document explains both actions as:

“Kinetic actions are those taken through physical materials like bombs, bullets, rockets, and other munitions. Non-kinetic actions are logical, electromagnetic, or behavioral, such as a computer network attack on an enemy system or a psychological operation aimed at enemy troops. While non-kinetic actions have a physical component, the effects they impose are mainly indirect—functional, systemic, psychological, or behavioral” (US Air Force, 2007).

The above definition shows not only the distinction but transformation in the two domains of warfare. Modern militaries are continuously trying to address the political environment that could allow their actions to utilize non-kinetic means against their opponents but also disallow the same against themselves. There is a great deal of learning within the
historical linkage of non-kinetic means and its application that is briefly overviewed in the next section.

3.3. **Evolution of Non-Kinetic Warfare:**

Understanding the concept of warfare has always evolved traditional explanations involving hardcore military instrumentation, whereas the domains of indirect warfare which defines the very nature and character of non-kineticism has to be deliberate in explanation. Therefore, it is considered prudent to examine how some iconic thinkers during the evolution of warfare have related kinetic conflict to non-kinetic warfare. To do so, Sun Tzu could be one of the most appropriate thinkers who said that, “those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle”. Sun Tzu, in his *Art of War* considers indirect approach of fighting with the enemy as the height of brilliance, when he refers that “he will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation” (Tzu, 2008). Though, he does regarded kinetic application as a significant and decisive mean of warfare.

Parallel to Sun Tzu is the Indian military strategist Chankaya Katalia, who in his famous book *Arthasastra* charted out six points to engage in a confrontation with other nations. The cursory look at the six points of engagement, which are also referred as ‘Six Fold Policy’ of Chankaya Katalia, defines the very limits of his understanding towards geographical outlook of battlefield. For example his six-fold policy is confined towards neighborhood and does not extend to a greater sphere of influence. To achieve political interests Chankaya advocates, (i) co-existence, (ii) neutrality, (iii) alliance, (iv) double policy, (v) march, and (vi) war (Zaman, 2006). In his six elements of policy, war is the last resort which necessitates the very idea of indirect strategy as the priority. His calculated focus on war along with deliberate application of indirect means to engage the enemy makes him quite a cautious military leader. To get into real
perspective, he says that, “if the end could be achieved by non-military method, even by methods of intrigue, duplicity and fraud, he would not advocate an armed conflict” (Singh, 2016).

To extend the application of non-kinetic warfare, Andre Beafure highlighted the indirect warfare as, “it seeks to obtain result by methods other than military” (Shultz, 1991). He regards indirect strategy as the primary scheme to engage the enemy and to attain decisive victory.

The history is full of exceptional examples that verify application of non-kinetic actions to attain decisive military victories. Few of the most relevant scenarios which saw non-application of kinetic means are explained in the next few paragraphs. All these scenarios highlight the usage of indirect means during a conflict that sustained the importance of non-kinetic application as reliable means of war.

- **Capture of Jerusalem by Kalifh Omar**: The Second Muslim Kalifh Omar got control over Jerusalem without going into direct military confrontation.
- **Filling of Water Wells with Stones in Ghazwa-e-Badr**: Muslims filled water wells with stones in Ghazwa-e-Badar.
- **Changez Khan’s Psychological Operations in Central Asia**: Changez Khan captured many forts in Central Asia through psychological operations.
- **British East India Company control over Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent**: The British East India Company got full control over Indo-Pakistan sub-continent without going into direct military confrontation.
- **Bismarck’s Alliance Strategy to Consolidate Germany**: Bismarck through alliances consolidated the Germany in the 19th Century.
- **Application of Propaganda and Psychological Warfare during WW I**: During the WW-I, an extensive application of propaganda and psychological warfare was done to achieve political ends.
3.4. Spectrum of Kinetic and Non Kinetic Warfare:

The spectrum of both kinetic and non-kinetic warfare gives us clear explanation towards understanding of the concepts along with distinction of the two as parallel modes of warfare. Connecting the non-kinetic warfare with ‘generations of warfare’ explained by William S. Lind, it seems that the initiation of indirect means of war got impetus during the second generation warfare (2GW) (Lind. 2004). Moreover, during the third generation warfare (3GW), the application of non-kinetic means of warfare got formal acceptance that achieved its ultimate sophistication during the Cold War. This shift made the indirect strategy an evolving military doctrine, which almost minimized the traditional application of force and kinetic means of warfare.

Relationship of direct and indirect strategy, which in other words is referred as kinetic and non kinetic means of warfare, is explained in a spectrum diagram 3.1.

Figure/Diagram 3.1: Spectrum of Warfare

- Annexure of Austria by Hitler before WW II: Shaping the environment for annexation of Austria by Hitler before WW II.
The post-Cold War period has not only shifted the global politics away from kineticism but also induced the very application of fourth generation warfare (4GW) with all manifestations vested in the domain of indirect warfare, which is limitless and non-kinetic in nature. Although, the driving actors behind the 4GW were always kinetic forces particularly the armed forces but in the 21st century warfare, the dynamics are evolving towards fifth generation warfare (5GW), which has created a mixed monopoly of kinetic and non-kinetic forces (the non-state actors) as driving factors of indirect strategy. Today, nations struggling against 5GW have to involve all state institutions to generate a robust response against multi-dimensional threats evolving through amalgamation of kinetic and non-kinetic sources.

a. Notion of Non-Kineticism

The slight change from use of force to application of non-physical instruments including economic, informational, cultural, ideological, cyber, diplomatic, is the manifestation of non-kinetic warfare. Interestingly, like its application the term itself is going through evolutionary phases and failed to receive consented response that could define it. The 2005 United States Air Force document defines the domain as ‘cyber and informational’ (Robinson, 2005), whereas, Chinese took the concept as ‘holistic maneuverability’. In Chinese view, it involves indirect strategy such as elements consisting non-traditional warfare that also considers using variables of ‘smart power’ (Katoch, 2017).

The extension of the concept also elaborates the context of irregular warfare/sub-conventional warfare as a kinetic tool of the non-kinetic warfare. Moreover, psychological operations launched to shape the political environment before executing a kinetic operation also comes in the domain of indirect strategy. In other words, a definition that could help to elaborate the concept of non-kinetic warfare shall be the amalgamation of elements of national power...
because the same very elements become hostile to the application of indirect strategy. For example, powerful states cherish elements of national power (EoNP) and their ability to exploit the same very EoNP’s of weak states allows them to monopolies the non-kinetic warfare. If weak state fails to strengthen EoNP, the very weakness becomes the fault lines of its national security. In the non-kinetic warfare, this is the ideal environment which allows the enemy state to impose his will. Hence, the concept non kineticism can be explained as the “use of informational, psychological, diplomatic, economic, social and technological tools of the statecraft to achieve national interests and objectives by either acquiescing or impairing national will of the adversary” (NDU, 2012).

Non-kinetic applications involve exploitation of the existing vulnerabilities and fault lines by deepening the rift and weakening the national will. However, every internal rift or a problem surrounding the fault lines is not necessarily by product of non-kinetic warfare. Most of the time internal fault lines when expose its vulnerability, the actors of non-kinetic warfare gets an ideal opportunity to execute their agenda to further destabilize the situation, hence imposing the will on the target state. Ways, means, and ends solely operate under the psychological environment. It is possible to see application of kinetic means along with non-kinetic means during a situation. The very purpose of the non-kinetic warfare is to impose fear and destroy the enemy will. It works in the psychological ambit and without using physical force occupies the enemy’s decision making space which is necessary to perform national tasks.

b. Trinity of Non-Kineticism:

The above explanations amplifies that means used against the target state could be constant both for kinetic and non-kinetic application. For example, Berlin Airlift in 1948 involved use of physical means but is identified as non-kinetic application (Clodfelter, 2002);
whereas, the use of electromagnetic pulse by the United States during Iraq war in 2003 was non-kinetic in nature but its effects were direct and kinetic (Wilson, 2006). Hence, understanding the notion of non-kineticism in the contemporary politic-o-military environment is a complex phenomenon. Though, an effort has been made to better explain the notion through a trinity including adversary, indirect means, and impairment of will.

**Figure 3.2: Tritinity of Non-Kineticism**

The notion of trinity works in a simple way. The indirect means orchestrate the environment of non-kinetic warfare. There is an adversary who through indirect means takes the target state into the ‘black hole’ where ‘will’ of the imposer is achieved. For better understanding a comparative evaluation of both kinetic and non-kinetic warfare means have been orchestrated by using the matrix of ways, means, and ends.

The application of non-kinetic means operates in an environment suitable to achieve the desired objectives meant to paralyze the resilience of the national leadership in general but of the nation in particular. Hence, further explanation of the trinity of non-kineticism would evolve a better understanding in the contemporary environment. The best way to do so is to comprehend
both kinetic and non-kinetic warfare in comparison, which is done through segregation of Ends, Means, and Ways matrix.

- **Ends**

The last objective in any context whether its kinetic warfare or non-kinetic warfare is victory against the target state though it works differently in both scenarios. For example, through application of kinetic means the end objective is to gain victory through physical annihilation of the enemy both in terms of defense and economy. On the other hand, the application of non-kinetic means create the environment where ‘will power’ and ‘resilience’ of the national leadership and nation as a whole is impaired.

- **Ways**

The ways which are used in application of kinetic warfare differs from the ways that helps the non-kinetic warfare. For example, the application of kinetic means involves the following ways such as concepts, doctrines, strategies, plans, designs, and techniques. In case of non-kinetic warfare the ways are open-ended but specific to non-use of physical force and violence. It involves information, cyber, diplomacy, economic instruments, international law, guerilla/ insurgency/ sub-conventional warfare, espionage, smart and soft power projections. According to 2012 National Security Paper presented at National Defense University (NDU) Pakistan, non-kinetic ways also include, “cybernetics, trade wars, intelligence operations, media wars, WHAM, creative chaos, HAARP, ELF, mind control applications and disaster capitalism to mention few” (NDU, 2012).

- **Means**

The variation of ways defines the selection of means, which predominantly include air, sea, and land for the kinetic warfare. Moreover, fire-power, mobility, lethality, C4ISR, and
precision play the crucial role in a successful operationalization of kinetic warfare. Whereas, information, culture, alliances, aid, espionage, ideology, technology, social media, smart and soft power projection plays decisive role in non-kinetic warfare. In the non-kinetic warfare most of the time ways and means are used in synergy and revolve around same elements.

Military is one of the most important variables which tangibly allow the imposer to execute non-kinetic warfare. A weak state with no military power cannot initiate non-kinetic warfare. Therefore, military plays an important role on a back stage to strengthen the application of non-kinetic means. Other means which play very important role include role of diaspora, intelligenca, diplomats, traders, bankers, economists, politicians, non-state actors, multi-national corporations, non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations and international organizations like United Nations, European Union, International Court of Justice, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund.

**Figure 3.3: Non-Kinetic Matrix of Ways, Means, and Ends**
In theory and application, the non-kinetic warfare involves all the above variables and explanations which help to evolve the dynamics of 21st century warfare. Some other facets that revolve around non-kinetic warfare are pointed out below.

c. **Drivers of Non-Kineticism**

The drivers of the non-kinetic warfare are:-

- Aversion to war
- Economy
- Societal values
- Technology
- Mutually Assured Destruction

d. **Concepts and Theories of Non-Kinetic Warfare:**

Some of the important concept and theories are mentioned as under:-

- Creative chaos theory
- Shock doctrine
- HAARP theory
- Mind control sciences
- Strategic communication
- Effect based operations (EBO)

e. **Scenarios of Non-Kinetic Warfare:**

Application of non-kinetic warfare is likely to be witnessed in following three scenarios:-

- No Peace No War
- Sub conventional conflict or 4GW
- Conventional war
f. Facets of Non-Kinetic Warfare:

Important facets of non-kinetic warfare are the following:-

- Economic/Trade wars
- Diplomacy
- Information operations
- Soft power
- 4GW/ 5GW
- Espionage
- WHAM/Humanitarian operations
- Proxies

3.5. Non-Kinetic Warfare during the Cold War:

When it comes to application of non-kineticism, the phenomenon is not new neither its execution in the hands of powerful states. It has been used by many nations but in an unorganized manner. Though, the application of indirect strategy saw its military usage in the 2GW but it only became legitimate during the 3GW and slowly started to overcome direct methods of military engagement when 4GW completely adopted the context of indirect strategy. Application of non-kinetic warfare saw its legitimate peak during the Cold War which gave an official portfolio to indirect strategy to engage the enemy. It not only revolutionized the military thought but also shackled the very notion of military industrialization which had always focused on icons of warfare such as tanks, fighting jets, missiles, and nuclear weapons. The world of military strategy suddenly but rapidly changed the discourse of battlefield, where the concept of total war was almost eliminated (Hurley, Bucher, Numrich, Ouellette, Resnick, & Lidy, 2009).

The end of WW-II immediately declassified the alliance between victors, who failed to seek convergence in the new liberal order. For the Western World particularly for the United
States of America, Soviet expansion was an indication of competition rather cooperation. The competition of the Soviet Union was tagged by the then US President Truman into containment, who in 1947 declared a two pronged strategy to stop the Soviet expansion. The strategy was formally known as ‘Containment Policy’ which gave birth to Cold War (Clemis, 2009). The initiation of the Cold War was exceptionally challenging situation for the military strategists who under the umbrella of nuclear weapons could not guarantee a decisive victory against the Soviets. Moreover, Soviet technological advancements in the field of nuclear weapons also fixed US policy makers not to take direct punitive actions against communist Moscow. Therefore, a momentum of restraint existed between the two rivals, which gave impetus to application of indirect strategy. Hence, various means of indirect strategies involving diplomacy, economics, information, propaganda, insurgency, and proxies were applied in newly independent countries of Africa and Asia. Also neutral states were indirectly influenced not to join the Soviet expansion. The technological advancements in the field of nuclear, missile, and scientific exploration in outer space were also utilized as a symbol of superior nation, which further enhanced the competition in the said fields.

Tagging the application of non-kinetic warfare in the Cold War is quite a complex task, whereas; based on the declared policies of the United States of America and reciprocal response by the Soviet Union, a calculative effort has been made to summarize important elements of indirect strategy that both countries engaged against each other. This includes the following policies:

- Economic Warfare
- Information Warfare
- Cyber Warfare
- Espionage
• Proxies
• Diplomacy

a. Economic Warfare

The foundations of the post WWII world order rooted on liberal notions that officially adopted the concept of free market economy and values perpetrating the birth of accountability, transparency, and democracy. This new world was about to erode the very foundations of authoritarian fundamentals that one way or the other have set a stage of unaccountability in all spheres of politics and economics. So, this distinction automatically distinguished the US as liberal and Soviets as authoritarian inevitably announcing them two natural opponents and heading anti-clock-wise. This led to an obvious initiation of economic warfare between the two rivals. So, under the containment policy, the USA in 1948 announced Marshal Plan to uplift the Eastern European nations.

• The Marshal Plan

Marshall Plan was an economic instrument to contain Soviet expansion in Europe. The fear was that economically collapsed and politically unstable Europe will not be able to resist the Soviet expansion. Therefore, all the European nations were invited to share their plans about reconstruction of the Europe. It led to an ambitious effort to reconstruct the Europe and help the collapsed nations stand on their feet. The US provided $13 billion financial aid to Europe under the Marshal Plan. In addition to this amount, the US had already provided $12 billion aid during the period of Second World War that continued until Marshal Plan. Soviet Union was also invited to become part of Marshall Plan and contribute towards reconstruction of the Europe. Under the Marshall Plan each participating nation was suppose to declare its economic position by disclosing its financial records (Hogan, 1989). The USSR refused to accept the American
financial aid because it did not want to unveil its financial information to the United States of America as required under Marshal Plan. Moreover, the Soviet Union does not want to open up its society to western influence while receiving the aid from the United States of America. It feared that indulging into economic assistance would weaken its authoritarian writ and increase western political influence over the period of time making its government vulnerable to international negotiations. The weakening of the authoritarian government would have trickledown effect on its allies too and the whole notion of communism will go in vain. Therefore, the Soviet Union also dictated its allies not to indulge in the Marshal Plan and evolved a plan of its own, which named as Molotov Plan. This was reciprocal response to the American efforts which it started to rebuild Europe. Now under the Molotov Plan, the Soviet initiated the parallel arrangement to engage its allies and provided financial assistance to them. This action of the Soviet Union formally distanced it from the western world, hence marked the economic isolation of USSR (Roberts, 1994).

- **Berlin Airlift**

The Soviet Union took serious notice of the 1948 economic developments and reforms that came in the aftermath of Marshal Plan. Soviets apprehensions grew and multiplied its concerns in East Germany. Moreover, the success of the currency reforms in Europe was seen direct threat to Soviet influence and control in the East Germany. Therefore, Soviets decided to block all western efforts by economically hurting the west. USSR claimed the whole of Berlin within its zone by squeezing it into East Germany. That is how, upon introduction of new currency in Europe, the USSR declared the Berlin Blockade on June 24, 1948 and cut all land routes to West Berlin (Davison, 1980). This action of Soviet Union led the USA, Britain and France to start an expensive airlift support program to rescue about two million people trapped in
the western side of the Berlin. Regardless of lack of resources available to continue the airlift operation, the plan kept going for the period of eleven months. There were 278,000 flights ferrying more than 2 million metric tons of food, fuel, machinery, and other supplies at a total cost of 224 million dollars (Miller, 2000). On May 9, 1949, Stalin unable to force withdrawal of western nations admitted defeat by lifting the Berlin Blockade but successfully inflicted heavy financial losses to the west.

- **Embargos and Sanctions**

  Embargos and sanctions are somehow considered one of the most punitive indirect strategies to put long lasting pressures on an opponent. The method of forcing other nations to use economic and trade variable as a weapon was first advised by Madison (Moore, 2013), who drafted the ‘American Declaration of 1805’ and also known as father of the ‘American Declaration’ (Grafton, 2012). Application of economic sanctions and embargoes have remained important policy option for the United States during times of crisis evolving in the aftermath of military standoffs or diplomatic tussles (Selden, 1999). It is a useful tool when military options have limited scope to deter the opponent. US have been making legislations like Export Control Act of 1949 and Battle Act of 1951 to make sanctions legal. Keeping in view the reliance of this method, the United State has imposed sanctions and embargos on number of countries all over the globe (Mastanduno, 1988).

- **Reagan Doctrine**

  Ronald Reagan was no different to his predecessor and continued using non-kinetic means to engage the Soviet Union. He introduced a new strategy to subdue his Soviet counterparts which had three policy goals such as, denial to Soviet access towards modern
technology, devaluing the Soviet commodities at international market, diminish Soviet resources by engaging her in heavy defense spending. To achieve that, Reagan administration on the one side ensured that the Soviet Union should be denied access to modern technology. It also installed diplomatic efforts to devalue the prices of different products in the international market that had been helping Soviets to draw economic sustainability out of trade. Furthermore, keep engaging Soviets in expensive military projects were seen necessary to diminish its resources and put permanent burden of its financial institutions. This was ensured by the second tier of the policy, which was achieved by increasing the defense budget back in the USA. Dedicating more defense budget to US military inevitably gave greater leverage to Washington negotiating and bargaining position. It also helped the US to achieve third tier of the policy which inevitably engaged the Soviet Union to devote more resources to its defense (Schweizer, 1994).

Reagan’s policy of disengaging Soviets from the modern technology impacted negatively on Moscow’s ability to compete with the US. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration heavily invested to upgrade the armaments which took the US defense machinery ahead of the Soviets. This made the Soviet defense machinery absolute and incompetent to US high technology. The US defense up-gradation included almost induction of 600 navy ships, a whole new generation of missiles, fighting jets, improved tanks, and new divisions of the land forces (Gaddis, 2005).

The US non-kinetic means were not limited to disengagement of Soviets on periphery of known battlefield rather it took an exceptional move in 1983 to take the competition in outer space by announcing Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Under the SDI, the US initiated a plan to install a missile defence system in the outer space, which was to counter and prevent a Soviet ballistic missile attack. Also, it was about to give strategic superiority to shackle the Soviet defence. It was an exceptionally strategic move in the sphere of military technology and under
the doctrine of competition, Washington successfully engaged Soviets in outer space arms race (Duric, 2017).

During 80s Soviets major earnings come through its oil trade with the developed west and contribute about 80 percent of its capital earnings. Ronald Reagan deliberate persuasion with his Saudi counterparts helped dropping the oil prices up to fifty percent. Saudi Arabia rapidly decreased the “oil prices from $66 a barrel in 1980 to $20 a barrel in 1986” (Franklin, 1988). The sharp drop in the oil prices was part of an indirect strategy to bankrupt the Soviet Union, which critically pressurized the Soviet economy.

The Soviets responded by connecting gas fields in Siberia through 4,000 miles long pipeline to Western Europe. This opportunity was also denied by US through a cyber attack, which destroyed the project (Rid, 2012).

On kinetic fronts, the Soviet Union increased defence spending by 45 percent. It also spent billions more to bolster nervous and worried third world communist dictators, who from the very first day were parasites on the Soviet economy. As a result of combined effects of all these non kinetic measures the Soviet economy suffered heavy losses. Moreover, CIA through special operations in Afghanistan and Central America inflicted massive damage to Soviet economy. Within five years of Reagan administration came in office, the Soviet leadership started crippling and failed to put covers over fragile and doomed economy (Schweizer, 1994).

The aftermath of continued and deliberate usage of non-kinetic means of warfare placed victory in the court of United States, which ultimately weakened the Soviet economy so badly that the country was unable to stand on its feet. The presence of thousand of nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, naval ships, fighting jets, and tanks were incapable of holding
the vulnerable economy. The country was not defeated militarily but through internal economic blowback, which resulted out of non-kinetic means used by the USA (Bailey, 1998).

b. Information Warfare

From the perspective of non kinetic warfare, information operations are an important facet of environment and are defined as “actions taken in peace, crisis, conflict and war to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems” (Hurley, Bucher, Numrich, Ouellette, Resnick, & Lidy, 2009). The US used propaganda, and exchange programs as a core capability of information operation in the Cold War against the Soviets. Details of the use of propaganda and exchange programs are given in the subsequent paragraphs.

- Propaganda

The US politics and foreign policy dynamics uses propaganda so often that it has today became a permanent feature of Washington’s non-kinetic warfare. As John F. Kennedy said, “No matter how big the lie; repeat it often enough and the masses will regard it as the truth” (Daniels, 2012). Linking the propaganda with information operations was United States clandestine non-kinetic policy holding the objective to denounce the communism and to spread good ideals and attraction for America. This was quite a successful operation and was heavily funded by the US successive governments. Soviets were actively pursuing anti-US propaganda in Europe, which United States reciprocated with anti-Soviet propaganda. As part of the propaganda, the US spread good ideals and attraction about itself among the communist population. Moreover, the propaganda outcaste the goods of Soviet authoritarianism by propagating the horrors and evils
vested in communism. This helped the United States to influence internal trends among the communist public for positive reforms (Belmonte, 2013).

US established international communication networks such as Voice of America (VoA), Radio Free Europe also called Radio Liberty as credible means of propaganda campaigns against the Soviet communism. This medium of communication was used to transmit anti-Soviet information and propaganda messages to the local European community. Film making industry of Hollywood became the centre of attraction to discourage the communism and portray American way of life having abundance of everything. These films helped in creating an environment conducive to the disintegration of Soviet Union without much of the resistance (Shaw & Youngblood, 2010). Film stars, media personalities, successful business, and scholars disseminated the goodwill of the US as a land of opportunity and carried the image of it to the rest of the world.

- **Exchange Programmes**

  US policymakers turned to communist public to clarify the ideological differences in clandestine manner using official agreements. Therefore, an exchange agreement was signed between US and the Soviet Union on January 27, 1958 on exchanges in the cultural, technical, and educational fields to make progressive approach in all walks of life. Among many programs that the US initiated, two of them are of utmost importance, (a) International Visitor Leadership Program, and (b) US Fulbright Program. The International Visitor Leadership Program invited thousands of influential leaders and scholars to the US for sharing their ideas, views, and experiences. Under this program the US invited around 2000 foreigners until 1980s. Moreover, the Fulbright Program accommodated around 300,000 exchanges between US and foreign graduates (DOS, 2018).
c. **Cyber Warfare**

Cyber operation is a domain of non-kinetic warfare which has no physical world to operate rather functions in a space which is bigger than the physical world. This is in fact a world of cyberspace where everything is connected with computers, networks, databases, information systems, and cables that gets affected through combat coding (Cobos, 2012). The purpose is to create confusion and particular disruption into normal affairs of social, political, economic, and military operations. Hackers hack through intervention into the system and by exploiting gaps data is encrypted. On military fronts, the same could bring by adding false data which could feed disinformation in to the system while making it vulnerable to false commands. If it is successfully conducted, the catastrophic results emerge out of nowhere.

The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union did recognize the use of cyber operations as means of non-kinetic warfare. For example, in 1980s when Ronald Reagan persuaded to Saudi Arabia to 50% oil prices cut, it badly impacted on the Soviet economy. The Soviets main source of economy was export of its oil to rich western nations, which immediately went down due to extensive oil production by the Saudis and also fifty percent cut to oil price per barrel (Reynolds & Kolodziej, 2008). The Soviets responded to such an American non-kinetic move by connecting the gas fields in Siberia through 4,000 miles long pipeline to Western Europe (Blinken, 1987). This Soviet project was exploded by the CIA in 1982 through a cyber attack, which later on was also referred as the bomb attack. In the words of Thomas C. Reed who was the Advisor to President Ronald Reagan, the United States infiltrated the ‘Trojan Horse’ virus into the software that the former Soviet Union acquired from a Canadian company to run the pipeline control. Reed writes in his book *At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War* that “the pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines and valves was programmed to go
haywire, to reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline joints and welds. The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space” (Reed, 2005).

d. Espionage

Intelligence agencies of all the countries, big or small, carry out all kinds of tasks in accord to their national interests. Cold War is no different when it comes to see application of espionage in the domain of non-kinetic warfare. During the Cold War, espionage was centered on:

- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
- Communications Intelligence (COMINT)
- Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)
- Image/Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
- Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Without going into detail of the above specifications of intelligence, it is important to mention seriousness of the operations conducted under espionage. For example, a US court sentenced two American citizens Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to death, who were charged with sharing Atomic secret with the Soviet Union (Goldstein, 1975). Some historians attribute this as a reason for acquiring nuclear capability by the Russians.

The Americans had their own spy hero known as Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet military officer, working for the American and British Intelligences. Mr. Penkovsky played the major role during the 1962 standoff between Soviet Union and United States in Cuba. The intelligence based information provided by the Penkovsky was decisive to help United States avert the backlash of Cuban Missile Crises (Scott, 1999).
Furthermore, the US inability to collect information over vast geography of the Soviet Union had blessing in disguise to go after satellite technology. It gave birth to imagery intelligence technology and the famous U-2 Spy plane came into being (Polmar, 2001).

e. Proxies

The history of the Cold War is littered with proxies supported by USA and USSR against each other by using direct and indirect means. Starting from a blow back in the Vietnam to proxy war in Afghanistan, both the United States and Soviet Union felt the heat, respectively. Vietnam as the first televised war of America entered into the dark tunnel when it through détente and backdoor diplomacy helped the US to come back to light. The Soviet Union had the same fate in Afghanistan, when it failed to overcome proxy war fed through Pakistan and led by the United States. The decade long involvement of Soviet Union in Afghanistan and economic bleeding back at home became the final reason of its economic meltdown. The elephant went down and the symbol of ‘evil empire’ was disintegrated (Mamdani, 2005).

Some of the other important proxies that happened during the Cold War are mentioned in the Figure 3.1.

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<tr>
<th>Table 3.1: Cold War Proxies</th>
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<td>Korean War</td>
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<td>Yom Kippur War</td>
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<td>Afghan War</td>
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f. **Diplomacy**

Diplomacy is a unique tool of statehood which distinguishes its role both for the soft and hard power in such a way that makes it suitable and applicable in all situations. This distinction of it has also opened new avenues when non-kinetic domain of warfare comes into discussion. For example, diplomacy as determinant of foreign policy has distinguished itself in kinetic affairs. In the meanwhile, its utilization to make alliances and to highlight global issues for international peace and security brought non-kinetic tactics to project ones global image. The interplay of diplomacy between kinetic and non-kinetic domains gives it a leverage to maneuver the situation. The same had happened in the Cold War when the US diplomacy found its strength from the Truman Doctrine and dictated its policy of ‘Containment’ with means of indirect strategy towards the Soviet Union.

- **Alliance Diplomacy**

As a result, it gave birth to military diplomacy which formed unprecedented transatlantic alliance, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO’s main aim was to discourage communist aggression but was also meant to keep peace among former enemies in the Western Europe. This integration was a great feat of diplomacy as some of the countries in the past were enemies while others had cultural, religious, economic and ethnic differences (Muthanna, 2011).

- **Arms Control Diplomacy**

The aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki opened the door for hard power competition with variables of high technology vested in the policy of confrontation and competition among the newly emerged victors of Second World War. Immediately, the US and Soviet Union got engaged in a nuclear arms race to dominate each other. Resultantly, both became increasingly
preoccupied with calculations of stability-instability paradox with possibility of use of nuclear weapons. The likely arms race and indirect military operations against each other brought a stage of nuclear catastrophe many times during the Cold War. The first situation arose when during the Korean War both Soviet Union and United States came so close to engage into direct war. The second stage was even more complex when in 1962; Soviet Union successfully installed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in Cuba and gave strategic surprise to United States. The 90 kilometer distance with thousands of lives at risk made the United States so vulnerable that the country almost thought the war is inevitable (Mueller, 1990). Thanks to diplomacy and resumption of it on the fronts of non-kinetic domain, which helped both the states to start rounds of negotiation thus brought military and political compromise between the two arc rivals.

The Cuban Missile Crises opened a lot of new domains for cooperation between the United States and Soviet Union. Among them the most important was arms control diplomacy, which helped both the states to realize for the very first time, how bad is the arms race? Therefore, the aftermath of Cuban crisis brought multiple agreements including the Outer Space Treaty to limit the risk. These treaties were result of consistent and hectic diplomatic efforts from the both sides. The success of early treaties gave much needed confidence and importance to diplomacy, which ultimately became instrumental in negotiating and crafting a wide range of treaties between the two worst enemies (Johnson, 2013).

The Cold War is a classic example when it comes to application of non-kinetic means to engage an opponent. The ultimate objective of the US to defeat Soviet ideology of communism took almost five decades. Ultimately, Soviet Union disintegrated in 1989 due to prolonged and long lasting application of non-kinetic means. Beside multifarious non-kinetic means applied by
the US, there were many other reasons which contributed to Soviet demise (Stoner-Weiss & McFaul, 2009). In view of Michael McFaul, the domestic reasons of Soviet demise were:

i. Unreliable planning system
ii. Unrealistic economic targets
iii. Continued decline in growth rate
iv. Slow oil production and agricultural growth
v. Negative demographic trend
vi. Almost 100% inflation rate

There are many conclusions that one can draw out of Cold War competition and disintegration of Soviet Union as a result. Though, salient features on application of the non-kinetic means during the Cold War could be summarized as under:

a. The Soviet Policy of Iron Curtain created insecurity among the European countries and provided reason for unification of western block against USSR.
b. Over arching influence of nuclear USA and ability to confront the communist ideology through application of non kinetic means was no match for the Soviet Union.
c. Ideology of capitalism was used against communism for gaining support of west against Soviet Union.
d. Well orchestrated and long term economic maneuver enabled the collapse of Soviet Union.
e. Devoting already weak economic resources to sustain arms race lead boosted the processes of Soviet disintegration.
f. The successful execution of propaganda operation under information warfare softened the hearts and minds of communist societies towards western values and ideals making the US far ahead of cultural acceptance than the Soviets.
g. Proxies and espionage as important elements of non-kinetic warfare were successfully employed by the USA to defeat and outcast the USSR.
h. Nuclear weapons alone cannot ensure sovereignty of any nation. Comprehensive national security policy is a recipe to guard against multi dimensional threats. The amalgamation of both kinetic and non-kinetic means of warfare and its appropriate understanding made the USA invincible against Soviet kinetic measures.

i. Non-kinetic warfare by the United States with special emphasis on use of economic, diplomatic, psychological and information means were the main contributing factors in the disintegration of USSR

3.6. Non-Kinetic Warfare in the 21st Century:

The direct military actions are mostly damaging to humans both physically and morally. The real attainment of objectives is thus obscured by the physical annihilation caused. It is to the credit of the indirect art of war to mould opinion and demoralize enemy before actual physical attack. In many of the cases even the masses are so mentally mobilized and harmonized that they actually perform the task of the enemy.

Reliance on non-kinetic means is an economic and non violent approach to secure national interests in the long term without invoking violent response from the adversary. Owing to economic interdependence, prohibitive cost of war, conflicts between states are likely to be driven by non-kinetic means. However, strong militaries will continue using kinetic application as primary means, supported by information operations. Moreover, contemporary environment substantiated by the defense budget of global powers amplifies the continued overarching relevance of military might for power projection. Therefore, proportionate representation between kinetic and non kinetic has been driven by national interests, threat spectrum and reach and efficacy of the means available.

The contemporary environment has witnessed the development of the most modern military means ever built. However, their existence is also an impediment to their use, mainly
due to lethality which provides a strategic choice to rely on indirect means. Emerging features of globalization include information, diplomacy, societal values and overarching facet of economic interdependence. This has diffused states beyond internationally recognized borders, increasing their reach ‘farther, deeper and cheaper’ (Friedman, 2005). This phenomenon has increased the financial stakes of individuals, states, non-state actors (NSA), and Trans-national Corporations (TNCs) amplifying the cost of damage to unacceptable limit. Therefore, in order to secure national interest transition of priorities from geo-politics to geo-economics has put non-kinetic warfare under the spot light.

The 21st century political environment has shaped the sphere of insecurity into multi-levels, which includes economic, societal, environmental, information, human and military security, implying utilization of all elements of national power (EoNP). Therefore, the modern concept of security is holistic in nature and can be summarized under the title ‘comprehensive national security’. The comprehensive national security adopts both kinetic and non-kinetic domains into its ambit and provides balance remedy to challenges arising from domestic, regional, or international political environment. Under the ambit of comprehensive national security, military acts as a mean of kinetic strength and variables of economics, societal, environmental, information, and human security comes in the domain of non-kinetic means (Bachmann, 2012). To better understand the changing dynamics of 21st century non-kinetic applications, few important events have been explained, which include:

- Gulf War-II: Synchronized application of both kinetic and non-kinetic means
- Application of non-kinetic means in the Arab Spring
- Annexure of Crimea by Russia in 2016
- Cyber attacks on Pentagon and Iranian nuclear installations
- Application of information warfare by Russia to influence US Presidential Elections 2016
Application of non-kinetic warfare in contemporary environment is happening on multi-levels, which is quite complex then its evolutionary phase particularly from the Cold War. Understanding the complexity is somehow interlinked with the post-WWII sequence of events that witnessed application of indirect strategy. Extensive debate regarding application of indirect strategy during the Cold War period has already been explained in the previous section of the chapter. It is important to highlight that the successful application of indirect strategy during the Cold War have categorically replaced the role of kinetic application though some of the context of direct strategy was prevalent in US response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when they provided Stinger Missiles to Mujahedeen (Withington, 2003). In fact, Soviet Union being the invader was not directly countered by the United States rather through proxy war Washington engaged the Moscow. The same strategy was applied when United States entered into Vietnam and the Soviet Union while supporting the South Vietnamese driven the proxy war against Washington. One of the states was using kinetic means particularly military force to achieve its interest, whereas the competing opponent preferred application of non-kinetic means to defeat its enemy. The enemy was visible and provided opportunity to apply indirect strategy against its kinetic posture. That is why the Cold War era is classic example of non-kinetic warfare to bleed and wound the opponents through indirect strategy.

The 21st century warfare dynamics are totally different. Under the prevailing military technology particularly the development of nuclear weapons; any kinetic adventure would inevitably bring total war scenario. Moreover, induction of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) into military response could change the landscape of the whole world within the span of few minutes. The application of kinetic means through military confrontations has an irrevocable damage. The investment and price of progress in the fields of economic prosperity,
cultural diversity, modernity, political stability, revolution in science and technology could not be compromised just on the blink of an eye. The competitive outlook vested in the international order has failed to learn from the capabilities of destruction achieved through icons of warfare. Regardless of ensuing peace and order in the political space of international relations, more and more unique strategies of warfare are being indoctrinated into the national security. 21st century has witnessed its unique interaction with the changing dimensions of warfare. Today, the application of kinetic means is less idealized rather non-kinetic means are preferred. The competition is still alive.

The Cold War distinction where one of the enemies was visible had brought phenomenon of invisibility. Uniquely, in the 21st century, all the opponents are in stealth mode and clandestinely applying non-kinetic means. The opponents take their enemy out of nowhere, thus providing no margin of response. So, the elements such as economic prosperity, cultural diversity, modernity, political stability, revolution in science and technology that one does not wants to comprise while engaging into direct military confrontation could orchestrate a modern way of war. The non-kinetic warfare becomes hybrid in its nature when one of the strong opponents exploits economic prosperity, cultural diversity, modernity, and political stability of the other and changes the elements of national power into variables of vulnerability. This is obviously done through the means of indirect strategy such as economic warfare, information warfare, cyber warfare, espionage, proxies, soft power, and diplomacy to mention few.

That is why we have clear distinction between application of non-kinetic means when it comes to Cold War and 21st century modern warfare. Therefore, the Cold War is classified as 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) and the 21st century is classified as 5th Generation Warfare (5GW), which is rightly referred as ‘hybrid warfare’. To connect it with the 21st century context of non-
kinetic warfare, a specific case study is identified that will bridge the Cold War with the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Keeping in view the distinction between Cold War and 21\textsuperscript{st} century hybrid warfare, this case study is unique. In fact, this case study presents an example of non-kinetic warfare with synchronized kinetic application, whereas, 21\textsuperscript{st} century hybrid warfare only includes non-kinetic warfare without use of kinetic application. To explain this perspective of non-kinetic warfare, ‘Gulf War II’ is presented in the context of synchronized application of both kinetic and non-kinetic applications. The later part of this chapter would specifically shed light on examples of 21\textsuperscript{st} century warfare that only brings context of non-kinetic application without applying kinetic means.

1) **Gulf War-II: Synchronized application of both kinetic and non-kinetic means**

The Gulf War II is a first event of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century which happened to witness application of both kinetic and non-kinetic means of warfare. Before US and allied forces attacked Iraq, a dedicated plan of action consisting application of non-kinetic means was initiated, which included shaping the environment, pre and post-conflict information operations, and perception management both at domestic and international fronts. A cursory explanation is given in subsequent paragraphs.

- **Shaping the Environment:**

  The Gulf War-II created synergy between kinetic and non-kinetic means of warfare before final attack was launched on Saddam’s Baghdad. Dedicated means of indirect strategy were applied even years before the use of kinetic force, which included economic warfare, information warfare, cyber warfare, espionage, soft power, and diplomacy. Since the end of Gulf War-I of 1991 (operation desert storm), means of indirect strategy were continuously in
execution. The post 1991 Iraq faced economic sanctions through United Nations resolutions with international rhetoric against its nuclear propaganda which isolated the country. The weapons of mass destruction (WMD) mantra also classified the Saddam regime threat to peace and stability. The final context was Iraq’s status as ‘axis of evil’ which ultimately grabbed the very international image of the country. Before final attack the US also ensured a no-fly zone over the Iraqi air space.

- **Information Operations:**

  George W. Bush while having a discussion with three of US Senators along with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, categorically announced (while making the other discussants uncomfortable) that, “______Saddam, we’re taking him out” (Elliott & Carney, 2003). Continuing the information propaganda, US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz while his interview to *Vanity Fair* which he gave on May 28, 2003 said, “the truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction, as the core reason” (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2003). The narrative of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) potentially received great number of consumers, who could be moulded time and over again. Moreover, the narrative was so big so good that almost international community along with United Nations was unable to resist. The continued contextualization of WMDs created a landscape of general misconception which further received continued policy feedback from the highest offices that negated the narrative at one stage deemed utter nonsense. This gave the impetus to policy mobilization which happened as the bad luck of Iraq.

  On September 8, 2002, the National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice during his interview with *CNN* and while speaking on the topic of Iraq’s nuclear program and Bush
decision to go to war said, “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud” (CNN, 2002). This showed her indirect acceptance of the fact that there was no full-fledged nuclear program neither a developed nuclear weapon in possession of Iraq. The context of smoking gun was seriously taken by many circles in United States which later-on Condoleezza Rice twisted to convert it into a bomb. The mushroom cloud was nowhere around Iraq even for many decades. Also, in continuation to the rhetoric, the prime US secret agency, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stayed side by side to orchestrate the plan of Iraq War. On December 21, 2002, the CIA Director George Tenet while speaking about the case of war in context to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) said, “It’s a slam-dunk case” (Blomquist, 2004).

The war started on March 20, 2003 and entered in the phase of expectations, which was the biggest war in itself. The way Bush administration orchestrated the war, the same way they have to deliver the results. The war continued with full blow and it was the first of its kind which telecasted all its postures, mostly live. Getting into post war scenario when Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense was interviewed by ABC News on March 30, 2003 and encountered with a question about weapons of mass destruction said that, “we know where they are. They’re in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat . . .” (Shanker, 2003).

The post war scenario was no different to information propaganda. Regardless of sharing true picture of the war with American citizens, the US President George Bush kept lying. On May 2, 2003, when he visited the USS Lincoln Aircraft Carrier to boost the forces moral, he said: “major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed” (Sanger, 2003). Behind him was the banner displayed ‘Mission Accomplished’. As a matter of fact, it’s September 2019 but the war in Iraq is still going on and
shedding its disaster on lives of millions of Iraqis. Nothing is achieved neither political stability and peace nor prosperity which was promised to the people.

The leader of the whole information propaganda campaign to sell the war against Iraq, President Bush categorically also lied to Polish TV during his interview on May 29, 2003 that, “we found the weapons of mass destruction” (White House, 2003). The lie has never been endorsed with facts of any weapons recovery but the Iraq as a whole has been thrown out into hellfire. Taking the lead and also stationing himself close to the narrative of the Iraq War, the then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once again on June 24, 2003 stated that “I don’t know anybody that I can think of who has contended that the Iraqis had nuclear weapons” (Rumsfeld, 2003).

The propaganda never stopped, it went on just like the war in Iraq. Adding disinformation to the whole narrative, the United States Vice President Dick Cheney on November 7, 2003 said that, “in Iraq, a ruthless dictator cultivated weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. He gave support to terrorists, had an established relationship with al Qaeda. . . .” (White House, 2003). This was utterly wrong as false narrative was build as an excuse to justify the war in Iraq.

On January 20, 2004, President Bush while delivering a State of the Union Address in a joint session of Congress nationally televised said that, “already, the Kay Report identified dozens of weapons of mass destruction-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed. . . .” (The Washington Post, 2004). David Kay was given responsibility to investigate the potential capability of Saddam Hussain to develop weapons of mass destruction, who submitted his findings on October 2, 2003. He gave mixed interpretations
that lead the Bush Administration to re-invoke the very idea of weapons of mass destruction narrative (Binder, Franz, Monteleone-Neto, Spertzel, & Zilinskas, 2003).

The war was not over but the patience that required to defend the outcomes and failed promises got impetus. On August 29, 2004 while giving an interview to *Time Magazine* Bush almost accepted the misery and failure when he replied that, “had we to do it over again, we would look at the consequences of catastrophic success, being so successful so fast that an enemy that should have surrendered or been done in escaped and lived to fight another day....” (Fox News, 2004). He shockingly realized the non-kinetic response of Iraqi people who through guerilla warfare took the US and allied forces out of their boots. Underestimating the non-kinetic response of Iraqis and over-relying on the kinetic power of the US forces was the mistake that Bush wanted to regret on.

Not as a last nail into coffin but few among many, the Defense Secretary encountered a serious question on December 8, 2004 by a US marine who participated in the Iraq war bluntly asked, “why troops had to dig through scrap metal to armor vehicles” (Schmitt, 2004). Donald Rumsfeld replied to him and said that, “as you know, you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time” (Schmitt, 2004). This answer of Donald Rumsfeld was in fact a ‘statement of confession’ about tragedy of Iraq war and expectations they have urged from the so called outcomes. Nothing was real from the very beginning then how come the outcomes of the war. United State’s political and military ranks were in jeopardy and turmoil. The declassification of the war mantra was impossible and the dilemma of insurgency took them from head to toe. Escape was impossible as was evident from the US Vice President Dick Cheney’s understatement regarding insurgency, when in June 20, 2005 he said that, “I think they’re in the last throes, if you will, of the insurgency” (CNN, 2005). Realistically unaware,
Dick Cheney did not realize that insurgency is just opening up an open-ended world of warfare, which is a black hole and nothing can come out of it once gets into it.

The US also used few other information operations to mold and inflict the outcomes of war. For example, the US dropped leaflets in Iraq. They also used electronic warfare to disable command, control, and communication networking of the armed forces. Moreover, planted reporters and live coverage of the war through video reporting did the most important job to influence both local and international public opinion.

Prior to war, US had two goals; one to curtail Iraqi ability to develop weapons of mass destruction while forcing the Saddam regime to comply with United Nations weapons inspection team, and the second to gain support from the international community to get oust Saddam regime and invade Iraq. Both the objectives were achieved successfully but at the cost of exposing the whole Iraqi nation to terror, turmoil, instability, and insurgency.

- Perception Management:

Perception management is again an important facet of the whole of information warfare, which United States continued on all important forums. For example, the US Secretary of State Collin Powell’s presentation to the United Nations that he delivered to Security Council on February 05, 2003 had been part of perception management, which culminated the desired international support (The Guardian, 2003).

The post war symbolic demolition of the Saddam’s statue that was destroyed and torn down on April 09, 2003 by the locals along with help of United States soldiers was classic example of perception management (Fisher, 2011). The projection was fantastically portrayed everywhere in the world which indirectly established the promise of so-called liberation and freedom for the Iraqi people.
• **Survey of American Perception:**

On October 2, 2003, The *Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and Knowledge Network* submitted a study which explained American public opinion on Iraq war. Between January 2003 to September 2003, seven separate surveys were conducted to analyze the public perception about US foreign policy, world public opinion, availability of weapons of mass destruction and links of Iraq with the 9/11 incident. There were so many other questions which time and again were shaped to better evaluate the misperception and belief of the American public (PIPA, 2003). Steven Kull as Principal Investigator conducted the study and looked on three important facets in context to Iraq war, which included:

a. **Saddam Hussein and 9/11**

The poll was conducted while framing this question; “how likely is it that Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the September 11th Terrorist attacks?”

The poll on this question provided the following results:

- 32% American told that they believed it is ‘very likely’
- The remaining 37% believed it was ‘somewhat likely’

In continuation to few other polls conducted as part of *PIPA and Knowledge Network* the overall survey reflected that about 7 Americans among 10 believed that Saddam has direct connection with 9/11 terrorist attack.

b. **Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s) and Iraq**

The poll also included perception of American public related to weapons of mass destruction which was done through the following questions, “Since the war with Iraq ended, is
it your impression that the US has or has not found Iraqi weapons of mass destruction?”. Both questions were asked in the aftermath of war as earlier America launched its military campaign against Iraq majority public opinion was clutched in the belief that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction including majority of the Intelligence community believed WMD context is reality. Therefore, another question was framed to get a response regarding use of WMDs by the Iraqi military which asked particularly, “Is it your impression that Iraq did or did not use chemical or biological weapons in the war that just ended?”

The poll on this question provided the following results:

- Almost in seven different surveys an aggregate 35% American believed that United States have found the weapons of mass destruction.
- Responding to second question on use of WMDs by the Iraqis, an aggregate 24% believed that weapons of mass destructions are used against US forces.

The overall results of the poll reflected massive misperception took over the whole American public opinion which saw wrong side of the real posture. In fact, Iraq never used any weapons of mass destruction against US forces neither United States found any such weapons in custody of Iraq.

c. Perception of International Community about US War against Iraq

The internationalization of the Iraq war received dedicated portion in the information warfare campaign. It was necessary for the United States political and military leadership to sell the cause to an international audience that could endorse its military invasion of Iraq. Exploring a real picture of international perception about US war against Iraq was deemed necessary by the PIPA and Knowledge Network experts. The American public opinion was once again believed on misperception that majority of the world supports US invasion of Iraq, whereas in real, majority
of the international community rejected the unilateral decision of US going to war against Iraq by bypassing the United Nations. In this regards, the *PIPA and Knowledge Network* framed a separate question to know American public opinion on reaction of international community regarding US invasion of Iraq, which asked, “thinking about how all the people in the world feel about the US having gone to war with Iraq, do you think: The majority of people favor the US having gone to war?" The poll results showed the following trends:

- About 31% believed that international opinion is confused and has split verdict on US decision to go to war with Iraq.
- Again around 31% believed that the majority of international community supports the US decision.
- 38% rightly pointed out that the US decision to go to war with Iraq is opposed by the majority of international community.

The split of public opinion was drastically in negation to international threat perception. The United States conducted a comprehensive and well orchestrated application of Non Kinetic Warfare before and during the conventional stage of the conflict; however, lost sight of this aspect when the war transitioned into 4th Generation Warfare, which gave space to the Iraqi insurgents to apply the non kinetic means against US effectively. The dilemma of insecurity is still ‘ON’ in Iraq which gave impetus to non-state actors to generate multidimensional threats to US and its allies. The Muslim World as a whole has been clutched in the phenomenon of instability and most likely would face a prolonged instability due to uncontrolled borders of ideology.
As mentioned in the earlier section of this chapter that Gulf War II has been an exceptional case study when it comes to application of both kinetic and non-kinetic warfare. Though, evolutionary in understanding the complexities of the military thought, it does provide a unique portfolio to application of force in the 21st century. It is moreover a unique event in the post-Cold War period which allowed application of kinetic means by a powerful state against the week. The underestimation of the non-kinetic response by the week state even make it more inclusive case study to evaluate failure of a state who brilliantly applied combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means. As beautifully explained by Henry Kissinger that:

“We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win” (Kissinger, 1969: 214).

The kinetic application carries burden of time limits as it has to address the zenith of political objectives, whereas, non-kinetic means provides the best results when it is operating freely from time bar. Big nations with big intensions cannot afford prolonged kinetic warfare rather their ability in the domain of cyber, information, economic, culture, diplomacy, propaganda, technology, and international law; makes them more appropriate player in the non-kinetic warfare. This in fact sponsored the realization of the 21st century application of force and had helped to evolve the military thought in the dominion of non-kinetic warfare. The US synergized strategy which it applied in Iraq War had given inevitable lessons to military pundits who learning from the mistakes of other had evolved a new era of 21st century ‘hybrid warfare’.

It is important to highlight that machines can be controlled but human minds cannot be controlled. Information warfare as a tool to manipulate millions of minds provides instant results as compared to firing millions of bullets to push a nation to surrender. The mechanism of controlling the collective will brings amazing results, thereafter the biggest variable of resilience
goes in vain. Non-kinetic warfare is amazing, you do your job and gets no impact but the target vanishes away its strength, resilience, and image at once.

2) **Application of non-kinetic means in the Arab Spring**

In the aftermath of Tunisian political crisis in 2011, the use of social media networks which gave birth to ‘Arab Spring’ is classic example of application of non-kinetic means in the 21st century. Protracted but deliberate indirect strategy escalated the so-called Arab Spring to whole Middle East. Stretching its influence from Tunisia, the movement was extended through social media which grabbed instantly the cultural, political, and socio-economic elements, which had immediate fallouts on Egypt, Syria, Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen (Markham, 2014).

3) **Annexure of Crimea by Russia in 2016**

In 2016, by charging the cultural and linguistic variable Russia initiated annexation of Crimea, which became quite a successful execution of Moscow’s soft power usage as part of non-kinetic application. Russian kinetic interest was to disallow Ukraine tilting towards America and becoming part of antimissile shield, a greater US project to encircle Russia through installation of anti ballistic missile system (Lanoszka, 2016). Crimea was annexed through referendum which was influenced through the cultural and linguistic provocation by the Russian propaganda.

4) **Cyber attacks on Pentagon and Iranian nuclear installations**

The cyber attacks on Pentagon and Iranian nuclear facilities are also successful episode of the application of non-kinetic warfare.

As a result of Crimean annexation to Russian Federation, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Moscow. This led to a cyber response by the Russians against military
heart of United States, the Pentagon. In the month of August 2015, Russian hackers initiated almost 30,000 emails and sent to West Coat University, among four were successfully forwarded from the university to Joint Staff at Pentagon. Lucky for the hackers, one out of four emails was opened at Joint Staff, which let the hackers enter the system. This caused hardware and software replacement to Pentagon which indirectly took almost two weeks to do the job (Martin, 2016).

Moreover, struggling against the Iranian nuclear program is a continuous foreign policy posture that United States have permanently pursued. Tehran’s nuclear intension is a subjective question but her unwillingness to open itself to international inspections had been a matter of serious concern by the advocates of non-proliferation and global zero. Dialogue, negotiations, sanctions, and political bargaining have been a permanent facet that the international community adopted to deal with the Iranian nuclear program. Parallel to that the US National Security institutions have also configured cyber warfare as viable tool to inflict into Iranian nuclear facilities. In this context, during 2000 US developed a virus called ‘Stuxnet’ which successfully reached at one of Iranian enrichment facility ‘Natanz’ through an encrypted USB device. In 2009 and 2010, the virus sabotaged the system which faulted around 1000 or so centrifuges and almost halted the uranium enrichment process (Fingas, 2014).

Some sources did claim that a parallel attack was also initiated against North Korea, which failed due to inability of computer identification which operates at any of the Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities (Menn, 2015).

5) Application of Information Warfare by Russia to influence 2016 US Presidential Elections

There are hundreds of examples that can be quoted and among top will be the recent 2016 US Presidential Elections, which came into spotlight in the aftermath of Russian meddling into
United State’s one of the finest political system. This act of Russia is true example of information warfare, which sent a wave of insecurity to all major political systems of the world. The successful execution of so-called information warfare made Donald J. Trump 45th US President; a legitimate custodian of one of the most powerful nation with its resources. The results of information warfare are so sudden and positively fruitful that the use of kinetic means to bring regime change has totally lost its significance.

Reacting to meddling of Russia into 2016 US Presidential elections and its clandestine cyber activities against the United States, on March 15, 2018; Department of the Treasury sanctioned five Russian organizations including nineteen people. It also prohibited the American people and companies to do any business with the banned companies and people of Russia. The Treasury Department statement categorically said that “the Administration is confronting and countering malign Russian cyber activity, including their attempted interference in US elections, destructive cyber-attacks and intrusions targeting critical infrastructure” (DOTR, 2018).

The shifting interests and complexities vested in the geo-politics of the international system have tilted nations to focus more on non-violent and non-kinetic means to achieve desired objectives, which inevitably brought up the importance of elements of national power. Though, the 21st century environment has completely adopted the non-kinetic means but still strong and viable armed forces are necessary to protect and defend a nation. The global trends point towards the smart power where military will keep supporting other elements of national power instead of being a primary driver. That is why to guard against the threats of non-kinetic warfare; the contemporary environment expects some extraordinary changes in the traditional thinking of national security policies. Modern and comprehensive national security policy could only evolve
an ambit of resistance against the complexity of non-kinetic theatre. Nations with mix signaling could not survive in the pandora of falsehood.

Since the nature of 21\textsuperscript{st} century is complex and evolving with hybrid nature. Here the fundamental question, how Pakistan has tackled this nature of warfare is an important gap that requires relevance with the previous investigation and deliberate exposure to identify Pakistan’s geostrategic compulsions and security vulnerabilities. To attain this primary objective the next phase of study is dedicated to evolve genesis of Pakistan’s threat perceptions till the 21\textsuperscript{st} century warfare that it had fought through military application.
CHAPTER FOUR

PAKISTAN AND THE GENESIS OF ITS THREAT PERCEPTIONS

4.1. Introduction:

Pakistan came into political existence in 1947 but the very manifestation of its ideological foundation goes back to era of Muslim glory that took shape around 1400 years ago in Arab. The broader domain of Islamic philosophy has mostly inaugurated political, economic, and social structure of South Asian Muslims. Owing to the holistic life style of Indo-Pak subcontinent, Muslims of the region adopted milled postures of cultural harmony. In other words, recognizing each other’s different culture, traditions, socio-economic dynamics, and religious rituals; both Muslims and Hindus of the subcontinent existed on lines of distinction for many centuries (Varshney, 2003).

Specifically, Muslim rule under Mughal Empire did not isolate the Hindus and Sikhs rather invented amalgamation of political discourse which never fueled communal sentiments. Moreover, the posture of Muslim rulers in the Subcontinent had always cherished diversity and allowed freedom to religious practices. That is why at the times of Muslim politics other communities were not forced to convert their religion rather were supported to maintain their presence as Hindus, Sikhs, Parsies, and Christians (Ahmed, 2002). Even in the 21st century Subcontinent though divided into India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh; availability of millions of followers and existence of temples clearly endorses that Islamic liberty had allowed all different religions to evolve at the same time when Muslims were getting strength in the region. In fact, it was collective evolution and progress towards future.

Similarly to Muslim cultural presence, Hindus does have enjoyed some sort of civilizational heritage. Prior to Muslims rule in Indo-Pak Subcontinent, Hindus ruled the region
with mixed political authority. It was the year 712CE when an Arab General Muhammed Bin Qasim entered the subcontinent hence bringing the first phase of Islamic orientation to the region. Muslims under different political mechanisms ruled the region for about 1000 years and were replaced by the then British Colonial Empire in 1857 that fought with the last custodians of Muslim glory the Mughal Empire (Ali, 1967). The 90 years successful rule of the British Empire ultimately divided the region into two sovereign states, India and Pakistan in 1947. Being distinctive in cultural context, the ideological foundations of both Muslims and Hindus had also remained distinguished (Gaborieau, 1985). Hindus have never accepted the ideological premises of Muslims in the region rather clandestinely invoked anti-Muslim resistance (Frykenberg, 2017).

It is once again important to highlight that the Muslim rulers had never ignited anti-Hindu or anti-Sikh hatred rather adopted inclusive approach to accommodate all minority religions. Since Hindu politics was weak and unavailability of strong military means to challenge Muslim rule; the Mughal Empire successfully governed the region. It was 18th century when the British East India Company entered in the Indo-Pak Subcontinent through the route of trade which with the passage of time inaugurated colonial posture by exploiting the socio cultural and ideological fault lines. The so-called trade and economic venture of the East India Company clandestinely executed its real military plans to invade the whole sub-continent. Mughal’s failure to understand British plan of colonizing the region and inability to appropriately respond ultimately shifted the power from Muslims to British Empire (Richards, 1995).

Successful in colonizing the whole of Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, the British used ‘divide and rule’ policy to isolate Muslims and gain sympathies of the Hindus and Sikhs. Hindus progressed and endorsed the British rule, whereas Muslims as former rulers faced direct
consequences and were isolated. Moreover, the backdrop of 1857 War of Independence that Muslims fought against the British and lost it badly convinced the Monarchy not to allow administrative reforms favorable to democratic environment. In the aftermath, British Empire maintained constabulary order and disallowed Muslims of the subcontinent to regain their political and economic glory. Majority of the Muslims took the path to resist British rule and denied all the possibilities that could help next generation of Muslims to get along modern education.

Contrary to Muslims, Hindus not only welcomed British invasion but also fully benefited from modern education, which with the passage of time took them to the highest administrative places of the colonial administration (Christopher, 1988). Muslim scholars like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan wanted Muslims to continue their struggle while adopting the changing discourse of politics. He did many efforts to involve Muslims in the modern education to better compete with other communities. It was Sir Syed Ahmed Khan who believed that Muslim voice can only be heard if they are capable of understanding the system. Muslim’s isolation would bring negation of their very presence, therefore the future of the region lies in adoption of learning English language, studying modern education, participating in science and technology (Husain, 1970).

Time passed away and Muslim struggle against the British rule continued. Finally, on August 14, 1947, Muslims of the subcontinent got an independent state, called Pakistan. The journey was not so convenient that people of newly born state could forget so easily. The political, economic, socio cultural, ideological, and above all constitutional struggle ended the Muslims into Pakistan. In the aftermath of 1857 War of Independence that Muslims fought against British invasion of subcontinent, it almost took a century to regain political freedom. The partition of British India was completed through June 3, 1947 Plan along with the Indian

The partition of the subcontinent was so inconveniently done by the British administration that made Pakistan two spotted points on the map rather one territory as a whole (Davis, 1949). On the one corner, it was West Pakistan and on the other side there was East Pakistan, situated at distance of thousands of miles. The uneven partition also made difficult for princely states such as Junagarh, Hyderabad, Jammu and Kashmir and Pathan Kot, to join Pakistan as Indian forces immediately invaded the states through use of force and ousted the legitimate political regimes (Copland, 1991). In 1961, Indian forces forcefully invaded the State of Goa, who wanted to join Burma (Wright, 1962). Furthermore, due to unjust distribution of the resources, the post partition India got 4:1 superiority over Pakistan as Maddy writes in his blog that “division of solid assets took place in 4:1 ratio, which meant that out of every 5 gold bars, 4 would remain in India and 1 would be sent to Pakistan” (Maddy, 2017). India’s military and economic strength furthered the security anxiety of newly independent Muslim state. The war of 1948 over Kashmir and later in 1950-51 Indian military concentration on the Punjab border stipulated the security construct of Pakistan.

Moreover, the Hindu ideological construct negated the very territorial identity of Muslims as Pakistan. The ‘Hindutva Doctrine’ that previously remained silent due to weak military posture of Hindus was now a far well-placed political and economic landscape against the Muslims. As mentioned above the direct consequences of the partition plan and uneven distribution of resources between the two states, India got 4:1 superiority over Pakistan. Addition to that, Hindu leadership chanted slogans of motherland, which denounced the very real existence of Pakistan. The idea behind the motherland as ‘Atotang’ inspired by the ‘Hindutva
Doctrine’ orchestrated the narrative that India is a greater land which cannot be divided into many parts, henceforth, creation of Pakistan is the negation of Hindustan (Hindu motherland) (Jaffrelot, 1999).

The unhappy political leadership of the Congress invoked the idea of reunification of India and gave public statements about Pakistan’s negation. India as a neighbor proved himself the greatest threat to Pakistan’s future, which even worsen the situation when Afghanistan did not recognized Pakistan and toed the line of India. Moreover, the fatalities, communal riots, and massive killing of Muslim migrants moving out of India brought drastic impacts on people’s psychology, which almost proved debacle to resettlement (Engineer, 1997).

The genesis of Pakistan’s threat perception is not a byproduct of one or two decade’s security anxiety. In fact, it is a dilemma which immediately took shape in the aftermath of 1947 partition of British India. The episode of continuous struggle for its survival and territorial integrity had intensively contributed in the military thought of Pakistan. Therefore, to better understand Pakistan’s security anxiety which gave birth to its military thought, a South Asian perspective on security orchestration of the region is important. To achieve this task, genesis of both Indian and Pakistani military thought is explained in a sequential manner, so that the very idea of nature of warfare and Pakistan’s military response should be understood in relevance.

The chapter will also elaborate geo-strategic compulsions of Pakistan that specifically brought variable of security into the matrix of its national survival. Due to the variable of perpetual insecurity arising from its immediate neighbor India, the country became hostage to permanent tit-for-tat syndrome of military strategy. From conventional superiority to nuclear imposition of India, Pakistan faced continued hostility on its borders that never helped restoration of harmony and peace between the two neighbours. As a pleading argument, an
impartial analysis is done to explain in detail the Indian military adventures which shaped Pakistan’s threat perceptions, ultimately convincing the later to raise a strong conventional military. This phenomenon leads the argument until end of 20th century, when in 1998 due to Indian ambitions, nuclear weapons were included in the security matrix of South Asia, hence deteriorating Pakistan’s threat perceptions to a new level.

At the beginning of 21st century, when the world witnessed 9/11, the paradigm of war totally changed and brought a new dimension of non-kinetic warfare. On the one side, there was a state threatening the legitimate territorial integrity of Pakistan and on the other side an invisible enemy orchestrated it’s never ending violence and terror. Pakistan was unwillingly trapped into this very confused construction of new war and inevitably became victim of it. The security dilemma visualized a new era of national security challenges for Pakistan, though experienced earlier but never tackled on such a massive scale. The amalgamation of conventional, sub-conventional, and proactive military posturing demanded revolutionary understanding to mitigate the challenges. The post 9/11 international order, war against terrorism, US mantra of ‘do more’, Al-Qaida, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Black Water, massive terrorist attacks, killing of civilians and law enforcement officials, phenomenon of Raymond Davis and Kalbushan Yadev; altogether shackled the foundations of Pakistan’s future.

The investigation carried out in this chapter addresses the fundamental question, how threat perceptions impacted on the military thought of Pakistan? The subsequent sections of this chapter are dedicated to elaborate the answers associated with the above question.

4.2. Genesis of Military Thought in Indo-Pak Subcontinent:

It is important to highlight that Pakistan’s military thought is predominantly reflection of Indian security construct. The post independence orchestration of the political and security
landscape has predominantly influenced on Pakistan’s strategic thinking. The fundamental security threat which gained momentum over the period of time was the byproduct of partition plan that due to its unjust division and uneven distribution of resources perpetuated the vulnerabilities (Maddy, 2017). Moreover, Indian unwillingness to accept Pakistan as a sovereign and independent nation manifested hostility in her political, economic and diplomatic relations with the newly born Muslim nation (Jaffrelot, 1999). Therefore, the evolution of Pakistan’s military thought needs to be understood in context to Indian security and political construct. Indo-Pak evolution of military thought from pre partition era to date has been discussed in eight stages on comparative basis in order to comprehend the evolution process and its linkage in the fullest sense. The division of the stages is mentioned below:

i. Historical Perspective - Pre Partition Era  
ii. Birth of Modern Militaries  
iii. Pakistan and its Threat Perceptions  
iv. Formative Era 1947-64  
v. Era of Major Wars 1965 – 80  
vi. Mechanisation Era 1980 – 97  
vii. War under Nuclear Overhang: The Post 1998 Phase  
viii. The ‘Hindutva Doctrine’ and Hybrid Warfare

4.3. Historical Perspective - Pre Partition Era

4.3.1. Indian Military Thought:

The modern outlook of Indian military thought is predominantly influenced and ranked by the former colonial crown, Great Britain. The civilizational context of Indian military thought had maintained a low profile though earlier references of the standing army could be found in Vedas and classic writings of Ramayana and Mahabharata (Rajagopalan, 2014). The political
landscape of ancient India which saw emerging dynasties and declining empires mainly confined its military orientation ‘within’ rather allowed expansion ‘beyond’ the Indo-Pak subcontinent. Challenges ‘within’ orchestrated the confrontations by weak against the strong and powerful rulers struggled against the potential internal threats. The dichotomy of internal political, social, economic, and ideological rifts restricted the military thought of modern India to claim its history as cherished legacy.

It is important to understand Indian military thought to better evaluate Pakistan’s threat perception and its impact on military thought. Therefore, an attempt has been made to briefly declassify evolution of Indian military thought and thereafter its deliberate influence on shaping Pakistan’s threat perceptions. Indian military has learned through its weakness and strengths, which has clustered its modern military thought. Following important periods of Indian civilization from ancient times to contemporary era had shaped strategic thinking process, which includes:

i. Vedic Period
ii. Magadha Dynasties
iii. Golden Age
iv. Classical Age
v. Declining Age
vi. Medieval Age
vii. Colonial Era

A. The Vedic period

The Vedic period is classified between 1100BCE to 500BCE and explains some of the earliest understanding of military thought prevailing in ancient India (Singh, 1989). This period was dominated by the Rajas and therefore the inter-tribe wars were led by the local Rajas who in other words were considered kings and uphold the army of men carrying bronze weapons along
with chariots consisted of horses. Their men loot each other and share the booty with their Rajas as the legitimate beholder of the tribe. Moreover, the application of animals particularly elephants in battles dates back to Vedic period (Hopkins, 1972). Also Ramayana and Mahabharata, which are known as classics of India, too shed light on the earlier form of military mechanism and philosophy of war (Rajagopalan, 2014). Military posture in the Vedic period has not contributed a revolutionary discourse in the subject matter, which could be taken as exemplary model to testify glory of Indian military thought. Neither this period has expanded its vision beyond territorial jurisdiction that could bring dire need to revolutionize military thought of the Vedic time period. Whatever happened in that period was for domestic consumption and failed to integrate inter-tribal contest into collective security mechanism. Hence, military thought remained under-developed and never entered into evolutionary phase.

B. The Magadha Dynasties

The post Vedic period India transformed from tribes to dynasties and gave birth to monarchs in place of Rajas. The tit-for-tat tribal confrontation slowly changed its discourse towards collective and territorial defense, henceforth giving rise to the evolution of standing armies (Rao, 1978). Famous dynasties of the time period include Shishunaga dynasty, Nanda dynasty, Maurya dynasty, and Shunga dynasty. The Magadha dynasties remained intact for almost two hundred years from 400BCE to 300BCE (Chakrabarty, 2010).

The Shishunaga dynasty covered the area of today’s West Bengal and introduced some modernity in weapons use during fight. The Nanda dynasty covered mostly the East of Bengal and the West of Punjab. According to Raychaudhuri “the size of the Nanda army was numbering [about] 200,000 infantry, 80,000 cavalry, 8,000 war chariots, and 6,000 war elephants” (Raychaudhuri, 2006). Alexander the Great started his ventures in 327BCE and marked Punjab
as his appetizer. He took control of Taxila without a fight. Moreover, in 326BCE when Alexander fought with Porus who was a monarch holding control of land between Jhelum and Chenab lost the war but later on Alexander made him his representative called Satrap (Fuller, 2018). It is important to mention that during the Alexander march, there were eight principal states in ancient India, who altogether hold up to 10,68,000 infantry, 26,000 elephants and 17,000 chariots. Due to internal rifts, jealousy, and political differences proved no threat to Alexander rather as mentioned above conveniently allowed his forces to control maximum states without a fight.

The Maurya dynasty covered most of the ancient India starting from the Arabian Sea to Bay of Bengal and West of Indus River to Central India. Chandragupta Maurya maintained 600,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, 8,000 chariots corps, and 9,000 war fighting elephants (Roy, 2012). Maurya as an ancient hero has been associated with great respect in the contemporary India. He through strategic vision of Chanakya Kautilya overthrew the Nanda dynasty in 321BC. Chanakya’s military thought predominantly shaped the armed forces of Chandragupta and even is believed to shape strategic thought of modern India. The Maurya dynasty also maintained reasonable size of a navy, which was consisted of almost 30 officers and distributed into five sections. Mauryans tactfully adopted espionage as an important element of warfare (Mookerji, 1966).

The work of Kautilya admires all methods such as “spying, bribing, women’s wiles, and assassins knife”, respectively. Even in context to diplomatic services, the ambassadors are considered an honorable spy who enjoys protection of the international law and renders the same service to his nation just like an underground agent (Kangle, 1986). Mauryan’s generated the revenues through tax collection as vast area of their territory brought tremendous economic
prosperity to the dynasty. Moreover, cultivation of new land and tax inclusion from one-fourth to one-sixth percent on the total produce further mechanized the economy. The monopoly of the dynasty over mining, manufacturing, and sale of liquor directly benefited the empire (Thapar, 1981). Chandragupta’s excellent military march against Greeks also helped him expand the territory up to Afghanistan (Boesche, 2003). This era is classically considered golden age of Indian military thought.

The contemporary armed forces of India are very much connected to the six fold policy of the Chanakya Kautilya. Chanakya’s policy not only has shaped military thought of India but it also had driven the foreign policy. No civilizational context of modern India is complete without appropriate consideration of Kautilya neither his unique character as minister of Chandragupta Maurya is forgettable. Kautilya’s thought had successfully inflicted almost every aspect of modern India whether its politics, economics, security, or ideology. *Arthashastra*, being classic work of Kautilya had elaborated statecraft, military thought, and law (Gautam, 2013).

Ashoka, the grandson of Chandragupta Maurya ruled the region between 268BCE to 232BCE and promoted the religion of Bhuddism that he embraced in 263BCE (Allen, 2012). The end of the Mauryan dynasty completed its journey with Brihadratha Maurya, who in 185BCE was assassinated by Pushyamitra Shunga. Shunga was the Commander in Chief of the Mauryan armed forces, who killed Brihadratha Maurya. Later on, the Shunga dynasty was known as an epicenter of war and conflict and led to the beginning of a new era of invasion, insurrections, and brutal intrusions, which lasted about 400 years (Thapar, 2012).

C. The Golden Age

The golden period of ancient India includes Satavahana dynasty, Mahameghavahana dynasty, and Gupta dynasty due to their ever increased expansion under Hindu empire. The
Satavahana dynasty covered modern Indian territories including Telangana, Andhra Pardesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Perdesh, Chhattitsgarh, Odisha, Goa, Karnataka, Malwa, Konkan, Saurashtra, Rajasthan, and Vidharbha. The Satavahana dynasty was at his peak around 200BCE and lasted in power for about 400 years until 200 CE (Raychaudhuri, 2006). Parallel to that the Mahameghavahana dynasty expanded the ancient India to its maritime zenith. The outreach of the dynasty stretched its maritime wings towards modern Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Borneo, Bali, Sumatra, Java, and started settling themselves as colonists. The dynasty also extended its war adventures towards other dynasties prevailing within ancient India such as Satavahanas (Chand, 1955).

The glory of the ancient Indian military thought came to an end with the exceptional Gupta dynasty. The dynasty had remarkably conquered twenty one kingdoms until the end of 380 CE, both within and outside India. Knowing the fact of declining Roman Empire, the Gupta Empire was the most powerful empire of its time. Learned through its environment and strategic requirements, the Gupta Empire enhanced its land and maritime abilities up to the mark that none of its predecessors had managed to maintain in the ancient history of India. Chandragupta II died in 380 CE and the empire failed to sustain due to economic burden of continuous war. Later on, the war economy drained its resources and brought a decline to the dynasty (Raychaudhuri, 2006).

D. The Classical Age

The classical age of the ancient India classifies war fighting of the struggling dynasties which due to their smart choices managed to exist but failed to prolong their rule. Empires of this age included Empire of Harsha; the Chalikyas and Pallavas; the Chola Empire; and the Gurjar-Pratiharas, Palas and Rashtrakutas.
The Empire of Harsha covered most of the Northern India and lasted about forty years in power between 606 CE to 647 CE (Edwardes, 1961). On the other hand, the Chalukyas and Pallavas covered most of the Southern India but remained busy in defeating each other. They fought to win and loss. Pallavas conquered the Chalukyas and later Chalukyas took the revenge and defeated the Pallavas in 642 CE. The century prolonged confrontations between the two ultimately brought decisive victory in favor of Chalukyas, whose king Vkramaditya-II won the war in 740 CE (Avari, 2007). The Chola Empire from time to time clashed with Chalukyas Empire. The Chola Empire sustained and expanded its war theatre up to Sri Lanka. Cholas as rulers of India lasted until 10th century (Subbarayalu, 2012). Last but not the least, the Gurjar-Pratiharas dynasty and Palas dynasty were at war with each other in the 9th century, which favored the former. The Pratiharas dynasty and Rashtrakutas dynasty did engaged against each other but ended with stalemate without securing decisive victory (Chopra, 2003). During 915 CE, from West the Pratiharas and in the South Rashtrakutas dynasties were separately at war with the Arab Muslims (Singh, 2009).

E. The Declining Age

In 712 CE, Muhammad bin Qasim, an Arab general marched towards Rai Dynasty which was then ruled by Raja Dahir. Dahir provides no protection to Muslim traders rather looted them again and again. Due to his misuse of power and breach of trade customs, Sind (now one of Pakistan’s province) became the first gateway which Arab Muslims crossed by conquering it. The revenge from Raja Dahir who looted many Arab traders brought Muslims in the Indian Subcontinent and permanently stationed their presence in the region. Indian dynasties were unable to uphold Muslim conquerors and struggled miserably against extensive marches. Muslims got hold in Gujrat and most of the Punjab up to Multan (Solangi, Laghari, & Kabooro,
Later in the 11th century, Mahmud of Ghazni shackled the foundations of Indian dynasties that through continuous marches conquered and brought North-west frontiers of the Afghanistan and Pakistan into his control. On the Northern side of India, he sacked few areas while focusing more on Punjab (Hunter, 2013). Hindu history started loosing its relevance and had sent back to the dark ages before it takes height of glory. The remaining India got spotted dynasties that slowly and steadily reached to their natural decline. Absence of political order and negation of collective security vested an inevitable defeat in them which provided an easy way out for the Muslim rulers to control the subcontinent.

F. The Medieval Era

The medieval era is again out of context which gives impetus neither to strategic vision nor to military thought to the modern India. This era includes Delhi Sultanate, The Rajputs, Muzaffarid dynasty, Calicut Kingdom, Vijayanagara Empire, Ahom Kingdom, Mughal Empire, The Marathas, Travancore Kingdom, Mysore Kingdom, and Sikh Empire.

The Khalji dynasty controlled the Delhi Sultanate. The crown from the Khalji’s was taken away when Ibrahim Lodhi fought a battle in the Panipat against the Mughal King Babur in 1526 CE (Lal, 1967). The victory in the battle opened the doors for Mughals who latter formally ruled India. The battle to grab all of India continued and with the passage of time Mughals conquered more and more territory. The Mewar dynasty king Rana Sanga organized an army of about 20,000 men meant to defeat Babur and to take Delhi. The Rajput army failed to prevail against Mughals who had well trained men and superior artillery. The Battle of Khanua that was fought on March 16, 1527 was won by Babur.

The capital of Mewar dynasty, Chittor was later on conquered by Akbar, the grandson of Babur (Sharma, 1954). Continued military marches defeated many other dynasties which
expanded and strengthened the reign of Mughals. The Battle of Haldighati which fought on June 21, 1576 between Rana Partap Singh and Mughal King Akbar; the former lost the war and retreated with insult. In the battle, Mughal army of around 80,000 soldiers was led by Salim, the son of King Akber; whereas Rana Partap led an army of 20,000 soldiers. The humiliated Rana Partap Singh managed to organize contingents of tribal soldiers and started application of guerrilla warfare against Mughal King Akbar (Sharma, 1954). Until 1576 CE, Khalji dynasty and Mewar dynasty were under complete control of the Mughals. With better military training and weapons, Mughals successfully out casted the resistance within span of few years.

Muzaffarid dynasty was established in 1391 by the Sultan Muzaffar Shah, who was governor of the Gujarat. The dynasty expanded quickly and lost its glory in the hands of Portuguese by 1509 CE (Tirmizi, 1968). Moreover, the Calicut kingdom which was ruled by a Hindu monarch referred as Zamorin welcomed the Portuguese in 1498 CE. Portuguese came in the kingdom as traders but later on during 16th century many fights occurred between the two but Zamorin successfully defended themselves (Pearson, 2006). It was 1766 CE, when Haider Ali of Mysore kingdom took control of Zamorin by defeating the dynasty (Barua, 1994).

The Vijayanagara Empire has been referred as powerful dynasty during the 15th century India, which fought many wars just like the other dynasties to survive and gain territorial expansions (Michell & Filliozat, 1981). Ahom Kingdom on the other hand had been successful in continuing its rule from 1228 to 1826 covering nearly 600 years. The kingdom had ruled much of the current Assam area from the 13th century to 18th century British Raj (Sen, 1982).

During 17th century Maratha dynasty under Shivaji Bhosale managed to carve a territory in the vicinity of modern Indian city Pune, which they sliced out of Bijapur Sultanate in 1674. Marathas enjoyed tactical presence under the great Mughal Empire mainly because of their
guerrilla abilities. Marathas looted and forcefully demanded ransom from the gray zones, which were administratively less controlled by the Mughals. Moreover, Marathas actively targeted sea routes where commercial trade of Dutch, Portuguese, and British came under direct attack during the 18th century. Marathas were medieval pirates and looters, who through their exceptional abilities of maneuver managed to survive under powerful Mughal Empire (Gordon, 1993). It is important to mention that Marathas does have strong naval presence but rarely managed to have a professional army that could sustain their strategic posture against the Mughals (Bhave, 2000). Though, as mentioned earlier their ability to maneuver did provided guerrilla abilities to hit and run while plundering. The Afghan Army in 1761 during Third Battle of Panipat defeated the Marathas (Gupta, 1961). The Britishers later on subsequently weakened the remaining Marathas who being pirates plundered commercial ships and ceased their existence by 1818 (Cooper, 1989).

On the other hand, the Travancore Kingdom was established in 1723 by the King Marthanda Varma, who with the help of British East India Company made himself quite influential. King Marthanda fought with the Dutch forces during 1739 to 1746 and expanded its territory as he conquered many small localities which aligned with the Dutch. Moreover, Travancore dynasty faced direct threats from Tipu Sultan of the Mysore dynasty, which led the King Marthanda to seek refuge and help from the Britishers. Later on, the leaders of Travancore fought with the British East India Company but were defeated badly. Though, British signed a treaty of alliance with Travancore that continued until 1947 and afterwards became part of India (Menon, 1998).

Mysore Kingdom gave tough time to the extension of British East India Company to control over Mughal India. Haider Ali being the ruler of the dynasty became the first Indian elite
who resisted the British while seeking alliance from France. Exceptionally brilliant was the Haider Ali, who for the very first time used rockets in the war theatre of subcontinent and defeated the British army (Chandra Guru & M S, 2018). Raja Ranjit Singh also known as Maharaja ruled Punjab as sovereign territory and established the Sikh Empire. The capital city Lahore of the Punjab province of Pakistan was the Capital of Sikh Empire. The Empire expanded till Amritsar in Indian Punjab which was holy city of the Sikh religion. Ranjit Singh with strategic instinct hired European private army in 1822 to train its own military. Due to well trained army, Ranjit Singh was quite successful in halting the speedy pace of British colonial expansion towards Punjab. Though, during the Battle of Jamrud in 1837, it faced great loss that restricted the Sikh Empire to the west of Khyber Pass. In the aftermath of Ranjit’s death in 1839, the Empire failed to resist the British marches who until 1849 completely annexed Punjab (Kohli, 1967).

The Mughal Empire as mentioned above successfully defeated many dynasties particularly Ibrahim Lodi of Khalji dynasty in 1526 and took control over most of the South Asian region covering major chunk of today’s India. The Empire almost controlled more than 4 million square kilometers including Bengal, Kabul, Kashmir, and south of the Kaveri basin (Taagepera, 1997). Mughal Empire is considered the third ever largest kingdom after Mauriya Empire that was the second largest with its control over an area of 5 million square kilometers and British Indian Empire being the biggest territorial power existed in the sub-continent with its control of contemporary Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Mayanmar. Though, Mughal Empire as a whole ruled the most complex political terrain before British entered in the region.

It is again important to mention that Mughal rule had cherished the longest control for about 331 years. There was no other dynasty, kingdom or empire that has established its writ
upto so long other then Mughal Empire. As compared to Maurya Empire, the Mughal and British Empires faced quite a tough resistance and successfully established their writ in the Indian subcontinent. The Maurya ruled for about 137 years (322-185 BCE) at a time period when there were no strong competitors rather a vast unmanned geography made it easier for their respective rulers to enhance their territory. The Mughal ruled for about 331 years in the Indian subcontinent (1526-1857 CE), whereas the British rule exercised its writ for about 90 years (1857-1947 CE).

The urban inhabitants in the Mughal Empire were counted around 23 million by 1700 CE as compared to British Raj population in the urban areas which was around 22.3 million by 1871 (Broadberry & Gupta, 2010). After establishment of the empire in 1526, the Mughal rule flourished and progressed for the next 331 years. The decline started during last few decades of its rule mainly due to British East India Company which through clandestine means weakened the Mughal and raised a private army against the Empire (Lawson, 2014). Bahadur Shah, the last Mughal King was imprisoned by the British in the aftermath of 1857 War of Independence and later exiled. That is how the glory of Mughal Empire ended and the rise of colonial era started.

Muslim rulers were difficult to bribe and made corrupt. Therefore, they continuously resisted the British and fought till the end (Malik, 2008). On the other hand, non-Muslim dynasties took refuge from the British against Muslim rulers particularly against Mughals, Mysore, and others. This initially helped the British seek confidence and later conquer their territories. After getting required territorial space and manpower, Britain acquired strength with the passage of time and developed de facto empire alongside the Mughal Empire. It was the only War of Independence in 1857, which finally set aside the last stone in the way of declaring colonial order and making it one of the biggest empires to rule the region (Richards, 1995).
G. The Colonial era

This led the origin of Colonial era which in other words started a collective ‘Dark Age’ of the Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Parsies, Buddhists, etc. Hindus were already cursing Muslims who have been successful in establishing their writ over four million square kilometers of territory. This time the decline and defeat knocked the door of Muslim rulers. The glory of Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, and other dynasties which lost their relevance over the period of time entered into an era of foreign invasion. The British Raj was established which introduced a new discourse of military thought to the subcontinent that raised local army under company rule and were made subservient to the Crown. The British army which faced human shortage over the years was marvelously strengthened during World War I and World War II mainly because of Indian men recruitment into the force (Moreman, 1996).

Initially, the British raised an army to safeguard the factories of East India Company. This was done by using the Travancore dynasty which was earlier defeated by the Britain and later were made ally under a treaty (Kooiman, 2005). The Dutch trained the army of Travancore that became useful for the British (Sankaran, 2001). During ‘War of Independence’ in 1857 the *Bengal Native Infantry and Cavalry* units participated in the war against the Britishers (David, 2001). The freedom struggle ended as failure which was suppressed by the British army supported by Sikh and Afghan recruits (Fremont-Barnes, 2014). The post war scenario totally changed the British military thought. It reorganized the military structure under British Raj and brought the administration under direct control of the United Kingdom and princely states through paramountcy of the Crown (Copland, 1982). The states were given controlled autonomy under treaty agreement with the Crown and allowed protection and limited interaction in politics.
beyond borders. Contrary to that contemporary Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India were directly administered by the British Raj.

Militarily, a new army was constituted in the aftermath of 1857 ‘War of Independence’ which was named as British Indian Army. It was controlled by the British Crown and his representative Viceroy of India. By abandoning the previous units, new formations were raised keeping in view the ‘War of Independence’ experience. For example, during the war Sikhs supported the British as they disliked the Mughals. Sikhs were considered loyal to Britishers. Therefore, new units of Sikhs and Gurkhas were raised. Moreover, Indians were only recruited as sepoys and restricted to uphold ranks of officer. They were also restricted to serve in the artillery. Local races were classified as martial and non-martial. Hence, caste, creed, and religion were invoked in the recruitment, placement, and promotion of the British Indian Army. Sikhs were always given better placement in the British Army as compared to Muslims (Khalidi, 2001). Expanding military thought, the British in 1932 established the Indian Air Force (Chhina, 2006).

The darkness of India under the colonial control of British was not so dark rather it brought light when the World War I started. During the war, more than 800,000 Indian men showed to participate in the war along with 400,000 who volunteered for the non-combatant role. About a million Indian soldiers fought the World War I on foreign fronts to defend the interests of the British Crown. Around 74,187 soldiers lost their lives, and approximately 67,000 were seriously injured during the conflicts. India Gate commemorates all the dead soldiers who lost their life during the World War I and secure the glory of great colonial Crown (BBC, 2015).

Continuing the pace of professional training and technological superiority, Indian soldiers recruited in British army once again ended up in the World War II. At the start of war in 1939
British standing army have around 189,000 soldiers, of which 3,000 Army officers were British and around 1,115 were Indians. Keeping in view the need of the war which brought massive military modernization and required extensive human resource greatly influenced the recruitment process. Around the end of World War II the British Army had around 2.5 million soldiers, of which 34,500 Army officers were British and around 15,740 were Indians. Around 179,935 soldiers lost their lives, approximately 64,354 were seriously injured, 11,762 went missing, and 79,481 were taken as prisoners of war (Sumner, 2001).

The British Indian Army establishment and its participation in the war theatres of World War I and World War II exceptionally improved the understanding about battlefield theatre. Recruitment of Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims, Christians, and others into the army allowed everyone to take appropriate lessons particularly the future arch rivals Hindus and Muslims started their learning through British military thought. Though, British forces emerged as victor of the WWII but economic and political environment in the aftermath of war numbered the days for colonial Crown. The political struggle between Indian National Congress and Muslim League got impetus that gave almost no excuse for the British Crown to prolong their rule in the region.

The military affiliation of the Indian troops proved exceptionally loyal and supportive to protect the interests of the Crown but on political fronts Hindus and Muslim nationalism became unfriendly and hostile to British rule. The weak economy of the British Empire and declining political control over colonial territories enforced the Crown to uphold the demands of Congress and Muslim League for independence of India. Finally, the partition of British India was completed through June 03, 1947 Partition Plan along with the Indian Independence Act of July 1947. Two sovereign nations were carved out of British subcontinent; one became Hindu’s India and the other emerged as Muslim’s Pakistan (Khan, 2017).
4.3.2. Pakistan Military Thought:

The history which had shaped contemporary military thoughts of both India and Pakistan is predominantly influenced by the glorious past of the two. The next few sections of this study will briefly summarize the already stipulated information to better relate Pakistan into the history of Indian civilization. It is important to mention that Muslims knocked the doors of Indian subcontinent only in 712 CE when Muhammad Bin Qasim entered in Sind but the people who latter embraced Islam and established their political writ were the same old ancestors of Indian civilization. There is only one distinction and that was Islam which replaced Hinduism as the most dominant culture and ideology in the subcontinent. People who accepted, adopted, and reinforced the Islamic ideology were the Hindu converts as no new human race was immigrated to this area. Roughly, the following below mentioned phases are deemed necessary to address the historical linkages and its relations with the modern military thought of Pakistan, who are the same old inhabitants of the region but today are known as Muslims.

i. Ancient Empires
ii. Muslim Conquests
iii. Mughal Empire
iv. British Raj

A. Ancient Empires

*Darius the Great* ruled the area of modern Pakistan from 522 to 485 BCE, which was part of the *Persian Achaemenid Empire*. During the Darius rule, this area as a whole was one of the richest and populous region of the *Persian Empire*. Among many, the first prominent conflict occurred in the region when Alexander the Great in 334 BCE fought and defeated the *Achaemenid Empire*. In due course, Alexander marched towards India and defeated King Porus
in the *Battle of Hydaspes*, which took place near *Jehlum* in 326 BCE. Porus was a monarch holding control of land between *Jhelum* and *Chenab* lost the war but later on Alexander made him his representative called *Satrap*. It is important to mention that during the Alexander march, there were eight principal states in ancient India that altogether had 1,068,000 infantry, 26,000 elephants and 17,000 chariots. Due to internal rifts, jealousy, and political differences among the Indian states, Alexander conveniently took over states without a fight for example he took control of Taxila in Punjab without a fight. The battle fatigue took over Alexander forces that refused to march deep into India, where *Nanda Dynasty* could be the next victim of his forces (M’Crindle, 1816).

Alexander while moving southwest marching along the sides of Indus valley confronted with many small dynasties and established his *satraps*. Moving further towards westward, he entered in Iran while marching across the Makran desert. As long as Alexander kept moving westwards with his army, the *satraps* he nominated to represent his empire got invaded and conquered by the *Maurya Empire* under the leadership of Chandragupta Maurya, who later on ruled the region between 321BCE to 185BCE. The mighty *Maurya dynasty* covered most of the ancient India starting from the Arabian Sea to Bay of Bengal and West of Indus River to Central India. Chandragupta’s excellent military march against Greeks also helped him expand the territory up to Afghanistan. Through strategic vision of Chanakya Kautilya, Mauryans overthrew the *Nanda dynasty* in 321BCE. *Maurya dynasty* maintained 600,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, 8,000 chariots corps, and 9,000 war fighting elephants. The *Maurya dynasty* also maintained reasonable size of a navy, consisted around 30 officers and distributed into five sections. The era is classically considered golden age of Indian military thought (Bhargava, 1996).
Maurya Empire reached its end in 185 BCE when Pushyamitra Shunga killed the last of its king. Pushyamitra Shunga was the Commander in Chief of the Mauryan armed forces. He and later his predecessors ruled the *Shunga dynasty* between 185 BCE to 73 BCE. The *Shunga dynasty* became the epicenter of instability, chaos, war, and conflict, which lasted for about 400 years and gave birth to many small and medium dynasties along with invasions, insurrections, and brutal intrusions. In the aftermath of Mauryan fall and weak control of the Shunga dynasty, the control of Kybar Pass went unguarded, which initiated a new wave of foreign invasions. In 180 BCE, King Demetrius of the Greco-Bactrian Empire invaded area surrounding Pakistan and south of Afghanistan. Demetrius formed Indo-Greek Empire and ruled the Kingdom around 10 CE, which during the time period faded away (Chattopadhyaya, 1968). Rulers marched from Central Asia who casted of Indo-Scythians made their new *Kushan Empire* in the former Indo-Greek Empire and ruled it until 375 CE (Sims-Williams, 1999). The aftermath of *Kushan Empire* also ended as defeat and invasion which took place in the hands of Persians, who formed Indo-Sassanid Empire and ruled the region until 565 CE (Gilmartin, 1988).

From Alexander to Maurya, from Maurya’s to Shunga, from Shunga’s to Indo-Greek Empire, from Indo-Greek to Kushan Empire, and from Kushan Empire to Persians Indo-Sassanid Empire; the territory confining Pakistan remained under perpetual conflicts, chaos, insurrections, invasions, and brutal intrusions. The inhabitants of the region were multicultural, multilingual, and multi-ideological with multi-faceted backgrounds. At the same very time when Persians Sassanid Empire was expanding its geography back in Arab the foundations of Islam were laid by Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) (Kennedy, 2007).
B. Muslim Conquests

Muslim military marches approached the region in 712CE, when one of the Syrian-origin military general Muhammad Bin Qasim extended the Umayyad Empire and invaded most of the contemporary area surrounding Sind and Multan region of modern Pakistan (Malik, 2008). This was the beginning of century long Muslim rule in the Indo-Pak subcontinent. Later in 997CE, another Muslim ruler Mahmud of Ghazni extended the empire while marching on today’s Baluchistan province, Kashmir, KPK province, Punjab province, Khorasan, and Qanoch. More specifically, in 997CE Mahmud Ghaznavi occupied majority of Khorasan region. In 1005CE, he marched towards Peshawar and continued his success towards Punjab which he occupied in 1007CE. Confident in his military marches, Mahmud Ghaznavi occupied Balochistan in 1011CE along with his never ending strength took control of Kashmir and Qanoch in 1015CE and 1017CE, respectively. He lived until 1030CE and extended his empire in the west up to Kurdistan and in the east up to Yamuna River. The Ghaznavi reign lasted for about 190 years starting from 997CE till 1187CE (Bosworth, 1973).

It was Muhammad Ghori who started the decline of Ghaznavids. In 1160CE, Ghori marched towards Ghazni which he took over and became its first Governor in 1173CE. He did not stop and continued his military marches towards Gujarat and remaining areas of Ghaznavi Empire. In 1180CE when Ghori marched towards Gujarat, he was successfully repulsed by the Solanki rulers who control the area. Though, rebuffed by the Solanki’s of Gujarat, Muhammad Ghori remained successful in controlling the whole Ghaznavid Empire, when in 1187CE Lahore was taken over by his army. He continued his marches and in 1200CE returned to Lahore in the wake of ongoing mutiny in Punjab by the tribe of Rajput Ghakkar. This time success came with end of his destiny when in 1206CE he successfully suppressed the uprising but was killed in his
camp by the night raid of Rajputs. Remarkably glorious military marches provided the foundation to the future of Islamic rule and glory (Nizami, 1998). His successors managed to establish the first Islamic Kingdom in the history of South Asia, which was named as Delhi Sultanate (Jackson, 2003).

Limited in its rule, the Delhi Sultanate ended up to Mamluk Dynasty, that in 1211CE took control of the throne, which further gave birth to a beginning of Turkish and Afghan dynasties which continued ruling their kingdoms from Delhi (Waterson, 2006). For example, the Mamluk Dynasty remained in power until 1290CE, when Khalji’s defeated them and took over the control (Lal, 1967). The Khalji dynasty remained in power from 1290CE and 1320CE, when Tughlaq got control over Kahlji (Hasan, 1976). The Tughlaq dynasty remained in power until 1413CE, when it was occupied by the Sayyid in 1414CE (Mahajan, 2005). The journey of Sayyid dynasty continued until 1451CE, when Lodhi took over the reign in 1451CE. The power of Lodhi also diminished in 1526CE and ended the rolling chair legacy under Mughal Empire (Robinson, 2007). Along with power rolling around Delhi, there were few dynasties that remained independent of Muslim rule such as the Bengal, Gujarat, Deccan, and Malwa in the central India unless Mughal Empire influenced their politics. The post Delhi Sultanate, Islamic dynasties controlled most of the Indian region including Indus plain. Initially, the Delhi centric Islamic dynasties successfully stop the Mongol military marches originated from Central Asia but eventually lost the western part of Pakistan and Afghanistan to them.

C. Mughal Empire

The continuity of the Islamic rule was replaced by the Mughal’s who once again through glorious military learning and administrative skills marked the major part of India. The Mughal ruled India between 16th to 19th centuries before they ended up to the conspiracies of the British
East India Company in 1857CE. Referring to its glorious past, the Mughal also faced threats from Persians when in 1739CE, Nadir Shah who was Persian emperor marched towards India and took most of Baluchistan along with Indus plain from Muhammad Shah, the Mughal King (Richards, 1995). In 1747CE, Afghanistan was declared a kingdom in the aftermath of Nadir Shah’s death by one of his General Ahmad Shah Abdali, who born in Pakistan’s city Multan. Ahmad Shah Abdali as Afghanistan’s ruler extended the kingdom by including Punjab, Peshawar, Multan, Sind, and Daman (Singh, 1959).

During the reign of Mughal King Aurangzeb, dynasties in the South had declared their independence that included Talpurs, Daudpotas, and Kalhoras in the Sind province of Pakistan. The Baluchistan came under the control of Khan of Kalat who controlled most of it other than Gwadar, which was ruled by the Sultan of Oman. During the time period of drastic political changes, Mughal were facing direct threat from Persians and Afghans. This rivalry further created political cleavages in the Mughal rule, which was exploited by the Sikh Confederacies, group of small states in Punjab. The collectiveness of the confederacy, which existed between 1748CE to 1799CE, pushed the Mughal out of Punjab and also repelled Afghan marches to invade them. The Sikh occupied Lahore in 1764CE and formally made it their capital (Major, 1996).

In the aftermath of failed attempts by Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Sikh Confederacy though successful in repelling Afghan military marches indulged into internal instability and disputes. As a result of the turmoil an internal discourse took shape under the leadership of Raja Ranjit Singh, who in 1799CE established Sikh Empire in the west up-to Khyber Pass and south till Multan. He was called as Maharaja, who conquered Kashmir in 1819CE and subsequently Peshawar in 1834. On the other hand Afghanistan continued its attempts to get control of Khyber
Pass and Peshawar but failed miserably. Ranjit Sing hired European mercenaries to train its forces, which showed great resilience not only against Mughal but also defeated many Afghan attempts including British for a good period of time. Eventually, Maharaja Ranjit Sing died that weakened the Sikh Empire from toe to head (Singh, 2008). In 1849CE, the Sikh Empire came under full control of the British that ended the legacy of Maharaja. Inability to recover the glory ended the supremacy into British Crown, who after fighting two Anglo-Sikh wars annexed Empire in to the British Raj (Nijjar, 1976).

**D. British Raj**

The British East India Company entered in the Indo-Pak subcontinent through trade corridors and defeated the century long rule of Muslims along with smartly managed Sikh Empire. The British rule lasted for about 90 years from 1858 till 1947 that without any doubt brought revolution into political, administrative, socio economic, science, education, and military landscape of the region. The overall development of the above variables starting from ancient era till Mughal rule had no compatibility with the contribution made by the British Raj just in nine decades. The 90 years rule helped both Hindus and Muslims to jump nine centuries ahead in terms of knowledge up-gradation that British contributed through its administrative and developmental infrastructure. Though, one of the biggest shortfalls of the British Raj was its divide and rule policy that remained intact in the political system later on inherited by both India and Pakistan (Stewart, 1951). Moreover, its exploitation and administrative tilt towards Hindus had undermined Muslim political struggle that was even evident at the time of partition in 1947 (Moon, Tully, & Raychaudhuri, 1998). The British seized power from the Mughal, who were Muslim and thereafter labeled them as permanent threat to their colonial rule in the subcontinent. The 1857 War of Independence which Muslim lost was the formal beginning of British colonial
rule. The British Indian Army was established by merging the previous constabulary. New units were raised and the army as a whole was made subservient to British Crown and its representative Viceroy in India.

The post 1857 war scenario deprived the Indian soldiers from officer ranks both in officer corp and artillery. The reason was their hatred to British colonial rule. More importantly, the ratio of British soldiers was increased as compared to Indian in the army. Sikhs and Gurkhas were seen more loyal to British rule as they supported the Empire against the Muslim ‘War of Independence’. It gave birth to British Indian Army which focused recruitment based on cast, creed, and religion. The fault lines were accommodated through martial race and loyalty based orientation of the army (Khalidi, 2001). The post war British Raj was not politically compatible with the domestic changes that almost negated the prolonged colonial era. Both Muslim League and Congress insisted withdrawal of British and demanded independence from the century old colonial rule of the Crown. Therefore, on June 03, 1947, a plan was announced by the British Government to divide the subcontinent between Pakistan and India. Subsequently, on June 30, 1947, the British Indian Army was divided between the two, which gave birth to modern military thought of Pakistan and India. Below is given the chart depicting the most powerful dynasties of the Indian subcontinent.

**Table 4.1: Most Powerful Dynasties/Empires/States of the Indian Sub-continent**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Dynasty/Empire</th>
<th>Controlled Area in KM²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td><strong>India</strong></td>
<td>India totally claims 3,287,263 km² which includes 222,236 km² territory of Kashmir that belongs to Pakistan and was occupied by India in 1948. Currently Pakistan is in control of 78,114 km² territory of Kashmir (Azad Jammu and Kashmir-35%) whereas 106,567 km² territory is in Indian control (Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir-45%). Aksai Chin (20%) is another part of Kashmir comprising 37,555 km² that India lost to China during Sino-Indian War of 1962 (CNN, 2018). Indian militarily had also invaded Pakistani territories of Hyderabad State (215,339 km²) along with</td>
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Junagadh (8,643 km²). Also in 1962 Indian military occupied the Portuguese Indian territories including Goa (3,702 km²), Daman and Diu (112 km²).

**At the time of partition under British Crown:** 2.8 Million km² (2,837,231 km²)

**In 1948:** 3,205,335 km² (in 1948 through military invasion Indian forces occupied about 144122 km² of Kashmir, 215,339 km² of Hyderabad State, and 8,643 km² of Junagadh).

**In 1961:** 3,209,149 km² (in 1962 Indian forces occupied the Portuguese territories of Goa (3,702 km²), Daman and Diu (112 km²).

**In 1962:** 3,171,594 km² (37,555 km² territory of Indian Occupied Kashmir was lost by India during Sino-Indo War of 1962)

Since, India claims Azad Kashmir of Pakistan (78,114 km²) along with Aksai Chin (37,555 km²) of China in her territory, if added it equals the claimed territory of India. For example: 3,171,594 km² + 78,114 km² + 37,555 km² = 3,287,263 km²

Indian territorial claim over former sub-continent is again full of hypocrisy and flaws such as:

Sikhs of Indian Punjab are striving to establish their own country ‘Khalistan’ as an independent and sovereign state, which is consist of about 50,362 km².

The famous Seven Sister States of North Eastern Region of India are connected through Siliguri Corridor situated in the West Bengal State of India that has a width of only 21 to 40 kilometers crossing between Nepal and Bangladesh to link the states. These states are striving for independence from India and have not accepted New Delhi as constitutional center. Total territory of the Seven Sister States makes 7% of the total Indian geography with 255,511 km². These states have bigger border with China, Burma, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal then India.

Sikkim is another state of the North Eastern Region which has recently joined the Seven Sister States to resist Indian control over the territory. It is consisted of 7,096 km² territory.

The Maoist phenomenon in Chhattisgarh State altogether has given impetus to separation from India. It is the 10th biggest State of India with 135,194.5 km² territory.

The Tamil Nadu State is the 11th largest state of India and is consisted of 130,058 km². Tamil people are also struggling to establish their own independent country separate of India.

**2. Pakistan**

*1947-till-Date*

At the time of Independence in 1947, Pakistan’s total territory included 796,096 km² of West Pakistan, 148,460 km² of East Pakistan, 222,236 km² of Kashmir, 215,339 km² of Hyderabad State, and 8,643 km² of Junagadh.

**At the time of partition under British Crown:** 1.4 Million km² (1390774 km²)
In 1948: 1,022,670 km² (until 1948 about 144122 km² of Kashmir, 215,339 km² of Hyderabad State, and 8,643 km² of Junagadh was invaded by Indian military)

In 1971: 796,096 km² + 78,114 km² territory of Kashmir (in 1971 Indian military once again intervened in East Pakistan, which was situated at a distance of about 2,208 kilometers from West Pakistan and disintegrated the country)

<p>| | | |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>148,460 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971-till-Date</td>
<td>(In 1971, the then East Pakistan was forced to disintegrate from Pakistan due to Indian military invasion. The East wing was then declared as independent Bangladesh)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>British Empire</td>
<td>Ruled over modern India (3,171,594 km²), Pakistan (796,096 km² + 78,114 km² Azad Kashmir), Bangladesh (148,460 km²), Mayanmar (676,578 km), and Aksai Chin (37,555 km²)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1858-1947</td>
<td>If above geography is added together than the British India controlled around 4,908,397 km² (about 5 Million Square Kilometers).</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mughal Empire</td>
<td>4 Million Square Kilometers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1526-1857</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Maratha Empire</td>
<td>2.5 Million Square Kilometers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1674-1818</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Delhi Sultanate</td>
<td>3.2 Million Square Kilometers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1206-1526</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Empire of Harsha</td>
<td>1 Million Square Kilometers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>606-647</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Gupta Empire</td>
<td>3.5 Million Square Kilometers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>300-590</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Kushan Empire</td>
<td>2 Million Square Kilometers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 BCE-375 CE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Mauryan Empire</td>
<td>5 Million Square Kilometers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>321 BCE-185 BCE</td>
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The contemporary history of Pakistan’s military thought includes a rich experience of struggle against invaders and conflicts that its predecessors had fought for about 1,000 years
surrounding the geography where it is situated today. However, the classic exposure to its military learning started in the post-independence era, when it became a sovereign nation in 1947. Modern military composition is linked with the partition legacy, when the British Indian Army was divided between Pakistan and India. Pakistan received units of the British Army that had already fought both the World Wars and laid tremendous contributions to the Crown. It was Khyber Rifles, which composed major part of the Pakistan Army and most of the military Generals of Pakistan served in that unit and fought the British wars (Stewart, 2006). Moreover, the rich military history had evolved over the period of centuries in the surrounding areas of Arab in general and Indian sub-continent in particular that encompasses the foundation of Pakistan’s military thought. It also gave impetus to Muslim strategic thought that had successfully ruled the region for over 1000 years and provided modern day Pakistani military to cherish its valor and perseverance.

Many medals, missiles, army divisions, acts of valor are named in the remembrance of glorious Muslim rulers such as four of its ballistic and cruise missiles; Ghaznavi, Ghauri, Abdali, and Babur are titled over heroic generals of Muslim empires of the sub-continent, Mahmud of Ghazni, Muhammad of Ghor, Ahmed Shah Abdali, and Mughal King Zahir-ud-din Babur, respectively (Ollapally, 2003). Mahmud Ghaznavi ruled the Indo-Pak subcontinent during 994 to 1040 and founded Ghaznavid Empire in the region (Ghaznavi, 1964). The Ghurid Sultanate established its writ in the present day Afghanistan, Pakistan, Northern India, Iran, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan between 1173 to 1202 (Nizami, 1998). Ahmed Shah Abdali (also called Durrani) who born in Multan, which is a historical city situated in the Punjab Province of Pakistan, established the Durrani Empire from 1747 to 1772 and ruled Afghanistan, Kashmir, North India, while expanding its writ from Amu Darya to Arabian Sea (Singh, 1959). Zahir-ud-din Babur was
a descendant of Turco-Mongol royal Genghis Khan, who became the first king of the Mughal Empire established in the Indian subcontinent from 1526-1857 (De la Garza, 2016). Babur’s royal family had already established *Timurid Dynasty* in Central Asia and Persia in 1370. Indian subcontinent was an extension of *Timurid Dynasty* rule under *Mughal Empire*. It is also said to believe that Pakistan has a project of Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) named ‘*Taimur*’ (India TV, 2014) which is again titled to glorify the *Timurid Dynasty* that had covered the regions of Persia and Central Asia between 1370-1507 (Woods, 1990).

4.4. **Military Learning from the Hindu Era**

Historically, Hindus, being descendents of Aryan civilization, ruled the subcontinent prior to Muslims and Britishers. During ancient Hindu era, Monarchs organized armies under different Rajas on caste based system mainly to fight internal strives (Pardesi, 2005). Later, influenced from Chanakya’s thought of “imperial expansion, covert actions and aggression” Mauryas (321CE–185CE) and the Guptas (321CE–500CE) organized large armies (600,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, 8,000 chariots and 9,000 elephants) which helped in extension of their rule across major part of the subcontinent up to Afghanistan (Pardesi, 2005). However, these armies lacked cohesiveness and therefore succumbed to determined invaders one after the other.

Other than the 19th century Britishers, the predecessors of the Indian modern military includes sepoy regiments, native cavalry, irregular horse and Indian sapper and miner companies organized by the former colonial presidencies under British Raj. During British Raj, the modern Indian military fought both World Wars. The post independence military orientation was different then the army under British Raj. Most of the wartime army was disband and squeezed to normal functions of defense within Indo-Pak subcontinent. Thereafter, the army was divided between Pakistan and India in 1947. The post-independence Indian military actively engaged and
fought three full-scale wars with Pakistan in 1948, 1965, and 1971. It also fought a Kargil war in 1999, which is the highest conflict ever fought above the sea level in the history of warfare (Ganguly, 2002). Other than its war with Pakistan, the Indian military also fought a war with China in 1962, which brought humiliation to its Generals (Palit, 1991).

Few important learnings regarding military thought from Hindu Era are:

a. Value and importance of standing armies was recognized
b. Shift in thinking from fighting internal strife within a tribe to expansion and subjugation of neighboring Chieftains
c. No ambition to expand beyond the subcontinent
d. Ended up as local army under company rule and were made subservient to the British Crown

4.5. Military learning from the Muslim and British Era

Muslims reinvigorated the concept of single military power to protect frontiers and ruled for almost 1000 years, yet due to scientific backwardness in the field of weaponry, barring few concepts, very little progress was made in the evolution of military thought.

The British Indian Army with experience from the two World Wars exposed subcontinent to a more current military science, however, development of military thought amongst Indians was almost absent as the native officers were mostly trained only at the company and battalion levels.

Muslim/ British rule had common imprint on both Indian and Pakistani military thought as both Hindu and Muslims lived together in that era. The influence on military thinking can be formalized as following: -

a. Military thought essentially remained focused on land operations demonstrating offensive and bold actions.
b. Organization and development of Artillery as an arm (Qazi, 2004).
c. Introduction of swift movement and bold military tactics (Hassan, 1990).
d. Adoption of ‘Hit and Run’ technique mainly by Sikhs (Hassan, 1990).
e. The British rule introduced more modern military system including uniformity of induction, training, military laws to a detailed system of administration and logistics.

4.6. Birth of Modern Militaries

The decision of the British Government to divide the subcontinent into India and Pakistan came on June 03, 1947 that further initiated administrative and resource distribution between the two. Among many, the most important distribution was related to transfer of power and division of the British Indian Army assets and weapons. Therefore, on June 30, 1947 the division of the British Indian Army took place under the criteria agreed by the Division Council. The Council was composed of the Viceroy of India, Rear Admiral Lord Mountbatten and representatives from the Indian National Congress and Muslim League. The Council agreed to divide the British Indian Army based on a ratio of 64% for India and 36% for Pakistan. At the time of partition, the British Indian Army have 11,800 officers along with 500,000 soldiers that include the forces of the Princely States. Therefore, Pakistan was supposed to receive around 4,248 officers and 180,000 soldiers. On the other hand, under the division formula India was about to receive 7,552 officers and 320,000 soldiers. The division of British Indian Army does not have sufficient number of Muslim officers and soldiers who could join Pakistan Army. The British Indian Army had only raised two combat units with Muslim soldiers, the 1/15 Punjab Regiment and 3/16 Punjab Regiment. Sikhs and Hindus on the other hand had been accommodated in multiple units and regiments of combat. So, most of the officers and soldiers remained in India due to their ethnic background as Sikh and Hindus.
For Pakistan the division was also not so ideal and fair when it came to the distribution of military assets as most of the military possessions such as bases and depots were inside Indian territory and therefore forced to accept 1/3 share of the total military assets. According to Pakistan Army official website, “of the total 46 training establishments; only nine were located in Pakistan; all of the 17 Ordnance Factories were located in India, as were most of the Ordnance Depots and Engineer Store Depots. In addition to Pakistan receiving far less stores than originally stipulated, most of the stores received were of general nature, perishable, unwanted and obsolete” (Pakistan Army, 2016).

Pakistan was divided into East and West each with a distance of thousands of kilometers. Inevitably, the defense of the newly independent state of Pakistan was militarily vulnerable and weak. Consequently, depleted reservoirs of ammunition which could only sustain military response against a possible aggression were worth of one week. This low ammunition placed very low confidence into Pakistan’s security management. Until August 15, 1947 both India and Pakistan were in full control of their Armed Forces though both militaries inherited British Generals as their first Army Chief. The first Army Chief of the Pakistan Armed Forces was General Sir Frank Messervy, who latter on was replaced by General Sir Douglas Gracey in February 1948. General Gracey served Pakistan as Chief of Army until January 1951.

The post partition strength of Pakistan Army initially counted around 150,000 soldiers and 2,300 officers. Under the division ratio, Pakistan Army required around 180,000 soldiers and 4,248 officers. As mentioned above many of them were scattered around India and needed to be transported to Pakistan. To overcome the shortage of officers, Pakistan requested neutral British officers to join. As a result Pakistan received around 500 Polish and Hungarian military officers with a medical background. They performed their professional duties in the medical core of
Pakistan Army. Frustrations were not only linked with the distribution of resources rather the processes of migration created trauma and communal violence which exhausted the state of Pakistan. Around 7 million Muslims migrated from India to Pakistan and 5 million Sikhs and Hindus migrated to India from Pakistan. In the journey, unfortunately due to communal riots more than one million migrants were killed, majority of them were Muslims.

Captured by the circumstances and vulnerabilities, Pakistan managed to raise four army divisions in the West wing of Pakistan and one army division in the East wing of Pakistan. Along with thirteen tanks one armored brigade was successfully rose which was complimented by the strength of ten infantry brigades. Most of the raised divisions do not have full strength in its brigades and battalions. Militarily not an ideal situation to defend two separate wings, Pakistan stood firm and continued to upgrade its professional army. The vulnerability of Pakistan Army was so visible that the last Indian Viceroy Lord Mountbatten and Indian Army Chief Claude Auchinleck told Pakistan that in case of war with India no commonwealth force will end up helping Pakistan. This message was not delivered in isolation rather both the political and military leaders having British background were aware of the Indian leadership’s sentiments against newly formed Pakistan.

The leaders of the Indian National Congress particularly Sardar Patel, who also became Home Minister, was not happy with the independent status of Muslims and publically chanted out the slogans of reunification. This raised serious concern in Pakistan hence was picked by the British leadership who then categorically clarified to Pakistan that no support should be expected from Britain or commonwealth states against Indian aggression. The message reflected that defense of the nation and its territory is solely Pakistan’s own responsibility and whatever means of strength it had received are the only material means for national defense. Unfortunately, there
was no comparison between Indian Army and Pakistan Army, the former was so superior then the later. Moreover, the distance between East and West wing of Pakistan was strategic compulsion rather opportunity against India. Also, the Indian aggression of 1947 in Kashmir took Pakistan with surprise. Pakistan Army official website had elaborated its anxiety of the 1947 with the following words “after the fraudulent accession of Kashmir by the Maharaja on 27 October 1947, Mountbatten and Nehru air-transported the Indian Army into the Sri Nagar Valley. The Indian Army's offensive was halted at the Ceasefire Line (now Line of Control) initially by Azad Kashmir Forces, and from April 1948 with support of the ill-organized Pakistan Army without adequate logistic support” (Pakistan Army, 2016). Therefore, in the aftermath of 1947 partition of subcontinent, Pakistan ended up in the troubled waters of territorial threat and national security.

4.7. Pakistan and its Threat Perceptions

The complete review of Indo-Pak pre-partition military thoughts provide us clear indication that both the nations had rich military history and security orientation. The legacy is rich but also competitive when it comes to ‘own’ political landscape of the region. Is the legacy belongs to Muslims? or Hindus are the real custodian of the glory of India? Shall the pre-British rule of Mughal be assigned as variable of legitimate political identity of the region or pre-Muhammad Bin Qasim India? Establishing the link of legacy is quite difficult and impossible in many contexts. Pakistan had never carried out the burden of such an inheritance that this land belongs to Muslims. It is India which had officially orchestrated the legacy under ‘Hindutva’ philosophy and wanted to regain all the land which once belongs to Hindu rulers like Maurya dynasty. Even when Pakistan got independence from British Raj, it was Indian National Congress leadership which wanted to bargain Kashmir with Hyderabad and denied the
independence of Pakistan while publically chanting out slogans for reunification (The Print, 2018). Pakistan felt insecure and vulnerable knowing the very facts of military, economic, and geographical strengths of India.

The slogans to reunite the Indian subcontinent were not in isolation rather an ideological background existed which has never accepted Muslims even as a minority. The Hindu extremist organizations wanted Muslims to revert back to Hindu religion. In such a passive and regressive thought, how come Muslim’s independent identity as Pakistan could be acceptable to Hindu extremists? The thought of denouncing the existence of Islam as religion and later Pakistan as a State was primarily originated in the beginning of 20th century. The formal end of Mughal Empire in 1857 and taking over by the British Raj from the East India Company in 1858 became a catalyst for the Hindus to aspire for creation of a Hindu nation under ‘Hindu Rashtra’ in South Asia composing of modern day Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives (Chatterjee, 1995). Significantly, the proponents of the Hindu extremist ideologies from the very beginning have been well educated and well versed with the western political knowledge. They are not mere production of the seminaries rather being part of middle and elite class formed a new team committed to demonstrate practicality of the ideological reconstruction in the whole of India. Being foreign qualified and exposed to multi-disciplined education, the team work have been impressively calculated and well thought.

In the beginning, a ‘Hindu Mahasabha’ was initially founded in 1907 in India, which at that time was known as Punjab Hindu Sabha. Later on, Hindu Sabhas were also founded in many other parts of the British India such as in Utter Pardesh, Bihar, CP, and Bombay (Prakash, 1966). To bring likeminded right wing Hindus under the same umbrella, an all India based ‘Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha’ (ABHM) was founded in 1915. ABHM aimed at non-secular party
for safeguarding issues of Hindus. It was the Mahasabha leader Vinayak Damodar Sarvarkar who is known to be the first to define the ideology of ‘Hindutva’ in his book ‘Essentials of Hindutva’ which he wrote in 1923, being captive in Maharashta jail. Sarvarkar revolutionized the philosophy of Hinduness which includes wholeness in an individual who in his aspects of life follows code of Hindutva philosophy. His book along with many of the lectures that he delivered in ABHM sessions became fundamental guiding principles for the Hindu Nation (Savarkar, 2016).

The ‘Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha’ became mother ideology for the so many other right wing Hindu extremist organizations which later on started their struggle on Hindutva doctrine. Many of the leaders who inspired the post partition Indian Hindutva organizations were members of the ABHM. For example, some of the top Hindu leaders that assembled under ABHM included, “Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Swami Sharadhanand, Shankaracharya Lala Lajpat Rai, Raja Narendranath, Ramanand Chatterjee, Vijayaraghavacharya, Bai Parmanand, Bhikustootama, Vinayak Damodar Sarvarkar, Dr. B. S. Moonje, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, N. C. Chaterjee, Prof V. G. Deshpande, N. N. Banerjee, Vikram Savarkar, Balarao Savarkar” and many others (Khan, Svensson, Jogdand, & Liu, 2017).

One of the ABHM leaders, Keshav Balaram Hedgewar founded Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in 1925, which uphold the same Hindutva ideology (Goyal, 2000). Many of the ABHM leaders joined Indian National Congress and formed other political, social, and cultural movements with clear manifestation of Hinduism. Due to all these developments Muslims who initially started political struggle against the British Raj as part of Indian National Congress were convinced that Hindus will not accommodate them into any political settlement rather isolation will be their fate. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was known as Hindu-Muslim Ambassador left the
Congress based on his reservations that Indian National Congress is no more a national political entity rather it only represents the Hindus. Afterwards, Muhammad Ali Jinnah joined the Muslim League and started his struggle to uplift the Muslims of India in political, economic, social, and cultural domains (Jalal, 1994).

The political and ideological struggle continued under the British Raj, which on the parallel lines gave impetus to Indian National Congress as Hindu representative political party and Muslim League as Muslims representative party. Over the period of time politics came into highlight whereas ideology went under the umbrella of both elite political parties. After rigorous political struggle including elections of 1946 and public agitations convinced the British Crown in 1947 who decided to announce partition of the Indo-Pak subcontinent. The distribution of resources were in process when one of the due share in terms of money was not being transferred to Pakistan and in protest to that one of the great Indian leader Gandhi sat on hunger strike, he was assassinated by the member of Hindu Mahasabha on January 30, 1948 (Saha, 2017). Nathuram Godse killed Mohandas Gandhi in hatred to his act which he was demonstrating in favor of Muslims of Pakistan. Afterwards, both the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha were banned in February 1948. After continuous efforts with the Indian National Congress and Government of India, RSS was able to get reinstated in July 1949. In fact, the then leader of RSS M. S. Golwalkar managed to get the then Congress Home Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel on board, who was himself follower of Hindutva philosophy. Under the deal, the RSS distanced itself from the ABHM, which remained banned (Noorani, 2000).

ABHM was also restored later but its leadership particularly Savarkar lost the active role in national politics due to Gandhi’s assassination and Godse relations with the top leadership. Though, became less active but his political thought kept driving the elite discourse of India as
Hindustan, which further gave impetus to many more right wing extremist Hindu organizations. The ideological phenomenon was so deep in the Hindu society that even failed to tolerate Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, one of the greatest non-violence leaders in the history of Indian civilization. After independence of India and following the assassination of Gandhi, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) became the frontrunner custodian of ‘Hindutva’ ideology under its Sangh Parivar umbrella. Owing to the involvement of Gandhi’s assassination, the ‘Hindu Mahasabha’ lost its political relevance. The Hindu right wing thereafter conceded political ground totally to the ‘Nehruvian’ dynasty led Indian National Congress for almost four decades.

The RSS conceived its first political party ‘Bharatiya Jana Sangh’ in 1951 which had limited success and merged into Janta Party. Later on a new party by the name of ‘Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’ under the RSS patronage was made in 1980 (Graham, 2007). The BJP covered enormous ground to become the flagship political party of ‘Hindutva’ under Atal Bihari Vajpayee, L. K. Advani, and Narendra Modi; riding primarily on fanning of the right wing Hindu extremism by way of anti-minority and anti-Muslim campaigns. The tactics to fuel hatred ranged from demolition of ‘Babri Mosque’, destruction of Christian churches, desecration of nuns, Gujarat holocaust of Muslims, and forced conversion of minorities to Hinduism.

The above mentioned ‘Sangh Parivar’ could also be referred as ‘collective family’, a name given to the umbrella of organizations sharing, propagating and striving for ascendency of ‘Hindutva’ ideology (Jaffrelot, 2005). With RSS remaining in the driving seat other affiliated organizations essentially tow the objectives, policy, and strategy outlined by it. Some of the ‘Sangh Parivar’ organizations are listed below that play an active role under the umbrella of ‘Hindutva’ doctrine:

- The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
Vishwa Hindu Parishal (VHP)
Abhinav Bharat
Bajrang Dal
Durga Vahini
Akhil Bharatya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP)/ All India Students Council
Rashtra Sevika Samiti (RSS)
Dharm Jagaran Samiti (DJS)
Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (VKA)
Bharat-Tibet Maitri Sangh/ Indian-Tibet Friendship Union

The network includes close to a dozen various professional organizations, scores of educational, socio-cultural, religious societies, NGOs, and nearly a dozen of think tanks including:

- Vivekananda International Foundation
- Vivekananda Kendra
- Hindu Vivek Kendra
- Indian Policy Foundation

Besides, there is a huge network of Ashrams, self-styled Swami and Seers, Gurus and temples that supplement the ‘Hindutva’ doctrine in all sphere of Indian life, whose disciples run in tens of thousands. The Parivar thus includes of ‘Hindutva’ zealots of various colors and hues. The entire network acts as a force multiplier to achieve various objectives for BJP and RSS. These organizations are multiplying at an alarming pace and have received major boost following Narendra Modi becoming Prime Minister of India. How the network of these organizations had impacted on Pakistan’s national security, is explained in the last section of the chapter under ‘the Hindutva Doctrine and Hybrid Warfare’. For this part of the study, an effort has been done to highlight the ideological foundations of India manifested out of ‘Hindutva
Doctrine’ that hijacked its post-partition military thought and political discourse that has been haunting Pakistan. Moreover, chapter five is dedicated to expose the ‘Hindutva Warfare’ to highlight the contemporary non-kinetic and hybrid nature of war that New Delhi has waged against Pakistan.

Pakistan from the very beginning was wary of such ideological fault-lines that in the post partition India were fully invested in her political system. Hypocritical distribution of resources and military assets, communal killing of thousands of Muslims during migration, assassination of Gandhi while supporting Pakistan, rhetoric of reunification through use of force by Sardar Patel predominantly supported by Congress, ABHM, RSS, and many other Hindu cultural, political, and social organizations denouncing the very existence of Muslim state; was not a safe passage for Pakistan’s national defense and territorial integrity. It was facing both material and ideological threats from Indian Hindutva ideology and had to prepare itself at any cost. The insecurity was unlimited but sources to curb the threats were limited. Pakistan with this security dilemma entered into post partition political landscape and faced tremendous pressures on multiple fronts by the Indian military and political stalwarts.

Over the period of seventy years, Pakistan army had been striving hard to ensure national security and territorial integrity against external threats. One of the biggest threats it faced immediately after the independence was unfriendly and aggressive behavior of India who through its superior military force continuously threatened Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Therefore, the journey since independence of the country was never smooth and easy to cope with. That is why, Pakistan had to respond back to Indian aggressions and thereafter fought three full-fledge wars in 1947, 1965, 1971, along with a limited conflict in 1999 (Ganguly, 2002). Pakistan had to get along Indian strategy of limited skirmishes on Line of Control and Siachin,
that’s primary objective was to disengage Pakistan from peace, stability, progress, and prosperity. Moreover, the Indian military and political pundits have ensured the same strategy while bringing other allies into the discourse such as Afghanistan and to some context Iran (Lodhi, 2016). Afghanistan had also toed Indian strategy to engage Pakistan into border skirmishes that created threats on the both sides of borders. Iran though remained reluctant to follow Indian strategy of skirmishes but it had indirectly facilitated intelligence operatives of India to create instability in Pakistan’s province of Baluchistan.

The post-9/11 incident had exceptionally engaged Pakistan to fight global war on terror, which brought non-state actors and their terrorist networks to destabilize the country. In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan army is continuously fighting with non-kinetic sub-conventional war along its western borders. Indian consulates in Afghanistan have been sponsoring the terrorists to cause Pakistan economic and political instability (Ahmed & Bhatnagar, 2007). Along with such enormous national security threats within and outside, Pakistan is still the leading contributor in the United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNDPKO) and sends large contingent of its armed forces to ensure peace and stability around the globe (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2018). Dedicated and an unbiased evaluation of post-partition security environment is the key to address questions like, why Pakistan became a security centric state? Therefore, in the below mentioned sections of this chapter, deliberations are done to unfold the security environment which evolved Pakistan’s threat perceptions.

4.8. Threat Perceptions in the Formative Era 1947-64

Pakistan’s military thought during formative era had to take shape under the pulls and pressures of its national defense, which ultimately established an unending discourse of security alliances with the superpowers. The nature of bipolar system of international politics gave fewer
options for independent foreign policy of Pakistan. It was a time when Pakistan in the pursuit of independent foreign policy ended up into security alliances with the west (Shahi, 1988). Furthermore, the vulnerabilities that came out of Indian military aggression consequently defined the future political developments and shaped security environment since independence till 1964, which are elaborated below in three distinct timeframes (Rizvi, 2004):

a) 1947- 53: The Evolving Years

The founding father and first Governor General of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah showed his commitment to develop cordial relations with neighbors and nations around the world. On the one side managing hostility posed by the Indian political and military leadership and on the other hand introducing Pakistan to international community, were two front challenges that occupied the founding father. The challenges which Pakistan inherited were mostly the result of June 03, 1947 British decision of division and Indian Independence Act of July 1947 that hastily completed the process. The distribution of the funds along with division of British government assets that included depots, arms, and military equipments were inappropriately handed over to Pakistan. Also the communal riots and killing of thousands of Muslims during the time of independence, the religious tensions among minorities of the both states, the clearance of evacuee belongings and properties, the improper distribution of water and river management, and last but not the least trade between the two nations created an uncomfortable beginning for Pakistan. Even before partition Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian National Congress leader and the first Prime Minister of India in 1946 said:

“We don’t need a defence plan. Our policy is non-violence. We foresee no military threats. You can scrap the army. The police are good enough to meet our security needs” (Sharma, 2005).
Contrary to what Nehru said, soon after the independence, India started capitalizing on unjust division of forces which gave her 2:1 superiority, adopted offensive military approach for absorption of numerous princely states including Junagarh in 1947, Jammu and Kashmir in 1948, and through Operation Polo Hyderabad was annexed in 1948 (Roychowdhury, 2017). Junagarh, Kashmir, and Hyderabad were Muslim majority princely states and wanted to join Pakistan under the partition plan. The *Hindutva* ideology of Indian politics forcefully took control over the states and deprived Pakistan from its due geographical representation.

Pakistan inherited the post World War II British Army and fought Kashmir War of 1948 without any major changes into its organization, equipment and leadership. Indian Army adopted offensive approach to annex Jammu and Kashmir (Nath, 1990). Pakistan’s Army on the other hand, faced with shortage of resources came up with the idea of combination of regular and irregular forces to meet the threat. Pakistan lost Kashmir in the aftermath of United Nations Resolution 47 passed on April 22, 1947, when Prime Minister of India approached the organization for a ceasefire (Subbiah, 2004). Jawaharlal Nehru promised and committed to go for plebiscite to gave right of self determination to the people of Kashmir to decide their future. Kashmir was one of the biggest Muslim princely states that under the partition plan was suppose to join Pakistan. The Indian manipulation with its Hindu ruler Mahraja Hari Singh cunningly got his signature on an agreement of annexation and sent its forces to crush the revolt of locals who wanted to join Pakistan. When Pakistan responded back to military aggression of India, Nehru rushed towards the United Nations and pledged for the plebiscite. Pakistan agreed to it and declared ceasefire on January 01, 1949 but unfortunately India clandestinely prolonged its commitment and had not fulfilled its international promise to give right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir (Rizvi, 1995).
The founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah due to his prolonged illness that he managed to conceal during the last years of his political struggle could not fight anymore and died in 1948. The country was orphaned by the great leader who has been remembered as ‘Quaid-e-Azam’. Politically demoralizing and strategically vulnerable security environment of the evolving years furthered insecurity when in 1950-51 Indian army started stationing its forces on the Punjab border of Pakistan. Threatened by the Hindutva ideology in Junagarh, Kashmir, and Hyderabad; Pakistan nearly averted another war with India. Above all the so-called slogans of reunification camouflaged with Hindutva ideology continuously haunted the formative foundations of Pakistan. Concurrently, non-cooperative Afghanistan didn’t recognize Pakistan’s western border. This act of Kabul was endorsed by New Delhi and an era of diplomatic cum military alliance got birth between Afghanistan and India. Through this India successfully created another hostile neighborhood for Pakistan. This two sided security compulsion reflected two sides of the coin as ‘the obverse and the reverse’ security dilemma and entangled Pakistan between the pendulums of insecurity. Also in the same time period in 1951, Pakistan Army successfully detected and neutralized the so-called ‘Rawalpindi Conspiracy’ which was sponsored by the Soviet Union to overthrow the political regime in Pakistan (Zaheer, 1998). This incident later on impacted on bilateral relations between the two when during 1950’s Soviet Union endorsed Afghanistan’s territorial claims and showed its resentment against Pakistan’s decision to tilt towards the West (Rizvi, 2002).

The obverse and the reverse context of insecurity forced Pakistani leadership to focus on the military modernization that it inherited from the British Indian Army. New divisions were raised and regrouped while administrative networking and organizational restructuring was seen necessary. Western countries were approached to buy new military equipments to modernize
three wings of Pakistan armed forces. Officers were sent to Britain and commonwealth countries for training. To fill the gaps in the army, Pakistan requested neutral officers of the British Army to volunteer their services for the newly developed army. Even all these efforts were not enough to compete with the security needs of Pakistan that could ensure an ideal defense on both sides of the West and East Pakistan (Rizvi, 2000).

b) 1953-62: Alignment / Non Alignment Phase

During this phase, Pakistan aligned with the West by signing SEATO and CENTO in September 1954 and September 1955, respectively; while India adopted ‘Nehruvian policy of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence’. India mostly acquired Soviet equipment while in May 1954 Pakistan signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (MDAA) with US which helped her to raise and equip 4 Infantry Divisions, 1 Armoured Division and 1 Armoured Brigade. Ironically, “Pakistan was obliged not to use the assistance provided under this agreement for undertaking any act of aggression against any other nation” (Nawaz, 2008). Therefore, Pakistan followed a defensive policy.

Inadequacies in military hardware vis-à-vis India led to the motto ‘makeup in skill what we lack in material’. Gradually the motto of Army became ‘training, more training and still more training’. Though it helped to bring realism in training but the Army continued to follow the World War II tactics. A cell was set up at General Head Quarters (GHQ) Rawalpindi in 1958 to study and evolve indigenous tactical doctrines, which produced a paper on ‘Basic Concept of Defence’, and some preliminary ideas on attack. Forward Policy adopted by India for dealing with China also testified India’s approach to use of force despite its claim for peaceful coexistence (Cheema, 2002). Moreover, the military mantra of Hindutva still continued to
flourish in India, when in 1961 it forcefully annexed Goa, an area under control of Portuguese since last 451 years (Wright, 1962).

On March 1959, a Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation (BAC) meant to improve military strength was signed between Pakistan and United States. Pakistan received around US $650 million as grant assistance and US $55 million as credit facilities to enhance its land, air, and naval capability to ensure security. Pakistan Army received transport, armored personnel carriers (APCs), arms, artillery pieces, and ammunition. On the other hand, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) received different aircrafts such as C-130, F 86, F 104, and B 57. Pakistan Navy got defence related equipments such as communication system including radars and few warships. Moreover, the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG) was stationed in Pakistan to help cope with security and military arrangements including advice and modernization support in the three armed wings of Pakistan. Thereafter, the defence structure of Pakistan armed forces was upgraded with technological induction. It also included new training facilities that allowed both domestic and foreign platform for the forces to upgrade their battlefield knowledge. Many of the “Pakistani officers were sent in the United States to complete training courses”. Pakistan Air Force and Pakistan Navy due to their participation in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) military exercises gained excellent exposure and experience (Rizvi, 2002).

Pakistan in response to the agreement ended up offering Badaber Air base situated near Peshawar, which was used by the United States to spy over Soviet territory (Lifschultz, 1986).

c) 1962-64: Re-adjustment / Adjustment Phase:

The Indians did not perceive “any serious threat from China till 1962. In the absence of any planning there existed considerable confusion in military thinking during the Indo-China War 1962”. A flawed defensive strategy was manifested through use of defended areas as pivots
to destroy enemy by mobile reserve, which never existed. The nation suffered humiliation and “Indian Army commanders’ right up to the highest level failed” to prove their military competence and professional leadership (Nawaz, 2008).

Indo China War besides being a wakeup call for the Indian military leadership also brought shift in US policy in favour of India. Kennedy administration started projecting India as a counterweight to China. India was offered a nuclear umbrella against the Chinese threat. With assistance from US and number of other western states, rapid expansion of the Indian Army commenced, primarily for the defence of Himalayan frontiers, however, the same was later on used against Pakistan in 1965 War. On the other hand, Pakistan's relations with China in post 1962 period improved more rapidly. In 1964, China declared its support to the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir (Bukhari & Parveen, 2014).

Indo–Pak military thought during formative era remained more so a British legacy, however, US military assistance to Pakistan and Indo China War of 1962 proved to be defining events in development of respective military thought.


The second stage of Pakistan’s security dilemma evolved through its improved phase of military management that began with the Runn of Kutch episode in April 1965 which gave Pakistan a psychological advantage. This tactical victory led to the decision to go for clandestine operations to defreeze Kashmir issue which eventually triggered Indo-Pak War of 1965 (Ahmed, 2006). During 1965, India adopted offensive–defensive strategy. Indian offensive had the dual aim of destroying Pakistani forces along with the acquisition of large chunk of its territory, to enable a bargaining lever in the post war negotiations. On Pakistani side, the war reflects earliest traces of application of original military thinking aimed at creating strategic effects through
guerrilla operation in Kashmir (Musa, 1983). The plan, however, was based on faulty assumption that India will not cross international border.

During 1965 war, US imposed sanctions banning sale of military hardware to both India and Pakistan. Pakistan approached her allies to improve its military capability while India continued to build her armed forces through Soviet Union and later through concluding Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 9, 1971 just prior to the third war between the two in December 1971 (Mansingh, 1984). Pakistan’s security situation worsened when 1970 elections caused political bifurcation between East and West Pakistan. A non-cooperation movement against the centre was launched by dissident elements of East Pakistan which was countered through Operation Searchlight that “marked the beginning of the end” (Bose, 2011). According to Marwah, “this gave a very legitimate excuse to India, which claimed that over 10 million Bengali refugees are on her soil and used it as an effective propaganda ploy against Pakistan” (Marwah, 1979).

During 1971, India successfully shaped the environment and employed Hybrid strategy utilizing diplomatic, political, informational, military and economic tools. Pakistan also used its diplomatic channels to curb Indian hybrid strategy but failed to receive meaningful support from its so-called allies. It was Pakistan’s posture of independent foreign policy that annoyed the United States when Islamabad ended up in an agreement with China in March 1963 to settle border dispute (Dobell, 1964). Moreover, in the aftermath of Indo-China war of 1962, the US tilt towards India was considered a breach of trust with Pakistan. Thereafter, Pakistan initiated rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Pakistan did enjoyed smooth relations with both China and Soviet Union but due to some internal differences between Beijing and Moscow inevitable circumstances took over the positive environment and converted it into negative. For example, in
1969 the former Soviet Union wanted Pakistan to join Asian Collective Security System which was in fact a replica of Warsaw Pact for Asian nations meant to isolate China (Horelick, 1974).

Pakistan due to its previous experience of block politics particularly its cordial relations with China did not endorse the idea, which once again annoyed the Soviets. Thereafter, Soviet Union developed cordial relations with India and signed a Treaty of Friendship on August 09, 1971. Under hybrid strategy India successfully executed the Friendship Treaty article 9 in October 1971 and sought full Soviet support in the United Nations Security Council when on December 5th, 6th, and 13th Pakistan submitted ceasefire resolutions and highlighted Indian aggression. All three efforts were consistently vetoed by the Soviet Union that gave sufficient time to Indian military to take control of the East Pakistan (Rizvi, 2004).

Militarily India launched a well regulated offensive in East Pakistan and maintained defensive–offensive posture in the West while stationing its army on the borders (Singh, 2005). Pakistan’s strategic thinking was encapsulated as ‘Defence of the East Lies in the West’. Furthermore, Kamal Matinuddin made his opinion while explaining Pakistan’s strategic thinking and stated that, “in the overall strategic perspective, West Pakistan was conceived as the main theatre of operations. Consequently in the Eastern Wing, a purely defensive strategy was adopted while in West Pakistan, a defensive-offensive strategy was adopted to capture objectives of strategic importance and relieve pressure in the Eastern theatre in order to strengthen the post war bargaining position” (Matinuddin, 1994). The concept was based on the assumption that Indian threat against East Pakistan would be dealt by launching a counter stroke inside Indian territory in the western theatre. However, no time frame was fixed for launching the counter offensive hence the strike corps was not clear when it was to be launched.
Emboldened by victory in East Pakistan, India resorted to power projection manifested through nuclear tests of 1974 (Schrafstetter, 2002) and adopted policy of dominance through asserting herself on neighbours by military actions in Sikkim 1975, Siachin 1984, Sri Lanka 1987 and Maldives 1988. The actions were taken to project India as a regional power (Ahmed, 1993). It was only in Sri Lanka where the practice was checked by the Tamils and India had to abandoned its operation after heavy loss both life and material.

The fate of 1971 War propelled Pakistan’s leadership to take concrete steps to improve the military system, particularly in higher rungs of the military hierarchy. Consequently, National Defence College (NDC) was establishment in 1971 at Rawalpindi for higher studies in national defence for nurturing and maturing of the military thought that later on in 2011 was upgraded to National Defense University through an Act approved by the National Assembly of Pakistan (National Assembly, 2011). To achieve jointness and synergy amongst three services Joint Staff Headquarters was also established in the aftermath of 1971 war with India (Cheema, 2000). It is considered to be a starting point in conceiving, developing and coordinating the operations of three services, a vital aspect of military thought development.


The power show between the two superpowers in Afghanistan brought Pakistan closer to the USA once again. India benefited mostly from USSR while still maintaining relations with US. Domestically, Indian political thought of the era is reflected mainly by Indra Gandhi, IK Gujral and Jaswant Singh:-

i. Indra Doctrine: Indra doctrine showed a shift from Nehruvian doctrine indicating a hegemonic approach in South Asia (Kapur, 1987).
ii. **Gujral Doctrine:** It sees India in the role of a greater economy having cordial relations with its neighbouring states while at the same time safeguarding own security. It wants to prove India as a neutral and peace loving state (Gujral, 2003).

iii. **Jaswant Singh:** He regards that the seeds of Hindu domination lie in her ancient history. He aspires for the Indian domination of the South Asian region and Indian Ocean (Singh, 2013).

Doctrinal sway also transformed the military thought. Besides power projection in 1974 at Pokhran detonating nuclear device under ‘Smiling Buddha’, New Delhi started mass-mechanization of its armed forces. In the mid-80s, the Indian Army Chief General Sunderji adopted offensive doctrine (Sunderji Doctrine) called “the Concept of Simultaneity” (Ahmed, 2008). This was validated through Exercise Brass Tacks of July 1986, which was aimed at employment of large scale mechanized forces supported by massive air power to achieve maximum degradation of enemy system of forces and absorb significant territory (Bajpai, Chari, Cheema, Cohen, & Ganguly, 1995). This was basically an amalgamation of German Concept of Blitzkrieg (Citino, 2007) and Russian Deep Operations Theory (Glantz, 2012). In operational terms, the centerpiece of this concept was simultaneity of attack and attempt at destruction of entire depth of defenses, with speed and momentum as its essential features.

In nutshell, hegemonic political thought was transformed into military thought by developing ‘offensive doctrine’. Large scale reorganization (RAPID) and mechanization process started, which gave birth to massive build-up required to initiate war while precluding any chance of a surprise.

This new Indian military thinking provoked a similar response on the Pakistani military thinking. As a result, a major reorientation of operational planning was undertaken in terms of military strategy. With US aid, Pakistan upgraded its military equipment, which gave its military thinkers an idea to think offensively as well. Withdrawal of Soviet Forces from Afghanistan
released pressure on Pakistan’s western borders, created space for offensive employment of sizeable formations. Thus, Pakistan Army adopted ‘Defensive-Offensive Strategy’ in 1989, validating it through ‘Exercise Zarb-e-Momin’, and asserting that next war will be taken into enemy territory (Singh, 2008). Indians deployed their forces in Siachin in 1983/84. Known as Operation Meghdoot, Indian army not only tried to dominate certain important passes but also sever Pak–China strategic link through Karakorum Highway (KKH) (Hafeez, 2016). This was the most significant move since 1971. Pakistan therefore shifted its military thought from purely defensive to ‘Defensive-Offensive Strategy’.

4.11. War under Nuclear Overhang: The Post 1998 Phase

While India tested her nuclear device in 1974, covert nuclearization of Pakistan was concluded in mid 1980s which averted a major conflict that was planned by India under the garb of Exercise Brass Tacks of 1986-87. With overt nuclearization of South Asia in May 1998 possibility of an all-out conventional war significantly reduced. It brought about paradigm shift in Indian politico-military thought (Ganguly & Kapur, 2010).

The situation raised serious concerns for implementation of deep strategic maneuvers. Concept of ‘nuclear threshold’ became an important consideration giving birth to the concept of ‘Limited War’ under nuclear overhang. Indian military desperately started looking for alternatives / options for limited war and Kargil Conflict of 1999 provided them an opportunity. Kargil indicated that space for conventional conflict though limited still exists under nuclear overhang (Ladwig III, 2008). Coupled with ‘limited war’ under ‘nuclear overhang’, sub-conventional warfare also emerged as a dominant form of 21st century warfare.

Frustrations emanating from mobilization differential favorable to Pakistan, reinforced through Operation Parakaram-2001/2002 hastened Indian military hierarchy towards
development of a new military doctrine (Siddique, 2016). Thus, building on NATO’s military concepts, Indian Army officially unveiled her Cold Start Doctrine on April 28, 2004 (Ladwig III, 2008). The underlying notion was to achieve surprise by giving no or minimum reaction time to Pakistan for possible response while at the same time achieves military aims prior to intervention by the international community. For realization of new doctrine, Indian Army embarked upon a developmental strategy which could take another decade or so. Therefore to implement the doctrine with available force structure, Indian military came up with the Concept of Pro Active Strategy (PAS) (Ahmed, 2011). The strategy aims at ‘Hit and Mobilize’ intending to launch multiple shallow thrusts all along the front to create response dilemma.

Pakistan in response evolved New Concept of War fighting (NCWF), which comprehensively addresses all the issues/ threats arising from Indian Cold Start Doctrine / Proactive Strategy and mounts a formidable response at all levels (Abdullah, 2018). This response not only addresses Pakistan’s vulnerability against ‘Hit and Mobilize’ concept by taking necessary safeguards, it also exploits enemy imbalance in early timeframe (Fair, 2014). Along with the induction of tactical nuclear warheads the ‘new concept of war fighting’ is in fact Pakistan’s non-nuclear response to counter Indian ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ (Sood, 2017).

4.12. 4GW—The New Face of War

In the growing asymmetry of resources between India and Pakistan, the modern war in terms of 4th Generation Warfare has assumed greater importance. There are numerous terms which though fall in the ambit of the 4GW such as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) that are used interchangeably (Richards, 2008). It is important to know the subtle differences between these terms with a view to enhancing understanding of this phenomenon. All standing armies are finding it hard to cope with this new form of warfare. To this end it’s
significant to fully comprehend the importance of understanding dynamics of 4GW. There cannot be anything more unfair than the misnomer that, there is no major difference in the employment of standing army in response to 4GW or conventional war. It is also essential to take a stock of the factors contributing towards the insurgency like situation along the western border of Pakistan.

Fourth generation warfare (4GW), military operations other than war (MOOTW), irregular warfare (IW), asymmetric warfare, sub-conventional warfare, low intensity conflict (LIC), insurgency, counter-insurgency (abbreviated as COIN), guerrilla warfare, terrorism, rebellion, three block war, non-linear war, civil war, revolutionary war, small wars, urban warfare, gang war, subversion, sabotage, mind control, social media, net-centric warfare, and information warfare, etc. are few of the recognized forms of modern war. These terms like asymmetric warfare, irregular war, sub-conventional war and non-linear war are somewhat used in the similar connotation. Pakistan being the frontline state in global war against terrorism and close to the epicenter being one of the perceived threats is confronted with unprecedented consequences. In December 2004 the US National Intelligence Council assessment report on *Mapping the Global Future* highlighted the significance of 4GW and irregular challenges and stated that:

“The key factors that spawned international terrorism show no signs of abating over the next 15 years. The likelihood of great power conflict escalating into total war in the next 15 years is lower than at any time in the past century. Lagging economies, ethnic affiliations, intense religious convictions and youth bulges will align to create a perfect storm, creating conditions likely to spawn internal conflict. The governing capacity of states, however will determine whether and to what extent conflicts actually occur. Those states unable both to satisfy the expectations of their peoples and to resolve or quell conflicting demands among them are likely to encounter the most severe and most frequent outbreaks of violence” (National Intelligence Council-US, 2004).

No standing army primarily structured and equipped to fight conventional war is comfortable at fighting 4GW. Armies are meant to fight an identifiable enemy on a linear front,
whereas 4GW involves a faceless enemy on a non-linear front. Performance of US Army in Iraq and Afghanistan sufficiently highlights this point. In conventional war, they captured entire countries in couple of weeks whereas seventeen years down the road they are still grappling with 4GW environment with no success in sight (Oliphant, 2018).

Besides this, the non-combat MOOTW also warrants service of the military employment. In the recent past the Earthquake of 2005 and internally displaced persons (IDPs) crisis of 2008 saw major employment of the Armed Forces (Reis, 2018). Role of armed forces in such employments also warrants complete understanding. Furthermore, specialized namely net-centric warfare and information warfare are demanding adequate attention to understand 4GW, its terms of relevance and differences from the conventional warfare with a view to enhancing the understanding of this in vogue form of warfare (Tunnell, 2014).

4.12.1. 4GW-Manifestation

- Subversion
- Insurgency
- Terrorism
- Internal Security
- Psychological Warfare
- Economic Crisis and Mismanagement

4.12.2. General Causes

- Foreign Interests
- Sectarianism
- Geographical and Regional Environment
- Political and Social Causes
- Nationalism
- Economic Unrest
**Table-4.2: Differences between Conventional War and Irregular War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conventional War</th>
<th>Irregular War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Linear front, identifiable enemy.</td>
<td>Non linear front, reverse front, faceless enemy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. As we go in rear/ depth the intensity decreases.</td>
<td>Intensity rises to maximum in the rear areas and thus a reverse front.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Combined role of Ground, Air and Naval Forces. The later two create environment for employment of former.</td>
<td>No/ negligible role of naval forces and extremely limited role of Air Force. Within ground force predominant role of Infantry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Armed Forces deal with traditional opponents i.e. Regular Armed Forces of adversary, based on bilateral construct.</td>
<td>Armed Forces besides regular enemey. Armed Forces deal with insurgents, terrorists, organized criminals under multilateral and ambiguous environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Less dependence on other elements.</td>
<td>Greater dependence on “intelligence services, police, law enforcement agencies, air and development agencies, private enterprises etc” (Kilcullen, 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Traditional concept of battle space.</td>
<td>“Disaggregated battle space such a force’s, mission space in which battle spaces erupt with little warning” (Kilcullen, 2005). There is no empty space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Category of special forces and normal forces.</td>
<td>Every soldier requires capabilities (of special forces) such as “initiative, cultural sensitivity, linguistic competence, mastery of sophisticated weapons” (Kilcullen, 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Empty spaces are assailed.</td>
<td>Complex terrain such as population centers and other cluttered terrain that offset precision strikes. This involves “complex physical terrain, complex human terrain, complex information terrain” (Kilcullen, 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) <strong>Complex-Physical-Terrain</strong> “Forces can be drawn into close combat more readily” (Kilcullen, 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) <strong>Complex-Human-Terrain</strong> Numerous population groups co-exist in same physical space. Difficult to distinguish antagonizing group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) <strong>Complex Info Terrain.</strong> Inability to control flow of information out of area of operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Such complex terrain leads to “extremely high density operating environment and enormous friction upon military operations. Thus operations become bogged down and stalemated” (Kilcullen, 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Clear distinction between levels of war i.e. tactical, operational and strategic.</td>
<td>As pointed out by Kilcullen, “combat has diffused across the strategic, operational and tactical levels” (Kilcullen, 2005). Action of junior leader</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>k.</strong></td>
<td>Distinction between combatant and non-combatant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>l.</strong></td>
<td>Victory would end the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>m.</strong></td>
<td>Army task is to provide “military aspect of national power”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>n.</strong></td>
<td>Armies follow “Terrain-Centric Approach” or “Enemy Centric Approach”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>o.</strong></td>
<td>It is netcentric warfare based on super technology enabling precision strikes while avoiding ground combat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p.</strong></td>
<td>Less involvement of media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>q.</strong></td>
<td>Aim of massing fire power at appropriate place and time to destroy enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>r.</strong></td>
<td>“Either side can initiate the conflict”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>s.</strong></td>
<td>Transition from peace to war is abrupt and sudden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>t.</strong></td>
<td>Insurgency is cheap so insurgent can afford protracted war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>u.</strong></td>
<td>Insurgent is fluid because he has neither responsibility nor concrete assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>v.</strong></td>
<td>Propaganda is weapon of insurgent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.13. Specific Causes of contemporary Regional and International Environment impacting Pakistan’s Threat Perceptions

The aftermath of Soviet disintegration and collapse of the Cold War has given impetus to regional and international orchestration of power politics that multiplied threat perception of Pakistan. Below are mentioned few of the important facets of the contemporary challenges that the Islamic Republic is encountering with.
• **Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and Afghan Factor**

The aftermath of US proxy war in Afghanistan against the former USSR has been further accentuated by the ongoing GWOT directly affecting the social, cultural and economic fabric of Pakistani society. Prior to action against Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA), Afghan soil was being used as terrorist harboring ground and also served as sanctuary of sectarian elements. This further magnified sectarianism and extremism syndrome, which heavily damaged Afghan provinces neighboring Pakistan.

• **Hostile Neighbor**

During the Cold War India got marginalized and continuously faced low intensity conflict (LIC) situation in Kashmir and in few other states as well. New Delhi always blamed Pakistan for its ordeals. However, in post 9/11 scenario, game matrix has changed. While Pakistan is facing the dire adverse consequences of its role in GWOT, India is in a better position of contributing towards instability against Pakistan. India is utilizing all available means to bleed Pakistan and cost economic, political, ideological, security, and diplomatic isolation.

• **Nuclearization of the Subcontinent**

To some extent nuclearization has diminished chances of total war while concurrently increased the chances of limited war including 4GW. This means that conventional war no longer remains practicable option because of the danger of escalation to nuclear level. 4GW thus becomes a viable option for the countries in pursuit of a particular interest under nuclear environment. Secondly, the nuclear deterrence inhibits the countries being subverted from retaliating through conventional or nuclear means.
• **US Interests and Popular Aspersions**

The US global interests in general and regional interests in particular are perceived as
containment of Islam. Pakistan’s role to serve US interests in this very context provided religious
factions a justification to denounce the writ of the state that along with post 9/11 environment
pushed the Islamic Republic into chaos and instability. Coupled with this, the US war in Iraq was
also considered as an effort to serve the interest of ‘Greater Israel’. The US Asian aspirations
while promulgating Indian role as ‘Net Security Provider’ are adamently contributing towards
instability while giving rise to great power politics in the continent (Joshi, 2017).

• **Rise in Fundamentalism**

Jihad in Afghanistan brought religiously zealous Arabs to come for the help of their
brethren in distress. The concept of Ummah, in a way, was revitalized. Influence of United States
in Middle East was threatened and activities were planned to target American interests in the
region. From Cold War to 9/11, the US global aspirations has disconnected the Muslims from
their regimes and governments hence giving room to social disorder and chaos favoring the
phenomenon of 4GW. Pakistan is under serious attack of this social disorder.

• **Effects of Globalization**

The world is turning into a global village. Globalization has placed new demands on the
nation-states. The cohesive forces of a nation-state have been greatly eroded. The independent
nature, culture and character of a state are being defused. There is a merger of cultures and social
values of various regions of the world. Based on the concept of the Core, Peripheral and Semi-
peripheral States, in the interaction among nations most of the problems emerge from the
peripheral states (Shannon, 2018). The same model can be applied to Pakistan’s diversified
society as well. FATA region is on one extreme and mega cities like Karachi and Lahore are on the other.

- **Regional Context**

Following challenges are specifically impacting on Pakistan’s national security discourse.

**a. Societal Disparities.**

There are great vulnerabilities existing in the internal dynamics of the region. Social dissent, economic disparities, political instability, ethnic polarization and religious extremism are some of the most glaring breeding factors. These vulnerabilities provide sufficient grounds for 4GW scenario.

**b. Economic Constraints.**

Due to economic constraints and emerging global trends maintaining huge armies is becoming an unviable option. However, presence of hostility and core issues between neighboring states imposes compulsions in this regard.

**c. Ethnic Polarity.**

Regional and linguistic nationalism is another factor, which may result into 4GW. In a polarized society, the aspirations and goals of different groups are not same which result into friction. Pakistan is vulnerable to 4GW due to this factor, as the centrifugal elements have always exploited regionalism for their personal gains.

**d. Jihadi Culture.**

It is important to trace the roots of fundamentalism that gave birth to Jihadi culture in South Asia. This would provide pragmatic analysis to reach to correct conclusions. Since
independence of Pakistan and even being weak state vis-à-vis arch rival India, Pakistan had been successful to ensure its territorial integrity. Regardless of resorting to low intensity conflict or promulgating the Islamic concept of Jihad, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan selected the right path when it joined western security pacts such as SEATO and CENTO in 1950s to upgrade its defense and security response against Indian hegemonic ambitions. It was India who in 1971 indulged into state terrorism and sponsored ‘Mukti Bahini’ in East Pakistan (Jamil, 2017). Foundations of insurgency with low intensity conflict were established which got real exposure when former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Following Moscow under ‘Containment of Communism’ policy, the United States ended up in the battlefield and crafted a new version of low intensity conflict that gave birth to ‘Jihadi culture’ in South Asia. As verified and exposed by the former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, when she gave her testimony to Congressional hearing in 2009 and said that:

“The problems we face now to some extent we have to take responsibility for, having contributed to it. We also have a history of kind of moving in and out of Pakistan. Let's remember here, the people we are fighting today we funded them twenty years ago and we did it because we were locked in a struggle with the Soviet Union. They invaded Afghanistan and we did not want to see them control Central Asia and we went to work and it was President Reagan in partnership with the Congress led by Democrats who said you know what it sounds like a pretty good idea let's deal with the ISI and the Pakistan military and let's go recruit these Mujahideen. And great, let them come from Saudi Arabia and other countries, importing their Wahabi brand of Islam so that we can go beat the Soviet Union. And guess what they (Soviets) retreated. They lost billions of dollars and it led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. So there is a very strong argument which is it wasn't a bad investment in terms of Soviet Union but let's be careful with what we sow because we will harvest. So we then left Pakistan. We said okay fine you deal with the Stingers that we left all over your country. You deal with the mines that are along the border and by the way we don't want to have anything to do with you. In fact we're sanctioning you. So we stopped dealing with the Pakistani military and with ISI and we now are making up for a lot of lost time” (Dawn, 2009).

Today the environment in Pakistan is quite charged and ideally helpful for 4GW that the country is dealing on daily basis. In the post Cold War world particularly in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 standing alongside the global forces to fight war on terrorism, Pakistan has
entered into strange realities. On the one side of its territorial security and integrity nuclear deterrence has certainly off-balanced the conventional superiority of India but on the other hand the post 9/11 scenario gave impetus to Indian aspirations to destabilize Pakistan. In the wake of the shock waves emanating from global war against terrorism, instability in Afghanistan, and Indian renewed concepts of war; Pakistan has become more vulnerable to 4GW perpetuated by state and non-state actors such as CIA of U.S., RAW of India, NDS of Afghanistan along with TTP, Al-Qaeda to mention few. The amalgamation of all these forces gave impetus to the following acts of terror against the civil and military personnel and installations around the country.

- Ambush
- Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
- Suicidal Attack
- Rocket attack on Camps
- Fire raid on posts
- Physical attack on posts
- Laying siege around posts

4.14. The Hindutva Doctrine and Hybrid Warfare

Frustrated from Pakistan’s formidable response in conventional domain, Indian Army in line with political thought is strategically professing use of Hybrid War to destabilize Pakistan internally while at the same time maintaining pressure along the Line of Control (LOC). Indian military thought is greatly influenced by ancient military thought of Chankya Kautilya and Hindutva ideology that shapes opinions of the leaders of contemporary India. They believe that India merits international status by virtue of its size, population, military, economic potential and democracy. Pakistan is therefore considered part of ‘Akhand Bharat (Greater India)’ and the
Muslims are henceforth defectors of Hindu religion. The greater application of the *Hindutva* ideology both within India and in the region of South Asia strives to create an environment suitable to attain this legacy.

Muslims along with other minorities living in India had been facing terrible discrimination and brutality due to rising influence of the Right Wing Hindu Extremism. Moreover, a century long political, social, economic, military, and ideological *Hindutva* philosophy had deeply rooted in the overall system of India, which had clutched its politics and foreign policy. Pakistan is one of the biggest victims of the Indian *Hindutva* ideology that from the very first day did not accept the Islamic Republic. Over the period of time the philosophy got its strength and started executing its plan against Pakistan. The hatred against Pakistan which originated out of *Hindutva* ideology not only took over Junagarh in 1947, Hyderabad in 1948, and Kashmir in 1948 but it also disintegrated Pakistan in 1971 out of which Bangladesh came into being as an independent state. Indian ideological, political, and military thought achieved its ultimate objective of Akhand Bharat primarily through use of conventional methods which purely engaged its armed forces. Later on, learning from the Cold War experience of indirect strategy that allowed both the United States and the former Soviet Union to engage against each other through proxies, insurgencies, and guerrilla warfare; India immediately used it against Pakistan while raising Bengali insurgents under the umbrella of *Mukti Bahini* movement. The proxy was directly supported, trained, and mobilized by the Indian forces and its intelligence agency RAW. As a result Pakistan disintegrated in 1971.

Ancient military thought and its execution through economic, diplomatic, and military means had conveniently merged itself into the flora of multiple aspects of Indian politics. In political terms, the state has officially allowed *Hindutva* ideology to flourish. One of the greatest
examples of it is the current BJP Government that is the official wing of RSS Hindu extremist organization. Moreover, current Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi who was once banned in the United States due to his involvement in killing of Muslims in Gujarat being the Chief Minister is an active follower of the Hindutva ideology (Gowen, 2016). Economically, India had allowed establishing thousands of Hindu charity organizations which collects funds to feed the Hindutva ideology. Moreover, its foreign policy is very much in line with one of its ancient military strategist Chankya Kuatilya who suggested developing friendly ties with neighbor’s neighbor while aggressively engaging the immediate neighbor. This policy of India is very much active against Pakistan but at the same time it has established cordial relations with Afghanistan. Pakistan as Indian immediate neighbor had been facing threats since its independence even lost half of its part in 1971. The so-called military modernization of India furthered the context of Hindutva ideology that seeks to achieve Akhand Bharat. The modern orientation of India is cleverly projected as liberal democracy but in real the country had failed to ensure equal rights to its minorities and the peak of its intolerance is very much alive in Kashmir where more than a million troops of India are busy to suppress the freedom struggle (Abid &Ashfaq, 2016).

The so-called Hindutva ideology had impacted on the peace, prosperity, progress, and politics of the region. Pakistan being the biggest victim of this philosophy is facing a new threat of sub-conventional warfare. While using Afghanistan’s territory, India had successfully organized anti Pakistan groups that use nationalism, ethnic, and sectarian faultiness against Pakistan’s national integrity. Through use of such elements India had not only fuelled violence into Pakistan but also created a network of agents who time and again attack strategic assets of Pakistan. Kalbushan Yadev, a serving Indian Naval Commander was captured by the Pakistan intelligence agency who in interrogation accepted that his main task was to spread violence in
Karachi, Baluchistan, and sabotage China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). He had done this through raising and financing guerrilla insurgents while using nationalism as an important variable (Ikram & Rashid, 2017). Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is another group of terrorists residing and operating from Afghanistan who terrorize the country through their guerrilla tactics. One of many defectors of the TTP, Ihsan-ullah-Ihsan who was the spokesperson of the terrorist organization told Pakistan intelligence agencies during investigation that India had been financing and supporting the organization in Afghanistan (Yousaf, 2017). Both Kalbushan Yadev and TTP confessions had filled all the gaps which Pakistan officially required to expose Indian Hindutva ideology that has never accepted the division of British India.

This undeclared sub-conventional war under the broader guidelines of hybrid warfare had deeply impacted on Pakistan’s national security. Ajit Kumar Doval who is the National Security Advisor of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi; propagates the idea of bleeding Pakistan through sub-conventional war and had been bluntly bashing Pakistan through public talks (Noorani, 2018). Also Manohar Parrikar statements in the same domain unfold the dilemma into real posture against Pakistan’s national security (The Express Tribune, 2015). Moreover, revelations of Technical Service Division of India (TSD) under General V.K. Singh makes the sub-conventional war quite a reality in the 21st century that Pakistan had to combat through its renewed military approach (Joseph, 2013). There are so many examples which India under the domain of sub-conventional warfare had been applying against Pakistan.

Pakistan army since the very beginning prepared and strived hard to gain balance on the conventional fronts, whereas this new threat of sub-conventional war had exposed the army to a new level of warfare. The 21st century battlefield is now shifted from external to internal territory. The next chapter is dedicated to highlight the linkage of Indian military thought with its
Hindutva ideology which had been incisively executing anti Pakistan warfare. It has been observed that the backbone of Indian hybrid warfare seeks energy from the ideology of Hindutva, which relies more on indirect strategy rather direct war. In the aftermath of strong conventional forces, why contemporary Indian military thought is dependent on Hindutva ideology to isolate and destabilize Pakistan?; is a question that needs an answer to better understand and evaluate Pakistan’s military response against the 21st century warfare.
CHAPTER FIVE

FROM CONVENTIONAL TO SUB-CONVENTIONAL: FACING THE HINDUTVA WARFARE

5.1. Introduction:

Formulation of policies and priorities that shapes political process of any nation is a reflection of its history, culture, tradition, heritage, language, politics, and ideology. Understanding the past is a key to unfold future thought of any nation. Upholding values of the past helps build better nations but the process is dependent on rich history. The Indian civilization is rich in all variables whether its culture, tradition, language, heritage, politics, or ideology. This rich history of Indian civilization got birth from the Indus Valley Civilization when Moenjo Darro and Harrapa evolved multicultural nations carrying many different faiths and traditions (Possehl, 1999). From ancient to modern Indian civilization, an evolution of it had unfolded two powerful custodians of the history. One beholder of the Indian civilization is Hindu religion and the other is Muslims of the subcontinent. Both have ruled the region more than any other nation that surfaced in the post ancient civilizational period. It is also important to relate that both India and Pakistan are exceptional custodians due to their military strength and power that no other nation smaller or bigger had ever exercised on this region. Bangladesh does have historical relevance but due to overshadowed influence of Indian Hindutva on its domestic and foreign policy had made it gloomy competitor. Also contemporary Dhaka has negated the very glory of Islamic ideology and adopted for a secular future (Wood, 2007).

The Maurya dynasty saw its peak under Chandergupta Maurya who through its advisor and the Prime Minister Chankya Kautilya ruled over a vast area of modern India but for only 300 years when its last ruler Brihadratha was killed by one of his army chief, Shunga (Bhargava, 1996). Muslims being foreign rulers entered in the region in 712CE and established their writ in
Indian the sub-continent afterwards. Through their religious acceptance Muslim rulers allowed natives to enter into Islam and had ruled more than 1000 years over different strategic parts of Indian sub-continent being the most decisive rulers of the geography (Schimmel, 1980). The Indian civilization was now bifurcated between Muslims and Hindus as two biggest ideologies. Mughal Empire became the last ruling elite of the Indian civilization before it was defeated by the then British Empire in 1857. The British Raj thereafter was established in 1858 while rulers of the Mughal Empire were exiled. Hindus being the opportunist wanted to overshadow Muslim politics and accepted the British, whereas Muslims entered in the flux of limbo and continued resisting the Crown.

The so-called Indian Congress was seen as the sole representative body of Hindus and thereafter in 1906 Muslim League was established to protect the Muslim rights. The struggle continued on separate fronts between Indian Hindus and Muslims, who altogether started resisting British rule in the sub-continent. British ruled the Indian sub-continent for about 90 years and ultimately divided the Indian civilization into modern Pakistan and India. The division happened on the variable of ‘Two Nation Theory’ that propagated the distinction of ideology and classified both Hindus and Muslims different nations in all aspects. The truth of which was realistic and modern in political practice. Both the major political parties, the Muslim League of Indian Muslims and the Indian National Congress of Indian Hindus accepted the partition and started their journey as sovereign states (Hodson, 1985).

Muslims got East Pakistan and West Pakistan as two separated units along with camouflaged independent states like Junagargh, Hyderabad, Pathan Kot, and Kashmir. India received majority of the territory consisting Hindu majority population. Though, the division was not so smooth but still it happened firmly and without any hassle from the British Crown. Both
countries started their journey with uneasy beginning towards each other. Indian forces marched toward Junagargh in 1947 and forcefully annexed it. Likewise, in 1948 Operation Polo began that ended Hyderabad into Indian control. Not enough for Indian stalwarts, who then through cunning political move got signed the document of annexation from the Maharaja Hari Sing, the ruler of Kashmir, and sent its forces to invade Kashmir. Pakistan though responded but lost more than half of the Kashmir to Indian invasion. This was the revenge and birth of modern Indian Hindutva that wanted to re-install its Muriya dynasty while taking back all Muslim territory.

The region was divided in 1947 but it failed to divide the Indian civilization just like the flowing waters in the ancient rivers. Indian political and ideological leadership immediately transformed the division of the region ‘a great loss’ while chanting out the glory of ‘Akhand Bharat’ (Yadav, 2016). They called it motherland and the division henceforth was declared as unacceptable. The regret and sorrow manifested Indian policy towards Pakistan that became one of the biggest threats for its territorial integrity. With slight ups and downs into the ideological glory of Hindustan, the Indian regimes initiated some active and few passive military campaigns against Pakistan with having one objective of ‘Akhand Bharat’ in view. Pakistan resisted and took all necessary steps to ensure its survival. Though successful in its survival but the country lost East Pakistan in 1971, when Indra Gandhi the then Indian Prime Minister through covert military operation trained and launched Mukti Bahni insurgents and exploited the situation (Jamil, 2017).

The days are over to occupy and invade Pakistan but the methods to achieve ‘Akhand Bharat’ objective is still alive in Indian political and military thought. Pakistan had been categorically denouncing any such vision of India that time and again wanted to disintegrate Muslim politics through application of force. The ideological manifestation of India is an
important variable of insecurity and instability for the whole region. Indian society as a whole had been raised on anti-Pakistan phenomenon and thereafter allowed political and military leaders to weaken its neighboring nation. Pakistan had been facing and resisting to Indian conventional superiority. Unsuccessful in its conventional superiority, today India uses sub-conventional war as a mean to destabilize, bleed, and weaken Pakistan; the strength of which is emanating from Indian ideology of ‘Hindutva’ that had committed itself to achieve the ultimate and prime objective of ‘Akhand Bharat’. Therefore, this chapter is dedicated to unfold what is ‘Hindutva’ ideology of India and how it had successfully penetrated into Indian strategic thought? Moreover, the chapter would also investigate, why contemporary Indian military thought is dependent on Hindutva ideology to isolate and destabilize Pakistan?

5.2. Rise of Right Wing Hindu Extremism in India:

The present day Right Wing Hindu Extremism, the organizations, and political parties practicing such ideologies primarily originated in the beginning of the 20th century. The formal end of the Mughal Empire in 1857 and taking over by the then British Raj from East Indian Company in 1858 became a catalyst for the Hindus to aspire for creation of a ‘Hindu Rashtra’ in South Asia (Chatterjee, 1995). Significantly, the proponents of the Hindu extremist ideologies from the very beginning to date have mostly been well educated and belonged to the elite or middle class. They are not mere products of Hindu seminaries but those having extensive exposure to multi-disciplined western education. Their moves have therefore always been very calculated and well thought.

The journey of the Hindu thought started its trip towards becoming 20th century most powerful ideology back in 1907, when ‘Hindu Mahasabha’ was founded. Initially, it was Punjab Hindu Sabha, which later on extended its geographical representation in the British India while
setting up more Hindu Sabha’s in Utter Pradesh, Bihar, CP, and Bombay (Prakash, 1966). To bring likeminded right wing Hindus under the same umbrella, an all India based ‘Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha (ABHM)’ was founded in 1915. The party meant to address social issues of the Hindu of India. It was the Mahasabha leader V. D. Sarvarkar who is known to be the first to define the ideology of ‘Hindutva’, a term now commonly associated with the Right Wing Hindu Extremism. The Hindu Mahasabha may be regarded as the mother of the current right wing extremist ideologies in India as most other right wing Hindu movements and Hindu leaders were inspired by it and emerged from its cradle. The top Hindu right wing leadership in the pre-independence India also remained associated with ABHM at various times and many remained till the end. Some of the top Hindu leaders that assembled under ABHM included, “Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Swami Sharadhanand, Shankaracharya Lala Lajpat Rai, Raja Narendranath, Ramanand Chatterjee, Vijayaraghavacharya, Bai Parmanand, Bhikustootama, V. D. Sarvarkar, Dr. B. S. Moonje, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, N. C. Chaterjee, Prof V. G. Deshpande, N. N. Banerjee, Vikram Sarvarkar, and Balarao Sarvarkar” (Khan, Svensson, Jogdand, & Liu; 2017).

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was also founded by a former ABHM leader Keshav Balram Hedgewar in 1925 (Goyal, 2000). Many of the ABHM leaders joined Indian National Congress including other political, social, and cultural Hindu movements caring the cores of ‘Hindutva’ ideology (Qureshi, 2018). It was Hindu Mahasabha member Nathuram Godse who assassinated Mohandas C. Gandhi on January 30, 1948 (Saha, 2017). The RSS and Mahasabha were banned after Gandhi’s assassination in February 1948. Later on, through an understanding between RSS leader M. S. Golwalkar with the then Congress Home Minister, Sardar Vallabhai Patel; the RSS was reinstated in July 1949 (Noorani, 2000).
ABHM was also restored later but its leadership particularly Sarvarkar lost the active role in national politics even though his political thought continued to inspire and followed by the ABHM and RSS along with other right wing Hindu outfits.

The ABHM and RSS had a close link up till the time of Gandhi’s assassination with later being considered a cultural wing of the former. The assassination conspirators had a fused membership of both the organizations hopping between one to other. RSS, however, got away by shifting the entire onus on the ABHM. The scars left were deep and even as recent as November 2015, ABHM National Vice President, Ashok Sharma called RSS the biggest traitor for betraying the Hindus by abandoning Mahasabha while hijacking its issues and joining the hands with Congress (Rai, 2015).

The Hindu Mahasabha which had informally remained the parent body of RSS until Gandhi’s assassination lost this role. RSS leaders tactically severed ties with the Mahasabha and distanced themselves gradually from it. Yet the ideological fraternity between the two is so apparent and tied together that the current government of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) allowed the Hindu Mahasabha to unveil the bust of Gandhi’s assassin Nathuram Godse on October 02, 2016 to coincide with Gandhi’s birth anniversary (Bhatia, 2016). ABHM had also tried in the past to unveil Godse’s statue but was not allowed by the Congress. Though, BJP’s earlier government in 2003 had unveiled Sarvarkar’s portrait in the Indian parliament’s Central Hall amidst protest from the Indian National Congress, who were then in opposition. The unveiling of the Sarvarkar’s portrait was performed by “the then President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani, and Lok Sabha Speaker” besides others in attendance (The Hindu, 2003). Even though ABHM has been out of the driving seat of ‘Hindutva’ politics but is very much alive and kicking the ideology. It remains
an essential part of ‘Hindutva’ think tank which participates actively in its various cultural, social, religious and extremist drives such as ‘Gao Rakhsa’, ‘Ghar Wapsi’, and ‘Opposing Valentine Day’ (Flock, 2018).

5.3. ‘Hindutva’

It was Hindu Mahasabha leader V. D. Sarvarkar who coined the word ‘Hindutva’ for the first time in his book Essentials of Hindutva in 1923. Sarvarkar argued that, “Hinduism’ is only a derivative, a fraction, a part of ‘Hindutva’. Failure to distinguish between these two terms has given rise to much misunderstanding and mutual suspicion between some of those sister communities that have inherited this inestimable and common treasure of our Hindu Civilization”. Sarvarkar argued that, “Hinduness would have certainly been a better word than Hinduism as a near parallel to Hindutva”. In his view, “Hindutva embraced all the departments of thought and activity of the whole being of our Hindu race”. He maintained that to comprehend the connotation of the term ‘Hindutva’, “we must first understand the essential meaning of the word Hindu itself and realize how it came to exercise such imperial sway over the hearts of millions of mankind and won a loving allegiance from the bravest and best of them. But before we can do that, it is imperative to point out that we are by no means attempting a definition or even a description of the more limited, less satisfactory and essentially sectarian term Hinduism. How far we can succeed or are justified in doing that would appear as we proceed” (Savarkar, 2016a).

While attempting to conceptualize his term ‘Hindutva’, Sarvarkar strays into attempting to define the word ‘Hindu’ itself. He calls the ancient dwellers of areas now comprising Pakistan as the ‘intrepid a people’ (of Aryan stock), “the ‘Sindhus’ or ‘Hindus’ who could no longer be kept cooped or combined within the narrow compass of the ‘Panchanad’ or the Punjab. In his
view, the vast and fertile plains farther off stood out inviting the efforts of some strong and vigorous race. Tribe after tribe of the Hindus issued forth from the land of their nursery and led by the consciousness of a great mission and their Sacrificial Fire that was the symbol thereof, they soon reclaimed the vast, waste and but very thinly populated lands. Forests were felled, agriculture flourished, cities rose, kingdoms thrived; the touch of the human hand changed the whole face of the wild and unkempt nature. While these great deeds were being achieved, the Aryans had developed to suit their individualistic tendencies and the demands of their new environments a policy that was but loosely centralized. The great mission which the Sindhus had undertaken of founding a nation and a country found and reached its geographical limit when the valorous Prince of Ayodhya made a triumphant entry in Ceylon and actually brought the whole land from the Himalaya to the Seas under one sovereign sway. The day when the Horse of Victory returned to Ayodhya unchallenged and unchallengeable, the great white Umbrella of Sovereignty was unfurled over that imperial throne of the Princes of Aryan blood” (Goodrick, 2000).

Sarvarkar’s concept of ‘Hindutva’ has been carefully crafted to justify the Hindu caste system which segregates people within the same society of ‘Samaaj’ (Chowdhry, 2000). By degrading the term Hinduism and preferring to mint his own term of ‘Hindutva’ which lays emphasis on the amount of ‘Hinduness’ in a person, an attribute that would depend on ones lineage and cannot be earned through proficiency, merit or capabilities in person. Thus a Brahmin (priest) would have the highest level of ‘Hinduness’ followed by Kshtriya (rulers/warriors) and Vaishya (merchants/farmers). While a Shudra (labourer) a Dalit/Harijan (sweeper/outcast) and still lower ‘Maha-Dalit’ would have none. Justification of caste system is given through the concept of ‘Karma’ in Hinduism whereby “people of lower caste are
themselves to be blamed for their plight owing to their bad ‘Karma’ (deeds) of their past (Fuller, 1979).

Another significant aspect of Sarvarkar’s concept of ‘Hindutva’ is its rejection of Aryans being invaders from Central Asia who destroyed the flourishing Dravidian inhabited Indus civilization towns of Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa. Sarvarkar regards Aryan to be ‘Sindhus’ (considering it synonymous to Hindus) residing in the ‘Panchanad’ (or Punjab); broadly construed to be the entire Indus basin, as the inhabitants of these regions since the dawn of history. A 2016 Indian movie *Mohenjo-Daro* also harps on the same theme. The movie tried to establish a pure fiction and figment of the script writer’s imagination that the inhabitants of Mohenjo-Daro settled on the banks of river Ganga following its destruction. Critics have accused movie Director Ashutosh Gowariker to have fallen prey to ‘Hindutva’ bandwagon (Mahaprashasta, 2016). According to critics in India, the “Hindu Right’s worn out, archaeologically baseless argument that the Harappan civilization and Rig Vedic age coincided,” has problematic aspects (Chopra, 2016). In yet another attempt of postdate usurp the archeological history, Thakur Prasad Verna of the Indian Council of Historical Research (IRHC) asserted that “iconic ‘Dancing Girls’ of Mohenjo-Daro is Goddess ‘Parvati’, proving that people of Indus Valley worshipped ‘Lord Shiva’” (Financial Express, 2016).

Interestingly, this is the first time anybody claimed ‘Dancing Girl’ to be a Goddess let alone ‘Parvati’ (Sharma, 2016) as the overall climax of ‘Shiva’ is already refuted by Doris Srinivasan and Gregory Possehl (Srinivasan, 1984; Pessehl, 2002). The Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s appointed team of Hindutva zealots at various educational, cultural, and historical organizations are going overdrive to appropriate Indus Valley Civilization to Aryan Vedic culture. In order to augment their claim of Aryans being the indigenous people of South Asia, the
Hindutva proponents go to the extent of even calling the original inhabitants Adivasis (the indigenous people) as Vanvasis (the Forest dwellers) (Pandey, 1991). In the face of these beliefs and imbued with revivalism of hyped mythological past, an independent Islamic Republic of Pakistan in these regions becomes indigestible to the proponents of ‘Hindutva’, as they aspire to undo its sovereignty.

Sarvarkar thus also explained that “why Hindus should rule India and others should either be expelled or merged into the Hindu majority”. He believed that, “the Aryans who settled in India at the dawn of history already formed a nation, now embodied in the Hindus”, adding that “Hindus are bound together not only by the love they bear to a common fatherland and by the common blood that courses through their veins and keeps our hearts throbbing and our affection warm but also by the reason of our common homage we pay to our great civilization, our Hindu culture”. He thus dogmatized that “Indian Muslims should rather resign themselves to be considered as a minority, the recognition of whose rights should depend on the magnanimity of the majority” (Jaffrelot, 1999).

Moreover, M. S. Golwalkar who succeeded Hedgewar as the RSS’s Sarsangchalak (Collective Shrewd Head) from 1940 to 1973 sharpened these themes. In 1938, commenting on the Nuremberg racial laws, he said that:

“if we Hindus grow stronger in time of Muslim friends … will have to play the part of German Jews... in one word, they (Muslims) must cease to be foreigners of the non-Hindu … must adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and reverse Hindu religion … or (they) may stay in the country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges far less any preferential treatment, not even citizen’s rights” (Hoveyda, 2010).

RSS being an offspring of Hindu Mahasabha strictly adheres to the Sarvarkar ideals till this day. Initially, RSS was perceived to continue pursuit of ‘Hindutva’ ideology under the cover of cultural campaign whereas Mahasabha to hold the political front. While ideologically they
still are on the same page, RSS created its own political party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), social wing VHP and militant organizations such as Bajrang Dal, Durga Vahini, etc.

5.4. **Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)**

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was founded by Keshav Balram Hedgwar on September 27, 1925 as a cultural organization with a claimed purpose to impart Hindu discipline and character training to their community to establish a Hindu Rashtra (Kanungo, 2002). Making the announcement Hedgewar stated that, “all of us must train ourselves physically, intellectually and in every way so to be capable of achieving our cherished goal” (Sahai, 2010).

Although, RSS professed to be a cultural organization, in actuality its behavior and conduct since its inception to the present day has been that of fascist militant outfit which intends to control all facets of Indian political, social, religious, cultural, civil and military domains. The procreation of the RSS family into Sangh Parivar comprising of Rashtra Sevika Samiti (women’s exclusive RSS), Bharitya Janata Party, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Bajrang Dal, Durga Vahini, Abhinav Bharat, etc. is a testimony to its much bigger agenda than merely being a cultural organization seeking to protect Hindu identity. The RSS founder K. B. Hedgwar was a qualified medical doctor but preferred extreme right wing activism instead of pursuing the career as a physician. He was influenced by Hindu right wing nationalists like V. D. Sarvarkar, Dr. B. S. Moonje, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, Dayananda, Swami Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Lokmanya Tilak, and M. S. Anay among others. He also remained associated with the Indian National Congress in his early political life. Hedgwar got disenchanted with Gandhi considering him to be ‘following appeasement policy towards Muslims’. Among various right wing leaders of his time Hedgwar was most impressed by the two Hindu Mahasabha leaders V. D. Sarvarkar and B. S. Moonje. He extensively adopted from Sarvarkar’s writings and in view of Oza “much
of his rhetoric concerning the need for the creation of a Hindu nation” was inspired by it (Oza, 2013). Dr. Moonjee was like a mentor to Hedgwar who continued guiding him on the organizational and ideological aspects of RSS (Casolari, 2000).

Moreover, Prasad reiterates that “Hedgwar formed the RSS as a disciplined cadre consisting mostly of upper caste Brahmins who were dedicated to independence and the protection of Hindu political, cultural, and religious interests. In the early days of the RSS, it drew praise and approval from eminent stalwarts including Mahatma Gandhi, Sarvarkar, Subhash Chandra Bose, Madan Mohan Malaviya, and others” (Prasad, 2015). RSS had a Fascist and Nazi leaning from its inception. The RSS founding leaders Dr. Hedgwar and his successor Golwalkar expressed admiration for Fascist and Nazi regimes at a number of occasions and adopted a number of their practices (Rao, 2017), which would be discussed separately.

5.5. **Sangh Parivar**

Sangh Parivar (collective family) is name given to the umbrella of organizations sharing, propagating and striving for ascendancy of ‘Hindutva’ ideology (Jaffrelot, 2005). With RSS remaining in the driving seat other affiliated organizations essentially tow the objectives, policy, and strategy outlined by it. Some of the ‘Sangh Parivar’ organizations are listed below that play an active role under the umbrella of ‘Hindutva’ doctrine:

- Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
- Vishwa Hindu Parishal (VHP)
- Abhinav Bharat
- Bajrang Dal
- Durga Vahini
- Akhil Bharitya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP)/ All India Students Council
- Rashtra Sevika Samiti
The network includes close to a dozen various professional organizations, scores of educational, socio cultural, religious societies, NGOs, and nearly a dozen of think tanks including:

- Vivekananda International Foundation
- Vivekananda Kendra
- Hindu Vivek Kendra
- Indian Policy Foundation

Besides, there is a huge network of Ashrams, self-styled Swami and Seers, Gurus and temples that supplement the ‘Hindutva’ doctrine in all sphere of Indian life, whose disciples run in tens of thousands. The Parivar thus includes of ‘Hindutva’ zealots of various colors and hues. The entire network acts as a force multiplier to achieve various objectives for BJP and RSS. Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption drive during the Congress led UPA government (2010-14) is a case in point (Khandekar, 2015).

5.6. **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)**

As explicated earlier that the RSS was created by Dr. Hedgwar under the influence and instructions of Mahasabha leader Dr. B. S. Moonje to act as force multiplier organization for ABHM. Its purpose was to create and trained cadres under the garb of cultural activities, who could come handy in organizational and fighting skills during elections, rioting and at the time of British departure. Renowned Indian historian and lawyer A. G. Noorani has regarded such a relationship as ‘division of labour’ (Noorani, 2000). The basic idea was that while ‘Mahasabha’
being a political party may have to keep a conciliatory policy and real politics approach, RSS would continue pursuing the agenda of indoctrinating Hindu youth to create the cadres deeply imbued in the ‘Hindutva’ ideology.

As described earlier, Gandhi’s assassination at the hands of Hindu ‘Mahasabha’ member, who was also a former RSS ‘parcharak (propagator)’, Nathuram Godse saw imposition of ban on both the outfits. At that particular juncture, the RSS Sarsanghchalak, Golwalker was able to negotiate with the then Home Minister Vallabhai Patel; the lifting of ban on his organization by distancing it from the ‘Mahasabha’ which could not emerge as a popular political party after it. ‘Hindutva’ ideologue V. D. Sarvarkar was also reduced to political oblivion although his ideological influence among the Right Wing including RSS remains strong to this day.

While RSS cadres swelled under the ‘Hindutva’ overhang, its new Chief Golwalkar felt left out of the political discourse due to the distancing from the parent political party ‘Mahasabha’. Joining hands with S. P. Mookerjee, another ‘Mahasabha’ leader, Golwalkar floated the ‘Bharatya Jana Sangh’ (BJS) on October 21, 1951 as the political arm of RSS. BJS merged into a new right and left coalition by the name of Janata Party in 1977 and won the elections sailing on the anti-Congress sentiments generated by the emergency imposed by the then Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Subsequently, the BJS politicians left the Janata Party and formed a new party by the name of ‘Bharatiya Janata Party’ (BJP) in 1980 under the leadership of Atal Bihari Bajpai. The BJP had a power electoral start with only winning two seats in ‘Lok Sabha’ in 1984 (Elst, 1997).

It was BJP’s second President L. K. Advani’s campaign of ‘Rath Yatra’ (pilgrim chariots) to demolish the 16th century Babri Mosque and to construct Ram Temple at the site that saw BJP’s meteoric rise in popularity. RSS, BJP and Sang Parivar outfits built of the
‘Mahasabha’ narrative that Babri Mosque was constructed in the 16th century by Mughal Emperor Babur, demolishing the temple and birth place of ‘Hindu God Ram’. The campaign was also called ‘Ram Janmabhoomi’ (Ram’s birth land) movement due to this reason. Advani, converted trucks and buses into chassis looks like Hindu Gods mythological chariots and lead the procession of fanatic Hindu gatherings, enlarging steadily as it passed from various cities in September—October 1990. The Bihar State government arrested Advani on its way. The procession of the frenzied VHP and RSS Karsevaks (service workers), however reached Ayodhya and tried to destroy the Babri Mosque but could not succeed (Datta, 1993).

In the elections that were held the following year in 1991 saw BJP’s seat tally rise to 117 in Lok Sabha from the previous two. The mosque later was demolished by a similar ‘Ram Janambhoomi’ procession on December 06, 1992. Riding on the popularity of ‘Rath Yatra’ and ‘Janambhoomi’ among the Right Wing Hindus, BJP was able to form its first coalition government under the banner of National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 1998. It was however voted out of the parliament through a ‘no confidence’ motion within one year. In the subsequent elections BJP won again with a clear majority and led its first Indian coalition government to survive full five years tenure. BJP again lost in 2004 but came back strongly in 2014, riding for Narendra Modi’s strong pitch for ‘Hindutva’ based developmental agenda (Pai, 2014).

As a political party, BJP’s role is reversed and became under the direct supervision of RSS stalwarts even Hindu ‘Mahasabha’ got into subordination. Today, it is the RSS that completely controls the BJP. Former UP Chief Minister Kalyan Singh once stated that he had been an RSS ‘karsevak’ for a good part of his life and affirmed that from allocation of party tickets to decision of Cabinet Ministers and Prime Ministerial candidates, RSS calls all the shots in BJP (Noorani, 2000). Thus it was RSS which appointed Nitin Gadhkari as BJP President in
2010 replacing Rajnath Singh and again appointing Rajnath in 2013 (Vij-Aurora, 2013). Even Narendra Modi’s nomination as Prime Ministerial candidate ahead of party veteran L. K. Advani as well as Arun Jaitley and Sushma Sawaraj both of whom had wide experience of Union level politics, was a result of RSS endorsement and lobbying (Pande, 2014). The division of responsibilities allows RSS to keep the communal agenda at the forefront. BJP while maintaining its ‘Hindutva’ outlook at times keeps it under the check of political expediencies. Further this division is maintained throughout the Sangh Parivar, RSS, BJP, VHP, and Bajrang Dal. Even in the demolition of Babri Mosque, Advani reflected the hardcore RSS ‘Hindutva’, whereas Vajpayee demonstrated a moderate face. Similarly, Modi depicted the RSS and Mahasabha ideology of making minorities subservient to the Hindu majority during 2002 Gujarat riots, while Vajpayee maintained the soft heeling figure image by showing remorse and regret on the killings (Spodek, 2010).

5.7. Hindu Rashtra, Akhand Bharat and Ram Rajya

Three intertwined concepts of Hindu Rashtra, Akhand Bharat and Ram Rajya are at the heart of Hindutva’s ambition and dangerous futuristic worldview. With the strong rise of the right wing extremists in India and a thumping victory in Lok Sabha elections as well as many State elections that followed strengthened the Hindutva ideology proving that it is no longer a mere rhetoric. ‘Hindutva’ zealots are now actively following the themes may it be through ‘Ghar Vapsi’ (home return) program or ‘Gao Rakhsa’ (cow protection) as well as direct attacks on minorities such as Christians, Muslims and low caste Dalits alike. RSS Chief Mohan Bhagwat has on several occasions stated that India is ‘Hindu Rashtra’ and if the Muslims and Christians are being converted to Hinduism it is just ‘reclaiming our looted property’ (Das, 2014). This conversion program of minorities into the Hinduism is called ‘Ghar Vapsi’ and was being done
even earlier in the States ruled by BJP governments such as Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, etc. RSS and VHP had in the past been converting Christians and Muslims especially tribal people; however with the current BJP government in power at the Center since 2014, the frequency of it has been increased manifold (NDTV, 2018).

A ‘Hindu Rashtra’ is commonly defined by RSS as a Hindu Nation, however its literal meaning are closer to a Hindu State or Hindu Country. Aakar Patel maintains that “Rashtra means nation, though loosely it could also mean state” (Patel, 2014). The apostle of Hindutva V. D. Sarvarkar gave the definition of Hindu Rashtra on which there is a general consensus amongst the Hindu Right Wing. Apparently, the definition seems simple and logical yet the devil is in its details. He defined that for “everyone who regards and claims this ‘Bharatbhoomi’ (Hindu land) from the Indus to the Seas as his ‘Fatherland’ and ‘Holy-land’ has Hindusthan as his Hindu Rashtra Darshan”. He further elaborated that “the Buddhists of Japan and the China, for example do not and cannot regard themselves as fully identified with the Hindus as only their Holyland is India, whereas they don’t regard India as their fatherland. Indian Mohammedans, Jews, Christians, Parsees, etc. are excluded from claiming themselves as Hindus which in reality also they do not in spite of their recognizing Hindusthan as their fatherland, as their Holy-land is outside India” (Savarkar, 2016b). The definition is fine as long as Sarvarkar and his disciples don’t regard minorities as Hindus. The problem starts when they are not considered a part of ‘Indian Nation’ for not being Hindus.

The double speak of ‘Mahasabha’ was exposed in its ‘vision and mission’ resolution passed in the Central Board meeting in Calcutta in December 1949. The resolution clearly stated that any government formed by ‘Mahasabha’ shall allow non-Hindus same rights as that of Hindus under normal circumstances. Further, “it (India) shall not be duty bound to take up the
defense, in foreign lands, of the interests of the non-Hindus, as they are not its bona-fide nationals”. The Resolution stated that in order to look after Hindus in Pakistan and other alien lands it shall “radically modify the outlook of the Bharat Government and enlarging the scope of its activities”. The resolution further goes on to draw distinction “in the event of war or some such emergency” between its treatment of non-Hindus and even various sections of Hindus. It stated that “the Government should have powers to make distinction, if deemed necessary between its Hindu and non-Hindu nationals even as it may at times have to distinguish between different sections of the Hindu themselves” (ABHM, 1949). The ‘Mahasabha’ clarification actually confirmed the assertion given earlier while elaborating the concept of ‘Hindutva’ being the amount of Hinduness in a person. What could be a better way to distinguish between various sections of Hindus other than the ‘Manu Smriti’ (Dharma Shastra) based caste system. Manu according to the Hindu mythology is the eldest son of the “creator of Universe and humans”, ‘Lord Brahma’ (Sabedi, 2003).

The ‘Manu Smriti’ ascribed to Manu and regarded as the most important and authoritative Hindu law book, which lays foundation of caste system (Buhler, 1886). That the India should be regarded a ‘Hindu Rashtra’ of which ‘Hindutva’ was the only dominant identity barometer meant to supplement that only Hindus were the premier citizens of the ‘Rashtra’ and that also according to the caste precedence. Other citizens are ranked outsiders who have to depend on the magnanimity of the majority (as also cited earlier in reference to ‘Hindu Mahasabha Vision and Mission). Secondly, the Christians and Muslims have to sever their allegiance with their original ‘Holy-land’ in order to get any acceptance in the ‘Hindu Rashtra’. Thus during the 2014 election of Narendra Modi as Indian Prime Minister, Deputy Chief Minister of Goa Francis D. Souza belonging to BJP stated that “India is a Hindu Rashtra”. He
added that all Indians are Hindus and that he was a Christian Hindu (Hindustan Times, 2014). The BJP’s Minority Morcha President Abdul Rasheed Ansari and Union Minority Affairs Minister Najma Heptullah have also defended RSS Chief Mohan Bhagwat’s declaration of India being a ‘Hindu Rashtra’, though they used the term ‘Hindi Muslims’ for themselves instead of ‘Hindu Muslims’ to avoid backlash from their Muslim compatriots (Patel, 2014). The other major issue with Sarvarkar’s definition is that significant part of territory referred in it is now Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Myanmar and even Afghanistan. Consequently, for the ideologically inspired zealots, Hindu Rashtra is incomplete unless it is reunited into India. Pakistan becoming an independent country in 1947 still haunts the Hindu Right Wing making its acceptance difficult for them. Many of them still hold aspirations to bring it back in the folds of the ‘Hindu Rashtra’.

Ronald Fischer and Sammyh Khan of Victoria University New Zealand have attempted to identify the four major themes connected with Hindutva’s concept of nationhood or Rashtra that leads to exclusionism, hate and violence. They summarize:

“The first theme of interest involves the idea that true Indians share a bond of common Hindu blood inherited from the ancient Indus civilization. Outsiders such as Arabs, Turks and British who cannot trace their heritage back to the Indus civilization can therefore never consider themselves to be true Indians. The second theme involves the idea that India and Hinduism are indistinguishable. This ideological proposition actively rejects secular democratic governance of India and justifies the subordination of minority groups that are not indigenous to the Indian subcontinent such as Muslims and Christians. The third theme concerns the revitalization of traditional Hindu values, beliefs and practices in modern Indian society. Foreign influences, it is argued, such as Islam and Christianity, have historically degenerated and polluted the superior fabric of the Hindu race and belief system, which therefore have to be restored and cleansed. Finally, the fourth theme binds the previous three together and specifically locates the source of current suffering in historical periods of Muslim conquest and rule. The Hindu race must never forget the injustices and cruelties carried out by Muslims against the Hindu race and should never cease resisting the influences of Muslims and Islam in India” (Fischer & Khan, 2018).

A closely knotted concept to that of ‘Hindu Rashtra’ is the notion of ‘Akhand Bharat’ (Greater Hindu-land). Though the Akhand Baharat is also a long held aspiration of ‘Hindutva’
proponents to which they hold on to staunchly until day, it is more of a territorial ambition and reflects expansionist and hegemonic mindset of ‘Hindutva’. ‘Hindu Rashtra’ on the other hand reflects the exclusive and intrusive nature of the concept of ‘Nation’ that is espoused by ‘Hindutva’. A day after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi ended up with a surprise visit in Lahore on December 25, 2015; BJP National Secretary Ram Madhav spoke of ‘Akhand Bharat’ on Al-jazeera TV. Madhav stated that as an RSS Parcharak he held on the idea of reunion of “Pakistan and Bangladesh with India through popular goodwill” (Qazi, 2015). According to Yadev, who in his article published in The Indian Express on January 04, 2016 stated that RSS second Sarsanghchalak, M. S. Golwalkar in his press conference on August 24, 1949 termed Pakistan an ‘uncertain state’. The article further mentioned that “RSS’s idea of ‘Akhand Bharat’ includes not only Pakistan and Bangladesh but also Afghanistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Tibet. It terms the combined region as a ‘Rashtra’ based on ‘Hindu cultural’ similarities” (Yadav, 2016). The same article explained a map that RSS operated publishing house had created. The article specifically stated that”

“Suruchi Prakashan, a publishing house run by the RSS has brought out a map called ‘Punyabhoomi Bharat’ [victorious Hinduland] in which Afghanistan is called ‘Upganathan’, Kabul ‘Kubha Nagar’, Peshawar ‘Purushpur’, Multan ‘Moolshthan’, Tibet ‘Trivishtap’, Sri Lanka ‘Singhaldweep’ and Myanmar ‘Brahmadesh’. A caption, in Sanskrit, below the map reads, ‘All that’s south of the Himalayas and north of the Indian Ocean is Bharat’. There are several other RSS publications, including a book titled, Pratyek Rashtrabhakta Ka Sapna: Akhand Bharat (Dream of every patriot: Akhand Bharat), that champions the cause of Akhand Bharat”, advocates putting “the map of Akhand Bharat in our homes so that we will be offended every time we see the map of divided India on Doordarshan [Indian State TV], newspapers and magazines to remind us of the resolution of Akhand Bharat” (Yadav, 2016).

Some of the maps of Akhand Bharat extend to include Indonesia, Central Asia and Middle East (Akhand Bharat, 2018). The Hindu Mahasabha’s Vision and Mission Resolution of 1949 mandates under “the ideal of ‘Akhand Hindusthan’” that:
“The indivisibility of the land extending from the Himalayas down to the Southern and Eastern Seas being an article of faith with Hindudom, the Mahasabha shall strain every nerve, and try all possible methods—from peaceful negotiations on Inter-State level to utilisation of international strategies—to bring about the reunion of the States now called ‘Bharat’ and ‘Pakistan,’ into a consolidated one, to be called ‘Akhand Hindustan’. For this purpose, the Hindu Mahasabha shall mobilise popular opinion in Bharat, in foreign lands and above all, in Pakistan, so as to enlist moral and material support of all people to its cause” (ABHM, 1949).

Now while the quest for ‘Hindu Rashtra’ and ‘Akhand Bharat’ is on the pursuit for utopian Hindu state of ‘Ramrajya’ (Hindu God Ram’s rule) has to be done simultaneously. According to the Hindu mythology when ‘Ram’ the prince of ‘Ayodhya’ returned home victorious with his wife ‘Sita’ after slaying Lankan King Ravan, who had abducted her, and conquering (Sri)Lanka, he established a utopian state which is referred as the Ramrajya (Nath, 1995). In the ideal state of Ramrajya, everyone lives an eternal happy and prosperous life, no one dies or suffers any woes or sorrows, there are no evildoers and poverty is nonexistent. All the members of the society perform their role ideally in accordance with their castes (Hindujagruti, 2018). Sarvarkar while elucidating Hindu nationhood wrote “at last the great mission which the Sindhus had undertaken of founding a nation and a country”, he regards mythological story of Sri Lankan conquest by Ram and return to Ayodhya to establish ‘Ramrajya’ as “the real birthday of Hindu people”.

Furthermore, “it summed up and politically crowned the efforts of all the generations that preceeded it and handed down a new and common mission, a common banner, a common cause which all the generations after it had consciously or unconsciously fought and died to defend” (Savarkar, 1969). The King of Lanka, Mr. Ravan, in Hindi mythology represents evil personified. The killing of Ravan at the hands of Ram is therefore a metaphor for the death of evil. The ‘Hindutva’ zealots therefore believe that in order to achieve a harmonious society based on Hindu culture and ethos the evil of divergence either is eliminated altogether or assimilated in
the bigger whole. Until such, cultural harmony is achieved the utopian state of ‘Ramrajya’ will be inconceivable. Thus the Hindus must strive to achieve it through all means whether through ruse, deception or coercion.

5.8. Inspiration of Right Wing Hindu Extremist from Nazis and Fascists:

Hindu nationalism drew inspiration from European oppression as some of their own core values coincided with the Fascism and Nazi doctrines. The Right Wing Hindu leaders “repeatedly expressed their admiration for authoritarian leaders such as Mussolini and Hitler and the fascist model of society” (Casolari, 2000). Hitler and Mussolini’s doctrine of absolute subservience to one dictator represents closely the RSS’s own dictum of ‘Ek Chalak Anuvatitva’ (Single shrewd leader/supreme leader). Interestingly Mussolini’s Fascist Party and Hitler’s Nazi Party like the RSS had also laid a heavy thrust on their so called ‘cultural and racial superiority’.

According to Mackel, in Fascism, “the Nation refers to a collection of people bound together by race, ethnicity, or culture. Mussolini intended to guide the material and moral progress of the [Italian] community”. Whereas, in Nazism, Mackel said, “Hitler planned to return the German nation to its position as the culture founder of this earth” (Mackel, 2010). It is no coincidence that RSS training of its own cadres was closely based on the Fascist Party’s twin youth training at its academies of ‘Balilla’ and ‘Avanguardisti’ where the physical military style training was laced with deep seeded indoctrination of extremist ideology. The Hindu Mahasabha leader Dr. Moonjee who personally met Mussolini in 1931 and also visited the Fascist military academy and youth training institutions, recorded his deep inspiration from the whole regimen and maintained their contacts in his diary (Kartikeya, 2015a). Moonjee pledged in his dairy to “spread the rest of his life in developing and extending RSS institutions of Dr. Hedgwar all throughout Maharashtra and other provinces” (Gatade, 2018).
Links of Hitler and Nazism with that of Indian Hinduism were stronger and profound owing to Hitler’s obsession with Aryan supremacy. Also in India much of the Nazi ideology and imagery matched the symbols and social order based on superiority of Aryan lineage. The infamous Nazi ‘swastika’ is regarded as a “Hindu symbol of strength and good fortune” (Hubs, 2018). According to Ghosh, “the commonality in the Aryan symbols and the historic legend or myth of the prehistoric invasion of India by the Aryan tribes to India as well as Central Europe provided Hitler with his notion of a ‘super master race’ that was destined to dominate the world” (Ghosh, 2012).

The common Aryan lineage of Germans and Hindus, however lends credence to the theory that Aryans invaded India and were not its original inhabitants. Sarvarkar and ‘Mahasabha’ praised Hitler’s treatment of the Jews on numerous occasions. Ghosh also wrote that “in 1938 during the time of accelerating anti-Jewish legislation in Germany, Sarvarkar suggested a similar fate for Indian Muslims and declared ‘a nation is formed by a majority living therein’” (Ghosh, 2012). Ghosh pointed out that Sarvarkar further negated the German Jews while saying that “what did the Jews do in Germany? They being in minority were driven out from Germany” (Ghosh, 2012). After Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939, a spokesperson for the Hindu Mahasabha lauded Germany’s Aryan chauvinism in the following words:

“Germany’s solemn idea of the revival of Aryan culture, the glorification of the Swastika, her patronage of Vedic learning and the ardent championship of the tradition of Indo-Germanic civilization are welcomed by the religious and sensible Hindus of India with a jubilant hope … Germany’s crusade against the enemies of Aryan culture will bring all the Aryan nations of the world to their senses and awaken the Indian Hindus for the restoration of their lost glory” (Goodrick-Claarke, 2003).

Palash Ghosh in his article Hindu Nationalist’s Historical Links to Nazism and Fascism writes that, “in a speech delivered in 1940 (after the Second World War had commenced),
Savarkar said that ‘Nazism proved undeniably the savior of Germany under the set of circumstances it was placed in’” (Egorova, 2008). On another occasion, the RSS senior leader M.S. Golwalkar (who one year later replaced Hedgwar as the RSS chief) also “praised Nazism and believed the ideology should be applied to India as well” (Jaffrelot, 1999). Golwalkar said, “Germany shocked the world by her purging the country of the Semitic races—the Jews … a good lesson for us in Hinduism to learn and profit by” (Jaffrelot, 1999).

The romance of Fascism and Nazism and the ‘Hindutva’ supporters continues to this day. RSS protégé BJP has dominated electoral politics in the Indian state of Gujarat since 1995 and Narendra Modi remained its Chief Minister for a record tenure from 2001 to 2014, when he resigned to take over as Prime Minister of India. Irony of the fact is that even the Gujarat state’s text books eulogize Fascist and Nazi ideologies. The 10th grade book of social studies in Gujrat contains few chapters within a major section of Ideology of Nazism and propogates the glorious past of Nazism. Part of this section includes two chapters, (i) Hitler, the Supremo, and (ii) Internal Acheivments of Nazism. An extract of a Class X textbook showing the positive description of Germany under Hitler and Nazism is reproduced below:

“Hitler lent dignity and prestige to the German government within a short time by establishing a strong administrative set up. He created the vast state of ‘Greater Germany’ (Akhand Bharat in Indian context). He adopted the policy of the German race. His new economic policy brought prosperity to Germany. He began efforts for the eradication of unemployment. He started constructing public buildings, providing irrigation facilities, building railways, roads and production of war materials. He made untiring efforts to make Germany self-reliant within one decade. Hitler discarded the Treaty of Versailles by calling it just ‘a piece of paper’ and stopped paying the war penalty. He instilled the spirit of adventure in the common people” (Rao, 2017).

The discourse of Right Wing Extremist Parties and Organization in India both in external relations and domestic affairs such as hegemonic designs and treatment of minorities can thus be best explained keeping in mind their Fascist and Nazi ideologies (Setalvad, 2017).
5.9. Rise of Narendra Modi: The Gujarat Pogrom

While Savarkar, Hedgewar, Golwalkar, Vajpayee, Advani and scores of other ‘Mahasabha’, RSS and BJP cadres have played their part in nurturing and upbringing of ‘Hindutva’; Narendra Modi has taken it to its zenith in the contemporary times. Modi belonged to a humble household of Gujarat State of India and in his early years helped his father serve tea at his stall. He joined RSS as a Karsevak in his early years and rose in its ranks steadily. In the mid 1980s, the RSS placed him with the newly formed Bharatiya Janata Patry (BJP). Modi’s role was to be a hinge between the two organizations, doing his best to ensure that the BJP stayed in step with the RSS. He cemented his reputation as an organizer in 1991 for his role as “the advance man” for the ‘Rath Yatra’ (chariot journey); a brainstorming propaganda tour by the then BJP President L. K. Advani covering much of India (Price, 2015).

In 2001 Modi was selected by RSS to replace Keshubhai Patel as Chief Minister of Gujarat during the last year of the latter’s term. Modi remained Chief Minister until 2014 successfully winning all the subsequent Gujarat elections and upgraded its portfolio for the Prime Minister position following the massive victory of BJP with him being the party’s candidate for the post. The RSS choice of Narendra Modi for Indian prime minister proved a quantum leap in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections that put forward his evolutionary successes towards the destination of ‘Hindutva’. When veteran leader L. K. Advani protested, he was sternly told that “there must be no more dissonance over Mr. Modi” (Shrivastava, 2013). Advani considered himself as the most legitimate Prime Ministerial candidate after Vajpayee for his role in putting BJP on its feet through his ‘Rath Yatra’ and ‘Ram Janmabhoomi’ campaigns.

The rise of Modi and the success of his ‘Hindutva’ antics represent the most dangerous trend in India by far. During his over twelve year regime in Gujarat, Modi reigned over one of
the worst pogrom of terror and genocide, cleverly masking it up with the so-called developmental plank. Though, after being elevated as Prime Minister, Modi made a pitch for ‘Sabka Sath, Sabka Vikas’ (everyone is together in everyone’s development) and later adding that ‘Sabka Nyay’ (justice for all) is an essential component of his political allusion (Times of India, 2015a).

Modi’s past tenure as Chief Minister Gujarat and the current stint so far as Prime Minister is, however, a mockery of the concepts of collective development and justice.

Modi, in February 2002 oversaw the cold-blooded carnage of over 2000 Muslims in Gujarat following the burning of a train carrying Karsevaks and Yatris returning from Ayodhya at small station of Godhra town that comes before the Ahmedabad city. The town is said to have almost 40% Muslims. A scuffle started between a Muslim tea vendor and a drunken ‘Karsevak’ which was joined by other Hindu passengers. Stone pelting started between Karsevaks and the Muslim vendors. A fire later started on the train that burned 59 passengers for which the ‘Hindutva’ outfits and the Sangh Parivar blamed the Muslim mob. The entire incident and its aftermath are, however, shrouded with mystery and conspiracy (Maniar, 2018). According to Times of India report of 2002:

“Investigations of the Ahmedabad based Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) revealed that almost 60 liters of inflammable material was poured from inside the train compartments before it were set on fire. A report by the FSL’s Assistant Director Dr. M. S. Dahiya, which was part of the charge sheet filed in the Godhra case, was based on a study of the pattern of the burns in the compartments and a simulated exercise conducted on May 3, 2002 to recreate the incident. The report contradicted the view that the mob which attacked the train threw inflammable liquid at the train using buckets and cans from outside. The passengers had shut all the windows and doors of the compartments” (Times of India, 2002a).

Strangely, the FSL’s findings appeared on number of Indian newspapers and magazines in Ahmedabad were later on removed from the websites.

In a controversial decision the Gujarat government allowed the charred bodies of the train inferno to be brought in Ahmedabad in a procession with charged up Hindus chanting anti-
Muslim slogans and enticing and fanning communal hatred. The Hindu mobs started rioting pulling the Muslims out of their homes and setting them ablaze alive. Muslim businesses and homes were also burnt with miscreants carrying lists identify their shops and houses. In a high level meeting held on the eve of the riots, the Chief Minister Narendra Modi is quoted to have told the senior police and administrative officers to “let Hindus vent out their anger against Muslims following the Sabarmati Express train burning incident in Godhra on February 27, 2002” (Hindustan Times, 2011).

Superintendent Police (SP) Sanjeev Bhatt filed an affidavit in Supreme Court and also recorded statement to the Special Investigation Team (SIT) about Modi’s instructions to Police and Administration, has since been victimized and dismissed from the service. To discredit him, a statement was got filed by his driver saying that Bhatt never went to attend the meeting at Chief Minister’s residence. The driver had earlier given an affidavit stating that he drove Bhatt to the meeting but later retracted saying he was coerced to sign it (Kartikeya, 2015b). A usual pattern of retraction of witness’s statements in cases against Hindutva terrorism began to appear. Even fake video of Sanjeev Bhatt with a mistress were circulated in Hindutva sympathetic social media to malign his image. Bhatt and other police officers who dared to give evidence against Modi have been targeted (Bengali, 2015). When Modi asked about unabated violence by Hindu mobs against Muslims, he blatantly justified “every action has an equal and opposite reaction”. He also shamelessly justified the lynching of former senior Congress MP Ahsan Jaffery along with nineteen family members and claimed that Jaffery opened fire on the rioters. When asked whether Jaffrey fired in self-defense, Modi replied “probably it was his nature to do so” (Times of India, 2002b).
Several other extra judicial killings of Muslims took place during Modi’s reign in Gujarat including the infamous murder of Sohrabuddin Sheikh and his wife, infamous murder of Ishrat Jahan and three others, etc. which were overseen by his Home Minister and right hand man Amit Shah, who has now been elevated to the post of BJP President since Modi’s election as Prime Minister (Mahurkar, 2016).

The Division of labour between BJP, RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal and other outfits under the Sangh Parivar umbrella that A. G. Noorani has been pointing at is cleverly used to convey different messages of varied intensity and threat (Noorani, 2000). Even in the Gujarat pogrom the VHP and Bajrang Dal were more vociferous and intimidating. For example, Haynes points out that “the VHP International President, Ashok Singhal described the Gujarat carnage as a ‘successful experiment’ and warned that it would be ‘repeated’ all over India” (Haynes, 2016). After the December 2002 BJP election victory in Gujarat, VHP General Secretary Pravin Togadia declared that “all Hindutva opponents will get the death sentence and we will leave this to the people to carry out”, clearly referring to the Gujarat model of Hindu mobs rioting and lynching the minorities. He added that “the process of foming a Hindu rule in the country has begun with Gujarat and VHP will take the Gujarat experiment to every nook and corner of the country” (Marshall, 2004). Thus while BJP at times downplays hardcore ‘Hindutva’ and ‘Hindu Rashtra’ rhetoric, it gives the driver seat to the ‘Sangh’ to keep the appeal to the base of right wing electorate.

What makes Modi absolutely dangerous as the Indian Prime Minister is that he has shown times and again his propensity to emulate ‘the Gujarat Model’ at the all India level as well as in the regional politics. He seems to strongly believe that his extended and uninterrupted success as Gujarat Chief Minister owed it to the clamping down on the Muslims in his first year
of reign. This enabled him to achieve the so called “harmony which the proponents of Hindutva have often desired” (Jaffrelot, 2016). RSS second Sarsangh Chalak Golwalkar had stated that:

“The answer to the so-called problem of ‘religious minorities’ can be found only in the historically correct, rational and positive approach of ‘Hindu Rashtra’. Otherwise, they are bound to become more and more hardened in their separate shells of religion and turn into a dreadful source of disruption of our body politics. So, all that is expected of our Muslim and Christian co-citizens is the shedding of the notion of their being ‘religious minorities’ as also their foreign mental complexion and merging themselves in the common national stream of this soil” (Golwalkar, 1966).

Since coming into power, Modi has thus unleashed the Bajrang Dal, VHP, Sadhus, Sadhvis, Swamis, Yogis, and scores of other ‘Hindutva’ violent vigilantes in the name of ‘Gao Raksha’, ‘Ghar Vapsi’, etc. on the minorities of which Muslims, Christians and the low caste Dalit Hindus are the prime targets.

Modi has kept protracted silence over such violence against the minorities and denial of basic rights to them. The philosophy of letting the Hindus vent their anger on the minorities dominates. Simultaneously Modi’s aggressive design to abrogate article 370 & 35A, imposing curfew in Kashmir while making it the worlds biggest jail, escalatory moves on the Line of Control (LOC) and Working Boundary as well as efforts to isolate Pakistan regionally and globally are all attempts to replicate the Gujarat model. The logic is to take Pakistan into submission. Incidentally he happens to be greatly inspired by another staunch Hindu supremacist, Swami Vivekananda, a passion he shares with his National Security Advisor Ajit Kumar Doval. This compatibility of mind with Doval is stroking an aggressive hysteria in the Indian establishment.

5.10.  Ajit Kumar Doval: The Doval Doctrine

Modi’s National Security Advisor (NSA), Ajit Kumar Doval is a retired police officer who spent most of his service in the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Doval apparently had an eventful
career and claimed a number of exploits to his credit. He claimed to have infiltrated into the North Eastern secessionist movement the “Mizo National Front to win over its top commanders”, befooling Sikh separatist in Golden Temple Amritsar while posing an ISI agent and freeing fighters to diplomat from Sikh separatists. He also created ‘Ikhwan Force’ of renegade Kashmiri fighters to support Indian forces. Doval claims to have undertaken seven year undercover work in Pakistan. He was in the negotiations with hijackers of IC 814 in Kandhar and handed over Jesh-e-Mohammad (JeM) leader Masood Azhar during the previous BJP government in December 1999 (Datta, 2014). Doval during his career as an intelligence officer has shown enormous skills for deception and stage managing skills with false flag targeting techniques through grand staging of terrorism incidents on enemy’s behalf that would actually damage its own cause.

An important aspect of Doval’s personality is obsessive impact of Hindutva supremacist Swami Vivekananda on him. Swami Vivekananda is regarded as great harbinger of Hindu national renaissance, Hindu Nation or ‘Rashtra’ by RSS second Sarsanghchalak Golwalkar. Vivekananda preached display of masculinity among boys with the dictum that “muscles of iron and nerves of steel” and “not to cry like girls”. He strongly believed Bharat was the only ‘Punyabhoomi’ (blessed land) in the world and any soul wanting to achieve salvation through ‘Godward’ spirituality must come here. Thus by exclusive claim of access to God, Vivekananda sowed the supremacist seeds amongst the Hindus, breeding contempt and disdain for others. While speaking to The Hindu on February 6, 1897 Vivekananda justified the detested caste system stating that “Caste is a good thing… Caste is the plan we want to follow… Caste should not go but should be adjusted occasionally… It is a sheer nonsense to desire abolition of caste” (The Hindu, 2016b).
Narendra Modi is also inspired by Vivekananda even more than RSS demigods; Hedgewar or Golwalkar shows the commonality of scorn for minorities and highhanded approach in both their attitudes. Interestingly, Doval is also the founding Director of Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), an ultra ‘right wing think tank’ based in the prime location of Chankiyapuri, New Delhi (Donthi, 2017). The articles and publications of VIF are full of venom against Pakistan and China. Pandey writes that “Swami Vivekananda had specifically warned that China would invade Bharat soon after the British quit” (Pandey, 2006). In his book *Restatement of Religion*, Jyotirmaya Sharma regards Vivekananda’s religious nationalism to be the divisive influence behind Hindu nationalism. He writes that “Vivekananda’s forceful and substantial articulation of Hinduism as religion also makes him the father and preceptor of Hindutva”. He calls Vivekananda’s inclusiveness to be a powerful myth owing to partial study of his works. In his view Vivekananda regarded “Islam and Christianity as mere sects and the larger ideal all of them merged to was Vedanta”. Sharma argues that Vivekananda was not “particularly generous towards many sects and school of thought within Hinduism”, what to talk about Islam and Christianity. Vivekananda can thus at best be regarded as a Hindu revivalist who took the vehicle of ‘Vedanta’ to enhance appeal of Hinduism to the West (Sharma, 2013).

In 2010, Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) was undergoing a strong wave of protests popularity called the ‘stone-palters movement’ (Kak, 2010). Doval had retired from the IB by that time, while speaking at Hyderabad based NGO event “Turmoil in Kashmir: Root Causes and Remedies” in October 2010 recommended to the Congress government “not to panic” over the strong wave of protests. He stated that “the crises will pass off, it looks big in the midst of it but they cannot sustain it beyond a point and even if they do there is a price they have to pay”. He
characterized that “the Kashmir problem as the product of the ‘dysfunctional mindset’ of three parties; India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris”. He believed that India has towed a policy of appeasement towards the Kashmiris and Pakistan by taking the matter to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and granting special status to Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. He argued that “India has trouble exercising power in setting the agenda and changing realities in its favor. Pakistan instead decided the timing and terms of engaging India in war or peace, India restricted itself to defensive-defense not defensive-offense”. He reckons that Pakistan and Kashmiri mindset believes that “India is weak, it is a nation of ‘brahmins’ and ‘banias’, they are no fighters… The Kashmiri separatists assume that international opinion is in their favor and they have great faith in Pakistan” (Aaron, 2016). Doval’s proclamation is primarily based on three assumptions:

i. India is traditionally reluctant to exercise its power potential
ii. Pakistan is bent on destroying India
iii. Kashmiris are a part of this construct

His recipe is thus to firstly change India’s mindset which he believes will automatically change the response from Pakistan and Kashmiris. He boasted that “in the game of power the ultimate justice lies with the one who is strong”. Islamabad’s mindset “is unlikely to change unless India gives a decisive blow to Pakistan” (Aaron, 2016). Doval thus believes in aggressive assimilation of Kashmiris into India by applying much harsh force that they consider it their safety to remain within the Indian Union’s fold rather than wanting separation.

The decision to cancel bilateral Foreign Secretaries talks in September 2014 on the flimsy excuse of Pakistan High Commissioner’s meeting with the Kashmiris Huriyat leaders for consultations is a part of the strategy to distance Pakistan from the Indian Occupied Kashmir
(IOK) and its leadership (Haider, 2014). It is an established practice that Pakistan always consulted Kashmiris before any sort of bilateral dialogue. Such unwarranted conditions by BJP government are a part of Modi—Doval strategy to eventually remove or relegate Kashmir from the bilateral talks. It is also a part of Indian strategy to make incremental gains in the long drawn psychological and kinetic war over Kashmir. Taking the Kashmiris out of Pakistan’s consultative mechanism will leave them helpless and at the mercy of Indian Home Ministry, relegating the dispute in the Indian view to an internal matter. Cancelling of high level foreign ministerial meetings is somehow became political fashion in Modi’s India. On the sidelines of UN General Assembly Session in September 2018 both Pakistan and Indian Foreign Ministers were suppose to resume the dialogue process which just two days before the proposed day of meeting was called-off by India (Dawn, 2018). Regardless of getting into dialogue with Pakistan, India had preferred to apply ‘Hindutva’ doctrine to crush freedom struggle of Kashmiris.

The massive retaliation and brutal use of force against the protesters following the extra judicial assassination of Burhan Wani by the Indian Security Forces in July 2016, is thus a signal to the Kashmiris in line with Doval’s 2010 proclamation that the cost of demanding rights would have unbearable and inconceivable price for them. The idea of forceful assimilation of Kashmiris into India without any political reconciliation remains Doval’s prescription that finally surfaced on August 05, 2019, when Modi with his second term in office decided to abrogate Article 370 and 35A.

BJP’s call to rescind “Article 370 of Indian Constitution granting special status to Kashmir” is also an outcome of similar hawkish mindset (Khan, 2017). On the advice of Doval, Modi had also tried to oust United Nations Military Observer Group between India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) from India (Dawn, 2014). The Indian government did not wanted Pakistan to
pursue the UNSC resolutions. In spirit of the UNSC resolutions, India cannot unilaterally ask the UNMOGIP to leave. Knowing the implications and Pakistan’s resistance to such illegal action, after which the decision was retracted.

Human security has shifted the socio-political dynamics of state security with impulsive highlights of individual respect and right to live a free life. This evolves the 21st century debate on universality of human development while constituting security of individuals, communities and societies (Axworthy, 2001). The basic right to live, survive, cherish and prosper in life is for every human being and is explicitly guaranteed in the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (Morsink, 1999). Irony of the fact is exposed through bitter realities when on this noble earth there are communities that have been victimized by the so-called modern nations. The region of South Asia is no different to this which born with such an abnormality when in 1948 Indian military forcefully occupied Pakistan’s territory of Kashmir (Malik, 2002). It was the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who approached the United Nations and promised the right of self-determination to Kashmiris under the legal commitment. Since then the dilemma of disorientation and delusion became the fundamental policy priority of the Indian political stalwarts (Ahmed, 2000).

Regardless of over twenty five UN resolutions calling for the solution of the Kashmir dispute, India has been reluctant to grant Kashmiris their right to self-determination (Khan, 2015). The denial of UN resolutions (Khurshid, 2016), rejection of human rights reports (The Nation, 2018), and deployment of over one million troops (Dawn, 2016a); are unyielding facts of Indian state aggression towards Kashmir. The Indian military is equipped with draconian powers, as explained by Muhammad Hanif in his commentary written for Daily Times. He highlights that the Indian forces are unaccountable against brutal use of force and have been provided immunity
through “the Safety Act, 1978 and 1990; Jammu & Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, 1990; Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) 1990; the Armed Forces (Jammu & Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990; Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 2004; Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2002; the Armed Forces (Jammu & Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990; the National Security Act (NSA); Newspapers Incitements to Offences Act; and the Indian Telegraph Act” (Hanif, 2018). Similar to above, the mantra of revoking Article 370 & Article 35A (Gulf News, 2019) and earlier unlawful execution of Section 92 of the IOK Constitution (Pakistan Today, 2018a), are few other tangible Indian designs of violating the international law with intentions to suppress basic human rights of Kashmiris.

The discourse of human rights violations by the successive Indian regimes has been noted and timely protested by Pakistan. This is very true when it comes to international organizations particularly the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCR) that on June 14, 2018 have published a report identifying grave Indian human rights violations in Kashmir calling an inquiry to inspect the atrocities (UNHCR, 2018). Moreover, on October 30, 2018 a final inquiry report by All Parties Parliamentary Group (APPG) of the British Parliament was released which recognized ‘massive human rights violations and mass murder’ in the Indian occupied Kashmir (IOK) with an emphasis to repeal the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Power Act 1990 that disallow prosecution of its forces (Shah, 2018).

It is important to highlight that from January 1989 to August 31, 2019, while exercising the draconian laws the Indian military along with other law enforcement forces have brutally murdered around 95,438 innocent Kashmiris. The excessive use of force has killed 7,128 Kashmiris in custody and about 11,140 women were raped and molested by the Indian forces. As an effort to jeopardize the civil life around 158,048 civilians have been arrested without
providing legal justifications. To insert fear and threat into Kashmiri life, the Indian forces have destroyed about 109,409 public properties including houses. By widowing 22,909 Kashmiri women, after orphaning 107,778 Kashmiri children, and rapping 11,140 innocent Kashmiri girls and women; New Delhi claims the status of secular and democratic nation (KMC, 2019). Brutality has crossed all settled norms of political activity as Indian forces have started assassinating the leadership of Tehreek-e-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir. Within span of few months starting from February 2018 till November 2018, four prominent political leaders of the Tehreek, Mir Hafeezullah, Muhammad Yousaf Nadeem, Tariq Ahmad Ganai, and Hakeemur Rehman Sultani have been killed by the Indian military (The News, 2018b). After all these atrocities, still New Delhi feels so comfortable and convenient to nullify UN resolutions along with denial of human rights reports highlighting grave misconduct.

Suppression by the Indian military and its brutal violence against the Kashmiris had entered the youth into equally violent response. For example, on February 14, 2019 a local resident of Pulwama’s Kakapora, Adil Ahmad Dar did a suicide attack on Indian paramilitary forces that killed almost 44 of its soldiers while injuring 70. This was one of the worst attacks happened against the Indian forces in occupied Kashmir (Dawn, 2019). Unfortunately, regardless of understanding the sensitivity of Kashmiri resilience against its armed forces brutal violence, the Indian government allowed a new wave of nation wise hatred against Kashmiris. As a result, Kashmiri youth studying in Indian institutions had to flee for their life. Many had to take refuge in the mosques. Business and property of Kashmiri people in India was burnt by the Hindu mobs under the patronage of BJP government. The situation got ‘bad to worst’ that Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi had to write a letter to ‘United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’. His letter specifically pointed out that:
“As if the use of pellet guns against Kashmiri protestors, the outright refusal by India to initiate political dialogue with the Kashmiris and Pakistan, ongoing ‘shoot to kill’ orders against Kashmiris, were not enough, there is now a concerted campaign to whip up hatred and violence against Kashmiris and discrimination against them across India... Even more worryingly, the Indian government has chosen to remain silent in the wake of most appalling acts of violence against Kashmiris, perpetrated by extremist elements” (Siddiqui, 2019a).

To the fact of military might that India enjoys in occupied Kashmir is of great reference here. For example, the occupied Kashmir is heavily militarized and availability of more than 1 million Indian troops in the region along with other law enforcement agencies with that of rigorous intelligence penetration each and everywhere, how come a person with 80 kilogram of explosive could end up conducting a successful suicide attack? Even the Indian military officer, General D. S. Hooda told the international media that “it is not possible to bring such massive amounts of explosives by infiltrating the border” (Iqbal, 2019). It was orchestrated and facilitated by the politic-o-military regime of India as happened in the Samjhuata Express terror attack when one of Indian army serving Col. Prohit was found behind the incident.

Linking the dots of politic-o-military nexus, the Congress Spokesperson Randeep Surjewala convened a press conference on February 21, 2019 and raised five serious questions about Pulwama incident. The questions included: “(1) Why is PM Modi not taking responsibility for the failures of Home Minister Rajnath Singh and NSA Ajit Doval?; (2) How did such huge amount of explosives and rocket launcher entered the area? How did the vehicle entered the area?; (3) Why was the video warning imminent attack overlooked? Why was the letter written by the police ignored?; (4) Why was the CRPF’s demand for air travel not acceded?; (5) Why 488 jawans lost their lives in last 56 months?” (India TV, 2019).

Continuing with the pace of deconstructing ‘false flag operation’ by PM Modi, one of the prominent Hindu stalwarts particularly the traditional zealots of ‘Hindutva ideology’ such as Raj
Thackeray (the son of Bal Thackery, the founder of Shiv Sena) also made serious accusations against Modi, when on February 25, 2019 during a public rally, he stated that “if NSA Ajit Doval is investigated, then all the truth about the Pulwama terror attack will come out”. He maintained that “every government manufactured such things but it is taking place more frequently under Modi’s rule”. Mr. Raj Thackeray called the killing of 44 soldiers as “political victims” (Hashmi, 2019).

The unwise political rhetoric and electoral milestonage for the 2019 General Elections had put Modi into dilemma of ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’. This has been reiterated by almost every single opposition party of India. For example, on February 22, 2019 the former Chief Minister of Indian occupied Kashmir, Mr Omar Abdullah said in an interview with *Gulf News* that “the prime minister [Modi] and his party men are using the tragedy of Pulwama in which more than 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel were killed to promote their own political agenda. It is the biggest disservice they are doing to the nation”. To highlight the atrocities of Indian military in occupied Kashmir, he pointed out that “Jammu and Kashmir has been at the receiving end of violence of this nature for nearly three decades now. Entire generations of people have been born and brought up in the shadow of gun”. This has somehow created reaction in Indian occupied Kashmir, which is further fuelled by the violence of Hindu nationalists. To underscore such a dirty nexus of state sponsored terrorism and violence, Mr Abdullah pointed out “it is no secret that Bajrang Dal and the student wing of the Sangh were foremost in fomenting trouble against Kashmiri students in various parts of India. This was done keeping in mind the upcoming general elections” (Shaban, 2019).

The acts of terror are now deeply penetrated into Indian society, which at all stages cherish political backup. Due to this socio-political nexus of violence, Supreme Court of India
has to intervene and told the state to protect Kashmiri youth (BBC, 2019). This ultimately set a stage to revoke Article 370 and Article 35A of the Indian constitution that provides Kashmir a ‘special status’. Notwithstanding the calculated narrative of Indian propaganda, Pakistan’s intelligencia had inherited the responsibility to highlight and expose Indian violations of human rights in Kashmir with that of deliberate conscious to remind New Delhi about its commitments that it rendered to United Nations while accepting the mandate of international law over Kashmir Dispute that the people of Kashmir are entitled to cherish their basic right of self determination. The crossroads of conflict resolution and bilateral negotiations between Pakistan and India have allowed Kashmir to achieve its due weightage as an important and decisive point of reference for regional peace and stability. The high-times of contemporary political landscapes do demand to refresh and review international commitment on Kashmir.

The years 2018 and 2019 became one of the worst years for the Kashmiris when Indian military discriminately started executing well educated Kashmiris and after imposed curfew in the aftermath of abrogation of Article 370 and 35A. For example, On May 6, 2018, Indian military killed Dr. Muhammad Rafi Butt who was a professor of sociology in Kashmir University (Javeed, 2018). Continuing the brutality, on October 11, 2018 Dr Mannan Wani was killed who was a PhD scholar in geology from Aligarh Muslim University (Pakistan Today, 2018b). This did not stop here and on October 24, 2018 another PhD scholar Dr. Sabzar Ahmed Sofi was killed (The News, 2018a). Indian troops within the span of six months killed three highly educated youth of Kashmir and this is not restricted to killing of highly educated youth as young students on daily basis are taken into custody, shot dead on point blank, and harassed through draconian laws. Contrary to year 2018, Indian false flage operation in Pulwama and subsequent election victory of Narendra Modi, opened a new phase of terrible time. The very
exceptional status of Kashmir protected under Article 370 and 35A was abrogated by the Modi regime and the whole Jammu and Kashmir overnightly converted into world’s biggest jail. This was very rightly summarized by the *New York Times*, which titled its report “*Inside Kashmir, Cut Off From the World: ‘A Living Hell’ of Anger and Fear*” (Yasir, Suhasini, & Jeffery, 2019).

Besides Kashmir, Doval has often repeated his mantra of ‘Defensive Offensive’ on numerous occasions now also commonly known as the Doval Doctrine. Doval has spoken in public to the extent of admitting tactical use of terrorism against Pakistan through Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and supporting Baluchistan separatists. During his lecture at Shastra University Thanjavur Tamil Nadu in February 2014 and later at the Lalit Doshi Memorial Lecture on ‘State Security Statecraft and Conflict of Values’ in Mumbai on August 4, 2015; Doval articulated the contours of his doctrine. Doval ridiculed what he called India’s ‘defensive mode’ as amounting to hiring a ‘Chokidar or Chaprasi’ (watchman or peon) to prevent someone from coming in. He advocated for India to take ‘Defensive Offense’ thus exploiting Pakistan’s internal political and economic vulnerabilities, isolating it internationally and defeating its policies in Afghanistan. Doval emphasized that once India shifts gear, Pakistan would realize that the pain and cost is unaffordable for them. Openly threatening to dismember Baluchistan, Doval stated that “you may do one Mumbai you may lose Baluchistan” (Mehta, 2015). He also admitted buying out TTP to perpetrate terrorism against Pakistan including having Pakistani soldiers brutally slaughtered in the TTP custody. He bragged of having the resource of *Deoband* Ulema to act as bridge between India and TTP, if the need be.

The ‘Defensive Offense’ Doctrine is significantly visible in the disproportionate use of force on LOC and Working Boundary (WB) since the coming of Modi government and with Doval in the NSA seat (Chaudhary, 2017). Indian attempt has been to give Pakistan thrice the
number of casualties and if these cannot be the regular soldiers than numbers are met through targeting civilian villagers on the LOC and WB. It is the same offensive targeting which was reflected in Modi’s statement on Independence Day Address on August 15, 2016 that people of “Baluchistan and Gilgit and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) had thanked him”, a veiled threat to Pakistan that the ongoing protests in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) following Burhan Wani’s killing by the Indian Forces would have repercussions for Pakistan (Dawn, 2016b). Nirupama Subramanian while writing in the Indian Express called the Indian Prime Minister “remarks on Baluchistan, Gilgit Baltistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir” during his Independence Day Speech as “bad portents”. She also added that “as much as India might wish, there is no people’s movement against this because most people living in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Gilgit Baltistan and Baluchistan think of themselves as Pakistanis. This narrative of feeling thankful is self-proclaimed rather highlights the prevailing reality” (Subramanian, 2016).

Ms. Subramanian has worked in Pakistan for almost four years from May 2006 to 2011 as resident correspondent of Indian newspaper ‘The Hindu’.

5.11. Manifestation of the ‘Hindutva’ Warfare: A Case of ‘Samjhauta Express’

Samjhauta Express terrorist attack targeting Pakistanis is a direct consequence of rise of the Right Wing Hindus. On February 18, 2007 blasts triggered by Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) occurred on board the Delhi—to—Lahore bound Samjhauta Express train near Panipat. Sixty eight person including 42 Pakistani nationals were killed in the terror incident (Abbas, 2016).

Although, earlier reports from India established involvement of serving Indian military intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Shrikant Prashad Purohit in planning of the attack and supply of RDX for the blasts. Later on, the Indian Government denied his role in this act of
terrorism despite existence of incriminating evidence. Lt. Col Purohit’s name was dropped from the investigation of Samjhauta Express case charge sheet under pressure from the military. Even though his name remains in some of the other related terrorism incidents charge sheet but the Central Government controlled prosecution and investigation agency National Investigation Agency (NIA) has diluted charges against all the ‘Hindutva’ accused since the taking over by the BJP government in 2014 (NDTV, 2017).

The numerous evidences, however, establish not only the role of Lt. Col Purohit but also of some other serving and retired Indian military officers in the wave of terrorism perpetrated in India by the extreme right wing Hindu terrorist outfits ‘Abhinav Bharat’ between 2006 to 2008. In a further confirmation of its ‘denial mode’ the Indian Home Ministry in August 2013 refused Maharashtra Government’s recommendation to ban and place Abhinav Bharat on its list of proscribed terrorist organizations (Jain & Chakrabarty, 2013). The following account renders some of the evidences and statements of the accused establishing the role of Indian military intelligence’s Lt. Col Purohit, Abhinav Bharat and linkages of RSS and VHP not only in Samjhauta Express blasts but in a series of interlinked terrorist attacks carried out in India in 2006-08 that targeted Muslims.

Despite attack on Samjhauta, Pakistan’s the then Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, who was to arrive in New Delhi the very next day for bilateral talks on February 19, 2007 did not cancelled his trip and visited as per the schedule. Foreign Minister Kasuri was assured by the Indian leadership that results of the investigation in the Samjhauta Express blasts would be shared with Pakistan and all the perpetrators of this act of terrorism in which many Pakistanis lost their lives would be brought to justice. The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself expressed “anguish and grief” stating that “the culprits would be caught” (BBC,
2007). Nonetheless, now these promises appear hallow in the face of India’s cover-up and overlooking of the role of Lt. Col Purohit and his belonging to military intelligence. Further, now even the other ‘Hindutva’ accomplices are being let off the hook.

The initial investigation in the Samjhauta blasts in 2007 led Haryana police to Hindu extremist (Hindutva) terror network in Indore, Madhya Pradesh state having BJP government and considered a hub of RSS ‘Sangh Parivar’ and ‘Hindutva’ organizations. According to the Indian leading Magazine *Outlook* sources in Haryana Police told its scribe that:

“All their leads pointed to the involvement of ‘Hindu fundamentalists’ elements, and despite several arrests, the investigators failed to find any evidence of the involvement of Islamic groups like Indian Mujahideen (IM) or Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). Why was the probe stalled then? The commonly given explanation is that when the government’s policy has been to blame Pakistan for every terrorist incident in India, it would have damaged the country’s credibility if, after blaming them for the blast, it was proved to be the work of Hindus’. Crucially, several senior police officials told ‘Outlook’ that ‘it was the office of the then National Security Advisor, M. K. Narayanan which informally advised the police to go slow on the probe and not investigate the Hindu connection. Within official circles, it’s widely known that investigations into the Samjhauta Express blast were discreetly stopped when the trial led to Hindu activists in Indore. According to the view conveyed by the security officials to ‘Outlook’ since the government had already accused Pakistan, a Hindu link would have led to loss of credibility for India” (Dogra, 2010).

In fact, a day after the bombing, Indian investigating agencies stated that “the attack was carried out by five people associated with LeT” (Bhushan, 2018). The agencies even released “the sketches of two suspects” (Bhushan, 2018). There was no concrete progress in the case until November 2008. Interrogation of Lt. Col. Purohit in November 2008 brought the ‘Hindutva’ dimensions to the public domain (Ramakrishnan, 2011). The information on Samjhauta Express blasts as falsified by Indians was passed on to the United States. The Indian meanwhile used their usual ‘catch all’ mantra to include the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Dawood Ibrahim, Al-Qaeda, the Mumbai train attack of 2006 and Samjhauta Express blasts of 2007. Based on the Indian information, the US got one Arif Qasmani alleged Lashkar coordinator and three others on its
Treasury Department’s sanctions list (The Indian Express, 2009) as well as UNSC 1276 proscribed list (Varadarajan, 2009).

While the Haryana Police had placed the Samjhauta case in cold storage, interestingly the involvement of Lt. Col. Purohit in Samjhauta blasts first came to public knowledge because of investigations in another blast in the town of Malegaon Maharashtra in 2008. Tracing the motorbike that was used in the Malegaon blast, the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) arrested Sadhvi Pragya Thakur, a self styled God woman. According to Rana Ayub’s 2011 special report appeared in *Tehelka Magazine* “her cell phone call records” led to arrest of a string of persons “involved in terror blasts in India” including Malegaon Maharashtra, Samjhauta Express, Mecca Masjid Hyderabad and Ajmer Sharif Dargah, etc. After initial arrests, the big catch Maj (retd) Ramesh Upadhyay, now at his 67 years of age and an inhabitant of Pune was nabbed. Tehelka Magazine also pointed out that “he had worked in the Indian Army’s Military Intelligence (MI) and had imparted training to those who had assembled the bombs. He had also headed the BJP’s ex-servicemen’s cell in Mumbai”. This followed another round of arrests but the biggest arrest was of a serving army MI officer, Lt. Col. Purohit on November 9, 2008. In *Tehelka* report Ayub further stated that Sadhvi Pragya had disclosed to the ATS officials that “Lt. Col. Purohit was hinting at the Samjhauta Express and Ajmer Sharif blasts but this was not made public as it would lifted the cover over the Indian farce of misleading the international community of suffering from foreign sponsored terror while it’s own military intelligence was spawning these terrorist attacks” (Ayub, 2011).

Lt. Col. Purohit’s role as the prime conspirator in a series of terrorist blasts across India including Samjhauta blasts signified “with the arrest of another self-proclaimed Seer Swami Dayanand Pandey alias Shanker Acharya alias Shukhakar Dwivedi. Pandey had a habit of
recording all conversations with his co-conspirators on his laptop” (Ayub, 2011). Maharashtra ATS retrieved 37 audio and 03 video tapes from Pandey’s laptop. *Tehelka magazine* which printed part of the transcript of these tapes finds it alarming that the investigators failed to pin down 08 other serving and retired Indian army officers, at least 04 of these having MI background whose names appear in these tapes and were involved in the terror network (Ayub, 2011). These include:

- Brig. Mathur
- Brig. Lajpat Prajwal
- Col. (retd.) Hasmukh Patel
- Col. (retd.) Shalesh Raikar
- Col. Aditya Bappaitya Dhar
- Lt. Col. Purohit
- Maj Ramesh Upadhyay
- Maj. Nitin Joshi
- Maj. Prayag Modakaikar

According to the *Tehelka report* “the audio tapes revealed a chilling landscape. A God-woman, a seer, political bigwigs and serving and retired Indian army officers all form an integral part of the conspiracy. They spilled vitriolic hate for Pakistan, Muslims and even Hindus who did not subscribe to their ultra-right communal vision”. The purpose of setting up Abhinav Bharat according to conversation in the tapes is to “infiltrating and subverting every institution in the country”. In an extract from the tapes Lt. Col. Purohit describes the aim of ‘Abhinav Bharat’ as “militarization of the organization where every member at all levels must have a basic knowledge of weapons”. He recommends “establishment of an academy for ideological indoctrination”. The organizational goal is propagating the establishment of ‘Ram Rajya’ and all
India ‘Hindu Rashtra’ called ‘Abhinav Bharat’. According to Purohit, “reporting channels like those in the armed forces will be established. This will ensure the smooth flow of information and passing of orders” (Ayub, 2011).

Moreover, the tapes identified “Col. (retd.) Shailesh Raikar of the Maratha Regiment, who as commander of the Bhonsla Military Academy in Nashik provided facilities to Lt. Col. Purohit and his other ‘Abhinav Bharat’ members for weapons training in the academy”. Interestingly, it is the same Bhonsala Military School that was founded by Dr. Moonje in 1934. 

_Tehelka_ report highlighted that “Lt. Col. Purohit, Col. Dhar, Maj. Ramesh Upadhyay, Swami Dayanand Pandey, B. L. Sharma Prem (twice BJP MP), and R. P. Singh (an endocrinologist at Apollo Hospital and President of the World Hindu Federation)” are recorded in the tapes talking about military takeover of India by distributing rebellious letters to Jawans (soldiers) and maps of ‘Akhand Bharat’ to sow seeds of rebellion among Jawans. Seditious links between MI and deposed Nepalese King Gyandendra “who took over after grisly murder of his brother King Mahindra under mysterious circumstances” are also exposed in the tapes. Swami Dayanand Pandey offers Lt. Col. Purohit arranging meeting with the then Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi through Swami Aseemanand, which later welcomes. Lt. Col. Purohit also suggested that “buying two army vehicles from the scrap and painting them with army colors and sending them along with their people in army uniform into Meerut, where they can just fire and come out of the situation easily” (Ayub, 2011).

Lt. Col. Purohit also talks about sending thousands for guerilla combat training to Israel and Nepal and claims of negotiations with Israel of providing training. He mentions having demanded from Israelis “continuous and uninterrupted supply of arms and training, the ‘Abhinav
Bharat’ office with saffron flag in Tel Aviv, political asylum and support for the cause of a Hindu Nation in the United Nations” (Ayub, 2011).

As the news of investigations spread, a lot of pressure was instead built on late ATS Chief Hemant Karkare to downplay the role of the Indian Army. The BJP’s veteran leader L. K. Advani and then Shiv Sena Chief Bal Thackeray regarded Karkare’s line of investigation as blasphemous. Interestingly, the testimony for Lt. Col. Purohit’s good character was given by none other than his neighbor Col. (retd.) Jayant Chitale, Director of the Shiv Sena’s Maharashtra Military Foundation (MMF). Calling Lt. Col. Purohit “an outstanding officer and patriot person”, Col. Chitale disclosed that he had trained Purohit for the Army recruitment tests (The Indian Express, 2008). Interestingly, Chitale himself had been apprehended in the past for starting commando training camps for ‘Hindu Terrorist Squad’ to “disturb internal peace of Pakistan”. Chitale’s squad had the blessings of MMF’s Chief Lt. Gen. (retd) Premnath Hoon who called “these suicide squads an answer to Pakistanis for the destructions that Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) did to our country” (Hashmey, 2011).

The aftermath of the arrest of Lt. Col. Purohit exposed larger pattern that showed involvement of MI’s ‘Abhinav Bharat’ in Samjhauta Express blasts, Malegaon, Mecca Masjid, Ajmer Sharif and several other terrorists’ blasts. The disclosure of ‘Hindutva’—MI nexus was damaging for the Indian Military as well as the Hindu Right Wing politic-o-militant organizations. ATS Chief Hemant Karkare was mysteriously killed on 26/11. Congress Secretary General Digvijaya Singh disclosed in 2011 that “on November 26, 2008 just about two hours before the attacks in Mumbai (the famous 26/11 terrorists attack), Karkare rang him on his mobile and told how his family and his life were blighted by constant threats from people annoyed by his investigations into the Malegaon blasts” (Chishti, 2010). Digvijaya later
produced his mobile phone bill as proof of call record when challenged by the Maharastra Home Minister that no call record of such conversation was available (Times of India, 2011b). Several Indian civil society persons have expressed doubts whether 26/11 Mumbai attackers actually killed Karkare or it was a job of ‘Hindutva’ terror network (Mushrif, 2009).

According to Tehelka Magazine report, an Intelligence Bureau (IB) official based in Mumbai while talking its scribe “raised a pertinent question, do you think Lt. Col. Purohit can smuggle RDX and weapons from Jammu Army depot on his own? Can he alone sponsor sending men for military training to Nepal and Israel?” (Ayub, 2011). Surely a wider involvement of Indian MI is apparent. The IB official added that “after the 1992 Ayodhya movement of L. K. Advani, things have changed. The political climate has affected the army too in a big way especially among officers posted along the border. The story of Lt. Col. Purohit has exposed the Indian Army’s terrorist and communal overtones. Col. Purohit did indoctrination of other Army men during his posting in Indian Occupied Kashmir” (Ayub, 2011).

The charge sheet filed by Maharastra ATS in the Malegaon terror attack on 2008 stated that the ‘Abhinav Bharat’ “engineered a series of terrorist attacks with the larger ambition” of establishing ‘separate Hindu Rashtra’ a concept visualized originally by V. D. Savarkar and reincarnated by Hemani Savarkar (Dasgupta, Koppikar, & Hasan; 2010), who is the daughter of Gandhi’s assassin Nathuram Godse’s brother and married to V. D. Savarkar’s nephew. One of the stark discoveries of Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) was that the RDX used in both the Malegaon and Samjhauta Express blasts were supplied by Lt. Col. Purohit as also confirmed by the ATS statement submitted to the court (Zeenews, 2008). According to Hafeez who wrote in the Times of India that “Maharashtra Special Prosecutor Ajay Misar told the court that a
witness in Malegaon blast” informed ATS about Lt. Col. Purohit obtaining 60KG of RDX from an Army depot in Jammu and Kashmir (Hafeez, 2008).

The report also mentioned that the Prosecutor Ajay Misar also told the court that “Lt. Col. Purohit was stationed at the Deolali Army Camp and went to Jammu and Kashmir on official work” during which he procured RDX that he later handed over to one “Bhagwan who used it in the Samjhauta train blast” (Dawn, 2008). Pertinent to note is Purohit’s own statement that does not deny the pilferage of 60KG RDX from Army depot by him but that he threw it in “Jhelum River instead depositing in the Army depot” (Plumber & Vishnoi, 2008). According to Misar, Maharashtra ATS was also investigating the “role of Nashik based builder who paid Rs. 2.5 lakhs at the behest of Purohit” to Dayanand Pandey for Malegaon and Samjhauta Express blasts (Plumber & Vishnoi, 2008).

The linkage of the six ‘Hindutva’ terrorists attacks between 2006 to 2007 such as Malegaon (2006, 2008), Samjhauta Express (2007), Ajmer Sharif (2007), Mecca Mosque Hyderabad (2007) and Modasa (2008) was further established by the Hyderabad based Indian forensic laboratory. The similarities established by the forensic laboratory’s report include use of same (Tripathi, 2013):

- Bomb containers
- Bomb making techniques
- Electronic circuits
- Arming and triggering mechanism
- That the mode and signature of detonators used pointed to the Hindu terrorist rather than the usual suspects such as IM, SIMI, HuJI, Let, etc.

The report elaborated that RDX—TNT is employed as main charge, identical keys used to arm explosive, similar LED, circuit power source and identical cell phones, for example Nokia
6030 used for triggering. The report further established “the differences between these bombs” and those used by certain other homegrown Indian terrorist groups such as the Indian Mujahedeen (IM) that used C-shaped wooden boxes, using ammonium nitrate, fuel oil or nitrogen gel as the main explosive. The forensic laboratory’s report, therefore, further established that all these seven terrorist attacks executed from 2006 to 2008 were conducted by the same terror network (Tripathi, 2013).

Earlier in January 2011, senior Congress Secretary General Digvijaya Singh complained that the BJP government in Madhya Pradesh is not cooperating with Haryana Police in the Samjhauta probe. He also accused BJP governments in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat of shielding activists belonging to radical Hindu groups. He added that a conspirator in Samjhauta blasts Sunil Joshi an RSS ‘parcharak’ “was murdered in December 2007 on the orders of RSS to cover-up the trail of ‘Hindutva’ sponsored terror networks activities” (Sharma, 2011a). Sunil Joshi’s planned elimination has been a great setback to the Samjhauta investigations and trial. According to the confessions of many co-conspirators and numerous independent reports, Sunil Joshi was the main logistics planner of Smajhauta Express blasts. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) investigations also revealed that Joshi had delivered a motivation speech after the training of the Samjhauta blast bombers in which he said that they should avenge the attacks on Hindu temples (Tripathi, 2012). There have been several reports in Indian media quoting police charge sheet that Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur got Joshi assassinated on the instructions of RSS Executive Committee member from Rajasthan, Indresh Kumar to eliminate possible approver in Ajmer Sharif Darga, Samjhauta Express and other terrorist attacks (Ahuja, 2011a).

Furthermore, in the aftermath of 2014 BJP government, charges against a number of main accused have been dropped by the Indian Central Government’s National Investigation
Agency (NIA), who were involved in the series of terrorist attacks between 2006 and 2008. Ironically, NIA to which all these terrorists cases have been transferred has gone to the extent of calling the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) investigations to be fudged. NIA has even disregarded the prime accused persons, who have fulfilled all the legal formalities in front of magistrates. The much celebrated Chief of ATS late Hemant Karkare who reportedly died under mysterious circumstances (allegedly at the hands of 26/11 Mumbai attackers) had been posthumously labeled a villain who planted RDX in Lt. Col. Purohit’s kitchen to implicate him (Modaf & Rajput, 2016).

5.12. Smajhauta Express Blasts: Confessions of Naba Kumar Swamy Aseemanand

Naba Kumar alias Swami Aseemanand had been fugitive since the arrest of Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur in October 2008. He was arrested by CBI in November 2010 from Haridwar for his role in a “series of terrorist acts across India targeting Muslims” including the Samjhauta Express. Aseemanand was produced in Tis Hazari Court New Delhi before metropolitan magistrate Deepak Dabas by the CBI on December 16, 2010. Aseemanand told the magistrate that he wanted to make a voluntary confession. The magistrate, however, remanded him to judicial custody for two days, giving him time to reflect if he really wanted to make the statement or otherwise retreat (Sharma, 2011b).

During this period no investigation or prosecution representative was allowed access to him, even while transporting to and from the Magistrate’s Court. On December 18, 2010; the magistrate again asked Aseemanand whether he wanted to make a statement on his own free will, without duress, and that if he was aware of the conviction he could get due to his statement. Aseemanand was even asked whether he was under the impression that the confession could lead to his exoneration and told that this was not the case. Aseemanand replied “I know I could be
sentenced to death but wanted to make confession fully understanding the consequences”. He told the magistrate that “while in jail he shared cell with one Abdul Kaleem, a Muslim boy accused in Mecca Mosque Hyderabad blast. Kaleem took good care of him, helping to bring food and water. Learning that Kaleem had to suffer imprisonment for the blasts that Aseemanand and his comrades had planned and executed, the later felt guilt and wanted to do ‘prayschit’ (penance) by making a confessional statement so that real culprits can be punished and no innocent has to suffer” (Khetan, 2011).

Aseemanand’s confessional statement put together many missing pieces of puzzles of the terror attacks spread across seven locations in India from 2006 to 2008. It also collaborated with the audio and video tapes that Maharashtra ATS had seized from the laptop of Dayanand Pandey, implicating Lt. Col. Purohit in Samjhauta Express and other blasts. According to Aseemanand’s statement “he first came in contact with Sunil Joshi and Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur in 2003 but it was only in March 2006 that he became actively involved in the terror plot. Sunil Joshi and two other RSS ‘pracharaks’ from Madhya Pradesh; Ramchandra Kalsangra and Sandeep Dange,” according to Aseemanand “were the core operatives” though they were apparently receiving instructions from higher levels. The like-minded ‘Hindutva’ cadres mostly from the RSS, Bajrang Dal, VHP, Abhinav Bharat, Jai Vande Matram and Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram were recruited by them as per need (Khetan, 2011).

In June 2006, Aseemanand, Riteshwar, Sadhvi Pragya and Joshi met in Valsad and decided to “give a befitting reply to Muslims for the Sankatmochan temple blasts”. Aseemanand told the magistrate that he expressed “bomb ka jawab bomb se dena chahiye” (I stated that we should answer bomb with bomb). While identifying the targets Aseemanand stated that “80 percent of the people of Malegaon were Muslims and we should explode the first bomb in
Malegaon itself”. He also said that “during the Partition of 1947, the Nizam of Hyderabad had wanted to go with Pakistan so Hyderabad was also a fair target”. Then he said that “since Hindus also throng the Ajmer Sharif Dargah in large numbers we should also explode a bomb in Ajmer which would deter the Hindus from going there”. Aseemanand also suggested “the Aligarh Muslim University as a terror target during the meeting”. According to Aseemanand “Joshi suggested that it was basically Pakistanis who travel on the Samjhauta Express train that runs between India and Pakistan and therefore we should attack the train as well. Joshi took the responsibility of targeting Samjhauta himself and said that the chemicals required for the blasts would be arranged by his associate Dange” (Khetan, 2011). The confession gives enormous details about logistics and division of work for execution of Samjhauta blasts.

Except for the Aligarh Muslim University, all the other identified targets were successfully hit by the terror network. The Malegaon was actually targeted twice on September 8, 2006 and September 29, 2008. Aseemanand told the magistrate that “in February 2007, Riteshwar and Joshi met him and informed that good news would be received shortly”. After a couple of days, Aseemanand again met Riteshwar, Joshi and Pragya at Valsad, the Samjhauta Express terrorists attack had already taken place and Joshi told that this was done by his men”. Aseemanand added “in the same meeting, Joshi took Rs. 40,000 form me to carry out the blasts in Hyderabad”. The Mecca Masjid Hyderabad blasts were executed on May 17, 2007 (Khetan, 2011).

Ashish Khetan in his special report for Tehelka Magazine writes that a few months later, on October 11, 2007 “a powerful bomb went off in Ajmer Sharif Dargah killing three people and injuring over a dozen”. Khetan writes that according to Aseemanand, Joshi told him that “this blast had been executed by Muslim boys” arranged by Indresh Kumar, who was RSS Executive
Committee member from Rajasthan. *Tehelka* report further exposed that Aseemanand “told Joshi that Indresh might get him killed” to avoid getting implicated. Report maintains that barely two months later on December 29, 2007, “Sunil Joshi was mysteriously murdered outside his house in Dewas, Madhya Pradesh. His family claimed he had been murdered by his own organization” (Khetan, 2011).

According to Khetan report, Aseemanand also confessed having contacts with “terror outfit ‘Abhinav Bharat’ in January 2007”. *Tehela magazine* pointed out that “Lt. Col. Purohit is one of the founder members of the outfit. Aseemanand has confessed to proposing more terror strikes in a meeting of ‘Abhinav Bharat’ held at Bhopal in April 2008. Sadhvi Pragya, Bharat Riteshwar, Col. Purohit and Dayanand Pandey were also present in the meeting”. The report highlights that Aseemanand told the magistrate “I participated in many ‘Abhinav Bharat’ meetings and proposed to carry out more terror strikes” (Khetan, 2011).

The reign of terror continued despite the assassination of Joshi. On September 29, 2008, Malegaon town was again targeted during the Month of Ramadhan. The Maharashtra ATS Chief Hemant Karkare who started the investigation of the second Malegaon attack was able to expose the broad ‘Hindutva’ terror network in a short span of time finding its links with many previous terror attacks. According to Khetan, “Karkare arrested eleven ‘Hindutva’ radicals including Lt. Col. Purohit, who was attached with the military intelligence unit at Nashik. Karkare also arrested Dayanand Pandey, a self-styled religious guru who ran an ashram named Sharda Peeth in Jammu and the third arrest of Sadhvi Pragya, for their role in the 2008 Malegaon blast. Following the arrest of Sadhvi Pragya by Maharashtra ATS in connection with the Malegaon blast, Aseemanand went absconding. He was finally arrested by the CBI from Haridwar on November 19, 2010” (Khetan, 2011).
Interestingly, Aseemanand’s lawyer Manvir Rathee had alleged that the confession was obtained under duress, despite following all the procedures by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Tiz Hazari Court New Delhi (National Spirit, 2011). On January 13, 2011, Aseemanand was again produced before the Special Judge, Nitu Garg in Panchkula Haryana and this time by NIA for getting permission to record statement in the Samjhauta Express blasts case. The judge granted Aseemanand two days judicial custody before recording confession during which no investigating officer or prosecutor was allowed to interact with him (Nagarkot, 2011). The confession was recorded on January 15, 2011 by Panchkula Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajesh Singh in accordance with the basic principle to allow the accused to record statement free of duress. Aseemanand stuck to his earlier confessional statement of December 8, 2010, made before the Metropolitan magistrate New Delhi that “Hindutva radicals including him were behind the bomb attack on Samjhauta Express in 2007”. The maintenance of confession of guilt by the accused almost after one month of the earlier confession disproved the allegation of duress by his lawyer Manvir Rathee. Both the statements recorded in the Tiz Hazari Court New Delhi and Panchkula have evidentiary value for being recorded before the Magistrate according to the prescribed judicial procedures (Times of India, 2011a).

Commenting on Aseemanand’s confessions, the Indian Magazine *Frontline* wrote that in line with their usual line of investigations different agencies had described Samjhauta Express blasts as a “macabre attack by LeT”. *Frontline* further writes that “this line of investigations and projections made on that basis found so much currency that this was highlighted even in international forums such as the United Nations” (Ramakrishnan, 2011). Aseemanand’s confessions raised questions about the decades of investigation practices of these agencies. The charges against LeT thus proved to be a smoke screen erected by Indian NSA. The purpose was
to divert attention from the involvement of Indian Military Intelligence (MI), and homegrown Hindu terror networks who actually committed the Samjhauta Express attack, as such exposure would have demolished the propaganda that Indian government has been spreading to show itself as victim of so called ‘Pakistan sponsored terrorism’.

The NIA sources were of the view that the confession ruled out the conjectures of involvement of any other groups such as the initial investigations had “looked into the possibility of involvement” of jihadi groups including Arif Qasmani, a Pakistani alleged to be affiliated with LeT named by the United States as financier of the Smajhauta blasts. Significantly, there is no rebuttal or denial of the test and extracts of either of the two confessional statements of Swami Aseemanand printed by various Indian media outlets led by Tehelka Magazine. Similarly, the existence of the 37 audio tapes and 03 tapes recovered by the Maharashtra ATS from the laptop of Swami Dayanand Pandey and their transcripts printed in media have not been denied by any of the Indian law enforcing agency, yet scant importance is being given to such incrementing treasure grove of evidences.

Despite loads of evidences, NIA Chief, and Director General Sharad Kumar stated in April 2015 that “no evidence has been found against Lt. Col. Purohit and he is not involved in (the Samjhauta Express blasts) case” (The Indian Express, 2016a). Meanwhile, in what is being regarded as a “rare move” the BJP Government gave second extension in the contract employment of Sharad Kumar as the Director General of NIA in October 2016. Samjhauta Express terror blasts and Pathankot attack are being cited as the major reasons for his unprecedented reemployment (The Indian Express, 2016b). Kumar was an Indian Police Service (IPS) officer from Haryana cadre and thought to be a close protégé of National Security Advisor (NSA), Ajit Kumar Doval.
In August 2015, a public interest litigation (PIL) was filed by social activist Harsh Mander in the Supreme Court of India that “NIA was exerting external pressure on Special Public Prosecutor, Rohini Salian to go soft on the eleven accused in the Malegaon blasts” (The Wire, 2015). Salian had herself leveled this allegation in an interview with The Indian Express on June 26, 2015 (The Indian Express, 2015). The PIL argued, “as is evident from Salian’s statement, the hallmark of the Special Public Prosecutor’s office i.e. its independence from government influence has been severely compromised”. The petitioner sought the intervention of the Supreme Court to ensure “that the trial is conducted in the most impartial and fair manner irrespective of the outcome” (The Wire, 2015). Significant point to mention here is that Malegaon terrorist attack is inseparably linked to the Samjhauta Express blasts and five other terrorist attacks by the same terror network. Dilution of case by the prosecution in one incident would automatically affect the others. Earlier in August 2014, the Punjab and Haryana High Court had granted bail to Swami Aseemanand in Samjhauta Express case owing to the dilution of charge sheet against him by the NIA. Further, NIA announced that it did not intend to challenge the bail as there were no grounds for it (The Indian Express, 2014).

Ironically, despite making voluntarily confessions before two Magistrates separately about his involvement in Samjhauta Express and other terror blasts, Aseemanand subsequently retracted his statement. It is believed that external pressure from the former ‘Hindutva’ comrades, RSS, Abhinav Bharat, etc. was applied on him to retract. Aseemanand’s retraction needs to be compared with the statement of Nathuram Godse’s brother disclosure that “the denial of RSS links was deliberate to protect colleagues in that organization” (Punyani, 2014).

Despite, the PIL in the Indian Supreme Court, in an inconceivable volte-face the NIA withdrew all charges against Sadhvi Prigya Singh Thakur on May 13, 2016 and five others in the
Malegaon case. The charge sheet against ten other accused including Lt. Col. Purohit was mellowed down by withdrawing charges under stringent Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act (MCOCA). The NIA’s Special Public Prosecutor, Rohini Salian who had gone public about the pressure on her to go soft in the case had already been replaced by then. Even the new Special Public Prosecutor of NIA, Avinash Rasal threatened to resign for not being consulted in the charge sheet changes but later retracted saying the matter had been resolved internally (Singh, 2016). Some sanity was, however, restored when Special Court in Mumbai denied bail application of Sadhvi and other co-accused on June 28, 2016 (Sinha & Ghosh, 2016). The court also rejected the dropping of charges against her under the MCOCA; ruling that these would stay as *prima facie* there was enough evidence against her.

Aseemanand’s original name is Jatin Chatterjee and he is a native of Indian state of West Bengal. He got affiliated with RSS and other right-wing ‘Hindutva’ organizations during his school days. Later, assuming the avatar of self-styled God-man he changed his name to Naba Kumar and was called Swami Aseemanand by his followers. Aseemanand admitted in an interview with Magazine ‘*Caravan*’ that he was inspired into the extreme right wing thoughts losing compassion of any sorts for non-Hindus through the reading of Swami Vivekananda’s works. According to him, “one particular line from Vivekananda dominated his reading, which states that ‘every man going out of the Hindu pale is not only a man less but an enemy the more’” (Reghunath, 2014). Ironically, Aseemanand shares the passion of Vivekananda with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and National Security Advisor Ajit Kumar Doval.

Swami Aseemanand shifted his base to Dang in Gujarat State in 1998 with the help of RSS and VHP workers, conceptualized and built the Shabridham Temple and Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (Forest Dwellers Auspicious Hermitage). The temple and Ashram were situated on a hill
near Subir Village, what was said to be the spot where ‘Lord Ram’ was offered berries by his devotee named Shabri (Kanungo & Joshi, 2009). Aseemanand launched ‘re-conversion’ movement of mostly Christians at his Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram to Hindus. He would baptize the minorities by organizing a bath at Unai Temple, which had hot water springs and declare them Hindus. Tripathi notes that “Legend has it that Sītā used to bath in these springs found by Lord Ram” (Tripathi, 2010).

Contrary to the construction of the Shabridham Temple and Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, there exists the purpose of the ‘conversion’ drive under the ambit of the so-called ‘Ghar Vapsi’ drive of the RSS. Aseemanand was “seen as being close to the RSS leadership as leaders like the then Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi, Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Shivraj Singh Chauhan, former RSS Chief K. S. Sudarshan and current Chief Mohan Bhagwat have attended religious functions organized by him in Dang District in February 2006” (Khetan, 2011).

Congress senior leader Digvijay Singh citing Aseemanand’s involvement in terrorist attacks on Samjhauta Express, Ajmir Sharif Dargah, Mecca Masjid and Malegaon blasts stated that “I cannot say that the top RSS leaders or Modi were privy to the conspiracy. But I have a photo of these leaders on the stage with Aseemanand,” (Sharma, 2011).

Aseemanand has himself claimed in an interview with the Carvan Magazine while in captivity in Haryana that he converted thousands of Christian Dangs to Hinduism using both lure and coercion. Joined by VHP, Bajrang Dal, Hindu Jagran Manch and Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram cadres; Swami claimed to have destroyed thirty Christian churches and scores of Christian and Muslim business in 1998 and patronaged mob rioting. He further claimed to have converted 40,000 Christians to Hinduism in the next one year (1999). According to Aseemanand, when the then BJP’s Gujarat Chief Minister Keshubhai Patel tried to rein him in, Modi came to his rescue.
telling him “I know what Keshubhai is doing to you. Swamiji there is no comparison to what you are doing. You are doing the real work. Now it has been decided that I will be the Chief Minister. Let me come and then I will do your work, rest easy” (Reghunath, 2014). Swami Aseemanand also claimed in the interview that in July 2005 RSS Chief Mohan Bhagwat and Indresh Kumar now RSS Executive Committee member visited him in Dang, where Sunil Joshi apprised them of the plan to target various Muslim sites.

According to Aseemanand both RSS leaders approved and Bhagwat told him:

“You can work on this with Sunil. We will not be involved, but if you are doing this, you can consider us to be with you… Swamiji, if you do this we will be at ease with it. Nothing wrong will happen then. Criminalisation nahn hoga (It will not be criminalised). If you do it, then people won’t say that we did a crime for the sake of committing a crime. It will be connected to the ideology. This is very important for Hindus. Please do this. You have our blessings” (Reghunath, 2014).

RSS and BJP have tried to downplay the status of Aseemanand calling him just a member of the organizing committee of Sabri Kumbh mela. The facts are quite to the contrary. He was spearheading the flagship project of RSS and the then Chief Minister Modi such as ‘Ghar Vapsi’ to bring the Christians tribal people into the folds of Hinduism. BJP’s spokesperson Tarun Vijay after the 2006 Mela had called him “hero of Dang’s homecoming [Ghar Vapsi] revolution” (Ahuja, 2011b). The ‘Adivasis’ (indigenous tribal community) has been demanding bannig of Sabri Kumbh and even had file a petition in this regard in 2006 (The Hindu, 2012).

The response of RSS—BJP combine plus affiliated Sangh Parivar over the string of seven terrorist’s attacks perpetrated by their fellow ‘Hindutva’ bretheren smacks of the Gujarat Model. It is being pointed that the law enforcing agencies routinely roundup dozens of Muslim youth labeling them Indian Mujahideen (IM), Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami (HuJI), or Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) associates slapping terrorism charges on them. Contrariwise, if a Hindu linkage is found, the same is ignored, slow-tracked and
evidences disregarded. The accused retract confessional statements and even witnesses turn hostile back-tracking their earlier statements.

The story of witness back-tracking is not new in India. For example, in Case of Ajmer Dargah blast of 2007 among 149 witnesses 36 turned hostile (First Post, 2018). The drama is no different in 2007 Mecca Masjid case. The Times of India reported that “out of 226 witnesses (in Mecca Masjid case) more than 66 witnesses turned hostile in the court” (Times of India, 2018). Aseemanand the prime accused in both the cases had been already acquitted due to 36 witnesses back-tracking in Ajmer Dargah case and 66 witnesses back-tracking in Mecca Masjid case. The case of Samjhauta Express was no different to that. Finally, on March 20, 2019 Aseemannand along with three other accused were acquitted from the charges of Samjhauta Express train attack (AJazeera, 2019).

In Samjhauta Express terror attack there were almost 299 witnesses (The Indian Express, 2018). According to Hindustan Times, the special public prosecutor on September 18, 2018 hearing with the court has apprised that “all witnesses, except 13 Pakistan nationals, have already been examined” (Hindustan Times, 2018). It is important to highlight that almost 24 Indian witnesses among 299 were gone hostile and many more told the courts that they were never recorded. Even on May 06, 2018 another important witness Ram Saran Das had turned hostile (Times of India, 2018). It was not an issue of producing Pakistani witnesses rather Modi regime has created a witness fiasco to prolong the cases and to provide relief to Aseemanand, who is the prime victim of Samjhauta Express terror attack.

The biased investigation agencies, weak prosecution and politicized judiciary could not stand infront of Hindutva ideology. This has been already predicted by the sane voice in India. For example, IBN 18 Network Editor in-Chief, Rajdeep Sardesai wrote in Hindustan Times that
“when Rajnath Singh as BJP President visits Malegaon blast accused Sadhvi Pragya Thakur and claims she is ‘innocent’ and is being harassed by the state government, he is taking a political stance incompatible with the rule of law. Has he, or any BJP leader for that matter, attempted to empathize with innocent Muslim youth who may also be facing similar charges?”. Sardesia added that “likewise, when a leader of the stature of L. K. Advani also chose to attack Karkare, he exposed himself to the charge of being a leader of a saffron brotherhood—not of the nation” (Sardesai, 2011). Separately, Pratap Bhanu Metha, President Center for Policy Research, New Delhi wrote that BJP’s L. K. Advani, Nitin Gadkhari and Shankar Parshad’s attack on ATS Chief Hemant Karkare and defense of Sadhvi Pragya should haunt them. They should have at least shown similar concern for the Muslim youth falsely arrested. Ironically, the way Samjhauta Express terrorist attack trial is leading the expected verdict could well be predicted that ‘nobody executed the Samjhauta Express blasts’ (Mehta, 2011), which has been finally proved in March 2019.

5.13. ‘Hinduization’ of Indian Military:

Like many other ‘Hindutva’ doctrines, Savarkar was also the originator of the slogan “Hinduize all politics and militarize Hinduism” (Yeptho, 2015). Savarkar not only encouraged Hindus to join the British Army but also civil services in order to have dominance in civil and military hierarchy, when it was time for the British to leave. In 1934, Dr. Moonje, his close associate and Mahasabha leader started the Bhonsla Military School. Moonje had earlier met Mussolini and also helped RSS in setting up its ‘Shakha’ militant wing. He also started the “Central Hindu Military Education Society, whose aim was to educate them in ‘Sanatan Dharma’ and to train them in the science and art of personal and national defense” (Gatade, 2018). In view of Jha, “Moonje’s program was entirely devoted to Hindu society and not to Indian society as a
whole” (Jha, 2013). Meeting the Viceroy in 1939, during the World War II, Savarkar assured him support to recruit Hindus for British Army (The Independent, 2016). This was in the face of resignation of Congress for not being taken into confidence while declaring India to be at war. Explaining his decision, Savarkar stated that it would help the Hindus. The British had kept politics out of army since 1857 but Hindus should try to take politics in the army and once we succeed in this, the battle of freedom would be won (Ghose, 1991).

The same philosophy of militarizing Hindus is being followed by ‘Hindutva’ proponents till today. The terror spree carried out by Lt. Col Srikant Prasad Purohit an Indian military intelligence officer, who was leading terrorist organization by the name of ‘Abinav Bharat’ mirrors the mindset to Hinduizing the military (Tiwary, 2017). The terror tapes recovered from the laptop of his associate Swami Dayanand Pandey establishes a dangerous nexus of ‘Hindutva’ syndicate existing within the Indian Army that patronizes its comrades. Lt. Col Purohit is even recorded on these tapes repeating Savarkar’s slogan “Hinduize all politics and militarize Hinduism” while discussing strategy to propagate ‘Hindutva’ in the Indian Military (Khetan, 2011). The details of Lt. Col Purohit’s exploits in Hinduising military including of ‘Jawans’ had been already discussed in the context of his role in Samjhauta Express terror attack.

The former Indian Army Chief General V. K. Singh who joined BJP after retirement acted spuriously during his tenure as Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). His insistence on changing of date of birth to give him additional tenure in office kept the Congress led UPA Government embroiled into an unavoidable controversy. This entire showdown added to the general sense of all not being well with the government that went favor of the BJP (Unnithan, 2011). His formation of ‘Technical Services Division’ (TSD) professedly for carrying out covert operations in Pakistan also raised eyebrows with some allegations of it being used for spying
against the government (Times of India, 2013a). Destruction of documents of TDS before the end of General Singh’s tenure further raised suspicions. An inquiry launched by the government on TSD activities was told that “the TSD carried eight covert operations and claimed that in October and November 2011; it had paid money from secret service funds to try and enroll the secessionist leader in a province of a neighboring country” (Pakistan’s province Baluchistan) (Joseph, 2013). Subsequently, TSD was unceremoniously disbanded in August 2012 after the retirement of General V. K. Singh in March 2012 (Joseph, 2016).

His moving of two units from Hisar and Mathura towards capital New Delhi on the night of January 15-16, 2012 to coincide with his date of birth appeal in the Supreme Court “rang alarm bells at the highest level in the government” (Gupta, Sarin, & Samanta; 2016). The civil military relations had gone so low that the Defence Minister Anthony was alerted, who informed the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the early hours of the morning, while immediately calling back to Defense Secretary Shashi Kant Sharma from his tour of duty in Malaysia (The Hindu, 2016a). Police were discretely instructed to check every vehicle on the roads leading to Delhi on the units’ route so as to create a traffic jam situation intentionally to delay military advancement towards the capital. Although nobody mentioned ‘C’ word but the fears were at the closest (Chauhan, 2012).

V. K. Singh’s winning the 2014 Lok Sabha election two years after the retirement on BJP ticket and immediately being made the Minister of State for External Affairs further lends credence to his politically motivated actions as CAOS (The Hindu, 2014). Analysts believe that there are a large number of men in the Indian Armed Forces uniform whose first loyalty is to the right wing ‘Hindutva’ ideology rather than with the institution they represent. Let’s not forget about current Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat who had been mad about the notion of
‘surgical strike’ against Pakistan to charge public sentiments of pride and help Modi to win the General Elections (The Economic Times, 2018). To help Modi secure a large pool of political constituency based on the Hindutva ideology, the armed forces of India had already attempted to conduct two surgical strikes inside Pakistani territory. The first it claimed on September 29, 2016 and the second one India conducted on February 26, 2019. Chapter seven ‘The Environment of Indian Pro-active Operations (PAOs) and Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy’ has explained in detail the so-called Indian attempts of surgical strikes with that of Pakistan’s response. Though, a brief discussion is conducted at the end of this chapter under ‘notion of surgical strike’.

To conclude the overall findings of this chapter, the next section has deliberated on some of the applications of ‘Hindutva Warfare’ against Pakistan.

5.14. Application of ‘Hindutva Warfare’ on Pakistan

A unique attribute of the Right Wing Hindu Extremism is the continuation of their stream of thought from Vivekananda, Savarkar, Hedgewar, Golwalkar to Narendra Modi. The core ideology of the Hindu Right Wing favoring the dominance of Brahman-led-Hindu supremacists, secondary status to minorities and quest for ‘Hindu Rashtara’, ‘Akhand Bharat’ and ‘Ram Rajya’ has essentially remained steadfast and deeply entrenched in their psyche. An integral constituent of this mindset is the unacceptability of the independent viable and prosperous state of Pakistan. In this backdrop, the BJP’s extreme right wing government led by its hardliner Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has unleashed a multi-prong attacks on Pakistan. Although, a number of policies and strategies of the BJP government are similar to the ones applied by the previous governments, the intensity of Indian action and intransigence seems much more stubborn this time. The Indian policy towards Pakistan seems stuck in the Modi-Doval’s perceived
intoxication of the ‘big-power’ arrogance. At the same time Pakistan is being made a testing ground for the long held aspirations of Hindu Right Wing Extremism to practice several of the dictums vested in the Kautaliya Chanakya’s ‘Arthshastra’.

Thus use of Chanakya’s dictum of “subverting neighbor’s realm” and “seeking allies from among neighbors’ neighbors” aimed at building an “alliance system with the conqueror at the center” is apparent in the Modi regime’s strategy towards Pakistan in particular and South Asia in general (Kissinger, 2014). The obsession in the Modi brand of Hindu extremism is in line with Chanakya’s inherent dynamic of “self-interest to which the only criterion of virtue is victory; irrespective of the means” is manifest in its actions. More importantly the Modi-Doval pair thinks that the Chanakya’s prerequisite of “if the conqueror is superior, the campaign shall be undertaken; otherwise not” is fulfilled (Kissinger, 2014). They believe that India can have its way with Pakistan being a much bigger country, enjoying huge asymmetry in conventional military, economic and financial strength and global influence as compared to it.

Broadly speaking the Indian policy stains towards Pakistan some of which already discussed, may be listed as follows:

i. Diplomatic
ii. Kashmir
iii. Defence
iv. Waging Sub-Conventional and Hybrid Warfare
v. Fueling Insurgencies
vi. Nuclear
vii. Economic
viii. Indus Water Treaty
ix. CPEC
x. Trade
A. *Diplomatic:*

On this front, the Modi-Doval Doctrine strives to isolate Pakistan. Some of the strategies and objectives include:

i. Stall dialogue process

ii. Incrementally remove Kashmir from the dialogue agenda

iii. Strengthened the Indian narrative of Pakistan being the ‘mother-ship of terrorism’ with India being its biggest victim

iv. Isolate Pakistan regionally and globally

v. Establish a grid with the regional countries through a combination of interventionist and economic assistance policies as in Bhutan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Nepal

vi. Enhance Pakistan’s cost of resisting Indian regional hegemonic designs gigantically making it succumb

vii. Target Pakistan’s traditional allies and close friends in Middle East such as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran through economic engagement, promises of technological collaborations and lure of using India’s bigger clout to build favorable support for these countries in the international arena

viii. Block Pakistan’s entrance into multilateral organizations where India is already a member or full dialogue partner e.g. Indian Ocean RIM Association (IORA), ASEAN, etc.

ix. Encouraged from US assigning it the role of net regional security provider, India is taking the Washington route to Islamabad for pressuring it to grant unilateral concessions and accepting its hegemony.
B. Kashmir:

All the strategies of the Modi-Doval Doctrine are to isolate Pakistan while completely taking over the Kashmir. Some of the objectives and strategies include:

i. Create a condition of despondency among Kashmiris where they feel abandoned by Pakistan and international community, helplessly at the mercy of Indian security forces with no option besides accepting assimilation in India
ii. Continue policy of equating Kashmiris freedom struggle with terrorism
iii. Dehumanize Kashmiris to the extent that countries are not willing to condemn the violation of the basic human rights of even the peaceful protesters
iv. Create dissent in Gilgit Baltistan (GB) and Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) based on socio-economic and sectarian fault lines conveying impression to the international community that it’s the people in Pakistan controlled Kashmir who are oppressed and facing Human Rights abuses.

C. Defense:

Inflicting and weakening the territorial integrity of Pakistan is another important goal of the Modi-Doval Doctrine. Some of the objectives and strategies include:

i. Disproportionate use of force on Line of Control (LOC) and Working Boundary (WB) and create the notion of ‘surgical strikes’ on so called ‘terrorist bases’ in Pakistan controlled Kashmir
ii. Exhausting Pakistan Armed Forces by subjecting them to continuous three pronged engagement fatigue at:
   - Line of Control and Working Boundary
   - Unstable Afghan border
   - Internal security duties against terrorists and organized crime—gang mafia
iii. Enhance conventional imbalance to a level where engagement in arms race would financially ruin Pakistan with the fallout on under development of other segments of the country.
D. Waging Sub-Conventional and Hybrid Warfare:

The Modi-Doval Doctrine encompassed with ‘Defensive Offence’ strategy to bleed and wound Pakistan has been using sub-conventional and hybrid warfare techniques. Some of the objectives and strategies include:

i. Orchestrating paid terrorist attacks in Pakistan through Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baloch insurgents, Lashkar-e-Janghvi (LeJ), etc. extending them heavy monetary support and providing arms ammunition, terrorist training and safe heavens

ii. Target ideological basis of the country and spreading of ethnic, socio economic and sectarian disharmony in various parts of Pakistan exploiting local fault lines

E. Fueling Insurgencies:

Through Modi-Doval Doctrine, India had developed a network of terrorists in Afghanistan to fuel instability, anarchy and chaos in Pakistan. Some of the objectives and strategies include:

i. Instigate full blown Baluchistan insurgency

ii. Revive Sindhi and Pashtun nationalism

F. Nuclear:

India had been pursuing a policy of proactive nuclear and conventional military buildup while holding the very ambition to bypass non-proliferation regime. Contradictory to its nuclear posture, the Modi-Doval Doctrine had been negatively propagating Pakistan. Some of the objectives and strategies include:

i. Disturb nuclear parity in South Asia, by:
ii. Developing narrative, which could be widely accepted, questioning Pakistan’s non-proliferation credentials, safety and security of its nuclear assets

iii. Obtaining for itself quasi recognition of nuclear weapons possessing state through acceptance of India in global non-proliferation regimes while leaving Pakistan out from such as NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement.

iv. Huge built-up of nuclear arsenal and full scope deterrence on land, air and sea based delivery platforms under the cover of ‘no-first-use’ (NFU) doctrine.

v. Remain prepared to avail first use options if need felt such as Indian former Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar said on November 10, 2016 that “India should not bind itself a ‘no-first-use’ policy on nuclear weapons” (Lal, 2016). The same has been recently reiterated by the Defence Minister Rajnath Singh that “[India] yet remain firmly committed to the doctrine of ‘no first use’. India has strictly adhered to this doctrine. What happens in future depends on the circumstances” (Sen & Laskar, 2019).

vi. Development and deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) systems like S-400 to degrade Pakistan’s strategic credibility.

G. Economic:

On economic fronts, the Modi-Doval Doctrine follows this strategy:

i. Strangulate Pakistan economically using every available opportunity

ii. Veto on Asian Development Project and World Bank loans for Bhasa Dam raising the boggy of sovereignty claim on Gilgit Baltistan.

H. Indus Water Treaty:

Water is a long lasting issue between the two countries and play vital role in Agricultural economy of Pakistan. The Modi-Doval Doctrine is using water as weapon against Pakistan to strangulate its economy. One of the most important strategies is to build up hype to challenge Indus Water Treaty (IWT) brokered by World Bank between Pakistan and India in 1960. In September 2016, Modi came close to threatening abrogation of IWT but later decided to make it
dysfunctional through series of carefully crafted violations by Indian side. Some of the steps that Modi decided in a meeting with his team of experts (Roy & Sinha, 2016) were:

i. Suspend the twice yearly meeting of Indus Water Commission, denying Pakistan the platform to raise its grievance on bilateral forum. This would also limit its access to multilateral forum including World Bank, as the Treaty requires bilateral discussions as a first step.

ii. Review suspension of work of Kishanganga Project and Tulbul Navigation (Wullar Barrage)

iii. Maximize use of water from Western rivers; Jhelum, Chenab and Indus granted to Pakistan

iv. Not allowing any water flow from Eastern rivers Ravi, Sutlej and Bias to Pakistan, where India has been given the primary rights

An apparent fallout of Indian strategy was the World Bank’s decision to “pause” the references on Kishenganga project to the appoint Court of Arbitration by Pakistan and Neutral Expert by India. The Bank advised the two countries to resolve this issue amicably in line with the spirit of the Treaty (The Indian Express, 2016c). While unilateral abrogation of Treaty could have repercussions such as legal, kinetic and global irk; India expects that measures short of it would largely go unnoticed internationally, yet add to Pakistan’s water stress as well psychological anxiety. For that very reason on August 19, 2019 India in violation of the IWT “opened three out of five spillways of the Ladakh Dam and outlets of Alchi Dam without preschedule” that has cause a massive flood situation in Pakistan (Dunya News, 2019). Water is now another tool in the hands of India to create chaos and choke the river system of Pakistan.
I. CPEC:

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a strategic project between the two countries which has established permanent prospects of future economic development. The potential of the project has great value for the country and had been labeled as ‘game changer’. India is not comfortable with such an exceptional strategic orientation of Pakistan through Chinese commitment to build future Silk Route passing through it. All the efforts which had been done through Modi-Doval Doctrine to destabilize Pakistan and its potential to take the economic track went in vain. Therefore, success of the CPEC is seen an indication of progressive Pakistan. Some of the Indian objectives and strategies include:

i. Oppose CPEC both overtly by raising territorial and sovereignty issues of Gilgit Baltistan

ii. Sabotage the project by terrorist attacks through Baluch insurgents, LeJ and TTP proxies

iii. Build negative narrative in Pakistan’s electronic and print media while active usage of social media maligning the intent of CPEC

iv. Propagate and hype adverse effect of the CPEC on local employment, business, economy, culture and population

J. Trade:

The value of trade within South Asia is huge. The dual policy of India which is on the one hand to deny Pakistan all possibilities to positively trade with her and on the other hand propagate its wish to trade with Islamabad; exposes its strategy of isolating Pakistan. Few of the objectives and strategies are:
i. Block market access to Pakistan through Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) while maintaining the rhetoric of having granted Most Favorite Nation (MFN) to it since 1996

ii. Threaten to revoke MFN to Pakistan even though the minuscule bilateral trade is already heavily in favor of India

Besides, India is bypassing the direct trade route by registering proxy companies in UAE and Singapore etc. to export large amount of items to Pakistan. Taking advantage of lacunas in Pakistan’s trade in services regime India has monopolized Pakistan’s Advertisement market exporting Indian produced Ads to Pakistan.

K. Transit:

The transit route is quite a strategic objective that Indian political stalwarts had tried the most. The Modi regime works to pressurize Pakistan to grant transit rights to India through Afghanistan. India also has been successful in winning the US support to pressurize Pakistan in her favor. Interestingly, Afghanistan is consequently threatening to deny Pakistan transit access to Central Asia, if India is not allowed transit to Afghanistan (Dawn, 2017).

L. Sports Embargo:

India had been pressurizing sports organizations whom it is member of, to deny Pakistan hosting of international events. Also it is isolating Pakistan from international sports moots by denying visas for events held in India.

M. Notion of Surgical Strikes:

With various war doctrines such as ‘Cold Start’ India keeps looking for creating a space for war, despite nuclear overhang. Its latest gimmick of conducting the so-called ‘surgical strike’ against ‘terrorists staging platform’ in AJK is very dangerous even though India failed to prove
that it had actually ventured such strike in September 2016 (The Economic Times, 2016). To deny 2016 claim of India, Pakistan immediately took the international media as well as UNMOGIP to the claimed area of the ‘strikes’ to demonstrate that no such activity had taken place (Pakistan Today, 2016). Yet, India’s insistence and tacit acceptance of its claim by many international players gave it a room for trying another misadventure on February 26, 2017 as was evident through General Bipin Rawat’s continued mantra (The Express Tribune, 2018). Pakistan’s robust response to Indian violation of its air space with that of sovereignty could have grave risk of escalation, which could be totally destructing under the nuclear overhang.

What ostensibly appears like belligerent madness, war hysteria and Pakistan obsession of the Modi regime and its Sangh Parivar allies is not without method. Ever since taking over power Modi regime has deliberately scuttled the dialogue process and raised the ante through unprovoked aggression at the LOC and WB. Knowing well Pakistan’s preoccupation and huge commitment towards war against terrorism, India seeks to make dialogue process an end for Pakistan rather than a means to resolve outstanding disputes. The idea is to make Pakistan grant unilateral concessions merely for the sake of retaining peace and tranquility at the Eastern front. The mindset prevailing in the Modi government is that benefits from dialogue can be reaped better if the environment is built up where the adversary is in a psychological state of mind to give in its positions and demands, preferably even before the talks commence.

Placing of numerous preconditions for talks by India is a case in point. It was a part of BJP’s electoral manifesto to repeal article 370 of the Indian Constitution of forcefully end special status of Indian Occupied Kashmir. Coupled with Doval’s advocacy to forcefully assimilate Kashmiris into India, this double whammy poses serious challenge in form of the brutalities and Human Rights violations unleashed on the helpless Kashmiris. Knowing well that Pakistan
cannot remain aloof of the Indian brutalities in IOK; the same are being perpetrated to drag it in. This allows the Indians to keep Kashmir, LOC and WB heated up not only stressing Pakistan Armed Forces but also staging fake attacks in IOK to malign them. It thus seeks to exploit global community’s wariness and lack of appetite for Violent Non State Actors and terrorism especially under the nuclear overhang, to erode sympathies for the Kashmiris.

The Indian Right Wing intellectuals are well aware that their dream of ‘Akhand Bharat’ cannot be realized in literal sense in the existing geo-political scenario. The best alternate is to gradually turn the regional states pliant to Indian dictates. This policy is visible in regime change through political, intelligence, subversive and financial interventions. The obvious examples are:

i. The orchestration of joint opposition candidate Maithripala Sirisena against former Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa through clandestine Indian support in January 2015 elections (Chalmers & Miglani, 2015).

ii. Manipulating Bangladesh political environment and elections in favor of Awami League and infiltrating its Armed Forces, bureaucracy and civil society (Sohail, 2016).

iii. Continuous interference in Maldives (Times of India, 2015b).

iv. Huge financial, defense and social sector assistance to Afghanistan to make common cause against Pakistan. Former US Secretary Defense Chuck Hagel had observed in February 2013 that India has financed problems for Pakistan from Afghanistan (Times of India, 2013b). Ever since the new found Modi-Ghani coziness Afghan rhetoric against Pakistan and border violations from its side and terrorist attacks in Baluchistan handled from inside Afghanistan have increased.

v. Bhutan was the first victim of Indian hegemonic designs when it was forced to accept India’s ‘guidance’ in foreign policy and defense matters, in the Treaty of Friendship signed between the two on August 9, 1949.

vi. Nepal has been forced to even change its constitution to accommodate Indian dictates. India placed undeclared transit embargo and arm twisted the landlocked
country into submission. Besides, no party in Nepal has been able to retain government without Indian blessings.

vii. India has even claimed to have struck against its North-Eastern rebel camps inside the Myanmar, which the former denied (First Post, 2015). Ajit Kumar Doval has paid numerous visits to Myanmar with pockets full of gifts to lure it to join hands with India against China and agree to allow it strike against targets inside its territory.

viii. Attempts to revive erstwhile India—Iran nexus in Afghanistan (as in the pre-9/11, Taliban—Northern Alliance era). Influence Iran through Chahbahar port, International North South Transport Corridor and other economic incentives.

The strategy of Indian Right Wing could be regarded as a neo ‘Akhand Bharat’ approach, much like the neo-colonialism. The aim is to control or have significant influence over decision making of the regional countries; a first step towards the larger objective. Indian coercion of the SAARC countries into boycotting the Summit in Pakistan in November 2016 was evident in the more or less similar statements issued by them while announcing their inability to attend. The hostile attitude demonstrated by India and Afghanistan towards Pakistan at the Heart of Asia Conference in Amritsar India in December 2016 also betrayed their connivance to push it against the wall.

Notwithstanding Indian ploys, Pakistan has its own merits and strengths of relations with the regional countries and global community. The setback in one domain can be compensated by gain in others. The global scenario is a dynamic phenomenon. While the tide of global developments is unprecedentedly tilted towards India, situation may not remain the same as alliances keep reshaping. Necessary course correction would be required on part of Pakistan to sustain and thwart this onslaught of rise of Hindu Right Wing. Pakistan’s utility in regional and global issues cannot be diminished unless it gives up on its own. Pakistan’s positive
contributions, its own significance as the nuclear power, sixth largest country situated at the cross roads of South Asia, West Asia, Middle East and China is too important to ignore or isolate.
CHAPTER SIX

DYNAMICS OF NUCLEAR THRESHOLD AND PAKISTAN’S FORCE PREPAREDNESS

“To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”  
(Sunzi & Griffith, 1963: 77)

6.1. Introduction:

In today's mercurial environment, everything seems to have evolved into a new and different visage, military is no less than the others. Military forces are the principle instrument of statecraft since ages. From medieval times when wars were fought using hand to hand combat to the two World Wars where weapons of deceit and covert military diplomacy were used alongside the traditional bombs and guns, to the current era of increased dependence on psychological operations as compared to physical actions; military's warfare tactics have come a long way. They have played consequential role in making and breaking states and empires.

There are situations wherein military forces are the only representation of the state for application of all instruments of power. For instance, in irregular conflicts and wars within the states, military forces have to create enabling conditions for final political outcome in an area where other instruments have become ineffective and governance fails. For such eventualities, forces are obligated to possess both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, and evolve methods and approaches to employ these in a winning manner. Although there's no denying fact that the kinetic mode i.e., direct and physical offensive of war has been a favorite of the military's policy makers but the non-kinetic approach such as insurgency, guerilla war, proxy, cyber war, media, soft war, deceit and psychological warfare, are fast catching up. In fact contemporary environment demands that both the kinetic and non-kinetic means of warfare be used in a perfectly balanced equation.
With change in the use of traditional warfare also comes a shift in the objective of a war which has moved from the annihilation of the enemy's military forces to simply breaking of its resolve. Concept of ‘deterrence’ comes to play an important role to breaking the resilience and resolve of nation’s brinkmanship. On the kinetic fronts both conventional and nuclear strength of a nation plays adamant role to impeach enemy’s resolve, whereas induction of indirect strategy such as proactive military operations particularly guerilla warfare, low intensity conflict, and insurgency through proxy orchestration weakens the will of a nation. In fact, basic concepts and means of non-kinetic warfare advocate subjugation of the enemy forces without getting indulged in a physical combat (kinetic means).

Along with many political changes, the birth of Cold War also brought technological sophistication in the domain of military warfare to its zenith. The United States of America being the first nuclear weapons state and the only country that used nuclear weapons during a war in 1945 enjoyed its monopoly until the former Soviet Union challenged Washington by subsequently developing its own nuclear weapons in 1949 (Sagan, 1997). Predominantly superior in conventional forces, the former Soviet Union did manage to develop an embryonic nuclear response to its rival but the US continued cherishing its superiority. As a result, the discourse of nuclear weapons had initiated an arms race along with conceptual domains of nuclear politics. Both the concepts of deterrence and nuclear policy evolved hand in hand while marking the technological advancement of nuclear weapons. South Asia is no different to it. Both Pakistan and India have very much inflicted with the dominions of power which sought reliability of nuclear weapons in the national security. India as an ambitious nation strived to achieve nuclear capability whereas Pakistan based on its threat perceptions pursued the policy of reactive nuclear strategy (Nizamani, 2001).
If we take holistic view of South Asian security spectrum, we observe that the Indo-Pak past is maliciously imperfect due to massive amount of disagreements, divergences and clashes that gave birth to conflicts and disputes. Pakistan’s decision for nuclearization is based on accentuating mistrust, animosity and hatred towards India. Indian capture of Kashmir, Goa, Junagarh, Hyderabad Daccan and lately Siachin Glacier and the unfortunate split forced upon Pakistan by India in 1971 which was further followed up by Indian nuclear explosion in 1974; accumulatively made Pakistani’s to choose to ‘eat grass’ and make the nuclear weapon to guarantee their survival in the Indian neighborhood (Khan, 2012). Thus the explosions of 1998 which were also led by India, superimposed nuclear dimension onto the conventional scenario.

The dilemma of security consisted with kinetic and non-kinetic threats juxtaposed dual challenges to the national security of Pakistan. Not only the conventional superiority of India allowed to squeeze Pakistan on its own terms but also maintained monopoly of its strategic forces in the aftermath of 1974 nuclear tests, which New Delhi labeled as ‘Smiling Buddha’ (Bharucha, 1998). The security construct drastically complicated the conventional superiority with that of nuclear threshold into South Asian politics that Pakistan had to engage with. Pakistan due to absence of both conventional and nuclear elements became vulnerable to maintain credible competition with India. In this chapter existing military doctrines and strategies validating kinetic capabilities of Pakistan Armed Forces are therefore explained to evaluate a response posture on two parallel contours of conventional and nuclear warfare. This would analyze elements of nuclear strategies, deterrence concepts and armed forces kinetic capabilities juxtaposing it with the Indian protracted kinetic campaigns against Pakistan.

The aim of this chapter is to explain dynamics of nuclear threshold and add to the existing threat spectrum which Pakistan is facing under the kinetic account. Its scope is to
explore the fact that kinetic warfare is just as important as non-kinetic warfare in today’s strategic environment and how satisfactorily Pakistan Army had worked on its kinetic capabilities? Below is given a brief explanation of the concept of deterrence that would highlight the evolution of nuclear strategies in the Cold War and its relevance with contemporary dimensions of the subject matter making it helpful to understand South Asian nuclear context and Pakistan’s kinetic force preparedness.

6.2. **Concept of Deterrence:**

The concept of deterrence came into vogue after World War-II, referring to the prevention of war through the threat of using nuclear weapons to carry out counter value strikes. In words of Dr. Qadar Bakhsh Baloch, “deterrence is not a strategy of war, it is a strategy for peace, designed to convince the opposition that aggression is the least attractive of all alternatives” (Baloch, 2007). The concept also implied the following assumptions:-

i. Deterrence is in fact a show of force but not actual use of it.

ii. Deterrence meant to stop the adversary and convince him not to use force with an ability to inflict dire consequences on opponent’s national survival.

iii. Deterrence is not a static concept rather it is dynamic and ever evolving, for example what deters an adversary now may not deter him tomorrow.

iv. Nuclear deterrence is primarily a function of presence of survivable nuclear weapons in hands of the adversaries.

6.3. **Conditions Necessary for Deterrence:**

Following conditions are deemed necessary for deterrence:

- **Capability:** To preserve the deterrence capability, state must be able to deliver nuclear capability under all possible circumstances.
- **Will**: The state must be able to use the capability, via secure command and control system and ready to use nuclear weapons.
- **Credibility**: Convincing readiness to fight the nuclear war at any level.
- **Rationality**: Centerpiece of deterrence is the rationality of the leaders of the nuclear weapon states. In fact, no rational decision maker would provoke a nuclear war because there does not seem to be any conceivable objectives of a state that can be attained by the use of nuclear weapons.

Additionally, Kenneth Waltz describes three requirements for deterrence to be credible which include (Waltz, 1981):

i. Possession of 2\textsuperscript{nd} strike capability
ii. Safeguards against false alarms and early firing
iii. A proper command and control system

6.4. **Types of Nuclear Deterrence:**

There are many concepts of nuclear deterrence that not only evolve in its types but approaches to configure application of subject matter. Few of the important types of nuclear deterrence are explained below:-

- **Virtual Nuclear Arsenals (VNA)**. Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) having advance and well organized strategic forces adopt agreeable restraint to keep parts of nuclear warheads separated providing ample time to decision making processes during the crises. This provides sufficient time lag between the authorizations of weapons use till execution of the decision (Waltz, 1997).

- **Graduated Deterrence**. It is said to be in place when NWS have capability to deal with the situation of conflict at different stages with multiple response options. The idea is to mitigate aggression while allowing it to graduate through threshold parameters and detach nuclear weapons use at early stages of war (Buzzard, 1956).
• **Mutual Deterrence.** The idea of mutual deterrence comes into matrix when both the adversaries are capable of credible nuclear response and deliberately do not allow escalation of the conflict knowing the fact of total destruction (Garthoff, 1978).

• **Minimum Deterrence.** It exists when a nation possesses a capability to inflict a crippling blow to the adversary through nuclear means. In other words, minimum deterrence is a policy with ability of preventing adversary’s threat or attack by applying limited nuclear response with capability of destroying strategic targets (Shulon & Yu, 2008).

• **Maximum Deterrence.** The idea is based on initiative and splendid first strike posture with minimum general-purpose forces (Bolton, 1987).

• **Strategic Deterrence.** It exists when a nation is capable of inflicting sufficient damage to an adversary thereby denying him retaliatory strike capability (Powell, 1985).

### 6.5. Strategies for Application of Deterrence:

Following are some of the key strategies for the application of deterrence.

i. **Strategy of Denial.** It requires the ability and capability to uphold first strike of the enemy with resilient preservation of sufficient response force to initiate a credible retaliatory strike against the enemy’s nuclear forces making him impotent to absorb the fallout (Snyder, 1961).

ii. **Strategy of Punishment.** It is less demanding as compared to strategy of denial but still expects sufficient nuclear force preparedness to punish the enemy in case of first strike. There is some ambiguity in the execution of ‘strategy of punishment’ due to its response which comes to play its role in the aftermath of enemy’s first strike. For example, what constitute punishment? Is it total destruction, which requires substantial forces or a simple retaliation that may not require credible second-strike force? (Mueller, 1998).

iii. **Strategy of Existential Deterrence.** Least demanding of all approaches, it requires robust second-strike capability or just existence of a nuclear capability as
a factor. The force based on this deterrence doesn’t require guarantee of security rather creates doubts and hesitation in enemy’s brinkmanship that considers a ‘first strike option’ (Bundy, 1984).

6.6. Nuclear Strategies during the Cold War:

Being the leaders of nuclear deterrence and associated strategies both the United States and the former Soviet Union had impacted on the subject matter in such a deliberate way that discussion of any type cannot be compiled without getting along the Cold War way of strategic posturing. Therefore, to better apply the concepts of deterrence to decode the context of South Asian nuclear threshold, one must evidently interconnect the US and Soviet amalgamation of nuclear politics during the Cold War with that of Indo-Pak nuclear strategies. In this regards, salient nuclear strategies coined in different periods and influenced by the changing environment are as follow:-


It was evolved in the 1950s by Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles in Russo-American context. According to this theory, any act of aggression by Soviet Union across East-West frontier in Europe was to be responded by a massive American nuclear attack. The strategy involved deliberate means of warfare for ‘instant response on strategic value targets’ as punitive measures (Wells, 1981). Parallel to that of US strategy, the Soviets on the other hand recognizing the importance of surprise nuclear attack came up with the concept of ‘Pre-emption’ (Freedman, 2003). The US strategy of Massive Retaliation suffered heavy criticism from US critics along with military strategists on the following account:-

i. It had a potential for excessive violence and an attempt to find less dangerous ways to live with nuclear weapons.
ii. US commitment to defend Europe by using nuclear weapons was viewed with suspicion especially by France.

iii. Should the response be same in case of minor conflicts? A question indicated gaps in the response during low threshold scenario.

iv. US Strategic Air Command bombers were concentrated in limited areas in Europe. Fear of pre-emption by Russians through uncertainty; a massive retaliation was considered nothing but ‘mutual suicide’.

- Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD):

  It was adopted in 1960s. Due to ever increased number of nuclear weapons and technological advancements into triad nuclear forces, level of terror brought parity into the destruction of each other (Jervis, 2002). That is why the understanding of which brought the discourse of mutual assured destruction into the matrix of nuclear threshold between the Cold War rivals. The time period originated concepts like ‘nuclear stalemate’, ‘deterrence stability’ and ‘balance of terror’. Political strategists like Robert McNamara, the former United States Secretary of Defense also maintained that “assured destruction is the very essence of the whole deterrence concept” (Art, 1985). Salient aspects of MAD strategy include:-

  i. Mutual destruction.
  ii. Deterrence through 2\textsuperscript{nd} strike capability – to save own expenses.
  iii. Superiority against enemy becomes irrelevant.
  iv. Ruling out the use of nuclear arms as levers for political influence.
  v. Provide stimulus, to consider seriously any arms limitation agreements with the Soviet leadership.
• **Flexible Response:**

In 1970s, the theory of flexible response came into play, which implied that limited nuclear attacks would act as a better and implementable deterrent (Stromseth, 1988) with emphasis on:-

i. Graduated deterrence and building up of conventional forces through superiority and effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons.

ii. Wars confined to local war zone (geographically).

iii. An alternate to threat of launching all out nuclear war.

This doctrine meant that “there will be a graduated response to Soviet threat; beginning with the conventional defense, then to the tactical nuclear weapons, followed by strategic nuclear weapons. There would be deliberate pauses in between to allow for bargaining and crises management” (Stromseth, 1988). Flexible response could be a counter-force or counter-value target, however the emphasis would be on counter-force targeting. The strategy of flexible response was adopted as the official “Nuclear Doctrine of NATO and remained so till the end of Cold War” (Legge, 1983). It required an increase in the strength of conventional forces which could not be undertaken till 1975 due to American pre-occupation in Vietnam War. Another weakness of the doctrine was that it pre-supposed that the enemy would follow the same line of thinking, play by the rules of the game set by the western allies and would hopefully not proceed straightaway to a strategic nuclear exchange after an initial attack with the conventional forces had been stalled or the NATO forces had resorted to the selective application of tactical nuclear weapons (Legge, 1983).
• **Strategy of Limited Nuclear Options:**

In late seventies, under President Carter, the commonly known as ‘Schlesinger Doctrine’ envisaged escalation control through a series of limited and selected strikes with pause in between to allow for a negotiated ceasefire (Odom, 2004). Adoption of this strategy was made possible due to the availability of tactical as well as more accurate missiles and Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) warheads. For instance US Minuteman-III missile has an accuracy of 200 meters at intercontinental ranges. In fact, it called for the ‘graduated deterrence’ concept.

• **Countervailing Strategy:**

The ‘Schlesinger’s Doctrine’ was further refined in the light of changes in Soviet Nuclear Strategy. It sought to establish further flexibility with more countervailing options at a variety of exchange levels in the escalation ladder. The emphasis of this strategy was on ‘counter-force targeting’ such as targeting the Soviet leadership and the ability to fight a long drawn nuclear war (Slocombe, 1981). This strategy aimed at deterring the Soviets by convincing them that the use of nuclear weapons would not lead to victory. This approach was again made possible by the availability of highly accurate missiles and warheads.

• **Prevailing Strategy:**

In 1980s, during Reagan Administration, the new strategy focused on the US ability to prevail in any future conflict with USSR. It focused on the modernization of nuclear and conventional forces and development of defensive technologies to counter missile threats to US soil, its allies and nuclear forces spread around the globe (Posen & Van Evera, 1983). This strategy led to Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ program, which was aimed at effective defense to intercept
and destroy ballistic missiles before they could reach American soil or that of its allies (Goodnight, 1986). The program has been cut down to size due to budgetary and technical constraints though it did provided the much needed technological advancement in the modern ballistic missile defense of United States.

6.7. Post Cold War Nuclear Strategies of the United States and Russia:

i. United States Nuclear Policy

The post Cold War US aim to maintain deterrence preferred a mixture of both nuclear and conventional forces at a minimum level. Both US and Russia are engaged in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) of 1991 and Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) of 2003 to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. The Bush administration in 2002 finalized a ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ (NPR) which introduced new approach of ‘triad’ system integrated with ‘offensive strikes’ mechanism (Guthe, 2002). The approach also brought reorganization of nuclear forces along with defense infrastructure. The overall understanding of the new triad system was to address the emerging strategic threat environment, which estimated its nuclear rivalry with resurgent Russia along with classification of new threats emerging out of horizontal proliferators and intensions of rogue states to acquire nuclear weapons and potential use against the United States (Payne, 2005).

Moreover, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review of the Obama administration foresaw less reliance on the nuclear weapons into his national security strategy and considered reduction of the nuclear warheads. The policy outlook moreover highlighted the purpose of nuclear weapons as the sole deterrent against nuclear attack on its soil, allies and at the US military around the world. The Obama NPR increased the nuclear threshold while giving no room to lowering the
threshold by the Russians (Kristensen, 2010). This was an attempt to maintain ‘strategic deterrence’ as a sole nuclear deterrence. The aftermath of 2010 NPR brought different learning outcomes for the US military strategists who realized that Russian inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons have lowered the nuclear threshold (Schneider, 2018). The assumption of the 2010 US NPR that ‘the increased nuclear threshold would maintain the deterrence’ became futile.

The Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review of 2018 therefore took a U-turn, which came on the surface on February 2, 2018. It explained explicitly the use of nuclear weapons as the sole deterrent against a nuclear strike under ‘extreme circumstances’ but differentiated with the context of ‘extreme circumstances’ from the previous 2010 NPR. Adding into the extreme circumstances, the Trump administration included even conventional military attacks of non-nuclear nature on “civilian populations, infrastructures, and United States forces”, an issue of nuclear threshold (NPR Draft (915-927), 2018). Also by maintaining the previously increased nuclear threshold, the Trump’s NPR had signaled the acceptance of lower nuclear threshold allowing tactical nuclear warheads as robust response to Russian and Chinese induction of low-yield weapons (Perkovich, 2018).

In other words, the Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review has initiated two prong arms races. On the one side it counters the strategic nuclear weapons of Russia but on the other hand also responds induction of the tactical nuclear weapons. The review is in fact a response and declassification of the Russian maneuverability of limited war context which brings flexibility in the nuclear threshold (Heuvel, 2018). The Obama administration only considered strategic nuclear weapons as ultimate deterrence and supposed it has raised the nuclear threshold but Russian deployment of tactical nuclear warheads leveraged Moscow to lower the threshold. It is quite impossible for the US to use its strategic nuclear weapons when Russia during a conflict
situation manipulates the battlefield with low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons. Moreover, non-availability of the low-yield nuclear weapons with the US nuclear forces makes them prone to Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

Therefore, United States has now shifted itself towards ‘tactical nuclear warheads’ to maintain the deterrent, which in words of the US officials provides them "more flexible capabilities to give tailored deterrence". The vulnerability of the current political order and fast pace of the contemporary military modernization implicated the US strategist to adopt strategy of low-yield nuclear weapons along with extensive modernization of triad nuclear forces. Though, the process of land, sea and air based delivery weapons are already been modernized since the Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review but Trump’s NPR had instigated a specific sea-based modifications meant to facilitate induction of low-yield nuclear weapons (Woolf, 2018).

ii. **Russian Nuclear Policy and Doctrine**

In November 1993, Russia adopted a strategy that emphasized more on regional threats and called for an overall military modernization with ability to enhance its professionalism, deployment, and capability of rapid response (Belous, 1997). This concept of smaller, lighter and more professional Russian military was modified in December 1997, when the then President Yeltsin inked the idea of a “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation”. This in fact gave the birth to the idea of comprehensive national security of Russia. It declared that “in the case of a threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state”, the use of nuclear weapons will be the ultimate choice (Godzimirski, 2000). The next national security strategy came into surface in January 2000, when Vladimir Putin entered in the office of Russian Presidency. His vision of the use of nuclear weapons lowered the nuclear threshold and allowed
flexible response with graduated deterrence. The document of Russian national security contextualized the use of nuclear weapons only "to repel armed aggression if all other means of resolving a crisis situation have been exhausted or turn out to be ineffective". The aftermath of the 2000 national security strategy of Russia brought induction of the ‘low yield nuclear weapons’ into the matrix of battlefield (Godzimirski, 2000).

The closer outlook of the Russian nuclear posture takes us back to 2010, when it officially raised the nuclear threshold. Moreover, the 2014 military doctrine of Russia clearly distinguishes itself from ‘nuclear deterrence’ to ‘strategic deterrence’ making the later more compatible to disallow use of ‘non-strategic nuclear weapons (tactical nuclear weapons)’ in a battlefield. The 2014 military doctrine of Russia described that:

“The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat” (Dvorkin, 2015).

The 2010 and 2014 official documents of Russia suggested increasing the nuclear threshold that was also complimented by the then 2010 NPR of Obama administration. The overall posture highlighted the purpose of nuclear weapons as the sole deterrent against nuclear attacks on both rivals and their allies including their militaries around the world. The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review has addressed the supposed dichotomy of Russian military posture that on one hand maintains the strategic deterrence but in practice had inducted non-strategic battlefield nuclear warheads. On a reciprocal basis the Trump NPR had tried to declassify its proposed nuclear doctrine based on the phenomenon that Moscow is getting into ‘escalate to de-escalate’ context which brings non-strategic nuclear weapons into orchestration of conflict
situation. Presenting a response to Russian nuclear doctrine, the 2018 US NPR document specifically explained:

“Russia's belief that limited first use, potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide such an advantage is based, in part, on Moscow's perception that its great number and variety of non-strategic nuclear systems provide a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict. Recent Russian statements on this evolving nuclear weapons doctrine appear to lower the threshold for Moscow's first-use of nuclear weapons. Russia demonstrates its perception of the advantage these systems provide through numerous exercise and statements... Russia may also rely on threats of limited nuclear first use, or actual first use, to coerce us, our allies, and partners into terminating a conflict on terms favorable to Russia... [Russia] mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to ‘de-escalate’ a conflict on terms favorable to Russia... [Russia] is also building a large, diverse, and modern set of nonstrategic systems that are dual-capable (may be armed with nuclear or conventional weapons). These theater and tactical-range systems are not accountable under the New START Treaty and Russia's non-strategic nuclear modernization is increasing the total number of such weapons in its arsenal, while significantly improving its delivery capabilities... Most concerning are Russia's national security policies, strategies, and doctrine that include an emphasis on the threat of limited nuclear escalation, and its continuing development and fielding of increasingly diverse and expanding nuclear capabilities. Moscow threatens and exercises limited nuclear first use, suggesting a mistaken expectation that coercive nuclear threats or limited first use could paralyze the United States and NATO and thereby end a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Some in the United States refer to this as Russia's ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine. ‘De-escalation’ in this sense follows from Moscow's mistaken assumption of Western capitulation on terms favorable to Moscow” (US Department of Defense, 2018).

The declared nuclear posture of the Russian leadership subsequently turned into ‘escalate to de-escalate’ context of the nuclear threshold making its counterparts particularly the US vulnerable. The ‘escalate to de-escalate’ mantra contextualizes Russian ability to control the escalation of the conflict through limited use of tactical nuclear warheads particularly at times when it found itself losing control of the situation, an arrangement not suitable to NATO and United States. Furthermore, it distinctively gives leverage to Russian decision makers to distinguish the situation as ‘strategic’ or ‘non-strategic’ allowing them to control the escalation. Dave Johnson one of the NATO experts has rightly decoded the Russian thinking and said that, “Russia’s nuclear threshold in a crisis or conflict would be … subject to political decisions in the
circumstances of the moment. The bottom line is that Russia’s nuclear threshold would be wherever the President [Putin], as commander-in-chief, chooses” (Johnson, 2018).

6.8. Dynamics of Nuclear Threshold in South Asia:

The South Asian overt nuclearization of 1998 constituted the dynamics of Indo-Pak nuclear posturing while tracking their future vulnerabilities to ‘total war’. The aftermath of nuclearization saw curiosity and serious constraints over Indo-Pak ability to handle such a destructive military technology under the prevailing hotspot of political turmoil between the two. Many western research institutes and think tanks kept exploring about nuclear forces, its operational capability and rudiments of command and control in both states. Evidently, due to national security priorities of both the states, the strength of nuclear weapons, their readiness status, employment plans and nuclear delivery capabilities remain mostly concealed.

The most authentic estimates proclaim that India possess at least 120 to 130 warheads and conceivably Pakistan is the fastest growing nuclear weapon state in the world having between 130 to 140 nuclear warheads (Davenport, 2018). Moreover, both countries also have the wherewithal to prepare, at a very short notice, an amount of nuclear weapons equal to their current possession. According to Nuclear Weapons Archive report, until 2001 India got 4,200 kilograms of reactor grade plutonium, fissile material enough to make more than 1,000 nuclear weapons (Nuclear Weapons Achieve, 2001). Also, thanks to international community who helped India get into Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal through an exceptional status, today the quantity of fissile material is manifold and numbers of weapons could be multiplied due to Indian undeclared fissile material inventory (Mian, Nayyar, Rajaraman, & Ramana, 2006).
It is now generally believed that well before their overt nuclearization, both the South Asian rivals India and Pakistan had modified air delivered nuclear warheads appropriate for external carriage using aircrafts and had converted a large fleet of conventional strike and fighter aircrafts to carry these nuclear bombs (Kristensen, Norris & Diamond, 2018). Thereafter, to make their nuclear targeting surly successful, both states began investing in missile development programs with an aim to put nuclear warheads on these missiles which are almost difficult to intercept due to their very high speeds and hence extremely limited reaction times. In the aftermath of overt nuclearization, one of the biggest challenges for the newly nuclear states was to develop robust command and control system that shall be capable of ensuring safety, security and safeguard of strategic weapons.

The challenge of structuring the nuclear command and control is to allow it to be responsive and in conformity with the defined nuclear strategy and yet possess strict safety measures to eliminate the possibility of unauthorized or accidental firing. The most positive requirement of the command system is its readiness, whereas negative requirements dominate its operation to avoid accidents, unauthorized launches, terrorism and sabotage. After their overt nuclear testing, both India and Pakistan were under international scrutiny to have proper control over nuclear assets and to address the fears of proliferation. Therefore, both states began evolving and implementing ‘Nuclear Command and Control’ mechanisms since 1999 and these structures with continuous minor variations are in place since then (Khan, 2005). Both nations have maintained that the declaration of war particularly employment of nuclear warheads would be authorized by civilian leadership and that effective and redundant procedures are in place to ensure weapon employment capability even after enemy action including ‘Pre-emptive First
Strike’. The details of both the nations national nuclear commands is explained below for right and accurate understanding of the nuclear posture and threshold dynamics in South Asia.

6.9. **Indian Nuclear Command Authority (NCA)**

The outlook of Indian politics along with its national security policy is an amalgamation of both Gandhian and Nehruvian vision of ‘Akhand Bharat’ [Greater India] (Zubair, 2018). According to Feroz Hasan Khan, “Nehru had envisioned the slogan of a Greater India, which for him, would play a greater-power role in world affairs commensurate with its size and power potential. Thus, India’s nuclear policy making was originated from distinct values attributed to the possession of nuclear weapons: its historic rivalry with China and Pakistan, ambitions for maximization of power, country’s prestige, recognition and standing in the international community to achieve a great power status, to have a principal role to construct, orient and regulate regional and to some extent global security order” (Khan, 2012).

New Delhi officially formulated and exposed its ‘Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine’ on August 17, 1999 (Arms Control Association, 1999) and waited for further five years to inculcate ‘no first use’ nuclear posture. The draft was later approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security in January 2003 that outlined explicitly important areas of ‘nuclear doctrine and its operational arrangements’. Satish Chandra points out four important points of Indian nuclear doctrine: “First, it vigorously reinforces Indian policy of a credible minimum nuclear deterrence. Second, it maintains a no-first-use posture—nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation to a nuclear attack on Indian territory or against Indian forces. Third, it highlights that nuclear retaliation should be massive, so as to inflict unacceptable damage to an adversary. Fourth, it highlights a political control over nuclear weapons use through the Nuclear Command Authority” (Chandra, 2014).
Based on the aforementioned guiding principles, India on January 4, 2003 publically announced formal creation of its nuclear structure under civilian control. The Nuclear Command and Control Authority (NCA) comprise two prime committees, the ‘Political Council’ and an ‘Executive Council’. Primarily, the ‘political council’ through the PM decides about the authorization to use nuclear warheads and the ‘executive council’ through the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) ensures that nuclear weapons are employed and delivered in accordance with PM directive (Rajan, 2003). Further details are as follow:-

a) **Political Council**: The Prime Minister of India chairs the ‘Political Council’ and other members include Personal Secretary to PM, Deputy PM, External Affairs Minister, Home Minister, Defense Minister, Finance Minister, and Cabinet Secretary. The ultimate power lies with this council that cherishes the highest and final authority to authorize the employment of nuclear warheads.

b) **Executive Council**: The National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister chairs the Executive Council and its members include all three service chiefs, Chair-Joint Intelligence Committee, Convener-National Security Advisory Board, Cabinet Secretary, Heads-Intelligence Agencies (IB, RAW), Secretaries, Ministries on Cabinet Committee on Security (Home, Finance, Defense), Chairman-Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOSC) including heads of Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), and Strategic Force Command (SFC). The council provides inputs for decision making by the National Command Authority (NCA) and also executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.

c) **Strategic Forces Command (SFC)**: Being an important part of the Indian National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) plays vital role in the nuclear decision making process. Sometime referred as the Strategic Nuclear Command; the SFC counts on the managerial and administrative tasks related to both tactical and strategic warheads of Indian nuclear force. It checks on the stockpile of weapons along with their readiness. The commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Forces Command, who holds the rank of Air Marshal, is responsible to implement the orders of the National
Command Authority (NCA). The wartime employment of the nuclear weapons is the task of this command which comes into active role after NCA sanctions the use of nuclear weapons and passes its orders to SFC for implementation. Strategic targets are then scrutinized through a well articulated decision making process within and between the organizations, which again goes through the approval of the NCA’s ‘Political Council’. The SFC is the custodian of Indian nuclear forces involving triad system of credible response mechanism and cherishes her full management, administration, operational plans, command and control. Since the inception of SFC that came into existence on January 04, 2003 by the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, has achieved operational readiness and attained robust ‘Command, Control and Communication’ systems.

**Figure 6.1: Indian National Command Authority**
It is important to highlight that both India and Pakistan maintain nuclear deterrence based on the concept of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals (VNA), which maintains restrain and allows segregation of nuclear warheads from delivery means. In case of NCA’s ‘Political Council’ decision to use nuclear weapons, the ‘Executive Council’ through Strategic Forces Command initiates the employment plan of nuclear strike. Moreover, due to the very nature of de-mated form of fissile cores and bombs trigger assemblies, the SFC has to closely work with DAE and DRDO to integrate the weapons before final launch. It’s the DAE and DRDO who jointly work to store different parts of nuclear warheads such as fissile cores and trigger assembly and assembles the weapons well in time before the Prime Minister’s approval.

The guiding principles of Indian Nuclear ‘Command & Control’ are as follows:-

i. The warheads must be securely managed and have to be employed by the highest civil leadership. The highest competent authority of the employment of nuclear weapons shall be the Indian Prime Minister, including of those designated to perform the task such as his ‘successor’ under the DND Clause 5.1. It says that “nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level. The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s)” (Arms Control Association, 1999). The Clause 5.1 of the ‘Draft Nuclear Doctrine’ of India does not provide any list of legitimate successor(s) of the Indian Prime Minister, which makes the decision of nuclear use highly controversial. For example, in case of accidental death or assassination of the Indian Prime Minister during conflict times, the Chair of the ‘Executive Council’ having massive power and authority would siege the control and could invoke nuclear catastrophe. Being Chair of the NCA ‘Executive Council’, the role of National Security Advisor in this scenario becomes highly important but controversial as he is not a democratically elected person (but installed by the Prime Minister). This in fact, increases Pakistan’s concerns over vulnerable decision making process of nuclear command. More precisely appointment of Ajit Kumar Doval as National Security Advisor by the Indian Prime Minister ‘chairs’ the ‘Executive Council’ of National Command Authority. Ajit Kumar Doval being Indian spy had spent many years of
his service working against Pakistan in and outside India. A detailed analysis of his clandestine operations against Pakistan and secret service to Indian government as spy and an agent of RAW is already explained in chapter five ‘From Conventional to Sub-conventional: Facing the Hindutva Warfare’. His current ‘Doval Doctrine of Defensive Offensive’ is again meant to wound Pakistan internally. During conflict times, Indian Prime Minister himself becomes so vulnerable that could be assassinated by his own ‘Hindutva’ stalwarts to transfer infinite and exclusive power to execute nuclear catastrophe against Pakistan.

ii. Robust and responsive ‘command and control structure’ shall be in place with requisite ability to predict and incorporate operational plan of actions both pre-emptive and reactive.

iii. Integration of the ‘command and control system’ shall ensure employment of the nuclear weapons through triad delivery systems.

iv. Credible assurance of the survivability of nuclear forces with effective “command, control, communications, computing, intelligence and information systems” shall be in place.

v. The Armed Forces of India in context to Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) environment shall perform military operations with limited degradation.

vi. For appropriate surveillance and credible warning systems, space based instruments shall be in place.

a) SFC Assets:

SFC assets include; missile groups, strike aircraft and submarines.

1) Missile Groups

  i. 2 x Prithvi Missile Groups
  ii. 1 x Agni I Missile Group
  iii. 1 x Agni II Missile Group
  iv. 1 x Agni III Missile Group
These constitutes total of six missile groups three each in 40 and 41 Artillery Division.

Details are as under:-

a. **40 Artillery Division** (Kristensen & Norris, 2012)

   • **332 Missile Group.** The group is equipped with Prithvi-I missile system. Located near Secunderabad with Rajasthan as its operational area.

   • **333 Missile Group.** The group is equipped with Prithvi-I missile system. Located near Nagpur.

   • **334 Missile Group.** The group is equipped with Agni-I missile system. Located at *Chakrata* (100 km South East of Simla).

b. **41 Artillery Division** (Kristensen & Norris, 2012)

   • **335 Missile Group.** The group is equipped with Agni-II missile system. Located at Secunderabad.

   • **444 Missile Group.** The group is equipped with Prithvi-I & II missile system. Located at Kamptee.

   • **555 Missile Group.** The group is equipped with Agni-II missile system. Located at Kamptee.

c. **2401 Squadron.** Location at Begumpet. Operational location is Jaisalmer and Nalia (Air Base) equipped with Prithvi-II Missile System.

d. **2203 Squadron.** Location unknown, equipped with Prithvi-II Missile System.

2) **Air-Force**

   • SU-30 MKI Fleet
   • Mirage Fleet
   • Jaguar Fleet
   • MiG 27s
Table 6.1: IAF Combat Aircrafts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/ Role (Multirole)</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>3 squarden with MiG-29 Fulcrum; Mig-29UB Fulcrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter/ Ground Attack</td>
<td>4 sqn with Jaguar IB/IS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Multirole)</td>
<td>6 sqn with MiG-21 Bison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 sqn with MiG-27ML/MiG-23UB Flogger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 sqn with Mirage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000E/ED/I/IT (2000H/TH secondary ECM role)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 sqn with SU-30MKI Flanker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-surface warfare</td>
<td>1 sqn with Jaguar IM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircrafts</td>
<td>814 combat capable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Banerjee & Suhas, 2019)

3) Navy

Presently, Indian plans have achieved ambiguous credibility of the second strike capability with the secret commissioning of nuclear capable submarine termed as ‘Arihant’ in August 2016 under the project ‘Advance Tactical Vehicle’. The Indian nuclear submarine (INS) plans to commission Arihant have cost more than US$2.9 billion to make the project uproot Indian navy to new horizons (Mizokami, 2018). INS Arihant is yet to claim official induction. It initially started the trial exposure back in July 2009 before getting knocked out in 2017. Unfortunately for the Indian military ambition particularly of its political leadership, INS Arihant went off because of a disaster when one of its hatches remained opened and the seawater entered in the ‘propulsion compartment’ of the submarine. It sank and since February 2017, Arihant is going through major but serious repairs (Peri & Joseph, 2018).

Arihant is the only nuclear-submarine meant to carry out the operational aspects of nuclear deterrence particularly second strike capability while staying undetected. Indian naval
fleet is also equipped with another nuclear submarine named ‘INS Chakra’ that was leased from Russia solely for the purposes of ‘training and escorting’ also went off in October 2017 (Peri & Joseph, 2018). The third nuclear submarine ‘INS Arighat’, which is believed to be an advance version nuclear submarine, has started trial patrolling in November 19, 2017 is said to believe practically non-functional (Peri & Joseph, 2018). Four more of which are scheduled to join the Indian navy fleet until 2025 (Hundley, 2018). The Hindu, which is one of India’s leading English Newspaper has classified Indian bid to get five Arihant type nuclear submarines to complete Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) fleet as “ambitious plan to build SSBN fleet”. The Hindu further writes that, “the plan (SSBN fleet) hinges on Arihant’s success. It has taken 30 years to build it, at a high cost. It was initially estimated to cost about Rs. 3000 crores for three boats — now the cost of Arihant itself seems to have gone over Rs. 14,000 crore” (Peri & Joseph, 2018).

The mantra of Indian nuclear submarines have taken hype into Indian defense posture but even after spending billions of dollars credibility of which is doubtful. As of now, India has modified a ship and a conventional submarine to launch Prithivi missiles constituting the bid of assured second strike against Pakistan. This in fact provides India ‘nuclear triad’, an ability of second strike from all three sections of the armed forces but of course without possibility of ‘sweet dreams’. In addition to submarine cartel, Indian Navy currently had two aircraft carriers including INS Vikramaditya which is a Russian origin 45,000-ton and is quite modern. Its length is about 283 meters and could host “up to twenty-four MiG29K attack fighters and six ASW and AEW helicopters” (Ho, 2018). The other aircraft carrier INS Virant is a British origin but bit smaller as it has a length of about 262 meters and at the edge of decommissioning. This aircraft
carrier could accommodate “around thirty aircraft, comprising MiG-29Ks and ASW and AEW helicopters” (Ho, 2018).

India’s active armed forces are 1,395,100 (Army 1,200,00; Navy 58,350; Air 127,200; Coast Guard 9,550) alongside paramilitary forces of 1,585,950 (The Military Balance, 2018). The existing airborne platforms of India for delivery of nuclear bombs include high-tech Saukhoi SU-30 MKIs, Mirage-2000H, Mig-29Ms besides the medium-tech Jaguars, Hal Tejas, Mig-21, and Mig-27. Indian air fleet capable of delivering nuclear weapons is thought to be quite large. It is estimated at about 590 aircrafts (Global Fire Power, 2018a). India in continuation of its airborne platforms has tested missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads that include air, navy and land/surface to surface mobile launchers.

**Table 6.2: Indian Ballistic Missile System**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Propellant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prithvi-I</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>150 km</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prahaar</td>
<td>Tested/Development</td>
<td>150 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prithvi-II</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>250-350 km</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prithvi-III</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>350 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhanush (ship-launched)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>400 km</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagarika/K-15 (SLBM)</td>
<td>Tested/Development</td>
<td>700 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni-I</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>700-1,200 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni-II</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2,000+ km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni-III</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>3,200+ km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni-IV</td>
<td>Tested/Development</td>
<td>3,500+ km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni-V</td>
<td>Tested/Development</td>
<td>5,200+ km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni-VI</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>8,000-10,000 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-4 (SLBM)</td>
<td>Tested/Development</td>
<td>3,500 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-5 (SLBM)</td>
<td>Rumored Development</td>
<td>6,000+ km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Arms Control Association (Davenport, 2017)

In this domain, India posses liquid-fueled Prithvi which is basically the Soviet SA-2 air defense missile. India has two versions of Prithvi missiles. Prithvi-I is of 150 kilometers range which can carry 1000 kilograms payloads, whereas, Prithvi-II can carry 500 kg payload to an
increased range of 250 kms. India also possess, ‘Dhanush’ which is a liquid-fuel, ship-launched ballistic missile and ranges up-to 400 kilometers. Then is the two-stage Agni missile which has demonstrated its range up-to 1200 kms. Agni-II and Agni-III are already in operational deployment and can carry a nuclear warhead up-to 2000kms and 3200kms, respectively.

Similarly, India can place a nuclear warhead on any of its other long range ballistic missiles. Presently, India is developing and testing the inter-continental ballistic missiles for adaptation as a standoff system against China as well as developing nuclear capable ship launched versions of its cruise missiles such as ‘Brahmus’; a supersonic cruise missile which is Pakistan specific.

6.10. Pakistan’s Nuclear Command & Control Structure:

Pakistan’s nuclear command and control structure came on surface before India in February 2000. Being the sole responsible organization, the command assumed the task to develop and employ nuclear weapons in Pakistan. The Authority formulates nuclear policy, decision making and tasks associated with the operational management of strategic forces and allied organizations. ‘National Command Authority’ is headed by the PM and has three components including two committees and Strategic Plans Division (SPD). The two specialized committees are:

- the Employment Control Committee
- the Development Control Committee

The Employment Committee orders the use of nuclear weapons whereas the Development Committee ensures availability and delivery of nuclear weapons through the three Service Strategic Commands (SSC). Further details are as follow:-
Figure 6.2: Pakistan National Command Authority

Prime Minister (Chairman)

Strategic Plans Division

Employment Control Committee
- Deputy Chair: Foreign Minister
- Minister for Defense
- Minister for Interior
- Minister for Finance
- Chairman JCSC
- COAS/ VCOAS
- CNS
- CAS
- Secretary: DG SPD
- Others: as required

Development Control Committee
- Deputy Chair: CJCSC
- COAS/ VCOAS
- CNS
- CAS
- Heads of concerned strat orgs.
- Secretary: DG SPD

Services Strategic Forces
(Operational Control—NCA)

Army

Navy

PAF

(Technical, Training & Administrative Control)
i. **Employment Control Committee:** It is headed by the Prime Minister and members are; Foreign Minister as Deputy Chairman, Defence Minister, Interior Minister and Finance Minister in addition to the Chief Joint Chief of Staff Committee (CJCSC), the three service chiefs (Army, Air, and Navy) and Director General SPD as the secretary. The employment committee is the highest body and holds the power to authorize the use of nuclear warheads in consent to the Prime Minister or his successor.

ii. **Development Control Committee:** It is also headed by the PM and has the same military and technical members as the Employment Control Committee, but it lacks the cabinet ministers. This committee however has the heads of the services strategic commands and technical advisors as additional members. It ensures execution of developmental plans of nuclear weapons and the requisite delivery systems.

iii. **Strategic Plan Division (SPD):** The most important part of the National Command Authority (NCA) is SPD. It is the secretariat for the NCA. It was established at the Joint Services Headquarters (JSHQs) under the CJCSC and is headed by a DG SPD. This Division is responsible for planning and co-ordination and in particular for establishing the tiers of the command and control system of individual services and its physical infrastructure. The three Services Strategic Commands are responsible for the employment of strategic assets as and when ordered by the Employment Control Committee.

1) **Air-Force**

- F-16 Fleet
- JF-17 Thunder Fleet
- Mirage Fleet

Pakistan’s active armed forces are 653,800 (Army 560,000; Navy 23,800; and Air 70,000) alongside paramilitary forces of 282,000 (The Military Balance, 2018). Pakistan mainly relies on the F-16s, JF-17s and Mirages for airborne delivery of nuclear bombs and the nuclear capable air fleet which is estimated at about 320 aircrafts (Global Fire Power, 2018b). With capacity of manufacturing 25 aircrafts annually, Pakistan is currently in possession of 110 JF-17
Thunder Block-I and Block-II aircrafts (Gady, 2019). A fourth-generation advance version of JF-17 Thunder Block-III (with two-seater cockpit in the aircraft) is under development. By 2020 Pakistan will be completing the induction of remaining 35 JF-17 Block-II and by 2022 PAF will be able to induct 28 JF-17 Block-III aircrafts (Rizvi, 2019).

Table 6.3: PAF Combat Aircrafts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Role</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>3 sqn with F-7PG/FT-7PG Airguard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 sqn with F-16A/B MLU Fighting Falcon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 sqn with F-16A/B ADF Fighting Falcon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 sqn with Mirage IIID/E (IIOD/EP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter/Ground Attack</td>
<td>2 sqn with JF-17 Thunder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Multirole)</td>
<td>2 sqn with JF-17 Thunder Block-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52 Fighting Falcon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 sqn with Mirage 5 (5PA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-surface warfare</td>
<td>1 sqn with Mirage 5PA2/5PA3 with AM-39 Exocet AShM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircrafts</td>
<td>425 combat capable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Banerjee & Suhas, 2019)

The Indian fleet of combat aircrafts is double as compared to Pakistan but still PAF has managed to maintain an upper hand over IAF. The most recent February 27, 2019 dogfight between Pakistan and Indian aircrafts ended up in favor of the former as latter’s Mig-21 and SU-30 MKI aircrafts were taken out by JF-17 Thunder aircraft. So, in simple calculation if one Pakistani combat aircraft without losing itself is capable of taking two Indian aircrafts then superiority in air combat definitely tilts in favor of PAF (Gady, 2019). Moreover, in 1965 when Pakistan and Indian militaries fought a full fledge war, one of the Pakistani fighter pilot M. M. Alam took 5 Indian fighter jets in less than a minute with that of shooting down 9 in total...
aerials during an aerial dogfight. Afterwards, he landed safely without a single scrap on the F-86 Sabre aircraft. This has been a world record and still remains unbeaten. He was named as “Little Dragon” and died in March 2013 (The News, 2018).

2) Missile Inventory

Reciprocating Indian ballistic missile developments, Pakistan had also successfully tested missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads that include air, navy and land surface to surface mobile launchers.

**Table 6.4: Pakistan Ballistic Missile System**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Propellant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hatf-1</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>70-100 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatf-2 (Abdali)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>180-200 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>290 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>750 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaheen-1A (Hatf-4)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>900 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghauri-1 (Hatf-5)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>1,250-1,500 km</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghauri-2 (Hatf-5a)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>1,800 km</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>1,500-2,500 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghauri-3</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>3,000 km</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasr (Hatf-9)</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>60 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ababeel</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>2,200 km</td>
<td>Solid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Arms Control Association (Davenport, 2017)

Parallel to Indian missile development, Pakistan had also been working on the delivery means of its nuclear warheads. The country had developed both solid and liquid fuel ballistic missiles. For example, the solid-fuel missiles are developed for shorter range, whereas for longer range liquid-fuel ballistic missiles are envisioned to ensure strategic stability of South Asia. To compete with Indian Prithvi missile, Pakistan has developed single-stage Hatf-I and Hatf-II, which carries a range of about 100 kilometers and 200 kilometers, respectively. The Hatf-I and Hatf-II missiles are also called ‘Abdali’ missiles, whereas Hatf-III is referred as ‘Ghaznavi’ which has a range of about 300 kilometers and also is a solid-fuel missile. The Hatf-IV nuclear
capable ballistic missile has a range of about 720 kilometers and is called ‘Shaheen-I’. Equivalent to ‘Shaheen-I’ is ‘Shaheen-IA’ that has a range of about 900 kilometers and also labeled as Hatf-IV.

Similar to single stage, solid-fuel medium range missile system, Pakistan has successfully developed two-stage, liquid-fuel ballistic missiles consisting ‘Ghauri-1’ and ‘Ghauri-II’. Ghauri-I has a range of about 1250 kilometers to 1500 kilometers, whereas, Ghauri-II ranges up to 1800 kilometers. In an effort to upgrade the ‘Ghauri system’, in October 2018 Pakistan conducted a test launch of the missile (Panda, 2018a). Among the long range ballistic missiles, Pakistan has developed ‘Shaheen-II’ ballistic missile with a range of 2500 kilometers, which is a two-stage, solid-fuel ballistic missile. To touch the range of 3000 kilometers, Pakistan has developed ‘Ghauri-III’ two-stage, liquid fuel ballistic missile. To counter ever-emerging limited war threats from its arch-rival India, Pakistan has developed tactical missile with a range of 60 kilometers named ‘Nasr’. The operational induction of the missile was completed in 2017 and as of January 2019, the missile had gone through tremendous battlefield deployment manuevres (Siddiqui, 2019a).

Pakistan has also developed about 600 km range air launched RAAD cruise missile to be employed as a stand-off weapon against deeper targets probably along the Eastern Indian Coasts. In January 2017, Pakistan tested Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) missile ‘Ababeel’ with a range of 2,200 kilometers, which is a surface launched ballistic missile (Keck, 2018). Following the tale, in the same month of January, Pakistan tested submarine launched cruise missile with MIRV technology ‘Babur-III’, which again was tested in April 2018 that just in time compiled the inventory of Pakistan’s second strike capability (Panda, 2018b). Moreover, Pakistan is currently in possession of ‘Shaheen-III’ ballistic missile with a range of up-to 2750
kilometers (Haider, 2015) and is working enthusiastically to develop ‘Taimure’ missile, which is an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of about 7000 kilometers.

3) Navy:

Pakistan navy has successfully modified five of its Augusta-90 submarines originally acquired from France during 1990’s. Three of the submarines are now ready to host nuclear capable cruise missiles (Gady, 2018). The country is about to induct eight more Chinese submarines to enhance her naval fleet to match Indian superior nuclear submarine (The News, 2018). Following the Indian line of nuclear force preparedness, Pakistan has also modified its surface vessels. As a first phase of modifications PNS Zulfiqar has readily hosted the nuclear capable cruise missiles. Few of the other vessels are going through the process of dual role modifications (Hundley, 2018). Pakistan currently has no nuclear submarine, whereas India currently operates two of the nuclear submarines capable of delivering nuclear missiles, though both are going through repairs due to accidents.

6.11. Salient Features of Indo-Pak Nuclear Potential:

The salient conclusions which can be drawn from the current weapons potential of the two states are as follows:-

i. Both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers with limited number of nuclear weapons. Numbers vary but most writers and researchers credit India to posses more fissile material to develop more than thrice the numbers held by Pakistan.

ii. Numerical superiority coupled with large geographical area injects a feeling of ascendancy in the minds of Indian strategic stalwarts to withstand a nuclear strike by Pakistan and still be able to launch a second strike effectively.

iii. Nuclear deterrence at present favors Pakistan more due to its geographical vulnerabilities, relatively smaller conventional capability and limited economic
potential and consequent lesser conventional war stamina. Therefore, Pakistan rightly employs the nuclear dividend by its declared resolve to use nuclear weapons as ‘first use policy’ against India to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

iv. Neither side has demonstrated the capability to manufacture thermo-nuclear devices though India claims to have the capability and recently reports came on the surface about building a city around this concept (Siddiqui, 2017). Pakistan may be striving to achieve it, though it had shown no intension as such. However, both sides had developed tactical nuclear weapons which are also been successfully tested.

v. Delivery means are based on land, air and submarine launched missiles. In the missiles category, ballistic and cruise missiles are the primary means while in aircraft; India relies on SU-30s, Mir-2000s, Jaguars and Mig-27s whereas Pakistan would use F-16s, JF-17s and Mirage aircrafts.

vi. Efforts to develop and incorporate submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) have already become fruitful and both sides are technologically approaching new standards towards this end.

vii. Regardless of strong national security rhetoric, both the South Asian rivals had not been able to take over each other, Kashmir is an exception which is already divided between the both states. Unless the Kashmir dispute is amicably resolved, a sword of conventional war lingers with an ability to expand the extent of confrontation from limited to full scale war involving the nuclear catastrophe. The conflict involving exchange of nuclear weapons would wipe out the glorious history of Indus Valley civilization just in minutes.

viii. The superior conventional military of India allows it to tarnish the defense of Pakistan by executing limited war concepts with a purpose to bargain Kashmir, which Islamabad considers a suicide mission from the Indian strategists under the nuclear overhang.

ix. The strong economic strength of India strategically upholds the idea of engaging Pakistan into an arms race that would inevitably clutch her into economic burden.
Due to weak economic position, Pakistan would become victim of nuclear arms race, just like the Soviets during Cold War.

x. Lack of credible warning system by both the countries can lead to miscalculations especially during crisis situations. Also, the limited flight timing of the missiles coupled with technological deficit in the “surveillance and early warning systems” can increase probabilities of misperceived unwarranted launches leading to greater nuclear instabilities during high intensity conventional conflict.

6.12. Interplay of Conventional and Nuclear Threshold:

A. Conventional Threshold

The conventional asymmetry between the two nations tilts the advantage in favor of India, which is now superimposed with a nuclear strategic balance. Nuclear weapons generally erode conventional disparities. However, it is not to suggest that nuclear weapons should be considered convenient alternatives to conventional capabilities. The lowering of the threat perception for a longer period of time inevitably downgrades the military preparedness at conventional fronts. To achieve such an ideal context balancing both conventional and nuclear forces is a key to create strategic stability. Weak force preparedness either on conventional or nuclear domain makes the deterrence futile and vulnerable. Hence, strategic parity both in nuclear and conventional domains makes the deterrence credible. It is true that nuclear deterrence in the absence of strong conventional forces allows the possibility of conventional war, which makes the strategic environment very unstable. The strong deterrence is not workable with a weak conventional force. That is why, in the scenario of limited war posture by the enemy, nuclear deterrence fails because using nuclear weapons to deter limited war is an impractical doctrine to avoid nuclear threshold. In fact it’s quite difficult to invoke nuclear
weapons in low-intensity or sub-conventional conflicts that warrant the maintenance of sufficient conventional military capabilities.

Although, Indo-Pak strategic parity could be exploited by Pakistan in the sub-conventional plan but India would endeavor to pursue space for exploiting its military superiority in the conventional plan besides investing in the sub-conventional spectrum against Pakistan. The tempo of sub-conventional conflict had been therefore accentuated since the incident of 9/11. Therefore, when India loses escalation control in the sub-conventional plan it is likely to enter the conventional military plan which could further lead to all out war or even a nuclear war. The Indian think tanks preach the availability of limited space for war below nuclear threshold quoting Kargil episode of 1999 (Tellis, Fair, & Medby, 2002). However, a deeper analysis indicates that Pakistan disowned Kargil intrusion showing no space for application of traditional conventional military instrument and India also seriously remained confined towards her side of Line of Control (LoC), thereby validating non-availability of space for war between nuclear states. Moreover, the Indian stance with respect to space for war further matured from restraint in 2002 to avoidance in 2008, showing Indian political leadership’s new wisdom regarding the consequences of Indo-Pak military conflict. Nevertheless, if the military instrument is ever deemed to be used as is being advocated through the manifestation of the proactive operations (PAOs) or the Cold Start Doctrine by Indian military leadership, the unfolding of events could come to forefront in one of the following ways:-

i. India continues to resort to a combination of low intensity conflict (LIC) and coercion.

ii. Mobilizes its land forces and resorts to offensive posturing by its Navy, while maintaining her Air Force in the forward bases.
iii. If it still does not succeed in bending Pakistan’s will, escalates to a higher rung with Indian Air Force striking at selective targets in Kashmir, while land forces capture few important spaces across the Line of Control (LoC) in order to exert greater pressure and embarrass the armed forces. Navy would have been tasked to undertake sea denial.

iv. Having failed to achieve her objectives through coercion, undertakes capture of important territory in Kashmir under the garb of striking terrorist camps, for altering the Line of Control (LoC) or as a bargaining lever. Indian Air Force supports surface operations and Indian Navy carries out offensive posturing. In such an eventuality it may also attempt capture of local sensitive territory across the international border.

v. While resorting to tactical offensives in Kashmir, launches a tri-service synchronized offensive across international border. Navy degrades Pakistan’s maritime assets and Indian Air Force supports operations on land and sea besides undertaking measured military and economic degradation.

vi. In failure to achieve any of the above, as a last resort Indian leadership would continue claiming and maintaining the mantra of ‘surgical strikes’ against Pakistan.

In view of Rodney Jones who believes that the military modernization of India is meant to incapacitate Pakistan on revolutionary fronts. In his view, revolution in military affairs (RMA) brings “high-performance aircraft, wide-area communications, reconnaissance, and battlefield awareness” (Jones, 2015). Moreover, Paul Bracken also highlights heavy investment of India in advance radars, reconnaissance, surveillance, signal intelligence and satellites as assets to improve military capabilities (Bracken, 2012). The Indian military modernization both at nuclear and conventional fronts increases the asymmetrical anxiety for Pakistan. Particularly, Pakistan’s conventional inferiority allows Indian ambition to posture proactive military operations under the nuclear overhang. Due to which Pakistan had embraced tactical nuclear warheads to outcast
Indian bid to limited war and heavily invested on the qualitative and quantitative improvements of its nuclear arsenals (Krepon, 2012).

The conventional deterrence is altogether in the Indian favor even knowing the fact that today it is going through scarcity of outdated tanks, military vehicles and weaponry. Addition to that Indian defense forces also face acute shortage of ammunition along with air defense equipments attributing to the dilemma of its massive conventional operations against Pakistan. The massive Indian military modernization does address its shortfalls for a longer period of time and also provides her leverage to undergo with proactive military strategy bringing upset to Pakistan’s threshold posture (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2011). Change and transformation in the military affairs is critical to achieve political objectives that once seems unachievable as explained by Eliot Cohen that “smart weapons and advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT) networks allow a state significantly greater power projection capability while simultaneously reducing both the hazards and the costs of undertaking such operations” (Cohen, 2004).

Today, out of 36 Indian Army divisions, nine are stationed on the eastern side of the country to cover China, Burma and Bangladesh that forms 25% of its total strength. 50% of its military strength is oriented towards Pakistan which costs allocation of its 18 divisions along borders of Punjab, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Kashmir. Significantly, out of these 18 divisions, 15 are infantry divisions with minor offensive assault power (The News, 2009). India stations its armored formations deep inside in central part of the country, which forms quite a long distance from international border with Pakistan, China, Bangladesh and Burma (Ladwig III, 2008). As compared to Indian force posturing, Pakistan had 22 divisions and almost 80% of its military deployment by allocating its 18 divisions on its eastern border with India.
B. Nuclear Threshold

Pakistan has a limited number of nuclear weapons and therefore the preferable mode of employment is likely to be in the form of counter-value strategy, which is to employ the atomic bombs as city-busters. It can then gradually shift to an appropriate mix of counter-force and counter-value targets through amplifying the number of nuclear warheads and diversification of delivery systems. Furthermore, to counter Indian plans of limited war context under the strategic nuclear posture, Pakistan had successfully developed and inducted tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) such as NASR. The missile is specifically developed to respond Indian designs of ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ (CSD), which is a limited war strategy against Pakistan. As a matter of fact, both Pakistan and India has access to sophisticated ‘Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C4ISR)’ capability systems, which would provide the requisite intelligence and accurate surveillance to completely destroy counter-force targets. The problem is, will both the states be able to draw correct analysis of the situation to initiate or not initiate response mechanism makes the strategic environment prone to nuclear catastrophe.

Nuclear strategy could be predicated on offsetting conventional force imbalances and invoke nuclear response once conventional response has been saturated and vital national security interests are threatened. The contingencies warranting the threat of employment of nuclear warheads are to be clearly and carefully defined but kept ambiguous for the enemy. Declared nuclear thresholds can provide the enemy with liberty of action while adhering to them. Some of the visualized thresholds could be combinations of the following conditions:-

i. Deep penetration of Pakistan territory by Indian forces threatening its core areas and population centers of psycho-social importance.

ii. Substantial degradation of conventional forces resulting in their inability to respond to enemy threat.
iii. Economic strangulation of Pakistan.
iv. Enemy first strike/use.

Whether, the nuclear capability has created only notional or real deterrence is under discussion by scholars and think tanks not only in India and Pakistan but throughout the world. However, the ground realities since 1998 illustrate both aspects such as creation of deterrence as well as space for limited conflict. The overall circumstances in the Indo-Pak sub-continent are quite different from that of the Cold War era mainly owing to its geographical closeness, ideological division, technological sophistication and harsh state of affairs that gave birth to unending conflicts. Starting from the 1986-87 Indian military exercise ‘Brasstacks’ to Kargil Conflict of 1999 with extensions of military standoff between the two nations in 2002 and the Bombay incident of 2008 are few scenarios which were averted mainly due to nuclear factor. In nutshell, the exposure of the South Asian strategic environment to nuclear deterrence helped more to Pakistan as compared to India which during all the above scenarios wanted to impose its superior military might against Pakistan. In fact, the nuclear factor introduced an element of restraint between the two nuclear power states, however, since there are unresolved territorial disputes which are unlikely to be resolved fairly or even not resolved at all; the possibility of limited war transcending into an all out war / nuclear war is a real scenario.

6.13. Interfacing Nuclear and Conventional Strategies:

Since Pakistan’s nuclear capability was solely developed to counter Indian conventional and nuclear threat, therefore the policy of an inherent “First-Use-Option” was also adopted to counter such a situation and use the weapons as and when the need arises. Moreover, the Indian articulated ‘Nuclear Threshold for Pakistan’ has also never been quantified and has been kept vague. Therefore, up on initiation of war, Pakistan would seek to gain parity in spatial and
destruction effects at an early time frame by employing conventional capability in high tempo operations based on performance rather than viability principle and thereafter resort to nuclear posturing failing which nuclear weapons could be employed using graduated response. Since Pakistan would not be the war initiator, therefore, India ought to respond positively to Pakistan’s nuclear posturing and order immediate cease fire or face nuclear holocaust which will only bring about destruction for both countries and victory for none. The perceived timing for nuclear posturing could be on day five or six (D+5/6) if the desired parity in effects has been achieved by then or it could go on to day twelve or thirteen (D+12/13) when the cost/benefit analysis for continuing the war starts to tilt heavily in Indian favor. However, the exact timing of nuclear posturing cannot be predicted with complete certainty. The application of this strategy requires very robust integration of military strategy with the nuclear strategy.

Table-6.5: Nuclear Strategies and Applicability in South Asian Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear Strategy</th>
<th>Applicability in Indo-Pak Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy of Massive Retaliation (Cold War Era)</strong></td>
<td>Does not suit to Pakistan as it does not possess the wherewithal to retaliate in this manner once India commences hostilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any act of aggression was to be responded by a massive nuclear attack with second strike capability to punish strategic value targets.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mutual Assured Destruction (1960s)</strong></td>
<td>Situation is unlikely to prevail in South Asia in near future. Sufficient number of warheads available with both India and Pakistan precludes adoption of this strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual destruction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence through 2\textsuperscript{nd} strike capability–to save on expenses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superiority against enemy becomes irrelevant. Ruling out use of nuclear arms as levers for political influence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flexible Response (1970s)</strong></td>
<td>Is unrealistic as it assumes that the enemy would respond to the step by step escalation. In the South Asian context, weak conventional forces of Pakistan cannot afford to this response as India have superior conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated deterrence and building up of conventional forces through superiority and effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated Deterrence</td>
<td>The Indian Cold Start Doctrine does not use nuclear weapons though it aims to penetrate deep into Pakistan’s territory through rapid and swift mobilization of its conventional forces under integrated battlefield concept. Pakistan on the other hand responds back to such Indian force mobilization by using low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons but only within its territory. The concept is not applicable since no one is using nuclear weapons as first use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countervailing Strategy</td>
<td>Is also a war fighting strategy hence its adoption in Indo-Pak scenario is not visualized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Strategy</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-emption Option</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| First Use Option | India has adopted ‘no first use’ policy. Pakistan on the other hand has announced ‘minimum credible deterrence’ with ‘first use option’.
6.14. Why nuclear strategies of the Cold War are not prudent in South Asia?

The nuclear strategies to deter aggression adopted by P-5 have been pre-dominantly overshadowed by the Cold War era strategies of US and Soviet Union. The overall strategies remained dynamic with each new addition in conventional or the nuclear capability bringing about some variation in the strategy. However, after the Cold War, the nuclear strategies became quite consistent and stable aiming to maintain effective deterrence employing declared strategy of total response. In case of India and Pakistan, continuous advancements are taking place both in the conventional as well as in the nuclear weapons developments. Moreover, India is enjoying clear conventional superiority and aims to exploit it; whereas, Pakistan would always look for employing its strategic parity against India in any conventional conflict imposed on it. Also unlike, the continental separation that existed between US-Soviet Union, the case of India and Pakistan which are neighbors, the nuclear environment as well as the threat perception becomes quite different. Many significant targets lie in very close-proximity of their mutual borders making the war critical and dangerous. The close-proximity of major cities populated with millions of people and industrial units very close to the border further compound the problem for Pakistan and makes her ‘strategic depth’ vulnerable. The other factors, which characterize the nuclear environment in this part of the world, are as follows: -

a. **Imbalance in Nuclear Arsenals:** The imbalance in the nuclear fissile material and final production of arsenals of the two states are in Indian favor. Moreover, the Indo-US Civil Deal had independently allowed India to maintain a ratio of approximately 1:5. This numerical advantage could negatively influence the mindset of Indian political leadership in terms of decision making to allow conventional war to transcend into nuclear domain while allowing Pakistani first strike and still have the capability to impose total response against it.
b. **Contiguity of Borders:** It is relatively easy for both countries to deliver nuclear weapons to targets with the existing sophisticated delivery means. However, fallout and radiation effects generated over closer targets could be carried across borders by weather.

c. **Early Warning:** Time of flight from launch to strike will be extremely short thus leaving no space for crisis management.

d. **Accidental Use:** Lack of proper early warning and identification coupled with limited missile flights will increase the chances of accidental nuclear reaction as responses to possibly inaccurate or misinterpreted information.

e. **Public Pressure:** The war mongering phenomenon vested into the domestic politics particularly in India provides less awareness to the local public about understanding the destructive impacts of nuclear catastrophe. This enhances the public pressure on both sides to go for undesirable decisions.

Both India and Pakistan are following ‘Minimum Credible Deterrence’ (MCD) policy in the domain of development of nuclear weapons. However, the minimum part such as the number and yield of nuclear weapons is being solely defined independently and is also being kept closer to chest. In the employment policy context, Pakistan has a declared policy of ‘first use’ whenever its sovereignty or territorial integrity is threatened. Although, India has announced policy of ‘no first use’ (NFU) but its policy is very dubious and has ample room for first use. The introduction of proactive military operations (PAOs) strategy manifests Indian desire to find space for applying her conventional military superiority against Pakistan. The coining of yet another term, the nuclear threshold, to define Pakistan’s perceived level of acceptable destruction before electing for a nuclear response, further certifies Indian hegemonic ambitions against a nuclear powered Pakistan.

Since the Kargil episode, Indians have been advocating space for war with Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan has been working on finding out the quantity or value of destruction after
which it will resort to application of nuclear weapons and this value or level of destruction is being termed as a nuclear threshold (Ladwig III, 2008). It is nevertheless, only a theoretical construct advocated by specific strategists and lacks valid logic because no nuclear state has ever conceded any alteration to its status-quo. Therefore, initiation of war against a nuclear adversary to achieve defined objectives is an ill-conceived proposition. On the whole, the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan are likely to promote security and stability in the region but peace is unlikely till the resolution of Kashmir conflict. The solution of the Kashmir dispute keeping in view the aspirations of Kashmiris is the only hope to avert nuclear catastrophe in South Asia along with decades old hostility between the two nations. India’s military modernization has furthered the strategic imbalance and continuously contributing towards unstable ‘nuclear deterrence’ situation. Some of the salient features are:

i. India has inducted and continues to develop nuclear capable submarines and is also purchasing as well as developing Missile Defence Systems (MDS) with collaboration from USA, Israel and Russia. These developments will adversely affect the nature of Indo-Pak nuclear deterrence.

ii. Both countries have potential to enhance massive number of nuclear weapons and could launch nuclear strikes at each other.

iii. Means of delivery are specifically focused on ballistic missiles besides air launched bombs and cruise missiles.

iv. India has a dominant superiority in conventional weapons and also enjoys numerical advantage in nuclear arsenal.

v. The threat of a real nuclear showdown over Kashmir has added global concerns towards resolution of Kashmir dispute along with other Indo-Pak bilateral issues.

vi. USA has been an important factor in resolving Indo-Pak crisis but its nuclear deal with India has tilted the Indo-Pak nuclear balance in Indian favor.

vii. Pakistan being the weaker state and the victim of Indian aggression is likely to initiate the nuclear war against any future conventional Indian adventure.
Over a half-century long investment on conventional forces provides India a superior edge over Pakistan’s ability to engage in limited war. Today, it had been consistently looking to chart out punitive strategies under the nuclear overhang. Due to the very nature of Indian military buildup, Islamabad had swiftly twisted its ‘credible minimum deterrence’ to more robust ‘full spectrum deterrence’ (FSD) indicating applicability of tactical nuclear warheads in case of Indian troops advancement deep into Pakistani territory. Pakistan has sent strong messages to its counterparts in India, “whether it’s ‘Cold Start’ or ‘Hot Start’”, Pakistan is prepared and ready to respond (Syed, 2015). The concept of ‘minimum credible deterrence’ (MCD) maintains the idea of Pakistan’s ability to punish India through targeting ‘strategic value targets’ under the increased threshold, whereas the concept of ‘full spectrum deterrence’ allows its resilience to counter Indian ‘Cold Start Doctrine’, while lowering the threshold to accommodate use of tactical nuclear warheads on its own soil. It is important to highlight that under the ‘credible minimum deterrence’ the ‘full spectrum deterrence’ allows strategic, operational and tactical nuclear weapons variations from high to low yield including selection of ‘counter value’ to ‘counter force’ targets of India.

Moreover, under the prevailing emblem of credible minimum deterrence, Pakistan’s adoption of ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD)’ surfaced for the first time in September 5, 2013, when during the National Command Authority (NCA) meeting consensus came among the top military and civil leadership. Moreover, during 2015-16 NCA meetings, the FSD policy was reassured. Specifically and more recently during the 23rd NCA meeting that held on December 21, 2017, the top leadership of the country once again reiterated their commitment to FSD. According to Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), which is an official media wing of Pakistan Armed Forces, stated that “NCA reiterated Pakistan’s policy of developing and
maintaining Full Spectrum Deterrence, in line with the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and avoidance of arms race” (Syed, 2017). The threat spectrum discussed in the meeting identified three dimensions as core national security challenges arising out of Indian military modernization. It highlighted the following:

i. The superior conventional Indian forces with massive build-up that causes asymmetry

ii. Nuclearization of the sea by Indian induction of nuclear submarines into Indian Ocean Region

iii. Indian plans of ballistic missile defense systems

Pakistan’s doctrine of FSD manifests the capability of upholding weapons in all three directions including strategic, operational and tactical with requisite range and yield. This in fact, covers all Indian targets whether they are counter value or counter force including distinctive postures on the battlefield territories within mainland or distant territories. The former Director General of Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Lt. Gen. (retd) Khalid Kidwai, (who after his retirement from the military services became advisor for NCA’s developmental planning) reiterated the FSD policy as an approach meant to cover every single target within India. While explaining three bedrock elements of the policy, he articulated Pakistan’s readiness of “full spectrum of nuclear weapons in all three categories—strategic, operational and tactical, with full range coverage of the large Indian land mass and its outlying territories”. The outlying territories of India include islands of Nacobar and Andaman where it has been establishing its maritime commands that furthered the stability of Indian Ocean region. Pakistan response preparedness to upgrade its force posture on strategic, operational and tactical levels in real terms disallows India to escape from Islamabad’s full spectrum response. Gen. Kidwai also said “Pakistan should also have appropriate weapons yield coverage and the numbers to deter the adversary’s pronounced
policy of massive retaliation”. The implication of this strategy would ensure ‘counter massive retaliation’ to Indian designs as punishment from Pakistan. The third point highlighted mastery of Pakistan to achieve “liberty of choosing from a full spectrum of targets, notwithstanding the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), to include counter-value, counter-force, and battlefield targets” (Dawn, 2017a).

The original response of Pakistan’s nuclear threshold maintained the context of mutual assured destruction (MAD) perpetrating the strategic environment fueled with increased nuclear threshold. India due to its superior conventional forces had never endorsed neither wanted to align with Pakistan’s vision of nuclear deterrence. Considering its superior conventional military, it always kept searching for new ideas and ways to punish Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan has to respond back to Indian Cold Start Doctrine while lowering the nuclear threshold and inducted the low-yield battlefield nuclear weapon, NASR (Hatf-IX).

The dynamics of nuclear threshold are unsettled as India is still not getting the point of ‘no return’. Rather accepting the contextual force preparedness of Pakistan, it has started rethinking its ‘no first use’ policy. In 2016, Shivshankar Menon who is a renowned expert and also worked as national security advisor to the previous Congress government highlighted “a potential grey area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first” (Sundaram & Ramana, 2018). He suggested about India’s willingness to go for pre-emptive strikes in case of knowing Pakistan’s decision to go nuclear. This in fact creates a doomsday scenario. The question is how accurate it is to know that Pakistan is thinking to go for nuclear? Moreover, the former defense minister Manohar Parrikar of the current Hindu nationalist government of Bharatiya Janata Party also suggested that “India needed a less restrictive nuclear doctrine,” arguing to bring shift in the doctrine (Hundley, 2018). This has been further reinvigorated by the current defense minister
Rajnath Sing in August 2019, who also indicated a change in the ‘no first option’ of India. He said that, “[India] yet remain firmly committed to the doctrine of ‘no first use’. India has strictly adhered to this doctrine. What happens in future depends on the circumstances” (Sen & Laskar, 2019).

The dilemma of antagonism vested in the Indian military thought is reflective of nuclear adventurism. Time and again Indian political and military stalwarts have tried to shape and maneuver with the environment of South Asian strategic stabiligy to allow its strong conventional and nuclear forces to outcast Pakistan’s credible deterrence. Though, the discourse along with its associated maneuvers have a long history which is stretched over 72 years but as recent as of February 2019, the Indian political and military pundits have once again started beating the drums of nuclear war. On February 14, 2019 one of the Kashmiri youth conducted a suicide attack on Indian paramilitary forces in Pulwama that killed 44 of its soldiers and 70 were severely injured. The suicider lived just few kilometers away from the place of attack (Pulwama) in occupied Kashmir. This was one of the worst attacks happened against the Indian forces in occupied Kashmir (Dawn, 2019). Regardless of decoding the revolt of Kashmiri youth against the atrocities of Indian military, New Delhi immediately looked for an ‘escape goat’ and started blaming Pakistan. Since, Pakistan was seen as an easy way out to setaside the real course of Pulwama incident; therefore a deliberate political and military campaign got impetus against Pakistan. War rehotoric has now overshadowed the rationality of Indian thinking and the media, politicians, military strategists along with whole of the national character is now looking to revenge from Pakistan.

In the aftermath of Pulwama, Indian government has allowed a new wave of nation wise hatred against Kashmiris. As a result, Kashmiri youth studying in Indian institutions had to flee
for their life. Many had to take refuge in the mosques. Business and property of Kashmiri people in India was burnt by the Hindu mobs under the patronage of BJP government. The situation got ‘bad to worst’ that Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi had to write a letter to ‘United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’. His letter specifically pointed out that:

“As if the use of pellet guns against Kashmiri protestors, the outright refusal by India to initiate political dialogue with the Kashmiris and Pakistan, ongoing ‘shoot to kill’ orders against Kashmiris, were not enough, there is now a concerted campaign to whip up hatred and violence against Kashmiris and discrimination against them across India… Even more worryingly, the Indian government has chosen to remain silent in the wake of most appalling acts of violence against Kashmiris, perpetrated by extremist elements” (Siddiqui, 2019b).

As a last resort to dismantle the socio-political nexus of violence, the Indian Supreme Court finally intervened on February 22, 2019 and ordered the state to protect Kashmiris around the country (BBC, 2019). In context to nuclear environment, the situation got vulnerable when Indian Prime Minister Modi in a public speech told its nation that he has given ‘free hand’ to its military to revenge Pulwama incident (Khokhar, Khan, & Haq, 2019). Based on the pseudo narrative while having purpose to avoid real cause of the Pulwama, Indian war mongering is quite a challenge to maintain stability and avoid response readiness of Pakistan. That is why in the National Security Council meeting held on February 21, 2019, the Prime Minister Imran Khan reciprocated the Indian move with that of extending full confidence and permission to Pakistan army to respond any Indian aggression on Pakistan (Khaleej Times, 2019). Based on Pakistan’s declared minimum credible deterrence with that of ‘first use option’ to deter Indian aggression, any escalation on the Indian side would have catastrophic impacts on the strategic stability of South Asia.

Last but not the least, the nuclear threshold whether is lowered or increased, the Indian strategic community seems to provoke adventurism under the nuclear overhang. Completing the line of argument, Indian military generals have also configured to interplay in the nuclear
threshold since they have completed the ‘nuclear triad’. For example, in January 2018 the current Indian Army Chief, General Bipin Rawat even indicated to test Pakistan’s resilience and willingness to use nuclear weapons during a conflict. He wanted to expose “Pakistan's nuclear bogey” and said that “we will call their bluff. If given the task, we will not say we cannot cross the border because they have nuclear weapons” (Pandit, 2018). It seems that the so-called Pulwama incident was manifestation of Indian resolve to test “Pakistan’s nuclear bogey”.

To the fact of military might that India enjoys in occupied Kashmir is of great reference here. For example, the occupied Kashmir is heavily militarized and availability of more than 1 million Indian troops in the region along with other law enforcement agencies with that of rigorous intelligence penetration each and everywhere, how come a person with 80 kilogram of explosive could end up conducting a successful suicide attack? Even the Indian military officer, General D. S. Hooda told the international media that “it is not possible to bring such massive amounts of explosives by infiltrating the border” (Iqbal, 2019). It was orchestrated and facilitated by the politic-o-military regime of India as happened in the Samjhuata Express terror attack when one of Indian army serving Col. Prohit was found behind the incident.

Linking the dots of politic-o-military nexus, the Congress Spokesperson Randeep Surjewala convened a press conference on February 21, 2019 and raised five serious questions about Pulwama incident. The questions included: “(1) Why is PM Modi not taking responsibility for the failures of Home Minister Rajnath Singh and NSA Ajit Doval?; (2) How did such huge amount of explosives and rocket launcher entered the area? How did the vehicle entered the area?; (3) Why was the video warning imminent attack overlooked? Why was the letter written by the police ignored?; (4) Why was the CRPF’s demand for air travel not acceded?; (5) Why 488 jawans lost their lives in last 56 months?” (India TV, 2019).
Continuing with the pace of deconstructing ‘false flag operation’ of PM Modi, one of the prominent Hindu stalwarts particularly the traditional zealots of ‘Hindutva ideology’ such as Raj Thackeray (the son of Bal Thackery, the founder of Shiv Sena) also made serious accusations against Modi, when on February 25, 2019 during a public rally, he stated that “if NSA Ajit Doval is investigated, then all the truth about the Pulwama terror attack will come out”. He maintained that “every government manufactured such things but it is taking place more frequently under Modi’s rule”. Mr. Raj Thackeray called the killing of 44 soldiers as “political victims” (Hashmi, 2019).

This somehow qualifies the assumption for an objective application that the Pulwama incident was manufactured and orchestrated by the Indian intelligence-cum-political stalwarts to test Pakistan’s resolve to exercise its ‘political will’ to bring nuclear response into matrix of proactive military operations. The unwise political rhetoric and electoral milestone for the 2019 General Elections has put Modi into dilemma of ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’. This has been reiterated by almost every single opposition party of India. For example, on February 22, 2019 the former Chief Minister of Indian occupied Kashmir, Mr Omar Abdullah said in an interview with 

*Gulf News* that “the prime minister [Modi] and his party men are using the tragedy of Pulwama in which more than 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel were killed to promote their own political agenda. It is the biggest disservice they are doing to the nation”. To highlight the atrocities of Indian military in occupied Kashmir, he pointed out that “Jammu and Kashmir has been at the receiving end of violence of this nature for nearly three decades now. Entire generations of people have been born and brought up in the shadow of gun”. This has somehow created reaction in Indian occupied Kashmir, which is further fuelled by the violence of Hindu nationalists. To underscore such a dirty nexus of state sponsored terrorism and
violence, Mr Abdullah pointed out “it is no secret that Bajrang Dal and the student’s wing of the Sangh were foremost in fomenting trouble against Kashmiri students in various parts of India. This was done keeping in mind the upcoming general elections” (Shaban, 2019).

Pakistan has taken all necessary measures to ensure peace and stability in the region. It has not only strategically increased the nuclear threshold but also on the expense of Indian military adventurism managed to lower the nuclear threshold. Indian wish to distinguish between conventional and nuclear threshold massively undermines Pakistan’s territorial security. That is why whether it’s conventional or nuclear threat, Pakistan has only one option to control conflict escalation and that is the use of nuclear weapons. That is why, under the prevailing nuclear threshold, the Indian political thinkers are joining hands with their military strategic pundits who have adopted strategy of pro-active military operations (PAOs) against Pakistan, which provides them an option of limited war scenario practically executing the ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ with that of surgical strikes along with imposing hostile environment under the emblem of diplomatic, political, economic, military, and propaganda warfare. This allows Indian military thought to orchestrate and impose the hybrid warfare on Pakistan. The next chapter is dedicated to elaborate Indian proactive military operations and answers the question what strategy Pakistan has adopted to deal with the Indian threat of limited war scenario under the nuclear threshold?
7.1. Introduction

Contemporary strategic environment has added complexity and variety to the security threats to national sovereignty and internal stability, in the domain of both ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional security’. While dominant existential threat to Pakistan continues to evolve ‘from within’; the traditional foe India remains the major external threat. However, plethora of external threats may further expand in non-kinetic domain, as Pakistan’s internal turmoil and alleged negative relevance in the international community continues to escalate due to divergence of interests with some of the global players particularly United States. In this backdrop, Pakistan’s security mechanism places tall order on ‘comprehensive deterrence’ comprising conventional armed forces, nuclear capability and non-kinetic response mechanism. Given the fact that conventional war is mostly vulnerable to transform into nuclear escalation, Pakistan’s deterrence posture must be reliable and consistent with the evolving regional threats. This inevitably generates complexity among the force structure and posture along with synergy between military strategies at both conventional and nuclear fronts. Due to the very nature of superior conventional military of India, Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear deterrence is deemed necessary. Since overt nuclearization of South Asia in May 1998, a sense of relative stability in the region has emerged (Jones, 2000). Though the stability in South Asia has other dimensions also, yet correct orchestration of nuclear deterrence by India and Pakistan has a promising feature to entrench stability in the region. The cost of which has compromised the possibility of
conventional deterrence between the two nations, which in turn stays invalid in case of proactive military operations.

More than a year after the Pokharan tests, India announced her “Draft Nuclear Doctrine” and formalized it on January 4, 2003, whereas contrary to this, in view of peculiar security dictates, Pakistan has chosen to remain quiet on that account (Pant, 2005). Pakistan has to deliberately weigh the pros and cons of declared or undeclared policy and follow the line which suits her security spectrum the best. This in fact, gives leverage to Pakistan’s strategic decision makers to play between the ‘first use’ and ‘early first use’ policy posture disallowing Indian counterparts to manipulate the situation in their favor. Though, the problem of conventional imbalance and rapid technological modernization into Indian military paves the way towards aggravated security construct against Pakistan (Ladwig III, 2015). Traditionally, Islamabad had successfully managed to create operational parity but today the pace of Indian modernization and its very ability to upset both conventional and nuclear threshold along with maneuvers in the doctrine and operational strategy have placed enormous challenges for the military thinkers in Pakistan.

Therefore, with new operational concepts in place, both India and Pakistan are poised to test stability of their nuclear deterrence. Hence, it becomes imperative to study the interface between nuclear and military strategies, conceptualizing the cardinal aspects of war scenarios. However, interfacing of nuclear and military strategies is highly complex issue in the contemporary geo-strategic environment. Conflicting opinions and application spectrum make the situation multifaceted, imperative and perplexing. Issues that stem out of conventional-cum-nuclear deterrence postures between India and Pakistan calls critique and debriefing of some of the important aspects comprising, applicability of nuclear strategies in futuristic environment;
how to deter conventional war?; if deterrence fails and war breaks out, how to establish intra war deterrence?; what will be implication on nuclear deterrence in the aftermath of Indian acquisition of nuclear missile defense?; and last but not the least, how to articulate war termination strategy under nuclear environment? In continuation to the above pretexts, the aim of this chapter is to study the impact of Indian operational doctrines and strategies particularly the ‘proactive strategy’ on the nuclear environment with a view to understand Pakistan’s nuclear strategy to meet emerging demands of changing geo-strategic environment. The specific question in line to the above problem is, what strategy Pakistan has adopted to deal with the Indian threat of limited war scenario/ pro-active military operations (PAOs) under the nuclear threshold?

7.2. Geostrategic Environment:

At the geo-strategic plan, US unipolarity continues to drive the global events. While, rising China, ambitious India, ideological Iran and instable Afghanistan are the key elements shaping the regional context in South Asia. To manifest her strategic interests in this part of the world, US draw military support from two Carrier Battle Groups which remain present in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea (Ho, 2018). These forces together with the US led ISAF and NATO forces presence in Afghanistan had reciprocated the dilemma of Extra Regional Forces (ERF) (Altaf, 2014). In the post-2014 US withdrawal made the ERF presence smart and technical but complicated the security situation with provisions of greater role assigned to Indian and Afghan forces under ‘Net Security Provisions’ (Mukherjee, 2014). The possible long term ERF motives are envisioned as below:-

i. Ensure safety of international oil routes.
ii. Contain Chinese influence especially in Indian Ocean.
iii. Curtail Iranian nuclear aspirations.
iv. Power projection in Middle East.

v. May restrain Pakistan from employing nuclear weapons against India, if the situation so arises.

Coming to Pakistan’s eastern neighbor, the current Indian focus remains on building her economic might while it continues to pursue her grand ambition of achieving the ‘Dominant Regional Status’ (Brewster, 2014). US concerns regarding rise of China are being greatly exploited by India to gain access to American high end space and nuclear technologies as well as high tech military hardware (Madan, 2012). Indian economic boom is also serving as a catalyst to increase defense budget and consequently improve the combat potential of her fighting arms by induction of large scale modern western military equipments. Besides that, large Indian domestic market is being eyed by EU, China and other nations which give her greater diplomatic leverage against Pakistan at most international forums.

Pakistan’s time tested friend, China continues to follow its non-confrontational policy so as to sustain its economic growth. Deliberate efforts have been made to expose Beijing’s economic inter-dependence with India and US as alarming indication that might reduce the effectiveness of Beijing’s traditional level of staunch support, which it used to display for Pakistan (Gulshan, 2015). Moreover, the presence of East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and its linkages in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have influenced Chinese stance regarding terrorism and its linkages to Pakistan (Rehman, 2014). On the whole, out of the two strategic partners of Pakistan, US have already indicated her preference for India over Pakistan (Chari, 2014), China has also started advising Pakistan to peacefully negotiate territorial disputes with India (Amin, 2017). Though, Pakistan and China had cleared all the dust by reasserting their long term commitment towards bilateral political priorities (MFA China, 2018) but forces
unhappy with the Sino-Pak alliance may invest instability in the region through proactive military operations (Motwani, 2018).

7.3. **Global Nuclear Environment:**

The global nuclear environment amalgamates contemporary issues such as nuclear proliferation, reduction and complete abolition of nuclear warheads, restraint in employment of nuclear warheads along with safety and security of them especially with reference to possible threat of nuclear terrorism in the hands of non-state actors. Since their first use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have bought about a paradigm shift and have contributed positively in transforming the international security environment (Waltz, 1981). Few notable facts are as follows:-

- There has been no global war of the dimensions of First and Second World Wars, after the dawn of nuclear era.
- There was no direct war between United States and former Soviet Union despite occurrences of serious political upheavals like the Berlin Crises, Korean War, Cuban Missile Crises and Arab-Israel wars.
- There has been no direct confrontation, even between the close allies of the two erstwhile super powers.
- The phenomenon of mutual assured destruction therefore established the decorum between nuclear weapons and operational facets of its utility

Under the prevalent ‘global nuclear dictates’ international community is largely averse to war, more so to the outbreak of armed conflict between two nuclear states. Nuclear weapons are therefore only meant for deterring and not for fighting wars. These are now considered as “weapons of last resort” whose threat of use is exploited to avert imminent wars and return to
mediation and negotiation for settlement of disputes (Krepon, 2018). However, in the context of South Asian nuclearization and its acceptability by the international community things are somehow different (Mishra, 2017).

While Indian Nuclear status has been vividly accepted with clear signs to help India boost her nuclear arsenal through the Indo-US Nuclear deal and lately by Australian permission for uranium exports, Pakistan’s case met an entirely different course (Davenport, 2017). The nuclear proliferation issue, the myth of Islamic bomb, the safety of nuclear weapons in the face of ERF sponsored and orchestrated ‘Tehreek-e-Taliban’ and the divergence of interests with US in Afghanistan were the main underlying causes which together made Pakistan’s nuclear capability suspicious for Western nations especially for the US.

As a consequence, engineered narratives are in place regarding Pakistan’s internal instability and consensual nuclear proliferation, which is a permanent propaganda to seek compliance or cooperation from Pakistan along with circumventing its traditional strategic leverage in the region. Therefore, Pakistan is compelled to develop her nuclear capabilities under adverse conditions against India, which is enjoying the best of both western as well as Russian and Israeli help to improve its nuclear capabilities (Rajagopalan, 2018).

Following conclusions can be drawn from the prevailing global environment:

- US overt support to India has tilted the South Asian power balance in Indian favor. However, immediate Indo-Pak conflict would not suit global powers, especially if Pakistan decides to play its role in stability of the region and Afghanistan stays stable.
- Considering US regional interests and her strategic partnership and nuclear deal with India, it will try to restrain Pakistan from use of nuclear weapons, even when India initiates the war against Pakistan.
• In case of unimpeded negative relevance of Pakistan, international community and US may encourage India to apply kinetic force to seek Pakistan’s compliance, or exploit misinformation to create suspicions about security and safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets seeking their placement under international safeguards.

7.4. Indo-Pak Nuclear Environment:

In the aftermath of geostrategic and global nuclear environment, it is important to evaluate the Indo-Pak nuclear environment and establish the applicability of the nuclear and the conventional deterrence regimes amongst the two countries. Has nuclear capability created notional or real deterrence, is under discussion amongst scholars and think tanks not only in India and Pakistan but throughout the world. Some analysts profess emergence of an environment which restricts space for application of military instrument (Yusuf, 2018) while a few others say that below the perceived nuclear threshold possibility of a ‘limited war’ is possible between the two belligerent neighbors (Saran, 2013).

However, the ground realities since 1998 illustrate both aspects. The 1999 Kargil crisis, 2002-03 Indo-Pak military stand-off, 2008 Bombay incident, and pro-active military adventurism under ‘notion of surgical strikes’ that India first claimed in September 2016 with that of her real attempt on February 26, 2019 can be taken as examples of presence of nuclear deterrence. However, a dispassionate analysis of the threats and the contributors to the nuclear deterrence regime can help bring to fore the pertinent conclusions in this regard. The contributors of the deterrence regime are:-

• Both countries after rendering proof through explosions in 1998 about the possession of nuclear weapons have restrained from further testing thereby accepting and respecting each other’s capability and not indulging in a nuclear arms race.
Both countries have agreed on no attacks against declared nuclear sites even in case of war and the location of such sites is bilaterally updated on yearly basis.

Hotlines between Director General Military Operations (DGMOs) are in place for immediate diffusion of any untoward incident or accident.

Forewarning of missile tests, military exercises and border rescue missions indicate mutual intent to ensure that misunderstandings and miscalculations should never lead to any type of crises.

Nuclear weapons were never readied for use during Kargil conflict or even during the 2002 Indo-Pak military stand-off.

Unlike, the continental separation that existed between US-Soviet Union, the near proximity in Indo-Pak scenario makes the employment of nuclear weapons quite dangerous. Because common borders would lead to nuclear fallout and radiation effects being carried across both sides of borders through winds and other weather affects, hence enhancing the deterrence is deemed necessary as ultimate choice for averting escalation.

China will not be supportive of any war that can lead to the use of nuclear weapons in her neighborhood.

Indo-Pak nuclear exchange will adversely affect most of the regional countries, thus they are also likely to exert political pressures to avert a war which can lead to nuclear escalations.

Lastly, use of nuclear weapons in any military conflict will be the most difficult decision for the political leadership of the time, as it will not only bear international criticism and sanctions, but also invite unpredictable retaliatory responses from the adversary which will cause unthinkable devastation.

Having examined the facts contributing to Indo-Pak nuclear deterrence, it would be equally important to evaluate the threats to nuclear deterrence. Historically, the nuclear strategies to deter aggression during the Cold War era remained dynamic with each new addition in
conventional or nuclear capability bringing about some variation in the strategy. It was only after the Soviet demise that the nuclear strategies became consistent and stable with their principle aim only being effective deterrence (Stearns-Boles, 2007).

Coming back to South Asia, continuous developments are taking place in India and Pakistan, both in conventional as well as nuclear weapons domain. Moreover, India aims at exploiting her clear numerical-cum-technological conventional advantage against Pakistan. Pakistan on the other hand, looks for employing its strategic parity against India in any conventional conflict imposed on it. The main facts and actions aimed at diluting the nuclear deterrence regime in South Asia are as follows:-

- The unresolved Kashmir dispute and its extremely high emotional value for Pakistani’s coupled with the Indian construction of large dams over rivers flowing into Pakistan poses the potential for Indo-Pak war.

- The resolution of Kashmir dispute would eliminate the root cause of hostility between India and Pakistan. However, India endeavors at sustaining status quo on Kashmir by downplaying the validity of UN Resolutions and propagating their obsolescence after passage of so many decades.

- India enjoys strategic relations with US, cordial defense ties with Russia, Israel, France, UK and special economic and trade relations with some important Islamic countries. Therefore, through adroit diplomacy, India can seek to marginalize Pakistan’s legitimate interests by attaining an ease-off from the global community on contentious bilateral issues thus lowering the nuclear threshold.

- Heightened Indian support to sub-nationalist elements in FATA and Balochistan would certainly draw escalated if not equal Pakistani response in the sub-conventional plan rendering increased Indo-Pak instability.

- India’s military developmental goals like acquisition of nuclear capable submarines to complete the nuclear delivery triad along with purchase and
development of the Ballistic Missile Defence Systems (BMDs) would also undermine Indo-Pak nuclear deterrence.

- Increased Indian economic capacity leading to wide conventional Indo-Pak asymmetry would severely curtail Pakistan’s conventional response options against India.

- Pakistan’s involvement in global campaign against terrorism would further deplete her conventional capability and translate into capacity issues during Indo-Pak conflict.

- Poor health of Pakistan’s rail-road/communication infrastructure, particularly condition of railways will delay mobilization of forces as well as missiles/launchers if required to disperse.

- Lack of awareness of the devastating effects of nuclear conflict amongst the general public on either side is likely to generate undesirable public pressure on decision-makers during crisis, inevitably negatively impacting the nuclear deterrence.

- Numerical advantage in conventional and nuclear capabilities, coupled with large geographical area can generate a ‘notional ascendancy’ amongst Indian leadership to choose the military option for conflict resolution with notion that India would be able to absorb Pakistani first use and thereafter launch effective nuclear response.

- Since the Kargil episode, Indians have been advocating availability of ‘space for limited war’ with Pakistan. The coining of the term, ‘nuclear threshold’, to define Pakistan’s perceived level of acceptable destruction before electing for a nuclear response, certifies Indian military ambitions against a nuclear Pakistan (Ahmed, 2013). ‘Nuclear threshold’ is nevertheless, only a theoretical construct advocated by specific strategists and lacks valid logic because no nuclear state has ever conceded any alteration to its status-quo (Lalwani & Haegeland, 2018). Therefore, initiation of war against a nuclear adversary to achieve defined objectives is an ill-conceived proposition.
Pakistan’s rational offered to India for stability has been to sign a comprehensive ‘No War Pact’ while resolving territorial disputes including Kashmir through dialogue (Noorani, 2016) but India has been professing finalization of only ‘No Nuclear War Pact’ with Pakistan in an attempt to be able to apply her conventional military superiority whilst sidelining Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence. Though contrary to Indian ambitions, in 1988 Pakistan signed ‘Non-Attack Agreement’ with New Delhi. The agreement initiated bilateral commitment to refrain from attacking on nuclear installations of both nations. According to Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI):

“The agreement provides for refraining from undertaking, encouraging, or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing destruction or damage to any nuclear installation or facility in each country. It describes a nuclear installation or facility and requires each party to inform the other of the precise locations (latitude and longitude) of installations and facilities by 1 January of each calendar year and whenever there is any change” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011).

To strengthen peace and security Pakistan in 80’s had offered India to sign a ‘nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia’ that Indian leadership straightforwardly rejected (Ahmed, 1979). Continuing the pace of love for peace, in 1999 when the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee travelled to Lahore, another historic document ‘Lahore Declaration’ was signed that mated both nations to avoid nuclear risks under ‘pact on nuclear war risks’. The agreement stated that “the two sides undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorised, or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout... or an outbreak of nuclear war” (Goldenberg, 1999).

Regardless of all these positive efforts by Pakistan, Indian military stalwarts and political pundits have selected the path of limited war with space of proactive military operations. Therefore, under the prevalent regional nuclear environment, Pakistan’s strategic parity lies in its ambiguous nuclear threshold against India in a conventional war. And while India endeavours to garner space for conventional war with nuclear Pakistan, Islamabad must carve space for ‘full
spectrum nuclear war’ including employment of tactical weapons against potential aggressor(s) whenever and wherever it feels her sovereignty and territorial integrity would be threatened and make this assertion a part of its declared ‘First Use’ nuclear policy.

7.5. **Indian Pro Active Operations Strategy (PAOs):**

After most unproductive mobilization and escalation of 2001-02, Indian military thinkers evolved strategy to reduce their prolonged period of mobilization and decided to exploit Pakistan’s vulnerabilities in a short war focused at economic and military degradation, while keeping the gains under Pakistan’s perceived nuclear thresholds. The aftermath of the 2001-02 Indian military thought evolved the ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ in 2004 that led to ‘Pro-Active Operations (PAOs) Strategy’ as major shift in synchronized employment of military might for attainment of her decisive objectives in a short duration war. Indian military adventurism had been quite a challenge for Pakistan to cope up parity and to raise standards of war fighting since the very inception. The superior conventional forces has incorporated never ending ambition into Indian military thought that’s ultimate objective is to takeover Pakistan’s will to resist its regional hegemony. The idea is not old rather had been continuously motivating India to brought technological advancements in its war fighting capabilities. The pace of dual compatibility in shape of denouncing Pakistan and keeping the pace of military power to achieve the objective have been one and the only consistent learning in the modern military thought of India. Avoiding such real intensions of India has never offered an opportunity to disengage rather Pakistan had to engage by utilizing all element of its national power. Not a good idea for Pakistan as it had been exhausting its potential to progress as a conflict free nation.

Today, Indian capabilities are manifold and much better than its notorious past when it enjoyed less potential to punish Pakistan. Though, it is necessary to mention that even with less
potential India was quite capable of launching proactive military operations (PAOs) and as a result successfully disintegrated East wing of Pakistan (today known as Bangladesh). Pakistan resisted and utilized all means but failed to uphold its territory against sub-conventional posture of proactive Indian military operations during early 70’s. At times, Pakistan does not have strong conventional army neither it had intensions to develop nuclear weapons. As a result, more than 90,000 Pakistani troops surrendered to Indian military and felt great humiliation back in West Pakistan (Khan, 2011). The East wing was gone and the West wing almost lost its moral, resilience and political purpose. Moreover, the 1974 nuclear explosions of India further aggravated the context of national integrity and territorial security of Pakistan (Wellen, 2010).

Indian superior conventional army and now nuclear technology made its muscles stronger than ever before. Pakistan has no choice other than following the nuclear path and reacted in May 1998, when for the second time India detonated its nuclear device on May 11, 1998 and declared its nuclear status (Ganguly & Kapur, 2010). Therefore, before getting into the 21st century proactive military operations that are surrounded with nuclear environment, it is important to explain a bit of Cold War mantra of Indian PAOs. This in fact would provide embryonic understanding of Pakistan’s vulnerabilities that why it feels threatened when it comes to 21st century Indian proactive military operations (PAOs)? Over the period of time, Pakistan’s resilience does have ensured its national security but Indian motivated ambitions to punish its neighbor had seemed to sworn an oath to disintegrate the nuclear nation of more than 220 million inhabitants. As highlighted by the former Director General of Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Lt. Gen. (retd) Khalid Kidwai, who on December 7, 2017 said “because of mutually assured destruction there is unlikelihood of a hot war or a conventional war and, therefore, the conflict
has shifted towards sub-conventional level. As of now, that could be seen in full play at our Western borders” (Dawn 2017).

7.6. **Indian Pro Active Operations under ‘Non-Nuclear Environment’:**

This part of the study covers engagement of Pakistan Armed Forces against sub-conventional warfare in former East Pakistan, non-kinetic warfare in Sind, and insurgency in Baluchistan province. All the above challenges were sponsored and received direct support from Indian political and military leadership. Indian ambitions of indirect warfare to bleed and disintegrate Pakistan are not new though recently got camouflaged under proactive military strategy. Details of which will be explained in a dedicated section of this chapter but first Indian indirect strategy against Pakistan is narrated in the subsequent paragraphs.

**A. East Pakistan**

Exploiting the internal political disorder and bipolar nature of the international system, India trapped Bengalis against anti-Pakistan sentiments. Through highest political approval, the Indian armed forces trained thousands of Bengalis under ‘Mukti Bahini’ militant group that launched a well planned insurgency against Pakistan civil and military administration in East wing (Khaleej Times, 2015). Indulged into massive massacre of pro-Pakistan segments, the ‘Mukti Bahini’ with the help of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the prime military intelligence of India, successfully penetrated into major cities and created civil disorder. Pakistan’s political and military leadership stayed calmed and wanted to evolve the situation to broader negotiations with the then Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, who won the elections and secured more than 95% seats in East Pakistan (Ahmer, 2018). Meanwhile militants of the ‘Mukti Bahini’ started executing pro-Pakistan Bengalis in front of military check posts igniting hatred
and brutality (Hali, 2016). Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman endorsement to ‘Mukti Bahini’ terrorism and massive killing inevitably invoked decisive decision to stop the lawlessness, disorder, and chaos perpetrated by the Indian sponsored Awami League and Mukti Bahinis (Bose, 2011). Thereafter, the involvement of Pakistan Army in East Pakistan can be divided into two broad phases.

i. Phase 1-Regaining Control

“Operation Search Light, March 26th to Mid April 1971”—This operation was launched by Pakistan Armed Forces to regain control of the province from Bengali rebels under Awami League (Ahmed, 2017). Counter-insurgency in East Pakistan was unique i.e. its first phase was conventional such as direct strategy and second phase followed the indirect strategy to fight the insurgency (Zaki, 2012). All six East Bengal Regiments resisted disarming. Pitched battles were fought and bulk of these regiments deserted to India. Bulk of East Pakistan Rifles and police also deserted to India with their weapons (Matinuddin, 1994). 57 Brigade cleared Dacca by 26 March. Heavy casualties were suffered by the Bengalis, as artillery, armour and heavy infantry weapons were used to clear the city. After clearing Dacca, 57 Brigade moved 180 miles in 5 days to link up with the besieged troops at Rajshahi. 107 Brigade cleared Jessore sector by 18 April after many pitched battles. 23 Brigade cleared Rangpur-Saidpur area by 25 April. Artillery fire was used to clear Bogra. 53 Brigade, after securing Comilla on night 25/26 March, left behind an artillery unit and moved off to link up with Chittagong garrison. 117 Brigade ex 9 Division on arrival in East Pakistan was sent to Comilla by air. It fanned out in battalion columns and secured the sector by 10 April. The single infantry battalion at Chittagong was reinforced by air with another newly arrived infantry battalion and two companies of Commandos on 26 March. 53 Brigade, after covering 105 miles and losing two Lieutenant Colonels en-route, linked up with
Chittagong garrison on 31 March. Rangamati and Kaptai were cleared by 11 April. The only infantry battalion in the area held the airfield till 313 Brigade ex newly arrived 9 Division started landing there. 313 Brigade cleared the area.

**ii. Phase 2-Fighting Insurgency**

Mid April 1971 to November 21, 1971—On April 11, Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi took over as Commander Eastern Command (Siddiqi, 2004). Phase I of counterinsurgency i.e. regaining control of East Pakistan was almost finishing. The typical military mindset had regained LAND at all costs, but the PEOPLE inhibiting that land had been lost very cheaply. What was captured in two weeks could not be guarded in next 6 months. The phase which should have been fought on political front was lost due to overstretch and over-estimation of effectiveness of military muscle. It was a typical counter-insurgency operation. To guard 2000 miles long border with India and simultaneously protect all important places within the country against almost 100,000 Mukti Bahinis and 70 million hostile populations with just 43,000 troops was not possible. The situation had all seeds of disaster, already sown in (Matinuddin, 1994).

Pakistan army was unable to counter Indian plans of disintegration. Well orchestrated plans of India allowed execution of its strategy on multiple fronts where Pakistan was almost unprepared (Dasgupta, 2016). Some of the findings are:

- Indian ability to compass political leadership of East Pakistan against leadership of West Pakistan allowed it to create socio-economic gaps that ultimately helped the intelligence agencies to exploit.

- Due to inability of the two political leaderships claimant to uphold the mandate to lead Pakistan failed to surrender their selfish slogans of serving the nation. This division further penetrated into politics while creating an environment suitable to pronounce independence, ultimately established Calcutta (India) based shadow government.
‘Mukti Bahini’ as militant wing of the Indian military did its best but failed to uphold the major blow to Pakistan army. Visualizing defeat on the fronts of insurgency, Indian political leadership finally decided to send its military to wage war on a sovereign territory of Pakistan.

Ill-prepared political planning of Pakistan lacked to comprehend the overall situation. Army was used to handle a political problem through military solution which ultimately exasperated the circumstances.

Indian politic-o-military objectives did not allowed Pakistan to achieve its immediate goals meant to bridge and install long term objectives such as installation of non-radical civilian setup.

The immediate objectives of the then politic-o-military objectives of Pakistan altogether lost importance of the people. Territory was considered more important over people. Even today, all books on 1971 tragedy claim that the military maneuver was almost victorious as army handled the situation well and regained control over the land of East Pakistan. Aspirations of the people of East Pakistan along with their hearts and minds were given least importance. The ruthless efficiency with which phase-1 of counter insurgency was completed alienated the whole population.

Due to collapse of the civilian administration and alienated population, the intelligence set up became non-existent. The initiative passed to the insurgents. Pakistan Army became reactive in its own strategy.

The well orchestrated exterior maneuver of the Indian political leadership allowed it to present herself as liberator and Pakistan as aggressor. Pakistan faced complete isolation on the situation and thrice failed to get approved ceasefire resolution from the UNSC on 5th, 6th, and 13th December 1971, respectively. The resolutions were ‘Vetoed’ by the then Soviet Union (Russia).

Multifaceted nature of insurgency as a separatist movement was never comprehended by the government and local martial law authorities. To them, there was one solution to every problem and that was tight and strict martial law.
While giving approval to the ‘Operation Search Light’, no thought was given to follow it quickly through April or May with some sort of political solution. Use of force, instead of means, became an end in itself.

B. Events in Baluchistan

During the Cold War era, Pakistan faced almost three insurgencies in Baluchistan funded and supported by India, Afghanistan and former Soviet Union. In the aftermath of which, Pakistan army was thrice involved in Baluchistan in counter-insurgency operations. The details of which are given below:

• 1958-1960

The insurgency initiated by Sardar Nowroz Khan Zehri in district Jhalwan resulted in a full-fledged military operation and was terminated by negotiations in 1960 (Ahmad, 2013).

• 1963-1969

In 1963, the insurgents resorted to classical guerrilla warfare. The army hit back with force. In 1967, with the appointment of General Musa as Governor West Pakistan, general amnesty was announced. In 1969, insurgency completely ceased when President Yahya Khan finished ‘one unit’ and recreated Baluchistan as a province, this being a major demand of insurgents (Rizwan, Waqar, & Arshad, 2014).

• 1973-1977

On charges of sedition, Mr. Bhutto dismissed the Baluchistan government, banned the National Awami Party (NAP) and arrested its leaders in 1973. Within six weeks, Baloch started their third insurgency under Mir Hazar. By 1974, insurgency had spread in the entire length and breadth of Baluchistan. As a result of army operation ‘Chamalang’, the guerrillas suffered heavily and were forced to shift their bases to Afghanistan. With this, the number of guerrillas in
Baluchistan declined and so did the insurgency (Majeed & Hashmi, 2014). Insurgency, however, finished in 1977 when General Zia took over and released NAP and Baluch leaders and announced general amnesty for insurgents.

Insurgencies in Baluchistan have been outbreak of regional-cum-international politics that created space for local ‘Sardars’ to denounce the writ of Pakistan. Though, largely remained unsuccessful to disintegrate Pakistan but became quite lucky to get acquaintance with India, Afghanistan and Soviet Russia. Both India and Afghanistan have been seriously funding and helping to rejuvenate militant wings of the Baloch insurgent (Dawn, 2017b). Following conclusions can be drawn out of this situation.

1. In all three insurgencies, the army was very effective in controlling the situation but never managed to finish it. It finished either by negotiations, or through political solution of the problem. Basically, all three insurgencies were political in nature and could have been avoided by better political handling.

2. The standard of motivation and training displayed by the army to deal with insurgency was more than satisfactory. In Baluchistan, army always put the insurgents on the defensive.

3. Baloch Sardars were instrumental in initiating the three insurgencies. Their aim was to keep civilization out of their area so that they could continue their repressive rule.

4. India, Afghanistan and Soviet Russia provided material support to grind their own axe.

5. Immature handling by various political governments always compounded the problems. It was during the third insurgency i.e. 1973-77, that new roads were constructed throughout Baluchistan. The exposure of interior Baluchistan to progress and development was instrumental in pacifying the masses.

6. The third Baloch insurgency was well handled. Military action was followed by civil action of opening of Baluchistan through roads, airports and schools. Release
of Baloch leaders and grant of general amnesty completed the economic and political parts of counter insurgency.

C. Events in Sindh

Sindh is claimed as the forefather’s territory of Hindutva fascists, had always given impetus to contemporary ideological preambles. Recognition of ‘Sindh’ into national anthem of India had clustered it into its basic identity that they have been striving to achieve (Sequeira, 2015). The post partition Pakistan has hosted and accommodated more than a million migrants who left India to seek prosperous future. Handsome amount of them particularly the Urdu speaking migrants settled in Karachi, the then Capital city of Pakistan (Ansari, 1994). Sindh being the host territory of old civilizations and strong political landscape of South Asia is believed to uphold conscious interaction with its cultural, intellectual and ethnic heritage (Possehl, 2002). The post partition migration into one of its port city along with massive influx of other ethnic Pakistani communities who to secure their prosperous future ended up in Karachi, invoked the very nationalistic appraisal within Sindhi nation. Karachi since the very first day has been an economic lifeline normally referred as ‘back-bone’ of Pakistan. Massive migration was natural due to its economic status as port city and political centre as capital. The positive amalgamation was supposed to be taken as a recipe of progress and development but it ended up into ethno-political competition (Vaughan, Karimi, & Khan, 2017). Insurgency, civil disorder, terrorism, law and order situation, whatever we may call it, in Sindh it could be divided into two distinct categories, rural and urban. Both being different in nature need separate handling.

• Rural

On August 14, 1983, due to long rule of Martial Law and alleged atrocities committed by the law enforcing agencies, sense of deprivation, growing unemployment, inflation and price
hike, the native Sindhis launched the movement for civil disobedience commonly known as the MRD (Paracha, 2015). Within a few days, the movement turned violent in northern Sindh. The inability of the MRD leadership to initiate agitation in other parts of the province allowed the military regime to isolate it to rural areas of Sindh only. The movement was crushed by the martial law administration. The second MRD movement began on August 14, 1986 (Paracha, 2015). Many clashes between angry mob and law enforcing agencies were witnessed, leaving many dead. The whole communication system was disturbed. Army dealt with the insurgents very strongly. By September 1986, the movement lost its momentum. The phenomenon of dacoits however increased manifold. Finally, on June 19, 1992, Operation Clean-Up was launched by the army (Fazila-Yacoobali, & Jan, 1996). Although, in rural Sindh, army could never recover from the shock of Tando Bahawal incident, yet the operation was very successful (Raja, 2015). Within months, the ‘Dakoo Raj’ was crushed and the rural Sindh took a sign of relief.

- **Urban**

By June 19, 1992 i.e. the day Operation Clean-Up started in urban areas, the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) militants got enough time to disperse their arms and militants. Army thus could not recover any sizeable number of arms. Instead of six months, the army remained deployed for 29 months and finally was withdrawn on November 30, 1994 without having achieved any worthwhile results. The Rangers took over the urban areas from the army. In 1995-96, the MQM militant set-up was penetrated by the intelligence and acting very aggressively, the Rangers either killed most of the militants or put them in jails. By mid 1996, Karachi calmed down (Raja, 2015). However, the Rangers operation was only against the militants of MQM as its political wing totally remained untouched.
The successful execution of political-cum-military strategy by the state of Pakistan allowed the desired objective fulfilled. Though, successful but lessons to be learned. Some of the lessons are mentioned below.

- **Importance of the Political Wing in Insurgency:** The most striking lesson of dealing with insurgency in urban and rural Sindh was regarding the effects of lack of a single political organization in rural Sindh. The two MRD campaigns were militarily crushed and their sympathizers turned into dacoits. The dacoits were spread in small groups without any central authority. Instead of having any political agenda, they had become petty criminals. They were dealt with militarily and crushed. However, in urban areas, the militancy was part of political organization, which had adopted terror as a policy. Army failed in urban areas because it remained on the defensive. Rangers adopted offensive strategy, but against the visible portion of the iceberg. They had short-term success but in the long-term all of their efforts were wasted. The lesson learnt was that the political organization should be the prime target of any proactive sub-conventional/low intensity conflict campaign.

- **Over burdening the Army in Urban Sindh:** The basic flaw in the conception and execution of Operation Clean-Up was practical handing over of urban areas to Army. The army got too much entangled and burdened with administration of the area. The civil administration and police were ordered around by the army. Army should have remained subservient to the civil administration and concentrated only on the militants. Picketing, searches and cordons etc should have been left to police and the civil law enforcement agencies. The government, administration and intelligence agencies should have dealt with the political wing of MQM but under a single coordinated plan.

The untouched political stalwarts of MQM along with their conspiracy of ‘Jinnahpur’ came to public surface in 2001 when its founder Altaf Hussain visited India. His visit was sponsored and facilitated by the Indian intelligence agency RAW. In a seminar in New Delhi, he criticized the partition of India and claimed that “Quaid-e-Azam’s quest for Pakistan was a big mistake” (Raja, 2015). Contrary to his public vengeance, the political wing of MQM remained
untouched and intact until in 2013 when the then civil regime of PM Nawaz Sharif finally decided to authorize Pakistan Rangers to launch operation against all the elements including political wings of any cluster that is causing instability in Karachi (Dawn, 2013). Today, Karachi is much safe place to invest and live. The ‘Muhajir Quomi Movement’ is banned in Pakistan and is now operated from London, whereas many of its former leaders residing in Pakistan had registered a new party ‘Mutahidda Quomi Movement’ and actively taking part in the national politics.

7.7. **Indian Pro Active Operations under ‘Nuclear Environment’:**

The episode of punishing Pakistan through multifaceted approaches particularly military adventures is observed to erupt as seasonal installments. Just like season one of any TV program that comes again with fresh ideas in season two and continues its subsequent on air shows keeping in view the interest of audiences that it secure over the period of time. The same very way Indian military adventurism has launched its military operations based on season one, season two, and so on. That is why when it comes to evaluate Pakistan’s threat perceptions, one has to dock his political affiliation and rationally investigate the subject matter. The scientific outlook of the national security challenges starting from post-independence period to date, Pakistan’s reaction and military response will also be based on season one, season two and so on mantra that India originated to consume most of its domestic opinion. After doing so many efforts and adventures, success at last did knocked Indian doors in East Pakistan, when Pakistan lost half of its territory. Due promises did executed their operations in Baluchistan and Sindh but failed to achieve the same results like in East Pakistan. Efforts accompanying frustrations in the Indian military doctrine continued in the aftermath of Cold War when in 1998, India detonated
its nuclear device for the second time. This time India officially declared itself a nuclear weapon state.

In the aftermath of its second nuclear test, never changing India once again charted humiliating statements and its top political leadership told Pakistan to forget about Kashmir and also accept Indian hegemony in the region (Ram, 1999). Continuing the very regret of independence when back in 1947 Congress leaders dipped with Hindu extremism wanted to squeeze Pakistan and take it back through force, the subsequent Indian leadership vested the policy of hatred into its political and military thought (Ashraf, 2017). On the day of overt nuclearization (May 11, 1998), Pakistan was once again standing on the same verge of ‘struggle for independence’. In 1947, Pakistan got independence from the British Crown and had to defend its national security and territorial integrity for many decades from belligerent neighbor that wanted to take it back or at-least sliced her into many parts (Dalrymple, 2015). The wish to make Pakistan subservient to its will remained an unending phenomenon in Indian neighborhood politics. Pakistan resisted with meager economic and military means to Indian ambitions but the May 1998 Indian nuclear explosions staunchly pushed Islamabad to the wall and inaugurated a new phase of power matrix (Khan, 2003).

The overt nuclearization environment gave momentum to Indian military adventurism. Pakistan protested against aggressive and destabilizing designs of New Delhi. It recorded the protests to the highest forums of international peace and security including UN and western capitals. Pakistan professed sanctions against Indian act of horizontal nuclearization and also demanded concrete assurances of its national security in the wake of Indian aggressive designs. After provoking all instruments of international diplomacy and waiting for consecutive seventeen days, when Pakistan received no positive condemnation and credible denouncement
on Indian acts, it finally decided to bring ‘balance of power’ into power matrix of South Asia. The then Pakistan’s PM Nawaz Sharif said in a televised speech that “today, we have settled a score and have carried out five successful nuclear tests” (Kauravi & Waqar, 2016). Not surrendering to Indian will and also ensuring its ultimate territorial integrity, Pakistan responded back with five nuclear tests on May 28, 1998 and May 30, 1998, respectively (Anderson & Khan, 1998). Pakistan reassured its independence once again, though Kashmir remained under Indian occupation.

Kashmiri aspirations piled-up and motivation to come out of Indian military clutches got stronger than ever before. Pakistan with its commitment to take and support Kashmir dispute at all forums showed no weakness when in 1999 both countries indulged into war under the nuclear overhang. The crises were averted through US intervention (Mazari, 2003). The aftermath brought frustration into Indian military mindset who through political backlash wanted to punish Pakistan on its orchestration of Kargil operation. Due to nuclear threshold, the superior Indian conventional military that also hold nuclear weapons failed to respond back. The gaps of Indian military response mounted when few of Kashmiri freedom fighters attacked Indian Parliament in 2001. Regardless of initiating any credible investigation or requesting Pakistan to help them out, New Delhi under frustration labeled Islamabad the orchestrator of attack on its parliament. Pakistan denied such allegations and offered complete support in the investigation. Failed to counter the attack on time which continued many weeks, the Indian leadership immediately decided to mobilize its forces towards the border to formally get into war with Pakistan under operation ‘Parakaram’. Pakistan also mobilized its armed forces and gave a signal of readiness in case of any Indian military adventure (Matinuddin, 2003). The standoff between the two militaries backed-up by their governments remained intact for many months. Indian failure to
punish Pakistan ended up in its retreat. Irony of the fact was the human cost that Indian army incurred during deployment of forces for operation ‘Parakram’ that claimed about 798 of its soldiers without ending up into formal battle with Pakistan (Times of India, 2003).

Frustrations emanating from mobilization differential favorable to Pakistan, reinforced through Operation Parakaram-2001/2002 hastened Indian military hierarchy towards development of a new military doctrine. Thus, building on NATO’s military concepts, Indian Army officially unveiled her Cold Start Doctrine on April 28, 2004. The underlying notion is to achieve surprise by giving no or minimum reaction time to Pakistan for possible response while at the same time Indian forces achieves military aims prior to intervention by the international community (Ladwig III, 2008). For realization of new doctrine, Indian Army embarked upon a developmental strategy which could take another decade or so. Therefore to implement the doctrine with available force structure, Indian military came up with the concept of Pro Active Strategy (PAS). The strategy aims at ‘Hit and Mobilize’; intending to launch multiple shallow thrusts all along the front to create response dilemma (Kumar, 2011).

Today, the use of jingoism in shape of anti-Pakistan slogan is out of political control and had become a permanent feature of domestic and international diplomacy of India (Shaheedi, 2018). The out of control jingoism gave strength and so-called legitimacy to Indian military planning to pinch the idea of proactive military operations in nuclear environment (Ali, 2016). This is now a derivative of socio-political discourse of Indian national politics that has consumed even the most responsible authorities such as Chief of Indian Army Bipin Rawat floated the idea of ‘surgical strikes’ to help PM Narendra Modi’s political campaign (Shukla, 2018). Pakistan has even labeled him ‘secretary general of BJP’ due to his unprofessional statements to provoke the environment under jingoism (The News, 2018).
7.8. **Indian Notion of Surgical Strikes:**

The 21st century India is inhabitant of two different segments of society. One that holds Indian modernity as the key to its success and the other upholds the idea of Hindutva ideology. The moderate mostly accepts multipolarity of India with that of her multiethnic society, whereas the stalwarts of Hindutva ideology wants to purify India from all different religions with that of their identity as a non-Hindu. The moderates in line of their internationalization are respective of regional realities with that of Pakistan’s sovereignty and integrity, whereas the Hindutva ideologists are striving to reverse the 1947 partition of Indian sub-continent under ‘Akhand Bharat’. This war within has put India into such a crisis that no institution is out of its influence. Congress Party of India in this respect falls in the premises of ‘moderate regime’, whereas Bharitya Janata Party (BJP) is the sole representative of ‘Hindutva ideology’. Right now in India BJP is the ruling party which is led by Narendra Modi as the Prime Minister. Modi is the same old guy who being Chief Minister of the Gujrat State is famous for killing many thousand innocent Muslims in 2002. Immediately, after becoming Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi has started fulfilling the manifestation of Hindutva ideology. The first step he took in this direction was to orchestrate a new institutional outlook of India vested by the Hindutva ideology. Somehow, BJP had already penetrated into the institutions of India but this time the ‘butcher of Gujrat’ is on the driving seat, who even in the 2014 and 2019 election campaigns had promised to fulfill the destiny of Hindutva. As a result of sweeping political mandate, the military is now open for full blown manifestation of Hindutva.

Today, the Hinduization of Indian military had evolved a unique nexus of brotherhood between politics and its armed forces. To achieve the destiny of Hindutva one of the primary objective that Modi had to achieve was making Pakistan a subdued state or a nation left with
many mini-Pakistan. This study had already pointed out that how Indian military had created an army of ‘Mukti Bahini’ in East Pakistan back in 1971 and disintegrated the country into two separate states. East Pakistan is now known as Bangladesh. Modi being the exceptional leader of Hindutva did became successful to uphold the most powerful position of India but also realized that the manifestation of breaking Pakistan into parts is no more a doable objective. It had to do it somehow because most of Hindutva stalwarts gambled on him as the only man to bring the prophecy of Hindutva true and take back the glory of ‘Akhand Bharat’. Therefore, Modi had been striving to apply all means available to subdue Pakistan and disintegrate the country into many new states. Fortunately, the resilience of Pakistani nation with that of strong armed forces did not helped Modi to fulfill the prophecy. Even the acceptance and approval of Indian military to Hindutva ideology with all military means available failed to subdue and destroy Pakistan.

It is important to note that immediately after entering into Prime Minister office, Modi was well aware of the fact that the ideological domain of Hindutva is far from political reality rather could be used as a dictum of his political legitimacy. Hindutva did provide Modi the required power but he failed to subdue Pakistan. Therefore, he has adopted a new strategy to isolate Pakistan on economic, political, diplomatic, and military fronts. Much of the detail is already provided in chapter five and six, whereas this section of the study has taken ‘Indian notion of surgical strikes’ as the key element of Hinduization of Indian military. So, along with other means of isolating Pakistan, the only possibility that Modi can exercise to prove his leadership and manifestation of Hindutva ideology was to propagate the notion of surgical strike. On which plea India should execute such an adventure became the fundamental challenge for Modi. So, India also created logic behind it just like it did back in 2004, when it propagated the limited war scenario under ‘Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)’. The logic of CSD was rested on a
terrorist attack and the same was presented as logic behind the surgical strike. The dilemma of the logic behind CSD and ‘surgical strike’ was not the terrorist attack itself rather who conducted it. So, without investigating who is behind the attack, Indian politico-military thinkers coined both ideas. They did it with deliberate purpose. For example, the execution of both CSD and ‘surgical strike’ is rested on a plea of terrorist attack and Pakistan has been already assumed as the perpetrator of any sort of attack in India. What a great vision of dealing with a nuclear state?

It is also important to notice that Indian military has been an occupant force in Kashmir since 1947. There are more than 25 UN Resolutions to negate Indian occupation and allow Kashmiris to their fundamental right of self-determination, which was in 1948 accepted by India by the then Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru. There are lots of other violent movements going on in India which are claiming their right of freedom from Indian constitutional hegemony. Some of the important movements are happening in Punjab (Khalistan Movement), North East of India (Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Manipur, Assam and Nagaland), and Jammu and Kashmir. If any of these separatist conduct a terrorist attack then what? Would India still blame Pakistan? Did Pakistan kill Indra Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India? The Indian Sikh in revenge of Golden Temple incident killed Indra Gandhi, who was her body guard. The same was the fate of Indian Prime Minister Rajev Gandhi, who was killed by a Tamil woman. She did a suicide attack. Disowning its own internal fault lines while putting the burden on Pakistan gives no logic to India to execute CSD and ‘surgical strike’. Therefore, ideas like CSD and ‘surgical strike’ can only be executed under a ‘false flag operation’ that means Indian politico-military stalwarts had to conduct terrorists attacks by themselves and then put the blame on Pakistan.

Since, Pakistan had already developed a robust response mechanism to outcast the execution of CSD through developing a tactical nuclear warhead ‘NASR’, therefore, the notion
of surgical strike is the only manifestation of such a politic-o-military Hindutva nexus to punish or subdue Pakistan. Knowing the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear country and it cannot be vanished neither disintegrated any more, the Indian notion of surgical strike got impetus in the Modi’s political options. To materialize the promises made in the election campaign, Modi’s political gambling wanted to exercise surgical strikes against Pakistan with a purpose to retain his political constituency with that of giving birth to a new generation of anti-Pakistan as his permanent future followership. Since, Hindutva philosophy’s foundations are rested on the negation of any other cast living inside its territory with that of Muslims as the prime target, Pakistan becomes the biggest victim of its ideology; therefore, to keep alive the Hindutva ideology and Modi’s own future relevance madness around ‘surgical strikes’ was devised. In case of a successful execution of the idea, Modi regime foresaw not only deep acceptance of the ideology but a permanent future role of his leadership into the Indian strategic discourse.

That is why in September 18, 2016, Indian army under a ‘false flag operation’ facilitated an operation at ‘Town of Uri’ situated in Indian occupied Kashmir that killed 17 of its soldiers (BBC, 2016). Under the preplanned strategy, Pakistan was blamed. Pakistan urged the international community to investigate the incident and denied its involvement. It also extended complete cooperation in the investigation (Dawn, 2016). Regardless of accepting the cooperation of Pakistan with that of launching a formal investigation, Modi created a countrywide hostile environment against Pakistan and ignited the wave of punishing Pakistan. It was clearly visible that the Uri incident was an attempt to boost the momentum of the possibility and eventuality of ‘surgical strike’ against Pakistan. Therefore, India on September 28, 2016 had constructed a drama of ‘surgical strike’ that was not only denied by Pakistan but also exposed through inviting international media and observers (Hussain, 2016). Pakistan’s reaction was much mature and
calculated which only revolved around decoding Indian ‘false flag operation’ and exposing its misleading claims about the ‘surgical strikes’ inside Pakistan that never happened.

Due to Pakistan’s open-ended offer of investigation into ‘Uri incident’ as well as exposing India drama of surgical strike, Modi’s dreams of punishing Pakistan and convincing its domestic audience particularly the Hindutva zealot’s not only started perishing but also received tremendous backlash. The moderate segment of Indian society with that of liberal political parties launched a denouncing campaign against Modi’s efforts to stall peace in the region. Modi was exposed by Pakistan and Indian moderate political factions. Resilient to his madness and to keep the notion of surgical strike alive, Modi invested hugely on propaganda. He sanctioned and funded a movie on ‘Uri: The Surgical Strike’ which was released on January 11, 2019, made to disorient the Indian public and keep them away from the facts (Times of India, 2019). Even the director of the movie was not much convinced with the rhetoric of anti-Pakistan in the film and said that “his film is not to show Pakistan in a bad light” (Hindustan Times, 2019). In September 2018, Modi had also celebrated the day of ‘surgical strike’ in a bid to remember himself as a ‘God Father’ and to provoke anti-Pakistan nationalism. Even to raise a next generation of Hindutva ideology mesmerized by Modi’s irrevocable leadership, the universities were ordered to celebrate the ‘Surgical Strike Day’ on September 29 (NDTV, 2018). Even all these efforts of Modi did not mesmerize the Indian population. As a result in December 2018, Modi lost assembly elections in many of the key states. Three of these states were known as the homeland of Hindutva ideology (BBC, 2018). Regardless of enhancing his popularity and becoming a permanent ‘God Father of Hindutva ideology’, Mr Modi’s political future started dying and entered into turmoil.
This time the possibility of his re-election in 2019 General Elections was at stake. To restore its lost glory, Indian military once again conducted a ‘false flag operation’ on February 14, 2019 in Pulwama district of Indian occupied Kashmir, when a local resident of Pulwama’s Kakapora, Adil Ahmad Dar did a suicide attack on Indian paramilitary forces that killed almost 44 of its soldiers while injuring 70 others. This was one of the worst attacks happened against the Indian forces in occupied Kashmir (Dawn, 2019a). Unfortunately, regardless of understanding the sensitivity of Kashmiri resilience against its armed forces brutal violence, the Indian government allowed a new wave of nation wise hatred against Kashmiris. As a result, Kashmiri youth studying in Indian institutions had to flee for their life. Many had to take refuge in the mosques. Business and property of Kashmiri people in India were burnt by the Hindu mobs under the patronage of BJP government. The situation got ‘bad to worst’ that Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi had to write a letter to ‘United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’. His letter specifically pointed out that:

“As if the use of pellet guns against Kashmiri protestors, the outright refusal by India to initiate political dialogue with the Kashmiris and Pakistan, ongoing ‘shoot to kill’ orders against Kashmiris, were not enough, there is now a concerted campaign to whip up hatred and violence against Kashmiris and discrimination against them across India... Even more worryingly, the Indian government has chosen to remain silent in the wake of most appalling acts of violence against Kashmiris, perpetrated by extremist elements” (Siddiqui, 2019).

To the fact of military might that India enjoys in occupied Kashmir is of great reference here. For example, the occupied Kashmir is heavily militarized and availability of more then 1 million Indian troops in the region along with other law enforcement agencies with that of rigorous intelligence penetration each and everywhere, how come a person with 80kilogram of explosive could end up conducting a successful suicide attack? Even the Indian military officer, General D. S. Hooda told the international media that “it is not possible to bring such massive amounts of explosives by infiltrating the border” (Iqbal, 2019). It was orchestrated and facilitated
by the politic-o-military regime of India as happened in the Samjhuata Express terror attack when one of Indian army serving Col. Prohit was found behind the incident.

During the time of Pulwama incident a high profile delegation of Saudi Arabia led by Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman was in Pakistan. Therefore, the government in Islamabad remained preoccupied with the delegation and decided not to respond to Indian accusations of Pakistan’s involvement. As soon as the delegation was gone, Prime Minister Imran Khan came on national television and shared official stance of Pakistan on the Pulwama attack while answering to Indian counterpart about delay in the response. He said that:

“We had a very important visit from the crown prince of Saudi Arabia; we had an investment conference happening that we had been preparing for for a long time. Therefore, I decided not to respond then, because the attention would have been diverted away from the visit and onto this issue. This is why I am responding [now], now that the crown prince has left. And this [message] is for the Indian government. First of all, you accused Pakistan. [There was] no evidence. You never thought: 'What would be in it for Pakistan?' Would even a fool do such a thing to sabotage his own conference? And even if he [the crown prince] had not been visiting, what benefit would Pakistan get from it [the Pulwama attack]? Why would Pakistan, at this stage, when it is moving towards stability ─ we have fought a war against terrorism for 15 years, 70,000 Pakistanis have lost their lives, terrorism is receding, peace and stability are returning ─ what benefit would we get from it [the Pulwama attack]? You wish to remain stuck in the past, and each time something happens in Kashmir, you want to hold Pakistan responsible. Instead of trying to resolve the Kashmir issue, start a dialogue or move forward, you want to make Islamabad your whipping boy again and again. I am telling you clearly, this is naya Pakistan. It is a new mindset, a new way of thinking. We believe that it is in our interest that our soil is not used for carrying out terrorist attacks in other countries, nor do we want outsiders to come and carry out terror attacks here. We desire stability. Today, I would like to make the Indian government an offer. Any sort of investigation you wish carried out regarding this incident about the involvement of any Pakistani, we are ready [for it]. If you have any actionable intelligence that a Pakistani is involved, give it to us. I guarantee you that we will take action ─ not because we are under pressure, but because they [any individuals found involved] are acting as enemies of Pakistan” (Dawn, 2019b).

Having fears about mounting possibility of Indian aggression against Pakistan under the ‘notion of surgical strike’, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan also intimated to India that:

“We are hearing the voices in India that say 'Pakistan must be taught a lesson', 'Revenge must be taken from Pakistan', 'There should be a strike' ... First of all, what law gives any country to become judge, jury and executioner? What sort of [sense of] justice is this?
Secondly, you are facing an election year. And we believe that during the election, [you think] you will get a big boost if you ‘teach Pakistan a lesson’. If you think that if you can carry out any kind of attack on Pakistan, Pakistan will not just think about retaliating, we will retaliate. There will be no way to respond other than to retaliate” (Dawn, 2019b).

India on the other hand rejected Imran Khan’s offer of full support to investigate the Pulwama incident and labeled the provision of an ‘actionable intelligence’ as ‘lame excuse’ (Mahmood, 2019). Modi continued feeding the war hysteria both through public rallies and nation wise media campaign to boost up the public sentiments to punish Pakistan with that of proving himself as a man who can revenge from Pakistan. In fact, BJP chief Amit Shah while addressing to a public rally presented the case that “Narendra Modi led Central Government can give a befitting reply to Pakistan” (The Pioneer, 2019). The BJP allies also started investing on Modi’s leadership to revenge from Pakistan such as President of Lok Janshakti Patry (LJP) Mr Ram Vilas Paswan urged Modi to “take revenge” from Pakistan (McGrath, 2019). This was quite evident that Pulwama incident and its relationship with the upcoming 2019 General Elections have quite a criminal linkage which just requires an adventure of surgical strike that would put a political topping over the whole of Hindutva manifestation. As a result Modi would be re-elected and the gambling around the ‘game of thrones’ would be finally over. Now, the maneuver was back to the military pavilion.

Linking the dots of politic-o-military nexus of Hindutva zealots, the Congress Spokesperson Randeep Surjewala convened a press conference on February 21, 2019 and raised five serious questions about Pulwama incident. The questions included: “(1) Why is PM Modi not taking responsibility for the failures of Home Minister Rajnath Singh and NSA Ajit Doval?; (2) How did such huge amount of explosives and rocket launcher entered the area? How did the vehicle entered the area?; (3) Why was the video warning imminent attack overlooked? Why was
the letter written by the police ignored?; (4) Why was the CRPF’s demand for air travel not acceded?; (5) Why 488 jawans lost their lives in last 56 months?” (India TV, 2019).

Continuing with the pace of deconstructing ‘false flag operation’ by PM Modi, one of the prominent Hindu stalwarts particularly the traditional zealots of ‘Hindutva ideology’ such as Raj Thackeray (the son of Bal Thackery, the founder of Shiv Sena) also made serious accusations against Modi, when on February 25, 2019 during a public rally, he stated that “if NSA Ajit Doval is investigated, then all the truth about the Pulwama terror attack will come out”. He maintained that “every government manufactured such things but it is taking place more frequently under Modi’s rule”. Mr. Raj Thackeray called the killing of 44 soldiers as “political victims” (Hashmi, 2019).

The unwise political rhetoric and electoral milestone for the upcoming General Elections had put Modi into dilemma of ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’. This was reiterated by almost every single opposition party of India. For example, on February 22, 2019 the former Chief Minister of Indian occupied Kashmir, Mr Omar Abdullah said in an interview with Gulf News that “the prime minister [Modi] and his party men are using the tragedy of Pulwama in which more than 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel were killed to promote their own political agenda. It is the biggest disservice they are doing to the nation”. To highlight the atrocities of Indian military in occupied Kashmir, he pointed out that “Jammu and Kashmir has been at the receiving end of violence of this nature for nearly three decades now. Entire generations of people have been born and brought up in the shadow of gun”. This has created reaction in Indian occupied Kashmir, which is further fueled by the violence of Hindu nationalists. To underscore such a dirty nexus of state sponsored terrorism and violence, Mr Abdullah pointed out “it is no secret that Bajrang Dal and the student wing of the Sangh were
foremost in fomenting trouble against Kashmiri students in various parts of India. This was done keeping in mind the upcoming general elections” (Shaban, 2019).

The acts of terror are now deeply penetrated into Indian society, which at all stages cherish political backup. Due to this socio-political nexus of violence, at last Supreme Court of India had to intervene and told the state to protect Kashmiri youth (BBC, 2019a). Regardless of challenging Indian politic-o-military nexus vested with madness, most of its media and political parties started bashing Pakistan with an obsession of punishment. Pakistan armed forces were not on a silent mode, they were part and parcel of all the key decisions made in the aftermath of Pulwama incident. In particular, on February 21, 2019 a meeting of National Security Council was convened in Islamabad that formally “authorized Armed Forces of Pakistan to respond decisively and comprehensively to any aggression or misadventure by India” (Chaudhry, 2019).

Pakistan made all efforts to avoid the hostile environment but Indian plans starting from ‘false flag operation’ to its irrational conclusion of ‘surgical strikes’ finally proved Pakistani apprehensions true. Indian military on February 26, 2019 around 02:55 A.M got the guts to execute the idea of ‘surgical strikes’ in real time when from three sides it tried to enter into Pakistani air space to conduct surgical strikes deep inside Pakistani territory. The two caps of Indian combat plans approached separately towards Sialkot-Lahore air space and Okara-Bahawalpur air space, respectively. The third cap of Indian combat plans consisted of about eight fighter jets was the biggest formation and entered from the Kiran sector Azad Kashmir’s Muzaffarabad air space. Pakistan Air Force robust and efficient response did not allowed the Indian infiltration from Sialkot-Lahore as well as Okara-Bahawalpur side, whereas due to mountainous terrain of Azad Kashmir (which is adjacent to Indian occupied Kashmir); the Indian aircrafts were successful to enter 4 to 5 nautical miles and remained about four minutes inside
Pakistani air space. The third patrolling contingent of Pakistan Air Force challenged the Indian air craft’s entering from Azad Kashmir, who witnessing their encounter run amok and scrambled back into Indian occupied Kashmir. One of the Indian jets unloaded its payload at mountain of Jabba area of Azad Kashmir that killed none of the other but few pine trees (Radio Pakistan, 2019). Though, India claimed that it had killed more than 300 terrorists inside Pakistan in Azad Kashmir and destroyed the terrorist’s sanctuary (CNBC, 2019).

On the evolving security situation, the Prime Minister convened another special meeting of National Security Council (NSC) on February 26, 2019. The press release of the meeting “strongly rejected Indian claim of targeting an alleged terrorist camp near Balakot and the claim of heavy casualties. Once again Indian government has resorted to a self serving, reckless and fictitious claim. This action has been done for domestic consumption being in election environment, putting regional peace and stability at grave risk. The claimed area of strike is open for the world to see the facts on ground. For this domestic and international media is being taken to the impact site”. The Prime Minister Imran Khan also “directed that elements of national power including the Armed Forces and the people of Pakistan to remain prepared for all eventualities” (Prime Minister Office, 2019).

The Indian population was once again fed through false information because no target was hit inside Pakistan. The reality was that on two sides Indian air craft’s failed to enter into Pakistani air space while at the third side when Pakistan Air Force challenged them, the Indian air crafts run amok and in hurry simply unloaded the payload on a mountain where no infrastructure was damaged neither anyone was killed. Though, one person got slight injury due to shock wave impact of the dropped payload. Pakistan officially invited all the national and international media along with observers to witness the claim of Indian surgical strikes and
denied any causality inside its territory. The official spokesperson of Pakistan Armed Forces denied Indian claims and also unleashed a commitment of stern reaction to Indian violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. In a press conference, he briefed the media and said:

“India is using lying and deceit to lodge propaganda against Pakistan and there has been no attack on Pakistani soil. Not even a single brick or debris is present there. They are claiming 350 deaths… Had there been even [as less as] 10 casualties, there would be blood, funeral prayers, injuries… A lie has no feet to stand on. You saw their first [fictitious] ‘surgical strike’ [after Uri incident of 2016]. I told them that you will never be able to surprise us… We have not been surprised [by India]. We were ready, we responded…I said that we will surprise you [Indians]. Wait for that surprise. I said that our response will be different. The response will come differently” (Malik & Ali, 2019).

Keeping alive the politic-o-military alliance of Hindutva ideology, the context of surgical strike needed the ‘Pulwama terrorist attack’. In the aftermath a deliberate campaign was launched to bash Pakistan and Muslims of Kashmir. All this theatre regardless of Pakistani civil and military warnings convinced the Modi regime to attack inside Pakistan. It is also important to highlight that the formation of eight combat aircrafts that entered into Muzafarabad airspace of Pakistan were able to end up into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province of Pakistan, which is beyond Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Balakot is a settled area of KPK province and Indian air crafts were in violation of not only the Line of Control (LoC) of Kashmir but sovereignty of Pakistan (Pakistan Today, 2019).

Indian violation of Pakistani territory and misleading claims of killing more than 300 terrorists inside Pakistan not only was an attempt to isolate Islamabad in the world but also it put the nation into a situation of limbo. This situation was further aggravated through social media campaign as well as electronic media that Pakistan armed forces have failed to defend the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Furthermore, the Indian aggression and glaring violation of Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty was propagated as a victory inside and outside India. Even the Indian media revived the September 29 ‘Surgical Strike Day’ celebration in whole of India.
Contrary to the narrative built, Pakistan Air Force could trace and shot down the Indian air crafts on the eve of their violation of Pakistani air space but showed restraint. This was done to ensure that Pakistan is not a hostile nation in South Asia rather believes on credible defense of its country. Pakistan foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi communicated with all key stakeholders such as US Secretary of State, Chinese Foreign Minister, Turkish Foreign Minister, Polish Foreign Minister, and many others to expose Indian act of violation. He briefed all of them that it was an attempt to undermine Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The international community remained silent on the issue of Indian violation while New Delhi continued mounting the momentum of bullying Pakistan. Its foreign office, armed forces, media, society, diaspora, and even the highest political poles including Prime Minister Modi bashed Pakistan’s sovereignty, integrity, honor and respect. Pakistan was set aside and left alone and had no choice other than protecting its sovereignty, integrity, honor and respect at its own.

The very next day on February 27, 2019 when once again two Indian fighter planes (Mig-21 Bison and SU 30 MKI) violated Pakistani air space, Pakistan Air Force (JF-17 Thunder) successfully shot down both the planes, the first kill of the Sino-Pak joint venture aircraft. Earlier in 2017, the JF-17 aircraft has shot down the Iranian drone that violated Pakistan’s air space in Baluchistan province. With capacity of manufacturing 25 aircrafts annually, Pakistan is currently in possession of 110 JF-17 Thunder Block-I and Block-II aircrafts (Gady, 2019). A fourth-generation advance version of JF-17 Thunder Block-III (with two-seater cockpit in the aircraft) is under development. By 2020 Pakistan will be completing the induction of remaining 35 JF-17 Block-II and by 2022 PAF will be able to induct 28 JF-17 Block-III aircrafts (Rizvi, 2019).

To amicably address the Indian aircraft intrusion, this time Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had a go signal by the civil and military command. Shooting down Indian aircrafts proved that PAF
is really ‘second to none’ in the world. PAF conducted the operation in such a professional manner that first baited the Indian planes and then gave them no passage to run away. The wreckage of one plane was dropped inside Pakistan, whereas the other ended up into Indian occupied Kashmir. The pilot who ended up on Pakistani side was captured by the armed forces. His name is Wing Commander Abhi Nandan and holds service number 27981 (Ahmad, 2019). The other pilot who ended up inside Indian occupied Kashmir could not survive and died on ground due to serious injuries. Information did surface that Pakistan has also captured an Israeli pilot who was accompanying Indian pilot Abhi Nandan. The whereabouts of the Israeli pilot were neither disclosed nor endorsed by the Pakistani authorities (Malik, 2019).

This was not the first time when Pakistan captured an Indian pilot. For example, in 1999 during Kargil conflict Pakistan has captured around 7 Indian pilots. Even a bigger number of Indian pilots such as around 20 were captured in 1971 war. Pakistan’s professional conduct has taken care of all the pilots under the Geneva Conventions but this time the act of Indian aggression with that of violation of Pakistani sovereign air space has qualified Wing Commander Abhi Nandan for a different treatment. All this happened without declaration of war by India neither Pakistan was at war. Indian Air Force was operating under the surprise ‘surgical strike’ phenomenon and for that very reason Wing Commander Abhi Nandan was on a mission of espionage and attack inside Pakistan, which does not allow him to avail special privilege of ‘Prisoners of War’ under the Geneva Conventions. Just like the earlier Indian spy Commander Kalbushan Yadev who is already in Pakistan’s custody and facing the trial, this time Wing Commander Abhi Nandan was about to face the same trial under Pakistan’s legal system. Regardless of punishing the Indian pilot under espionage, aggression and act of violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, the Prime Minister Imran Khan on February 28, 2019 while speaking in a
Joint Session of National Assembly announced that the Wing Commander Abhi Nandan will be released on February 29, 2019 as a ‘peace gesture’. Imran Khan specifically said that “we have an Indian pilot. As a peace gesture, we will release him tomorrow” (Ghosh, 2019).

Pakistan has been professionally dealing with war mongering hysteria of Indian politics. Not only at times of war but during peace times, Pakistan has been responsible in dealing with Indian threats. For example, on November 14, 2016 when an Indian navy submarine entered into Pakistani territorial waters, the country’s elite strategic command decided to escort the submarine rather destroying the naval asset along with its crew (Abbas & Mallick, 2016). More importantly is the Indian submarine intrusion into Pakistani waters on March 04, 2019 when the hostile environment was already in place. Pakistan once again showed restraint and escorted the Indian navy submarine out of its waters and did not escalate the situation by destroying it (Siddiqui, 2019b).

Wing Commander Abhi Nandan was released on February 29, 2019 to send the message of peace to Indian nation in particular but to the world in general, which was very well taken by both audience. People were happy in India, whereas its media was still hostile to Pakistan and continued feeding false information to its nation and international audience. Contrary to Indian media hostility, international networks particularly BBC of United Kingdom (BBC, 2019) and CNN of United States (McKirdy, Britton, & Mackintosh, 2019) remained neutral and presented true picture of the crises with that of release of Wing Commander Abhi Nandan. All this was well projected and recorded by international media that the core of Indo-Pakistan conflict is the Kashmir issue. The most exceptional part and the climax of ‘false flag operation’ staged against Pakistan to negatively project Islamabad was a time when Wing Commander Abhi Nandan before leaving Pakistan voluntarily made a statement in which he not only appreciated
professionalism of Pakistan Army but also gave rebuttal to Indian media who has been indulged into war hysteria and presenting wrong information to its public. He specifically stated that:

“My name is Wing Commander Abhinandan and I am fighter pilot at Indian Air Force (IAF). I was looking to find the target when your air force shot down my warplane. Thereafter, I was left with no other option but to leave my aircraft which had broken down. I ejected and my parachute opened and I was carrying a pistol … there were many people [on the ground]. I had only one option for safety, I dropped my gun and tried to run away. People followed me and they were full of passion. Then two personnel of Pakistan Army arrived and saved me from [mob]. They kept me safe and took me to their unit where I was given first-aid and then I was taken to a hospital where I was given further medical treatment. Pakistan Army is a very professional service. I am very impressed with them. Indian media exaggerates a lot. They make a mountain out of a molehill” (The Express Tribune, 2019a).

This time when on October 27, 2019 Indian air craft pursued Pakistani planes were shot down. Pakistan immediately after Indian intrusion into its air space exposed New Delhi’s war mongering dreams and also brought its air force pilot to the lime light, so that the whole world could witness the reality and truth behind Indian intension to destabilize the peace of the region. In an official response to Indian aggression, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan once again appeared on national television and invited Indian counterpart to sit and fix the differences through dialogue. He said that:

“History tells us that wars are full of miscalculation. My question is that given the weapons we have, can we afford miscalculation? We should sit down and talk. I once again invite India to come to the negotiating table. If escalation begins from here, where will it go? We should sit and talk out our issues. Let better sense prevail” (The Express Tribune, 2019b).

Tit-for-tat is the climax of Indo-Pak history. Unfortunately, it got birth on the eve of independence in 1947 and is still posing potent threats to peace and stability of the region. The theatre of surgical strikes to subdue and punish Pakistan has failed and even became a permanent factor of shame for India. As the prime minister of Pakistan has said in his speech that “let better sense prevail” therefore India must understand the importance of peace and for tiny and small
objectives such as electoral benefits it must not escalate the tensions between nuclear nations. This has been even reiterated by Indian National Congress along with senior leadership of about 21 political parties mainly in opposition that altogether blasted on Narendra Modi “over using military for political purpose” (Times of Islamabad, 2019). Verifying the politic-o-military nexus in India, the BJP chief of the Karnataka state Mr BS Yeddyurappa stated that “the impact of this strike will help BJP win more than 22 seats in state” (Bhat, 2019).

The Hindutva ideology has just crossed the limits which is evident from the politic-o-military nexus of BJP and Indian military. To secure electoral benefits while ending up into a sovereign territory through a ‘false flag operation’ is nothing other than ‘utter non-sense and madness’. The modern generation and the leadership of India must get rid from such zealots of Hindutva, who for political gains are ready to kill their own soldiers. Narendra Modi is the same man who in the aftermath of 2002 Gujrat riots was banned by the United States and denied visa for about 12 years. Today, he is serving the second term being the Prime Minister of India with much volatile and vulnerable behavior than his previous position of Gujrat Chief Minister. The world must not underestimate the Hinduization of Indian military and its negative impacts on strategic stability of South Asia.

It is also a responsibility of international community to underscore and recognize Pakistan’s efforts to install peace in the region. Under the prevailing jingoism which the Modi regime has unleashed on Kashmir by imposing curfew, one must not forget that nation always strive to protect their integrity, honor, dignity and sovereignty. Was not this a case for US integrity, honor, dignity and sovereignty when 9/11 happened? How come Pakistan would be behaving like a lame duck, when just for electoral gains a madman in India would do a ‘false flag operation’ and attack its integrity, honor, dignity and sovereignty? How come a nation that
has sacrificed more than 70,000 of its soldiers and innocent civilians to fight the global war against terrorism would be surrendering its dignity, honor, respect and sovereignty to a ‘false flag operation’ crafted to maximize electoral mileage? It has to respond and assert its writ necessary to ensure integrity, honor, dignity and sovereignty of the nation.

As mentioned earlier that there are lots of other violent movements going on in India which are claiming their right of freedom from Indian constitutional hegemony. Some of the important movements are happening in Punjab (Khalistan Movement), North East of India (Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Manipur, Assam and Nagaland), and Jammu and Kashmir. If any of the separatist groups operating in these areas conduct a terrorist attack on Indian forces then would India still blame Pakistan? Did Pakistan kill Indra Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India? One of her bodyguard who was Indian Sikh killed Indra Gandhi to take revenge of her decision to conduct operation against Golden Temple. Military atrocities against the Tamil Nationalism cost India another Prime Minister Rajive Gandhi, who was killed by a Tamil woman by a suicide attack. With that of Indian curfew in Kashmir and abrogation of Article 370 and 35A, what repercussions New Delhi must be expecting other than revenge and more aggressive posture of Kashmiri youth. This time India would not need to orchestrate false flage operations rather Kashmiris themselves would end up taking weapons, a situation that Pakistan since the invasion of Kashmir has avoided by preferring UN based political means of solving the Kashmir dispute. Disowning its own internal fault lines while putting the burden on Pakistan gives no logic to India in particular and to international community in general to justify pro-active operations like ‘surgical strikes’ or limited war like scenarios.

7.9. Contours of Indian PAO Strategy:

Contours of PAO strategy are as under:-
i. Adopting ‘Hit and Mobility’ concept, undertakes multiple shallow thrusts through application of Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) by the Pivot Corps assets; taking advantage of surprise and unpreparedness of Pakistan defenses with a view to capture sensitive spaces and consume Pakistan’s tactical and operational responses.

ii. Simultaneously mobilizing up-to 3–4 Theatre Force Reserves (TFR) for exploitation of initial gains of the IBGs and absorbing/saturating strategic responses of Pakistan military. Seamless fusion between IBG and TFR operations is the scarlet thread of the concept.

iii. Retains balance at various stages; initially through TFR forces in transition with simultaneous rapid mobilization of formations adjacent to Kashmir, Punjab, and Sind provinces to operate as offensive and defensive corps.

iv. Exploiting Indian Air Force (IAF) high-tech and statistical superiority before requisite artillery build up begins to carry out own proactive operations (PAOs). The sole purpose of the IAF is to ensure key exclusion and degradation operations to attrite Pakistan Air Force (PAF) along with impeding mobility of its land forces.

v. On maritime fronts, employing Indian Navy offensively to attrite and detain Pakistan Navy (PN) maneuvers and bounds strategic supplies to interrupt upon combat determination and therefore causing demoralization.

vi. Keeping the “spatial and force degradation objectives” lower than Pakistan’s professed nuclear threshold; terminate the combat on accomplishment of required objectives.

a) Advantages:

- Smaller battle groups may mobilize swiftly, reducing their logistics requirements and enhancing their maneuverability along with ability to surprise. Moreover, IBGs can “capture and hold” territory but they lack control to carry out a knockout blow, thus denying “regime survival justification” for utilization of nuclear warheads.
• Multiple IBGs, operating independently, will incapacitate the defender’s decision making cycle, thus causing dislocation and early pull on strategic capability. Also, multiple points of application increase the challenge for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to monitor movement and target the dispersed Centre of Gravity (COG).

• Dispersed TFRs will seldom present sizeable target for effective counter force nuclear weapons employment by Pakistan, thus guaranteeing liberty for speedy and strong battlefield maneuvers (Sultan, 2011).

• India’s overall goals would be less predictable than in a total war and Pakistan will face difficulty as the military objectives would be less obvious.

b) Shortfalls:

• Concept is hinged on over reliance of Indian capability to shape the environment, an extremely stressful decision making process and assumption that Pakistan Army’s operational and strategic reserves would be consumed against IBGs and TFRs operations, respectively.

• Not only attainment of strategic surprise impossible in Indo-Pak context, it is not advisable between the two nuclear rivals.

• Seamless fusion and synergy in sequential application of forces at three tiers has tenuous time linkages. A transient imbalance exists in system of forces till arrival of TFRs.

• Culling out IBGs from holding Corps places excessive demands on their resources, leaving gaps in Indian defenses, to be filled in by Indian Border Security Force (BSF). This vulnerability provides a window for exploitation during the initial stages by own forces.

7.10. Pakistan’s Response to Indian PAO Strategy:

In response to Indian proactive strategy, Pakistan has adopted ‘New Concept of War Fighting’ (NCWF), which comprehensively addresses all the issues and threats arising from
Indian Cold Start Doctrine / Proactive Strategy and mounts a formidable response at all levels (Baig, 2018). This response not only addresses Pakistan’s vulnerability against ‘Hit and Mobilize’ concept by taking necessary safeguards, it also exploits enemy imbalance in early timeframe.

Salient features of the ‘New Concept of War Fighting’ (NCWF) are mentioned below:

- Notion of Victory
- Strategic Capability
- Fundamentals of Land Strategy

A. Notion of Victory / Politico-Military Aim - National Security Level

i. Pakistan’s own notion of victory at the national level has scripted and understood meant to defeat Indian politico-military aim. The desired end-state encompasses:

- Fulfillment of national aspirations and sensibilities through denial of overwhelming and sensitive spaces.
- Capture of enemy spaces—parity in effects.
- Economic viability of the nation.
- Ensuring national cohesion and guarding of vital national interests.

ii. The politico-military aim specifically read the overall objectivity as “deter war; if imposed, defend the territorial integrity of Pakistan including AJK and GB; ending it in defeat of politico-military aim(s) to India”.

B. Strategic Capability

i. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has been deliberately kept undeclared to prevent conceding space for war to India.

ii. The deterrence strategy is being harmonized with operational momentum.
iii. Nuclear strategy fully corresponds to the obtaining and projected national security paradigms providing requisite stability and reinforcement to the conventional domain.

iv. NCWF has achieved the requisite resolve along with backstopping conventional strategy at required point in time.

C. Fundamentals of Land Strategy

It ensures comparable effects in the professed limited-war scenario and maintains the required order through tiered balance within Pakistan’s forces for operational advantage over Indian mobility. The modified land strategy in the wake of Indian proactive strategy envisioned pre-positioning of ‘integrated combat groups’ (ICGs), ready to exploit defensive vulnerabilities of the enemy. Thus curtailing enemy’s offensive options or operationally shaping the battlefield through tandem application of residual offensive potential to expand the gains to strategic proportions. This also includes:

i. **Ready and Arrayed Forces**: Relocation of selected forces to operationally/strategically suited locations—the Integrated Combat Groups (ICGs) Concept. This builds the combat potential and agility of forces to be able to strike and defend in synchronization with adopted strategy on short notice.

ii. **Extended Battlefield / Enhanced Perimeter**: Owing to own intolerance to loss of space and being smaller of the belligerents, Pakistan has the ability to take the battle to the enemy, disturbing his design.

iii. **Constraint Management among the Services**: Pursuance of an integrated military strategy is orchestrated for accomplishment of perceived politico-military aim. Air and maritime constraints have been addressed to stay compatible with land strategy, which originally fluctuated between Defensive–Offensive to Total Denial Strategy.
India seeks to neutralize Pakistan’s pre-war deterrence by creating response/decision dilemma through multiple IBGs applications, thus denying counter force targets to Pakistan in early timeframe. Even TFR will not present very big target as against conventional war forces in large scale assemblies, but propagates the idea to create difficulty for Pakistan to use nuclear weapons early on counter-value targets, and escalate in lateral and parallel ladder, thus impacting upon Pakistan’s deterrence. The strategy inevitably challenges Pakistan’s policy of unmated nuclear devices, hence pushing its strategic capability in a higher mode of alert and readiness. Limited war will impact upon tempo of operations on both sides, thus race to attain, maintain and sustain the parity in efforts will lead to high attrition due to ‘operational surge’.

On the other hand, widening force differential limits Pakistan’s capacity to respond to Indian colossal offensive, makes deterrence unstable at an early stage. Proactive operations (PAO’s) are intended to project shallow objectives and do not include sensitive communication centers as Objective Zone(s), assumption that this may keep the Indian operations under nuclear thresholds is groundless. With undeclared nuclear thresholds and media savvy environment, intense public pressures make every space critical, sensitive and tantamount to nuclear threshold.

Indian bid for repetitive application of strategic reserves would be susceptible to high attrition and curtail options at operational level. Pakistan may surrender to pressures to safeguards its sovereignty through early/very early interface of the strategic capability. India retains the option to adopt ‘fire-break strategy’. This would make it difficult for Pakistan to decide on playing its nuclear card, since part or bulk of strategic forces might still be awaiting engagements, thus sounding Pakistan’s nuclear ante less reliable to international audience.
7.11. Threat Scenarios emerging out of Indian PAOs:

i. **Scenario 1 – No War / No Peace.** This is on-going situation, where India continues abetting terrorism and insurgency in FATA, Swat and Baluchistan. To add to the challenges, India also combines the above mentioned activities, also ferments/ supports politico-militancy in Karachi. Retains the option of having sufficiently depleted the conventional capability and compulsion to remain involved in sub-conventional operations, animates conventional threat. Sting operations or surgical strike mantra by India against alleged terrorists / proclaimed terrorist camps in AJ&K also remain probable. Army remains embroiled in sub-conventional operations.

ii. **Scenario 2 – Politico-Military Coercion.** Exploiting international aversion to terrorism, undertakes exterior maneuver to portray India as a state harboring terrorism. Using an act of terrorism as evidence, mobilize international community and UN to pressurize Pakistan through sanctions, embargoes and secures compliance of Pakistan on core issues. Partial or complete mobilization of armed forces is done concurrently to coerce international community and UN to realize the seriousness of conflict while pressurizing Pakistan of impending kinetic threat.

iii. **Scenario 3 – Limited War (Single Front).** Due to unsettled territorial issues, a limited war between India and Pakistan may take place within a specific geographical zone, involving limited conventional means (single or bi-service) e.g. Kashmir. Such conflict will also have the potential of transcending into conventional all-out war.

iv. **Scenario 4 – Conventional All-Out War (Single Front).** A limited war transcends into an all-out conventional war through graduated or simultaneous application of all services. This may be animated through PAOs or traditional assemblies followed by conventional war (graduated / simultaneous application of services).

v. **Scenario 5 – Conventional Two Front War (Supported by ERF).** Owing to continued denial of Pakistan to follow dictated strategy for counter terror operations, divergences with External Regional Forces (ERF) get pronounced, while India follows scenario 3 or 4 with tacit support of ERF. ERF provides technical and intelligence support and also postures her forces in a way that Pakistan is unable to pull out troops from FATA/Afghan border to cater for threat from India.
vi. **Scenario 6 – Limited War with ERF (Single Front).** Limited kinetic engagements to include border skirmishes, special operations (to include raids, sting operations, etc.) and kinetic strikes on selected targets.

vii. **Scenario 7 – Nuclear Exchange.** As a result of failure to control escalation in any conflict situation (Scenario 3-5), the situation escalates to nuclear exchange. This could be result of an accident or false alert as well.

**7.12. Pakistan Nuclear Strategy in PAOs Environment:**

Pakistan nuclear doctrine remains undeclared to preclude conceding space for combat including a limited war to India; therefore the deterrence strategy is harmonized with operational momentum and vectored on a fine strategic line balancing between pretension and indecision. Keeping in view Indian ambitions to create decision dilemma, nuclear strategy is corresponded to the obtaining and projected national security paradigms providing requisite stability and reinforcement to the conventional domain. Hence, declared ‘First Use Option’ becomes the most prudent policy for Pakistan due to its small geographical size, relative disparity in conventional capability, limited economic potential and war stamina (Tasleem, 2016). Therefore, Pakistan can draw best nuclear dividend through its strong resolve to employ nuclear weapons to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. To address international anxieties over safety and security issues of nuclear assets, Pakistan has adopted policy of proactive information operations to mitigate any such challenges. Pakistan also had showed requisite resolve to develop range of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for credible deterrence and/or back-stopping conventional strategy at any required time (Sultan, 2018). Overall Pakistan aims to draw the following effects from its nuclear and military strategies:

i. Deter war
ii. In case of war, apply early counter strokes to deny early gains to Indian IBGs, while preferring performance over viability. However, this ‘initial operational surge’ could cost higher for Pakistan Navy (PN) and Pakistan Air Force (PAF), whose higher attrition in initial phases may undermine capacity to support later phases of operations. In such case, they would change posture to ‘pro-active defense by PN’ or only ‘Defensive Counter Air Operations (DCAOs) by PAF’. It indirectly impacts upon the land operations as well.

iii. Early interface of nuclear and military strategies would result in following:-

- Neutralizing Indian non-linear operations.
- Provide relief to military strategy by covering up military imbalances and force differentials.
- Maintaining stability of the deterrence.
- Refute Indian notion of Pakistan’s perceived ‘nuclear threshold’.
- Wrest the advantage from India that it seeks from PAOs strategy or ‘Fire Break Strategy’.
- Harmonization of Deterrence Strategy, as India attempts to bring relevance back to her large conventional forces.
- Synchronized projection and application of tri-services capabilities.
- Aversion of Pakistan’s single service imbalance (PN/PAF).

Based on a credible minimum deterrence (CMD), Pakistan disregards any strategic arms race with India. In this context, it has even offered ‘strategic restraint regime’ with nuclear risk reduction measures to India (Rizvi, 2016). Pakistan supports only non-discriminatory international arms control regimes and classifies its nuclear program solely for deterrence purposes. The de-classified understanding of its nuclear doctrine stems the fundamentals of nuclear policy that ‘Pakistan shall not use its nuclear capability against a non-nuclear state’. Though, it retains ‘First Use’ option against India, till such time the imbalances in the conventional capability persist within the region. Not to officially compete with India but to ensure its national security, Pakistan maintains sufficient conventional force preparedness to
appreciate the increased nuclear threshold. This policy also allows Pakistan to avoid accidental outburst of nuclear war. Hence, credible minimum deterrence comes to play vital role to disallow Indian proactive operations particularly ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ by utilizing ‘flexible and sufficient’ means of triad delivery systems.

Pakistan has undertaken stringent safeguards and continues to improve its existing mechanisms to ensure the highest possible standards of security and safety of its nuclear assets. One of the highest bidding to use nuclear weapons at time of escalated conflict is vested with the civilian leadership of the country. Prime Minister chairs the highest body to declare deployment of nuclear weapons which is the National Command Authority (NCA). NCA is professionally assisted by the civilian leadership exclusively by the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) along with highest commands of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, who ensure employment and development of the nuclear threshold (NCA Act, 2010). Lessons learned from its previously weak nuclear accountability when Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of nuclear weapons program shared part of abandoned centrifuges with Iran downgraded the very potential of Pakistan’s positive image in the de facto nuclear club (Dawn, 2004).

Pakistan though never joined the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nor it violated any international agreement took stringent measures to brought Dr. A. Q. Khan to justice and officially undermined his actions. Therefore, today Pakistan has robust mechanism of nuclear export control regime such as Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) and signed many international protocols with International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) to ensure safety, security and safeguard its civil nuclear commerce (MOFA, 2018). For military program, Pakistan through its Strategic Plans Division (SPD) had raised more than 25,000 dedicated forces to ensure safety and security of its nuclear weapons and associated infrastructure (Haider, 2018).
Exposing its commitment not to share nuclear technology including material to unauthorized recipients, Pakistan had also passed Export Control Ordinance in 2004, which is being updated on regular basis (Dawn, 2015). Islamabad also maintains unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, unless provoked (The Express Tribune, 2016).

Pakistan’s nuclear strategy in proactive military operations (PAOs) is somewhat balanced and considers international concerns. Dealing with the dilemmas of insecurity has become permanent portfolio of Pakistan’s national security. Running from direct to indirect threats of India that jeopardized its national security, Pakistan in between got stuck with issues of extremism. As investigated earlier, the so called Soviet containment mantra of the United States gave birth to fundamentalism and accommodated the concept of ‘jihad’ in Afghan insurgency. This phenomenon of violent extremism got impetus in the aftermath of 9/11 incident and entangled Pakistan from head to toe. Both state and non-state actors took benefit of the prolonged war against terrorism in neighboring Afghanistan that inevitably trapped the national resolve and political will to encounter the menace of terrorism in Pakistan. The challenges and the environment that caused an internal instability into nuclear nation have been discussed in next chapter. Specifically, investigation is done to answer the question; how Pakistan’s counter terrorism strategy mitigated the anarchy within?
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE MENACE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND PAKISTAN’S COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY

8.1. Introduction:

Pakistan today, is facing an existential threat which goes to the very core of its beliefs, values and ways of life. The amalgamation of cultural and religious fault lines have given birth to violent extremism, a bleeding wound that Pakistan is healing through since ‘Soviet Jihad’ which stimulated its impact on national security immediately after the incident of 9/11 (Aziz, 2015). On one hand, the country has internal fissures and governance weaknesses, while on the other hand it has a highly volatile and complex geo-political neighborhood with history of power struggles (Isby, 2011). These factors coupled with its strategic choices have been exploited by external and internal players to cultivate and promote extremist ideologies in the society.

Endowed with immense geo-strategic significance, contemporary Pakistan represents one of our world’s most under-rated success stories against violent extremism. In the complex cobweb of global power-politics, Pakistan have been quite frequently misrepresented as a state and mischaracterized as a society. While individual episodes of terrorism are routinely sensationalized, the complex realities behind Pakistan’s fight against this global menace are all-too-often ignored or misunderstood (Malik, 2018). In the face of a relentless assault on its traditional values and culture, the people have displayed an incredible amount of resilience and faith in the goodness of human spirit. Its tireless fight against violent extremism is an unfolding story that the world must not miss out. And that is why this chapter establishes an interaction and snapshot of Pakistan’s increasingly successful campaign against violent extremism.

To do so, a brief introduction of Pakistan’s counter-terror strategy along with its policy layouts has been explained to understand the real and the resurgent Pakistan. The scope of this
A chapter in continuation of the previously conducted research would shed interactive insights on the peculiar regional context of violent extremism and Pakistan’s unenviable character as a leading country against the war against terrorism. The primary question which has been investigated in this chapter is why violent extremism took over 21st century Pakistan and how Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy has addressed this threat. While doing so, a dedicated part of this chapter has explained National Action Plan (NAP) as Pakistan’s comprehensive national counter-terrorism strategy, which is a unique milestone towards peace and security.

8.2. **Regional Context of Violent Extremism:**

Global history of terrorism and violent extremism is well known (Mannik, 2009). This menace therefore is neither unprecedented nor unique to Pakistan. However, its causes and even the consequences for the country are, in many ways, unique. It will be helpful if the drivers of extremism are objectively laid out before digging down into the factors enabling those drivers. Some of the important drivers of extremism in Pakistan could be linked up to socio-economic alienation, extremist ideologies and culture of militancy. These three drivers have over the period of time influenced and rooted out the social harmony costing tangible and intangible challenges to state.

a. **Socio-economic Alienation.** Pakistan was born in a region devoid of basic physical or institutional infrastructure required for rapid development (Acemoglu, 2013). Therefore, despite some major improvements, expansive pockets of socio-economic deprivation still persist. These spaces have been occasionally exploited by well-oiled machine of religious zealotry and other nefarious interests to recruit unsuspecting citizens into militancy.

b. **Extremist Ideologies.** Violent and radical ideologies like the ones peddled by Al-Qaeda International (AQI) and now DAESH have also cashed in on a mix of socio-economic alienation and people’s love of religion (Chassman, 2016).
c. **Culture of Militancy.** Both the socio-economic alienation and ideology combine explosively with a culture of militancy promoted in the context of Iranian revolution and conflicts in Afghanistan, Palestine, and Kashmir (Saikal, 2010). The culture also gets its fuel from regional turmoil, foreign interventions and continued denial of people’s right to self-determination (Hannum, 1998).

The drivers just mentioned could be found in many societies but in Pakistan’s context what makes this situation so peculiar, demands an important explanation. This can be understood through a recap of root-causes or enablers behind the three drivers just identified.

a. **Trans-national Linkages.** Most of the terror outfits operating in Pakistan’s border regions draw their inspiration, strategic guidance and, in certain cases, even material assistance from trans-national terror outfits. Thus the fortunes of Pakistan’s immediate enemies vary according to the level of success achieved by world community against their sources of inspiration. While AQI served as the front-head of this inspiration for over two decades, it has been recently eclipsed by DAESH. Therefore, it must be understood that Pakistan’s national problems have a solid trans-national connection.

b. **Perceived Global Injustices.** It is widely known that organizations like AQI, DAESH and their local affiliates in passive part of the world prey on gullible minds by playing up themes based on some tragic global realities. Issues like Palestine, the unending consequences of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and now in Syria fuel the mills churning out extremist narrative.

c. **Situation in Afghanistan.** Afghanistan has been steeped in violence and instability for over five decades now. Throughout this conflict, Pakistan has housed millions of homeless Afghans and paid an immeasurable socio-economic price (Hilali, 2002). Unfortunately, it has been largely alone in dealing with the consequences of other’s acts of omission and commission.

d. **Indian Intransigence.** By refusing to engage with Pakistan in a meaningful dialogue to resolve bilateral disputes including the issue of occupied Kashmir, India has directly abetted extremism and militancy in the region. More recently, India has used Afghanistan’s under-governed regions to actively arm and finance extremist outfits
fighting against Pakistani nation (The Express Tribune, 2017). Recent arrest of a serving Indian Intelligence Officer, Commander Kalbushan Yadev in Balochistan Province who while leading a terrorist network organized attacks against innocent citizens, is the latest evidence of India’s destabilizing role in the region. This has been even exposed at the highest forums like United Nations by Pakistan (The News, 2018a). It is pertinent to mention that India is not alone in this game. It has been abetted and aided by other state and non-state, regional and extra-regional players.

The drivers and associated enablers explains the complex web of causes underlying the phenomenon of violent extremism that Pakistan have fought against for nearly two decades and is currently tackling through the strategy called National Action Plan (NAP).

8.3. Pakistan’s Unenviable Role as Frontline State in War against Terrorism:

Time and again, Pakistan has found itself sitting on global fault lines that permanently remained frontline of conflicts. During the 19th century, the then Great Britain strived to contain the movement of former Soviet Union towards Afghanistan, which made Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and Northern Areas of Pakistan including Kashmir a battle zone (Hopkirk, 2006). The 19th century un-demarcated territory does not impacted so intensively on the socio-cultural dynamics of the people living in the area; whereas, the late 20th and the earlier 21st century conflict did installed a permanent security anxiety out of instable and rough political landscape of Afghanistan for immediate neighboring region consisting Pakistan’s Northern Areas and Baluchistain. In fact, the whole of Pakistan received the impact of turmoil and instability due to prolonged nature of conflict in its neighboring country Afghanistan.

From the 19th century Afghanistan, the 20th century political configuration of Afghanistan was no different to its past as continuous instability caused another moot of Soviet extension. As a consequence, during the late 20th century mainly due to Cold War climax and bipolar global
competition between USA and the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan once again became a battlefield (Chelala, 2017). Intensified ideological confrontation spotted Pakistan and found it an important bridge to fight US proxy against the Soviets. With the Soviet-American involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan was condensed to bear the physical and economic costs of an ideological struggle. Pakistan inevitably flashed into the eyes of the storm that was about to establish its ideological, political, economic and geographical landscape.

The cost of the role which Pakistan played to help US defeat Soviet Union almost consumed the whole country within a decade. The Soviet disintegration as a result invoked an unending security dilemma in Afghanistan which inevitably took over the positive ambition of Pakistan to install peaceful political regime (Cheema, 1988). The ill-conceived political strategy with fluctuated political commitments of Pakistani subsequent regimes back in Islamabad were slowly trapped rather fasten its efforts to improve issues of stability in Afghanistan. The post Soviet disintegration challenges suddenly became matchless, when in September 11, 2001 the twin towers in New York were hit by an act of terrorism and proved another watershed event for Pakistan.

Pakistan once again emerged as a significant ally for the US led global alliance against outfits of Al-Qaeda and associated militant organizations in Afghanistan. Television screens across the globe beamed the events unfolding post-9/11 politic-o-military alliance. Though, politically undemocratic but still vibrant in its geography and strategic posturing, Pakistan received order of the day “are you with us or against us” (Bush, 2001). While accepting the mantra of madness, Pakistan once again continued to deal with the consequences of conflict in its socio-culturally integrated but economically deteriorated neighborhood (Hussain, 2006).
8.4. The Cost of being a Frontline State:

The years following the beginning of US-led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in neighborhood not only Pakistan witnessed a fresh wave of massive migration but also faced sudden rise in terrorist attacks. The societal fabrication of the country became at the verge of total collapse where internal fault lines such as ethnic, sectarian, ideological, social and political segments observed disconnectivity with the state policy of getting into US led global war on terror (Rabbi, 2012). As a result the national resilience was not fully ready to absorb the mantra of so-called international security while compromising its own. It is worth noting that in the aftermath of 9/11, a suicide bombing in 2002 was only the third ever act of terrorism of this nature committed in Pakistan.

On May 8, 2002 a suicide attack happened on Pakistan Navy bus parked outside a five star Sheraton Hotel in Karachi that killed eleven French engineers (McCarthy & Webster, 2002). The first ever suicide attack in Pakistan came as a repercussion of foreign militancy that was conducted by an Egyptian Islamic group ‘al-Gamaa al-Islamiya’ on November 19, 1995 in Islamabad (CNN, 1995). A suicide car attack was carried out in front of Egyptian Embassy to protest the Egypt government decision to give death sentence (in absentia) to notoriously infamous Aymal Al-Zawahri (Haaretz, 2018). The one after that happened on November 06, 2000 on head office of Nawa-e-Waqt in Karachi, a national ‘Urdu’ daily (CPJ, 2000). This was just a beginning to a chaotic turmoil and instability.

The cumulative impact of the unraveling of security situation seriously impacted on the economic growth of Pakistan. Since then the cost of global war on terror mostly had impacted on Pakistan’s ability to protect its own people while paying heavy price both on human and economic fronts. This situation interrupted Pakistan’s normal economic trajectory; resulted in
higher cost of doing business; disrupting production cycles and leading to export oriented setbacks including cancelation of global orders (Rabbi, 2012). Consequently, booming economy ended up into dooming economy with gradual loss of its share to regional contenders. The overall deterioration in the security situation also led to massive investment outflows crippling the export-oriented industry.

Pakistan’s resolve to fight against terrorism cost a price more than it expected to render. As reiterated by the Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa during his speech at ‘Munich Security Conference Germany’ in 2018 that:

“Pakistan Army has waged a relentless and bloody fight against terrorism and violent extremism, at a monumental human and material cost… over 35,000 Pakistanis have lost their lives… over 48,000 are critically wounded or disabled… financial cost exceeding US $ 250 Billion–only a fraction of which is actually shared by our global partners” (Dunya News, 2018).

Beyond money, mosques, schools, shrines and churches have been directly targeted for resisting the tide of terror. Even leaders from conservative religious parties along with parties having liberal voices had been attacked during the years (Shah, 2014).

Financial assistance extended to Pakistan over the years as part of Coalition Support Fund (CSF) makes up about $10.7 billion which is no more than a fraction of that cost (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013). Moreover, the dilemma of coalition support fund always ended up as carrot and stick policy rather genuine realization of the cost incurred by Pakistan. Also, given the trans-national nature of the threat, Pakistan have been dealing with a global concern to mitigate issues of terrorism and started fighting against terrorism due to an imposed compulsion on its national security. It was so called Al-Qaeda who denounced the US hegemony not Pakistan. As General Bajwa reminded the international community during his speech at Munich Conference that “with over 1100 Al-Qaeda operatives killed and other 600 handed over to US, Pakistan is instrumental in disruption and decimation of Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Dunya News,
But still Pakistani blood and treasure has been spent in service of global peace. Is it fair to say that, if nothing else, then out of sheer respect for tens of thousands of Pakistani martyrs, the often repeated rhetoric of “do more” must stop now. Eroding Pakistan’s political space in the region and at global level is not thankful gesture rather brings hypocrisy of the international community at the forefront.

8.5. Pakistan’s Strategy against Violent Extremism:

In the backdrop of the above discussion, Pakistani nation and its armed forces have spearheaded the regional fight against terror. Despite its limited resources and with only a modicum of international support, Pakistani nation and its armed forces have achieved unparalleled successes. It may be remembered that the US war in Afghanistan has so far cost the American taxpayers nearly $1 trillion (Dyer, 2014). This is the longest war in the US history and according to Pentagon estimates it is costing the US $45 billion a year (Pennington, 2018). Contrary to Afghanistan, the cost of war in Iraq has already exceeded US $2 trillion (Trotta, 2013). And yet, after these expensive war efforts spread over more than a decade and a half, Afghanistan and Iraq have ended up being the 2nd and 4th most dangerous countries in the world, surpassed only by South Sudan and Syria being the 3rd and 1st, respectively (Peter, 2018). Pakistan’s commitment has been widely acknowledged, though not always fully appreciated. This counter-terror effort has witnessed application of multiple instruments including sustained internal security operations across Pakistan’s tribal regions bordering Afghanistan and facilitation of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan initiated by USA and NATO (Fair, 2004). By attacking the front-head of a global menace, Pakistan have proudly fought on the frontlines of a global effort.
During the 18-year long campaign, Pakistan have conducted countless successful counter-terrorism operations (Khan, 2012). The flagship operation, called *Operation Al Mizan* (Balance), involved moving major military formations into the historically inhospitable Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 2002, adjoining the most troubled regions of Afghanistan. The campaign also witnessed launching of 2009 *Operation Rah-e-Rast* (The Straight Path) in Swat region of Pakistan. *Rah-e-Rast* is globally cited as a sterling example of text-book counter-insurgency operations (Hussain, 2014). *Rah-e-Rast* and *Al-Mizan* successfully reasserted state presence and apprehended al-Qaeda terrorists fleeing Afghanistan. Hundreds of Al-Qaeda and other extremist targets have been neutralized in the process (Dunya News, 2018).

In June 2009, Pakistan launched *Operation Rah-e-Nijat* to clear South Waziristan region of terrorist presence (Sheikh, 2014). Massive socio-economic development followed the kinetic operations. On June 15, 2014, Pakistan further up-scaled its fight against the remnants of terror holed up in the mountains of North Waziristan, along Pak-Afghan border. This, much more intense and high-tempo operation, has been named *Operation Zarb-e-Azb* (Strike of the Sword). *Operation Zarb-e-Azb* was the world’s largest and biggest anti-terrorism effort involving round-the-year deployment of over 180,000 of Pakistani security forces (Myklin, 2016). Being a synergetic tri-service effort, operation success had been widely acknowledged. Continuing the successes story of physical military campaign of Pakistan, General Bajwa took one step further and in 2017 started *Operation Radd-ul-Fassad* to target the sleeping cells of terrorists and their hideouts around the country. This is an ongoing operation which is in fact an ‘intelligence based operation’ (Pakistan Today, 2018a).

As a result of all these major and countless smaller operations *(a detailed discussion on these major operations is done in subsequent chapters 9, 10, and 11)*, Pakistani nation has been
able to achieve sustainable peace. According to independent estimates, Pakistan’s security forces have so far killed 32954 terrorists (News Central Asia, 2017). Many of these terrorists were free world’s common enemies; and Pakistani soldiers and citizens who died fighting them actually laid their lives in service of global peace.

The post US invasion of Afghanistan put the country at the forefront of ‘global war on terror’ pushing it into a new discourse of internal insecurity. During this period Pakistan saw terrorist attacks by violent extremists against public and armed forces resulting in immense suffering and loss of human lives and property. The period also witnessed a society marred by confusion and lack of clarity about who the enemy was and how to deal with it. Attempts were made to appease violent extremist groups through selective engagements and negotiations, which further helped these violent non-state actors to project the impression that they are at par with the state. However, eventually in 2009 the government decided to get tough and decisive campaign of military operations were launched to rid the country of these elements.

Not being capable to fight with Pakistan’s military operations, the militants launched the most horrific terrorist attack that occurred in Army Public School (APS) Peshawar on December 16, 2014 which claimed over 140 innocent lives (Roberts, 2017). This proved to be the last straw and finally consolidated public opinion against the threat of violent extremism. Ultimately, Pakistani leadership came together to develop a roadmap for countering the violent extremism in Pakistan, which was announced in shape of National Action Plan (NAP) on December 24, 2014 (NACTA, 2014).


Driven to desperation, terrorists resorted to the most cowardly act of attacking innocent school children. Recalling the tragedy is not an easy way but sometimes becomes necessary to
highlight sacrifice and resilience of the nation. In that very context the year 2014 ended up with an unforgettable trauma for the nation who has done everything necessary to uphold peace and deny any space to the terrorists. The coward terrorists on the morning of December 16, 2014 attacked on the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar and killed more than 140 innocent kids, the aftermath of which left many injured with permanent disabilities. The city that has historically served as a gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia was traumatized by terror of insanity (Farmer & Mirza, 2018). The Government of Pakistan quickly responded by approving what is called the National Action Plan (NAP). As an all-inclusive and comprehensive strategy, the plan was in fact intended to complement the then Operation Zarb-e-Azb.

The NAP orchestrated holistic approach involving civil and military law enforcement agencies for counter terrorism operations manifested through political and legal endorsements. In continuation to commitment, NAP also incorporated socio-economic packages necessary to restore administrative and social infrastructure. The post APS national response encompassed all necessary measures meaningfully mitigating issues of violent extremism (Pakistan Today, 2016). Although inspired by exceptional circumstances, NAP is rooted in Pakistan’s National Internal Security Policy (NISP). It is important to highlight that the action plan was adopted in the aftermath of APS incident which happened in December 2014, whereas NISP was promulgated in February 2013. NAP was therefore meant to address the gaps prevailing in NISP 2014-18 and thereafter gave impetus to underscore the compatibility between national internal security challenges. This helped to develop a broader and realistic NISP 2018-23 meant to address challenges of contemporary security environment and threats emanating out of ill understanding of the previous NISP (Niaz, 2018). In fact, both documents of NISP policies have different scope
at the time when they were being developed and that is why there is slight difference in their view of looking at internal security challenges.

Pakistan’s NISP 2014-18 focused on integrating its efforts into a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach towards deterring and dismantling terrorist networks. The policy encompassed two major dividends as part of NISP components involving ‘comprehensive response plan’ and ‘composite deterrence plan’. One of the leading English daily ‘The Nation’ elaborated these two NISP 2014-18 aspects as under:

“First, the Comprehensive Response Plan (CRP) deals with the soft component of the approach that strives for participative political processes and public support against extremism. The CRP strategizes through dialogue, rehabilitation of temporarily displaced persons, along with socio-economic development and reforms. It emphasizes formulation of a sustained national narrative against terrorism and extremism, a national de-radicalization program and integration of religious seminaries into the mainstream education system. Second, the Composite Deterrence Plan (CDP) represents the hard component of the approach. It mainly focuses on capacity-building of National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA). It proposes to develop and integrate national database, along with effective measures to shield against cyber crimes. In addition, under this plan, steps are being taken to regulate Afghan refugees and the formation of a Directorate of Internal Security (DIS) under National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) to coordinate intelligence-based operations, integrating ‘all grids of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence, civil and military, under one roof.’ Furthermore, formation of a Rapid Response Force (RRF) and Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) are amongst the measures being taken to up-scale national security apparatus” (The Nation, 2014).

In the wake of APS attack, Pakistan renewed its resolve to combat new form of terrorism which was now brutally linked-up with regional political gambling. Therefore, on December 24, 2014 Pakistan announced National Action Plan (NAP) rested over 20 points. The national resolve involving all political factions of the society being represented in the national assembly/parliament of Pakistan also gave legal cover to the NAP. On January 6, 2015 the then government of Pakistan with the help of opposition parties and Senate passed 21st Constitutional Amendment along with Army Act Amendment (Khan, 2015a), which was subsequently signed by the President on January 7, 2015 that officially legalized the NAP (The Express Tribune,
The NAP’s legal cover under 21st Amendment provided essentially re-articulated strength to NISP while offering two additional monumental features as under:

i. death penalty to the terrorists
ii. establishment of special military courts

One of its exceptional aspects involved the issue of death penalty to the terrorists and the second called upon establishment of special military courts (Kaphle, 2014). Due to immense political activism in Pakistan, the decision of establishing special military courts was challenged in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which after reviewing all legal and judicial aspects of the issue finally announced its verdict on August 5, 2015. The highest court of the land upheld the political consensus of the nation which was already endorsed and adopted by the parliament through 21st Constitutional Amendment. The decision to form military courts prevailed and precluded any miscarriage of justice with provision of judicial review that the Supreme Court of Pakistan (in his decision) made mandatory to military court's decisions (Malik, 2015). Moreover, the then Army Chief General Raheel Sharif also categorically charted out the necessity of military courts and said these are “not the desire of the Army, but [the] need of extraordinary times” (The Express Tribune, 2015b).

The national consensus evolved a collective thought that time has come to take a united stand against the curse of violent extremism and terrorism to eradicate it from Pakistan’s society through well-coordinated whole of the national approach. To continue the pace of understanding the resilience of Pakistani nation and resolve of the national leadership, the subsequent sections of the chapter has been dedicated to carry out an appraisal of National Action Plan and its impediments in countering violent extremism in Pakistan. The purpose is to undertake an appraisal of NAP construct with a view to evaluate its progress, trace out its impact on
achievement of stated objectives, identify gaps and impediments in its implementation. The subsequent sections of the study are divided into the following sub-sections:

- NAP—Review of Violent Extremism in Pakistan
- NAP—Vision, Goals and Objectives
- NAP—Sub-Committees
- NAP—Implementation and Performance Review
- NAP—Impediments in Implementation
- Pakistan’s Strategic Compass—Vision 2025
- Where Do Pakistan Stand Now?

8.7. NAP—Review of Violent Extremism in Pakistan:

It is pertinent to briefly relate the background which led to spread of extremism and tracing the factors leading to rise of terrorist outfits. This would layout the environment to highlight the context which triggered NAP and the necessity for its wholesome implementation.

i. Radicalization of Society During Russo-Afghan War. In the 1980s, effects of radicalization of Pakistani society for supporting ‘Afghan Jihad’ lingered on long after the purpose was served. Instead of winding down, this radical mindset proliferated into Jihadi culture in the 1990s (Weinbaum & Harder, 2008).

ii. Sectarian Dimension. Large funding from abroad in the name of Jihad also had a negative side effect as donors sought to propagate their versions of Islam, fanning flames of fanaticism between various sects. Consequently, strong sectarian armed outfits emerged propagating hateful ideas and causing sectarian violence. To stem the tide, the government passed the Anti-Terrorism Act in 1997 however, lack of its forceful application allowed the extremist trends to continue (Yusuf, 2014).

iii. US Invasion of Afghanistan. The post-9/11 US military operation in Afghanistan led to concentration on Afghan Taliban, Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA) and their affiliates in Pak-Afghan border region. Hence, US asked Pakistan to act against such elements on Pakistani side. Growing pressure on both sides of Pak-Afghan border led to
emergence of a new terrorists group, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which targeted Pakistan Army operating in FATA (Iqbal & De Silva, 2013).

iv. War on Pakistan. Operations against TTP by Pakistan Army and US declaration of Pakistan as a non-NATO ally in June 2004 (Dawn, 2004), gave strong excuse to TTP to proclaim so-called Jihad against the state of Pakistan. Overtime, the conflict escalated in scale and scope with TTP carrying out more potent terrorist acts all over Pakistan especially against soft targets. Enemies of Pakistan put in fervent efforts to create ideological rifts among society in Pakistan by funding TTP to carry out atrocities on one hand and glorifying their false narrative through electronic and print media on the other.

v. Appeasement Instead of Fighting. Backed up heavily by external elements, the terrorists were steadily spreading their influence in settled areas in quest for power using slogan of Islamic Sharia as a cover up. They confused the nation by raising questions on Pakistan’s system of governance and declared those who stood against them as ‘Kafir’. Under pressure, the government instead of taking action against the terrorists adopted the strategy of Development, Dialogue and Deterrence (3D) (The Nation, 2009). It proved a futile strategy as it allowed time to terrorists to grow in strength. The entire nation stood divided over terrorists’ ideology. Then came the Lal Masjid Operation in Capital city Islamabad in 2006, which further polarized the politico-religious environment of Pakistan (Abbas, 2007).

vi. Turning the Tide – Resolve to Fight Terrorism. Ultimately there came a stage when TTP was dominating complete FATA and Malakand Division with many settled areas of KPK under their influence while clerics were still intimidating Islamabad. Sensing the criticality in 2009, the government finally sanctioned Pakistan Army to undertake full scale operations to defeat TTP and rid the country of menacing terrorism. Starting with a grand Operation Rah-e-Rast to clear Swat / Malakand area, Pakistan Army began methodical clearing operations in FATA and KPK followed by another grand Operation Rah-e-Nijat to clear South Waziristan Agency (SWA) (Khan, 2012). These successful operations turned the tide against TTP and affiliated terrorist outfits in FATA and KPK. As a blowback, TTP launched wave of terrorist acts across the country against military and civilian targets but it failed to weaken the public resolve to fight terrorism.
Ultimately, *Operation Zarb-e-Azb* was commenced in June 2014 to clear the last refuge of these terrorists in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) (Javaid, 2015).

vii. **The Last Straw.** Pakistan’s military operational accomplishments made it clear to those orchestrating the terrorist outfits in the country that their entire investment to destabilize Pakistan had coming to naught. In a desperation, on December 16, 2014, Army Public School (APS) Peshawar was attacked to target young children to break the will of Pakistani nation as a last ditch effort (Qauym, 2015). It shocked the entire country, snapped national patience and solidified the nation into a firm resolve to root out terrorists and their ideology at whatsoever cost. For the first time all political parties came together to endorse a unified action by law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and institutions in shape of National Action Plan (NAP).

8.8. **NAP—Vision, Goals and Objectives:**

Pakistan has witnessed the extremist outfits and their emergence as a consequence of Soviet War and later its lack of war termination strategy in Afghanistan that gave birth to militant ideology with eventual growth into terrorist networks. The post 9/11 episode and immediate security situation faced by Pakistan trapped the national leadership to adopt cohesive and timely response to counter the evolving deceived and ideologically motivated violent extremism. It was the shocking incident of Army Public School (APS) Peshawar that happened on December 16, 2014 when an All Parties Conference was convened on December 17, 2014 to form and adopt a counter terrorism and violent extremism framework (Pakistan Today, 2014). The drafting committee was constituted to formulate the plan within three days. The outcome was the set of measures announced by the PM during his press conference on December 24, 2014 known as National Action Plan (Manan, 2014). It was not in shape of any formal document so clear vision and goals were not spelled out. It appeared that NAP was hastily announced more out of political compulsion to satisfy the national outrage. Nevertheless, in whatever shape, it
offered a good beginning and reflected Pakistan’s determination to get rid of terrorism and extremism from its society.

The National Action Plan proposed nothing out of the box rather it strictly wanted implementation of the existing laws while addressing constitutional lacunas on emergency bases. The post-APS days brought one of the most difficult time periods for the nation particularly for the political leadership which earlier for one or the other reason gambled their commitment to curb the menace of terror. This time the nation was aggressively expecting a national political resolve from all factions of politics representing the Parliament. The charged environment hit at the right place and all state institutions unanimously showed their resolve and passed the National Action Plan.

The 20 points of the NAP highlighted national action against banned militant organizations and to prevent them to re-operate with new titles; choking financial streams of terrorists; halting their communication setups; continuation of the operation in Karachi; strict observance of the social media content to monitor pro-violence sentiments; and dismantling militias operating under private force phenomenon. Few of the points of NAP strongly suggested acting against the networks operating on sectarian fault lines. Halting their methods of communication including hate speeches and distribution of associated literature was given special emphasis. Along with making NACTA effective, NAP called for regulating the Madrassa (seminary) stream, rehabilitation of temporarily internally displaced persons (IDPs), and introducing reforms in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along with stringent management of Pak-Afghan border. The plan also called for the development of a “comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees” (NACTA, 2014). The highest bidding of NAP involved its plea to approve death penalty for the convicted terrorists along with
establishment of military courts. Below is given the complete list of 20 points of National Action Plan.

### Table 8.1: 20 Points of the National Action Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No.</th>
<th>NAP Point</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Special trial courts under the supervision of Army. The duration of these courts would be two years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution will be strengthened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Ensuring against re-emergence of proscribed organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Taking effective steps against religious persecution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Registration and regulation of religious seminaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations through print and electronic media.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Baluchistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)

The research findings of this section are compiled through interacting with few key civil and military persons involved with drafting and subsequently implementing NAP in order to find out the then prevailing environment during formulation of NAP and to discern the vision and goals behind it. In addition, their views on NAP’s implementation and impediments were also sought. The below mention points have been evaluated to better cluster the vision, goals and objectives of the NAP.
a. Vision
  • Defeating terrorist networks operating in Pakistan.
  • Rooting out causes of extremism from Pakistani society.

b. Goals
  • Concluding military operations to eliminate all pockets of terrorists within two years’ time.
  • Improving law enforcement to eradicate terrorism and extremism.
  • Building institutional capacity related to counter violent extremism.

c. Objectives

For objective analyses of the ‘20 points of NAP’ which are its core objectives, the next section of the study is clustered into four categories i.e. Kinetic, Legal, Law Enforcement and Engagement (NACTA, 2014).

i. Kinetic
  • Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country.
  • Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab.

ii. Legal
  • Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism.
  • Special trial courts under the supervision of Army. The duration of these courts would be for two years (with provision of further extension).
  • Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system.

iii. Law Enforcement
  • Dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists.
  • Ensuring stringent measures against re-emergence of proscribed organizations.
• Registration and regulation of religious seminaries.
• Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end.
• Strict action against hate speech, literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance.
• Choking financing for terrorist and terrorist organizations.
• Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations through print and electronic media.
• Measures against abuse of cyberspace and social media for terrorism.
• NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution will be strengthened.
• Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force.
• Taking effective steps against religious persecution.
• Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely.

iv. Engagement

• Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs.
• Baluchistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders.
• Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees.

The extensive policy inclusion through the constitutional backup could only achieve desired objectives if it is implemented through robust mechanism ensuring the very national consensus. In order to implement NAP a set of committees were evolved to monitor, coordinate and direct the implementation of NAP. Therefore, keeping in view the genuine commitment to National Action Plane (NAP), number of institutional bodies started working to implement the 20 point agenda. Policy inputs and guidelines were given by the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who being the Chairman of the Federal Committee over-sighted implementation of the
NAP plan of action. This high profile committee includes three Chiefs of the armed forces along with nine members of the cabinet (who represent nine different ministries). The main institutional mechanism as an “apex committee” in each province was also established, which is chaired by the respective Chief Ministers including civil military representations such as members of provincial bureaucracy and law enforcement agencies (Ramay, 2016). This body oversees the progress achieved in implementation of the plan in addition to recommending cases to be tried in military courts. Brief configuration of the Federal and Provincial Apex Committees are:

1) **Federal Level**
   - A high power committee under Prime Minister to overview the implementation and monitoring of NAP (Federal Apex Committee).
   - Nine Cabinet Members with 15 Sub-Committees of Federal Ministries.
   - NACTA Review Committee.
   - Implementation Task Force under National Security Advisor since August 2016 (Dawn, 2016).

   In nutshell when it comes to Federal Apex Committee, there is a three tier institutional arrangement to oversee the implementation of NAP, which includes: (i) the Prime Minister, (ii) The Army Chief, (iii) The nine ministries, NACTA, and Intelligence agencies-both civil and military. This committee overseas and provides policy guidelines.

2) **Provincial Level**
   - Provincial Apex Committees comprising political and military leadership.
On the other hand, the four Provincial Apex Committees are headed by the respective Chief Ministers of the four provinces which include certain ministries, security agencies and intelligence agencies.

8.9. Is there something new in NAP?

As mentioned above, Federal and Provincial Apex committees headed by the Prime Minister (PM) and Chief Minister (CM) of respective provinces are overall in charge of NAP implementation. There are few questions that we need to address before getting into the oversight of NAP implementation and performance review. The first question that comes across and highlights the objectivity of the NAP revolves around, is there something new in NAP? In fact, there is not so much new in the NAP. Though, the plan of action highlighted the missing links that were crucial in its implementation. The missing elements of implementation that NAP provides are:

i. The laws exist already but enforcement was weak.

ii. Enforcement required political will which has been provided by adopting whole of the nation approach.

iii. 12 points in NAP are focused on law enforcement.

iv. Important judicial reforms, needed for robust enforcement, have been mandated.

v. Sanction to undertake kinetic operations are granted to assert writ of the state wherever it is challenged.

8.10. Is NAP a wholesome plan?

The second question that comes out of the close knitted observation of the NAP revolves around, is NAP a wholesome plan? In fact, there are certain voids in national action plan, such as:
i. NAP lacks definition of Violent Extremism.
ii. Diplomatic prong is missing to address external interference and intervention.
iii. Socio-economic development in vulnerable areas is not identified as a focus.
iv. Involvement and role of local governments to watch anti-social elements is not addressed.

8.11. NAP—Sub-Committees

The federal and provincial apex committees along with multiple layers to ensure implementation of National Action Plan (NAP) have been quite successive. The pace of desired results though has faced political and coordination issues among stakeholders. Success of Pakistan’s national strategy against violent extremism depends on effective implementation of the measures to be taken by respective stakeholders and rigorous and regular measurement of progress achieved against each measure to identify and remove gaps in implementation. This requires a lead coordinating agency at the federal level that has the political clout and required leverages with all relevant ministries and organizations to coordinate and drive implementation of the strategy. The government of Pakistan on December 27, 2014 charted out 15 committees to look after the progress of the NAP. The detail of the NAP committees to monitor each specific point is reflected through a table below (Waqar, 2017).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>So.#</th>
<th>Name of Committees</th>
<th>Headed by</th>
<th>Member Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Militias</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control</td>
<td>DG ISI, DG IB, DG MO, all provincial home secretaries including Fata, GB and AJK; as well as the NACTA national coordinator and the interior secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hate Speech</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control</td>
<td>Ministers for religious affairs, planning, information as well as the MD PTV, DG ISI, DG IB, all provincial home and Auqaf department secretaries, the NACTA coordinator and interior secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Proscribed Organizations</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control</td>
<td>DG ISI, DG IB, all home secretaries and Interior Secretary as members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Counter terrorism</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control</td>
<td>Ministers for Finance and Defence, the DG MO, the secretaries of Finance, interior and the NACTA Coordinator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Religious persecution</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control</td>
<td>Minister and Secretary for religious affairs, the Interior Secretary, all provincial police chiefs and the IGs of GB, AJK and ICT, as well as all home and Auqaq department secretaries and the NACTA coordinator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Madrassahs</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control</td>
<td>Minister and Secretary for Religious Affairs, State Minister for Education, all Home and Auqaq department secretaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Terror on the Internet</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control</td>
<td>This is the only committee whose composition was not mentioned in the Government’s official press release.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control</td>
<td>Governor Sindh, Chief Minister Sindh, Rangers DG and other senior officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control</td>
<td>Input from the DG ISI, DG IB, Home Secretary and provincial police chiefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sectarianism</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control</td>
<td>DG IB, all provincial police officers, home secretaries and heads of counter terrorism departments as well as the interior secretary and NACTA coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Afghan refugees</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control</td>
<td>Governor Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, SAFRON Minister, Nadra chairman and other senior officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Terror financing</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Governor State Bank, the DG ISI, Interior Secretary, FBR Chairman, FIA DG and Finance Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Media curbs</td>
<td>Ministry of Information and Broadcasting</td>
<td>Ministers for Interior and Planning and Development, and the information secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Justice system reforms</td>
<td>Ministry of Information and Broadcasting</td>
<td>Interior Secretary, Provincial Representatives, ISI and IB heads as well as the law secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>FATA reforms &amp; Internally Displaced Persons’ Return</td>
<td>Governor Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>The Ministers of Finance, Planning and Development and SAFRON, Economic Affairs Secretary, Corps Commander 11 Corps Peshawar and FATA Secretary Chief.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NAP is a national vision to rid the country of the menaces of extremism and terrorism, which has flourished in a vacuum of weak governance. The dissolution of the responsibilities and monitoring being part of greater national strategy against violent extremism is an integrated and holistic approach to ensure implementation of the national resolve reflected in policy objectives laid out in the National Action Plan. Though, much of the objectives are streamlined
and already submitted fruitful results but still sustainability of the success of this strategy depends on the following points:

a. Political will and ownership at Federal and Provincial level.
b. Mobilizing the society to create the required political will.
c. Buy in of all implementing ministries/agencies and preparation of implementation plans.
d. Most importantly, resolving institutional capacity issues.
e. Rigorous follow-up and monitoring of implementation by top leadership coupled with accountability for results.

The Fight against violent extremism is a fight for the future of Pakistan and in this fight failure is not an option.

8.12. NAP—Implementation and Performance Review

The NAP, which is Pakistan’s new counter terrorism strategy, has yielded mixed results. A serious examination of National Action Plan would allow leaders and policy makers to measure its strengths and weaknesses. And also provide guidelines for future counter terrorism policy framework. NAP remains under acute scrutiny and criticism for weak and intermittent implementation (Dogar, 2017). Unfortunately, in the past, many political regimes had taken elementary and incidental steps to address public sentiments against terrorism. Some of the important calls that National Action Plan makes to bring stability in the country and to establish a link to its national efforts are listed below:

a. **Suppressing Banned Groups.** According to NAP points (2) and (3), “militant outfits and groups will not be allowed to operate in the country and defunct outfits will not be
allowed to operate under any other name” (NACTA, 2014).³ The hallmark of Pakistan’s national effort has been to reassert the state’s exclusive monopoly over violence, not allowing state within state. Another key policy direction has been aimed at mopping up the residue of Jihadi culture of the 1980s and early 1990s and eliminating all confusion over the so-called “good” or “bad” Jihadis.

b. **Regulating Religious Seminaries.** The connection between religious seminaries and terrorism is often misunderstood or sometimes willfully stretched beyond correct proportions. Just as the Christian Seminaries or Jewish Yeshivas are not known for producing Einsteins or Hawkings, Islamic Madaris also do not create great works of art and literature. However, they have been a part of Pakistani culture and tradition for centuries and have contributed hugely as charitable organizations and seeds of religious learning. According to Interior Ministry, “some 90 percent of Madaris have no connection with terrorism whatsoever” (Dawn, 2014). However, NAP still lays out an objective to regulate all Madaris and ban suspect ones. As a foundational step, mapping of all religious seminaries across the country is already completed (Pakistan Today, 2018b). Additionally, Federal Ministry of Education and Higher Education Commission (HEC) Pakistan are working on mainstreaming the curriculum of these religious schools (Ali, 2018a). In this regards National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan (NACTA) and Higher Education Commission (HEC) of Pakistan have signed an M.O.U on October 25, 2018 (NACTA, 2018a).

c. **Hate Speech and Literature.** Controlling hate speech and spread of incendiary literature is a key pillar of NAP. So far, thousands of criminal cases have been registered against individual violators; hundreds of shops spreading such material have been sealed and large amounts of equipment confiscated (Dawn, 2017a).

d. **Curbing Terror Finance.** Since the initiation of NAP, hundreds of illegal or suspect transactions have been intercepted leading to recovery of tens of millions of dollars (Hanif, 2018). Under the plan of action, dedicated Counter Terror Finance (CTF) Units are raised in the provincial Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs). These units are

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³ NAP points three and seven. The two main relevant lists of banned groups and individual terrorists are a national one under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997 and overseen by the interior ministry; and the one maintained by the UN Security Council (UNSC) Sanctions Committee established under Resolution 1267 (1999).
jointly working with provincial law enforcement organizations to investigate and find “Reverse Leads” related to terrorist financing (NACTA, 2018b).

e. **Tackling Organized Crime.** In addition to a country-wide drive, the most spectacular success against terror-crime nexus has been achieved in Pakistan’s biggest and world’s 8th largest city, Karachi. Since the initiation of NAP, the city has witnessed a sharp decline in incidents of terror, targeted killing, random murders and kidnapping (Dawn, 2017b).

f. **Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security.** Pakistan continues to firm up its legislative and legal framework to enable the fight against terror and organized crime. In this context it has developed “Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997”, and promulgated the “Protection of Pakistan Act (PPA)”, giving more power to law enforcement agencies in interrogation and prosecution (NACTA, 2018c). Furthermore, the Fair Trail Act (FTA) was approved in 2013 (Dawn, 2013) and new initiatives have been suggested to incorporate all necessary changes to strengthen and implementing the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) (Tanoli, 2018).

g. **Intelligence Collection and Sharing.** Due to backlashes and gaps experienced during a long war on terror, Pakistan’s civil and military intelligence agencies have strengthened inter-agency communication and information sharing. They have created institutional mechanism to tangibly counter terrorism through central structure of coordination and subsequent provincial liaison (NACTA, 2017a). Moreover, the prime data agency of Pakistan ‘National Automated Database Registration Authority (NADRA)’ provides a comprehensive integrated capability to various civil and military intelligence agencies for furthering and refining intelligence collection and sharing process (Raja, 2018).

h. **Border Management.** Pakistan has been very keen to manage cross border infiltration but due to non-cooperation of the neighboring Afghanistan the burden had brought worst

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4 NACTA has been incorporated into the Ministry of Interior and is currently in the process of establishing its mission, staffing, and responsibilities. The Intelligence Bureau has nationwide jurisdiction as a civilian agency, is fully empowered under the PPA to coordinate with provincial and territorial counterterrorism units, and is taking more of an active role in counterterrorism. The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate has broad intelligence powers and fulfills a de facto border security role along with tribal militias, provincial police, and the Frontier Corps. The Ministry of Interior has over 20 law enforcement-related entities under its control.
impacts on its society. It is therefore, Pakistan has implemented biometric procedures under the ‘International Border Management Security’ system (The News, 2015). Under the system Pakistan had stalled robust mechanism of screening at land border check posts around its border with Afghanistan. Moreover, at international airports of Pakistan twelve (12) dedicated units are working to detect currency flow out of the country (Refworld, 2018). These units are supported by NADRA, Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and Pakistan Customs along with intelligence organs of both civil and military institutions. To counter cross-border infiltration, Pakistan had been enthusiastically working to fence its border with Afghanistan. Both countries share 2611 kilometers long border. Around 1200 kilometers is classified as priority-1 area, which also host 843 forts. Priority-1 area is considered a significant terrain that has been providing unchecked flow of terrorists into Pakistan. On December 15, 2018, the DG ISPR shared the information with media and general public that Pakistan Army had already completed fencing at 802 kilometers along with construction of 233 forts. DG ISPR in his tweet said that the overall completion of priority-1 area will be finished by December 2019 (Dawn, 2018a).

i. **Countering Radicalization.** Complementing the kinetic prong, Pakistan’s Federal Ministry of Information and Broadcasting together with Public Relations Arm of the Defense Forces of Pakistan is very effectively waging an offensive on the narrative front. As of today, the terrorist story has been totally discredited and the nation stands united against this menace. Additionally, Pakistan Army has partnered with leading civil society organizations to run and potentially expand several centers for de-radicalization, corrective education and reintegration of radicalized detainees (Khan, 2015b). The success of these de-radicalization programs are primarily focused on reforming the extremist mindset and has been unprecedented in terms of their high level of social acceptance and very low rates of recidivism (Senate, 2017).

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5 Out of the total nine de-radicalization centers originally established, five are still running. More than 3000 detainees have been de-radicalized and reintegrated into the society. The rate of recidivism has been less than 2%, which is globally unprecedented.
8.13. National Action Plan Implementation Status:

This part will evaluate the point wise progress achieved on implementation of NAP. Performance review of National Action Plan would allow gauging its successes and failures and identifying areas for further focused interventions for improvement.

1) Execution of Convicted Terrorists

The government revoked the six-year moratorium on execution of death penalty just after the announcement of NAP (Ramay, 2016). At the time of NAP commencement more than 8,000 death sentences were pending with the courts of Pakistan (Sardar & Houreld, 2015). According to Senate of Pakistan, till August 2017, 483 convicts have been executed (Senate, 2017). Majority of the death sentences are commenced in contradiction to Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), which is the umbrella law against all types of offences. What needs to be noted here is that out of these 483 executions, only 87 were convicted under Anti Terrorism Act (ATA) while the remaining 396 were convicted of crimes other than terrorism and had been awaiting executions since the imposition of the ban on death sentence in 2008. That was the main reason for such a high number of executions in 2014-15 (Brennan, 2015). While the numbers may convey a misleading impression the reality is that only 87 terrorists were executed under the offence of terrorist activities. Even more unfortunate aspect of the overall counter terrorism episode lies with the judicial scrutiny of captured terrorists. For example during the last five years more than 15,000 suspicious individuals were acquitted. Moreover, around 10,387 persons were granted bail.

This anomaly gave birth to military courts under Special Trial Courts (STC) in Pakistan, which were established in the aftermath of December 2014 terrorist attack on Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar. 11 STC were established in four provinces of Pakistan through 21st
Constitutional Amendment (The Express Tribune, 2015a). In May 2018 the Ministry of Defense shared the information with Senate of Pakistan and mentioned that about 486 cases are so far sent to military courts (Pakistan Today, 2018c). On December 16, 2018, DG ISPR released the information which claimed that the military courts have received around 717 cases from the government. Around 546 cases were trialed which concluded 310 death sentences and 234 awards of Rigorous Imprisonment (RI) from life imprisonment to five years sentence. The statement also claimed that military courts have acquitted the two accused persons in terrorist activities and due to ongoing legal process in the superior courts; there are about 254 terrorists who are still waiting execution for their death sentences (Anis, 2018). Moreover, Pakistan Army Chief General Qamer Javed Bajwa on December 28, 2018 signed the death sentences of another 22 hardcore terrorists involved in killing and bombing (Samaa TV, 2018). The very next month on January 18, 2019 ISPR updated the details. According to ISPR press release, “within four years, military courts had 717 cases, out of which 646 were logically concluded. 345 terrorists were given death sentences” (Pakistan Today, 2019a).

2) Establishment of Special Trial Courts

i. Article 175 of Pakistan’s constitution was amended through 21st Constitutional Amendment that allowed the provision to set up special military courts (STC) for the period of two years (Dawn, 2015).

ii. So far 11 special trial courts (STC) are notified and established in Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sind and Baluchistan. Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa each have three STC whereas Sind has two and Baluchistan got one. (Dawn, 2017c).

iii. In total 717 cases are so far transferred to special military courts and almost fate of about 646 cases is decided.

iv. Over 3600 terrorism related suspects merit their trial through military courts. The recommending authority is the Ministry of Interior however which receives the
cases from Provincial Apex Committees that after scrutiny forwards the names for military courts proceedings.

v. Progress is slow as up till now only 717 cases are sent to military courts whereas many are waiting decision by the Apex committees.

vi. Since 1997, the Anti-Terrorism Courts were established in all provinces with Special Judges and Special Prosecutors (Yusuf, 2010). However, unsatisfactory performance of ATCs led the Parliament to pass the 21st amendment in the constitution in January 2015 for the establishment of Military Courts with a sunset clause for 2 years, which was later extended for another two years in March 2017 with enactment of 23rd Amendment (Hashim, 2017). Since March 2019, the extension of the military courts is in a limbo situation and further extension of two years is not granted.

vii. The performance statistics of the military courts is given below (Pakistan Today, 2018c).

**Table 8.3: Performance Statistics of the Military Courts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Recommended for trial</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Trial concluded</td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Pending trial</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Sentences carried out</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Awarded rigorous imprisonment</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Acquitted</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) **Revamping and reforming the Criminal Justice System**

i. After a lapse of 18 months, NACTA started process of reforms and submitted its recommendations in July 2017 to the PM office (NACTA, 2017b).

ii. According to Senate report 2017, “NACTA had conducted nine (9) meetings of Provincial Representative since May 2016 and one week workshop of the Federal Core Group in April 2017 and also developed Recommendation for Revamping of Criminal Justice System, its implementation plan along with responsibilities, timelines and cost elements, Sector wise (Police, Prosecution, Prison, Parole &
Probation and Judiciary), through consensus and in coordination with provinces, ICT, GB, and AJK. These recommendations, approved by Interior Minister, have now been submitted to Prime Minister” (Senate, 2017).

iii. However, this proved to be a disjointed effort as there was a parallel exercise being conducted by the Law and Justice Division and provincial judiciary.

iv. No further progress has been made so far.

4) Action against Armed Militias

i. The authority of ATA had successfully launched intelligence operations to curb the networks of identified terrorism groups operating in Pakistan. Today, there is no network that operates in the country and any information that comes to the knowledge of intelligence agencies, rapid and robust operations are conducted to neutralize the threats.

ii. Sleeping cells of the splinter groups does have capability to conduct isolated terrorist acts in the country particularly with the help of foreign sponsorship. They would definitely surface randomly and register their unending hatred to open, democratic and liberal society of Pakistan. Clear examples of their hatred are evident from destroying schools, shooting of Malala Yousafzai, attack on Sri Lankan cricket team and last but not the least attack on Army Public School (APS) killing around 140 innocent kids. More recently, the sleeping cells of splinter groups had done suicide attacks on the former Punjab Interior Minister Mr. Shuja Khanzada (Gabool, Haider, & Bhatti, 2015), Badaber air base (BBC, 2015a), Quetta hospital attack killing 93 (Mann, 2016), attack on ANP leader Haroon Bilour (The News, 2018b), and an attack on the political rally in Baluchistan that killed Nawabzada Siraj Raisani along with 149 others (Shah, Saifi, & Vonberg, 2018), are few incidents in point.

iii. A recent November 2018 report of Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs claimed that “between 480,000 and 507,000 people have been killed in the United States’ post-9/11 wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan” (Crawford, 2018). According to report, among all others around
23,372 civilians died only in Pakistan. Therefore, the successful roar has surfaced against the armed militias, denying very visibility of their actions.

iv. Pakistan armed forces and law enforcement agencies have conducted a large number of combing operations against armed militia for which the statistics are shown below.

v. In these operations around 7,000 individuals were arrested and 2,471 terrorists were killed including the Head of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Malik Ishaque (BBC, 2015b).

**Figure 8.1: Combing Operation from 2014 to 2017**

By these measures, the government reclaimed the space it had lost to militants/terrorists and also sent out a message that it intends to finally assert itself.

5) **Zero Tolerance for Militancy in Punjab**

i. Simultaneously, Punjab Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) launched multiple IBOs between 2014 to 2018 numbering 91,666 in Punjab and not only arrested 897 terrorists but also killed 275 in encounters (Khan, Khan, & Rafique, 2018).

ii. Under the Pakistan Penal Code around 400 terrorists are executed along with 68,957 hardcore terrorists are enlisted in the Digital Databank of Policy/Counter Terrorism Departments (Khan, Khan, & Rafique, 2018).
iii. As a result of these concerted efforts, a visible improvement in Punjab is observed.

6) **Registration and Regulation of Religious Maddaris**

i. This point deals with the regulation of religious maddaris in the domain of geotagging, funding, curriculum, foreign students and any linkage with militant organizations.

ii. There are over 32,272 Madaris across Pakistan with almost 3.5 million students but no progress has been witnessed for mainstreaming them due to strong opposition of the religious circles (Khan, Khan, & Rafique, 2018).

iii. According to ISSI report, “Islamabad Punjab and Sindh have already carried out 100% geo-mapping (Special software technology that records data with visuals) on agreed parameters, while Baluchistan (80%), FATA (90%), and KPK (95%). Geo-mapping of all places of worships has also been undertaken” (Khan, Khan, & Rafique, 2018).

iv. According to Senate report 2017, the government has developed two different forms for the registration and data gathering purposes, which is done with the help of ITMP (a union of religious schools). Moreover, Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (FBISE) and Higher Education Commission (HEC) have been working with ITMP to award degree awarding status to Wafaqul Madaras (NACTA, 2018a).

**Table 8.4: Distribution of Registered Madaris**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sindh</th>
<th>KPK</th>
<th>Bal</th>
<th>ICT</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>AJK</th>
<th>FATA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>10,020</td>
<td>2567</td>
<td>2879</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB</td>
<td>13,934</td>
<td>3921</td>
<td>2568</td>
<td>1489</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoRA</td>
<td>8982</td>
<td>4369</td>
<td>1672</td>
<td>2284</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>17,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Dept</td>
<td>13,798</td>
<td>10,033</td>
<td>3028</td>
<td>2959</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>1404</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>32,272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Counter Terrorism Authority of Pakistan
v. As of July 2019, the Federal government showed its resolve to register around 30,000 religious seminaries (Pakistan Today, 2019b). The announcement came prior to Pakistan’s PM visit to United States.

7) **Choking Financing of Terrorist Organizations**

i. To counter the network of black money feeding the terrorist networks, two prime institutions of Pakistan, the State Bank and Ministry of Interior are closely working to track down the sources of funds of outfits of terrorists.

ii. Also the government had issued strict instructions not to collect funds through charitable activities along with sacrificial animal donations by unregistered elements/organizations (Ali, 2018b).

iii. Combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) is a core pillar of the fight against terrorism. Measures taken post NAP announcement are given below (Times of Islamabad, 2018).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Arrests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947/ Hawala Hundi</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>1209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Anti Money Laundering Act 2010</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>176 Suspicious Transactions Reports by FMU</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Amount recovered</td>
<td>Rs. 1489.918</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Counter Terrorism Authority of Pakistan

iv. Apart from these measures taken by FIA, a database of Schedule-IV individuals has been created in NACTA. By now 7,589 activists, office bearers and financiers of proscribed organizations have been enlisted from all provinces. By taking action on these lists, State Bank of Pakistan has frozen 4,580 accounts and seized an amount of Rs. 355,862 Million (NACTA, 2018d).
v. This exercise appears to be a significant one; however that comes to a paltry Rs. 77.699 per account. This suggests that either most of the terrorist financing is outside banking channel or the persons whose accounts were frozen were not the key financiers.

vi. Moreover, the August 2017 report of Senate of Pakistan refers FERA 1947/ Hawala Hundi cases while detailing 777 cases, 1060 arrests, and recovery of 1320.705 millions. The same report on the issue of anti-money laundering gives details of 336 cases along with 483 arrests. About suspicious transaction reports (STRs), the Senate report mentions 176 incidents among 32 were converted into cases, 14 were closed, and 130 are under process (Senate, 2017).

vii. According to Senate report 2017, counter financing for terrorists (CTF) units are established in the counter terrorism departments (CTDs) of all the four provinces, which are to be made part of investigations (Senate, 2017).

viii. The report also highlights the establishment of national task force (NTF) in June 2017 that through inclusion of all the stakeholders would effectively coordinate against matters on countering financing for terrorists (CFT) (Senate, 2017).

ix. Moreover, the document mentioned that 15 amendments are so far made in the ‘2010 Anti Money Laundering Act (AMLA)’ in 2015 (Senate, 2017).

x. This makes it amply clear that the above measures had greatly choked the terror financing. It has also sent out a signal that the government is quite serious in law enforcement.

8) Strengthening of NACTA

i. NACTA was administratively established in 2008 but NACTA Act was passed in 2013 with the view to create a coordinating body against terrorism and extremism in the country. NACTA is mandated to receive, collate and share intelligence. It was also tasked to “coordinate and prepare counter terrorism and counter extremism strategies”. Initially, NACTA could not be made effective due to budget constraints, capacity issues and lack of political backing. It is only recently
that the government has made attempts to operationalize it by providing necessary staff, infrastructure and budget (Khan, 2018a).

ii. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) faced many problems including administrative and financial that is now leading towards greater stability to play its due role (Khan, 2018a).

iii. Today, two buildings are being renovated for the administrative housing of NACTA (Ahmadani, 2017).

iv. During financial year 2016-17, NACTA demanded Rs. 1,559 million but received Rs. 1,545.5 million for the tasks, which was quite a positive development (Senate, 2017).

v. The 2017-18 financial budgeting did not acknowledge NACTA and only allocated Rs. 143.019 million for tasks in place of 1528.727 million demanded. For the year 2018-19 it received about Rs170 million, which was 20% increase (Tanoli, 2018). The year 2019-20 did promised 62% increase in the budget which came about Rs270 million (Mukhtar, 2019). It seems that NACTA is now on its rise due to very keen interest of the stakeholders.

vi. Few of the previous and contemporary reasons to remain NACTA unable to play its potent role in the national security of Pakistan are given below:

   a. NACTA has always been short on requisite funding. For example the Ministry of Interior deemed Rs. 32 billion for the organization to perform its job in-line with National Internal Security Policy (NISP) for the 2014-15 financial years (Farooq & Zaidi, 2014). Regardless of suggested amount, the Federal government allocated only Rs. 92 million for the task and to uplift the structure of NACTA (NACTA, 2018e). The situation in 2017-18 financial year was no different to 2014 as NACTA was allocated only Rs. 143.019 million regardless of its demand of Rs. 1528.727 million (Senate, 2017). Though, fiscal years 2018-19 and 2019-20 did promised required funds to upgrade the performance of NACTA that allocated Rs170million and Rs270million, respectively.

   b. Proposed Directorate of Internal Security for intelligence sharing among host of civil and military intelligence agencies could not take shape. A compromised solution in the shape of Joint Investigation Directorate is however, paying dividends (Pakistan Today, 2018d).

   c. NACTA being directly responsible to the Prime Minister has been taken under Ministry of Interior. Status of the Authority is pending before the
court and for the time being NACTA is virtually dysfunctional under legal limbo.

d. The pace of counter terrorism force (CTF) is again not so satisfactory. However, with a potent intelligence outfit and a dedicated Counter Terrorism Force, NACTA is likely to overshadow Ministry of Interior (Raza, 2018).

Details are given in table 8.6.

Table 8.6: Strengthening of NACTA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office Space</th>
<th>Pakistan Manpower Institute (PMI) hostel building allocated by PM office Capital Hotel hired on rent for 05 years Renovation of both buildings in progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Budget       | 2013-14 - Rs. 95.000 M  
|              | 2014-15 - Rs. 92.040 M  
|              | 2015-16 - Rs. 1210.989 M  
|              | 2016-17 - Rs. 1545.5 M  
|              | 2017-18 - Rs. 143.019M  
|              | 2018-19 - Rs. 140.000 M  
|              | 2019-20 - Rs. 270.000 M  |
| HR (811)     | Strength as on  
|              | July 2013 = 72  
|              | August, 2015 = 53  
|              | December 2016 = 104  
|              | September 2017 = 137  
|              | Further recruitment is in progress.  

Source: Senate Report 2017 (Senate, 2017), and National Counter Terrorism Authority of Pakistan (NACTA, 2018e).

However, NACTA still has to cover a long distance in order to gain the stature along with political weight for convincing stakeholders/institutions together and coordinate.
9) **Dealing Firmly With Sectarian Terrorists**

i. Along with cultural diversity, Pakistan has inherited sectarian dimensions that converted into fault lines in the aftermath of Iranian revolution of 1979. Also the post Soviet *Jihad*, Pakistan faced tremendous backlash that allowed extra regional actors to fuel instability in the country.

ii. In this domain, Pakistan has captured and convicted many clerics from different sects spreading sectarian terrorism.

iii. The root cause is still alive which post NAP initiatives are trying to address. Also special efforts are being done to address sectarian issues in Baluchistan and Gilgit-Baltistan to avoid permanence of the sectarian fault line.

iv. That is why, measures taken under NAP have resulted rapid decline in sectarian terrorism incidents, which can be gauged by the graph as under:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>688</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Senate Report 2017 (Senate, 2017). *According to PIPS 2018 Report, only 12 incidents were recorded.

10) **Efforts Against Re-emergence of Proscribed Organizations**

i. The ATA 1997 deals with the proscription of organizations involved in terrorism, sectarianism and subversion activities.

ii. Post NAP measures have proscribed/ arrested 7,589 activists, and freeze around 4,580 bank accounts that led to frozen of Rs. 355,862 Million (NACTA, 2018d).
iii. Other measures taken in this regards include cancelling and denial of passports, bank accounts freezing, financial ban on institutions to provide support, and restrictions on weapons licenses.

iv. As of July 26, 2019 seventy three (73) organizations/ splinter outfits have been proscribed, six (6) are under observation of Ministry of Interior, which include four organizations under “u/section 11-D-(1) r/w Schedule-II, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997” and two (2) organizations under UNSC Resolution No. 1267 (NACTA, 2019). Nine (9) among the seventy three (73) tried to re-emerge with different names but were proscribed immediately. Details are given in Table 8.8.

Table 8.8: List of Proscribed Organizations that Changed their Names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Old Name</th>
<th>New Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)</td>
<td>Proscribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan</td>
<td>Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan</td>
<td>Proscribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ahl-e-SunnatWalJamat</td>
<td>Ahl-e-SunnatWalJamat</td>
<td>Proscribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)</td>
<td>Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)</td>
<td>Proscribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>IslamiTahreek Pakistan</td>
<td>IslamiTahreek Pakistan</td>
<td>Proscribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al Alami (LeJ A)</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al Alami (LeJ A)</td>
<td>Proscribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jamat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)</td>
<td>Jamat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)</td>
<td>Proscribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD)</td>
<td>Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD)</td>
<td>Proscribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FIF)</td>
<td>Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FIF)</td>
<td>Proscribed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11) **On-Going Operation in Karachi will be Taken to its Logical End**

i. Karachi Operation is going on quite successfully as civil armed forces (CAFs) have taken extensive measures including intelligence-based operations (Shaikh, 2018).
ii. Also Pakistan Rangers have played decisive role to curb the menace of lawlessness in Karachi. Phase-I of the operation has been successfully concluded by Pakistan Rangers (Sind) (Khan, 2015c) and a tougher Phase-II is under way.

iii. The then Federal government showed its determination at the beginning of operation while sending clear signals, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that “we started the Karachi operation with great determination and there will be no let-up in this operation” (The Express Tribune, 2015c), the fruits of Karachi operation are quite visible today (Pakistan Today, 2018e).

iv. Resultantly, all the heinous crimes have substantially decreased and the business is at its rise.

v. According to Senate report 2017, there is a significant decline in the violent extremism and acts of terrorism in Karachi. The report charts out the decline as, for example, crimes associated to target killing went down about 97%, murder is squeezed down to 87%, acts of terrorism are down by 98%, the decline in robberies went down to 52%, and last but not the least the law enforcement agencies retrieved 33.37% weapons from the criminals/ militants (Senate, 2017).

vi. However, there is reluctant cooperation by the key political parties of Karachi.

12) Countering Hate Speech and Extremist Material.

i. The Government has taken quite serious measures against hate speech by making arrests and confiscating material as mentioned and has overcome this issue to a large extent.

ii. It had installed very tight scrutiny against politic-o-religious sentiments to be pronounced in the public.

iii. Ban on the speeches by Muttahida Quomi Movement (MQM) Chief Altaf Hussain, is a noticeable action in this regard (Gabol, 2015).

iv. However, the pace of actions against hate speeches during public rallies, social media campaigns including wall chalking is far away from eye sight of the state.

v. Much work has been done that surround condemnation of hate speeches and intolerance. For example, according to August 2017 Senate report around 1,353
cases were registered, 2,528 persons are arrested, and 70 mosques are sealed to counter elements of hate speech (Senate, 2017). On the other hand Pakistan Security Report 2017 of PIPS mentioned that 1373 cases were registered, 2566 persons were arrested, and 70 premises are sealed so far (PIPS, 2018).

vi. To stop the misuse of mosques as platform to spread hatred through loudspeakers, 17,795 cases were registered, 18,520 persons were arrested, and around 7,942 equipments were taken away from the possession of wrongdoers (Senate, 2017). On the other hand, the PIPS 2017 report mentioned that 18687 cases are registered, 7479 material/equipment is confiscated, and 19422 persons are arrested (PIPS, 2018).

vii. NACTA has also introduced a mobile app to curb the trends of hate speech and anyone while using the app can help national security institutions to identify people involved in hate speech (Pakistan Today, 2018f).

**Figure-8.2: Actions Taken Against Hate Speech**

![Graph showing actions taken against hate speech]

Source: National Counter Terrorism Authority

13) **Ban on Glorification of Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations through Print and Electronic Media.**

Banning the projection of militants has been enforced as per the provisions of ATA and PEMRA Ordinance. Resultantly, the coverage of the spokesperson of all proscribed organizations has largely been checked and visible improvement has been observed.
i. Section 11-E-(I)-d r/w section 11-W. Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 stipulates the purpose and intent of any counter terrorism effort and legislation is that any “public utterances by or on behalf of or in support of a proscribed organization shall be prohibited” (Molaw, 2018). It should be muted, instead of being amplified.

ii. Section 20 (c) PEMRA Ordinance, 2002 (amended in 2007) also exhorts the electronic media license holders not to air anything that can or is likely to encourage terrorism (Wipo, 2018).\(^6\)

14) **Measures Against Abuse of Internet and Social Media for Terrorism.**

i. Social media and internet, which became an important tool to “promote, recruit and train” terrorists got emphasis in the policy response of NAP.

ii. The “Prevention of Electronic Crime Act 2015”, which was passed by the Parliament in 2016 (National Assembly, 2016), has been critical to block approximately 937 URLs including multiple (almost 10) websites of banned organizations (Senate, 2017). According to ISSI report, “till March 2018, approximately 1447 websites have been blocked which exhibits extremism and hate” (Khan, Khan, & Rafique, 2018). This exercise requires continuous monitoring by the concerned authorities.

15) **Establishing and Deploying a Dedicated Counter Terrorism Force.**

i. Provinces were required to raise dedicated counter terrorism force and specialized police stations for dealing with ATA cases (NACTA, 2018b).

ii. By now, 73% of the sanctioned CTF has been raised in all provinces.

iii. Only Punjab has established CTD police stations, one in each division (Ghumman, 2014).

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\(^6\) Former clause (c) replaced by new clause (c) by the PEMRA (Amendment) Act, 2007 (Act No.II of 2007).
Table 8.9: Deployment of Counter Terrorism Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Sanctioned</th>
<th>Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>4300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bal</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>2206</td>
<td>2280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJK</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12,706</td>
<td>9,236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Senate Report 2017

16) Taking Effective Steps against Religious Persecution.

i. Provinces have taken measures to tackle the issue of religious persecution.

ii. However, apart from FIRs there is no credible mechanism of reporting these incidents, while such incidents are largely influenced by religious-o-political interventions.

17) Dismantling of Communication Network of Terrorist.

i. A concerted campaign was launched to block unregistered mobile SIMs.

ii. This exercise has borne significant results and 98.3 million unregistered SIMs have been blocked (Guramani, 2017).

iii. The fact that there are no unlicensed FM radio stations operating in the country and mobile SIM issuance got streamlined by induction of biometric verification system indicates to a major progress in this direction (Guramani, 2017).

iv. However, no progress has been made on stopping cross border mobile signal spill over in Pak-Afghan border area (Haider, 2016).

18) Administrative and Development Reforms in FATA.

i. Practical efforts started on the point after lapse of one year of NAP, when a six-member FATA Reforms Committee was constituted in November 2015, headed by Mr. Sartaj Aziz (Manan, 2015).
ii. The committee presented its report in August 2016 and was approved by the Cabinet in March 2017 (MOFA, 2017).

iii. Despite opposition from some political parties, Mr. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and Chief of Army General Qamar Javed Bajwa showed their commitment to remove all impediments (Wasim, 2018a).

iv. A phased mainstreaming of FATA into KPK over a period of 5 years was recommended.

v. After a long stall the decision of FATA merger into KPK was principally approved by the Parliamentary leaders on May 22, 2018 and got approved by the Parliament under its 30th Constitutional Amendment on May 23, 2018, which subsequently was signed by the President of Pakistan on May 31, 2018 (Ghauri, 2018). All this process constitutionally approved the integration bid, which included political representation of the agencies both at Provincial and National Assemblies.

vi. It had 12 National Assembly seats. After merger into KPK, the total NA seats will exceed from 48 to 60. This will also enhance provincial assembly seats from 126 to 147 (Chughtai, 2018).

vii. FATA was given representation in 2018 General Elections to contest for National Assembly (Dawn, 2018b) but due to administrative cum constitutional reasons elections on Provincial Assembly were postponed till July 20, 2019. On July 20, 2019 the former tribal agencies formally participated in the Provincial Elections and peacefully entered into the mainstream political discourse of Pakistan (The Nation, 2019).

viii. Yet introduction and implementation of administrative and application of constitutional reforms in FATA appear to be a distant possibility as:-

   a. Political administration has yet to resume control of their areas.
   b. Armed forces have to commence with progressive presence to ensure no possibility for the terrorist outfits. This needs small garrisons at important locations around the Pak-Afghan border.
   c. Return of 1.8 million IDPs and their rehabilitation is likely to take considerable time.
19) **Steps towards Baluchistan Reconciliation.**

i. The implementation of NAP measures has significantly improved the security situation in Baluchistan and insurgency is being marginalized.

ii. Reconciliation efforts with dissident Baloch leaders are in progress such as softened gesture of the Baluch nationalist leader Gazain Marri has shunned the separatist narrative and joined mainstream politics (Abrar, 2018).

iii. The hardcore Brahamdad Bugti, who is living in self-exile, has also showed willingness to join ongoing reconciliatory efforts in Baluchistan (Shahzeb, 2015).

iv. Moreover, Baluchistan government’s reconciliatory efforts to approach Khan of Kalat, Mr. Suleman Dawood through “Grand Baluch Jirga” are supplementary work to make the process both inclusive and exclusive (Shah, 2015). The government wants him to play his role in settlement of issues facing the province; though, anticipated inclusion of the exiled nationalist leadership in the province may have some negative impacts on the entire reconciliatory process.

v. So far 1800 Ferraris have surrendered since the initiation of the reconciliatory process (Shah, 2017).

vi. Rapid socio-economic development in the province is going on to lubricate the process and incentivize reconciliation efforts. For example, as mentioned by ISSI report, “in 2009, Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Baluchistan package was launched by the government to ensure Baluchistan’s representation in public institutions and fulfill its demands. For this purpose, scholarships have been allocated to the Baluch students, 13,200 Baluch youth have been inducted in the army and many others were inducted in FIA, Utility Store Corporations, Civil Defence Department, Planning and Development Department, Anti-Narcotics Force and Ministry of Defense. A special quota has also been reserved for the Baluch in all employments. In November 2017, a ‘Khushal Baluchistan’ initiative was launched to improve socio-economic as well as security conditions in the province” (Khan, Khan, & Rafique, 2018).
20) **Dealing with the Issue of Afghan Refugees.**

i. The “Tripartite Agreement for Voluntary Repatriation” of Afghan Refugees is facing continuous influxes and the dates have been extended on yearly basis (UNHCR, 2003).

ii. The due date of Afghan refugee stay which was approved until September 2018 was extended until June 30, 2019 (UNHCR, 2018), which was true for the validity of ‘proof of registration cards’ (POR) (The Nation, 2018). Later on June 18, 2019, Pakistan agreed to extend the ‘Tripartite Agreement for Voluntary Repatriation’ for one more year. An agreement was signed between UNHCR, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to legally cover the Afghan refugees for another year upto June 2020 under the 30th Tripartite Commission Meeting (UNHCR, 2019).

iii. The Interior Ministry along with NADRA conducted an extensive exercise of scrutinizing CNICs of illegal immigrants. As a result, 176,000 cases have been identified and are going through verification process (Raja, 2018).

iv. Pakistan government has also finalized a “Draft National Refugee Law” which is with the relevant institutions for final comments (Khan, 2017).

v. Also the Ministry of SAFRON along with NADRA has completed the operational plan to register the unregistered refugees. Until March 2018 under the Tripartite Agreement 1.38 million Afghan refugees are recorded in Pakistan and about 176,000 cases of illegal immigration are registered. In total, since 2002 about 4.3 million Afghan refugees have gone back; however without proper border control, this may prove to be another ’rolling chair’ situation (Khan, Khan, & Rafique, 2018).

Based on the progress evaluation carried out in this study, it is evident that efforts though selective, have certainly been made towards implementation of NAP. While progress has been made in areas of law enforcement, however progress in areas requiring reforms and capacity building has remained marginal. It is again important to place NISP 2018-23 into discussion as it has provided some of the expected policy directions which earlier were absent in the NISP 2014-
18. For example, the previous policy only focused on the four years time bar that it was assigned to but this new internal policy not only take forward the previous lessons but also fully mitigate the security environment of contemporary Pakistan. NISP 2018-23 focuses on three particular domains consisting of administrative, ideational, and socio-economic aspects (Niaz, 2018).

i. The Administrative domain of the NISP focuses on to enhance the ability of the state to efficiently mitigate the security issues and credibly respond to such situations.

ii. The Ideational aspect of the NISP promises to negate the extremist narratives and through counter construct State would challenge the underpinnings of terrorist ideology.

iii. The Socio-economic cluster of the NISP confronts to deny the social space to terrorists while improving the livelihood of the deprived segments of society.

NISP 2018-23 foresees security as an independent variable to achieve peace and development in the country. With four broader objectives, the NISP has placed ‘6R Strategy’ involving, “re-imagine, reconcile, redistribute, recognize, regional approach and reorient facets of the state” as means to interact with people of Pakistan (Niaz, 2018). More interestingly, the Policy provides almost 120 indicators to measure the progress which is an exceptional implementation plan vested in the NISP 2018-23.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No.</th>
<th>NAP</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Execution of Convicted Terrorist</td>
<td>No. of persons Executed under ATA/PPC: 483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2      | Special Trial Courts (STC)        | • 11Courts Notified  
• 717 Cases transferred to STC and about 646 are finalized including award of 345 death sentences.         |
<p>| 3      | Action against Armed             | • Visibility of armed militias and display of                                                                      |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Militias | weapons curtailed.  
- Terrorist Killed: 2127  
- Terrorist Arrested: 5884 |
| 4 | Strengthening and activation of NACTA | Office Space  
Renovation of two buildings for housing NACTA in progress  
Demanded: 1559.0 M  
Budget 2018/19: 170.000 M  
Budget 2019/20: 276.000 M  
HR: Recruitments in progress |
| 5 | Countering hate speech and extremist material | Hate Speech/Materials  
Cases registered: 1353  
Persons Arrested: 2528  
Shops sealed: 70  
Misuse of Loudspeakers  
Cases Registered: 17795  
Persons Arrested: 18520  
Equipments confiscated: 7942 |
| 6 | Choking financing for terrorists and terrorists organizations | FERA/Hawala Hundi  
Cases: 777  
Arrests: 1060  
Recovery: 1320.705 Millions  
Anti-money Laundering  
Cases: 336  
Arrests: 483  
Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs):  
STRs Received from EMU: 176 |
Converted into Cases: 32
Closed: 14
Under Process: 130

- Counter Financing for Terrorists (CFT) Units established in all provincial CTDs.
- Counter Financing for Terrorists (CFT) to be made an integral part of provincial investigations.
- National Task Force (NTF) on Countering Financing for Terrorist (CFT) with reps from all stakeholders, set-up in June 2017 for effective coordination on policy and operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7</th>
<th>Ensuring against re-emergence of proscribed organizations/Individuals</th>
<th>Categorize: (63+3) 164 UNSCR Common 13 4th Schedule Total Activists: 8333</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of accounts freezed: 5023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amount frozen: Rs. 150 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Following actions have been taken against Proscribed Persons:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Passport Embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Freezing of Bank Accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Ban on Financial support and services by financial institutes. Arms license Embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Provincial Governments requested to take legal action under ATA 1997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8</th>
<th>Establishing a Counter Terrorism Force</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Sanctioned</th>
<th>Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>4300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>728</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bal</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>1000</td>
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</tr>
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<td>KP</td>
<td>2206</td>
<td>2080</td>
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<td>GB</td>
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<tr>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Taking steps against religious persecution</td>
<td></td>
<td>Data collection in progress, to be verified and then put up for further action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Registration and regulation of Madrassas</td>
<td>Two separate Registration and Data form for Madaris developed in consultation with ITMP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Committees under FBISE and HEC formed with representation from ITMP for grant of equivalence degree awarding status to Wafaqs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ban on glorification of terrorism in media</td>
<td>Strict implementation of ban on electronic media of activists of proscribed organizations.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any violation is instantly reported to concerned quarters and actions taken.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Visible improvement noticed.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>FATA Reforms</td>
<td>FATA is merged into KPK and participated in National Assembly along with Provincial Assembly elections.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Dismantling communication networks of terrorists</td>
<td>98.3 million SIMs blocked</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Biometric Verification system in place.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Tangible measures against abuse of internet and Social media for terrorism</td>
<td>Pakistan Electronic Crimes Act 2015 passed.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>937 URLs and 10 websites of proscribed organizations have been blocked by MoITT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Militancy in Punjab</td>
<td>Visible improvement in law and order situation in Punjab.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Taking the ongoing operation in Karachi to its logical conclusion</td>
<td>Registered significant decline in terrorism, crime and improvement in law and order:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Target Killing down by 97%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Murder down by 87%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Terrorism down by 98%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Robberies down by 52%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Weapons recovered 33.37%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Steps towards Baluchistan Reconciliation</td>
<td>Surrender and Reconciliation/Rehabilitation of Ferraris/outlaws in progress.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ending Sectarian Terrorism</td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
<td><strong>Incidents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1: Decline in Sectarian Terrorism (2013-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year of Occurrence</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Visible decline in sectarian terrorism

19. Resolving issues of Afghan Refugees

- The Federal Cabinet approved the Repatriation and Management Policy
- POR cards valid until June 2020.
- Tripartite agreement for voluntary repatriation has been extended for one more year until 2020.
- The Ministry of SAFRON in consultation with NADRA has finalized and Operational Plan for documentation of unregistered Afghan refugees.
- Draft National Refugee Law has been developed and shared with relevant stakeholders.

20. Revamping the Criminal Justice System

NACTA conducted Nine (9) meetings of Provincial Representatives since May 2016 and one week workshop of the Federal Core Group in April 2017 and developed Recommendation for Revamping of Criminal Justice system, its implementation plan, along with responsibilities, timelines and cost elements, Sector wise (Police, Prosecution, Prison, Parole & Probation and Judiciary), through consensus and in coordination with provinces, ICT, GB and AJK. These recommendations, approved by Interior Minister, have now been submitted to Prime Minister.

Source: (Senate, 2017) & (Anis, 2018).

8.14. NAP—Impediments in Implementation:

NAP primarily focuses on implementation of existing laws to re-establish the writ of the state. However, review of the progress on NAP brings to light the systemic and institutional impediments which hampered its effective implementation. Though, the ‘6R Strategy’ of the
NISP 2018-23 does foresee implementation mechanism of the NAP but could not be seen as sole answer to the challenges since it is just a document. Therefore, the identified impediments can be categorized in four broad categories.

i. Political Issues.
ii. Systemic Issues.
iii. Capacity Issues.
iv. Complexity.

Key impediments under each category are discussed below:

1) Political Issues:

Within Political issues there was a lack of political will as well as resistance from religious and political parties.

A. Political Will

- **Issues of Coordination.** Of the 16 sub-committees formed under ministers to coordinate implementation of NAP, 13 never held a single meeting, and there was no accountability for this lack of interest.

- **Baluchistan Political Reconciliation.** The process of reconciliation with displeased Baloch factions involving talks with their top leadership has now been largely abandoned because of lack of interest by the stakeholders.

B. Religious/ Political Resistance

- **Regulation of Religious Maddaris.** There was resistance on part of religious-o-political parties to facilitate maddaris reforms. They saw it as an attempt by the government to encroach upon their turf. However only very recently, *Wafaq-ul-Madaris* have reluctantly agreed to participate in registration drive (Daily Times, 2018) as well as adopt modern
curriculum including four contemporary subjects English, Pak Studies, Science and Math (Pakistan Observer, 2016).

- **Reforms in FATA and Repatriation of IDPs.** While most of the IDPs have returned to their respective areas, reforms in FATA were previously delayed and held up due to resistance from the previous government’s coalition partners JUI (F) and Pakistan Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) (Khan, 2018b). Delayed but not too late, the merger of FATA came to reality in May 2018. This whole political gambling challenged the national security of Pakistan when youth of FATA were being exploited by anti-state sentiments. The efforts of the Pakistan Armed Forces based on the phenomenon ‘justice delayed is justice denied’ ultimately convinced the political stalwarts to merge FATA into KPK based on the six-member FATA Reforms Committee, which was constituted in November 2015, headed by Mr. Sartaj Aziz. The committee presented its report in August 2016 and was approved by the Cabinet in March 2017 with final approval by both lower and upper houses of National Assembly in May. The President of Pakistan also signed the 25th Constitutional Amendment Bill that made FATA the part of KPK (Wasim, 2018b).

- **Logical End to On-Going Operation in Karachi.** Giving power to Sindh Rangers has brought major decline in lawlessness in Karachi including terrorism related crimes. However, this has been a contentious issue for local political parties resulting in much acrimony between Federal and Sindh government (Mansoor, 2018).

2) **Systemic Issues**

Within systemic issues there was a lack of institutional ownership, issues between institutional coordination as well as disjointed efforts for judicial reforms.

**A. Lack of Institutional Ownership**

- There was no institutional ownership by implementation agencies. No strategy was developed for implementation of NAP and 20 points remained mere top-level policy guidelines.
• Absence of clear goals and associated performance indicators led to lack of responsibility and accountability.
• Thus there was a lack of direction and ownership.

B. Coordination

• The coordination and information sharing between NACTA and intelligence agencies remained low. There is no central intelligence database and all agencies are working independent of each other in silos.

C. Disjointed efforts at Judicial Reforms

• The efforts at judicial reforms remained disjointed. The decision of establishing military courts to set up parallel judicial mechanism especially to trial terrorists approved in the 21st Constitutional Amendment was suppose to be a short-term transitory measure during which judicial reforms were to be carried out. NACTA endeavored to formulate strategy for revamping of criminal judicial system (NACTA, 2017b) but effort was scuttled due to parallel exercise in Law and Justice Division (Ranjah, 2018).

3) Capacity Issues

Within capacity issues there were issues of monitoring capacity as well as resource constraints for investigating.

A. Monitoring Capacity

• **Choking Terrorism Related Financing.** The objective of choking terror financing laid out in NAP was easier said than done, keeping in view the limited institutional capacities to monitor terror financing and also the fact that most of terror economy estimated to be in billions is financed through cash and informal channels including charities. Efforts by the government to focus on banking channels only, made negligible impact.
• **Weak Inter Institution Linkages.** The inter linkages between State Bank of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance and FIA and their mutual sharing of information impedes attempts to curtail dubious fiscal operations.

B. **Resource Constraints of Investigating /Monitoring**

• Pakistan had established a dedicated unit called ‘Financial Monitoring Unit’ that deals with financial matters (FMU, 2018). Due to lack of resources, the agency is unable to cope with the tasks expected from it. Moreover, there is no mechanism to check informal non-banking channels of terror financing.

• Lack of resources have hampered enforcement of Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 (PECA). Also FIA’s *National Response Centre for Cyber Crimes* (NR3C) is mandated to monitor the cyber space (NR3C, 2018). However, due to serious capacity and resource constraints it remains handicapped ineffective law enforcement in cyber space.

4) **Complexity**

Within complexity issues there are humanitarian problems that bleed the whole effort due to repatriation of Afghan refugees as well as challenges erupting from Pakistan’s weak diplomacy to counter external support to insurgents and terrorists.

A. **Humanitarian**

• **Repatriation of Afghan Refugees.** While repatriation of Afghan refugees was an important element of NAP, this is a complex issue which also has a humanitarian element. Furthermore a substantial number of Afghan refugees managed to get CNICs over the years and became integrated into the society. This was further compounded by lack of clarity on their repatriation plan and weak Pak-Afghan border management.

• **Diplomatic.** External support being provided by foreign intelligence agencies to extremist elements and insurgents in Pakistan continues to provide them space, which need to be neutralized through aggressive diplomatic efforts.
In light of the above discussion, the study can draw that NAP for the first time articulated a clear set of intentions for countering violent extremism but its progress was impeded by the following factors:

- Lack of political will and resistance from religious parties
- Weak intra agency coordination
- Institutional incapacities

Although security situation in Pakistan today has improved due to efforts of the military and other LEAs but these gains are symptomatic and may prove to be temporary if the causes of violent extremism are not addressed through an integrated strategy. It is important to highlight that this study considers NISP 2018-23 a right step towards eliminating the violent extremism in Pakistan.

8.15. Where Do Pakistan Stand Now?

As the monster of terror breathes its last, the world has started to finally acknowledge Pakistan’s resilience, resolve and successes despite all odds along with courage in the face of overwhelming adversity. In 2015, the Forbes Magazine declared that despite all its challenges, “Pakistan has the potential to be a global turnaround story” (Runde, 2015). Celebrating what it called an “Asian Giant,” Gulf News also paid a glowing tribute to Pakistan’s successes in the face of all odds, when it wrote that “though Pakistan is not short of potentially acute or outright acute challenges, the country’s ability to withstand the test of time has proven to be inspirational” (Bukhari, 2015).

On the economic front, Pakistan has deepened its traditionally close cooperation with the world’s 2nd largest economy, China. Together with the Chinese, Pakistan is building a mammoth economic corridor that will bring fate-changing socio-economic opportunities for Pakistanis in
addition to making the country a bridge for trans-regional trade and shared development, economically integrating the South Asian region with Central Asia and beyond. As evident is its deep sea port at Gwadar, which is on its way to becoming a regional shipping hub at par with Dubai.

After bravely enduring over eighteen years of ceaseless trauma, Pakistani nation has emerged stronger and more determined. During all these years of bloodshed and mayhem, it has retained the sanity and will to plow ahead, no matter what. During all these years, it has continued to produce thousands of PhDs, globally acknowledged scientists, Nobel laureates, world class film makers, mesmerizing literature and some truly inspiring sportsmen. During all these years of trauma and travails, it has retained the essence of Sufi serenity, the richness of folklore, music and drama, culture and cuisine, film and fashion. During all these years of mayhem, Pakistan has added great roads, built new shopping malls, created beautiful monuments and excelled in arts and crafts. With friends and partners like China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and many neutral global nations spread over the continents of Europe, America, and Asia; Pakistan remained determined to press forward.

The efforts, sacrifices, and utmost contribution which are rendered by Pakistani military had no comparison. From a soldier to a four star general, all went to the extreme to save Pakistan from the trauma and trouble that it faced immediately after 9/11 incident. The dilemma of brinkmanship and discourse of twisted ideology was not a long night rather consumed more than eighteen years of Pakistani nation. Concluding this study without understanding and recognizing the exceptional contributions that Pakistan armed forces have registered to win the hearts and minds of more than 200 million inhabitants of Pakistan and rest of the world will be unfair. Furthermore, the kind of threats Pakistan had faced are multi-dimensional. For example, on the
one side it faced direct military threats from its neighboring India who since the independence put Pakistan on the ‘frying pan of territorial integrity’. On the other hand the so-called Cold War mantra of Soviet Containment put Pakistan into alliance with United States that finally ended up in Afghanistan while casting dark shadows over Islamic concept of ‘jihad’. This gave birth to violent extremism with motivated deception which ultimately got matted with the incident of 9/11. The ‘fire of global war on terror’ trapped Pakistan into a situation for which it was not ready. The challenges it was about to face were far complex than those of which it had been dealing since 1947. The situation was about to amalgamate conventional and sub-conventional elements operating within its own territory for which neither the nation nor the national security institutions were ready to deal. With ability to outcast Pakistan’s military and the ideological foundations, the ‘new style of war’ erupted with full blow. How Pakistan came out of ‘frying pan of territorial integrity’ and ended up into the ‘fire of global war on terror,’ is a question which is promptly investigated in the next chapter that will set a stage for the ‘new style of war’ that required ‘new style of response’ by Pakistan.
CHAPTER NINE

CRAWLING TOWARDS PEACE: FROM NATIONAL SECURITY TO GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

9.1. Introduction:

The journey towards peace was not so delicate and smooth which the most in the world perceive. Pakistan went through terrible times and had done its best to maintain neutrality and seek for a path of peace. Regional geography and political landscape made all efforts to clutch its progress and manifesto of nation-building that put the Muslim state in jeopardy of crawling towards peace. The resilience of the nation and sacrifices of the armed forces had altogether framed contemporary outlook of the state of Pakistan with 207,774,520 residents (GOP, 2018). How Pakistan dealt with the problems it faced during Cold War and Post-Cold War periods? is a question of utmost importance. By understanding the political dynamics of international environment the overall picture becomes clear.

Therefore, this chapter would address the international political landscapes that shifted the national security from regional discourse to a more complex global paradox. This in fact highlights that how Pakistan came out of ‘frying pan of territorial integrity’ and ended up into the ‘fire of global war on terror’? For example, Pakistan since 1947 was struggling with Indo centric national security discourse but immediately after 9/11 it ended up into global war on terror that drastically changed the dynamics of its politics. This does not happen over nightly as Cold War politics had been shaping the regional geography that allowed international politics to pave the way for orchestration of great game immediately in the aftermath of 9/11. This not only took Pakistan by surprise but also made inevitable victim of the whole new situation.

Due to the scope of research, this chapter would only bring about the role of armed forces to tackle the national security matters and afterwards the phenomenon of global war on terror.
Chapter four, five, six, seven and eight had already extensively investigated the dynamics of national security which originated exclusively from regional political environment. These chapters have shed light on the evolution of national security challenges and how post 1947 independence of Pakistan remained under constant threat from Indian aggressive designs. Therefore, what challenges Pakistan has encountered from regional political landscape and how it addressed the Indian hegemonic designs through appropriate military-cum-political strategies had been the focus of investigation in previous chapters. From now onwards the scope of the research investigation has precisely focused on international political environment that has corresponding impacts on Pakistan’s national security and pushed it into an awkward war. As mentioned earlier, the question which will be answered in this chapter is that how Pakistan came out of ‘frying pan of territorial integrity’ and ended up into the ‘fire of global war on terror’?

Pakistan’s military command since the inception of its sovereign status has been struggling to fix the challenges emanating from regional and international threat perceptions. The focus of most of the earlier commands was restricted to regional threats though part of it does maneuver the international environment, which was again meant to seek refuge from challenges arising out of military adventurism by neighboring India. Precisely, sixteen Generals including two British officers commanded the Army and have tackled the national security challenges confronted to Pakistan. The inventory includes the following names (Pakistan Army, 2016):

i. The first Army Chief of Pakistan Army was General Sir Frank Walter Messervy who remained at the post from August 15, 1947 to February 10, 1948.

ii. Later, General Douglas Daved Gracey occupied the position and stayed in the office from February 11, 1948 to January 16, 1951.

iii. General Muhammad Ayub Khan became the first Pakistani Army Chief who remained in office from January 17, 1951 to October 26, 1958. He is also known
as the first Marshall Law Administrator as was appointed by the then President of Pakistan Iskander Mirza who due to his political tussle with Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon dismissed the Constituent Assembly in 1958. When the situation ended up into turmoil and no settlement happened among the political forces, General Ayub appointed himself the President of Pakistan (Abbas, 2015).

iv. General Muhammad Musa came into office of the Army Chief on October 27, 1958 and served until September 17, 1966.

v. General Muhammad Yahya Khan became Army Chief on September 18, 1966 and remained in officer until December 20, 1971. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was the former Prime Minister and chief of Pakistan People Party (PPP) and General Yahya the Army Chief are the two culprits remembered as ‘failure and disgrace’ to secure and bargain East Pakistan with the then Sheikh Mujeeb of Awami League. Both the leaders not only share the burden of loosing East Pakistan but liberal and drunken personalities are also the common qualification between the two (Paracha, 2017). Even Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto camouflaged his drinking habit into political rhetoric such as in 1977 during a public rally in Lahore he said, “Haan mein sharab peeta hoon, laikan awam ka khoon nahi peeta [Yes I drink, but I do not drink the people’s blood]” (Paracha, 2011). This was a bleeding and drinking Pakistan.

vi. General Gul Hassan replaced General Yahya on December 20, 1971 and initially served the office as acting chief till January 21, 1972. From January 22, 1972 till March 02, 1972 he occupied the office as Chief of Army in full capacity.


viii. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq became Army Chief on March 1, 1976 and remained in the office until August 17, 1988. He never retired and died in uniform during a plane crash in 1988 that also killed the U.S. Ambassador with him (Sciolino, 1988). General Zia was the man who hanged Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and crafted the famous ‘Soviet War’ under the aspirations of President Reagan of the United States, which was reinstated by the former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2009 (Dawn, 2009a).
ix. General Mirza Aslam Beg took the oath on August 17, 1988 and served the office until August 16, 1991.


xi. General Abdul Waheed Kakar became Army Chief on January 12, 1993 and remained in the office until January 12, 1996.

xii. General Jehangir Karamat became Army Chief on January 1996 and served the nation until October 7, 1998. When Pakistan reacted to Indian nuclear explosions in May 1998, General Karamat was the Army Chief. Due to ever changing dynamics of strategic stability and security environment, General Karamat during a speech proposed the idea of National Security Council (NSC), a supreme body to deliberate decision making process on issues of national security. This was not liked by the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who pressurized him to resign. Therefore, he became the first Army Chief who resigned on the informal orders of the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1998. He was decorated soldier and without any hesitation or reluctance left the office. This was not liked by the Army as an institution and the way Nawaz Sharif exercised the power vested in Prime Minister Office was noticed (Dawn, 2009b).

xiii. General Pervez Musharraf entered the office on October 7, 1998 and occupied it until November 29, 2007. General Musharraf is also known as a military dictator who led a military regime from 1999 to 2007. His status as a dictator has an interesting portfolio that sworn him into politics out of nowhere but the dramatic sacking episode orchestrated by the then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. In fact, in 1999 General Musharraf was on an official trip to Sri Lanka and when he was en route to Islamabad, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif un-ceremonially ousted him and installed the then ISI Chief General Ziauddin Butt on his position. This was another event which was seen as an utter disrespect by the Army as an institution that decided not to accept an un-ceremonial removal of the Army Chief General Musharraf. The time General Musharraf’s plan entered in Pakistan air space which was a chartered flight carrying around 200 other passengers all civilian was ordered by the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to deny landing
anywhere in Pakistan (Harding, 2000). Meanwhile on national television, the ceremony of the new Army Chief General Butt was aired being commenced in Prime Minister Office, which was not the formal way of shifting command. This created a hell of situation in the country and Army at his own had to act that ended with removal of Nawaz Sharif government in Pakistan. General Musharraf has no choice other than leading the nuclear nation. It was a kind of ‘abortion’ of civil-military relations.


xvi. General Qamar Javed Bajwa is currently serving as Army Chief who entered the office on November 29, 2016. Just like General Kiyani, he also got extension for another term. General Bajwa has started the Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad in 2017 and successfully completed the Operation Zarb-e-Azab.

Among sixteen army chiefs only last four generals have fought the 21st century war against terrorism that not only shook the foundations of peace but also made the nation hostile to violence and terror. In fact, it’s the ‘Four General’s War’ that compiled Pakistan’s efforts against militancy and terrorism. Though, with hand twisting mantra of ‘do more’ Pakistan has been seen with suspicions on its role in the war against terrorism but the nation has always come forward to prove international concerns wrong. As General Qamer Javed Bajwa during 52nd Defense Day ceremony said:

“Despite all our efforts, our countless sacrifice and over decades of war, we are being told that we have not done enough against terrorism… if Pakistan has not done enough in this war, then no country in the world has done anything…only Pakistan has seen this
level of success with such limited resources. From Operation Sher Dil, to Rah-i-Rast, Rah-i-Nijat, Zarb-i-Azab and now Radd-ul-Fasaad, we have paid for each inch [of gains] with our blood…and now, I say that the world must do more” (Dawn, 2017).

The courage and strategy of Pakistan Army evolved around on simple promise, which directed its commitment to lay each and every single life to protect the nation and stood firm until last drop of blood in each soldier. Considering that Pakistan has done not enough to fight the menace of terrorism in fact highlights the agony of truth that the world has done nothing. It was Pakistan that proved its resilience against all regional and international conspiracies meant to destabilize the nuclear nation by showing its zero tolerance to accommodate extremist ideologies fueling hatred and violence among people of Pakistan. Starting from Operation SherDill till Operation Raddul-Fasad, Pakistan has protected every single inch of its territory. The mantra of ‘do more’ has been thrown into dustbin of political fallacy; now it’s the world at large that has to ‘do more’ to acknowledge Pakistan’s unparallel sacrifices.

During its efforts to counter the menace of extremism while becoming front line state in the ‘global war on terror’ Pakistan has rendered tremendous sacrifices that cost about 75,000 lives, put up with $123 billion economic loss, devastated its tribal region, and displaced millions of people along with war trauma that impacted daily life of every single Pakistani; cannot be simply ignored and placed for the consumption of political jargons (The News, 2018a). Chanting out miniscule $20 billion aid to Pakistan while ignoring the facts that “Pakistan still continues to provide free lines of ground and air communications (GLOCs/ALOCs)” to U.S. and ISAF forces to continue their mission in Afghanistan, is just like casting out layers of darkness over truth (The News, 2018a).

The priceless lives rendered to achieve the destiny of peace have by virtue lightened the future of Pakistan. The martyrs of the nation will never be forgotten nor will they be taken away from the hearts. The debt of martyrs is remembered and the cost is being paid by the terrorists.
Nations addicted to forget their martyrs have to learn terrible lessons that Pakistan would never wish to experience. Therefore, Pakistan has sacrificed the best of his soldiers and cherished each and every single soul. There was not an easy way out and simple narration cannot summarize the trauma that Pakistan has gone through. To get into the realistic posturing, a close encounter with Cold War politics is important which had not only shaped the United States foreign policy priorities in South Asia but directly impacted on Pakistan. Later-on in the aftermath of 9/11 incident, the paradox of Cold War unleashed the ultimate dilemma of insecurity under the so-called ‘war on terror’ and placed around 50 nations in the neighboring state Afghanistan. This directly made Pakistan a front line state and expected the same role which it had played during 80’s against the former Soviet Union.

Pakistan was still not been able to come out of the mess which the US foreign policy created in the region by twisting the ideological cause of ‘jihad’ into ‘insurgency warfare’. In 2001, as an immediate aftermath of 9/11 incident the US along with its coalition partners put in place almost 140,000 troops including ISAF forces under Operation Enduring Freedom (The Telegraph, 2011). As of July 2018, the number of troops is 16,229 which are contributed by 41 states for Resolute Support Mission (Brooke-Holland, 2018). The U.S. since 9/11 has spent over $6 trillion on wars with major chunk of it spent in Afghanistan (O’Connor, 2018). Regardless of all these commitments and financial contributions, after 17 years Afghanistan has only travelled between terror to turmoil. The circumstances and ground realities glaringly highlight U.S. failure in Afghanistan, which it had over the period of time attempted to overshadow by making Pakistan a scapegoat. This tendency of U.S. was reflected recently when President Donald Trump in an interview with Fox News on November 18, 2018 continued ‘tirade’ against Pakistan
(Hains, 2018). He was strongly given rebuttal by the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, who on November 19, 2018 tweeted in reaction to President Donald Trump’s ‘tirade’ and wrote:

“Instead of making Pakistan a scapegoat for their failures, the US should do a serious assessment of why, despite 140000 NATO troops plus 250,000 Afghan troops and reportedly $1 trillion spent on war in Afghanistan, the Taliban today are stronger than before” (The News, 2018a).

Without any single Pakistani involved in the 9/11 attacks, still it had faced enormous challenges along with hand twisting strategies around diplomatic, economic, social, political, and security variables. The worst part is the lingering instability in Afghanistan that has been spilling over terrorism and anarchy in the region particularly on Pakistan, which is why the country since its independence has been crawling between national security and global war on terror.

9.2. Crawling Between National Security and Global War on Terror:

The world pressurized Pakistan to support the US bid to fight war against terrorism in the wake of post 9/11 incident. It was a time when no nation was given an opportunity to stay neutral. Pakistan due to proximity of its geography became vulnerable to US military campaign against the Al-Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan. The famous speech of George W. Bush that he gave on September 21, 2001 categorized that:

“Either you’re with us, either you love freedom, and with nations which embrace freedom, or you’re with the enemy. There is no in between” (The Telegraph, 2001).

The post 9/11 close ties between both the nations initiated a new period of bilateral relations. Immediately after the attacks, the United States requested Pakistan to convince Taliban regime in Afghanistan to handover Al-Qaeda leadership to Washington who have already claimed the attack on World Trade Centers (WTC) on September 11, 2001. So, Pakistan even before getting into military alliance was engaged due to its supposed bargain with Taliban to handover the Al-Qaeda leadership to US. With all debt around its shoulders, Pakistan tried its best to avoid war in Afghanistan knowing the very fact that the burden of conflict would once
again end up on its side which will be futile and dangerous for Pakistan’s national security. To achieve this Pakistan did all efforts to convince Taliban regime in Afghanistan and told them that the fallout to resist international consensus is invincible with ability to ruin the future of the region. Terribly true and factually bitter, the Taliban regime did not listened to Pakistan. The impression that Pakistan has influence over the Taliban’s vanished away and finally United States attacked Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 (The Guardian, 2001).

What else United States can do other then declaring war? In fact, its image as a super power was challenged and two of its symbols, economic and military were attacked by the terrorists. World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Washington symbolizes the power of the United States. Terrorists have taken away the pride from a super power and without any doubt it was time for the attackers to pay the price. The way Pearl Harbor incident of December 1941 during the Second World War drastically shocked the US leadership who then decided to shift US foreign policy approach from ‘Isolationism’ to ‘Americanism’ by attacking Tokyo in January 1942; the same very way 9/11 attack also expected a serious response to restore the image and national resilience (Griffin, 2012). Unfortunately, United States lost around 3000 lives in each incident during Pearl Harbor of 1941 and 9/11 attacks of 2001, respectively. Pearl Harbor received final blow in 1945 when the US dropped ‘Little Man’ and ‘Fat Boy’ over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Now, the wrath of the mighty was once again ready to unleash its power on so-called Al-Qaeda and its safe heavens in Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, which side it must choose was not a difficult decision at all. It joined the civilized world and negated the existence of terrorists. The drama which is mostly presented in the literature that the country must have not become part of international coalition is somewhat full of distorted facts. The coalition was the right way to defeat the menace of terrorism. Plea that
Pakistan joined the US war because of ‘stone age’ threat does have some point in reference but altogether cannot surpass the very rational choice of joining the coalition. In other words, in absence of Bush connotation of ‘stone age’ threat Pakistan would have still decided to support international consensus to combat terrorism. It was the US conduct and hurriedness that before time spoiled Pakistani position on war against global terrorism by passing such unwise statements. Last but not the least, the overdue confusion was flushed out when the then President of Pakistan and Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf accepted the seven points demand of US and ensured full spectrum support to facilitate and fight global war on terror (The Economic Times, 2010).

The seven points were handed over to General Musharraf by the newly appointed US Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain. She presented her credentials to General Musharraf on September 13, 2001 and also the list of seven points. The points specifically highlighted seven expectations of US from Pakistan without any reciprocal commitment that could address repercussions and security vulnerabilities erupting out of so-called alliance. Seven of the US demands are briefly highlighted as under (Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011):

i. Disallowing Al-Qaeda operations on Pakistani side of the border along with denial of logistics and ammunition support to the militant outfits.

ii. Provision of over-flight and landing rights to the US air force for military and intelligence related operations.

iii. Provision of Pakistani naval and air bases.

iv. Intelligence sharing against the militant outfits operating in Afghanistan.

v. Denouncing and curbing the glorification of terrorist sentiments against the US and its allies.

vi. Cutting off the chains of human resource and recruitment ending up in Afghanistan to support Taliban.
vii. Breaking up diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime and assisting the US in destroying Al-Qaeda.

9/11 incident was an epic of horror that negatively impacted on the decision making process in Washington which wanted to achieve everything in a short span of time without considering the geographical, demographic, cultural, ideological, political, and security landscapes of the region. Everything was seen out of military lens that gave birth to difference of opinion between the United States and Pakistan. Initially everything was fine and cooperation on the so-called war against terrorism was going according to seven points. Under the terms Pakistan was not suppose to contribute its troops but to provide air/naval bases and land routes for NATO supply line. Slowly, Pakistan was grabbed into the war without its consent and the inevitable circumstances involved its military to respond the evolving threat around its border. Moreover, at times looking at the slippery situation in Afghanistan, Americans thought lets push the war into Pakistan. US failure to understand repercussions of the war that it also did not addressed in the seven points of cooperation and General Musharraf’s inability to decode the fallout of ‘war on terror’ on Pakistan altogether created a new security situation. The new situation and US hurriedness to achieve its political objectives further created dilemma of inconvenience between Islamabad and Washington (Yamin, 2015).

Almost after two months war campaign under Operation Enduring Freedom, Osama Bin Laden was located in the mountains of Tora Bora. Being the highest target of the US campaign an extensive war got started in Tora Bora from December 06 to 17, 2001. As a result most of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants run amok towards tribal areas of Pakistan (Corera, 2011). Now the war was no more in Afghanistan. It entered into Pakistan. The romance of military ties that got established during the Cold War against the Soviets was now at the edge of break-up in the
aftermath of 9/11. The reason was the overdue expectations which initially were not considered under the pact. On one side, Pakistan was aware of the fact that most of Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership along with militants have entered in its tribal areas. On the other hand, US objective of defeating the Al-Qaeda and changing the Taliban regime expected more and more from Pakistan. This situation over nightly changed the battlefield along with actors and factors of the so called war against terrorism. Now along with Afghanistan the battlefield was shifted into Pakistan’s tribal areas and the US led NATO alliance ISAF was not the only alliance to fight against Taliban and Al-Qaeda, it also involved Pakistan.

Taliban continued their struggle against the US and ISAF forces with a plea that their boots in Afghanistan are illegitimate and they will continue fighting until foreign troops leave the country (Zakaria, 2018). Bombing Pakistan was not an option for the US neither Pakistan was ready to act upon on US new demands. The expectations were piling-up day by day and US started pushing Pakistan to start military operations on its territory. Since the day of independence, Pakistan army had never entered in its tribal areas neither the training of soldiers has any clue to fight sub-conventional war. If Pakistan army on pressure of US enters into this mess, the invisible enemy clustered with twisted ideology could prove catastrophic for nuclear nation. So, stalemate over US demands to start military operations in tribal areas of Pakistan created inconvenience between the two nations.

Though, Pakistan under all circumstances fulfilled seven points agreed commitment. It provided intelligence sharing to decode and capture Al-Qaeda network, allowed US forces to utilize Pakistani bases, denounced the extremist voices along with banning militant outfits, facilitated NATO supply chain, and broke its diplomatic ties with the Taliban. Regardless of all this, confusion prevailed in Washington and many believed that Pakistan has not done enough.
Even few pointed out fingers towards Pakistan with a reference to sponsor terrorism in Afghanistan (Markey, 2007). It is important to mention that when Osama Bin Laden (OBL) was killed on May 01, 2011 by the US Special Forces ‘SEAL Team Six’ in Abattabad, the intelligence lead was provided by Pakistan and both the nations cherished successful conclusion of Bin Laden while labeling it ‘historic day’. This was rightly acknowledged by President Barrack Obama when after the operation he for the first time came on air and announced the news to the American people in particular and the world in general. He said that:

“It’s important to note that our counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding. Indeed, bin Laden had declared war against Pakistan as well, and ordered attacks against the Pakistani people…Tonight, I called President Zardari, and my team has also spoken with their Pakistani counterparts. They agree that this is a good and historic day for both of our nations. And going forward, it is essential that Pakistan continue to join us in the fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates” (Phillips, 2011).

As pointed out by President Obama, Pakistan has been the victim rather beneficiary of terrorism. It rendered countless contributions including human and economic but the world at large remained susceptible of its efforts. The discourse continued with partial and full acceptance of Pakistan’s role in the war on terror (Krepon, 2017). Presence of Osama Bin Laden in Abattabad has been mostly referred to denounce exceptional role Pakistan had played to curb the menace of terrorism. On November 19, 2018 President Donald Trump tweet was also seemed to be clutched with this perception when he wrote that “of course we should have captured Osama Bin Laden long before we did. I pointed him out in my book just BEFORE the attack on the World Trade Center. President Clinton famously missed his shot. We paid Pakistan Billions of Dollars & they never told us he was living there. Fools!..” (Burke, 2018).

If the conceptual understanding of Trump’s ‘tirade’ is applied on 9/11 incident then the hypothesis would be proved around the clandestine involvement of US military and intelligence agencies. How is it possible that in a country like US, terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda were
getting training to fly planes and later managed to hijack flights of different destinations from separate airports to hit the economic and military symbols of power in shape of World Trade Center and Pentagon? Trump’s theoretical premises suggest that CIA in US did the attacks on Pentagon and WTC, whereas ISI in Pakistan hide the Osama Bin Laden in Abattabad. In fact, there is a counter argument which suggests that both the incidents such as 9/11 in United States (Jones & Silberzahn, 2013) and Osama Bin Laden’s hideout in Pakistan (AlJazeera, 2013) were exceptional intelligence failures. Both CIA and ISI were not able to deconstruct the intentions and leadership of Al-Qaeda. Had this happened for the first time in history? The answer is ‘No’.

For example, during the Cold War no international relations theory neither any intelligence lead predicted that the Soviet Union will disintegrate. So, it had happen and most probably such intelligence failure would continue to happen but one should not forget to endorse the real facts.

And the real fact is that Pakistan is the only nation in the world that has contributed the most when it comes to fight against the ‘war on terror’.

Regardless of possible reasons of failure to predict initially the 9/11 incident and later on Osama Bin Laden secret hideout in one of Pakistan’s military city, Abbottabad that this study has maintained; there is another fascinating review by Symour M. Hersh on “The Killing of Osama bin Laden” that appeared in London Review of Books back in May 2015. Hersh has taken a totally new perspective on Abbottabad Operation and asserted that the Obama administration claim “that the mission was an all-American affair, and that the senior generals of Pakistan’s army and Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) were not told of the raid in advance. This is false” (Hersh, 2015). He kept developing his assertion into scientific explanation and explained all the possible reasons that how Pakistan superior military and intelligence networking have
already made Osama Bin Laden their prisoner in Abbottabad since 2006. To prove his assertion, Hersh specifically writes in his article that:

“This spring I contacted Durrani [former ISI and MI Chief] and told him in detail what I had learned about the bin Laden assault from American sources: that bin Laden had been a prisoner of the ISI at the Abbottabad compound since 2006; that Kayani [Army Chief] and Pasha [ISI Chief] knew of the raid in advance and had made sure that the two helicopters delivering the Seals to Abbottabad could cross Pakistani airspace without triggering any alarms; that the CIA did not learn of bin Laden’s whereabouts by tracking his couriers, as the White House has claimed since May 2011, but from a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer who betrayed the secret in return for much of the $25 million reward offered by the US, and that, while Obama did order the raid and the Seal team did carry it out, many other aspects of the administration’s account were false” (Hersh, 2015).

The way 9/11 Commission findings end-up towards black-hole, the same very way American explanations around ‘raid on Osama Bin Laden’ end up nowhere. Though, fascinating is the conclusion that happened with the dead body of Osama Bin Laden (BBC, 2011). So taking clue out of it one should also dumb the debate around 9/11 and Bin Laden into sea.

Coming back to the denial that has been haunting Pakistan’s remarkable contributions in the ‘war against terrorism’ and which is mostly orchestrated by the regional states like India and Afghanistan along with international actors, who always wanted to peddle and postulate the identity of Pakistan between an ally to enemy. Much time has been passed but the dilemma is still tied-up with scapegoat narrative. Let us travel back but not too far as in 2009 the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified in Congressional hearing and abruptly told the world that it’s the United States that has created the mess and gave birth to terrorists not Pakistan. She said that:

“The problems we face now to some extent we have to take responsibility for, having contributed to it. We also have a history of kind of moving in and out of Pakistan. Let's remember here, the people we are fighting today we funded them twenty years ago and we did it because we were locked in a struggle with the Soviet Union. They invaded Afghanistan and we did not want to see them control Central Asia and we went to work and it was President Reagan in partnership with the Congress led by Democrats who said
you know what it sounds like a pretty good idea let's deal with the ISI and the Pakistan military and let's go recruit these Mujahideen. And great, let them come from Saudi Arabia and other countries, importing their Wahabi brand of Islam so that we can go beat the Soviet Union. And guess what they (Soviets) retreated. They lost billions of dollars and it led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. So there is a very strong argument which is it wasn't a bad investment in terms of Soviet Union but let's be careful with what we sow because we will harvest. So we then left Pakistan. We said okay fine you deal with the Stingers that we left all over your country. You deal with the mines that are along the border and by the way we don't want to have anything to do with you. In fact we're sanctioning you. So we stopped dealing with the Pakistani military and with ISI and we now are making up for a lot of lost time” (Dawn, 2009a).

US President Ronald Reagan crafted the mantra of proxy war which shaped the political landscape of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The world has to consult few pages from the book of history when Mujahideen fighting in Afghanistan were sponsored and taken care by the United States. The above testimony of Hillary Clinton is adamant to that discourse but for many let alone history gives an accurate reference. Therefore let me get back to the history of bi-polar world when purpose to contain the communism convinced American leadership to sow seeds of indirect warfare. It was Afghanistan which became the battlefield of proxy war and Pakistan was deemed necessary to take the world out of ‘iron curtain’. All went well and Soviets have to retreat with dilemma of disintegration. It was the time when Mujahideen were pronounced as saviors of the world and Ronald Reagan called them “Freedom Fighters” and “moral equal of our [U.S] Founding Fathers and the brave men and women of the French Resistance”. President Ronald Reagan on March 1, 1985 said that:

“Freedom movements arise and assert themselves. They’re doing so on almost every continent populated by man-in the hills of Afghanistan, in Angola, in Kampuchea, in Central America. In making mention of freedom fighters, all of us are privileged to have in our midst tonight one of the brave commanders who lead the Afghan freedom fighters—Abdul Haq. Abdul Haq, we are with you...They are our brothers, these freedom fighters, and we owe them our help. I’ve spoken recently of the freedom fighters of Nicaragua. You know the truth about them. You know who they’re fighting and why. They are the moral equal of our Founding Fathers and the brave men and women of the French Resistance. We cannot turn away from them, for the struggle here is not right versus left; it is right versus wrong” (Reagan, 1985).
Even three years prior to such glorification of Afghan freedom struggle, Ronald Reagan in 1982 had dedicated the March 22 space shuttle launch of the ‘Columbia’ to acknowledge and extend American people’s support for Mujahideen. He said “as long as soviet forces continue to occupy that country” America and its people stand with Mujahideen (The New York Times, 1982). Soviets were labeled as tyrants and the world at large saw Afghanistan invasion an extension of tyranny. Not only has the United States but Pakistan also classified the Soviet invasion as an attempt to invade the weak with that of power. This was not acceptable at a time when the world has come to a point of mutual respect and acceptance of sovereignty. Marching on a nation by a military might was no more acceptable. Being situated in the close geographical proximity of Pakistan, Afghanistan had always been considered a ‘strategic depth’ for the national security; therefore Soviet invasion of Afghanistan exploded the security anxiety of Islamabad.

This was in fact not a sudden conclusion that Pakistan made out of Soviet actions in Afghanistan. In fact, since the very beginning both countries were not at ease when it comes to do international relations. It was 1949 when Stalin invited Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan to visit Moscow (Lacey, 1991). Knowing the Soviet move, the United States also decided to extend the invitation to Pakistan. Pakistani leadership keeping in view its national security crises with India decided to end up in Washington camp that triggered the uneasy beginning between Pakistan and Soviets as Liaqat Ali Khan never travelled to Moscow. Also as a coincidence, in 1951, a military coup d’état known as ‘Rawalpindi Conspiracy’ occurred to overthrow Khan’s government, which established leads to Moscow (Zaheer, 1996). On October 16, 1951, Liaqat Ali Khan was assassinated. Later on, Pakistan’s affiliation with ‘containment policy’ of the United States by joining SEATO and CENTO in mid 1954 and 1955, respectively.
highlighted Islamabad as anti-Soviet nation. The May 1960 incident of U-2 aircraft, which flew from Peshawar Badabar Airbase, was shot down by the Soviets during spying. This incident further deteriorated Pakistan’s position for the Soviets (Hussain, 2012).

Later, in June 1969 Soviets proposed an ‘Asian Collective Security Treaty’ and wanted Pakistan to join. Islamabad considered the treaty an attempt to isolate China in Asia and refrained to join such an arrangement. The decision came due to Pakistan’s bitter experiences which it have had by joining block politics (Horelick, 1974). The pragmatic foreign policy made unhappy to the Soviet leadership who then exploited the opportunity to get into alliance with India, a country that has border disputes both with China and Pakistan. In August 1971, both India and Soviet Union signed a ‘Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation’ that proved a landmark improvement in both countries strategic understanding. Furthermore, the treaty provided Indian leadership an international diplomatic leverage to violate territorial integrity of Pakistan. Under article 9 of the treaty, Soviets have to extend its diplomatic and military support to Indian security and must abstain to extend any assistance to third party. The article-9 stated:

“Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other Party. In the event of either Party being subjected to and attach or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries” (Government of India, 1971).

The treaty paved a way for India to speed up its ambitions to breakup Pakistan that it did in East Pakistan (now known as Bangladesh) by creating a guerilla faction ‘Mukti Bahini’ to disintegrate Pakistan. The insurgency was curbed by Pakistan army but failed to hold political backup necessary to project Indian violations of international border. Witnessing the defeat of ‘Mukti Bahini,’ the then Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi authorized Indian army to intervene directly in East Pakistan. By October 1971, India invoked article-9 of the ‘Friendship Treaty’ to
ensure Soviet backup on its adventure in East Pakistan. In the backdrop of India violating sovereign borders, Pakistan approached United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to approve ceasefire resolution. In words of Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi, “the Soviet Union exercised veto power thrice in the UN Security Council on December 5, 6, and 13, 1971, to stall a ceasefire resolution, which gave India enough time to overrun East Pakistan” (Rizvi, 2004).

All these events convinced Pakistan not to stand alone and allow Soviet Union to invade its ‘strategic depth’ Afghanistan. Moreover, being rough and mountainous terrain Afghanistan was of no use to Soviets rather its anxiety to excess warm waters was decoded by Pakistan as the main political objective (Garg, 1981). This in fact exposed the coastal areas of Pakistan as the most valuable strategic base for the Soviets. Islamabad at any cost wanted to defeat such a strategic Soviet move that due to ‘Friendship Treaty’ was about to involve Indian adventurism as well. Regardless of the Ronald Reagan context that the struggle of Afghan Mujahideen is “the moral equal of our [US] Founding Fathers” Pakistan was clear on its geostrategic compulsions. Though, it is important to highlight that the capacity to overturn Soviet military might and Indian possible involvement was out of Pakistan’s military response. Pakistan with its meager resources and military inferiority could not have done much dent to Soviet intension to approach warm waters.

In October 1980, on the sidelines of UN General Assembly meetings, President Carter offered President Zia about US $400 million to nourish Afghanistan war against Soviets that he refused to accept while referring it as “peanuts” (Yousaf, 1992). Washington believed that the fate of Pakistan is gloomy as Soviets would end up achieving their objectives in the region. During this time, Pakistan alone was dealing with the situation. Two years later, it was the Reagan administration that followed the Soviets and brought policy of ‘Soviet Containment’
directly into Afghanistan which inevitably knocked the doors of Islamabad. On December 07, 1982, President Ronald Reagan during a State Dinner with his counterpart President Zia-ul-Haq said:

“President Zia, today the people of the United States and Pakistan are seeking the same goals. Your commitment to peace and progress in South Asia and the Middle East has reinforced our commitment to Pakistan. We want to assure you, Mr. President, and the people of your country that we will not waver in this commitment… Mr. President, I propose a toast to you, to the people of Pakistan, and to the friendship that binds our nations together” (Reagan, 1982).

The intelligence of President Zia-ul-Haq took Pakistan to the new heights of diplomatic maneuvering that he successfully aligned with President Reagan priorities. Islamabad successfully became frontline state to organize insurgency campaign envisioned by the Reagan administration, which ended with such a success that Soviets have to retreat with embarrassment of disintegration (BBC, 1989). Pakistan achieved its strategic gains without compromising its national goals or sending its troops into Afghanistan battlefield. He died on August 17, 1988 in a mysterious plan accident near Bahawalpur and got no time to unknot the policies that he entangled to defeat Soviets in Afghanistan. His last knot was the ‘war termination strategy’ which went blank due to his death. This impend the aftershocks of Afghan insurgency and in absence of the master, Pakistan ended up in a perpetual turmoil. President Zia successors failed to postulate ‘war termination strategy’ to wrap-up the strategic gains and inevitably made him victim of intense criticism in absentia.

The Afghan war was with a ‘known enemy’ but through short-sighted policies of post Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan and United States converted it into an ‘unknown enemy’. This was the birth of terrorism in Afghanistan, which mainly got impetus due to US diverted interest towards the Gulf and Balkans. The promise to develop Afghanistan and to bring it in the mainstream was no more a US priority. Pakistan let alone was clutched in Afghanistan who in
absence of President Zia was about to face the backlash. During President Zia, hundreds and thousands of Pakistani youth were motivated to participate into so-called ‘Jihad’ against the Soviets. Now after Soviet withdrawal, they were about to return to Pakistan for sharing testimony of fabricated ‘jihad’ that the intelligence agencies deemed an emerging challenge for the national security. Back in Afghanistan, internal rift started between *Mujahideen* to grab power and gave birth to another wave of anarchy and lawlessness.

This led to the phenomenon of *Talibs* who being mercenaries to local warlords and were dispatched with truckers as guards came to forefront and filled the power space. By defeating the *Mujahideen* and getting control over Kabul, *Talibs* under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omer established their control in Afghanistan on September 1996. It is important to highlight that majority of the *Talibans* already fought along with *Mujahideen* against the Soviet Union, though basic distinction of their identity as ‘*Talib*’ remained guards to protect warlord truckers. This tendency even continued during the post 9/11 US military campaign ‘war on terror’ when Washington itself secretly provided money to *Taliban* for the safe passage of NATO convoys carrying supplies for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a coalition of more than forty-nine developed nations (DeYoung, 2011).

The phenomenon of Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and militancy got birth due to United States policy of Soviet containment. What else could be the byproduct of proxy war that United States and Pakistan should be waiting for? Pakistan was left alone and it did take all possible measures to stay out of Afghanistan mess which was erupting due to *Mujahideen vs. Taliban* power show. Later, when in 1996, Taliban got control over the Afghanistan government, Pakistan has to let them restrain within their territory knowing the fact the kind of ideology they carry would bring direct impact on Pakistan where thousands of former jihadi soldiers are residing and perpetuating
a dream of ‘Islamic Sharia’. To hold them back into Afghanistan, Pakistan recognized the regime and convinced few of its allies such as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to follow (Kaplan & Bruno, 2008). It became ‘Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan’ without formal endorsement from the United Nations and rest of the world. Before 9/11 incident, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan could do some diplomatic business with rest of the world but their political administration received intense criticism due to strict laws and punishments (Laub, 2014).

Taliban’s mantra of Islamic rule (Sharia) along with brutal governance did not helped them to become an opportunity for the international community rather due to its strategic importance and geographical proximity to South Asia, Central Asia and Middle East made it the battlefield of next great game. Pakistan was though successful in holding them back but not enough efforts were done by the international community to create institutional infrastructure complementing democracy in Afghanistan. Moreover, the post Soviet Afghanistan became heaven to extreme ideological maneuver carried out by the so-called Al-Qaeda, an organization of Arab based jihadist who being foreigners came to country to fund and fight the anti-Soviet war.

These Arab leaders like Osama Bin Laden and Al-Zehwari were cherished personalities both in factions of *Mujahideen* and *Taliban*. So, when Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, they did not exiled Arab fighters but isolated them from the government affairs. The international outlook was not much accommodative and appreciative for the Taliban regime that carried an extreme ideology wrapped with fabricated *jihad* and Islamic rule. Moreover, presence of Arab fighters in Afghanistan made the Taliban regime vulnerable and unacceptable to international community. This somehow was taken as a secret opportunity within close ambits of United States elite
institutions to fabricate a new great game. Pakistan was not aware of the fact that something is about to happen as it was rigorously trying to fix the Afghan turmoil.

With fast moving changes occurring in South Asia along with inspiring 21st Century, suddenly on the eve of September 11, 2001 two aircrafts hit the World Trade Centers in New York and the third in the Pentagon in Washington. The world has no explanation to the events rather astonished to witness such an exceptional incident in one of the strongest and powerful nation on earth. Is it CIA or Israel who did this attack to shape the world geography? Questions alike with ability to fuel conspiracy theories immediately surfaced and knocked out all rational explanations to the attacks. The world further divided when terminologies like “Islamic fundamentalist terrorism” were brought into discussion without knowing the fact that Islam itself negates such acts (Kibble, 2002). To many, Afghanistan due to its strategic location and unexplored natural resources became target (Chossudovsky, 2010). Moreover, former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice testimony before the 9/11 Commission confirmed that the United States had already decided to attack Afghanistan. A strategy to attack Afghanistan was formulated seven days prior to 9/11 incident. Condoleezza Rice before the Commission reiterated that:

“This new strategy was developed over the spring and summer of 2001 and was approved by the president's senior national security officials on Sept. 4. It was the very first major national security policy directive of the Bush administration, not Russia, not missile defense, not Iraq but the elimination of Al Qaeda. Although this national security presidential directive was originally a highly classified document, we've arranged for portions of it to be declassified to help the commission in its work. And I will describe some of it today…The strategy set as a goal the elimination of the Al Qaeda network and threat and ordered the leadership of relevant U.S. departments and agencies to make the elimination of Al Qaeda a high priority and to use all aspects of our national power, intelligence, financial, diplomatic and military to meet that goal. And it gave cabinet secretaries and department heads specific responsibilities. For instance, it directed the secretary of state to work with other countries to end all sanctuaries given to Al Qaeda. It directed the secretaries of the treasury and state to work with foreign governments to seize or freeze assets and holdings of Al Qaeda and its benefactors. It directed the director of central intelligence to prepare an aggressive program of covert activities to disrupt Al Qaeda and provide assistance to anti-Taliban groups operating in Afghanistan.
It tasked the director O.M.B. with ensuring that sufficient funds were available in budgets over the next five years to meet the goals laid out in the strategy. And it directed the secretary of defense to and I quote, ensure that contingency planning processes include plans against Al Qaeda and associated terrorist facilities in Afghanistan, including leadership, command control and communications, training and logistics facilities and against Taliban targets in Afghanistan, including leadership, command control, air and air defense, ground forces and logistics. And to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, which Al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups may acquire or manufacture including those stored in underground bunkers” (The New York Times, 2004).

That is why critics of US war calls 9/11 a “False Flag Operation” (Gaia, 2017). The conspiracy theories indicate that the United States after the Soviet disintegration saw Islam the biggest challenge to its ambition of ‘new world order’. It is important to understand that though foreign fighters like Arabs took refuge in Afghanistan and hold extreme ideology manuscripted with Islamic jihad but had not technical, material and intelligence support to attack on a country that is recognized as a ‘super power’ in the world. How come technologically ill equipped Arabs surprised the technologically most advanced nation on earth? The attack was a ‘false flag operation’ by the CIA or Jews that wanted to wage war on the Muslim world by taking advantage of the prevailing situation in Afghanistan. In fact, this was somehow reflected back in 1940 when one of the articles appeared in New York Times entitled “New World Order Pledged to Jews” reflected such a conspiring tendency (The New York Times, 1940).

General Hameed Gul who commanded the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) as Director General during Soviet Jihad had never believed on 9/11 incident rather categorically claimed that the event was meant to provide United States an excuse to use Afghanistan as a scapegoat to target nuclear weapons of Pakistan. As Seymour M. Hersh in his article *Defending the Arsenal* explained that, “many Pakistanis believe that America’s true goal is not to keep their weapons safe but to diminish or destroy the Pakistani nuclear complex. The arsenal is a source of great
pride among Pakistanis, who view the weapons as symbols of their nation’s status and as an essential deterrent against an attack by India” (Hersh, 2009).

The mantra of madness is not over yet as claimed by former President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai, who claimed that “US colluded with ISIL in Afghanistan” (Aljazeera, 2017). From Mujahideen to Al-Qaeda and from Al-Qaeda to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are the projects of American CIA. Today, the presence of Daesh in Afghanistan is sponsored and facilitated by the US top intelligence to reshape the regional dynamics and this is somehow creating challenges for Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, China, Central Asia Republics, and not to forget Russia (Press TV, 2017). Whether Daesh politics of United States is going to help Washington or not but it had definitely allowed Russia to maneuver its cards. For example, once the Mujahideen who fought against the former Soviet Union being the front line force created by United States are now aligning with Moscow to counter the phenomenon of Daesh (Ramani, 2018). Moreover, Taliban (former Mujahideen) have accepted the role of Moscow to negotiate peace process in Afghanistan, which without any doubt inflicts Washington’s political orchestration of the region (Atwood, 2018).

United States efforts to ensure liberty and freedom in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen altogether are testimony of new world order. Democracy is in real terms the ‘false flag operation’ that the US had been executing to overrule Muslim ideology. The global war on terror had shifted the war from 9/11 to South Asia and Middle East. Afghanistan was attacked on the plea that the so-called Al-Qaeda has done the 9/11, which majority of the Muslim world disbeliefed. Iraq was attacked because of weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussain never possessed. Libya was attacked on the plea of humanitarian intervention and to outcast Qaddafi ‘who through his non-existent air force had killed more than 50,000 innocent
people in Benghazi’ was a lie and yet to be proved (Gaddafi, 2017). Egypt, Syria and Yemen got revolutions through ‘Arab Spring,’ a social media based narrative that all the Middle East problems are due to the absence of democracy.

Without justifying kingships, dictatorships and conservative political practices, this research identify one common thing in Middle Eastern states and that is they all had not allowed Western influence particularly United States to penetrate into their economic and political systems. As a result, the phenomenon of ‘regime change’ became their fate and today none of the surviving states in Middle East is recognized as anti-western or anti-US nation. The narrative under the ‘Arab Spring’ was built to free the people from tyrants but as a result tyranny became the fate of these nations. All the operations ended up bringing exceptional benefits and strategic gains for the Western nations. During the so-called tyrant regimes, if people were dying with pain and suffering then should it be considered that due to democracy people would now die having smile on their faces?

Regardless of getting into scientific investigation of the truth behind the 9/11 incident, one can still find the factual analysis that the majority of Muslim world along with Pakistan did not absorb the mantra of ‘Islamic terrorism’ nor ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. Pakistan had also faced indirect threats through 5th generation warfare and the so-called ‘false flag operations’ meant to destabilize the country in the hands of terrorists, militants, fundamentalists and extremists. In 2001 Pakistan did became US ally but the core objective of the alliance was to only facilitate the so-called war on terror. That is why when speech of President Bush divided the world into two extremes of ‘either you’re with us or against us’ Pakistan immediately put itself into the basket of international cooperation. Under the bilateral understanding, Pakistan was not supposed to start any military operation. In return what happened was that the terrorists
operating in Afghanistan run amok in the wake of American extensive bombing and ended up into Pakistani tribal areas and got strong foothold.

As mentioned earlier that the US wanted Pakistan to start military operation against the militants. At that time Pakistan army was trying to renew its intelligence setup which almost has zero presence in tribal areas. Therefore, immediate response in terms of military operation could prove catastrophic for national security. Consequently, a group named ‘Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)’ emerged out of nowhere and started operating against Pakistani law enforcement agencies. By name TTP group seemed Pakistani but its core objective was to target law enforcement agencies and civilian population. The drastic security challenges caused by TTP along with US vulnerabilities in Afghanistan put enormous pressure on Pakistan to mobilize its armed forces. Therefore, in 2003 and 2004, to stop this invisible and unknown enemy Pakistan army for the first time entered into tribal areas. During that period, General Pervez Musharraf was the Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army.

9.3. From Known to Unknown Enemy:

It was almost after three years since the 9/11 incident when Pakistan ended up in the tribal areas to start military operation against the terrorist hideouts. In June 2002 near the area of Azam Warsak, South Waziristan an army contingent was attacked by the terrorists and killed around twelve security personnel (Khalid, 2016). This incident unfolded the seriousness of the situation to the top military leadership and identified presence of anti-Pakistan forces motivated to attack on security forces. It was surprisingly shocking to know that the terrorists have almost declared the region as their de facto state. Furthermore, Pakistan army was considered an alien force in its own tribal areas rather a force of national defense. Tribal areas were now the property of terrorists and the local population was hostage to them. The region was filled with mines and
became ‘no go area’ for everyone with inch to inch check posts established by the TTP. Even the local tribal populace also considered the TTP as their faithful leadership due to which Pakistan army received almost zero support from the inhabitants. After all this there was a clear change observed in military strategy of Pakistan.

Pakistan has never fought this nature of war since its independence and one could assume that no country would wish to fight a war with its own people at its own territory. This was in fact a non-traditional war under low intensity conflict with particularities of sub-conventional domain of warfare. The enemy was not visible, the way it used to be in the previous wars that Pakistan fought with India. In the traditional warfare, two standing armies confront each other while wearing their official uniforms. Each side is aware of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the other side. Contrary to this, in the non-traditional war enemy is not visible neither his identity. Whether he is a friend or foe, his presence close to you makes him an enemy camouflaged in the same dress, which is the biggest hurdle to distinguish the threat. Another problem the forces faced was attached with their basic responsibility which is to protect the lives and property of its people. Unfortunately, in non-traditional war the forces have to fight and kill the same people to whom they were suppose to protect. This happened in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, where forces were fighting with people who may have their relatives fighting from the camps of terrorists. This creates a psychological pressure over the forces when they end up in such type of warfare.

It is important to highlight that Pakistan is unique when it comes to non-traditional warfare. For example, United States experience to fight non-traditional war is tremendously rich but all their experience is on foreign lands in other parts of the world. United States has never fought such a war at its own territory. Pakistan is the only country that has fought this war on its
own territory and rendered all efforts to combat the menace of terrorism. America did face some
terrorist acts but not war against its integrity and sovereignty meant to challenge its survival. So,
for Pentagon it’s not a problem how many people have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan but
for Pakistan it becomes a great challenge even firing a single bullet on its own citizen. Killing
one innocent person means converting the whole family of him against the state. That is why
there prevails a great psychological pressure over forces during non-traditional warfare and the
role of leaders becomes very important the way they fight the war. Their confidence and clarity
plays decisive role to motivate the nation and operational conduct of the soldiers to fight the war.
That is why it’s the responsibility of national leadership to educate the nation and tell their forces
that the job they are performing is the righteous one as compared to other side.

The post 9/11 nature, requirements, actors, and environment of war were changed. The
situation was totally different then the 1965 and 1971 wars when Pakistani forces can identify
Indian mobilization and deployment of fire power. In the conventional warfare, it’s the army and
intelligence which exploits the weaknesses of the enemy. On the other hand, the sub-
conventional warfare due to its clandestine nature gains better leverage over the standing army
and makes it blindfolded to predict the threat posture. The biggest hurdle is connected with
people living inside its territory who through discontent inflict the state. Moreover, regional and
international actors through their respective intelligence agencies establish ties with the
discontented people and create a clandestine network. Pakistan in this very portfolio easily gets
fit since parts of its territory had been showing discontent to state policy. Baluchistan and FATA
were at the top which got impetus in the aftermath of Soviet Jihad, when more than five million
Afghan refugees ended up in different parts of Pakistan.
The post 9/11 war on terror created another wave of instability in Afghanistan and many more found their shelter in Pakistan by joining their countrymen already living inside Pakistan. This created a massive unregistered migration that poured millions of Afghans in the country. Pakistan regardless of intense security challenges and meager resources hosted Afghan refugees with brotherhood and provided all possible services to facilitate their peaceful stay in the country. They were allowed to start business and utilize hospitals, schools, universities, to uplift their economic life by occupying the local share. The sub-conventional war theatre made discontented Pakistani and migrated Afghans an ideal recruitment to inflict the nation by indulging into sponsored terrorism. Trained terrorists crossed the border from Afghanistan and ended up into Afghan camps in Pakistan, which later on attacked schools, universities, mosques, churches, parks, government installations and military infrastructures. Amalgamation of local and foreign militants tremble the state and the nation ended up into chaos and terror.

Moreover, Pakistan has been victim of its geography which is exceptionally strategic in nature and Indian hostile ambitions created vulnerabilities to its national security. The country has shown great resilience and fought almost four wars along with many skirmishes with India. In 1998, Pakistan in reaction to Indian nuclear explosions conducted its test and entered in the league of nuclear nations. This put full stop on Indian military mobilizations and closed the chapter of conventional warfare. Though, nuclear weapons created deterrence but the perspective of war in New Delhi restored to a new level that changed the nature and style of war completely.

Pakistan believes that due to nuclear factor it is quite risky to fight a conventional war and therefore India had converted its policy to punish Pakistan with sub-conventional warfare. It is very true that in presence of nuclear power when two countries share hostile borders it becomes impossible to fight a conventional war. Due to this vulnerability the warmongering
neighbor had to continue by searching alternatives and here low intensity conflict along with a bit of terrorism occupied the space. Hence, the nature of war got transformed from conventional to sub-conventional, where a known enemy got camouflaged into an unknown adversary.

9.4. Dilemma of Sub-Conventional Warfare:

The dilemma of sub-conventional warfare is not new. France has faced it in Algeria. United States has dealt with it in Vietnam (Merom, 2003). Former Soviet Union has been punished through sub-conventional warfare when it entered in Afghanistan in 1979 and at last got disintegration (Jones, 2010). The Iranian Revolution and Saudi Wahabism created the sectarian war which was again a kind of sub-conventional warfare (Stepanova, 2008). All this led to the craft of 21st century change in the nature of war and put Pakistan at the forefront of the so-called global war on terror. For Pakistan the war was not new as it had been victim of Indian sponsored insurgency in 1971, when it had created ‘Mukti-Bahini’ in East Pakistan and later through military intervention disintegrated it (Rizvi, 1981). Pakistan is even aware of the Indian intelligence operations to sponsor insurgency in Baluchistan to create political discontent (Khan, 2018). All this was understood and well countered by Pakistan.

The nature of war became so intense when the incident of 9/11 turned U.S military power towards Al-Qaeda residing in Afghanistan. That exposed areas of Baluchistan and FATA to be considered safe heavens for the militants who through Pashtun and Baluchi ethnic connections ended up in the area. Due to absence of government writ and particularly political discontent against the state allowed the locals to host the militants who later on started establishing their writ in the area especially in FATA region. With the passage of time, terrorists extended their control by challenging Pakistan’s writ into settled areas like Swat. During this time, United States followed many of the top terrorists belonging to Al-Qaeda and droned their locations in
Pakistan. Each time due to collateral damage civilians lost their lives and this enhanced public reaction against Pakistani government especially army who were considered American buddies (Afzal, 2013). Moreover, Pakistan being the frontline state in the global war on terror provided route to NATO containers that carried military equipment suppose to be used against Al-Qaeda militants. The revenge against United States was taken from Pakistan and terrorists started attacking military installations along with public places.

India due to presence of nuclear weapons was unable to squeeze Pakistan which it had already done in 1971 by disintegrating East wing. By taking advantage to post-9/11 situation, India established close ties with terrorists operating in Pakistan along with ethnic groups fighting to slice the state (Rizvi, 2016). Pakistan’s national security discourse entered into limbo that on one side was fighting a foreign war and on the other hand got stuck in an internal war. India was no more firing a bullet rather remaining in New Delhi sponsored and funded the bullets against Pakistan. While attributing to Pakistan’s claims, Senator Chuck Hagel in 2011 reiterated that:

“India has over the years financed problems for Pakistan on that side of the border [Afghanistan], and you can carry that into many dimensions” (The Express Tribune, 2013).

India has been vocal on its efforts to punish Pakistan through its policy of state sponsored terrorism. The same views have been shared by the Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, who at many occasions proclaimed to punish Islamabad with ‘defensive offence’ policy by supporting terrorism in Pakistan (Masood, 2015). Moreover, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) former spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan confirmed to Pakistani authorities that Indian RAW created a nexus with TTP and provided them safe haven in Afghanistan. TTP top leadership had to run from Pakistan when army started operation in Waziristan Agency of FATA. In Afghanistan TTP was facilitated by Indian RAW and Afghani intelligence agency (NDS) that sponsored the terrorist activities in Pakistan and provided heavy funding to conduct the
operations. Ehsanullah Ehsan latter surrendered to Pakistani forces and exposed the RAW-TTP-NDS nexus against Pakistan (Yousaf, 2017).

It was India that for the first time in South Asia started using proxies as an instrument of foreign policy. Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan became victim of Indian hegemonic designs and faced enormous challenges out of proxy politics of India (Aziz, 2017). Plausible deniability became key posture in Indian response who regardless of accepting its guilt had always denied the state-sponsored terrorism that it has been harboring in South Asia. With the passage of time hard power is complemented with elements of soft power where media became decisive tool to non-kinetic warfare. Role of non-governmental organizations had also shown indirect role to facilitate international actors striving to penetrate in the states. For example, the Osama Bin Laden (OBL) raid was facilitated by ‘Save the Children (U.S)’ which on the plea of Polio collected information from suburbs of Abbotabad city. Later on, the DNA lead helped the United States to carry out a military operation to target OBL. Hundreds and thousands of local and international non-governmental organizations became instruments of spying in Pakistan that exposed the dichotomy of development. Pakistan expelled ‘Save the Children (U.S)’ in the aftermath of OBL incident (Boone, 2015). This was the first time when Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) started operating in Pakistan directly through NGOs along with missionary forces such as Black Water (Walsh & MacAskill, 2009).

During Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan and United States had cooperated with each other but Islamabad never allowed CIA to establish direct contacts with Mujahideen. It was Pakistan that solely commanded the operation in Afghanistan. That is why the backlash was quite controlled. Later on, in the aftermath of 9/11, General Musharraf allowed the CIA to operate in Pakistan which established clandestine networking with militant organizations and
created a parallel intelligence system through NGOs and organizations like Black Water (Walsh & MacAskill, 2009). On January 27, 2011 capture of Raymond Davis stamped the final seal on American clandestine intelligence activities in Pakistan and the incident was labeled as direct interference into national security matters (Crilly, 2011).

Although, Pakistan’s national security system considers India an enemy state and strongly believes that whenever there will be a space, it would exploit the vulnerabilities; whether its Baluchistan or FATA, they are ready to stab the country. Since India is exposed that is why national security apparatus is readily measuring Indian moves. Now it’s the responsibility of Pakistan not to provide space to Indian hostile plans and had to safeguard its territory. It had never happened in the history of intelligence operations when an agent with the rank of Lt. Colonel was captured. Pakistan superior intelligence setup captured Indian serving naval officer doing spying and operating a terrorist network in Baluchistan. Commander Kalbhushan Yadev confessed to Pakistani authorities and exposed all Indian plans to destabilize the country (Dawn, 2016). Also Indian government was involved in Samjhauta Express incident, when Colonel Prohit bombed and burned the train (The Nation, 2008). Current Indian Prime Minister Narrendra Modi being Chief Minister of Gujrat facilitated the Gujrat Massacre and was put on travel ban by the United States (Gowen, 2016). What an irony, yesterday’s terrorist has become today’s prime minister. Somehow, Pakistan failed to sell its narrative at international level neither made it possible to pressurize India stop practicing state sponsored terrorism.

In fact, the way attributes of sub-conventional warfare are clandestine, the same very way enemy remains camouflaged and continue inflicting instability to the opponent. Hence, the rules and regulations are quite different to that of conventional warfare. The principles of sub-conventional warfare are also different. Enemy with his own choice decides the time and venue
of attack and runs amok. Historically, wars were fought with swords in battlefields marked outside cities. Later, technology brought use of guns that transformed the war into second generation. Afterwards, induction of fighter jets that blew the formations of opponents took the warfare into third generation. Slowly the massive technological advancement in the warfare with induction of nuclear weapons during Second World War surprised the world with its devastation. The peak of third generation warfare took the mighty to the heights of firepower but also unveiled the untold story that nations striving to protect their integrity cannot be defeated with superior military power. The point here is to note that as a political mean war has to continue and this led to fourth generation warfare where proxy war got into limelight. The charisma of indirect strategy further manifested improvements in the conduct and finally shaped it as a fifth generation warfare which is also proclaimed as Hybrid warfare.

That is why today the nature and character of warfare has changed where role of direct strategy is minimized with efficient use of indirect strategy. This in fact impacts at the lowest level when merged with instruments like social media. For example, Arab Spring in the Middle East was a remarkable execution of indirect strategy that fueled the pace of misperception through social media. A perception was orchestrated that all the issues in Middle East are neither born out of United States interference nor due to Israel’s occupation of the Palestine rather it is the absence of democracy, which is causing problems in the region. That was a strong narrative and caused many regimes to fall. Today, starting from Libya to Yemen and from Yemen to Syria, there is an environment of instability in the Middle East.

9.5. Putting the 5th Generation Warfare into Context:

Pakistan army had been trained under the standard operating procedures, which is to fight a conventional war. When it comes to conventional readiness the forces are well trained and had
given their best, which is even adamant to their international competitions where soldiers of Pakistan have stood at the top ranks. For example, Cambrian Patrol Competition which is held in Wales UK every year is considered one of the toughest missions stretched over 60km with task to carry 25 kilograms of personal load. The battalion level troops consisting of about 11 soldiers are supposed to meet the multi-prong 60km stretched terrain within 48 hours. Stavros Atlamazoglou explained the difficulty level and wrote:

“First of all, the patrol commander is issued a set of coordinates. The patrol, then, maps out the route that it will have to navigate during the next two days. The training staff, however, has planned numerous scenarios in between. For example, patrols are faced with surveillance and intelligence tasks, improvised explosive device (IED) ambushes, casualty evacuations, close-target reconnaissance (a highly dangerous affair, often conducted before an assault to determine the disposition and strength of an enemy force), traversing water obstacles, and performing basic soldiering tasks in a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environment” (Atlamazoglou, 2018).

A contingent of Pakistan army soldiers every year participate in Cambrian Patrol competition and have been winning the ‘gold medal’ consecutively. In 2018 with contingent of 11 soldiers Pakistan participated and won the gold medal out of competition among 31 countries and over 134 teams (The News, 2018b). The purpose to provide Cambrian Patrol reference is to highlight the conventional valor of Pakistan army so do their preparedness in traditional warfare. Due to these vested capabilities of Pakistan army, the nation defeated its enemies on conventional fronts but post 9/11 world order not only changed the nature of war but also pushed the nation to fight a new war of sub-conventional nature. This was a war that Pakistan has never fought earlier, which also came as an imposition in the aftermath of 9/11. The former U.S President George W. Bush requested help from the then President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf to facilitate proposed war against terrorism. Pakistan agreed to extend its support to US but felt inconvenient when the war was pushed from Afghanistan into Pakistan. This happened in the form of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which started operating in Pakistan
and conducted many terrorist activities against law enforcement agencies. That was a time when the whole nation was unaware of TTP activities along with their cause. It was so sudden backlash of Pakistan’s role in the global war against terrorism that took national security institutions with absolute surprise because Taliban’s were fighting with United States in Afghanistan. Then suddenly out of nowhere the so-called TTP came into existence and the objectives it carried became fundamental puzzle for Pakistan.

In fact, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 poured millions of Afghan refugees into Pakistan who started their religious education in different ‘Madaris’. Majority of the kids studying in these schools were orphan and children of different ethnic backgrounds. In Afghanistan doing trade was quite a challenge and routs towards Central Asia and Iran were dangerous. To protect trade convoys, the graduates of these schools (maddaris) ended up with Afghani warlords who hired and equipped them with heavy weapons to ensure safety of the trade. They were attached as vigilantes with truckers carrying goods to different destinations. Their power and influence slowly increased and people started obeying their orders. The term ‘Talib’ is referred to students studying in any school (Madrassa) and it became ‘Taliban’ when a group of former students formed an association in the aftermath of Soviet disintegration. The influence they cherish in Afghanistan as security guards to protect convoys helped them to stall a new wave against the Mujahideen who originally fought a proxy war against the Soviets. Due to internal rift between Mujahideen, Taliban got benefit and marched towards Kabul which was taken in 1996. The new Taliban regime in Kabul was quite influential and somehow organized the country. Law and order prevailed and opium production went down to zero. Though, on the spectrum of political attitudes, the regime tilted towards extreme right that compromised all necessary elements of human development and liberty. Furthermore, their administrative skills
were out of order that caused great damage to their possible acceptance among the international players.

Parallel to that in Pakistan, a group of dacoits, gangsters, corrupt and sluggish people came close to form an association based on the religious slogans. Starting from South Waziristan to Dir, radio operators, hawkers, peons, clerks, bus conductors, physical training (PT) instructors, cable operators, lift operators, poultry sellers, thugs, criminals and thieves started replacing traditional ‘pashtun’ political fabric, its leadership and ‘riwaj’. Slowly they started proclaiming Islamic rule in the area and obstructed Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) which was a special legal arrangement to regulate the region of FATA originally promulgated by the British Raj during 19th century (Siddiqui, 2018). Taking advantage from the intrusion, the enemies of Pakistan jumped into the situation and started funding the exploited pockets to create permanent presence. This led to the formation of an association, which had no aim and no strategy. Though, they did form a mother organization but each pocket has its own chapter whether it was Swat or Bajur. They do seek resources and technical support in terms of expertise from Baitullah Mehsud, who hold South Waziristan agency. He does provide some support to Swat and Bajur but exercise no official power over these chapters. That was the orchestration of so-called TTP operating in Pakistan.

During this entire period, what Pakistan intelligence agencies were doing is pertinent question to understand the formation of TTP. In fact, there was zero presence of Pakistan intelligence nor they were aware of the fact what’s going on in the area. Due to zero intelligence, the national security organizations especially the army was totally blind. The prime law enforcement agency in FATA was Frontier Constabulary (FC) and the condition of which was so poor that on one rifle two soldiers were assigned and vehicles were unable to operate. Absence
of resources made FC almost an ineffective force being the frontline feeder to national security institutions.

As narrated earlier, Pakistan army has been trained to fight conventional war and Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul had produced great soldiers who have never resisted fulfilling national security tasks. The training had made the soldiers so impactful that they have laid their lives for Pakistan without simply questioning the command about right or wrong. The aftermath of 9/11 incident broke out a war within the country that tasked the terrorists to attack civilian population and military installations. Unaware of the character and nature of war which soldiers are not trained to fight, once again they stood firm and entered in an area that Pakistan army has never walked before. The region has marked itself as a ‘no go zone area’ and the world knows it as the most dangerous place on earth (Nawaz, 2009).

Wana Operation of 2004 was the beginning of an untold story of Pakistan army bravery that after rendering thousands of lives had pushed back the invisible enemy and operating hands behind the orchestration of sub-conventional warfare. The world has acknowledged that Pakistan army is the only military in the world that has fought successfully with the challenges of sub-conventional war (The News, 2016). Not only it had incorporated new military doctrine on the sub-conventional warfare but also introduced rigorous changes in the training manuals (ORF, 2013). Pakistan army is today ahead of industrialized militaries and well equipped with both conventional and sub-conventional maneuvers. As acclaimed by the former Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif, who said:

“If the enemy tries to impose short or prolonged war on us, it will have to pay an unbearable price...I am proud to command one of the most battle hardened Armies of the world, which has no parallels. Armed forces of Pakistan are fully capable to deal all types of internal and external threats, may it be conventional or sub-conventional; whether it is cold start or hot start. We are ready” (The News, 2015).
All this pride was not achieved over nightly rather the best of best had formulated better strategies than their predecessors and laid lives not to compromise integrity and sovereignty of the nation. The post-9/11 Pakistan had crawled between its national security that it successfully preserved against India and phenomenon of global war against terrorism that just knocked the doors with possibility of ruining all accomplishments. As explained in the beginning of this chapter that there are almost 16 army chiefs who have commanded Pakistan Army until 2018. Among 16 military commanders there are only four who have fought the 21st century war full of clandestine nature. Therefore, it is important to highlight and investigate in detail, how these four Generals have fought the war? The answer of the question would not only expose ups and downs in military strategy but also depict the political environment under which Pakistan fought one of the most challenging and dangerous war.
CHAPTER TEN

FOUR GENERALS ONE WAR: POSTURING THE DILEMMA OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

“There will be boots on the ground if there’s to be any hope of success in the strategy”

10.1. Introduction:

When generals make mistakes in war it has catastrophic consequences for the military campaign. Failure in generalship brings disorder in command which inevitably put the soldiers at risk. The campaign ends up as fighting faulty wars with massive impacts on survival of the state. This had been the case of British military experience in the First World War when its generalship was coded as ‘Lions led by Donkeys’ (Sheffield, 2011). The poor training and unwise strategic decisions of the generals cost about a million soldiers to British Empire in the conflict, a disgrace the British generals can never get away. To be precise the numbers are referred around 700,000 that were killed in the WWI (BBC, 2014). This became the popular belief which has been reflected in films, books, articles along with television programs. Due to unpreparedness of the then British army, the empire has to count such a big number of casualties in the war. In fact, prior to 1914 British army was more of a kind of ‘colonial police force’ which was small but quite efficient in its job. The generals in colonial territories were mostly handling resistance of small-scale, which has no comparison with the phenomenon of firepower of Germany in the First World War (Sheffield, 2000). Therefore, from 1915 to 1918 the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) learned to fight the war in a hardest way against the opponent that was equipped with high-tech and intensive fire power (Gudmundsson, 1989).

Generals and their role in the combat have been evolving altogether. Many end their career with disgrace, whereas few finish with glory. With the passage of time technology has
evolved the battlefield so does the choices with the generals (Wavell, 2016). It is fine to claim that battlefield evolves with the skill and technology available to soldiers. Therefore, the command orientation in leading the war likewise evolves. History remembers great generals like Alexander the Great, Salahuddin, Genghis Khan, and Hannibal being the great commanders who due to exemplary tactical leadership permanently recorded their name in military strategy. Today, that exemplary role has been played by lieutenants and captains in the battlefield which once was played by such glorious commanders. Technological advancements along with complexities of the battlefield have created an enormous gap between contemporary generals responsible for strategic planning and their lieutenants fighting at tactical levels (Ricks, 2012).

It is believed that the United States military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan has been primarily at the level of strategic planning rather on the tactical level (Lamb & Franco, 2015). Generals play an important and influential role in decision making as compared to any other soldier in ranks. They are the ones who determine objectives and decide when to enter into battlefield. The gaps between the strategic planning and tactical execution bring tensions in the chain of command and expose discontent by the civilian leadership. This became true in 2007 when one of the U.S. Army officers Lt. Col. Paul Yingling extended his reservations through an article “A Failure in Generalship” that was published in Armed Forces Journal. Col. Yingling criticized his general officer corps for giving poor military advice in Iraq. He said that “the intellectual and moral failures . . . constitute a crisis in American generals” (Yingling, 2007).

This gap has once again highlighted the century old phenomenon of ‘Lions led by Donkeys’. War is constant, so does the vulnerabilities and bravery of solders in the battlefield. Armies trained to fight conventional war are today coping with sub-conventional battlefields. British, French, Russian, and Americans while possessing modern weaponry have had bad
experiences with changing nature of warfare (Smith, 2008). Whether it’s Iraq or Afghanistan, the battlefield dynamics has put forward the valor and tactical leadership of lowest ranks at the forefront. Generalship has became less valuable which is why their training and strategic education is considered outdated (Gordon B., Davis Jr., Graves, & Prigge, 2013). The new war has made both the strategic and tactical tiers equal. In fact, it is the tactical leadership which is more advance and appropriate to fight the modern war particularly the sub-conventional warfare.

10.2. Generalship in the 21st Century Warfare:

Before leading the discussion to Pakistan’s generalship, it is important to reiterate the generations of warfare which would help to highlight the relevance of generalship in the 21st century warfare.

i. Battlefield dynamics transcended from line and column in the first generation to trench warfare in the second generation, maneuver in the 3rd and low intensity conflict (LIC) in the 4th to hybrid in the 5th generation of warfare.

ii. Nature of adversary changed from ground and sea forces in the first and second generation to land, sea, air and cyber in the 3rd to insurgents in the 4th generation and to networks in the 5th generation warfare.

iii. Objectives shifted from mere destruction of enemy troops in the first generation to opposing command and control centers, and rear areas in the 3rd generation to political in the 4th and a mix of political, ideological, social and economic in the 5th generation of warfare.

It is important to note that the major wars and conflicts such as the Gulf War of 1991 have been fought in tandem of conventional and sub-conventional domains, which has altogether complicated the contemporary military thought. Hence, the military thought and more decidedly the continental military thought (CMT) developed simultaneously in both conventional and sub
conventional domains. The subsequent discussion on the continental military thought would include conventional and later on sub-conventional domains of contemporary militaries including Chinese, United States and Russian. While doing so an effort will be done to bring back the discussion to Pakistan’s environment through brief inferences drawn out of US experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

10.2.1. Conventional Military Thought

a. China

i. The Chinese concepts of ‘people’s war’ and ‘active defence’ have long been two fundamental components of Chairman Mao’s traditional military thought (Huang, 2001). The Chinese recognise defence as a transient phase with the ability to switch over to counter offensive being the ultimate objective.

ii. However, the doctrine of people’s war has undergone substantial revision in the last twenty years.

iii. It is now transformed to ‘Local Wars under Modern Informationising Conditions’ coming in synchronization with developing technologies like cyber, information and space (Chansoria, 2010).

b. United States

With regards to US, the military thought is evolving through a set of varying concepts and ideas. No single thought however can be attributed to represent US CMT. However, some of the overarching characteristics of the American Way of War as observed by Colin Gray include (Gray, 2012a):

i. Technology dependent and profoundly regular.

ii. Impatient, aggressive and offensive.

iii. Large Scale with firepower.
iv. Logistically excellent.
v. Culturally challenged.
vi. Highly sensitive to casualties.

c. Russia

Coming over to Russia, its military thought has long been attributed to deep maneuvers and operational art (Glantz, 2012). However, lately it is furthering towards jointness and creating synergetic effects through massive fire power and swift movement of mechanized elements (Cohen & Hamilton, 2011). Tenets which are applied in synchronization at all tiers include:-

i. Continued impetus while reinforcing the success.

ii. Importance of massive artillery support as an assured fire support as compared to air.

10.2.2. Sub-Conventional Military Thought

Coming over to the sub-conventional military thought which has also evolved over time. Colin Gray emphasizes that the new warfare will be counterinsurgency (COIN) driven (Gray, 2012b). Even if the military has achieved success through hi-tech, it will require a well framed COIN strategy to consolidate the threat. Colin Gray states that “Obviously for COIN to be successful, cultural education is not merely desirable, it is literally essential” (Gray, 2012a). Dr. Kilcullen in his theory of Three Pillars contends that overarching goal in COIN is to control the three pillars of security, political and economic and explains them as (Kilcullen, 2006):-

i. Security forces for human security and population safety.

ii. Political includes mobilization, governance, institutional capacity and social re-integration.

iii. Economic includes humanitarian assistance, infrastructure management and growth capacity.
On the other hand, the US concept of Light Footprint Warfare is another emerging concept according to which the kinetics are undertaken while remaining largely out of public view and often from a distance (Goldsmith & Waxman, 2016). Drones, air strikes, clandestine operations by Special Forces and cyber attacks are some of the methods used.

Digital operations by militaries are another evolving concept for shaping the environment. For instance, 77 Brigade group of UK Army is configured to carry out such operations through digital units and media content sections (MacAskill, 2015).

Russian experiences in recent conflicts of Chechnya and Ukraine have also impacted their military thought in sub-conventional domain. They realize the importance of public perception and emphasize engagement in both kinetic and non-kinetic domains. The Russian Chief of General Staff General Grasimov makes the point that the fault lines of modern warfare are changing. He states that “the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures — applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population” (Tijerina, 2017).

Martin Van Crevald had also shed light on the contemporary and future warfare in *Transformation of War* (Van Creveld, 2009). He makes the point that:

i. Operational strategy is caught in dilemma with nuclear weapons on one side and low intensity conflict on the other.

ii. The monopoly of violence in future will no longer remain with state—various groups will exercise this monopoly.

iii. Future conflicts will be based on small wars, primarily driven by religious and ethnic reasons.
iv. Motivation will play the decisive role.

10.2.3. Linking the Continental Military Thought with Pakistan’s Environment

As pointed earlier that the discussion on the contemporary military thought along with associated challenges would be linked back to the environment of Pakistan through drawing inferences from the US military experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Major findings of US involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria which are relevant to Pakistani environment include military and socio-political domains. Summary of the important inferences is given below.

a. Superior military thought coupled with revolution in military affairs (RMA) driven hi-tech forces achieved a clear victory in kinetic domain through the concepts of:-

   i. Jointness.
   ii. Shaping of Battlefield.
   iii. Effect Based Operations.
   iv. The concept of Shock and Awe.

b. Whereas, the front where US actually failed to achieve the desired results was the socio-political domain. Major inferences include:-

   i. Ground forces must be well cognizant with ethno-sectarian and tribal sensitivities. Disregard to local customs and norms can be damaging in a media particularly social media savvy environment.
   ii. Wars are becoming dirtier, messier and unfettered; therefore lack ethics and thrive on extreme terror.
   iii. Insurgent’s ability to camouflage allows them to merge in population. Taking them out from civilians is extremely challenging. Hence, human intelligence is vital to outcast command and control mechanism of insurgent.
   iv. Private Military Contractors (PMCs) may fill some voids but may also undermine legitimacy and credibility.
   v. While hi-tech RMA may succeed in overcoming conventional resistance, in the end however, it will be people centric political and local dimension which will prevail.
   vi. For any military operation, a clear and realistic exit strategy/ war termination must be devised beforehand.
The above discussion had underscored the importance of 21st century warfare. Today, both inter and intra state conflicts are likely to continue due to realm of ‘fear, honor and interest’. Future wars therefore will be determined by political, social and technological changes in the world, and these will be stemming from progress in robotics, genetic engineering and bio-industry. Thus character of contemporary warfare with ability to enter into next domain of warfare is evolving on the following domains.

i. Contemporary conflicts are volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. A single adversary is/may constitute an amalgam of regular, irregular, insurgent, terrorist and criminal.

ii. Media and law affairs have assumed greater prominence in the contemporary wars and conflicts.

iii. The ever pacing fourth industrial revolution is playing an important part in the contemporary war.

In order to understand the character of contemporary war, some of the projected technologies and their effects on continental battlefield also require delicate consideration. This include:-

a. Battle field transparency through advance radars, night vision devices (NVDs) and satellites based surveillance means.

b. Net-centricity bringing all force elements into a monolithic force.

c. Increased lethality and precision in the fields of munitions.

d. Increased protection in the face of emerging threats including use of battlefield robotics.

e. Enhanced developments in the fields of stealth.

f. Cyber operations causing a widespread disruption and damage.

g. Emerging concepts and technologies like Directed Energy Weapons, battlefield robotics and nanotechnology.
In a changed warfare amongst the states and non state actors with blurring lines of ends, the notion of victory has lost its traditional sense. It is likely to shrink inward discarding extremes of victory and defeat narrowing into a zone of ‘Not Winning-Not Losing’. Decision taken by the lowest in chain of command will have strategic implications. Thus the strategic corporal has been further tested and trialed in his critical decision making in the contemporary wars. The 21st century warfare is observing transition of conflict from 4GW to 5GW. While full scale war is less likely, both Hybrid and 5GW are the forefront runners of the contemporary warfare. This conflict is in fact the interplay of conventional, irregular, terrorist, criminal and the bystander interests and capabilities. Regime changes through violent protests and in the form of “Coloured Revolutions” is yet another possible form of contemporary conflict (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014). In future, the states dissatisfied with the status quo and determined to change important aspects of it, would like to resort to a measured aggression in a limited encounter called ‘Gray Zone Conflict’ (GZC) (Mazarr, 2015).

The above discussion has helped to understand the contemporary and future character of warfare that is evolving on shallow lines. Though, the territory itself will remain at the centre stage of military thought but the future military thought will be far more complex featuring challenges for the land forces. Pakistan will not be an exception to be impacted by evolving concepts of the people centric hybrid warfare, the technological developments and the prevalence of net-centricity, jointness, information, cyber and space. Therefore, Pakistan is no different to modern militaries when it comes to changing theatre of warfare.

The post 9/11 phenomenon abruptly engaged Pakistan into a war which the country was not ready to fight. The man responsible to uphold the art of war was the same who had been controlling the political and economic strings of the country. General Pervez Musharraf was not
only the Army Chief but also in capacity of President and Chief Executive has been managing the affairs of Pakistan when United States was going through an historic terrorist event on its soil in September 2001. The shock and awe situation with inability of the world’s prime intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), failure to neutralize the threat put forward the US at the verge of revenge. The desperate and wounded context orchestrated the immediate response of the United States, which demanded Pakistan’s decisive entry into the alliance. Pakistan decided to become frontline state in the U.S. led global war against terrorism. The aftermath of which unfortunately took the nation by surprise and shock when terrorists rushed into tribal areas of Pakistan and the country had to fight the so-called war on terror on its own territory (Hadar, 2002).

The war Pakistan has fought as a consequence of global war against terrorism without any doubt was an effort to preserve its national integrity and ensure survival of the nation. Today, the peace that Pakistani society is comfortably cherishing and applauding does not came over nightly. It consumed seventeen long years of this nation. Billions of dollars worth of economic activity was stalled and thousands of innocent Pakistani citizen lost their lives (Talat & Zeshan, 2013). Throughout, these years military command and its soldiers at tactical level remained vigilant to outcast the enemy. Though, at a high price of human life the military overall did an exceptional job to protect the national integrity and survival of the nation (Qazi & Zaman, 2018). To understand the above mentioned phenomenon of British experience during the World War I, which is referred as ‘Lions led by Donkeys,’ this chapter therefore has been dedicated to expose four generals who have commanded Pakistan army and fought the blurred war with low intensity context on the battlefield. For what achievements and failures these generals must be remembered for is the main context of this chapter as without decoding the generalship of these
four General’s, understanding Pakistan’s resolve against the 21st century warfare cannot be evaluated. The four generals that subsequent sections of this chapter would highlight are:

iv. General Qamar Javed Bajwa: November 29, 2016 to-date

10.3. General Pervez Musharraf: The Frontline Soldier

When it comes to fight the war against terrorism in Pakistan and who has fought it well, the names which come at forefront runners are the former army chiefs General Pervez Musharraf, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, General Raheel Sharif, and current Army Chief General Qamer Javed Bajwa. In fact, all the four generals have played important and strategically significant role to decode the mantra of terror in Pakistan and through their respective tenures the military response they have had adopted made an excellent contribution to counter the threat of extremism and terrorism.

General Pervez Musharraf during his tenure took the challenge seriously and formulated a comprehensive strategy that became primary document for military as a whole. One of the biggest challenges he encountered with was the threat of terrorism itself as before 9/11 incident Pakistan army never faced the menace of unconventional war particularly on its own territory. Musharraf being the President and Army Chief of Pakistan has to devise both political and military strategy necessary to cope with the threats that were also tied with United States who has coded the overall situation from the lens of global war on terror. Few of the challenges General Musharraf faced are discussed below.
10.3.1. Political and Military Challenges General Musharraf Encountered with!

General Musharraf on the one hand was facing internal political challenge along with gaps in the military capability that has no training to fight the unconventional war and on the other hand international pressure to jump into the global war on terror under the mantra of “either you are with us or against us” (The Guardian, 2001). He dealt the situation holistically and tried to fix internal and external dynamics of extremism and terrorism. For example, he separately but dedicatedly looked into the nature of problems erupting in Karachi, Punjab, KPK and Baluchistan. At one place nature of problem was ethnic but on the other place the dynamics were sectarian. Separatism and fallout of the 9/11 incident was also at its play that Pakistan was facing altogether. General Musharraf was also heightened to the evolving nature of regional and international politics and possible alliances to isolate Islamabad that could overrun Pakistan’s weak response. Therefore, his understanding of the military capability helped him identify the institutional weaknesses prevailing in the professional response. In this category he identified Frontier Corps of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Frontier Corps of Sindh and Frontier Corps of Baluchistan that were lacking behind in professional response.

It is important to understand the role of Frontier Corps. Frontier Corps also referred as FC is the second line of defense force in Pakistan. The first line of defense is Police and the third line of defense is Army. Due to professional incompetence vested over the period of time in FC, whenever in a situation Police fails Army has to jump to tackle the problem. By identifying this gap, General Musharraf decided to raise and upgrade the FC. So, to upgrade FC potential as a second line force, General Musharraf raised 10 to 20 new wings in FC, changed the command structure by raising 4 sector commanders of Brigade level, and equipped them with tanks and medium guns. Through this Musharraf wanted to ensure that Army should be the force that must
end up in any situation as a last resort. Along with reorganization of FC, he also created Sindh Rangers and strengthened the Punjab Rangers. The organizational and strategy review done by General Musharraf are some of the very timely and impressive contributions that formulated the initial response of Pakistan to control and curb the menace of terrorism.

10.3.2. Musharraf’s Decision to Join US ‘war on terror’: Good or a Bad Choice?

The post 9/11 close ties between the United States and Pakistan initiated a new period of bilateral relations. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the United States requested Pakistan to convince Taliban regime in Afghanistan to handover Al-Qaeda leadership to Washington who have already claimed the attacks on September 11, 2001. So, Pakistan even before getting into military alliance was engaged due to its supposed bargain with Taliban’s to handover the Al-Qaeda leadership to US. When Taliban refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden directly to US rather they emphasized to turn over him to a ‘neutral third country,’ Bush rejected the offer and launched the global war on terror (Harris, 2001). Pakistan has to become the frontline state in the war on terror mainly due to its traditional influence in the war torn country, Afghanistan. The role of General Musharraf to support United States priorities in the war on terror has received enormous criticism in Pakistan and later-on got tagged as “savior complex” (Reuters, 2008).

In 2006, President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf in his interview with CBS television unveiled the kind of pressure his government faced in the aftermath of 9/11 incident that altogether gave no choice of second thought for the Pakistani military establishment. Referring to US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s communication with his intelligence chief General Mahmoud Ahmed who was coincidently on an official trip to Washington at the time of 9/11 incident. General Musharraf said that, “the intelligence chief told me that, be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age” (The Guardian,
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2006). The posturing was disliked by Pakistan but it had decided to support US campaign against terrorism. This claim of General Musharraf was later on endorsed through the release of secret US documents on September 11, 2011. The ‘Document 3’ available on the National Security Archive had provided the details of General Mahmoud and Richard Armitage communication on September 13, 2001, the very next day of 9/11 incident. Armitage told General Mahmoud that:

“Pakistan must either stand with the United States in its fight against terrorism or stand against us. There was no maneuvering room” (U.S. Department of State, 2001).

Irony of the reality was the distinction which President Bush had created between ‘us and them’ phenomenon. The choice was only one and Pakistan has to pick ‘us’ or ‘them’. The ‘us’ clustered the free world led by United States and ‘them’ clustered the world led by terrorists. Does Musharraf have a choice to go for ‘them’? Obviously not! Taking terrorist’s side means standing against the rest of the world particularly the United States. On September 21, 2001 President George W. Bush during his speech to a joint session of Congress and the American people categorically stated that:

“We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. **Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.** From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime” (Bush, 2001).

The ‘black and white’ mantra was on its full swing and Pakistan was getting the heat of US pressure. Military action to punish Al-Qaeda was deemed necessary by President Bush, which in return was willing to denounce Pakistan’s strategic clout over Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Through, the then Secretary of State Colin Powell tried to convince President Bush that whatever choice they have to adopt, Pakistan’s support is decisive in its success. In the aftermath of this, a list of seven demands was compiled by Colin Powel and Richard Armitage. This was handed over to ISI Chief General Mahmoud by Richard Armitage on September 13,
2001 and Colin Powell rang General Musharraf to seek his consent on the same very day at 01.30pm. The seven points presented to Musharraf were accepted and therefore extended Pakistan’s willingness to help United States efforts to combat terrorism (Dawn, 2002).

A. Was Joining the US led War a Bad Choice?

Foreign policy of a nation along with international relations must be in line with national interest and national security. Based on this principle nations behave and prioritize their politics. Following the same spirit Pakistan became US ally though General Musharraf faced lots of criticism from different segments of society on his one sided decision that he made without consulting the nation nor the parliament (Raja, 2016). Military regime without realizing the backlash of the war jumped into global alliance. Furthermore, economic and security burden took the state to a new levels of vulnerability. General Musharraf was out of order when in his visit to US he delivered a speech in Washington. That was a time when ‘Pakistan First’ policy required US guarantees and political priorities for Pakistani people. For example on November 11, 2001 during his visit to US, General Musharraf stated that:

“Pakistan has taken a considered decision to be a part of the coalition, to be with the United States, to fight terrorism in all its forms wherever it exists... And let me also assure the President [U.S] that Pakistan will remain committed to the fight against terrorism” (Voice of America, 2009).

This was not a ‘considered decision’ at-all when it comes to Pakistan’s national priorities. General Musharraf without any economic, political and diplomatic backup jumped into fire of global war against terrorism. To some the reality was that General Musharraf was unable to absorb US pressure at a time when he had to plead the case for national interest of its own nation. Even his own interview to CBS revealed the so-called US threat to bomb Pakistan (The Guardian, 2006). Under exceptional situations when repercussions could have the potential to deteriorate national progress with blow to national survival, leadership has to show restrain.
Threats and challenges like sanctions, diplomatic isolation and bomb threats should not be the weapons of hand-twisting or black mailing a sovereign nation. Countries facing pressure and stubborn to their national interest successfully comes out of such situations, even as a result becomes far stronger than before. Iran has been facing enormous US pressures on its nuclear program but never surrendered its legitimized claim of peaceful nuclear exposure. At the end it came out successfully by signing an international nuclear agreement with P5+1 and today Washington is alone to isolate Tehran (Gaouette & Marquardt, 2018). Was Pakistan’s support solely because of fear or the country stood with United States on moral grounds? Whether it was fear or factor of moral superiority, General Musharraf was suppose to best bargain Pakistan’s interest and keeping in view its vulnerabilities must have received the best deal for the people rather unilaterally decide to ‘jump into hell while putting its nation at risk’ should be the policy.

Critique took Musharraf with iron fists and blamed him for the leadership crises in his personality which ultimately allowed the United States to spread CIA, Black Water and hire mercenaries to operate in Pakistan (Walsh & MacAskill, 2009). They also believed that Musharraf’s inability itself had caused greater damage to Pakistan as compared to ‘war against terrorism’.

B. Why Joining the US led War was a Good Choice?

This study appreciates General Musharraf’s decision to get involved in the ‘war on terror’ and look at his choice with a different lens in contrast to the critiques. In fact, it is important to recall the international political environment which unfolded immediately after the 9/11 incident, was decisive and inflexible. It was the UNSC Resolution 1378 that was passed on November 14, 2001 and signed by 193 countries, which demanded cooperation from Pakistan to curb the threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. This resolution complimented
the previous UNSC resolutions such as Resolution 1267 of October 15, 1999; Resolution 1333 of December 19, 2000 and Resolution 1363 of July 30, 2001. All these resolutions were over Afghanistan, whereas UNSC resolutions dealing with international commitment to root out terrorism such as Resolution 1368 of September 12, 2001 and Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001 were complementary parallel steps taken up by the United Nations (UNSC, 2001). Pakistan let alone cannot resist or undo the international consensus against terrorism. Today it’s quite easy to criticize Pakistan’s choice and General Musharraf’s decision to support US led war on terror but the story was other way around during 2001. If the environment is different than 2001, criticizing Pakistan’s choice could be accommodated. But with the same situation and maintaining the same conditionalities along with obtaining environment, the decisions made were in the best interest of Pakistan.

It is important to understand that under Resolution 1378 Pakistan was suppose to handover all the terrorist identified, the movement of the terrorists will be curbed, no one will be provided asylum with terrorist background, internal laws will be changed and made compatible with international law (in view to subsequent United Nations resolutions). Also when a resolution is passed by the United Nations, it becomes international law which inevitably becomes national law of ratifying states. Pakistan was signatory to the treaty that makes all UN resolutions binding. Considering General Musharraf responsible for ending up in the war is somehow escaping from the realities. Pakistan being member of the United Nations was suppose to respect international law and has to play a responsible role in the fight against terrorism. Telling the world that ‘we will face you’ was never going to happen rather Pakistan being the biggest contributor in UN peace keeping operations once again took the lead to combat the menace of terrorism. Since the inception of Pakistan as an independent and sovereign nation, it
had contributed about 200,000 troops to 46 United Nations peace keeping missions in almost 28 countries (Malik, 2018).

Moreover, in his book “In the Line of Fire” Musharraf denounces the critique of US policy makers and intelligencia around the globe that Pakistan had not done enough. For example, he writes in his book that Pakistan handed over high profile terrorists to United States who ended up in Guantanamo Bay prison where they were interrogated and helped the CIA to takeover remaining Al-Qaeda command. Musharraf specifically writes that:

“We have captured 689 and handed over 369 to the United States. We have earned bounties totalling millions of dollars. Those who habitually accuse of ‘not doing enough’ in the war on terror should simply ask the CIA how much prize money it has paid to the government of Pakistan” (Musharraf, 2006: 237).

Pakistan under General Musharraf was able to confine its strengths and weaknesses, which reflected inevitably in the decision making process of the then military leadership. The study has found that there was no such choice that could allow Pakistan to sustain independently rather joining the ‘league of nations’ to combat the menace of terrorism was the most suitable option. Contrary to the decision made by General Musharraf, one of the most important aspects of the choice made should be to secure the interests of Pakistan that shall consider economic opportunities rather than ending up into one-sided ‘yes’ for the Americans. This is in fact very true when comes to the sacrifices and economic loss Pakistan as a whole has faced in last eighteen years of its longstanding commitment to combat the menace of terrorism. The war was complicated with its strategic manifestation which indulged the military leadership into a situation they were not ready for. Therefore, not only the decision to join the league was a complex choice but latter the compulsion to fight it became an obligation.
10.3.3. The War on Terror and General Musharraf’s Strategy of ‘Selective Engagement’

The war earlier General Musharraf decided to support was led by the US and its coalition partners. The main battlefield was Afghanistan but due to massive bombing by the US and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), most of the terrorists entered into Pakistani tribal areas. United States did not secure the border neither Pakistan deployed its military at its border with Afghanistan. Also securing 2611 kilometers long porous terrain of Pak-Afghan border was possible. The US rush to launch a military operation in Afghanistan against the Al-Qaeda outfits did not provided a chance to think about such precautionary measures. The border remained uncontrolled. As a result the influx of terrorists found natural shelter in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The rough terrain and mountainous landscape of the tribal region of Pakistan provided safe heaven to Al-Qaeda and foreign militants fighting against the US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan since its independence had never established its military presence in her tribal belt rather preferred to allow native socio-political orientation with the center under constitutional supervision called Federally Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA). This in-fact sustained as a British legacy who ruled the region through colonial law called Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) (Yousaf, 2018).

Therefore, with terrorists entering in the FATA region, Pakistan army for the first time felt its obligation to secure the territory. Contrary to Pakistan army the terrorists have established strong footholds. In absence of active security apparatus the territory was at the helm of terrorists. Based on ease and choice of strategic communication, terrorists established their bases in almost all seven agencies of FATA. Many groups among them even travelled to settled areas of Malakand and Swat divisions which comes under Provincially Administered Tribal Areas.
(PATA) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the then North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan (Khattak, 2015). There was no intelligence network existing at that time neither military bases were up to the mark which could host massive military mobilization of Pakistan army. As a result, Pakistan under the supervision of President Musharaf who being the Army Chief decided to assert military presence in the tribal areas and used Peshawar based XI Corps 7th and 9th Divisions to establish primary contact with the region (Harnisch, Lohmann, & Szrom, 2009). This was not a full fledge military mobilization rather meant to initiate cooperative foothold with consent of the local tribes through peace committees (PCs) along with engaging political agents (PAs).

When President Musharraf mobilized the forces to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), he felt necessary to move two more Divisions one from Okara and the other from Gujranwala for South districts and Swat district (Harnisch, Lohmann, & Szrom, 2009). XI Corps in Peshawar already hold 7th and the 9th Infantry Divisions. Now, KPK have four infantry divisions along with Frontier Constabulary (FC) ready to execute military strategy. With operational readiness, it was decided that military operation will be initiated both in North Waziristan and Swat at the same time but due to President Musharaff’s priority, the operation was first started in Swat. The idea was to hold and control the terrorists in North Waziristan through deployment of forces but in Swat through military operation ‘kill all the terrorists first’ was the primary objective. Later on, after completing the Swat phase, bring back all the forces along with FC to North Waziristan and ‘vanish all the terrorists in once’ was the second phase. That was considered a very good strategy.

While enhancing pressure towards North Waziristan and Swat, the key purpose was to negotiate and then occupy the territory while making all stakeholders happy. Through this
approach in view over the period of time few agreements were signed with TTP leadership such as Shakai Peace Agreement in 2004, Sararogha Agreement in 2005 and Swat Agreement in 2008 to allow pass Pakistan army caravans and to convince the Taliban not to provide refuge to foreign militants. Under the agreements local people provided protection, political agents lead the convoys while Taliban observed all the movement.

Pakistan signed the Shakai Peace Agreement with Nek Muhammad in April 2004 but in the very next month on June 18, 2004 he was killed by a US drone strike which was the first ever drone flight in Pakistan. Brigadier (retd) Shaukat Qadir claimed that the drone strike happened on President Musharraf’s request who asked the US to kill Nek Muhammad (Qadir, 2013). It is also believed that killing of Nek Muhammad was a watershed event that brought the war from Afghanistan to inside Pakistan. Opening of the drone strikes on behest of the then President Musharraf never stopped and the United States fully got engaged inside Pakistan to track down and drone Al-Qaeda along with Taliban leadership.

According to National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) of Pakistan, the United States from 2004 till 2018 have conducted around 409 drone strikes in Pakistan that killed 2,714 people while injuring 728 (Azeem, 2018). To avoid instability that could fuel and construct anarchy, Pakistan military applied all possible mechanism to sustain the status quo in the tribal areas. The status quo meant to allow Pakistan military to enter in the area without disturbing the prevailing ‘no war context’. Therefore, to achieve this objective, Pakistan military under the command of General Musharraf had signed few important peace agreements at Shakai with Nek Muhammad in March 2004, Sararogha Peace Agreement with Baituallah Mehsud in February 2005, Waziristan Peace Agreement in September 2006 with Hafiz Gul Bahadur, and Bajaur
Peace Agreement in March 2007 with Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TSNM) along with Salarzai and Utmankhel tribes. Below is given the details of the above peace deals.

i. **Shakai Peace Agreement 2004**: Shakai Agreement was signed with Nek Muhammad, who was supporting foreign militants which were Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens. Pakistan army wanted him to cease his support to these militants that he denied and in March 2004 ‘Operation Kalosha’ was launched in South Waziristan (Khan, 2012). Operation Kalosha was a small scale operation which was in fact continuation of a bigger military campaign under ‘Operation Al-Mizan’ that continued from 2002 to 2006. March 2004 was an operation that Pakistan army conducted in Wana area of South Waziristan Agency against the presence of around five hundred (500) foreign militants (Holguin, 2004). It was not clear whether those militants were associated with Al-Qaeda leader Al-Zawahri group or members of Tahir Yuldashev’s Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. During the contest, Pakistan army lost many of its brave soldiers and ended up the yearlong operation with militant’s agreeing to surrender (Dawn, 2004). As a result, Nek Muhammad agreed to surrender the foreign militants. On April 24, 2004, Pakistan army signed the ‘Shakai Peace Agreement’ with Nek Muhammad (The News, 2014).

ii. **Sararogha Peace Agreement 2005**: In February 2005 an agreement was signed with Baitullah Mehsud in Waziristan to convince the TTP leadership not to target Pakistani installations and shelter foreign militants (Dawn, 2005). The agreement was short lived as Taliban used it to expand their influence and kept supporting foreign militants.

iii. **Waziristan Peace Accord 2006**: On September 5, 2006 the government signed a peace agreement with Hafiz Gul Bahadur and its associated Taliban’s operating in North Waziristan (Gul, 2006). The accord was inked in Miranshah to stall militant activities with that of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The agreement came out after an ongoing war in the agency which has cost instability and chaos in the region. The agreement included 16 main clauses with 4 sub-clauses. Under the agreement military agreed to stop air and land based attacks in the agency against the militants, who in return promised to stop immediately cross border infiltration in and out of Pakistan. All the foreign militants had to leave the tribal region with permission to lawful residence to those who were unable to leave. Pakistan army handed over the check posts to tribal forces with acceptance of no
change in the local administration and *Riwaj* (culture). Militants agree not to attack the security forces and damage state property. Tribesmen were allowed to carry small arms but have to disregard heavy weapons. Also militants agree to remain stand still in the agency and will not enter into neighboring agencies. The government authorities also agree to release the captures militants and pay compensation to people due to loss of their property. Both sides agreed to return captured instruments including weapons, devices and vehicles (Gul, 2006). With all these agreed points, the security forces remained in the Miranshah camps and at Touchi Scout Fort. The deal was again not lasted for a longer period of time as Taliban hidden motives exposed them over the period of time.

iv. **Bajaur Peace Accord 2007**: On March 17, 2007 the government of Pakistan signed an agreement with Bajaur Agency faction of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TSNM) along with Salarzai and Utmankhel tribes (Roggio, 2007). Under the agreement, Taliban factions of Bajaur pledged not to harbor terrorism and target security forces of Pakistan. They promised to outcast their support to foreign militants. In return security forces and the government consented not to arrest suspicious elements without consulting it with the tribal elders. Though, security forces remained in the area and administration kept its promise.

Not to be surprised, Taliban once again used the deal to stretch their muscles. They started demanding the release of Sufi Mohammad, the chief of TSNM who was taken into custody and jailed by General Musharraf in November 2001 (MMO, 2012). On January 12, 2002 TSNM along with four other militant organizations were banned (Haider & Suhrawardy, 2002). The situation remained hostile for the security forces and TSNM along with other Taliban factions continue threatening the forces with perpetual phenomenon of suicide bombing.

Later-on, in 2007 a similar kind of deal was inked with Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, a prominent militant operating in Bajaur Agency (now district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) who had pro Taliban sentiments, also failed to sustain and gave invitation to Operation Sher Dil (Sattar, 2014).
All the major peace agreements along with few smaller ones that were inked with Hafiz Gul Bahadar of North Waziristan Agency in 2006 (Szrom, 2009) and peace agreement of Bajaur Agency in 2007 (Zaidi, 2013), proved water bubble and paid no strategic restrain from the TTP (The News, 2014). The pacts faced lots of criticism and appreciation altogether. Critics were of the opinion that the deals have sent a wrong message to the tribal people in particular and to rest of the world in general that the state is weak in dealing with the militants. This was referred in particular context to XI Corps Commander Lt. General Safdar Hussain who visited Nek Muhammad residence and signed the Shakai Agreement in 2004 (Dawn, 2004). The act deteriorated the credibility and image of the army under the local ‘Riway’ (culture) and projected that Pakistan army has laid its weapons to terrorists. Though, this study makes the point that the narrative was deliberately propagated to malign military efforts that was using such agreements to expand its outreach in the area where they have almost zero intelligence presence. Without ears and eyes Pakistan army was in fact an impotent force in the area. So, to get ears and eyes they need to have a network of human intelligence that they established successfully out of all the above major and smaller agreements. Where pacts helped the military to expand their intelligence networking, militants also were able to stretch-out in whole of the tribal areas.

Until June 2004, the presence of militants was only limited to Waziristan Agency which in the aftermath of the pacts ideologically extended into adjoining districts of the agency and gave impetus to form an organizational portfolio of TTP. Militants started moving freely around the area and recruited many more youth to their force. By 2007, their influence spread towards areas such as Laki Marwat, Hangu, Bannu, Kohat, Darra Adam Khel, Khyber, Mohmand, Charsadda, Bunaire, Swat, Dir and Bajuar. In insurgency one can only sign agreements with position of strength not with position of weakness. Event of Shakai Agreement when XI Corps
Commander disarmed Nek Mohammad at his residence cultivated position of weakness for the Army. The overstretched hierarchy and geographical presence of the militants that expanded out of peace agreements was termed as nightmare by the critics.

Other than critics, defense analysts observing the situation does appreciated Pakistan strategy of signing the deals as ‘selective engagement’ with Taliban that helped the army to gain more time and space to convert the environment on its side (Jones & Fair, 2010). To understand Pakistan’s ‘selective engagement’ policy one has to look into traditional administrative setup of the frontier region which found its background to British Raj of the 18th century. At times when British Raj decides to enter in the region to take military action against a particular tribe, all the tribes in response united and denied excess to any outsider (the British). By doing so, all the administrative tasks such as schools, hospitals and flow of information stalls. The total blackout and excess denial brings no opportunity to the outsider to penetrate in the region. Since then for the tribal administration (under British Raj) signing deals with tribes became the fundamental strategy to get access to the area. Under the agreement, administration pledges not to do a certain act (agreed between the tribes and British) and in response the tribe allows them to access and operate. Through this arrangement suitable time and space was created in favor of the administration to fix the issue through politics of mitigation (Tripodi, 2008). So, in that reference of the local ‘Riway’ Pakistan’s policy of ‘selective engagement’ was not only good but an appropriate strategy.

It is important to make the distinction between British way of dealing the local pashtun and Pakistani way of signing the deals with local tribes. For example, British initially use force to pacify the area and kill as many as fighting Pashtuns. In fact, the British persuaded the “butcher and bolt” strategy to control the ungoverned tribes. Those ready to sign deals with the
British were taken under administrative control and those who violated the deals were again dealt through “butcher and bolt” strategy (Loyn, 2008). The British only offered ‘sick’ but no ‘carrot’. Pakistan contrary to that followed a cultural sensitive arrangement, where meetings with the locals, consultation with the maliks, and elders of the tribe were taken into consideration to sign the deals with militants. Through such peace agreements, the prime objective of Pakistan was not to rule the region rather bring peace and stability in FATA. Since, many of the tribesmen were directly indulging into anti-state activities under a camouflaged narrative of Sharia and anti-Americanism; therefore, it was considered necessary to bring them back to the righteous understanding. Through the deals, the armed forces and the government allowed the Pakistani misguided tribesmen to denounce their links and support to the foreign militants. Furthermore, the hostile environment of that time also convinced the government and armed forces to first establish intelligence bases and identify who is who in the area. As a result of ‘selective engagement,’ the armed forces were able to complete the picture of the area. Afterwards, those who violated the deals, military operations were launched against them. Even Pakistan took all necessary precautionary measures which demanded safety of innocent and their security to sustain the aftershocks of military operations, which the British never did.

At the same time, Lal Masjid incident occurred in Islamabad and on July 3, 2007 an operation referred to as ‘Operation Silence’ was conducted to neutralize the situation, which gave birth to a new wave of discontent among the masses particularly in tribal areas (Hussain, 2017). Militants materialized this whole situation in their favor and recruited a new discontented lot associated with the Lal Masjid incident. Moreover, the post operation environment gave birth to a new wave of terrorism with an element of suicide attacks (Leghari, 2007). The multiplying factor was the US ‘drone war’ that since 2004 created an enigma of revenge against NATO
coalition and Pakistani forces in the hearts and minds of tribal people. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, the last drone strike was done on July 4, 2018 in North Waziristan Agency of Pakistan (Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2018). The New America Foundation claims that until January 2018, US had conducted almost 409 drone strikes in Pakistan that killed 2,533 militants, 288 civilians and 275 unknown individuals making a total of 3,096 casualties (New America Foundation, 2018).

Pakistan army tried to handle the situation through peace pacts and dialogues but failed to curtail the militancy and their over-expanded influence in the region. All the above factors until 2007 pushed the army to conduct its first major military operation in January 2008 with serious strategic calculations that extended deployment of forces at Northern and Southern parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with Northern and Southern parts of FATA. The XI Corps of Pakistan army which is consisted of 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions are placed at Peshawar and Kohat, respectively. An Armored Brigade stationed at Nowshera was also mobilized. The XI Corps carry an exceptional identity being the elite battle hardened formation of Pakistan army that fought the post 9/11 terrorist outburst in the tribal areas of the country. It had also played a key role during Soviet jihad.

Pakistan built its first military cantonment in Miranshah, North Waziristan, which was an extension of an already existing 1905 British Fort. Routes and supply lines were constructed along with creating a pool of likeminded populace with human intelligence networking. This was necessary to do as the nature of war involved threats within rather coming from an alien’s territory. The enemy was camouflaged with the same face and culture, the one Pakistani nation cherish. Their language and color was the same. Being enemy they ambush and fight behind the scenes in North Waziristan but propagates their ideology and attacks through video recordings
everywhere in Pakistan. They recorded their anthems to motivate the youth and developed standard operating procedures (SOPs) for terrorist training. Now, the enemy was not outside Pakistan rather contingently busy in making house within. That is why Pakistan has to develop a kind of strategy through peace agreements that brought ‘selective engagement’ opportunity for the army.

Al-Qaeda and Taliban were now on a common standpoint to shake Pakistan as America was no more running after them in Afghanistan. It entered inside Pakistan along with its elite weapons. The battlefield was now Afghanistan and Pakistan. US ability to drone was not only easy but also interesting as it appears in the air and disappears in the air. For Pakistan the situation was quite challenging. It does not have drone technology neither can do carpet bombing on its own people. The enemy sheltered itself among the people of Pakistan who were now hostage to them and could not be easily segregated. Therefore, before starting the military operation, taking the civilian population out of the area was an important task for the government. Once this task was achieved, thereafter, the whole region was divided into different operational clusters and military campaign was launched in sequence. Though, in 2007 Operation *Rah-e-Haq* in Swat valley and Shangla District was the first major military campaign against the terrorist hideouts but there were few small scale operations conducted to install Pakistan’s writ which included Operation *Al-Mizan* between 2002 till 2006. The next section will refer some of the important military campaigns that were launched under the command of General Musharraf to engage the insurgents through application of limited force. Details of military campaigns of all the four generals are given in the next chapter.
10.3.4. Military Operations/Campaign during Musharraf Regime:

In the aftermath of US bombing on *Tora Bora*, most of the Al-Qaeda leadership ran into Pakistani tribal areas. Before decisive military campaign of 2009 launched by General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani; army under the command of General Pervez Musharraf had intermittently tried at different times to conduct military operations in the tribal areas (FATA) including Swat (PATA). Therefore, Pakistan military operations can be divided into two clusters, first being the selective military campaign under General Musharraf which started between Operation Enduring Freedom 2001 to Operation Rah-e-Haq-I of 2007 and second as the strategic military campaigns which started from Operation Rah-e-Rast of May 2009 till Operation Zarb-e-Azb of 2014. Though, in 2017 the current Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa started a countrywide Intelligence Based Operations (IBOs) under Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad which is targeting the sleeping cells of the militant-cum-terrorist groups. Chapter eleven “The Spectrum of Pakistan’s Military Response-An Evaluation” has deliberated the details on all the major military operations conducted by four generals of Pakistan army but the important military operations which were carried out during General Musharraf’s tenure are listed below.

iii. Operation Kalosha (March 2004)
iv. Operation Sunrise (July 2007)

All the military operations were somehow sporadic in response and most of the time was spent to decode the security situation in tribal areas with that of establishing Pakistani security forces eyes and ears. The situation General Musharraf has been handling could be described through Joseph Heller’s dictum “catch-22 situation” which he has contextualized in his war
novel in 1961 (Heller, 1999). It is important to highlight the surrounding environment of ‘catch-22 situation’. For example, militants operating in the tribal areas had formed parallel government and became host to terrorists operating in Afghanistan. The local militant provided refuge to Al-Qaeda and other foreign militants and helped them establish command and control structure in the tribal areas. They have banned and replaced the local _jirga_ system with that of their own justice mechanism. They have their own police, judges and administrative staff. To affiliate their identity with Islamic code of life, they have closed and banned all the business related to movies, music, and television. Orders were issued to grow beards by men. Anyone who stays on the side of the government was either killed or forced to leave the area (Amir, 2006). Furthermore, the Operation Sunrise of July 2007 which was conducted in Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) of Islamabad gave impetus to suicide attacks in Pakistan. Moreover, earlier disorientation in the command of the militants was now unified under Baitullah Mehsud, who formed the TTP in December 2007 and united all the factions of militants operating in PATA and FATA regions of Pakistan.

This was a time when General Musharraf handed over the command to General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani and left the office of Army Chief in November 2007. Though, the very next day he had taken oath for the office of President of Pakistan as a civilian, which was suppose to retain him for the next five years as head of the state (Dawn, 2007). Since, the most predictable thing in politics is its unpredictability; General Musharraf had to bow to intense pressure on his impeachment and resigned on August 18, 2008 (Shah, 2008).

10.4. *General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani: A Thinking Soldier in Terrible Times*

On November 29, 2007, General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyani took charge of the office of Army Chief. General Kayani hold quite an impressive professional record and based on distinctive credentials he replaced the then Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf. Though,
Pervez Musharraf continued as President of Pakistan until August 18, 2008 (Shah, 2008). It is important to highlight that on political grounds General Musharraf was becoming quite controversial to many political commentators. For example, in 2008 former President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari who replaced General Musharraf said that “we don’t hunt with the hound and run with the hare, which is what Musharraf was doing” (Cameron-Moore, 2008). To some, General Musharraf maintained two perspectives, one for domestic consumption and the other for international audiences. To convince his counterparts in the United States, General Musharraf maintained that I am with you, whereas to his domestic audience the General was presenting himself as a savior, which was seen an effort to prolong his political career while his decisions with international pressure. His decision to oust the then Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry (Wilkinson, 2007) and Operation Sunrise in Lal Masjid proved the last nail in his coffin. The nation as a whole was discontented with his policies. Opposition parties were though standing at two distinctive corners of the political spectrum but sought an opportunity to push General Musharraf into chaos. The conservative religious-o-political parties exploited the Lal Masjid operation and stood with the militant narrative that the army is fighting an ‘American War’; whereas, the liberal-cum-moderate parties got united over justice movement, which got impetus under ‘Pakistan Lawyers Movement’ to restore the Chief Justice of Pakistan (Phelps, 2009). Military operations were stuck and it was trapped in ‘catch 22’ situation.

General Kiyani was aware of the situation as he has sworn into the office of Army Chief from the prime intelligence agency of Pakistan, the ISI. Being ISI Chief he closely observed the changing dynamics of FATA, PATA, and Islamabad. Though, the biggest challenge for him surfaced on the day of December 27, 2007 when the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in Liaqat Bagh Rawalpindi (Stratton, 2007). The network of Baitullah
Mehsud was believed to assassinate Benazir Bhutto (Warrick, 2008). This suddenly changed the political and security dynamics of Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto assassination and the bigger narrative which the militants were able to craft started haunting the resilience of the armed forces. For example, the narrative militant’s were crafting propagated the voice that Pakistan army is fighting the ‘American War’ and using its weapons against its own people. This was somehow also getting voice from the conservative religious-o-political parties. Moreover, the man behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto gave an interview to Al-jazeera TV, which was aired on January 28, 2008. In his first ever interview with any television, Baitullah Mehsud shed light on the agenda of TTP. He specifically said that:

“The main objective of the coalition of militants is waging a defensive jihad. The Pakistan army is deploying its soldiers under orders from [US president] George [W] Bush. The army is bombarding our houses and fighting with us. Therefore, we have formed this coalition to guarantee the safety of civilians and this war which the army launched in the tribal areas is an American war… We no more feel sad about the Pakistani soldier’s deaths. They are implementing the orders of the West and the United States and they are destroying our houses. And I do pray that Allah will guide them back to the right path because they are Muslims and this is an Islamic country… But when the army soldiers come to this area to kill us, we will definitely be killing them. Our main aim is to finish Britain and United States and to crush the pride of the non-Muslims. We pray to God to give us the ability to destroy the White House, New York and London. And we have trust in God. Very soon, we will be witnessing jihad's miracles” (Mir, 2008).

Due to this situation, national resolve against the war on terror got shattered that further gave impetus to confusion among the armed forces, which were not sure whether they are fighting Pakistan’s war or supporting the US war against Islam. Moreover, ill training and inability to fight the unconventional war was altogether taking over the nerves of Pakistani soldiers. For example, on August 30, 2007 a group of around 200 Pakistani soldiers surrendered to local tribesmen (who were operating on behalf of militants) without firing a single bullet (Cloughley, 2010). Though, Pakistani soldiers were released on November 4, 2007 on reciprocal arrangements that brought release of around 25 tribal terrorists. In view of Brigadier (retd)
Shaukat Qadir the surrender of the forces was not an act of cowardness rather a moral courage and bravery because soldiers were unable to distinguish between ‘Just and Unjust War’ (ARY News, 2018).

10.4.1. Unique Prestige of General Kiyani:

One of the biggest successes for General Kiyani was to let his forces believe that the war they are fighting is ‘Just’ and completely theirs. After taking charge of the office of Army Chief, he completely changed the direction of the military campaign and redefined the role of armed forces. In the aftermath of this, Swat operation and campaign against the militants in South Waziristan was started in 2007. General Kiyani is known as a learned soldier who thinks a lot before ending into a situation. He was given an extension of three years by the then Pakistan People’s Party government with a rational that General Kiyani best understands the situation and in the middle of war changing the command could jeopardize the positive results already achieved through massive military campaign (The Express Tribune, 2010). Though, few believed General Kiyani himself asked for the extension and it also suited to the then government who considered Kiyani as ‘buddy’. After this, General Kiyani being a leader and brave soldier who has been given a credit to ‘own the war’ was about to fade away as his extension made him a ‘blindfolded sheep’ sitting in the General Headquarters. The perception of him as a ‘blindfolded sheep’ in fact made him an officer who even could not straightforwardly maintain an eye contact with his subordinates. In such a situation erupts, the dilemma of commanding and leading the forces.

Contrary to commentary on the extension of General Kiyani, when he took charge in 2007 the country was flooded with terrorist’s attacks and the State almost lost its writ to deter the terrorists. As this study has already pointed out that the operational readiness and planning of
Pakistan army to fight the unconventional war was almost incompatible with the nature of terrorist’s strategies and operational preparedness. Also the sudden incident of 9/11 exposed the region with adverse circumstances that inevitably brought national security challenges for which Pakistan was completely ill prepared and unaware of. As a matter of fact, Pakistan did fought the war from 2001 till 2007 but due to absence of military training, state of articulation and capability along with lack of experience to fight this kind of war lagged behind to completely overthrow the militants out of its territory.

Pakistan army being the conventional military had always focused on traditional warfare and built its understanding around kinetic threats. It had never raised nor trained its army to fight sub-conventional war. That is why Pakistan army gradually placed its forces along the 2,611 kilometers porous border with Afghanistan and conducted different small scale military operations in the tribal area. There are 7 agencies in the tribal region of Pakistan and until 2008 all the agencies were flooded by Taliban who apprehended strong grip on the social and administrative fabric of the region. Being part of Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA), the Malaknad Division which has 8 districts also became under constant threat by the over flooded presence of the Taliban. This evolving situation of PATA region along with FATA had adversely affected the writ of the State.

General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani sworn the command of the Army as Chief and devised a proper campaign plan to fight the war against terrorism. Under the Kiyani Doctrine, the military campaign started from Bajure Agency in 2008 and ended in 2014 with Operation Zarb-e-Azab in Khyber and North Waziristan. Immediately after taking charge of the office of Army Chief, General Kiyani issued a “Command Communiqué 1/2007” (Diary Number: 6217/1322/SD; Dated: 25 December 2007) for the army. The wording of which is reproduced below:
“I intend to initiate an institutionalized system of issuance of Command Communiqué. These will be issued on required basis not only to focus on emerging issues, but also to underline those critical areas where military standards and norms/practices have eroded over a period of time, both by fault and default… These Command Communiqué will not only amplify my command priorities but will also enable direct communication with appropriate command echelons to ensure unambiguous flow of my intent… I desire that these Command Communiqué be disseminated at the appropriate level and implementation on them be ensured as a matter of priority. I expect a proactive response towards this end to ensure healthy and correct command climate” (ARY News, 2018).

Similarly, General Kiyani issued another “Command Communiqué 2/2007” (Diary Number: 6217/1322/SD; Dated: 26 December 2007) related to army professionalism and on avoidance of direct contacts with politicians under “Subject: Interaction with Politicians”. The wording of which is reproduced:

“Keeping in view the primary role of the Army, we must focus on hardcore professional matters. This allows no room for involvement in political affairs or interaction with politicians… I don’t want any direct or indirect contact with the politicians, which develops a perception of Army’s involvement in politics… I, therefore, direct that no politician should be called to General Headquarters or any formation. Similarly, I desire that commanders at all levels should not interact with politicians without formal approval from General Headquarters” (ARY News, 2018).

The time when General Kiyani took over the command of Pakistan Army, all the Generals under his authority were unaware of the nature of war and none of them ever fought an unconventional war. This was in fact an extension of General Musharaf’s dilemma. All Generals including Army Chief were trained to fight conventional war with traditional enemy. On positive note, showing neither hesitation nor confusion into firmness of fighting the war each of the General wanted to rescue Pakistan from the clutches of terrorism. This was in fact meant to enter into troubled waters without knowing what is ahead. Irony of the fact was that on one side Pakistan army was struggling to clear its territory from terrorists strongholds and on the other side the world especially the United States was playing the enigma of ‘do more’. Based on ‘blessing in disguise’ Pakistan from 2001 to 2007 had learned a lot, though this learning was quite painful and full of tragedies. Based on the lessons learned, the training manuals were
reorganized and made compatible with the needs of hour. Once again military was ready to enter into South Waziristan and decided to start Operation Rah-e-Haq in 2007.

10.4.2. Doctrinal Transformations:

Pakistan army during ongoing military operations also worked on the doctrinal transformation that it developed in shape of ‘Sub-conventional Warfare Doctrine’ which was a counter insurgency doctrine (Rashid, 2016). The doctrine later was made part of the ‘Army Green Book’ in 2013. In fact, it was the changing nature of war that has brought doctrinal changes into Pakistan’s military strategy. Traditionally, the country has been following conventional doctrine to deter all-out war. Due to distinctive threat that Pakistan has faced in the sub-conventional domain, the country has to evolve a parallel military system dedicated to combat unconventional warfare. After learning and investigating different aspects of doctrinal vulnerabilities, General Kiyani has formulated a fresh understanding around theory and practice of sub-conventional warfare. This in fact, logically addressed the requirements inherent in sub-conventional war and unfolded the dynamic relationship of military doctrine with that of evolving 5\textsuperscript{th} generation warfare.

As mentioned earlier that in 2013, Pakistan army added a separate chapter in the military Green Book under ‘Sub-Conventional Warfare’. Pakistan Army “while remaining within the ambit of political authority had prepared the new sub-conventional warfare doctrine to combat militancy through appropriate training, logistics, weapons, and military exercises. The doctrine elaborated military strategy to deal with the evolving sub-conventional threat through clear rules of engagement, employment of force multipliers, capacity building of formations, training and equipping of units and guidelines on code of conduct. The doctrine helped troops to fight in own area against radical faction of society and flush out militancy from its roots. It also lay down
guidelines for other services, civil administration and stakeholders to play their role effectively” (The Express Tribune, 2013a).

This new doctrine had four basic pillars.

i. Clear
ii. Hold
iii. Build
iv. Transfer

According to this new doctrine, first Pakistan army cleared the areas from terrorist’s footholds and afterwards established their permanent presence not to allow the terrorists to come back. Working on the third point was to rebuild the war torn area that was meant to pay back the fruits of peace and stability through development and progress, so that people can stay in prosperity. Along with rebuilding phase, a need was deemed necessary for a political and administrative strategy to establish writ of the state. Since army was clearing the area, holding the area, and rebuilding the area, it also played decisive role to rehabilitate the area as well (Javed, 2012). Phase by phase the peace loving tribal’s were resettled in the area and by 2016 around 80 villages in South Waziristan were rehabilitated by the army (Dawn, 2016a).

10.4.3. General Kiyani’s Exceptional Contributions both at Operational and Institutional Levels:

Beauty around the battlefield was the fact that General Kiyani was directly in command and easily accessible through telephone. Field commanders can talk to him and take him up to get immediate approvals. General Kiyani always responded to the calls while joining the troops and rewarded the soldiers in the field under fire. As mentioned above, General Kiyani was known as a ‘thinking General’ who use to be well versed about understanding of complex issues.
He was a deep person and thinks mostly different than the officers under his command. His ability to give the allowance to his subordinates for arguing made him a good listener. His cross questioning had always proved his acumen that sustained his ability to lead the army. General Kiyani has been exceptionally recognized among its peers and told to be known as a Chief that has done great service to the institution as a whole. It is also believed that the contributions he has made for the army are greater than the efforts of all the Chiefs put together could do.

As mentioned earlier that most of the physical operations were conducted during General Kiyani period, which were highly intense and high level operations. The way General Kiyani conducted himself and allowed his subordinate command in the field was very well thought and excellent. That is something which was going on during his tenure on operational fronts but lots of other things were happening that mostly people are unaware of. For example:

- **Operational Level Contributions:** He changed the complete doctrine as far as India is concerned. When India propagated the idea of Hot Pursuit, Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), and Proactive Strategy; Pakistan developed a counter response which was validated through army level military exercises. General Kiyani participated in the exercises and spent nights with officers of the Central Command conducting the military exercises. This was a sea-like change happened in doctrinal shift. It is important to know that the doctrinal change is a theory. To validate the theory, General Kiyani brought drastic changes in the weapon system, training system, induction system of officers at the Staff College, and reorganized the War Course at National Defense University Islamabad. He also brought changes in the Operational Readiness and Training at the Central Level, and brought a new weapon system such as Air Defense, etc. All these contributions are done by General Kiyani on operational side of the Army.

- **On Institutional Level:** He doubled the pays of the officers. He doubled the ration and made it obligatory. ‘Shaheed Fund’ was created and the way it was expanded is exceptionally recognized. His efforts for the ‘rehabilitation of wounded’ and decision that he can continue serving in the army till as long as he (war wounded) wants and will not
be aborted out as a policy. In Rawalpindi, Rehabilitation Center was constructed where limbs were made for the soldiers who lost their organs in military operations. He completely changed the hospital system. He made a paper free army. He got into drone technology for the forces. He is the man who commemorated the Martyr’s Day for the first time in the country to remember each and every sing soldier who led his life to ensure territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan. He stayed in sorrow of his soldiers and shared all his joys with them while celebrating most of his Eid holidays with frontline soldiers deployed in Swat and FATA. All these contributions of General Kiyani are in fact publically not recognized. In fact, neither General Kiyani left his soldiers alone nor he abandoned his country rather he was a man who continued fighting the war against terrorism.

10.4.4. General Kiyani’s Strategy of ‘Selective Engagement’:

Just like his predecessor, General Kiyani was also aware of the cultural sensitivities, which drive the code of conduct in tribal areas. Also it is important to highlight that Pakistan army was not entering into its tribal region to occupy or subdue the tribesmen. In fact, the overall military campaign was to outcast the increasing influence of militancy, which the foreign militants including Al-Qaeda terrorists have made safe heaven. During this time unfortunately some of Pakistani tribesmen joined them and perpetuated terrorism while negating the very context of writ of the state. Those who resisted such developments, though in majority, were killed. Militants with local support had created a parallel government and in absence of army in the area, Pakistani state became just like an alien entity.

Furthermore, the idea of selective engagement was to create a space for the security forces to establish their eyes and ears along with decoding ‘who is who’ in the tribal belt. Since, foreign militancy was taking refuge under pseudo Islamic jihad and so-called implementation of Sharia Rule with that of ideological propaganda that in Afghanistan a Christian force is fighting against Muslims and Pakistan army is part of un-Islamic war. This has lent much credibility into
their voice and many of the local tribesmen were lost in the dilemma of orchestrated jihad and Sharia implementation in Pakistan. Therefore, other than establishing eyes and ears in the tribal belt, the peace agreements were signed to provide an opportunity to bring back Pakistani distracted tribesmen and allow them to denounce their nexus with foreign militants. Knowing the fact that all the previous peace deals were used by the militants to gain time and expand their influence in the tribal belt, General Kiyani was aware of the cultural sensitivities and power vested in it. Therefore, he also concluded some of the very important peace deals with Swat based militant’s Sufi Mohammad and his son-in-law Mullah Fazulullah along with Khyber Agency’s Lashkar-e-Islam of Mangal Bagh Afridi. The first major peace deal was the May 2008 peace agreement with Mullah Fazulullah. Details of all these is given below.

i. Swat Peace Agreement-May 2008:

Swat is one of the most serene districts of Pakistan was flushed by militant ideology immediately after the 9/11 incident when in 2001, a resident of it started its own religious seminary along with FM radio channel. He perpetrated hardcore sermons through his FM against the state of Pakistan and western forces fighting in Afghanistan. His militant group followed extreme policies to submerge the rich culture and liberal values of people of Swat. He banned the girls to go to school and visiting them to visit markets without full body veil. He propagated the idea of Sharia Law with his teacher Sufi Mohammad who formed an organization named Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). The momentum of the movement got impetus when in July 2007 General Musharraf launched Operation Sunrise against militant infiltration in Lal Mosque (Red Mosque) (Witte, 2007). Sufi Mohammad at that time was in prison as General Musharraf had imprisoned Sufi Mohammad for the first time back in November 2001, when he returned from Afghanistan (MMO, 2012) and his organization TNSM
was banned in January 2002 (Haider & Suhrawardy, 2002). Mulla Fazalullah later became his son-in-law and managed the whole movement.

In November 2007, Maulana Sufi Mohammad was released from prison to facilitate the ongoing peace talks with TNSM and Fazalullah (Baker, 2007). On his failure to ink the deal with the government, he was taken into custody. The violence and dilemma of insecurity continued until 2008 General Elections, which led foundation to a secular cum liberal political party, Awami National Party (ANP) (Dawn, 2008). In the center, Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party got majority and formed the government. Unfortunately, this time Benazir Bhutto was not able to become Prime Minister as she was assassinated on December 27, 2007, just two months earlier to the elections. Both the provincial and central governments wanted to give peace another chance and hastily approached the Taliban in Swat. To facilitate the peace dialogue, Sufi Mohammad was once again released in April 2008 (IRIN, 2009). His subsequent releases happened under the understanding that he will denounce anti-Pakistan activities, which in his absence Mullah Fazalullah, his son-in-law, had been orchestrating against Pakistani state and security forces. It is important to notice that though TNSM was the ideological foundation for Mullah Fazalullah but he has channelized his own influence through Taliban as Chief of TTP faction Swat. Pakistan government wanted to isolate Fazalullah from TNSM, which had quite an influence in the Malakand Division along with Bajaur Agency.

Therefore, due to fresh rounds of peace negotiations, on May 16, 2008 a 16-point peace agreement was inked with TTP faction of Maulana Fazlullah to lay down their weapons (Khattak, 2012). This was in fact a deal signed with Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TSNM) chief Sufi Mohammad and tapped as a strategy to install permanent peace in the region.
Taliban as usual failed to honor the deal and increased their influence in the surrounding region of Swat. Militants did not surrender their weapons and demanded from the security forces to leave the Swat valley. Situation got worst when they started destroying the girl’s schools along with kidnapping government officials. Shops were destroyed and local business was totally shutdown. This caused security anxiety among political stalwarts both at the center and province who now wanted the forces to start an active military campaign against Fazalullah group of Taliban operating in Swat. Pakistan army as a result started Operation Rah-e-Haq-I in Swat.

ii. Khyber Peace Agreement 2008:

In July 2008, Pakistan military and the government signed a peace deal with sectarian outfit Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) of Mangal Bagh Afridi, who have been perpetuating religious intolerance in Khyber Agency. Under the agreement all the religious factions agreed to live in harmony. The deal was inked during an ongoing military operation and used as a pressure tactic to denounce sectarian militancy in the area. Other than Lashkar-e-Islam, two other factions such as Ansar-ul-Islam and Haji Namdar’s so-called ‘Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice’ were targeted in the operation. The fears were mounting that Taliban elements who have taken camouflaged refuge in these sectarian outfits will be taking over the agency and put burden on adjoining provincial capital Peshawar. Therefore, a selective operation was going on in the agency against all those elements who could be affiliated with Taliban. Haji Namdar has showed his allegiance to Mangal Bagh. Therefore, during the operation Frontier Corps were riding Mangal Bagh to give the impression that the operation is not against his affiliates along with Ansar-ul-Islam (Roggio, 2008). The failure of maintaining the spirit of peace agreement by the Bajaur factions, Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem (Straight Path).
According to Bill Roggio, “this year [2008], the government [of Pakistan] signed peace deals in North Waziristan, Swat, Dir, Bajaur, Malakand, and Mohmand. Negotiations are under way in South Waziristan, Kohat, and Mardan. The Taliban have violated the terms of these agreements in every region where accords have been inked” (Roggio, 2008).

iii. Malakand Peace Accord 2009:

On February 15, 2009, an agreement with Swat based Maulana Sufi Mohammad, leader of banned Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), was signed to install peace (Shahid & Khail, 2009). Sufi Mohammad was considered critical to install peace in Malakand Division. Therefore, accepting his demands about Sharia Law was the first and foremost political surrender that both the provincial and central government had to make. The security forces do not have any other choice other than accepting the political process.

At last, with carrot and stick policy, Swat Taliban were under enough pressure to stall their anti-state activities and had to merge under the February 2009 peace agreement signed between TNSM chief Sufi Mohammad and the provincial government of Kyber Pakhtunkhwa [the then North West Frontier Province (NWFP)]. So, in Dir Timergara, a five point peace agreement was inked, which laid the foundation of future Nizam-e-Adl Regulation to be imposed in Swat and Kohistan districts. Ceasefire happened between security forces and Taliban militants. Hostages were released and a soothing environment for further negotiations was created (Shahid & Khail, 2009).

As a result of February peace deal between TNSM and ANP led provincial government, Nizam-e-Adl Regulation was passed on April 13, 2009 for Swat and Kohistan districts (Shah, 2009). Under the peace agreement the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa agreed to impose Sharia Law in Malakand Division and Kohistan district of the Hazara Division under
Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, which was passed by both provincial and national assemblies of Pakistan. As reported by Reuters that under the agreement militants were to “allow girls to go to school and stop carrying weapons in public” (Ali, 2008). The deal though meant to install peace and tranquility in the region but failed as Taliban continued suppressing the people and kept expanding their territorial influence.

10.4.5. Military Campaigns of General Kiyani:

When it comes to summarize the resolve of Pakistan against the war on terror, the story begins from General Kiyani and ends at General Kiyani. He was a battle hardened general of Pakistan and without competition stands first in the row as most of the physical operations were conducted during his tenure, which were intense and high level operations. He was a soldier who not only united the armed forces to fight the battle as ‘Pakistan’s war’ but a man who “kept Pakistan together,” a title which the *Foreign Policy Magazine* also affixed with his generalship (Rafiq, 2013).

In 2007, General Kiyani inherited an overstretched army which under the command of General Musharraf was almost exhausted to maneuver the battlefield. General Musharraf with all his abilities was managing the political clout and most of the times ended up into peace deals with the domestic breed of militants who one way or the other were exploiting the long years absence of Pakistani military in the rough terrains of most fascinating and culturally rich region of PATA and FATA. That is why when Musharraf marched to the area, he was blind and deaf due to almost zero presence of its intelligence agency. The time it took for him to create a network of human intelligence to reinvigorate eyes and ears for the forces pushed him to adopt policy of ‘selective engagement’. Though, his policy brought an impressive strategic gain but also allowed the cunning and notorious militants expand their influence in the region.
From Operation Enduring Freedom of 2001 till Operation Al-Mizan of 2006 along with highly tedious Operation Sunrise of 2007, General Musharraf was almost consumed in the war on terror that cost him domestic popularity with that of international expectations. The story of stalemates during Musharraf led military campaigns that occurred due to peace deals and helped lend much credibility to militants, who orchestrated grey area around religious discourse that almost confused the armed forces who at one place were fighting for the state but on the other side fear of ‘false flag operation’ against their own Muslim brothers was haunting and consuming them. As Karl Marx characterized faith that “religion is the opium of the people” was successfully applied by the militants (The Guardian, 2009). For example, in 2004 a Fatwa was given by Abdul Rashid Ghazi, the Lal Masjid cleric that “soldiers are not martyrs” (Nangiana, 2013). This made most of the Pakistanis hostage to religious opium. Under such slow conscious and dizziness few of the people would refuse to attend the funeral of glorious soldiers whom coffins were taken back to their hometowns. This was not the end but a beginning that even General Kiyani had to face when he was about to get retire in November 2013 (but he was given extension for another term). Not like General Musharraf whose army received a fatwa from a mosque cleric, General Kiyani was about to face a question from one of the most prominent religious political party, Jamat-e-Islami chief Syed Munawar Hassan, who inquired and problematized that “those fighting for the US could be declared martyred?” (The News, 2013).

Immediately after taking charge of the office of Army Chief, General Kiyani faced a unified command of at-least five militant groups operating in PATA and FATA under Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which was formed in December 2007 by the then South Waziristan Baitullah Mehsud, who had earlier ended up in a Sararogha Peace Agreement (February 2005) with General Musharraf (Abbas, 2008). He had inherited an ongoing military
campaign under Operation Rah-e-Haq-I (October 2007-December 2007), which was going on in Swat and Shangla districts of Malakand Division. Therefore, from the first day of his command security situation in the tribal region took General Kiyani on his feet. For example, in January 2008 twenty two Pakistani soldiers were killed and many were taken hostage in a combat with militants who attacked the Sararogha Fort in South Waziristan with about 600 to 700 fighters (Khan, 2008). The Fort was taken over by the militants. Regardless of jeopardy of terror and mesmerization of theocracy, the general’s resolve remained unchallenged. This incident as a consequence initiated Operation Zalzala in South Waziristan which focused to deny further space to Baitullah Mehsud. Below are listed all the important military operations that Pakistan army has conducted under the command of General Kiyani. Though, details of the military operations are given in Chapter Eleven ‘The Spectrum of Pakistan’s Military Response-An Evaluation’.

6) Operation Sher Dil (Lion Heart): September 2008
10) Operation Rah-e-Nijat: June 19, 2009 to December 12, 2009
11) Operation Koh-e-Sufaid: July 2011 to August 2011

Some of the other small scale military operations conducted between 2008 and 2009 were Operation Eagle Swoop (Kohat District), Operation Mountain Scanner (North Waziristan
Agency), and Operation Mountain Sweep II (South Waziristan Agency). During its 18 years long war against terrorism, Pakistan had continued its military operations keeping in view their tactical and strategic needs. For example, until 2012, Pakistan had conducted 251 major and 735 minor military operations in its tribal areas (Khalid & Roy, 2016).

10.4.6. Why General Kiyani did not go for North Waziristan Operation?

At time of General Kiyani’s military command, operation in North Waziristan did received attention but due to two reasons it remained pending. To understand both the reasons, this study has to elaborate the context. In fact, during the first five years of his command, General Kiyani had already conducted 6 military operations, which included:

i. Mohmand Agency operation
ii. Orakzai Agency operation
iii. South Waziristan operation
iv. Dir operation
v. Bajaur operation
vi. Malakand Division operation

When it comes to geographical stretch that General Kiyani in the above operations has managed could be compared through only one military operation such as the Malakand Division operation. Only Malakand Division has 7 districts, such as:

i. Buner District
ii. Chitral District
iii. Lower Dir District
iv. Upper Dir District
v. Malakand District
vi. Shangla District
vii. Swat District

So, one can understand how big military campaign General Kiyani had already launched against the terrorists. Khyber-I operation was also going on. Consequently, the first reason not to start military operation in North Waziristan was related to the decision of taking ‘operational and logistic pause’ so that army could be reequipped and reconsolidated with achievements in hand. Since the forces were overstretched and holding a vast area, therefore it was deemed necessary to first refurbish the overall operational readiness. Secondly, United States was drumming with ‘do more’ mantra and demanding from Pakistan to conduct military operation in North Waziristan. This ‘do more’ mantra was taken as a dictate and General Kiyani does not want to send a pulse that on order of the US, Pakistan will be conducting military operations on its soil. He wanted the operation when it is suitable and completely under the control of Pakistan army.

This study finds that the top military leadership had never underestimated the importance of military operation in North Waziristan. In fact, General Kiyani during his tenure at General Headquarters had planned military operation for the two Waziristan agencies as a whole, which included both North and South Waziristan agencies. Two plans were floated during decision making sessions held in the presence of Core Commanders, where one group sided with the idea to start operation first in North Waziristan and the other supported the proposal to launch operation in South Waziristan. Lastly, the plan to first approach South Waziristan prevailed mainly due to its terrain and landscape that was considered compatible for infantry movement including the battlefield tanks. South Waziristan along with compatible landscapes for military mobilization also host less population that made the operational conduct faster. Due to fast pace of operation in South Waziristan and mobility of troops vested in the terrain, Pakistan army could avoid political backlash, which during any ongoing operation was becoming the biggest
hurdle. So, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani decided that initially he will start military operation in South Waziristan and based on its success, the army without taking a pause shall immediately enter into second phase that was to start operation in North Waziristan. The basic segment of the plan was ‘not to stop’ but unfortunately immediately after South Waziristan Operation, Pakistan army has to take a pause. So, when stopped restarting the campaign in North Waziristan came as ‘ant climbing the cliff’.

This brings the context back, why Pakistan did not conducted the military operation in North Waziristan? The situation was just like “dammed if you do, dammed if you don’t” (Hendrickson, 2008). If you conduct the operation in North Waziristan then you are American stooge, and if you don’t do then the whole Pakistan will become hostage to terrorists. Other then the complexity of ‘dammed phenomenon’ and ‘do more’ mantra of the US, there were also few issues which were related to joint efforts involving reciprocal arrangements by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operating in Afghanistan. This included the following issues:

i. The first reason was related to United States commitment that when Pakistan will conduct the North Waziristan operation, ISAF forces in Afghanistan will secure the other side of the border. All the ISAF Commanders particularly General Stanley McCrystle and his successor General David Petraeus promised that when surge operation will be active on Pakistani side, they [ISAF] will be interchanging their efforts to compliment the operations. In this regards, ISAF will allocate one Brigade on the Afghanistan side of the border to neutralize, clear, and stop the influx of terrorists. Initiatives were not taken as promised by the ISAF. For example, contrary to Pakistani 2,000 military posts on the border, ISAF only went for 500 posts. This showed no seriousness from the ISAF nor have they taken stringent measures to tackle the influx of terrorists entering into Pakistan.

ii. Secondly, all the mobile SIM’s were blocked by Pakistan to curtail the communication network, whereas ISAF did nothing to block Afghani SIM’s. No one from the ISAF was showing interest. Indifference prevailed. Therefore, the first two hurdles were connected
with the reluctance of ISAF to complement Pakistani efforts on their side, which took lot of time and slowed the decision to conduct military action in North Waziristan.

iii. Third reason was related to the original military plan that was supposed to begin from Bajaure Agency and subsequently end at North Waziristan. The Bajaure operation took longer time than expected. Therefore, Pakistan military original plan to approach North Waziristan was delayed.

iv. Another reason that caused delay in North Waziristan Operation was the political decisions taken by all the civil regimes under Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarian (PPPP) of Asif Ali Zardari (The Nation, 2009) and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) Nawaz Sharif, who altogether preferred the dialogue over military operations (Naazer, Farooq & Khattak, 2017).

v. All the civil regimes continued with a tendency to feel that their predecessors may have not utilized all the options to deal with the menace of terrorism. So, each regime discarded its predecessor and charted out a new political strategy. For example when General Musharraf left presidency in August 2008, until that time Pakistan People Party was able to form its government in Islamabad. Simultaneously, in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (the then North Western Frontier Province-NWFP), Awami National Party (ANP) formed the provincial government. Both the Central and Provincial governments decided to dialogue and preferred to talk with Swat based Maulana Sufi Muhammad, leader of the banned organization Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TSNM). They envisioned a political solution for the problem based on a ‘Comprehensive Approach’ that involved 3Ds, deterrence, dialogue and development (The Nation, 2009). Even to facilitate the process, the then Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) government under Awami National Party (ANP) had passed a unanimous resolution to accommodate TSNM demands through ‘Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009,’ which was later on passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan controlled by the then Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) (Nawaz, Butt & Bukhari, 2009). All this was done to avoid military operations in PATA and FATA regions. In fact, the so-called ‘3D strategy’ failed and inevitably gave impetus to terrorism.

vi. By 2013, Pakistan army had already finished its military campaign in South Waziristan and about to direct its focus towards North Waziristan. Continuing with the tendency of
political mileage, when in 2013 Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) formed a
government in Center, they also decided to go for dialogue (Dawn, 2014). No military
can start an operation at its own unless it is sanctioned and supported by the state, society
and government. General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani was unable to resist the so-called
political strategy to appease the terrorists, who in fact were buying time to spread their
networking which the military had already successfully dismantled. Since, the PMLN
government just like the PPPP decided to give one more chance to dialogue, so another
chance was given that once again stalled the continuity of operations (Crilly, 2014). It is
important to mention that during this time, General Kiyani got retired and was replaced
by General Raheel Sharif in November 2013 (The Express Tribune, 2013b). Therefore,
he was never given a chance to enter into North Waziristan. Though, PMLN government
in full swing continued with the negotiations and sustained until Taliban themselves
unilaterally withdrew from the negotiations. That happened when on June 8, 2014
Taliban attacked on Jinnah International Airport Karachi (Ashfaq, 2016). Pakistan army
under the command of General Raheel Sharif took decisive move to restart the military
campaign in FATA particularly in North Waziristan (Javaid, 2015). So, it was Taliban’s
decision to left the dialogue, otherwise PMLN wisdom was to continue with negotiations
until ‘dooms day’. While putting aside the military option and looking for new
alternatives without learning from the gaps of previous approaches in fact served nothing
to Pakistan rather benefited the terrorists.

10.5. General Raheel Sharif: Lion’s Roar

On November 29, 2013 General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani got retired and was replaced by
General Raheel Sharif, who took the command of Pakistan Army. General Raheel Sharif was
known as an upright, straight forward, honest, truthful and capable soldier. In fact, Raheel Sharif
was a younger brother of Major Shabbir Sharif Shaheed, who laid his life during Indo-Pakistan
War of 1971. Major Shabir Sharif Shaheed was the only Pakistani military officers who have
ever received both Nishan-e-Haider and Sitara-e-Jurat awards along with Sword of Honor. His
bravery and gallantry during 1971 war with India took him to all new ranks of ‘Shahadat’ and
made him receive Nishan-e-Haider, the highest military award in the armed forces. Fascinatingly, Major Shabir Sharif Shaheed was the nephew of another celebrated soldier Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed who also received Nishan-e-Haider on his bravery during 1965 Indo-Pak War.

All the above links made Raheel Sharif a well exposed officer, who during services was lucky to cherish peers respect and support. Moreover, the most unique element in his promotion was the factor of former Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf, who being the course mate of Major Shabbir Shaheed took care of Raheel Sharif during his promotions from the rank of Colonel to Brigadier and later from Brigadier to Major General. General Musharraf during his service remained part of two separate promotion boards in which Raheel Sharif promotion came into consideration. General Musharraf extended the soft corner to Raheel Sharif in both promotion boards that ultimately raised his candidature for the position of Army Chief. Pervez Musharraf and Shabbir Sharif were together in the PMA Long Course and shared neighboring rooms. In the final term Shabbir Sharif was the Battalion-Senior-Under-Officer and Pervez Musharraf was a Battalion-Junior-Under-Officer. Being friend to Shabbir Sharif, Pervez Musharraf also served under his command. So, when Raheel Sharif was stepping into the military ranks, Musharraf personally took care of him.

10.5.1. Raheel Sharif and the War on Terror:

Different from his predecessor, when General Raheel Sharif took over the command of Pakistan army then all the Core Commanders under his command were the Generals who have almost understood this unconventional warfare. These Core Commanders were not like those who in 2001 under General Pervez Musharraf Command were unaware of the dynamics of sub-conventional war and continuously thought out, how to fight this new war? Contrary to General
Musharraf team, the team of General Raheel Sharif consisted of those Generals who not only knew the war very well but also had successfully fought and recovered most of the tribal territory from the strong footholds of terrorists. Until 2014 other then North Waziristan Agency and Khyber Agency almost on each tribal territory Pakistan army has established its strong foothold. Though, Pakistan has successfully defeated the terrorists but still external forces like India and Afghanistan were fueling and feeding the remaining militants of North Waziristan and Khyber Agency (The Nation, 2017). The opinions were also shared by Indian analysts such as Bharat Karnad who out cried on New Delhi’s state sponsored terrorism (The Express Tribune, 2017). Not in isolation, the overall picture became clear when one of TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan while in custody told Pakistani investigation agency about the Indo-Afghan nexus of sponsoring, training, and weaponizing the group [TTP] to carryout terrorist activities inside Pakistan (Hassan, 2017).

Pakistan has been continuously suspicious of Indian mindset who had always invested to destabilize the region. This apprehension did not arise out of context. For example, the 9/11 incident paved a passage for Indian RAW to penetrate into Pakistani tribal areas where it had established strong footholds. Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar in a public appearance with local news channel outlined a proxy strategy to punish Pakistan and specifically said that “we have to neutralize terrorists through terrorists only. Why can’t we do it? We should do it” (The Express Tribune, 2015). Even US Defence Secretary James Mattis on his official visit to New Delhi also pointed out fingers on India sponsoring terrorism in the region (Geo News, 2017).

Before getting into office of Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif had also served in the army as Inspector General Training and Evaluation and played an important role to introduce
new war strategy dealing separately with conventional and unconventional war fighting capabilities. He had good knowledge and professional grip on counter insurgency approach that Pakistan had been applying to combat the menace of terrorism. That is why, General Raheel Sharif in a short span of time decided to start the military operation in North Waziristan on June 15, 2014. The operation was named Zarb-e-Azb literally meaning “sharp and cutting edge” (Saeed, 2014). Almost thirteen years back operations were started in FATA even since 2007 active military operations were launched in the area but still North Waziristan was the region where military operation was not launched.

10.5.2. Unique Environment than his Predecessors:

It is also important to notice that General Raheel Sharif had interacted with the threat of terrorism in a unique environment as compared to General Kiyani and General Musharraf. For example, during General Musharraf time period United States started its military campaign in Afghanistan that gave impetus to the concept of Jihad against the foreign forces. Since, Pakistan played front line role to support and facilitate the global war on terror, it was propagated by the terrorists that fight with Pakistan army is also Jihad. Due to which confusion prevailed mostly among the forces as well as in the nation. Later on, General Kiyani also faced the same problem which he addressed consciously and successfully transformed the ownership of the war. Though, he had to continue military operations with careful distinction and one of the clear example was his decision about not to start military campaign from North Waziristan. In fact, it was United States that had always pressurized Pakistan in general and army in particular to target Haqqani Network operating from North Waziristan. Starting military campaign from North Waziristan means that Pakistan army is serving to the interests of United States and killing Muslims doing
Jihad against American intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So, General Kiyani never pursued a strategy that gives an indication that his force is indirectly serving foreign interests.

When General Raheel Sharif took the Command, the environment was about to change as United States have already started reviewing its role in Afghanistan. Until 2014 United States was clear about its future role and decided to withdraw its forces. United States decision to leave Afghanistan was in fact a shock for the terrorists operating in Pakistan who since 2001 were selling the mantra of Jihad against American and Pakistani military. Based on the same mantra, terrorists were able to get recruits who convincingly disagree with Pakistan’s facilitation to NATO supplies, intelligence sharing, and military actions taken against militant elements operating against ISAF forces. So, when US forces announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the rational also weakened and now it was only Pakistan army who was left behind in the tribal areas to put the last nail in their coffin. Moreover, the whole nation was standing with Pakistan army to hit the terrorists harder than ever.

**10.5.3. Military Campaigns of General Raheel:**


ii. Operation Kyber-I: October 2014

iii. Operation Khyber-II: February 2015


**10.5.4. Operation in North Waziristan, why now?**

Knowing the fact that terrorists have infiltrated in North Waziristan, Pakistan must have started the military operation in the beginning. Waziristan was the center of gravity from where all the problems and issues were erupting. When Pakistan concluded its military operation in South Waziristan, continuing the operation in North Waziristan could curb the remaining
terrorists. The main reason not to start military operation in North Waziristan was the idea of peace deals. It was deemed necessary by all military regimes starting from General Musharraf till General Kiyani that brokering peace deals with North Waziristan elements could avoid the backlash. That is why peace pacts were given importance and military option was set aside. Though, some spectators were of the opinion that since Pakistan had already decided to take stringent military actions against all the terrorists operating in the tribal areas, leaving North Waziristan aside was not a good idea. Most of the criticism for not going into North Waziristan compiles the following points:

i. The terrorist infiltration in North Waziristan was mild as compared to other agencies of the region. On the logic military operations were started in other areas, the same very rational was applicable to conduct military operation in North Waziristan.

ii. Secondly, Pakistan faced international pressure for not entering into North Waziristan which gave wrong impression and generated a narrative around Pakistan’s distinction regarding ‘good or bad’ Taliban (Ricks, 2015). The world at large started criticizing and claimed that Pakistan is neither serious to solve problem in Afghanistan nor it want to counter terrorism on its side.

iii. Another perception that came out of this mess was the propagation that Pakistan army is incapable to fight with terrorists operating in North Waziristan (Siddiqua, 2011).

The security situation which erupted from tribal areas was not fully curtailed through military operations. Terrorist activities were carried out from North Waziristan as much as from other parts of tribal areas. It was true that the space terrorists enjoyed earlier was almost squeezed but still North Waziristan provided them safe haven to operate freely. For example, in September 2013 over a period of one week two bomb attacks happened in Peshawar, first on
Peshawar Church that killed 78 innocent and left 100 injured (The Express Tribune, 2013c). The second attack happened on Qissa Khwani Bazaar that killed 40 innocent people by leaving over 100 seriously injured (Buneri, 2013). It seems that Pakistani law enforcement agencies believed that if the operation in North Waziristan will be started then terrorists could either run towards Afghanistan or they will spread everywhere in Pakistan. Unless Pakistan tangibly addresses and tap both runaway dimensions, going into North Waziristan could jeopardize all the achievements that nation had achieved so far. Though, critics were of the opinion that the day South Waziristan Operation was finished Pakistan must continue the trace of terrorists into North Waziristan and get rid from them once for all.

On June 8, 2014 TTP terrorists attacked on Karachi Airport and PMLN government led peace dialogues were underway. This act of terrorism in fact adopted the same strategy that Pakistan army previously had formulated through April 2004 ‘Shakai Agreement’ with Nek Muhammad to pave way towards softening the environment and to establish human intelligence network. This time terrorists took benefit of the ongoing dialogue process and established their sleeping cells across the country and at time of convenience attacked the Karachi Airport. But this time Pakistan armed forces were quite different to that of 2001, when they were unable to decode the environment of war. Over the period of last thirteen years, Pakistan army and the nation as a whole had rendered thousands of lives to establish writ at each and every single inch of the land. That is why immediately after few days of Karachi Airport attack, Pakistan army launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb on June 15, 2014. To curb the menace of terrorism, State requires systematic approach so does the armed forces that being the front line faces the fire. At last, it was almost after seven years of active military campaign when on June 15, 2014 Pakistan
Army under the Command of General Raheel Sharif decided to start military operation in North Waziristan. Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) issued a press release which stated that:

“On the directions of the Government, Armed forces of Pakistan have launched a comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists who are hiding in sanctuaries in North Waziristan Agency. The operation has been named Zarb-e-Azb… Using North Waziristan as a base, these terrorists had waged a war against the state of Pakistan and had been disrupting our national life in all its dimensions, stunting our economic growth and causing enormous loss of life and property. They had also paralyzed life within the agency and had perpetually terrorized the entire peace loving and patriotic local population… Our valiant armed forces have been tasked to eliminate these terrorists regardless of hue and color, along with their sanctuaries. With the support of the entire nation, and in coordination with other state institutions and Law Enforcement Agencies, these enemies of the state will be denied space anywhere across the country. As always, armed forces of Pakistan will not hesitate in rendering any sacrifice for the motherland” (ISPR, 2014).

The circumstances and the compulsion of the environment pushed General Raheel Sharif to go for the operation. The army had learned out of dialogue and peace deals, which Taliban only use to overplay. If Pakistan gives them time and space at one place they exploit the other and continue doing so until army responded. That is why it is safe to conclude that all the military operations that Pakistan army had conducted against the local and foreign militants in Pakistan were not ‘initiative based’ rather they all were ‘response based’.


On November 29, 2016 General Qamar Javed Bajwa took over the command of Army Chief. Under his command when first meeting of the Core Commanders convened, the room and the décor was the same like 2001 but the Generals in command were totally different to that of General Musharraf. Not only were the Core Commanders but General Bajwa’s overall army starting from a soldier to himself transformed into a new military. All the Generals in capacity of a Colonel, Brigadier and Major General had practically fought the war. All Core Commanders have physically participated in the combat and fought this war with weapons in their hands. The
first hand experience made them all different to those who did not have an opportunity to see the battlefield but had to decode the environment. This group of Generals knows the area, its terrain, strategy and tactics of militants. Also their unique exposure and experience of carrying intelligence information of last fifteen years and ‘who is who’ in the area made them exceptional. Therefore, in Pakistan army there is not a single General and soldier who have not fought the war physically. Due to this experience the level of motivation, planning and understanding has been evolved to a new echelon that classifies the professionalism of Pakistan army and its preparedness to fight the 21st century warfare better than any other military in the world.

Today, General Qamar Javed Bajwa is fighting the kind of war, which has changed military strategy for the third time. Pakistan army knows the unknown and the security environment that shapes both internal and external threat posturing was no more an alien’s domain. What role is being played by India in Baluchistan and so-called invisible hands operating against the CPEC project is no more a mantra of internal political rift as General Bajwa rightly pointed out during his speech delivered on 52nd Defense Day, when he said that:

“We are keeping a close watch on the designs of our enemies especially as they attempt to destroy the peace in Baluchistan. I would like to tell all anti-state elements that we are ready to combat their terrorism and malicious intentions. And whether we are Punjabi, Pathan, Sindhi, Kashmiri, Gilgiti or Balti, we are ready to sacrifice for Baluchistan the way the sons of Baluchistan have sacrificed for Pakistan” (Dawn, 2017a).

On a separate occasion, General Bajwa earlier in July 2017 while addressing to a gathering about CPEC logistics reaffirmed his commitment and said that “the army and law enforcing agencies are vigilant and are determined to provide full proof security to CPEC. No one should have any doubt to our commitment to the project. We will make CPEC a success Insha-Allah come what way” (Ali, 2017). For many years in capacity of X Corps Commander General Bajwa had already handled and dealt with Indian aggression on Line of Control in Azad
Kashmir. When all these different Generals sat in the first Core Commanders Conference under the Command of General Bajwa, they brought multidimensional experience and exposure that gave birth to ‘Bajwa Doctrine’ (Rias, 2018).

10.6.1. The Bajwa Doctrine:

In words of General Bajwa who said that:

“Despite all our efforts, our countless sacrifice and over decades of war, we are being told that we have not done enough against terrorism. If Pakistan has not done enough in this war, then no country in the world has done anything. Only Pakistan has seen this level of success with such limited resources. From Operation Sher Dil, to Rah-i-Rast, Rah-i-Nijat, Zarb-e-Azab and now Radd-ul-Fasaad, we have paid for each inch [of gains] with our blood. And now, I say that the world must do more” (Dawn, 2017b).

Pakistan is continuously fighting the war. All the areas that ended up in the hands of terrorists are recovered and writ of the state is established but still the war of Pakistan’s survival is ‘ON’. Although, limbo situation has been created around Pakistan’s external relations but still the nation had been successful to identify all the enemies, which are marked and traced out. Invisible hands are now visible as happened in the case of Indian serving spy Kalbushan Yadev (Dawn, 2016b). This exposes the hybrid mode of war to destabilize Pakistan. General Bajwa on February 19, 2018 during his speech at Munich Security Conference in Germany reemphasized Pakistan’s commitment and sacrifices. He said:

“Pakistan Army has waged a relentless and bloody fight against terrorism and violent extremism, at a monumental human and material cost. Over 35,000 Pakistanis have lost their lives… Over 48,000 are critically wounded or disabled… Financial cost exceeding US$250 Billion, only a fraction of which is actually shared by our global partners… Today, I can say with pride and conviction that there are no organized terrorist camps on our side of the border. However, presence of terrorists of various hues and colours cannot be ruled out. We still have their active and sleeper cells, who are hiding in mountains, border towns and 54 refugee camps, besides some major towns and cities” (Dunya News, 2018).
Today it is quite impossible to fight the war through conventional or sub-conventional fronts. Therefore, efforts are being done to take the war inside the population by activating non-kinetic domains of hybrid warfare. Sometime it is easy to achieve any task but its retention and sustainability becomes the real challenge. Same is true in case of Pakistan’s success against the sub-conventional warfare. General Bajwa being the leader of the armed forces has taken over the kind of war which is physically no more a threat but its connectivity with other then the physical domain is a challenge since the elements of it are unseen. Moreover, the unseen enemy too has transformed itself from physical domain to IBO domain, which requires intelligence based operations to identify and dismantle their networking. The enemy has no permanent residence as it is moving here and there through its abettors and facilitators. Pakistan’s objective to move towards enduring stability while consolidating the gains achieved by the previous military regimes is under constant threat. Militants through their sleeper cells want to reverse the gains. That is why the current phase is difficult and challenging one as compared to the physical phases.

Fifth generation warfare is very much present in Pakistan. The external forces are also busy in creating new challenges at social, political, economic, and ideological levels. Without choosing the physical option the anti-state forces are adopting non-physical elements to coerce Pakistan, which is in fact an ideal context of fifth generation warfare. It works in the social space and targets the minds of the people. Through technology these minds are polluted and used against the state. The same is very true for non-state actors like Daesh and ISIS that is polluting the minds and through efficient application of technology are using youth against the nations as a weapon. Pakistan has already identified the war and working out to deny the social space to the actors of fifth generation warfare. General Bajwa being the Commander in Chief is mitigating
this war that he has initiated under ‘Radd-ul-Fassad’. With an amalgamation of physical and non-physical domain of warfare, General Bajwa in his ongoing tenure has initiated the following military operations.

10.6.2. Military Campaigns of General Bajwa:

i. Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad: February 22, 2017 to Present
ii. Operation Khyber-IV: July 2017
iii. 5th Generation Warfare: An Evolving Assault against Pakistan

The next chapter “The Spectrum of Pakistan’s Military Response-An Evaluation” is dedicated to unfold Pakistan’s operational preparedness along with spectrum of military campaigns that it had launched against the foreign and local terrorists organizations operating on its soil. Starting from General Musharraf’s Operation Enduring Freedom (2001) to Operation Radd-ul-Fassad (2017) of General Bajwa, an effort has been done to expose the battle that in return cost lives of more than 35,000 heroes of Pakistan along with 48,000 seriously injured brave soldiers. The economic cost of around US $250 billion is also adamant when it comes to the price that people of Pakistan had paid to fight the war on terror. Moreover, in continuation to acknowledge General Bajwa’s contemporary contributions to install peace in the country the last section of the next chapter under ‘5th Generation Warfare’ will specifically highlight the efforts he made to install peace in Pakistan.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
THE SPECTRUM OF PAKISTAN’S MILITARY RESPONSE-AN EVALUATION

“And fight in the cause of ALLAH against those who fight against you, but do not transgress. Surely, ALLAH loves not the transgressors” (Quran, Chapter 2:191)

11.1. Introduction:

This chapter has addressed the question, ‘has Pakistan effectively applied military power for the achievement of sustainable political outcomes?’ To effectively evaluate Pakistan’s military doctrine and its preparedness, it is important to analyze military operations of Pakistan against the sub-conventional warfare. Moreover, an evaluation of Smith’s theoretical conclusion that “Western industrialized armies are ill-suited to the new style of warfare,” (Smith, 2008) entails a dedicated effort and highlights the very important answer to find out: Is Pakistan military ill-suited to the new style of warfare? The previous chapter summarized the major findings around Pakistani military generals and their awareness of the situation. It also elaborated the changing dynamics of warfare along with adopted approaches at different stages to mitigate the post-9/11 sub-conventional warfare theatre.

The resilience, sacrifices and valor of the soldiers finally brought changes into strategic thinking of the army who in 2013 adopted a new ‘doctrine on sub-conventional warfare’ into ‘Military Green Book’. Such shift of strategic and operational understanding of Pakistan army has very much negated the conclusions of Sir Rupert Smith, who acclaimed under theory of ‘utility of force’ that the Western industrialized military’s ill-suitability to fight sub-conventional warfare is due to their conventional doctrines, which dictates the intensive use of force in the battlefield. Pakistan because of its sub-conventional warfare doctrine is now out of Smith’s hypothetical conclusion but needs another round of analysis to expose its relevance with
Clausewitz ‘theory of military learning and change’ to answer the question; has Pakistan effectively applied military power for the achievement of sustainable political outcomes?

Therefore, holistic analysis and evaluation of Pakistan sub-conventional warfare doctrine would help us better understand its success or failure. Hence, the below mentioned sub-questions would require further enquiry to provide contextual answers to the main question, has Pakistan dealt with the threat of sub-conventional war effectively or the country is ill-suited to the new style of war? The questions that revolve around the spectrum of Pakistan’s military response are:

i. How many military operations Pakistan army has conducted in response to sub-conventional threats?
ii. When and why those military operations were conducted?
iii. What was the main objective and purpose behind those operations?
iv. How the application of military power in each of the operation was used to achieve particular aims?
v. What are their results in-terms of achievements or failures?

It is important to mention that in this chapter answer of the above questions are made part of the explanations given under each operation. Therefore, selection of each question with that of deliberate explanation is avoided to maintain the rhythm of events and their security environment.

Pakistan’s military response against the sub-conventional warfare had been resilient but also faced grave challenges. The experience of army to combat sub-conventional warfare could only be classified as success if the overall political objectives of Pakistan have been achieved in the aftermath of military operations. In other words, launching military operations do not serve the objectives as the purpose of use of force is always political in nature as Clausewitz said that “war is the continuation of politics (policy) by other means” (Gray, 2013). Therefore, it is
important to evaluate the primary question of the study; has Pakistan dealt with the threat of sub-conventional war effectively or the country is ill-suited to this new style of war? To do this, an analysis of the military operations of Pakistan is necessary to ensure the objectivity and enduring victory.

The enduring victory resides in the normalcy, writ of the government and above all – public support. Operational strategy must create following conditions to allow enduring notion of victory to take root:

a. Government forces are in physical control of the area and have monopoly over the use of force in the area.
b. Government or its delegated authority like JIRGA is the authority to make decisions on public matters.
c. Public services have been restored.
d. Terrorists appeal or coercion has been eliminated.
e. People avail government facilities that were targeted by terrorists; schools, medical facilities etc.
g. Faith of general public in writ of the state and the security forces restored.

The subsequent sections of this chapter will thoroughly debate and evaluate the military operations launched by Pakistan army. To analyze the pre and post operations situation ETSR (environment, time, space, and relative strength) model will be applied; whereas, to conclude success or failure of military operations in pursuit of political objectives, the above mentioned ‘notions of victory’ is seen as an appropriate model of evaluation. In the aftermath of 9/11 incident, Pakistan national security apparatus intercepted a direct threat from the emerging dynamics of terrorism. Therefore, based on the perceived nature of threats, Pakistan army has undertaken many military operations that include:
3. Operation Kalosha (March 2004)
4. Operation Sunrise (July 2007)
10. Operation Sher Dil (Lion Heart): September 2008
15. Operation Koh-e-Sufaid: July 2011 to August 2011
17. Operation Khyber-I: October 2014
18. Operation Khyber-II: February 2015
21. Operation Khyber-IV: July 2017
22. 5th Generation Warfare: An Evolving Assault against Pakistan
Starting from ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ of 2001 till ongoing Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, Pakistan army has conducted many operations in the tribal areas (specifically even agencies of FATA) that successfully removed the so-called label of ‘no go area’ from its tribal territory. Furthermore, in Swat (part of PATA in KPK province), the operations were not-at-all an easy job. The army was neither trained for this war nor has any experience to fight such a blurred enemy. Due to the situation on ground, Pakistan has no choice other than to get into it. The life and property of the people of Pakistan was in danger along with the very existence of the
state which was dangling at the mercy of terrorists. When the national security demanded sacrifices from the soldiers, the brave and strong men of Pakistan army responded to the call and approached the most dangerous region on earth, as proclaimed by the former US President Bush during an interview with ABC News, when he said that, “the tribal region along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is one of the most dangerous areas in the world today where Al Qaeda had established safe havens and was plotting attacks against the United States” (Dawn, 2008a).

Exceptionally unique in the history of warfare, Pakistan army officers and soldiers were about to learn fighting techniques during the ongoing military operations. There was no hierarchy of superior knowledge that dictated the art of war rather both the soldier and an officer stood shoulder to shoulder to decode the mantra of unconventional war imposed on Pakistan. The principles of war were also supposed to come at surface during the war. When the United States bombarded Afghanistan, they had not considered the fact that the terrorist would cross the border and enter into Pakistan where they will make permanent presence. The aftermath of the American bombing pushed terrorist into Pakistani tribal areas and a series of bomb explosions erupted at all major cities of the country. Though, in the first phase, operations continued from 2001 to 2006 but under a decisive campaign against the militancy, in 2007, Pakistan army had to envision a comprehensive military campaign which commenced from operations in Swat and started to push the terrorists out of valley. The first chapter of military operations was started in 2001 under ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ by the then Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf, who was also commanding the political clout of the country being the President of Pakistan.

Details of General Musharraf military campaigns along with subsequent military chiefs are explained in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

This was in fact Pakistani military efforts to compliment ongoing US military campaign in Afghanistan. The top US objectives were to dismantle the network of Al-Qaeda and overthrow the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Pakistan participated in the US led operation in two ways.

i. On one side Pakistan allowed its air and landing rights to US military and intelligence officers while dismantling the logistics and command network to Taliban and Al-Qaeda. It also cooperated on intelligence sphere with US and opened its routes for NATO supplies. Taliban were also denounced through discontinuing diplomatic ties with them (Kronstadt, 2003).

ii. On the other hand, Pakistan stretched its military presence on the routes used by terrorists to infiltrate and move freely between Pak-Afghan borders stretched over 2611 kilometers. This was done through deploying dedicated units from Army, ISI, FC, and SSG (Seth & Christine, 2010). At this level of cooperation, Pakistan army was conducting limited levels of operations to establish checks over free flow of cross-border infiltration of terrorists and to capture Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership with that of facilitating the ongoing US military campaign in Afghanistan.

During this time period, Pakistan Army spared two infantry brigades from its 9th Division from Peshawar based XI Corps to deal with internal security and border related military operations. For swift and quick deployment of troops, two rapid response units of Special Services Group (SSG) were raised from Kohan and Wana, which helped the military commanders carrying operation related to internal and border security (Seth & Christine, 2010). Furthermore, a contingent of around 4,000 FC troops was also carrying operations in FATA (Berntsen & Pezzullo, 2005). For example, in October 2001, Pakistan’s Frontier Corps in Bajaur agency’s area of Nawa Pass confronted with terrorists who were on their way to cross the border.
Moreover, in December to compliment the US operations in Tora Bora, Pakistan also deployed its forces in Khyber and Kurram agency to capture foreign militants including Al-Qaeda (Seth & Christine, 2010). When in March 2002 the US forces started it’s ‘Operation Ana-Conda’ in the Paktia Province of Afghanistan particularly in Shah-i-Kot Valley, Pakistan also raised its military presence in the adjoining North and South Waziristan agencies (Hastert, 2005). While imposing blockade to terrorists, in May 2002, the Tochi Scouts of Pakistan also engaged terrorists in Miranshah.

In June 2002 during an ongoing military assault under ‘Operation Kazha Punga’ of South Waziristan, Pakistan army along with FC and SSG engaged the Al-Qaeda commanders in Azam Warsak area. Moreover, in continuation of supplementing the US operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan army approached Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency along with Kurram Agency’s area of Parachinar (ICG, 2006). To extend its outreach to hiding terrorists, in August, alongside FATA, Pakistan army with its paramilitary troops conducted extensive military operations in Baluchistan. There is a long list of Pakistani military campaign which made possible for the US to overthrow the Taliban regime and break the back of Al-Qaeda command in Af-Pak region. The top Al-Qaeda commanders such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, and Abu Zubeida are few to mention which were captured by the Pakistani authorities and handed over to US.

Once the objectives of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ were achieved, the war shifted to Pakistan and General Musharraf was now ‘searching for a black cat in a dark room’. Though, he was projected as an international hero as chanted out by Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin and quoted by Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair in their publication Counterinsurgency in Pakistan. According to manuscript, Wendy said that “money was flowing into Pakistan. And
Pakistan was no longer a pariah state. The situation was euphoric. Musharraf was on the cover of every magazine and newspaper” (Seth & Christine, 2010). That was a time when Pakistan not only created political and economic space for the US led war but also compromised its own security to help achieve objectives of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. Over the period of two years, the complimentary military campaigns of Pakistan on its side almost isolated Al-Qaeda and Taliban.

The US was now relaxed from the burden of direct threat in Afghanistan. Though, the so-called disrupted terrorist organizations were uniting to seek revenge from Pakistan as they were convinced that it is Islamabad who has dismantled their network rather the US led coalition operating in Afghanistan. In this regard, the so-called ‘Fatwa’ of Ayman al-Zawahiri to assassinate General Musharraf highlights the clear example of Al-Qaeda frustration, which reflected their anger and vengeance of being defeated by successful military strategy of Pakistan. Now the terrorists and militants were after Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies, while forming a network of local and foreign affiliates. The US also started chasing the top leadership of Al-Qaeda and foreign militants in Pakistan. Pakistan was now sandwiched between friend and a foe. Sustaining its own national security and internal stability was the priority. On the one hand, the training of Pakistan army to fight a full-fledge irregular war was not appropriate and on the other hand, US increased demands to start full spectrum of operations against the infiltrated terrorists was creating annoyance to Pakistani military establishment. General Musharraf with clear manifestation of its national security and without compromising internal stability crafted strategy of ‘selective engagement’ and slowly but simultaneously approached seven agencies of FATA and troubled districts of PATA. This was a time when Operation Al-Mizan was initiated in 2002.
11.3. **Operation Al-Mizan (2002-2006):**

As mentioned earlier that the first phase of military operations continued from 2002 to 2006. During these operations, Pakistan lost between 1500 to 2000 brave soldiers of army (ARY News, 2017). One of the biggest reasons for such an enormous human loss was the methods and techniques of unconventional warfare applied by the terrorists that Pakistan army was unaware of. Also Pakistan army for the very first time entered in tribal areas that exposed its inability and vulnerability to mobilize the forces on rough terrain. Major General Waheed Arshad the then Pakistan army spokesperson in an interview with *AP News* explained the necessity of the operation as:

“The operation was launched in response to activities by the militants who have carried out lot of attacks against the security forces convoys, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and ambushes. The situation in Mir Ali was deteriorated because they started targeting the civilians also. So, there was necessity to ensure that the security is improved in that area and militants are flushed out. Pakistan carried out these operations and they have been intense because militants were well armed and well trained” (Associated Press, 2007).

After this operation ‘Shakai Peace Agreement’ of 2004 was signed with Nek Muhammad and time was gained to establish strong presence of Pakistan army in the area. The primary objective of ‘Operation Al-Mizan’ was to isolate and then capture the foreign militants operating in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The foreign militants have been causing great challenge to Pakistani government. Most of the operatives of foreign fighters were in the South Waziristan agency. Also, Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s fatwa for the assassination of General Musharraf had already counted him with quite a close encounters (Rashid, 2008). Pakistan was already receiving about US$2 billion per annum to outcast and conduct military operations against Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants (Cohen & Chollet, 2007). At the time of ‘Operation Al-Mizan’, between 70,000 to 80,000 troops of Pakistan army were deployed in the seven agencies of FATA, which included “two division headquarters, eight brigade headquarters, 20 infantry
battalions, six engineer battalions, one Special Services Group battalion, two signals battalions, and 39 Frontier Corps wings” (Seth & Christine, 2010). The army aviation along with artillery, logistics, and transportation units were used to support the operations and help deployment of forces at forward basis.

By mid 2003, the military along with government of Pakistan had been in consultations with the political administration of South Waziristan to identify native tribesmen who could be supporting and hiding the terrorists. As a result around 70 locals from the Ahmadzai Wazir Tribe were identified, who have been found to shelter and support the foreign militants operating from tribal areas (ICG, 2006). It was the political administration of South Waziristan that identified all 70 Wazir’s after having many meetings, consultations with the ‘Maliks’ and through rigorous intelligence backup. As a result, the first operation was conducted in the beginning of October 2003 (Abbasi, 2016). The operation was carried out in South Waziristan’s village of Baghar, where almost 2,500 soldiers took part to capture the militants (Seth & Christine, 2010). In this operation, Special Operation Taskforce and other army wings participated. After an intense fight, Pakistan army killed around 8 terrorists and 19 terrorists were captured including 8 foreign terrorists.

The overall security situation in South Waziristan was not stable as it was deteriorating day by day. The beginning of year 2004 saw rise in terrorist attacks and ambushes on military convoys and camps. For example, on January 8, 2004 when the army was conducting a similar operation like the one it conducted in October 2003, a convoy was ambushed on its way back. The same very night Pakistan military camp in Wana was also attacked through rockets. Terrorist’s encircled the camp and fired rockets from all dimensions. This continued for many coming nights and even one of the military posts like Shulama, which was established in the
west of Wana was also attacked by rockets (Khan, 2004a). The security situation worsened and Pakistan army has to start another action under ‘Operation Kalosha’.

11.4. Operation Kalosha (March 2004):

In continuation of the above security discourse, Pakistan army conducted second operation between 16 and 28 March 2004 in Kalosha village of Wana, South Waziristan (Khan, 2004b). Operation was started by the FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the Valley of Wana to takeout the Al-Qaeda terrorists operating from the area. In fact, by March intelligence agencies were receiving information about the presence of Al-Qaeda militants in the area. Also, during this time one convoy of FC was ambushed by the terrorists. Therefore, a rescue operation was launched, which thereafter entered into cordon and search operation. The operation almost took 13 days to cover the area of 36 square kilometers towards the west of Wana. Some of the prominent militants who were commanding different factions of terrorists included Nek Muhammad Wazir, Noor-ul-Islam, Maulvi Abbas, Maulvi Abdul Aziz, and Haji Muhammad Sharif. All these commanders were sheltering and supporting the foreign militants (Khan, 2004c).

The operation started around 06:30 in the morning on March 16, when FC surrounded fortifications of three commanders including Noor-ul-Islam, Nek Muhammad Wazir, and Haji Muhammad Sharif. These fortifications or fortresses were situated in the Kalosha village which was around 15 kilometers west of Wana. The operation faced enormous resistance from the terrorists and entered into complex and dangerous situation. To continue the operation, Pakistan army sent more troops along with Special Operation Taskforce. Air support was also made available to the troops and the task was achieved through efficient use of helicopters. Altogether, 7,000 troops from army and FC along with dozen Cobra helicopters and PAF fighter jets took part in the operation. In this operation around 64 soldiers rendered their lives and 58 were
wounded. Around 63 terrorists were killed among them 36 were foreigners. In this operation, Pakistan army completely destroyed the command and communication network of the terrorists.

By June 2004, Pakistani intelligence agencies and US intelligence reports have indicated that around 200 foreign fighters including Arabs, Uzbeks, and Chechens were gathering in the Shakai Valley of South Waziristan. The reports also suggested that hundreds of local militants were also present. Therefore, third operation was conducted on June 10, 2004 in the Shakai Valley. This was a massive military operation. In this operation around 10,000 Pakistani military personnel belonging to FC and Special Operation Task Forces participated. The fighter jets of Pakistan Air Force also participated in the operation. Tanks and gunship helicopters were used to endorse the fire power in the operation (Seth & Christine, 2010). In the operation around 4 soldiers laid their life and 12 got serious injuries. On the other hand more than 50 terrorists were killed. Related to this operation, military also claimed that all the safe heavens of terrorists were destroyed (Dawn, 2004).

The overall military campaign under ‘Operation Al-Mizan’ continued to deny the space during spring and fall of 2004, which was finally concluded through agreements signed with Ahmadzai-wazir Tribe in November 2004 and Sararogha Agreement with Mehsud Tribe in February 2005 (Gunaratna & Nielsen, 2008). Thereafter, small scale military operations and precision strikes continued against the terrorist hideouts. For example, some of the precision strikes which were conducted in 2004 and 2005 included “attacks in the Madakhel Wazir area of North Waziristan in March 2004, Dhog village near Wana in June 2004, the Lawara Mandi area of North Waziristan in July 2004, and Asoray village in North Waziristan in December 2005 (which killed Hamza Rabia, a senior Al-Qaeda operative)” (Seth & Christine, 2010).
Pakistan military campaign under ‘Operation Al-Mizan’ was not to hold the territory rather it showed intermittent engagement with the terrorists. The so-called peace deals to disconnect Pakistani tribesmen from supporting and sheltering foreign militants were falling apart. Foreign militants and terrorists hijacked the tribesmen and started violating the consented commitment. Moreover, the religious factor of Pakistani politics started labeling the ongoing military operations against Al-Qaeda and other militants as an ‘American War’ rather an effort to install peace and security in Pakistan. The religious interplay of militancy got impetus in the aftermath of ‘Operation Sunrise’ which was conducted in one of Islamabad’s famous mosque, the ‘Lal Masjid’ (Red Mosque).

11.5. **Operation Sunrise (July 2007):**

The overall enigma of terror stretched its mussels from unruly terrain to settled territory of Pakistan. Irony of the fact was that it was not any other territory but the capital territory of Pakistan, Islamabad. Terrorist were able to infiltrate into one of prominent mosques known as ‘Lal Masjid’ (Red Mosque) and its associated girls Madrassa (Jamia Hafsa). Terrorists tried to expand their writ in the associated area of Islamabad which was the elite and the first ever sector developed in the vicinity of Capital territory. Madrassa students while holding sticks in their hand move around in the markets and tell shoppers to close the business of music, videos, etc. General Musharraf was aware of the ongoing situation in Lal Masjid, which he wanted to resolve through political means. He sent many of his senior political stalwarts to dialogue with the religious cleric of Lal Masjid, which ended into opposite to ‘zero-sum-game’. During process of dialogue, the Madrassa students (who were guided by hardcore militants hiding inside the Lal Masjid) have captured police officers and created fear among the locals.
Notwithstanding the writ of capital territory, they even kidnapped Chinese workers and took them back to the Madrassa (Dawn, 2007a). The militants put on fire the adjacent building of Environment Ministry and encountered with Pakistan Rangers deployed to secure the building. That was a time when General Musharraf decided to respond through use of military force and ‘Operation Sunrise’ commenced on July 03, 2007. The operation was completed on July 11, 2007. The media unofficially called it ‘Operation Silence’, which was in fact officially coded as ‘Operation Sunrise’ (Dawn, 2007b). Terrorists mobilized the outrage of ‘Operation Sunrise’ against Pakistan army and took refuge under the mantra of revenge while exploiting the students who were rescued by military. Anger and avenge was converted into revenge and a new wave of suicide bombing along with terrorists attacks got impetus. Though, the whole of Pakistan was now under threat but the immediate impact occurred in the tribal belt and PATA region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. As a result, Pakistan army launched its full spectrum military outrage against the safe heavens of terrorists and the first phase of ‘Operation Rah-e-Haq’ commenced in ‘Swat Valley and Shangla District’.


Table 11.1: Operation Rah-e-Haq-1: Operational Command and Force Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Command and Force Structure</th>
<th>Main Militant Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Major General Nasser Janjua</td>
<td>Maulana Fazlullah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Zahir Ali Khan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontier Corps (FC), Pakistan army 10th Infantry Division, 12th Regular Army Regiment, No. 20 Squadron Eagles of Pakistan Air Force, and Police Service Forces took part in the operation</td>
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With having objectives to install peace in the region, Pakistan army started its first formal military operation in the serene and most beautiful part of Pakistan, the Swat district where Mullah Fazalullah terrorized the area. Fazalullah isolated Swat from the mainstream Pakistan
and created an environment of fear and tyranny. Malakand Division posed immediate challenges for the security forces, where the heavenly tourist destination was infiltrated by the Taliban under Suffi Mohammad’s Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). Therefore, security forces approached the heavenly terrain of its country. The tourist destination was now under siege of Sufi Mohammad and his son-in-law Maulvi Fazlullah. They have taken a violent path to impose Sharia Law in the region. To control the situation, army had to approach the region and establish its writ. Therefore, a sequence of military operations was launched under Operation Rah-e-Haq. The first phase of the operation was launched in October 2007.

The Sufi led Fazlullah outrage in Swat was preventing the women to go to school. Death penalty was announced for the barbers including shop owners doing business of music and movies. Even the local population was strongly forbidden to go for polio vaccination. Taliban had their own governors controlling the areas of Khawazkhela, Matta and Tehsil Kabal. To get the situation under control, Pakistan army on October 24, 2007 deployed around 3,000 infantry soldiers on the tops of mountains. On the very next day a suicide bomber hit the FC truck and killed almost 30 people including 17 soldiers and 13 civilians. Thereafter, a reciprocal war started between Taliban and Pakistan army attacking each other’s posts and hideouts. This in fact benefited the Taliban who not only overstretched their position in Swat but also established their control over adjoining Shangla district.

The stalemate continued until the next month, when on November 12, 2007 about 5,000 troops of the 12th Regular Army reinforced the already 15,000 infantry, FC and police troopers trying to hold the ground. Now military was not only looking to rescue Swat district but the situation in Shangla district altogether trapped their attention. Hence, two prong
military campaigns were launched simultaneously to hold Swat and take back Shangla. The efficient use of artillery and the fear of Pakistani soldiers pushed the Taliban back to hill tops, which resulted heavy loss for the militants. By November 27, security forces of Pakistan reclaimed Shangla and captured most of the hill tops (Khan, 2007).

This success though significant but still wanted another round of hellfire on Taliban in few of the remaining pockets of Swat such as Matta, Chabagh, and Khwazakhela. The forces sought strategic benefit in focusing on the native town of Maulana Fazlullah, Imam Dehri. In an effort to secure Imam Dehri, military also marched towards Kuza Banda, Bara Banda and Nigwalai (Dawn, 2007c). Most of the militants find shelter in running and fled to nearby areas. Security forces in the meantime got control over the peaks of Kabal district too and consolidated its recent gains (Morris, 2007).

By November 28, 2007 militants were exhausted and failed to face Pakistan army. All the government buildings were evacuated and police resumed their normal operations. The FM radio channels to outcry Pakistan army were taken into control and the ones who once provoked anarchy and chaos were now hiding behind the woods (PPF, 2007). In the meanwhile Pakistan had also taken control over Imam Dehri, the village of Maulana Fazlullah where he had established his command and control structure in a seminary (Dawn, 2007d). Also on November 28, 2007 General Musharaf resigned as Army Chief and took oath to resume the charge of President of Pakistan as a civilian leader. General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani took the charge of Army Chief and continued the command of the ongoing operation in Swat and Shangla. By December 08, 2007, Swat was under control of Pakistan army (BBC, 2007). Mullah Fazalullah ran towards Peochar ranges of Swat and disappeared. Peochar became the highest battlefield when Pakistan army sent its Superior Services Group (SSG) commandos to
track his whereabouts. TTP was wiped out from the valley. Due to successful military operation of ‘Rah-e-Haq’, Fazaullah lost his control over Swat and was defeated at his strong hold in Matta.

The escape of Mualana Fazalullah along with defeat of its militant wing of TTP, allowed Pakistan to establish its strong foothold in the region. In 2008, General Elections were conducted in Pakistan. In Centre, Pakistan People Party formed the government and subsequently pressurized General Musharraf for his impeachment, who as a result agreed to step down from the presidency on August 18, 2008. Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarians (PPP) became President of Pakistan. Awami National Party (ANP) formed the government in NWFP, which opened dialogue and talks with the tribal elders along with willing factions of Taliban.

The pace of the military operation in Swat slowed due to political changes happening in Islamabad and Peshawar. This also allowed the militants to regroup who later on reasserted and exploited the dialogue process with the provincial government of NWFP. Fazullah who was running amok from Pakistani SSG commandos came back with greater force along with Sufi Mohammad who proclaimed a new wave of ‘Tehreek-e-Nifaze-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)’. To establish their outrage, militants destroyed eleven schools (Roggio, 2008a) and burned a tourist resort of Mallam-Jabba in Swat (Dawn, 2008b). The writ that army established earlier through military operation was now reversed mainly due to less interest of the government to show force and to continue the military operation in the region. Parallel to ongoing developments in Swat region, South Waziristan was getting into chaos mainly due to TTP faction of Baitullah Mehsud. Therefore, ‘Operation Zalzala’ was enunciated in South Waziristan against Baitullah Mehsud in January 2008.
11.7. Operation Zalzala (Earthquake), Spinkai South Waziristan Agency FATA (January 24, 2008—May 20, 2008):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Command and Force Structure</th>
<th>Main Militant Group</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Major General Tariq Khan: General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 14th Infantry Division</td>
<td>• Baitullah Mehsud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Brigadier-General Ali Abbas: Officer Commanding of 20th Mountaineering Division</td>
<td>• Qari Hussain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lashkar-e-Islam</td>
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In this operation the 14th Infantry Division which was mobilized by General Musharraf from Okara to Peshawar to become part of XI Corps took part and was complemented by 20th Mountaineering Brigade. 9th Army Aviation Squadron Cobra helicopters, Al-Zarrar and Al-Khalid tanks took part in the operation.

Operation Zalzala was started in January 2008 against the TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud and his militants in South Waziristan. This was the first military operation in the area spread between Jendola to Kotkai area covering 28 kilometers. As a result of this operation majority of the South Waziristan agency was cleared. In July 2008, an operation was started against Laskar-e-Islam outfit. The operation was initiated in Khyber Agency and more specifically in Barra Tehsil with the objective of checking the growing trends of sectarian violence and criminal acts. The military action was called ‘Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqueem’.


In the aftermath of ‘Operation Zalzala’ conducted in South Waziristan Agency, which successfully isolated the Baitullah Mehsud group, Pakistan Army approached the Khyber Agency. Khyber Agency had become hub of sectarian violence where Brelvi and Deopandi school of thoughts were at the cross roads of perpetuate conflict. The two prominent groups were recognized as Ansar-ul-Islam from the Brelvi school of thought and Lashkar-e-Islami representing the Deopandi school of thought. In fact, the agency got into religious militancy when in 2003; one of its residents Haji Namdar successfully established its own organization
named ‘Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,’ which was not affiliated with TTP but almost replica of it in-terms of its working. Haji Namdar made the Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency its strategic outpost to attack the US/ISAF forces in Afghanistan. This made him quite popular among the militants, who immediately joined his command.

Along with Haji Namdar’s self-styled rule, there emerged Mangal Bagh Afridi of Lashkar-e-Islam who has over the period of time established prisons and his own Sharia courts. Through his FM channels, he regularly passes orders to fight against the state of Pakistan, the Western troops in Afghanistan and against the religious minorities and sectarian segments. Just like Namdar, he also continued his disassociation with TTP. Though, he formed his own group named as ‘Maqami Tehreek-e-Taliban’ (Local Talibain Movement). During this time, the Hakeemullah-led TTP group was also marching towards Khyber Agency and had established its strong presence in the area. It is believed that ‘Hakeemullah group’ entered into the area in the aftermath of Haji Namdar’s death, when in August 2008 he was shot dead during a meeting at his office in Bara town of Khyber Agency (Wazir, 2008).

With all these developments happening in Khyber Agency, there were two other incidents which triggered and initiated the ‘Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem’. For example, on June 21, 2008 militants of Mangal Bagh group had abducted 16 Christians in Peshawar along with kidnapping of 6 women on charges of human trafficking (Siddique, 2008). On June 28, 2008, Pakistan Army’s 40th Infantry Division launched aggressive campaign against the Lashkar-e-Islam and its competitor Ansarul Islam.

‘Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem’ successfully liberated the Bara District from the strongholds of militants and allowed the Army to negotiate a deal with the two rival groups in July 2008. Though, the deal was short lived and within a year it collapsed.

On the request of the provincial government, ‘Operation Zarb-e-Kaleem’ was launched in Hangu District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on July 14, 2008 (Dawn, 2008c). The situation in Hangu was deteriorating as militants of Baitullah Mehsud group had attacked an old British era Shnawaray Fort at Zargari and captured FC soldiers. About 25 soldiers were posted at the fort and in condition to surrender; Taliban offered them a safe passage. After the surrender of FC soldiers, the militants entered the fort and burnt it. Even the presence of Pakistani troops in the area with that of heavy artillery could not deter the militants to attack on the fort. Fifteen of the FC soldiers were later on killed in an ambush in Dorai near Zargari, which created anger at the GHQ. In another event, when Hangu police captured seven militants included close aide of Baitullah Mehsud, militants on July 09, 2008 had surrounded the police station in Doaba. Taliban militants have already kidnapped 29 officials and were threatening the provincial government to withdraw military from Hangu otherwise they would kill them all (Hindustan Times, 2008a).

Under such circumstances, to settle down the situation and to bring peace, a jirga comprised of political representatives from ‘Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam Fazalurehman group (JUI-F)’, local elders and clerics of pro-Taliban voices had been formed to convince the Orakzai Agency based Taliban commanders to agree to ceasefire (The News, 2008). Military due to brutal tactics of Taliban were not in a position to end up ceasefire situation rather preferred to outcast their presence once for all. Therefore, Pakistan Army started a week long military operation in Hangu district and flushed out the militants. Referring to the success of military operation, the ISPR stated that “security forces have achieved the desired objectives” (Dawn, 2008c).
In the operation, Pakistan army deployed its 1500 soldiers equipped with massive artillery and backed up by the gunship helicopters and tanks (Hindustan Times, 2008a). As a result of the operation, Pakistan army established its writ in the area and got back the control of police stations along with government property. Gunship helicopters were used that shelled the hills of Tora Waria and Zargari. About 20 militants died in the operation, whereas 30 were arrested. Militant’s hideouts in areas such as Zargari, Neryab and Doaba were destroyed. Parallel to South Waziristan and Hangu District campaign, army was already stuck in the Swat Valley which earlier on had launched the first phase of ‘Operation Rah-e-Haq’. Due to political changes both at the Center and in KPK province, a dialogue process was initiated to get back the Swat based militants into political process. This put halt on the operation and military had to go back to barracks. Though, militants used the process as a tool to regroup and situation in the region was worsened. Thereafter, on request of the Federal and Provincial governments, military launched the second phase of ‘Operation Rah-e-Haq’ in 2008.

11.10. ‘Operation Rah-e-Haq-II’ (Ture Path), Swat Valley, KPK: July 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Command and Force Structure</th>
<th>Main Militant Groups</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Air Chief Marshal Rao Suleman</td>
<td>• Maulana Fazlullah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Air Marshal Hifazat Khan</td>
<td>• Abu Saeed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Luetinent General Masood Aslam</td>
<td>• Misbah-ud-Din</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Major General Haroon Aslam</td>
<td>• Sultan Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Major General Sajjad Ghani</td>
<td>• Shah Dauran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Brig. Muhammad Habib-ur-Rehman</td>
<td>• Maulana Shahid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Qari Quraish</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Naseeb Rehman</td>
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<td>• Muslim Khan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Sher Muhammad Qusab</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Abu Faraj</td>
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</tbody>
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In this operation, Frontier Corps (FC), Pakistan Army 19th Infantry Division, Special Services Group (SSG), Airborne Division (No. 11th...
The new civil government that came into office in the aftermath of 2008 General Elections tried to bring back the militants but failed and was sabotaged by the TTP tactics to get more strength. This was a time when political intermingling with ongoing military campaign had given enough space to militants in the area. Though, security forces have had strong foothold in the Swat Valley but in few areas militants were still able to feed Sharia Law dictum to local people particularly in areas such as Sar Banda and Wainai. As a result of expanding influence of the terrorists in the area, the Federal government with consultation of provincial administration officially tasked the army to launch military operation to curtail the growing influence of terrorists.

Therefore, in July 2008 second phase of ‘Operation Rah-e-Haq’ was started. According to Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair who in their publication, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan wrote that “Pakistan utilized a range of forces, including two division headquarters, five brigades, 17 infantry battalions, five artillery regiments, and aviation assets (including Mi-17s, Bell 412s, and Cobra helicopters” (Jones & Fair, 2010: 66). Due to this operation, Swat was cleaned from the terrorists and TNSM leader Sufi Muhammad was captured by the law enforcement agencies, whereas Mullah Fazaullah ran into Peochar valley.

Immediately after this operation Taliban faction led by Faqir Muhammad got attention of Pakistan military that have been creating havoc in the Bjaur Agency. As a result of approaching Bjaur Agency, ‘Operation Sher Dil’ (Lions Heart) was started.
11.11. Operation Sher Dil (Lion Heart), Bajaur Agency FATA: September 2008

Table 11.4: Operation Sher Dil: Operational Command and Force Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Command and Force Structure</th>
<th>Main Militant Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Maj Gen. Tariq Khan: Inspector General of the Frontier Corps</td>
<td>• Al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Brig. Abid Mumtaz: Officer Commanding of Operation Sherdil</td>
<td>• TTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Brig. Zafar-Ul-Haq: Replaced Brig Abid Mumtaz on 24 February 2010</td>
<td>• TNSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Col Nauman Saeed: Operations Commander</td>
<td>• Faqir Muhammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions Commanders: Lt Col Baloch, Lt Col Munawar, Lt Col Anjum Saleem, Lt Col Nadir Khan, Lt Col Rashid, Lt Col Asad, Lt Col Ali, Lt Col Amjad</td>
<td>• Abu Saeed Al-Masri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around 8,000 to 15,000 troops from the Frontier Corps and 26th Infantry Brigade of the Army were deployed which were backed by Tanks, Cobra helicopters, and Pakistan Air Force F-16s</td>
<td>• Around 4,000 militants were in the area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After clearing South Waziristan, Hangu and its associated areas, now security forces approached Bajaur agency of FATA, where Faqir Muhammad and Zia-ur-Rehman were helping the Al-Qaeda network. It is also recorded that to isolate different factions of militants, Pakistan army broke a covert peace deal with Faqir Muhammad. Under the deal Faqir Muhammad halted its activities against military and civilian installations, whereas security forces promised not to implicate him.

In September 2008, Operation Sherdil was launched in Bajaur Agency and until December Pakistan army killed around 1000 terrorists in the combat (Dawn, 2008d). Bajour was prepared with tunnels and roads were dominated by the terrorists. During the operation when military reached the area of Loyesam, TTP terrorists surrounded the army Brigade (Roggio, 2008b). The news was spread by the terrorists that a Brigade of Pakistan army has been encircled. Pakistan army took advantage of the situation and developed a firm base in the area under encirclement. Taking the opportunity from inability of the terrorists to target the tanks as they don’t possess anti-tank weapons, Pakistan army used tanks to provide logistics and food
supplies to the encircled Brigade. During logistics support, a tank malfunctioned and abandoned by the army. The same tank was burned by the terrorists and in the media footage was shown. During this process terrorist from other parts of the tribal region started to enforce the terrorists to squeeze the already encircled Brigade. Army was closely observing all these developments, when saturated called upon the F-16 fighter plans with 2000 tones non-nuclear strategic bomb to carpet the area. Before bombardment requested, Brigade was told to stretch inward about one kilometer. That was the end of it. The entire terrorist team was saturated in the area and due to aerial bombing, situation of ambush siege was over and the Brigade was relieved. The whole situation lasted for about fifteen days and once finished the operation restarted.

11.11.1. **Militant Presence in Bajure Agency before Operation ‘Sherdil’:**

Bajure campaign started in September 8, 2008 which became one of the most difficult operations for the Pakistan Army due to the fact that there were no active operations going on in FATA. It was an isolated operation that united the terrorists operating in FATA against Pakistan army. Also Bajure is significant due to its border connected with Afghanistan. Due to its border with Afghanistan, Bajure became an important epicenter for the terrorists and played a pivot role for operational maneuvers of the terrorists operating in FATA. For example, Loe-Sam was an area connected to the main central city Khar of Bajure, became the pivot place from where the terrorists can spin around. While stationing themselves at Loe-Sam, the terrorists could easily control Muhammad Agency toward its South, the Malakand on its East, and on the North they can influence Dir and Chitral districts of Malakand Division. This strategic position of Bajure Agency made it valuable for the terrorists. So, whosoever controlled the Bajure Agency, in fact he was the one that could easily extend its influence towards three directions. That is why; it became critical for the Pakistan army to clear Bajure.
Bajure was the first operation of the General Kiyani’s military campaign. During that time the sub-conventional techniques of the Pakistan army were not refined neither equipped with necessary training to outcast the terrorists. How to fight with the terrorists became one of the biggest gaps in the operational readiness of Pakistan army that it filled while continuous fight with the terrorists. That is why it almost took one month for the Pakistan army to clear the area of Loe-Sam. Initially for the first seventeen (17) days, Pakistan army was almost disconnected from other parts of Bajure. The terrorists surrounded the army from all dimensions even the logistics support was provided through helicopters and tanks. Due to which Pakistan army started an outward operation from Loe-Sam to clear other parts of Bajure Agency.

When Pakistan army was heading from Kahr to Loe-Sam, the battlefield scenery resembled like the Second World War. The tanks and water bezels were burned and destroyed. The terrorists have dug tunnels deep in the ground and from small holes made beside the roads they fire on Pakistan army while maintaining safe distance. Furthermore, they have laced the area with explosive devices to resist the military movement. The credit goes to Major General Tariq Khan who used the tanks against the strong holds of terrorists at such a height. Knowing the fact that tanks are unable to maneuver at this height due to terrain restrictions using them was an out of the box strategy. In fact, the idea was to use the fire power of the tanks that proved exceptionally brilliant idea to destroy the strong hideouts. The tanks were used for the very first time and proved so successful which continued its deployment until Khyber operations. Involvement of tanks upgraded the battlefield firepower into favor of Pakistan army and ruined the aspirations of terrorist’s along with their ambitions to challenge the writ of the state.

Originally, the security arrangement in KPK and FATA were done through Frontier Corps (FC). The FC also controls the adjoining areas connected with Afghanistan border and
perform an anti-smuggling force. From 2001 to 2018, FC has traveled a long way to fight the war against terrorism that inevitably turned the force as an exceptional battle hardened wing of Pakistan army. During this time it achieved landmark improvements in its capacity building, capability enhancement, equipment and weaponry up-gradation, training and response potential. These are in fact considered the biggest learning that an army extracts from the combat experience. FC is equipped with exceptional combat experience. That is why the FC of 2019 is far better than the FC of 2001. Moreover, due to its combat experience, FC is now equally well trained and well equipped just like the other Corps Pakistan army.

11.11.2. **Battle for Bajure: Operation Sherdil**

When Major General Tariq Khan took charge of Frontier Corps (FC), he was told by the FC officers that the situation in Bajure is so grave and in Loe-Sam terrorists have cut nose and ears of few of the FC soldiers. He was further briefed by Col. Noaman (the commanding officer) that people have taken guns against the FC and they fire directly on them. Even the Khar Fort was under terrorists control, the entire road network was cut and in real perspective there was no writ of the government. An Afghan commander was controlling the whole Bajure. He was managing the administrative and economic affairs of Bajure including collection of tax and revenue.

Major General Tariq Khan as commanding officer was assigned a brigade from Dir to open the road network. He planned the operation with Brig. Noaman and commanded the operation to open the road network. The operation went successful and the road network was opened by the 63rd FF Battilion. After that Pakistan army was able to easily mobilize its forces. Though, it had fought an extensive war to clear the whole agency. The operations were carried
out on the infantry slogans of ‘close width and destroy through skillful fire power and maneuver’.

Bajure was prepared with tunnels and roads were dominated by the terrorists. During the operation at one stage General Tariq and General Farooq got ambushed just outside Loe-Sam area and were rescued by the helicopter. Brig. Abid Mumtaz (Brigade Commander) was then supported by the helicopter and ambush was neutralized. The use of tanks not only disallowed the terrorists to outbreak operational plan of Pakistan army but also they failed to counter them. The weapons terrorist possess cannot stop the tanks due to which military started using tanks to destroy their hideouts along with supplying food to soldiers from the base. During the extensive operational use of tanks in the Bajure one tank went off due to mechanical problem which was latter burned by the terrorists and propagated in the international media. According to Major General Tariq Khan, the pictures of the burned tank allowed rumors to take off in surrounding areas that terrorists have engaged Army Brigade in the area. Listening out such rumors many more terrorists flushed into the war to join the radicals. This was closely watched out by the army and used as a strategy against the terrorists.

Army Aviation played a very daring role in the operation knowing the fact their flight could be one sided mission. Their air support proved crucial and decisive in the operation. Pakistan army movement faced extensive challenges due to IEDs installed on roads and even at residential places such as houses. Terrorists have also placed chained IEDs around tunnels and areas where they have hidden weapons. The traps and trip wires were closely placed to walking steps. When Pakistan army went inside to clear and sanitize the places from IEDs, they have learned many brutal ways of IEDs camouflage. Due to which dedicated ‘standard operating procedures’ were adopted and rigorous care was considered towards IEDs clearance and
sanitization. The IED clearance setup was named as SEEDO (or SEETO). Soldiers were properly trained based on the combat learning. Extensive training support was received from the United Kingdom. Today, Pakistan is in a much better shape and holds a dedicated well trained and well equipped Brigade that deals with IEDs neutralization, clearance and sanitization.

When we look at the geographical landscape and its implications, one could easily understand how important Bajure is though it’s the smallest agency itself. Along with TTP the groups like Al-Qaida managed to get strong holds in this area. There was a mountain top called ‘Mullah Syed’ that housed the Al-Qaeda headquarters. The same very peaks or the sky land connects itself and goes into Afghanistan. This was the connection between terrorists operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The ‘Mullah Syed’ ridge, the geography, the landscape and the people including foreigners who were Egyptians, Sudanese, Africans and Afghans; were all getting into this area and creating all kinds of problems. But what actually happening out there was that they were developing this into kind of a defended area where they designed 156 caves to a defensive complex. This landmark defense was not the only area that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have managed to develop. There were other areas of Bajure such as Nawa-Gae, Loe-Sam, and places ahead of them that Pakistan army retrieved from the strongholds of terrorists altogether has similar stories to be told. Area surrounding ‘Mullah Syed’ was just one place that took years to develop such defended complex; these were not developed over nightly.

Developments of such defense complexes that were militarily well thought had not happened in a day or two rather terrorists were developing and preparing for the training camps and tunnels for about 5 to 7 years before the time ‘Operation Sherdil’ commenced. The instruments of battlefield were developed so clandestinely that sometime without knowing
military walks over them and get ambushed from the back. After the successful operation, the question arises, what Pakistan had dismantled in operation Sherdil?

Pakistan successfully dismantled the connectivity between Bajure and Afghanistan, which was being fueled by the ‘Khan of Kunnar’. Pakistan military officials repeatedly mentioned about the Khan of Kunnar’s support to the militants. Even he had come publically on FM radio to IDP camps that actually were converted to training camps for the militants, have established between the tactic belt of River Kunnar and watershed. Khan of Kunnar supported these people monetarily, has given expertise, funneled in resources and weapons along the ‘Mullah Syed’ ridge. And since this ridge was held by those people who were militants and getting support from terrorists like Faqir Muhammad. This all networking of Khan of Kunnar along with Faqir Muhammad were dismantled through the operation. Faqir Muhammad was the representative of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). There was Al-Qaida which was also dismantled. Terrorists miserably failed to exists in the wake of ‘Operation Sherdil’ and the connectivity which they established with Afghanistan was also dismantled. In fact, this was the reason why these terrorists were able to push themselves from Bajure to other agencies.


After the successful military operation in Bajaur, security forces now turned to Mohmand Agency. The agency saw violence back in July 2007, when militants took over a Turangzai Sahib Mosque situated in Lakaro (Roul, 2011). The mosque was colored in red to resemble the ‘Lal Masjid’ (Red Mosque) of Islamabad, where in the same month General Musharraf had conducted ‘Operation Sunrise’. To maintain peace in the agency and to denounce space to militants, Pakistan army inked peace deals with the tribal elders. Under the deals, tribal elders promised to isolate the militants and foreign fighters to operate in the
agency. The deals were short lived as due to an ongoing operation in Bajaur, militants escaped and took refuge in Mohmand Agency. The deals were not fulfilled and thereafter Mohmand Agency became sanctuary to fleeing militants. Pakistan army has to reassert and resume the military operations in the agency to deny strong footings for the militants. The active campaign of military operation was launched on October 24, 2008 (Dawn, 2008e). By March 2009, the operation in Mohmand Agency was completed and writ of the state was established in the area.


In continuation to the ongoing efforts of the military to install permanent peace in Malakand Division which included Swat district and many others, third phase of the ‘Operation Rah-e-Haq’ was launched in January 2009. This time the operation focused to consolidate the already made successes in Swat district and sustaining the supply lines. The operation was supported by the FC with four of its infantry brigades. Until the last week of January, militants received heavy aerial and artillery bombing. Mingora city, the head-quarter of Swat district, was regained by the forces and even the last of the militant was thrown out of Swat. By February 2009, Sufi Muhammad the chief of ‘Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)’ was released and under the patronage of ANP led provincial government signed a peace agreement. This promulgated the ‘Malakand Peace Accord’ as the then Prime Minister of Pakistan Yousaf Raza Gillani reiterated that “Nizam-e-Adl Regulation in Malakand was a step in the right direction” (Dawn, 2009). The confidence of the provincial government that the deal would bring peace and tranquility in the region was less lived as Taliban did not respect the accord and continuously worked to expand their influence. While remaining within the ambit of ‘Malakand
Peace Accord,’ they have captured the surrounding areas such as Swat, Buner, Mingora, and Shangla.

By the time PATA region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province of Pakistan was also bombarded with Taliban’s. Swat being the most beautiful district of Malakand Division of KP Pakistan had been called a heaven on earth was now infiltrated with militants who just like the FATA militants were mesmerizing the locals with ‘Marx’s opium’. The influence and outreach of the militants was now knocking the doors as *The New York Times* titled an article “60 Miles From Islamabad” (The New York Times, 2009).

An operation was launched on April 28, 2009 to push back the Taliban from the District of Lower Dir of Malakand Division. The operation was heavily supported by Pakistan Air Force fighter jets and Pakistan Army Cobra helicopters (Anthony, 2009). During the same time army had been politically clutched as the then Central government of PPPP and Provincial government of ANP were in talks with the Swat based Taliban faction to reach out an agreement to lay down their weapons in return of fulfilling the demands of ‘Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)’. Even the implementation of Islamic rule under ‘Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation (SNAR)’ failed to restrict the militant’s to Malakand Division. Taliban started flooding into surrounding regions (Shah, 2009).

In May 2009, Taliban attacked on a military convoy passing through the Swat valley that formally struck off the February 2009 ‘Malakand Peace Accord’ with them (Wilkinson, 2009a). With such an emerging situation, the provincial government requested to the Central government to officially task the army to start decisive military operation against the notorious Taliban’s who have only misused the spirit of peace agreements. This came as ‘blessing in disguise’ and General Kiyani finally jumped into fire with all his zeal and zest vested in his generalship.
Thereafter, in May 2009, a decisive military counterinsurgency campaign was launched in Swat, which brought full blow in the military operation under ‘Rah-e-Rast’ and gained upper hand over the militants in Swat (Wilkinson, 2009b). In the aftermath of ‘Operation Rah-e-Rast,’ General Kiyani extended the military campaign to South Waziristan in October 2009.

11.14. Why Pakistan Army has to conduct three phases of ‘Operation Rah-e-Haq’?

Swat was different to the tribal belt of FATA. Though the region falls into PATA area but in terms of its development, socio-economic status with that of tourism potential; Swat has enjoyed a unique position in Pakistan. The ongoing US war in Afghanistan has also impacted on the socio-political dynamics of this region that was amicably exploited by local militant mindset. Mulana Fazalullah, the famous ‘Mullah Radio’, who through his FM Radio slowly and steadily started brain washing the locals. Furthermore, his father in law, Maulana Sufi Mohammad was an old proponent of implementation of Islamic Law in the area which he was exercising through his banned organization ‘Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). In 2002 TNSM was banned by General Pervez Musharraf and Maulana Sufi was arrested. Though, in his absence his ‘son in law’ Mullah Fazalullah continued the narrative.

The confusion on war on terror along with love for Islam unfortunately mesmerized locals with their ability to distinguish between good and bad. It is important to highlight that there were few hundred locals in the whole region which embraced the militant ideology. Almost, 99.9 percent population remained intact with Pakistan and continued negating negative propaganda of the militants. It was the factor of violence by militants which altogether changed the socio-political dynamics and allowed Taliban factions to infiltrate in the area. Furthermore, terrorist’s ability to exploit religious love of the locals allowed them to sustain. Local politicians also became hostage to mesmerizing slogans of militants which brought complications for the
political will to initiate decisive military operations. It is important to remind that during the time of General Musharaf particularly until General Elections of 2008, the ‘North West Frontier Province (NWFP)’ province along with PATA was governed by the then religious party ‘Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)’. It is not difficult to summarize the whole environment of NWFP, PATA and FATA from 2003 to 2008; which due to the rule of religiously conservative party was almost enjoying ‘Marx’s opium’. Due to deteriorating security situation, time and again different pacts were signed to disallow the presence of foreign militants but no concrete results were achieved. In October 2007, ‘Operation Rah-e-Haq’ was started in the aftermath of all these developments.

Assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 and the February 2008 General Elections brought a new political class both at the Center and Provincial assemblies. Musharraf was no more army chief and chief executive of the country. His political authority in the Center was replaced by Benazir Bhutto’s party (PPP) and the army command was now vested in General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani. The so-called MMA was also no more ruling the NWFP, which was now replaced by more moderate and liberal faction, the ‘Awami National Party (ANP).

Immediately, after swapping the political authority, the NWFP government under ‘Awami National Party (ANP)’ and PPPP at the Center were also skeptical about the ongoing military campaign in Swat. They also wanted peace to prevail. Dialogue and negotiations were started to bring back the Taliban into acceptance of government writ. Pity to politics of negotiation, the Taliban went off and started increasing their influence. Army on the other hand was maligned by the militant factions as an impotent force that cannot fight the Taliban.

The result of ‘agreements and disagreements’ between Taliban and the civil governments intermittently ‘allowed and disallowed’ the military campaigns. So, during this theatre of peace
process another phase of military operation was launched in July 2008. After the July 2008 military phase, another episode of resumed dialogue was started. While facing the same results, in January 2009, the third phase of ‘Rah-e-Haq’ was launched. It is important to mention that all the three phases of ‘Operation Rah-e-Haq’ were not part of decisive military blow to terrorists rather these were launched to slowly and steadily deny the space to terrorists who in the previous few years have successfully made in Swat and its associated districts. Therefore, the main purpose of all the three phases of ‘Rah-e-Haq’ operation was to gain, regain, consolidate, and reconsolidate to establish the writ of the state.

Knowing the presence of Pakistan army and its resilience to deny space to militants and political vulnerabilities of the civilian regime; the terrorists somehow became habitual to peace dialogue as it was the only available strategy to push back the forces into barracks. So, immediately after the January 2009 military action they once again ended up with the government to install the peace dialogue. So, it was enunciated as the government was readily willing to give another chance to peace and signed an agreement with TNSM chief Sufi Mohammad to install peace in the valley. Under the agreement, the NWFP government agreed to promulgate ‘Sharia Law’ under ‘Nizam-e-Adl Regulation’ and in return Taliban will denounce anti state struggle with that of discarding their support to foreign militants. The military restrained itself and went back to the camps.

This in fact once again allowed the militants to regroup and rearm (Shahid & Khail, 2009). It created the required space for militants to go on the roads and enhance their influence. The militants continued with their armed patrolling of the area and enhanced activities, which included abduction, intercepting the convoys, stopping the convoys, kidnapping, killing and executing the prisoners. All these activities were continued even after the formal approval of
‘Nizam-e-Adl Regulation’ by the provincial parliament and national assembly. Terrorists did not respect the agreement and increased their space and control while reorganizing, regrouping, reasserting themselves in the valley and taking control of most of the population areas.

The challenges that Pakistan army faced during Swat operation, which caused quite a rift in the success of the campaign against Mullah Fazalullah included issues of military relieve, trust deficit and issue of Nizam-e-Adal.

i. The first and the foremost challenge was related to the over stretched military presence in the valley which could not be called back. If after relieving the military positions, TTP militants reoccupy the posts then an impression could prevail that the army has retreated and the Taliban have reoccupied the area. So, the challenge was to replace the troops at the same position, which in military term is called ‘relieving the troops’. This in fact means that without abandoning the foothold, troops shall be replaced with new contingent of personnel. So that the operation may not effect and the success of the results must supplement the overall objectives. Operational part of the challenge was related to Pakistan military commanders facing shortage of the forces, which was managed so efficiently and issues of military relieve were addressed with good practice.

ii. Second issue that the military commanders faced was linked with the problem of trust deficit with the local Swat population. Swat people believed that the army they have supported has betrayed them and the militants which were captured through their help are now back in the valley and started activities based on revenge against the local population. The trust deficit erupted and people after witnessing fourteen months long military operation came to the conclusion that Pakistan army cannot sustain this operation. So, they wanted to accept and implement the TNSM demand of Nizam-e-Adl in the Valley to get rid from the mess.

iii. The third challenge for the army was related to the acceptance of Nizam-e-Adl by the then NWFP government with ANP on the driving seat. The provincial assembly had passed a Bill to legitimize the Nizam-e-Adl and implement it in the eight districts of Malakand Division in Swat (GoP, 2009). Due to Swat administrative control that comes
under Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), the Bill cannot be implemented until Governor of the Province and President of Pakistan shall ratify it. That created a deadlock between the provincial government and federation. The provincial government passing the bill, henceforth legitimized the TNSM demand of Nizam-e-Adl, which isolated the military and classified as enemy.

The situation on ground was not good in Swat as the roads were blocked and Pakistan army has to lift the supplies through helicopters to the area. All these challenges created an unfriendly existence for the army in the area with zero possibility of continuing the operations.

Being General Officer Command (GOC) Swat, Major General Ijaz Awan covered Malakand Division. His command covered the areas such as starting from Malakand Fort on the river there passes two adjacent roads on the brink. On the right-side road are linked Malakand, Thanna, Billogram, Odigram, Qumber, Thakhtabund, Mingora, Fizzagut, and Khauzakhela. And on the left-side road are linked Dadaharra, Kabal, Kanju, Kozabanda, and from here one road offshoots to Khauzakhela and the other towards Peochar. Therefore, alongside the river brinks and center of the valley Pakistan army 37th Division was deployed that went up to the mouth of Peochar and relieved the 17th Division. After this a new wave of operations was started in the tribal areas.

This was quite a challenging phase for the Pakistan army and in view of Major General Ijaz Awan he shared his concerns with the then Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani on his visit to 37th Division. General Ijaz was of the opinion that the force with which they are conducting the military operation in Malakand Division, it is the same force that has been fighting with the militants since last fourteen months. The ground reality is the same neither has the environment changed. With four brigades turning the tables and getting over the valley would take quite a time. Whereas, people were losing their patience and the perception was
being built that the army cannot do this operation. Moreover, General Kiyani did not wanted to avail foreign assistance neither utilize drone strikes and instructed that the mission must be stand alone operation of the Pakistan army in the Malakand Division. So, General Ijaz demanded more troops to conclude the military operation to its meaningful end (ARY News, 2017).

After listening to Maj. General Ijaz, General Kiyani conveyed a conference in General Head Quarters (GHQ), Rawalpindi, which was also attended by General Ijaz along with Core Commander Peshawar. Maj. General Tariq Khan in capacity of Commander FC also attended the conference. Others included Maj. Generals of XI Corps conducting the operation, Director General Military Operations, Director General ISI and Director General Military Intelligence. The objective was to find the solution to get more force. The conference lasted for seven days and recommendations of Maj. General Ijaz were endorsed. General Kiyani afterwards got involved in the operational strategy and provided direct guidance to move three Divisions under three Major Generals. This included 19th Division from Mangla Core under Major General Sajjad Ghani that ended up in Shangla. Major General Tariq Khan with his FC and fresh infantry troops were tasked to conduct operation in Daggar, Sultanwas, and Bunair. Peochar was out of reach as it was a valley at a distance and Mullah Fazullah was in that area along with his associates. Militants were operating from this area and then falling back. To fix the gap a decision was made to launch SSG Commandos in the area. So, Major General Haroon Aslam being Commander SSG was tasked to start operation in Peochar valley. And Major General Ijaz Awan remained in the center of the Swat valley with his troops. This was the plan made out of seven days conference, which was a superior plan militarily and gave ideal results in a very short period of time. The execution of the plan enunciated the final and decisive blow to terrorist’s
safe heavens in Pakistan. The first blow went on under ‘Operation Rah-e-Rast’ in Buner, Lower Dir, Swat and Shangla Districts. Details of which are given below.


| Table 11.5: Operation Rah-e-Rast/ ‘Operation Black Thunderstorm’: Operational Command and Force Structure |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Operational Command and Force Structure**                  | **Main Militant Groups**                                     |
| **Army:**                                                    | • Maulana Fazlullah                                          |
| • Ltutinent General Masood Aslam                             | • Sufi Muhammad                                              |
| • Major General Ijaz Awaz                                    | • Maulana Ameer                                              |
| • Major General Haroon Aslam                                 | • Izzat                                                      |
| • Major General Sajjad Ghani                                 | • Syed Wahab                                                 |
| • Major General Tariq Khan                                   | • Maulana                                                    |
| **Air Force:**                                                | • Muhammad Alam                                             |
| • Air Marshal Hifazat Khan                                   |                                                            |

In this operation, Pakistan Army 9th Infantry Division, Special Services Group (SSG), Army Rangers Division, Pakistan Air Force No. 25th Squadron Night Strike Eagles, Pakistan Navy Northern Command, Pakistan Marines, 50th Airborne Division of Pakistan Navy SEAL, and local tribesmen took part. Around 45,000 troops took part in the operation.

There were reports that terrorists from the neighboring countries are operating in Matta and Peochar valley while having linkages and connections to each other. They migrate and operate from one place to another depending upon how the situation was developing. There were confirmed reports with the military that in Matta and Peochar valley foreign militants are operating along with extra sub-regional terrorists from Waziristan and some other places. Among the foreign militants were Uzbeks and Afghans operating in Peochar. Pakistan army intelligence reports pointed out neighboring countries that were providing these terrorists weapons, ammunitions, broad strategic directions, and operational guidelines. It was not an activity by
ragtag elements or individual groups operating in the area rather an organized militancy aided and abetted by neighboring countries including India and Afghanistan. Knowing the upswing of terrorists and their violation of the peace agreements, the then Federal and Provincial governments authorized the military to declare the war against Taliban. On May 8, 2009, the then Pakistan Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani said in a televised speech that:

““The nefarious activities of the extremists and terrorists and militants to disrupt peace and security had reached a stage wherein the government is constrained to believe that decisive steps have to be taken. In order to restore the honor and dignity of our homeland and to protect our people, the armed forces have been called in to eliminate the militants and terrorists” (News-18, 2009).

Following the instructions of the government, in May 2009, Pakistan army once again started military operation in Swat but this time it was ‘Operation Rah-e-Rast’. The operation was started in the wake of violation of ‘Malakand Peace Accord’ by the militants which was agreed to restore ‘Sharia Law’ in the area. TTP militants kidnapped three of the bank employees along with district coordination officer and his six guards. The post accord environment became hostage to terrorists rather an opportunity to bring peace in Swat. The agreement signed with the militants does provide a moral stand to Pakistan for providing all opportunities to install peace in the region that they (terrorist) have wasted and brought agony on themselves through military operations. The environment which prevailed at time of operations was so volatile and disrupting for the government to establish its writ.

Sufi Mohammad phenomenon came into Swat and Mullah Fazalullah militancy got impetus. This pushed the terrorists further into Buner just 70 kilometers away from the Capital and on the motorways where FC had to engage the terrorists. The Kohat Tunnel was closed, Peshawar Airport was not operational, the government was about to move in Abotabad, in Mohmand Agency officials get salary through helicopters, no vehicle can enter into Bajaur Agency as it was surrounded by the militants. This was the environment when Pakistan army
started the operation. Moreover, due to the so-called Bill passed by the NWFP provincial government that legitimized the ‘Nizam-e-Adl’ demand of TNSM by Sufi Mohammad in fact created a parallel constitution within state and as of today it is still in place. Neither Supreme Court of Pakistan nor the successive provincial and federal governments have repealed the ‘Nizam-e-Adl Bill’.

Initially, the operation was started in Buner, where Major General Tariq Khan went with his force. The terrorist’s strong hold was Peochar and the Swat valley where Mullah Fazalullah along with his associates were operating. The idea behind the Buner operation was to instigate the reaction of terrorists. For example, it was thought to believe that there could be two reactions expected from the terrorists.

i. The first assumption was that the terrorists will rush towards Sultanwas, Daggar, and Buner to reinforce terrorists operating here by flushing out from Peochar and Swat valley.

ii. The second assumption was that the terrorists operating in Buner would leave their presence in Buner and rush towards Swat and Pecochar valley. In case of this result, army would chase them on their heel and at Karrakarr would blockade the area. The area will be cleared by then and terrorists will be trapped in Swat valley.

They will fight or run away, either result was expected to come out of General Tariq’s operation in Buner. In case, terrorists in Buner fail to get reinforce and still decide to fight then within few days they will be killed because of their vulnerable posturing. Buner was one of the most spectacular operations in Swat.
i. The first problem associated with Buner was that Pakistan army was too late to approach the area as Taliban’s infiltration was impressive and the region became quite a strong hold of the militants.

ii. Second problem was related to the entrance of Buner which was Ambella Pass. The Pass has never been conquered by any military starting from Mughal King Akbar. Even the advisor of King Akbar, Raja Birbal died in this area while fighting with the local tribesmen (Malleson, 2001).

Birbal’s death in fact tarnished King Akbar and in words of Badayuni who writes:

“His majesty cared for the death of no grandee more than for that of Bir Bar. He said, 'Alas! they could not even get his body out of the pass, that it might have been burned'; but at last, he consoled himself with the thought that Bir Bar was now free and independent of all earthly fetters, and as the rays of the sun were sufficient for him, there was no necessity that he should be cleansed by fire” (Mehta, 1986:57).

Even in the aftermath of Mughal Empire, the rule of British Crown also failed to conquer the Ambella Pass during Waziristan Campaign of 1920s and gave around three Victoria Cross to its soldiers fighting the war with local tribes. The award came into existence during 1856 and is the highest military award for the act of valor that the British Crown envisioned to acknowledge extraordinary services rendered by its soldiers operating in the then British Empire. Around 153 Victoria Cross have been awarded to British Indian Army along with civilians between 1857 till 1947. Three of the Victoria Cross awards were given to the Waziristan Campaign exclusively and include Sepoy Ishar Singh (The London Gazette, 1921), Lieutenant William David Kenny (The London Gazette, 1920), and Temporary Captain Henry John Andrews (The London Gazette, 1920).

Keeping in view such a military history of Buner, Pakistan army understands the complications of the territory along with resilience of the flushed militants who were in a far better position as compared to Pakistan army. Neutralizing the situation along with clearing the area was an important facet of the military campaign that Pakistan has been achieving.
Therefore, a three pronged strategy was adopted by the army to clear the area from strong footholds of the militants.

i. Firstly, Pakistan army moved Mehsud Wing towards Ballendri Top through forced march that almost took two days to reach.

ii. Secondly, a helibond landing was done to drop SSG Commandos in Daggar.

iii. Thirdly, Al-Zarrar tanks were used with thermal imaging to detect suicide trucks at a distance of around 03 kilometers.

Meanwhile, a Battalion of Pakistan army was also arrived in Ballendri that took the militants out of response and were taken out by the army. Many were killed, some surrendered and few run amok. After a multipronged strategy Pakistan army cleared the area and became the first ever military to establish its writ in the region.

On the similar lines when at Shangla 19\textsuperscript{th} Division started the operation, the same concept was enacted around terrorist’s reactions of getting reinforcement or running away. From three dimensions, the operation was started and Major General Ijaz Khan remained in Swat valley with instructions not to deteriorate and stay firm in the area. He was not supposed to start the operation but to observe the situation and keep an eye whether the valley is reinforcing or thinning out.

When operation in Shangla started, terrorists rushed to help their associates and vacuum was created in Swat valley. Simultaneously, Major General Haroon with his special forces landed in Peochar valley with helicopters and started operation in the valley against Mullah Fazalullah who stationed there. Peochar Valley is also known as the highest battlefield. It is situated 10,000 feet above the sea level. The military operation was started around 03:00 A.M at midnight on May 12, 2009. This also tested Pakistan army ability to fight at night to avoid maximum damage and takeout the enemy from the area. The operation was conducted by the
Special Service Group (SSG) Commandos. Operation was difficult but the soldiers through professional conduct controlled the ridge. Valley was cleared from the terrorists within days. Before conducting the operation, leaflets were thrown through helicopters to forewarn the locals to leave the area. Also during the operation loudspeakers were consistently used as a cautious measure to inform the remaining civilians. When army approached the area, they only found miscreants but no civilian on their way.

The three dimensional military operation brought panic among the terrorists brinkmanship, who were confused to decide where to go. The vacuum created in the Swat valley allowed the Division of General Ijaz who at thirteen different positions was earlier surrounded. Due to space created by the terrorists, roads were opened. Civilian population of the area was already instructed to join the Jalozai camp established to provide them shelter. As a result only terrorists remained in the area and when faced three dimension assault out of military operation, they ran ‘helter-skelter’. Some of them ended up as reinforcement and many ran for their life. Here it is important to understand the composition of the terrorists operating in the area. Some of them were hardliners and others fence sitters and criminals. Criminals and fence sitters run amok while majority of the hardcore terrorists were killed in the operations.

The compulsion that army brought in strategy was not to use the long range weapons during the operation. The F-16’s were used only for two nights to fire precision guided missiles on houses suspected to shelter Mullah Fazaullah. Under the instructions of the then Army Chief General Kiyani, Pakistan army has to conduct the operation through its own resources as foreign support was deemed unnecessary. The operation in Peochar was about ‘loss and gains’ dilemma. The loss was the eight districts of Malakand Division that were under the control of TTP and Pakistan army has to get them back from the terrorists. Knowing the fact that on top of valley
TTP has strong foothold and ready to respond with advance weapons, General Haroon along with his commandos landed at Peochar valley and stayed there until conclusion of the operation. The operation was risky and challenging as terrorists have 12.5 and 14.5 heavy machine guns along with anti-craft guns. Element of surprise was the key for the operation as since last fourteen months no army helicopter landed any force and conducted operation against the militants in the area. Terrorists were not prepared for such a move of Pakistan army and were completely taken by surprise. Even Pakistan army intercepted their communication that American forces have landed at Peochar and started operation against them. Due to the element of surprise, Special Forces occupied the heights.

After landing at the top, General Haroon first established a base to oversee and command operational instructions. Major General Tanveer, who commanded Army Aviation, allocated eleven helicopters that through a serge operation landed two Commando Battalions of special services at the base. After securing the base, commandos crawled towards bottom of the valley, where they received intense and severe resistance from Fazalullah for about continuous eighteen hours. Later at night, in small groups commandos successfully penetrated into the close fences of terrorists and surrounded them. Witnessing commandos close encounter, Mullah Fazalullah panicked along with his remaining associates and run amok. In the next four to five days without much resistance Special Forces were able to enter in the valley and Peochar was cleared.

Pakistan army adopted the multipronged strategy to close operations that incorporated stealth, precision engagement, and involvement of ground forces. To any strategist, basic principle is to fight war in such a terrain that envisions the efficient use of the battlefield landscape. In this context, forces with control of high ground are in better shape to maneuver the situation. Terrorists were better-off as compared to Pakistan army as they hold superior positions
and controlled all important peaks of the area. To counter terrorist’s strategic edge, Pakistan army adopted two pronged strategy.

i. On the one hand they moved the troops to approach the peak of ‘Mallam Jabba’ through traditional foot climbing.

ii. On the other hand through helicopters, Pakistan army dropped SSG Commandos on Peochar.

That was the first time since the military campaign against the terrorists when Pakistan army used helicopters to drop its soldiers on top of the mountains. This took the terrorists by surprise and they were unable to counter such a move of the army.

Major General Sajjad Ghani was commanding the 19th Division of the Mangla Corps and led its forces from Shangla to Chamtiliae and approached Khazakhela. General Ghani after clearing the areas have to linkup with 37th Division commanded by General Ijaz Khan, who was operating in Malakand Division. Khazakhela was the mid-point that linked the two Divisions as roads coming from Shangla through Chamtiliae and respectively from Mingora through Fizzagut altogether joins in Khazakhela. Brigadier Ajab Khan was commanding the 1-Brigade in Khazakhela. General Ghani after clearing the areas joined Brigadier Ajab and afterwards moved towards ‘Northern Prong’ of the operation, which included ‘Kalaam’ on the one hand and ‘Peochar’ on the other. The 19th Division under the command of General Ghani also successfully concluded the operation by linking up the northern prong as well.

The ongoing Swat Operation also extended part of it with ‘Mallam Jabba’. Mallam Jabba being the tourist destination hosted a famous resort which came under the control of Taliban and the hotel was converted into operational base of the militants. The resort was constructed on a 250 acres land that was quite famous among national and international tourists mainly due to
skiing and snowy landscape. The resort was stationed just 35 kilometers away from the Mingora, a center city of Swat. The Taliban control over the resort was not without any reason. In fact, it has strategic significance due to its connectivity with Dir and Buner. It was necessary for the Taliban to retain control over the resort for their war fighting strategy. Moreover, a readymade hotel was serving their needs to take refuge and support operational command. At last, in May 2009 the 19th Division was tasked to start operation in Mallam Jabba to clear the area from Taliban’s control. Two companies of the 19th Division took part in the operation.

There were two dangerous aspects involved in the operation.

i. The first aspect was linked with the feasibility of operation which was decided to do at night knowing the fact that the enemy has already got control over the peaks of the area and hold strategic position as compared to Pakistan army.

ii. Second aspect was associated with soldiers’ ignorance of the terrain as they were not local to the area.

Contrary to Pakistan army, the terrorists know each and every inch of the area, therefore were better-off in both aspects then the military. Conducting the operation at night under extensive exposure of fire power was almost an impossible and risky task. Until 1600 hours on 25th May 2009, after an intensive fight Pakistan army cleared the Mallam Jabba resort from the terrorists. Pakistan lost many of its brave soldiers in the operation. With sacrifices rendered, Pakistan army gave impetus to the movement of army towards Buner, Dir, and Shangla. As a result Pakistan army established strong footholds in the Swat region.

11.15.1. Uniqueness of the Military Strategy adopted in ‘Operation Black Thunderstorm’:

The sacrifices rendered and military achievements are somewhat exceptional when it comes to campaign launched by Pakistan army against the terrorists. That is why ‘Malakand
‘Operation Rah-e-Rast,’ a Division of army was already marching at the access point of Mardan and Mingora. The dynamics of Swat region were different mainly due to its built-up area which was scattered over a large territory and presence of huge population also made the region quite complex terrain for the operation. Moreover, Peochar Valley and Sakhra Valley were the support base area of the terrorists who were resisting the advancement of the Division marching from Mardan-Mingora access point. Therefore, under the ‘Rah-e-Rast’ campaign plan, Pakistan army decided to divide the terrorist’s response mechanism. Hence, an Infantry Division regardless of enforcing the already operating Division at Mardan-Mongora access point was launched from the Hazara region that marched from Bisham to Shangla and lastly towards Khuwazakhela. Through this, Pakistan army entered at the backyard of the terrorists and activated the reverse response of the terrorists. This strategy of the army was surprise for the terrorists which they were not expecting. While approaching the terrorists from two sides, one from Mardan-Mingora access point towards Swat and the other from Bisham-Shangla access point towards Swat, Pakistan army simultaneously vertically landed its Special Service Group from Peochar Valley.

The vertical landing of the Special Services Group is one of the unique and exceptional landings in the contemporary military history, which involved a Division size force that took part in the operation. Uniquely in context was the idea of landing a Brigade of Special Forces through helicopters, which was a difficult task. There were no landing sites and over 10,000 feet above sea level was the height that put enormous risks for the aviation technology which was not suppose to operate under complex environment. Even during the landing operation one of Pakistan helicopter got hit by the terrorists. There are no contemporary examples in the contemporary military history to land Special Forces at 10,000 feet above the sea level with old
aviation fleet. Not only landing with old machinery but maintaining the logistics chain continued through the air support unless ground links were established. Terrorists did not expect that Pakistan would launch two way operation, one from the backside involving Bisham-Shangla route and the other being the vertical operation from Peochar Valley. That is why the turning point for Pakistan army in the ‘Malakand Operation’ was its unique military tactic of backside and vertical operation to torn down the terrorists battle formations. Therefore, the maximum credit is given to Special Forces who through difficult but resilient operation destroyed the safe haven of the terrorist. Regardless of presence of sophisticated weaponry with the terrorists and enormous risks involved, the success of the operation proved that no non-state actor can stand in front of a State will.

Terrorists have created a myth that no law enforcement agency could place a foot in the area, which was tarnished by the Pakistan army and complete control of the Malakand including Peochar Valley was gained. The search operations carried out in the aftermath of military operation brought stunning findings. For example, Pakistan army found huge piles of weapons, 14.5 and 12.5 antiaircraft guns, explosive materials along with laboratories and factories. During the search operation army also found caves that terrorists used to hide themselves. Before military operation was launched, terrorists compel the locals to do forced labour and punish those who resist or say no to their instructions. Terrorists also snatch money from the locals and send them into training camps. Pakistan army found hate literature and training manuals to prepare soldiers, suicide jackets and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens were also operating among the local terrorists. Their compartments, caves and tunnels that they use as safe havens were destroyed by the army. Fear factor was the key to subdue resistance of the local population otherwise people from their hearts and mind were unhappy
with terrorist’s presence in the area. The inexperienced terrorists run amok and took refuge among civilian population though hardcore militants fought with the army and were killed. Later on, Pakistan army squeezed the remaining terrorists who used locals as human shield through intensive search operations which was also facilitated through human intelligence. That is why during the operation Pakistan army has to take care of the collateral damage and conduct the operation with great conscious. The success of operation ‘Rah-e-Rast’ brought South Waziristan into lime light and ‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat’ was launched in the agency.


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<tr>
<th>Table 11.6: Operation Rah-e-Nijat: Operational Command and Force Structure</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Command and Force Structure</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Army:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani</td>
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<td>• Lt. Gen. Masood Aslam</td>
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<td>• Major General Khalid Rabbani</td>
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<td>• Major General Tariq Khan</td>
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<td><strong>Air Force:</strong></td>
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<td>• Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman</td>
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<td><strong>Navy:</strong></td>
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<td>• Naval Chief Admiral Noman Bashir</td>
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In this operation the XI Corps, Special Operation Commands of Army SSG, Air SSG and Navy SSG, 50th Airborne Division, No. 27th Squadron **Zarrars**, No. 25th Squadron **Night Strike Eagles**, No. 11th Squadron **Arrows**. In total around 45,000 troops including 500 SSG Commandos took part in the operation.

At the time of ‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat,’ South Waziristan was hub of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Baitullah Mehsud being Chief of TTP was calling the shots and declared that he
has more than 10,000 well trained militants in his command (Constable, 2009). Pakistan did not underestimate the proclaimed strength of Mehsud and continued operational readiness to circumvent the expected challenges. Pakistan army through dedicated efforts separated the civilian population from the terrorists and the area was freed to avoid the challenge of collateral damage. The civilian tribal population migrated to other parts of Pakistan particularly ended up in the camps established to accommodate them. Only in South Waziristan, TTP has killed 200 tribal elders (Abbas, 2008), whereas overall 600 tribal elders were murdered by the terrorists in 7 tribal agencies of FATA (Nawaz, 2009). That is why the system collapsed and terrorists got free run in the area. It was just like an ungoverned emirate, ‘state within state’ that after the September 05, 2006 ‘Waziristan Accord’ gave impetus to the idea of de facto ‘Islamic Emirate of Waziristan’ (Gul, 2006).

South Waziristan is strategically important, on its western side is Afghanistan and on its northern side is North Waziristan. On its southern side is Baluchistan and on its eastern side is located the NWFP province. Later on in April 2010 under 18th Amendment the name of the province was changed from NWFP to KPK (Dawn, 2010). In the wake of US bombardment in Afghanistan, it was this place where in 2001 most of the Arab and foreign militants came and settled. Based on the human intelligence it was evident that in South Waziristan there were Uzbek, Arab, and Chechen commanders upholding the territory. Presence of Indian currency along with bullets and weapons were a worrisome factor for national security institutions. Terrorists also established a Madarssa in Sararogha, which was originally post of FC Platoon. In fact, the post was attacked by the terrorists back in January 2008 and the Sararogha Fort fell into their hands. Terrorist occupied the post by killing 12 of the soldiers that marked almost half of the platoon. The Sararogha Madrassa became operational base for the terrorists. Terrorists
conduct all their briefings and issue operational orders from here. The close proximity of the fort with that of civilian population also made it strategic place of command for the terrorists. After getting control of the fort, terrorists continued their attacks on other posts including military convoys and soldiers operating in the area.

At last in October 2009 ‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat’ was started and active part of it was launched on October 17. When ‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat’ was started at that time other then TTP, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jamaat Jihadul Islami (JJI), Al-Qaeda, and few other foreign fighters were present in South Waziristan. Other then Baitullah Mehsud, the other top militant commanders included Hakeemullah Mehsud, Tahir Yaldashev, Yaldove, Walliurehman, and Qari Hussain. In South Waziristan almost every mountain ridge was occupied by the TTP militants with installation of 14.5 and 12.7 millimeter caliber antiaircraft guns meant to target helicopters of Pakistan army. With the help of Pakistan Air Force and Army Aviation, militant’s safe havens and command compounds were bombarded.

Pakistan Army Aviation Cobra Helicopters were used to dislodge the terrorists from bunkers, fortified positions and hideouts to engage them. In fact, terrorists hold all important peaks and ridges of the mountains which were used to attack offensive forces of Pakistan. Due to this advantage of the terrorists, mobilization of Pakistan military was not only slow but under heavy fire. To mobilize the forces through road, first Pakistan army has to take over the ridges. That is why until ridges and mountain peaks were taken out from the terrorist’s strong footing, the fight continued through Cobra helicopters. Therefore, main hindrance and the impediment which created resistance for military mobilization was dislodged through Cobra helicopters. Regardless of taking the Infantry into scene, Cobra helicopters proved an efficient option.
Interestingly, terrorists have given different names to Cobra helicopters. They were calling it ‘black bee’, which in Pashtu language is called ‘Tooramacha’. Sometime terrorists call the helicopters ‘Parinda’ which is an Urdu language word used for ‘bird’. So, whenever Pakistani pilots flew the Cobra helicopters over the ridges they shout the word and run amok and hide in their bunkers. Cobra helicopters first engage the terrorists at their positions and in the meanwhile Infantry was called-in to occupy and take control over the ridges. During Swat operation, when Cobra helicopters attack on the ridges, terrorist run and do not fire back but in South Waziristan terrorist fire back at helicopters. Terrorists in South Waziristan had 14.5 and 12.7 antiaircraft guns that they have used against the Cobra helicopters. To engage the Infantry, terrorists were using rocket launchers, RPGs, grenades, and whatsoever they have in their possession. They also grounded the area with minefields so that if Infantry approach the area their movement could be slow down and maximum damage should be unleashed. The well coordinated networking of the Cobra helicopters and Infantry paved no way to the terrorists to hold ground against Pakistan army.

As mentioned earlier that the active part of ‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat’ was formally launched on October 17, 2009. It is important to highlight that the Shakai Agreement that Pakistan army signed back in 2004 with Nek Muhammad Wazir proved a fruitful strategy for the army. Through the agreement Pakistan army entered in the so called ‘no go zone’ area and established a network of human intelligence. In the aftermath of ‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat,’ Pakistan army entered into South Waziristan from three sides. Pakistan Air Force, Army Aviation in joint coordination with 7 Division, 9 Division, 14 Division, and FC took part in the operation. While blocking the supply line of the militants, the tridimensional military operation shackled the terrorist’s command that run amok and abandoned the area. The operation was
successfully achieved its end objective and South Waziristan within one month was cleared from the terrorists. The seriousness of the foreign militants and presence of Al-Qaeda in South Waziristan could be gagged through the presence of Said Bhaji, who according to CNN report was “a suspect linked to the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington” (CNN, 2009). His passport was recovered by Pakistan army during the ongoing ‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat’.

After completing the operation and clearing South Waziristan from militants, the next task for the army was to hold the area. The objective was to retain writ of the military in the areas that were rescued from the terrorists and above all an overarching goal linked with rehabilitation of the displaced tribal’s with respect and dignity was deemed necessary. To achieve the latter goal one of the biggest challenges was linked with the absence of political and administrative structure in the area. The Federal government did tasked the responsibility of military operation to Army that it was fulfilling professionally and competently but how the displaced people will be resettled in the area remained out of political sight. At the end of the military operation, how political environment will be made feasible for tribal development through appropriate financial allocation and legislation was the domain of Federal government in Islamabad. In fact, the pace of military operations was faster than the process of political rehabilitation, which remained criminally, slow.

As mentioned earlier this happened due to unique military strategy adopted by Pakistan army but was not an easy task when it comes to operational conduct of the plan. For example, the active period of military campaign is considered from and between the years of 2008, 2009, and 2010. If one looks at the casualty ratio between officers and soldiers, Pakistan army’s ratio falls into 1 is to 10 (as of 2018 it is 1 is to 12). In the contemporary military history such ratio existed nowhere other then Pakistan. This happened due to an obvious reason. Such as when we say 1 is
to 10 that mean that if 10 soldiers are martyred, one officer has also sacrificed his life. This is in fact called ‘to lead from the front’. During the military campaign there was not a single moment when an officer instructed the soldiers from the back rather in each operation officers lead the soldiers from the front. That is why over 90 percent casualties of Pakistan army are related to young officers, who always lead the soldiers from the front. This is the motivation not only among young officers rather leadership of the army as a whole follow this principle whether he is a Brigade Commander, Division Commander, Core Commander or the Commander in Chief. After clearing Swat region and the South Waziristan, now the army marched towards Kurram Agency. Details of which are mentioned below.

11.17. Operation Koh-e-Sufaid (White Mountain), Kurram Agency (July 2011 to August 2011)

In July 2011, Pakistan army launched operation in Kurram Agency to impeach the militants operating in the area. Terrorists have challenged the write of the state and their sectarian violence had been a matter of concern for security forces. Shia and Sunni sectors sporadically target each other. Presence of foreign militants particularly the Uzbeks was fueling permanent state of insecurity in the agency and its outskirts. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan had established their strong foothold and was conducting anti-state activities on regular basis (Khan, 2012a). Tal-Parachinar was the only road link of the agency with outer world that was constantly under blockade by the militants (Munir, 2011). Under such circumstances, security forces started the operation on July 04, 2011. At the completion of the operation, almost 700 militants were killed, whereas 75 soldiers laid their life to protect sovereignty of the state of Pakistan. Almost 36 villages of the agency were completely destroyed by the terrorist factions that cost about Rs. 800 million in overall damage. Hundred and thousand families were dispersed, which the
political administration had to resettle in the aftermath of successful operation (Khan, 2012a). During the climax of the operation, General Ashfaq Kayani visited the battlefield and supervised the operational command (The Express Tribune, 2011).

After conducting a successful military campaign in the PATA and parts of FATA, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani completed six years long army command and handed over the ‘baton of command’ (also called Malacca cane) to General Raheel Sharif in November 2013. General Raheel to compliment the successful military actions against the terrorists operating in tribal areas of Pakistan started ‘Operation Zarb-e-Azb’ in 2014. Details of which are mentioned below.


Table 11.7: Operation Zarb-e-Azb: Operational Command and Force Structure

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<td>Army:</td>
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<td>• General Raheel Sharif</td>
<td>TTP</td>
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<td>• Lt. Gen. Hidayat-ur-Rehman</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Jhangvi</td>
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<td>• Major General Zafar Khan</td>
<td>East Turkestan</td>
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<td>Islamic Movement</td>
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<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
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<td>Haqqani Network</td>
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<td>Cross-border</td>
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<td>attacking militants</td>
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This operation was a joint effort by Pakistan Army, Air Force, and Navy to dismantle the network of last outlet in FATA. Around 30,000 soldiers have taken part in this operation.

‘Operation Zarb-e-Azb’ is known as one of the most successful military operation of Pakistan army that lasted from June 2014 to April 2016. It was a difficult operation due to thousands of sanctuaries that terrorist’s had established over the period of time. North Waziristan was the stronghold of the terrorists. This was their base and they plan, coordinate, and execute their terrorist operations from here. But when Pakistan army cleared all the other agencies and isolated North Waziristan from rest of the agencies, it in fact contained them into a confined
geography and had defused their overstretched power. Though, its border with Afghanistan was a matter of concern from where they could channel support. One of the biggest challenges for the armed forces was to take the civilian population out of the area and settle them at a respectable place until operation continues and later rehabilitate them back to their houses with immediate availability of infrastructure, communication network, basic needs, and safety, to mention few. That is why terrorists operating in North Waziristan were less resistant as compared to Bajaur, Swat, South Waziristan, and Khyber. Pakistan army had already successfully broken all the important centers of gravity and pushed them into North Waziristan where they were already consumed and their resilience to fight back encountered with fear.

The doctrine Pakistan army used during ‘Operation Zarb-e-Azb’ had four basic pillars.

i. Seek
ii. Destroy
iii. Clear
iv. Hold

The first element ‘Seek’ included identification of the enemy and then ‘destroying’ it. After destroying the target then ‘clearing’ the area was important element of the doctrine. And then one of the most important elements of the doctrine was to ‘hold’ the territory. This military doctrine came into envision based on two separate United States doctrines that it had applied. United States had used ‘Seek and Destroy’ doctrine during the Vietnam War of 1960s (Rohn, 2014) and used ‘Clear and Hold’ doctrine in the Iraq War during 2003 (Ignatius, 2005). Pakistan amalgamated both the US doctrines and made a new doctrine suitable to its environment and also to avoid external influence. For example under the US ‘clear and hold’ doctrine in Iraq, the American forces cleared and controlled the area whereas reconstruction and development of the
destroyed buildings and infrastructure under ‘hold’ element was done by the international community that through Iraqi government made their contribution. In case of Pakistan, all the elements of the doctrine were done by the Pakistan army alone. Regardless of receiving international support, Pakistan was unjustifiably blamed and cursed by proclaiming ‘do more’ mantra by the United States.

Pakistan army achieved unparallel successes in North Waziristan that once was called as the most dangerous territory on earth. The phenomenon of center of gravity for the terrorist was absolutely denied and the agency was no more a safe haven. Miran Shah was the artifact of terrorists which once was declared a ‘no go zone’; was retrieved by Pakistan army. In ‘Zarb-e-Azb Operation’ Pakistan army used another doctrine ‘Hammer and Anvil’ (Kopp, 2003). Under this strategy, Pakistan army first used air power and artillery to bomb the ridges and associated areas to get it free from the terrorists. Immediately then it pushed the land forces into North Waziristan to hammer the enemy. Operations launched to fight sub-conventional warfare are usually conducted through smaller parties like platoons groups and companies. Also soldiers cannot be moved in big vehicles. Therefore, small vehicles were used and also light weapons were carried out by the soldiers. Pakistan army has refined its war fighting capability on sub-conventional fronts that took time but has been considered the best as compared to all modern militaries. That is why the theoretical premises of General Sir Rupert Smith who claimed that “western industrialized armies are ill-suited to the new style of warfare,” could be logically disapproved on the eve of Pakistan’s successful fight against the sub-conventional warfare (Smith, 2008).

As explained earlier that during General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, Pakistan enunciated the military operations in its tribal areas and most of the territory was cleared from the strong holds
of militants except North Waziristan that the Bush described as ‘the most dangerous place on earth’ (Iqbal, 2008). As a prerequisite to start military campaign in North Waziristan, General Kiyani demanded from the United States to dedicate a sizeable force on the other side of Afghanistan border from already stationed force of about 140,000 troops under ISAF command. Pakistan had already conducted seven military operations on its side and successfully ‘bottled-up’ the terrorists in North Waziristan. Now, it was a time for the US-led-NATO troops to seal the other side of the Afghan border to deny safe passage for the terrorists. Pakistan was apprehensive of the situation that terrorist may run into Afghanistan, if it starts an open-ended operation in North Waziristan. Therefore, a close-ended approach was sought necessary to the success of military operation in North Waziristan.

To achieve this objective, Pakistan army adopted ‘sledge and hammer’ strategy to conduct the operation, which in 1942 during the WWII was coined by the British Prime Minister Churchill to engage German Air Force through UK-cum-US Air Force Operations to strengthening Soviet positions to sustain in the war (Global Security, 2019). Pakistan wanted the ISAF forces to become ‘sledge’ as the role of ‘hammer’ was about to be played by Pakistani military against the terrorists. In case of securing the Afghan border by the Americans, terrorists cannot survive the operation on Pakistani side. In case of running into Afghanistan, the readiness of the ISAF forces could hammer the terrorists to their total inhalation. In case terrorists get an uncontrolled and opened border then there were two possibilities that United States may exploit against Pakistan.

i. The first phenomenon was the fact that if terrorists are able to survive and enter into other side of Pakistani border then the US will propagate that all the terrorists are deliberately flushed into Afghanistan. The narrative that Washington had been
already trying to sell in the world. In fact, the mantra of ‘safe havens’ was mostly based on this phenomenon that Americans never wanted to address.

ii. Second phenomenon that Pakistan was apprehensive of related to Afghanistan becoming safe haven for terrorists. As a result of uncontrolled border terrorists will safely enter into Afghanistan and hostile agencies will start helping them and facilitate their sanctuaries. Out of this situation a new dilemma of national security with that of internal stability could rise, which the terrorists in all circumstances would like to exploit against Pakistan. Depending upon the hostile intelligence agencies will and capability such a situation can continue until years to come with great potential to jeopardize the whole security situation.

United States did not want to address these two phenomenons and in return claimed that they do not have enough troops to tackle the situation. They further exposed their vulnerability by saying that unless Afghan security forces are trained and ready to control the border ‘sealing’ is not the task that the ISAF troops can perform at their own. At that time almost 120,000 Pakistani troops were operating in the FATA/PATA region under military campaigns. General Kiyani told the United States that you simply cannot hold the border with 140,000 troops in Afghanistan but we have already conducted seven operations with only 120,000 troops deployed in the area. You [US] want us to conduct the military operation as well as control of the border at the same very time, which is not possible at this stage. So, he conveyed the message that when to conduct the military operation in North Waziristan will remain his choice and decision that he will take keeping in view time and space suitable for the military operation in North Waziristan. Therefore, these were the reasons not to conduct military operation in North Waziristan.

When General Raheel Sharif took the command then it was decided that now is the time to clean the North Waziristan since enough time has passed and gains in Mohmand agency, South Waziristan agency, eight districts of Malakand Division, Khyber-I, and Orakzai agency
were consolidated. The development was started in these areas, so General Raheel Sharif took a
decision about going into North Waziristan. Pakistan army followed the same pattern like they have already adopted in Swat. This was a strategy of distinguishing the terrorists from the civilians at the first stage. People who decided not to answer the call of the terrorists to fight against Pakistan army were rescued and settled in Bannu where special camps were made. Immediately after the successful completion of the military operation in North Waziristan, all the refugees were suppose to move back to get resettled in their homes. This has been the plan of action in all the already conducted operations and was about to get repeated in North Waziristan.

11.18.1. **Operational Conduct of Zarb-e-Azb:**

Mir Ali, Miran Shah, Boyadigaan, and Shawaal were the areas of North Waziristan that were earlier inaccessible and ‘no go zone’ places for Pakistan army. The planning to conduct the military operation in North Waziristan vested in the idea to isolate it from the rest of tribal region. All the bordering and neighboring tribal agencies were strangulated so that terrorists shall not be able to get the reinforcement and thereafter shall not be able to run into other agencies. Without fulfilling its commitments, the United States was pressuring Pakistan to launch military operation in North Waziristan (The Express Tribune, 2010). Washington without providing workable intelligence also started blaming Pakistan to provide sanctuaries to the so-called Taliban whom against Islamabad had been fighting. United States cunningly linked the Pakistani Taliban behind most of the major terrorist attacks to pressurize Islamabad and to lodge ‘do more’ mantra (Nelson, 2010). This demoralized Pakistan and its efforts to denying safe havens to militants but boosted the Taliban image among the terrorists that they are giving tough time to Pakistan. This American attitude in fact failed to recognize the sacrifices of Pakistani nation and
military that has rendered exceptional contributions to dismantle Al-Qaeda and Taliban operating against the free world.

Due to US stance on Taliban which was definitely reciprocating its geopolitical considerations slowly converted the ‘war against terrorism’ into ‘sub-conventional war against Pakistan’. This in fact happened when Pakistan started its military operation in North Waziristan, all the terrorists flushed out into Afghanistan. Due to absence of US troops on the other side of the border to stop the infiltration, militants were comfortable to spread around ungoverned Afghanistan. This situation was the testimony of Pakistani apprehensions not to start the military operation in North Waziristan. General Raheel’s predecessor General Kiyani had already shared such apprehensions with his US and ISAF counterparts in Afghanistan. The deaf alike tendency of the United States even continued in the aftermath of General Raheel Sharif. General Qamar Javed Bajwa categorically stated in the 2018 Munich Security Conference (MSC) that it’s the United States that harvested the seeds of failure not Pakistan. He said that:

“Unfortunately, Afghanistan, success of 2003 was lost when resources were pulled out prematurely for war in Iraq. Today, after spending more than 1.4 Trillion, the situation can best be described as a stalemate. But to my reckoning the cause of stalemate is not only the Haqqani Network or TTA [Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan], as they had almost been defeated 13 years ago; it was the pursuit of a wrong strategy which led to their resurrection. Let me say that the popular assertion of TTA not being defeated in totality due to presence of part of their leadership in Pakistan, is not correct or whole truth. We defeated Al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and Jamat-ul-Ahrar, while their safe heavens still exist in Afghanistan at a mere fraction of resources employed on the other side of the border. Now instead of blame games, it is time for NATO and allies to conduct an audit and introspection to find out causes for this stalemate” (Dunya News, 2018).

When in 2001 United States conducted military operation in Afghanistan, the terrorists flushed into Pakistan and few of them got settled in North Waziristan with motivation to orchestrate anti Pakistan plans. Back in 2005 Pakistan army in the aftermath of Shakai Agreement in North Waziristan was able to establish its intelligence network. It was about the
North Waziristan that was labeled as one of the most difficult operations for Pakistan army. Both the external and internal lobbies were claiming that if Pakistan army will go into North Waziristan, it will be trapped. That is why the decision making around North Waziristan was made questionable. Under such circumstances change of command from General Kiyani to General Raheel Sharif proved remarkable turnover in the leadership as the later got much experienced in decoding the environment and directly looking into the situation. Hence, it got straight to the business and decided to go into North Waziristan. Due to success of North Waziristan military operation, Pakistan has not only established complete writ on its tribal areas but had also witnessed meaningful decline in terrorist attacks. In the aftermath of North Waziristan operation, the nature of attacks in Pakistan was sporadic and frustrated. The blow back was executed mainly from the sleeping cells and hideouts that terrorists over the period of time have established around the country. This was already predicted by the intelligence organizations and got prepared to trace the leads to grab the remaining.

During the military operation in North Waziristan Pakistan army discovered a compound in Village Machis (the Urdu word meaning Fire Box) used by Al-Qaeda and their Arab affiliates, which included tunnels, IED factories, jackets, literature, printers and computers along with tones of depots consisting sophisticated weapons supposed to be used against Pakistan. Machis village was among one of many places used to train suicide bombers. Even the terrorists used basements of the Mosques to hide, indoctrinate and motivate the suicide bombers. Gulpakhel Mosque which was situated in the Miranshah Market was the TTP headquarters. That mosque had multitier smart cells in the basement meant to retain the suicide bombers along with air-conditioned rooms to facilitate the stay of top leadership. From these places terrorists dispatch
suicide bombers around the country to perform anti-Pakistan tasks. Village Machis compound was not the only one in the area as there were many meant to fulfill terrorist’s requirements.

Separate to these full-fledged multipurpose compounds, there was a market in Miranshah that hosted a superstore named ‘Al-Qaeda shop’ which provides all the necessary items and equipments to perform and conduct terrorist acts. The market also had a dedicated weapon cells that have all caliber of weapons such as rocket launchers, machine guns, communication devices, and military uniform. Everything was available in this market. Miranshah Market was a ‘no go zone’ area for most of the tribesmen living in North Waziristan and its associated agencies of FATA. There was a square in Miranshah Market where militants after killing people hang their heads and bodies and call it the justice system. It is important to highlight that all of the Miranshah market was not open for the local population. Even indigenous population was not allowed to enter into few places where terrorist’s sensitive equipments and top leadership was residing. The local population was made subservient through coercion and fear.

Until Pakistan army launched ground offensive in Miranshah, the area was a colony of terrorists and symbol of their terror. The ‘Adam Khor Bazaar’ [Man Eating Market] was a place where terrorists execute unwanted and unwelcomed people. As The News a leading English newspaper in Pakistan wrote, “it’s where the unwanted and the unwelcome were beheaded, and left to rot, decapitated for days...Their bodies were not allowed to be buried, and they used to stink up the bazaar, as a lesson for all and sundry” (The News, 2014). Terrorists used to assassinate and slaughter the people and created permanent fear in the area.

Parallel to that one of the biggest challenges that Pakistan army faced while conducting the operation was clearing the IEDs. Terrorists were there in the area for about two decades and had established an extensive network. In shops people can buy already prepared IEDs,
readymade bombs and suicide jackets. The dangerous thing was the ‘Stoneship IED’, which were placed among the stones on roadside. No one can make out of it what was that. These were specifically prepared IEDs that the terrorists place alongside the construction stones and retaining walls. Along with Miranshah, Pakistan army successfully cleared the Mir Ali which was also called a ‘no go area’ for the law enforcement agencies. Moreover, Degaan was one of the main areas of North Waziristan which was known as Pentagon of the terrorists. This was an epicenter of planning, logistics, supply, media propaganda, and a complex of residential cells. When Pakistan army entered in this area they faced quite a resistance. Army destroyed all the places, complexes that were used by the terrorists along with hotels, media cells and meeting points. The media centers were used to make videos of the kidnapped persons for ransom and interviews of their leaders to spread their version. Army purposefully destroyed few of the identified places to dismantle the fear factor installed by the terrorists. Terrorists who were unable to survive in the operation run towards Shawal Valley and made it their hideout. Pakistan army has to claim the area too, so they in May 2015 started the military campaign in Shawal.

Major General Azher Abbasi led the command as General Officer Commanding (GOC) and successfully established check posts on top of the ridges and mountains. Asmaan Panga was the first place situated about 11,500 feet above the sea level that was secured as pre-Shawal operation. After securing the watershed mark in case of Asmaan Panga and stabilizing it, Pakistan army initiated next phase of operations in Shawal valley. This phase of operation first secured the heights around the prim of Shawal Valley. The valley was consisted of Bibbik area that touches the Pak-Afghan border. Left to Bibbak is a ridge line that is called Kundsir and where it taper off is called Mangrotie Pass. The height which emerges from Mangrotie Pass there is Post-16 of the Pakistan army. In front of this area towards Pakistan is situated the Shawal
Valley and most important places of it include Dabber, Miami, Mana, and Gurbus. Pakistan after successful military operation completely dominated the area and established its writ (Dawn, 2016a).

The weapons stockpile Pakistan army had recovered from different parts in North Waziristan from the terrorists was more than the amount of weapons recovered from rest of seven agencies of FATA, which if used against army could help terrorists to survive for about five years. The terrorists were doomed so does the US mantra of ‘do more’. Pakistan at-last came out of mess and propaganda for not doing enough. The world can witness the results of North Waziristan. It is almost four years of post North Waziristan operation but still in Afghanistan US forces have failed to bring stability and peace. Without any doubt the US demand to start North Waziristan operation was a scapegoat strategy to put blame over Pakistan. If North Waziristan was the real ‘safe heaven’ of the terrorists then after destruction of it, why the US failed to install peace in Afghanistan?; is a pertinent question to ask.


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<th>Table 11.8: Operation Khyber: Operational Command and Force Structure</th>
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<td><strong>Operational Command and Force Structure</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Army:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• General Qamar Javed Bajwa (2016-date)</td>
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<td>• General Raheel Sharif (2014-2016)</td>
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Khyber operation was launched in 2014 being extension of ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azab in Khyber Agency, which is one of the seven agencies of FATA. The operation was divided into four distinct phases, Khyber-I, Khyber-II, Khyber-III, and Khyber-IV. Earlier
operations in Khyber Agency were of limited scope vested with immediate purpose to establish footprints of Pakistan army. This time a decisive military campaign was launched to flush out the terrorists once for all. As mentioned in the table above the main terrorists outfits operating in the area were TTP, Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Islam of Mangal Bagh along with Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Ansar-ul-Islam, who used the plains of Bara to destabilize the strategic outposts of Peshawar. Due to its close proximity with civil installations the area has been important for the NATO supply route as well. This strategic importance of the Khyber Agency was of utmost importance for Pakistan. The delay in the operation was due to its border sharing with Peshawar and Afghanistan that could spill-over the backlash of any operation to the rest of Pakistan that army wanted to avoid in its initial years of military campaign. The last operation in the series, Khyber-IV was conducted against the presence of ISIS terrorists in Khyber Agency. Brief orientation of the four Khyber operations is given below.

11.19.1. Operation Khyber-I:

Khyber Agency being the strategic epicenter became terrorist’s stronghold that until October 2014 remained untouched by the ongoing military operations. In October 2014 under the umbrella of Operation Zarb-e-Azab, a fresh military campaign was launched to clear the Bara Tehsil from strong footholds of terrorists operating in the area. Bara District had an important geographical location as it connected many other FATA agencies with Khyber Agency while providing north-south route. NATO supply route also passes through this district and lead the way towards Afghanistan. The operation aimed to clear the area from Bara district till Tirah valley. TTP, Ansar-ul-Islam and Lashkar-e-Islam of Mangal Bagh Afridi were the main terrorist organizations operating in Bara district (Dunya News, 2014).
Before launching the formal operation, Pakistan army gave the timeline to terrorists to negotiate and lay down their weapons. On total denial by the terrorists, Pakistan army on October 17, 2014 formally launched airstrikes in the area against Lashkar-e-Islam terrorists. Complimented through land forces, the operation was concluded and writ of the state was reestablished. According to Brig. Zahid who commanded the operation, Pakistan army killed almost 100 militants. About 450 were captured by the forces during the operation. After the successful competition of the operation, second phase of the operation under Khyber-II was launched in Tirah valley (Nizamani, 2015).

11.19.2. Operation Khyber-II:

In the aftermath of successful Khyber-I campaign; in February 2015 Pakistan announced the second phase of Khyber operation, which was formally launched in March 2015 under Khyber-II. The main target of the campaign was Tirah valley where TTP hideouts were bombarded through precision strikes. Tirah valley is situated on both sides of the Pakistan and Afghanistan border packed-in between two well-known Tora Bora Mountains and plains of Bara district, which is connected with Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The ground forces operation faced quite a tough resistance from the terrorists who due to deep valleys and high mountains were in a position to inflict enormous damage to security forces. Pakistan army had to face lot of casualities in Tirah. This was another area where terrorists have infiltrated and established their strong holds and negated the writ of Pakistan. The operation conducted here was Khyber-II that was launched in Tirah valley (The Nation, 2015). The operations were conducted in Khyber agency under the Khyber Campaign of 2014 to compliment Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Tirah valley is strategically placed between the Orakzai, Khyber and Kurram agencies, two of the later also share border with neighboring Afghanistan.
The complicated terrain and geography became the ideal allowance for the militants to shelter in the valley that was camouflaged by the Spin Ghar mountain range. Lashkar-e-Islam led by Mangal Bagh Afridi was the main militant organization that operated in the area. The significance of the valley was its connectivity with Khyber Pass as Tirah lies to the south to this infamous pass which earlier paved the way for Darius-I along with Genghis Khan. Even Alexander the Great avoided another pass of the Tirah valley called Nawa Pass due to its insecure terrain. Pakistan army has to secure the Khyber Pass which was the main trade route between Afghanistan and Central Asia. The pass also provided easy and uninterrupted supply chain passage from Afghanistan to deep into tribal belt. It is important to highlight that Pakistan army back in 2001 had already conducted a military operation in the valley (The Express Tribune, 2015a). The operation was conducted on the information of Al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden presence in the area. Furthermore, the area has also faced the then British military operation under ‘Tirah Campaign of 1897’ to crush the Afridi tribesmen who revolted against the Britain (Hutchinson, 2008). Pakistan military campaign has been different as it meant to crush Mangal Bagh and to put forward the valley on the road to development.

Bara River passes through the valley and connects the Sokh village that was the central point of the military operation in Tirah. There was a very big population of terrorists in Sokh village and opposite to that was Darkhosa village, where terrorists carry out their planning sessions and conduct Shura sessions (top leadership meetings). The area was adjacent to another important place Meherbankili where terrorists also maintain strong footholds. Once Pakistan army had conducted an airstrike in Meherbankili area where in a Madrassa a Shura meeting was going on that killed important leaders of the militants. Lashkar-e-Islami of Mangal Bagh was already in coalition with TTP and conducts joint operations against Pakistan army. All these
areas have significant number of terrorists. Also in Tirah valley there is a strategic pass called Masatul Pass which became the primary passage for the terrorists to mobilize their resources out of Afghanistan. They bring weapons and ammunitions from Afghanistan while following the Bara River and deposit it to their established posts along the strategic passes.

Initially, Pakistan army captured different ridges at once from multidimensional operation and then started pushing the militants backward. The multidirectional approach blocked the passes and simultaneously started operation on ridges along with inside the valley. Militant posts established on the ridges gave tough resistance to Pakistan army and used automatic weapons such as rockets, RPGs and antiaircraft guns against army aviation. Pakistan army got edge over militants due to night vision technology that in fact surprised the militants when forces all of a sudden attack them at night. Terrorists at that time do not expect an attack and those who gave fight were either killed or run amok. So, after facing defeat militants capture the ridges lying at their back and start fighting rearward. Pakistan army then advance and push the militants further and secured all the ridges after stiff fight. Pakistan army successfully engaged and out casted the militants through Khyber-II campaign (The Express Tribune, 2015b).

Shindan was another area where a dedicated training camp and a center to ensure operational preparedness for terrorist activities were established. In fact, the significance of Shindan is due to its connection with that of 2014 attack on Army Public School in Peshawar. The camp hosted and trained terrorists who attacked the Army Public School on December 16, 2014. The attack killed more than 150 innocent including 134 children and left more than 121 seriously injured who faced life threatening injuries (Dawn, 2019). Pakistan army had already approached this area back in 2004-05 when United States launched its war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Some of the Pakistani troops were deployed on Afghanistan border connected to
this area but later were withdrawn due to less significant threat. Later under Khyber-II campaign the forces approached the area to establish writ of the state and this was the first ever official effort since 1947 to enter in the region.

In February 2005 Pakistan army started the Khyber-II military operation, which was launched in the successful aftermath of Khyber-I already launched to clear scattered but surrounding areas of Bara in October 17, 2004 (The Express Tribune, 2014). Khyber-II as mentioned earlier was meant to clear Tirah Valley from the strong clutches of Lashkar-e-Islam, Jamat-ul-Ihrar, and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. All three militant outfits have joined their hands together and signed agreements to fight against Pakistan army. Basically, the area belongs to Mangal Bagh of Lashkar-e-Islam but when the operation was about to begin the two other groups joined him. There were also small militant groups of Bajaur and Swat region who also joined them to give tough fight to Pakistan army. This area also provided shelter and became sanctuary to the terrorists who ran away from North Waziristan where Operation Zarb-e-Azb took the terrorists from neck. So, all the different wings of terrorist outfits were here and forming an alliance. Peshawar was getting instable and the event of APS had shocked the nation. Thereafter, Khyber Campaign was materialized and military operation was launched against all these militants.

Weather conditions were one of the biggest challenges that played unfriendly role during the operation. There was snow all around and it was difficult to carry on with required pace to conduct the operation. Another challenge was the communication infrastructure. Due to rough terrain and mountainous ranges, it was difficult for the army to establish smooth networking. There were no road tracks either. Keeping in view deployment of such a large military force in the area, logistics was another challenge that Pakistan army faced due to lack of communication
infrastructure. During the operation, Pakistan army faced IEDs problem too. The intensity along with density of the explosive devices was not witnessed elsewhere during military campaign in FATA. They were unique and massively destructive in nature. Moreover, the sequence of installing the IEDs was an exceptional thing that these militants cannot be trained for. Pakistan army identified a military pattern of the IEDs that only could be installed by an officer trained to do the job. It was a minefield pattern and the last ten years have not seen such an elaborated mechanism and installation of IEDs. In area of 15 square meters one IED was installed and Pakistan army recovered about 600 IEDs from the area of Shindan only. Subsequently it emerged from investigation that the IEDs were not installed by the militant’s rather external facilitators installed the IEDs. This further made clear who is their handler and why all this was being orchestrated on Pakistani territory.

Based on conservative estimates, in Khyber-II operation more than 360 militants were killed and about 200 were seriously injured. This is considered quite a good figure in reference to number of militants gathered in the area against Pakistan army. On the other hand, Pakistan army rendered 44 lives and more than 100 got seriously injured. Pakistan army cleared around 274 square kilometers area from militant’s strong foothold. Under rough estimate, on each six square kilometers of Tirah Valley Pakistan army lost one soldier during Khyber-II operation. The sacrifices rendered to conduct the operation are invested through blood and that is how Pakistan army took over its territory back. The battle Pakistan army fought with terrorists was not easy as they have showed stiff resistance. Particularly the area of Kidney Ridge, which the Laskar-e-Islam militants called Khyber Sanghar was a symbol of strategic power for Mangal Bagh and its associates and they gave tough fight to Pakistan army before surrendering the area. The resolve which Pakistan army gathered out of Zarb-e-Azb operation was unmatched to the resistance of
terrorists. Even when the fight at Khyber Sanghar entered in its final day, the Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif was in Tirah Valley observing the fight in person.

To some extent Tirah Valley operation was different then few other operations already conducted and concluded at other parts of FATA. Main difference was the challenges which army faced in this area as compared to other. At other parts of FATA, terrorists were separately taken out by the army. Here in Tirah Valley different outfits smaller and major came together under an alliance and showed resistance to Pakistan army. This made them quite challenging and different then the other resistance lodged by the militants. Also the issue of IEDs that is already explained made the terrain more complex for the army to operate in the area. The mountainous landscape also made the terrain difficult as ups and downs starting from 5,000 feet to 10,000 feet above the sea-lane remained unfriendly for smooth mobilization of forces. Heavy snowfall and lack of road tracks made the situation worst. All the challenges were supposed to be overcome during the ongoing operation that Pakistan army did with its unmelting resolve.

It is important to highlight that originally Tirah Valley faced an internal religious rift on *Fiqh* (religious understanding) that gave birth to Lashkar-e-Islam and latter its rival outfit Ansar-ul-Islam. Both the outfits entered into new level when foreign handlers penetrated in their organizations and facilitated a new version of political Islam with violence as mean of denouncing the opponents. This allowed the foreign handlers and their respective intelligence organizations to intervene into the decision making of the outfits which organized the militia to adopt anti Pakistan mantra. Funding, training, weapons, literature, tasks and technical support was given by the handlers to raise the outfits to confront Pakistan military and that is how Lashkar-e-Islam of Mangal Bagh ended up into an influential and powerful threat to the writ of the state.
Moreover, the military pattern of IEDs and the proofs recovered by Pakistan army categorically identified foreign support to these militants. Mangal Bagh was a bus conductor who became chief of the organization and was dealing with custom affairs, court matters, and performing the tasks of policing. Who else other than external elements could help him establish his writ and raise the Lashkar-e-Islam to a new level with automatic weapons? Due to extreme external interference the same very area Shindan was the place that hosted and directed the attack in 2014 on Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar that killed 134 innocent children. Agriculture with limited capacity does provide source of economic activity for the locals but militants were running their affairs primarily through foreign funding, illegal trade, and drugs. Even Mangal Bagh himself issue receipts for narcotics trade and keep record of opium smuggling. In other words, narcotics and militancy came together to challenge the writ of the state.

Pakistan Special Services Group (SSG) along with 21 Artillery Division took part in Tirah Valley operation as leading force. Khyber Agency was consisted of the terrorists who made the region as their last hideout and were quite strong and well prepared to resist the military operation. That is why the responsibility was given to SSG being well trained and well equipped force of Pakistan army. Due to close proximity of the agency with Afghanistan was a challenge for the forces to stop the replenishments and reinforcements that militants receive across the border from neighboring country. Therefore on each ridge, mountainous peak and inside the valley SSG faced tough resistance and retrieved the area from militant’s strong foothold after an intense and severe fight.

The fights were actually like Hollywood movies that the SSG commandos fought with the militants. For example, at Masatul Pass when 4th Commando Yalghar Battalion of the SSG
soldiers got hand to hand fight with militants, one of the young Captains lost his eye in the battle. Regardless of being rescued he fought and fought with full zeal and zest. When a young captain losses one of his eye in the battle and continues to fight is above the story of a film. Even the 6th Commando Al-Samsaam Battalion of the SSG fought face to face with militants inside the valley.

With all dare and brave acts the SSG achieved the breakthrough to regain the territory. Overall 11 Special Services Brigade played an active combat role in the operations. They were part of North Waziristan operation and regularly acted in Intelligence Based Operations (IBOs) but Khyber Operation was the final combat battleground for the SSG. The apex and climax of the anti-terror campaign got impetus in the aftermath of Zarb-e-Azb especially in Khyber-II where necessity of SSG was irrevocable. So, within last one and half years SSG combat in Khyber-II was their third deployment. Their first deployment was in North Waziristan; second deployment was specifically in the IBOs that dismantled the militant’s network in urban areas and final deployment came in Khyber-II operation.

The Shindan training camp was also cleared by the 2nd Commando Rahbar Battalion that was one of the strongholds of the terrorists. That was the actual place where SSG acted as nut-breaker and successfully got breakthrough to decode the network of terrorists in Tirah Valley. 11 Special Services Brigade (SSB) focused on simultaneity of the operations based on the ‘Water Tactics’ approach. The approach outlays the concept of water movement which refers to flow of the commandos’ with forward movement and creating parallel passages where resistance is high while encircling the spot while providing the terrorists no way out. In fact, this proved just like ‘sledging and hammering’ the terrorists with no mercy. SSG established their presence
on each ridge and acted as a typical special force with small teams and techniques of infiltration while relying on more use of ground with individual skills vested in each commando.

In Tirah Valley there were Jawaro, Langaro, and Green Ridge mountains where SSG along with infantry conducted the operation. The height of the ridges was about 8,500 feet above the sea. There was no road track to approach the area so SSG climbed the ridges at night and denied the space to terrorists. Towards right to Green Ridge mountain there is Inqalabi Ridge which was also important center of communication and headquarter of Mangal Bagh. SSG also took over the ridge from the militants. Sandapaal and other areas were taken out in subsequent operations conducted by SSG. Militants were not expecting from Pakistan army to take a tough route to approach their hideouts that in fact was the strength of SSG. Special Forces climbed at night along with infantry and took them by surprise. Those who resisted were killed by the army and coward decided to run amok.

Khandwala ridge, Masatul ridge, Sarawela ridge, Tordarra passage, and Darramodra passage were taken by the SSG and Pakistan army posts were established. With all this the passes and passages that connect Afghanistan with Pakistan were disconnected and militants had no way to receive reinforcements and support from their handlers. They were trapped and death was made final destiny for the remaining. Though, a smaller portion of the Rajgal Valley does host some passes that are quite difficult to control as they don’t remain opened throughout the year. But the passages of Rajgal Valley are regularly observed by Pakistan army through deployment alongside the ridge that surrounds the valley. So, regardless of going inside the valley, this smaller portion is taken care through dominant positioning of the army on alongside ridges. Due to overall domination of Pakistan army no route is available that can let the militants move towards settled areas of Pakistan from Afghanistan. Today the sanctuary which Tirah
Valley provided to militants as their last hideout is denied along with support system which originated from Afghanistan and threatened security of Peshawar city. Threats generated here for the rest of Pakistan were also cleaned and militants who run amok into Afghanistan are unable to come back to destabilize the region. Those who will come back will face dire consequences.

The bravery, sacrifices, professionalism, and operational vigilance Pakistan army has shown to conduct Khyber-II along with many other military operations in FATA had made a history of unique accounts (Khan, 2015). Pakistan army had learned unique lessons from its military campaign in FATA. It was criticized that Pakistan army is entering into dangerous zone where great armies of Britain failed and militaries of Darius-I, Genghis Khan and Alexander the Great were vanished. Britain was the occupant force so does Darius, Genghis and Alexander. Britain wanted the region as buffer zone between their colony and Afghanistan. Pakistan military campaign was not for occupation nor did it behaved like the ones mentioned above. Pakistan military while conducting its military operations did not behaved like an invader’s force for a single day rather built the confidence of brave and honored tribesmen as their savior against the tyranny of terror and violence. The overall strength behind the operations was the national resolve where both the civil and military leaderships were on the same page and provided the required impetus to smooth functioning of campaign against the militants. The territory belongs to Pakistan and it was suppose to be reclaimed from the terrorists. It was done successfully and after 71 years of independence the flag of Pakistan was raised in Khyber Agency.

**11.19.3. Operation Khyber III:**

Khyber-III military campaign was launched in August 2016 to compliment the successful conclusion of Khyber-II military operation in Tirah valley. Pakistan army decimated around nine so-called dens of coward terrorists in this operation and recovered huge piles of weapons and
ammunitions (Firdous, 2016). The epicenter of the operation was Rajgal Valley that facilitates all weather routes to terrorists shuttling between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Denial of passes was necessary to curtail the movement and infiltration of the Mangal Bagh and TTP outfits back and forth into Pakistan. The operation was launched with the help of air bombardment that targeted hideouts of the terrorists at high mountains joining Pak-Afghan border. This complimented the Special Services that were already conducting the operation on roof tops of Rajgal valley.

Due to the successful Khyber-I and Khyber-II military operations, most of the remaining terrorists were bottled-up beyond Tirah valley, closer to Pakistan-Afghanistan bordering region. The operation successfully curtailed the terrorist movement and passes were secured by Pakistan army Special Forces. Meanwhile Pakistan has been already fencing the border and through successful military campaigns the high mountains were watched through establishment of new military posts. Pakistan along with conducting military operations put stringent mechanism at Torkham border by installing a gate that in fact sparked tensions between the two neighboring countries. In June 2016 while Pakistan was conducting the military operation in Khyber to deny high mountain passages, Afghan security forces opened fire on Pakistani security forces that proved fatal for one of its officer Major Ali, who later died in the hospital (Akbar & Shah, 2016). Though, this episode of border skirmishes was settled through a dialogue that brought establishment of a high level border management expert group between the two neighboring countries (Khan & Yousaf, 2016). Pakistan showed its resilience not to allow infiltration into its territory to both terrorists and their camouflaged abettors and facilitators in shape of Afghan intelligence agency. On the issue of Torkham border gate, Pakistan categorically told Kabul that it will not compromise security on the porous border and build similar gates on nine other crossing points between the two countries (Khan, 2016).
In this backdrop, Khyber-III military operation was of utmost importance for Pakistan and the sole purpose of the campaign was to deny all safe passages to terrorists. Through, Khyber-II military operation Pakistan army had already took control over the strategic passes such as Mzatal, Kandao Gharibi and Dramudrad connecting Tirah valley with Afghanistan. The victory did not come on easy grounds. It almost cost Pakistan army 50 brave soldiers including officers. More than hundred soldiers were seriously injured in the battle (Khan, 2015). Professional mining of the area with 15 meters of distance proved brutal for Special Forces of Pakistan. Resilience and bravery of the soldiers successfully pushed the terrorists into Kachkol and Rajgal valley where Khyber-III operation was launched. Initially through precision strikes Pakistan air force brushed out the terrorists. Later on hand to hand fight of the Special Forces took control of the high mountains and remaining passes. As a result Mangal Bagh along with his fighters fled into Afghanistan’s district, Naziyan that is situated across Tirah valley in Nangarhar province. Failure to regain control over Tirah, Rajgal, and Kachkol valleys of Pakistan; Mangal Bagh teamed up a new force parallel to ISIS in Afghanistan to take out the Afghan Taliban but was killed in 2016 by a US drone strike (Shah, 2016).

11.19.4. Operation Khyber-IV:

Khyber-IV was a decisive military offensive launched by Pakistan army in endorsement of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad under the direct supervision of General Qamer Javed Bajwa on July 15, 2017, which was completed within 37 days on August 21, 2017. The operation targeted the remaining pockets of Khyber Agency particularly Raigal and Shawal Valleys against the Daesh and their local affiliates. This aimed securing the Pakistan border with Afghanistan to prevent their cross border infiltration. As a result Pakistan army successfully secured around 253 square kilometers. In the operation 52 terrorists were killed and around four were arrested including one
who surrendered himself to security forces. Pakistan army lost two of its brave soldiers, whereas around 15 were seriously injured during the operation (Nazar, 2017). During the operation Pakistan army dismantled the network of all terrorist outfits in Khyber Agency. Indian made improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were recovered and dismantled. Moreover, Indian spy Kalbushan Yadheve linked terrorist network was also dismantled who back in 2013 ignited the sectarian rift in Rawalpindi Raja Bazaar mosque (Geo News, 2017).

Khyber operations were fast and decisive as previous operations have been time taking and rigorous in taking control over vast area of tribal belt FATA and PATA in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Though, the journey was painful and times taking but the success which was achieved through physical military operations has no parallels to notion of victory. The environment, time, space, and relative strength were totally made favorable for Pakistan which initially was maneuvered by the terrorist outfits operating in the area. The compilation of military operations was now converted into developmental along with hold phase that both security and political establishments were reciprocating through their permanent presence. Complementing this argument General Asif Ghafoor during his press briefing in the wake of Khyber-IV operation explained that:

“Around 500 families had been living in this area, which are currently staying in safer places as temporarily displaced persons (TDPs)... 95 per cent of the TDPs have returned to their homes after completion of military operation in the valleys while remaining 5 per cent either did not want to go back or got themselves settled in other areas...Over the years, Pakistan Army managed to restore normalcy in war-torn areas. This includes the construction of 258 water supply schemes, 147 schools, 17 health units, 67 markets and 27 mosques” (Rehman, 2017).

Due to physical operations, tribal areas have gone through the trauma of displacement and without any doubt their sacrifice and support to outcast the terrorists will always be cherished in Pakistan. They are the real heroes who have not only left their homes but lived a life full of challenges and problems. Pakistan army and civil governments did their best to facilitate
their stay in dedicated camps. Many of them moved into other parts of Pakistan and joined their relatives. The whole country feels indebted by their resilience and notion of denial to allow terrorists uphold their integrity, freedom, culture, and ideology. Today, about 95% temporarily displaced persons (TDPs) are back in FATA. According to 2017 report of FATA Disaster Management Authority almost 320,000 families have moved back to their native villages. Around 17,000 families of North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies will be completing their schedule to move back in 2018. To facilitate their smooth settlement, the Federal Government in Islamabad provided each family Rs. 2500 and ration of six months (The Express Tribune, 2017a).

Khyber-IV was the last physical military operation in tribal areas though Operation Radd-ul-Fassad is still continued as intelligence based operation (IBO) all around Pakistan. In the aftermath of Khyber-IV operation, Pakistan army established around 91 military posts only in Rajgal Valley. In a press briefing, General Asif Ghafoor, DG ISPR claimed that until August 2017 around 24,000 IBO operations were conducted in the country that sharply declined the impetus of terrorist attacks in Pakistan (Pakistan Today, 2017).

11.20. Operation Radd-ul-Fassad and 5th Generation Warfare:

As explained earlier that in Pakistan 5th generation war is actively fought by the enemies. Funding has been allocated and all possible means are being applied to detract focus of the national security institutions. For example, Indian violations on Line of Control provide a clear evidence to detract Pakistan from its focus to curb the menace of terrorism on its soil. Social media has been used to spread disinformation and trap young brains to target Pakistan’s resilience. Cyber attacks are continuously jeopardizing the security of state. Propaganda warfare through electronic and print media is at its peak. It is believed that General Bajwa never shows
his cards and reveal action plan to mitigate a situation but when he decides to take action to checkmate, he do not hesitate to continue until logical conclusion. In his first Core Commanders Conference he had identified the center of gravity and the same words were used by Major General Asif Ghafoor, Director General-Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) in a press briefing that highlighted the priorities of General Bajwa (ISPR, 2017a).

The 2017 National Census revealed that majority of the population in Pakistan includes youth. The youth bulge has been very well taken by the army to decode 5th generation warfare and at many occasions Army Chief has directly addressed them. For example while talking to Baluchistan youth on September 28, 2017 in GHQ, General Bajwa said that:

“I take lot of pride that I am a Balochi. I say that I have a lot of love and affection for Balochistan. And now our focus is towards Balochistan. Pakistan cannot succeed; Pakistan cannot develop, if there’s no cohesion between all the Federating Units... Have faith in this country. Together, if we join hands, we can take, sky is the limit. This is our country; we have to live here, and we have to die here. My stakes are in this country. I will die in this country” (ISPR, 2017b).

General Qamar Javed Bajwa has been striving hard to convince international community with past glory and future prospects of the country, which somehow had been ignored and deliberately faded away from Pakistan’s progressive status. While putting forward this case, General Bajwa during 2018 Munich Security Conference used the following words:

“When I was young, Pakistan was as normal a country as any other on the earth. Jacqueline Kennedy flew to Karachi, the Beatles visited us, Queen Elizabeth went to the Khyber Pass to chat with the tribesmen. We were a favourite tourism destination for many. We were hosting world cups of hockey and cricket, besides many other multinational events. World Bank termed Pakistan in 1963 as one of the most progressive and dynamic developing country in Asia” (Dunya News, 2018).

The doctrine which Pakistan had followed to counter the insurgency is based on the learning and experience that began immediately in the aftermath of 9/11 incident. Pakistan from the very first day claimed that there is no military solution to it rather mixture of both needs to be
applied. Comprehensive strategy was deemed necessary to deny the space to militants and allow development play its role. Basically the idea revolved around the political strategy that would have few elements into it such as economic element, legal element, military element, and religious counter narrative element. All these elements started evolving immediately after 2001 and became founding pillars of the political doctrine to counter militancy in Pakistan. The execution of the doctrine was mainly vested in government responsibility rather military wanted to implement the elements. That is why whole of government approach along with whole of nation approach was required to come on the same page and mobilize all available resource to counter the menace of militancy and terrorism. Relying or utilizing only kinetic means in shape of military operations was a short term solution. In fact, Pakistan during General Musharraf had already adopted multi-tiered and multi-layered approach under comprehensive strategy. Few of the important facets are explained below:

i. For example, even prior to 9/11 incident Pakistan on August 14, 2001 has banned two rival militant outfits involved in sectarian violence that included Sunni affiliate of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Shiite affiliate of Sipah-e-Mohammad (The Irish Times, 2001). The ban outburst the reaction of the affected organizations that came into alliance with terrorist organizations like Jaish-e-Muhammad (Army of Muhammad), whose leader was Ahmed Omar Sheikh; a man who kidnapped and killed the American journalist Daniel Pearl (Jehl, 2002). The amalgamation of sectarian banned outfits with terrorist’s organizations became the worst nightmare for Pakistan. To handle the situation a comprehensive approach was deemed necessary.

ii. Secondly, even prior to August 2001 ban on militant organizations, Pakistan has launched a countrywide de-weaponization campaign, which started in the year 2000 and continued until 2001. All those organizations which collect money for
Jihad in Kashmir, had opened countrywide offices, and projected their programs through banners were altogether banned by the then General Pervez Musharraf.

iii. Pakistan had already started Maddrassa Reform while having an agreement with Wafaq-ul-Madarras. The use of loudspeakers to spell hate speech, ban on jihadi literature, and restrictions were imposed on distribution of pamphlets. Denunciation of sectarian elements came with stringent actions (Dawn, 2001).

iv. With the passage of time Pakistan took stringent actions to curtail money trail feeding the militants in Pakistan (The Guardian, 2007).

All the above steps were taken to strengthen the multi-tiered and multi-layered comprehensive approach to counter extremism, fundamentalism and terrorism in Pakistan. This was clear and well thought strategy that Pakistan charted out years before 9/11 incident happened. General Pervez Musharraf himself stated categorically during his national address delivered on January 12, 2002 and elaborated salient features of his policy. He said:

“On February 15, 2001, we promulgated the Anti-Weaponization Ordinance. Through this law, we launched a de-weaponization campaign in Pakistan. On the 5th of June, on the occasion of the Seerat Conference, I addressed Ullema belonging to all schools of thought and spoke firmly to them against religious extremism. On the 14th of August 2001, we finally took a very important decision to ban Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Muhammad and placed Sipah-e-Sahaba and TJP (Tehreek-e-Jaffari Pakistan) under observation. In addition, on a number of occasions, I called Ullema and Mashaikh and held extensive consultations with them. The objective was to take them on board in our campaign against terrorism and extremism. These measures have been continuing since our government assumed office in 1999. I am explaining all this to you in great detail only because of the fact that the campaign against extremism undertaken by us from the very beginning is in our own national interest. We are not this under advice or pressure from anyone. Rather, we are conscious that it is in our national interest. We are conscious that we need to rid our society of extremism and this is being done right from the beginning. This domestic reforms process was underway when a terrorist attack took place against the United States on the 11th of September” (Musharraf, 2002).

One of the biggest drawback to comprehensive approach was the bureaucratic compulsions that often slowdowns the process. Therefore, it is always important to refresh the process after four to five years. General Musharraf’s comprehensive approach also faced the same dilemma, which slowed the progress of his domestic reforms. Though slow but still
Pakistan managed to get along the pace of national security challenges. Sometime efficient and sometime unsatisfactory but the response of comprehensive approach took the nation out of crises.

As charted out earlier that the contemporary security environment is totally different that of 2001 and today it’s the 5th generation warfare that is poisoning the roots of Pakistan. To this very context the incident of Noreen Laghari best fits, who was a young student of medical sciences studying at one of public sector universities of medical sciences in Sind province of Pakistan. She was exploited by the ISIS militants and was suppose to be used in a suicide attack in Lahore (The News, 2017a). The law enforcement agencies well on time decoded the plot and arrested all the terrorists. The incident of Noreen Leghari being an MBBS student of second year made people of Pakistan surprised and shattered. General Bajwa was requested by the parents of Noreen Leghari to rescue her and in response to request army chief tasked the job to Director General Military Intelligence to bring her back. She was rehabilitated and brought back to mainstream. This was in fact a classic example of 5th generation warfare with hybrid elements that are trying to takeover and trap the youth bulge of Pakistan. Militants while influencing the minds of youth push them towards passivity and isolation that becomes their main strength. Pakistan army has well in time decoded the threat and had directly decided to interact with youth bulge to provide them space in development and progress.

The challenges of 5th generation warfare even isolated Pakistani youth from sports and grounds were no more places of healthy activities. Pakistan has been hosting international events in cricket, hockey, and squash to mention few. Pakistan had been known as one of the best cricket country but through organized campaign, cricketing was taken out of its grounds. In 2009 when Sri Lankan team was playing matches in Pakistan, around 12 terrorist attacked on the
convoy carrying players in the bus. This incident isolated the youth from their favorite game and isolated the grounds from international cricket in Pakistan (The Express Tribune, 2017b). Irony of the fact was the cancellation of Indian cricket team matches on Pakistan’s soil. Pakistan has never cancelled matches whatsoever political and security environment prevailed between the two nations. Unfortunately, when terrorist incident happened against Sri Lankan team, India unilaterally decided to cancel the matches and categorically squeezed Pakistani option to play on her soil too. The boycott was not only an act full of suspicions but also meant to isolate Pakistan from international cricket (The Express Tribune, 2017c). The boycott not to play on Pakistani or their soil further extended and denounced the option of playing cricket in any third country (Malhotra, 2017).

It is important to highlight the significance of cricket in Pakistan. When it comes to cricket of Pakistan with India, whole nation comes together and join their hands and hearts to watch winning Pakistan. The day usually becomes a national holiday when everyone, old or young, women or men, kid or adult, sits in front of TV and becomes the player of its team. Fascinating is the point of national cohesion and coexistence because on that very day no one remains Pashtun, Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi, Saraiki, Kashmiri, Gilgiti, Balti, Sunni or Shia but activates the mode of nationalism and becomes a true Pakistani. If Pakistan wins the match from India, the whole nation celebrates the day just like the day of independence. And if it loses the match from India then the whole nation mourns the defeat and creates bondage towards the destiny of collectiveness in happiness and pleasure. India knowing the fact that whether it losses or wins, in both cases Pakistan gets united and wins the match on the ground of nationhood.

Therefore, it snatched this very opportunity from Pakistani nation and run amok from playing cricket with Pakistan. After all, the biggest investment of India in Pakistan has been to
denounce oneness and unity that it had been working against through its serving intelligence spies like Kalbushan Yadev. Exploiting Urdu speaking Pakistanis through Altaf Hussain (MQM), Baluchis through Brahamdad Bugti (BRP), and Pakhtuns through Manzoor Pashteen (PTM) are few of the glaring examples of Indian strategy of hybrid war with that of 5th generation warfare against Pakistan. Thanks to wise and Pakistan loving Urdu speaking countrymen, resilient Baluchis, and brave Pakhtuns; who altogether have defeated the Indian ambitions along with Afghani intelligence intervention that want to slash Pakistan into many ethnic and sectarian pieces.

Realizing the linkage of sports with 5th generation warfare General Qamar Javed Bajwa utilized all means available to circumvent the sports blockade faced by Pakistan. General Bajwa is very fond of cricket and himself had played first class cricket. He invited international players like Ronaldinho, a famous football player to uplift the image of sports in Pakistan (Din, 2017). A football match was also organized in Karachi which was played by the guest players. Pakistan army had been providing security to Pakistan Super League (PSL) as well. It had been ensuring the smooth functioning of matches where international players are part of teams (The Express Tribune, 2018a). Later on at Gaddafi Stadium, a series of T-20 matches under ‘Independence Cup’ was organized where World Eleven Team consisted of players from 7 different countries participated. Three matches were played under the series that was supported by the International Cricket Council (ICC) (Dawn, 2017a).

Pakistan army had constructed the Bobali Sports Complex in Miranshah, North Waziristan. It had also organized an international cricket match in Bobali Sports Complex; an area that was once called the most dangerous places on earth. International team was consisted of British journalists along with others who played the match in Bobali stadium. People from
different corners of North Waziristan along with other parts of FATA rushed to watch the match. The stadium was full from inside and many more in number waited outside. The match was televised live and gave an international message that the region is paradise of peace. Though, Briton lost the match but won the hearts of North Waziristan in particular and the nation as a whole. This was clear manifestation of the achievement that terrorism has been out casted from the region and sports and peace is installed on the grounds (Bennett-Jones, 2017). Terrorist made this region a factory of producing terrorism, weapons, and suicide bombers but Pakistan converted the area into producing world class cricketers. Today the environment is different than the dark days when militancy was the only activity in the area. People are back, infrastructure is installed, schools are opened, grounds are developed, markets are operating, hospitals are working, and smiles are on the faces of tribesmen chanting only one slogan ‘long live Pakistan’.

Critics without understanding the nature of 5th generation warfare criticized the role of army for organizing cricket matches and inviting international footballers in Pakistan. In fact, this is a new war that has charted out a new defense line which is to fight through new principles. All these efforts of Pakistan army are part and parcel of denouncing the space to 5th generation warfare. Fighting 5th generation war cannot be independent response of army neither armed forces are the only target of this new war rather the whole country is target of this threat. It starts from an individual and ends at an individual. Therefore, every institution and each individual has to play its part to expose the 5th generation war and fight it amicably. The work which Pakistan armed forces have done is not an end in itself but a beginning of the end. They have only created and shaped an environment that would lead the nation towards enduring peace where the whole of the nation approach has to play key role. In the 5th generation environment, state plays the secondary role as people have to look after themselves. People have to reject the propaganda by
complementing the efforts of the state that are done to denounce the space for 5th generation warfare. If people are with the state then the new war in shape of 5th generation warfare fails to operate. This in fact is the strength of Pakistan where people have rejected the space to 5th generation warfare and stood firm with the state to lead the peace to its logical end.

One of the most important parts of 5th generation warfare belongs to sleeper cells that the militants have established over the period of time at different parts of Pakistan. Sleeper cells are in fact those secret hideouts of the terrorists that look normal like residential compounds in the civilian areas having kids and family around. But at time of need these sleeper cells are activated to conduct anti-state operations. These sleeper cells are also used to give refuge, facilitation, funding, storage to deposit ammunitions and to provide technical support to the terrorists. The phenomenon of the sleeper cells is prevalent all around the world wherever terrorist organizations are operating. Even during peace times terrorist organizations develop sleeper cells and at time of need activate them and achieve their notorious objectives. Whether it is United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France or any other country; these were the sleeper cells that helped in the execution of terrorist attacks in these countries (Ensor & Whitehead, 2016).

General Bajwa is lucky to some extent as he has mounted a gallop in hearts of Pakistani nation. Before his command almost eight major operations were conducted, gains are gathered and the backbone of militant organizations to reorganize and to confront in alliance is almost vanished. Now Pakistan has entered into the phase of consolidating the gains, which is time taking and slow. Claiming that the last of the terrorists are killed and there is no more threat to terrorist attacks is somewhat daydreaming. That is why intelligence based operations (IBOs) to decode the sleeper cells is one of the most important task that General Bajwa is currently going through. Though, the nature of operation is now countrywide but still there are few regions such
as Punjab particularly South Punjab that has remained untouched. The wider scope needs to be made concise to target the areas where terrorist sleeper cells could have more presence. The scope is again linked with the IBOs that primarily drive the direction of concentration. It seems that the government and law enforcement agencies are more comfortable to expose a wider scope rather fixing its direction towards specific region.

General Bajwa’s decision to start Operation Radd-ul-Fasad on February 22, 2017 was meant to dismantle sleeper cells of the terrorists (The Express Tribune, 2017d). The operation complemented the law enforcement agencies tracing the secret hideouts. This became the primary objective of General Bajwa and gave impetus to countrywide intelligence based operations (IBOs). As General Bajwa stressed on the multipronged approach to curb the menace of terrorism when he was speaking at 2018 Munich Security Conference in Germany, when he said:

“In our war against terror, military operations were not the only thing that we conducted. We realized very early that the complex problem of violent extremism could not be handled through military operations only. First and foremost, we generated public opinion to defeat the terrorists’ narrative. We also formulated the National Action Plan, aimed at fighting terrorism and gradually rooting out extremism. We launched Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad in 2017, we the aim of: Firstly, targeted kinetic and enhanced law enforcement operations to locate and destroy the residual terrorist presence across the country. Second prong of our campaign, comprises supporting the National Action Plan, that involves better prosecution, policing, education reforms, along with curbing terror financing and hate speech” (Dunya News, 2018).

The Bajwa Doctrine is very much dependent on the overall national resolve to consolidate the gains achieved through physical and IBO based operations. The enduring peace and stability is very much dependent on both political and economic environment, which is mostly out of military range and comes directly under the will of parliament and government in office. Otherwise the reversal in the gains is very much possible, a situation for which terrorists and hostile nations are striving for. To consolidate the gains made are primarily dependent on
two things. First step involve some of the important aspects that are needed to be taken on internal front. In step two Pakistan had to coordinate with Afghanistan on external front. Specifically, the cardinals of Radd-ul-Fasaad Operation highlight the following points:

i. First and foremost is the task to curb the facilitators and abettors spread across the country particularly those camouflaged under Afghan refugee setup. After identifying them, dismantling becomes the priority under Radd-ul-Fasaad.

ii. Secondly, the management of Pak-Afghan border shall be done in such a manner that could completely disallow the cross border infiltration. Nor from Pakistani side any terrorist or illegal immigrant should enter neither from Afghanistan side threat could perpetuate and crossover into Pakistan. Pakistan on its own had already started fencing the 2,611 kilometers long porous border and posts have been established. If in coming years’ border management is amicably done then both the sides will have fruitful results in terms of enduring peace.

iii. Thirdly, in the Radd-ul-Fasaad Operation Pakistan had promulgated a de-weaponization campaign. There should be no illegal weapon anywhere in Pakistan. Under no circumstances illegal weapons shall be accommodated.

The overall objective of the Bajwa Doctrine is to get the normalized Pakistan the way it existed prior to 9/11 more specifically prior to Afghan war of 80’s, when there was no weaponization in the country, no suicide bombing happen, no incident of terrorism occur. Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad is the manifestation of this objective to get back Pakistan on track of normalcy and peace. It is important to highlight that the intelligence based operations are quite different to those of kinetic operations that involve large contingent of military personnel. IBOs are quite hard and dangerous operations. Until Operation Zarb-e-Azb Pakistan armed forces were tasked to conduct military operations in physical domain to clear large parts of Pakistani territory and to establish writ of the government. When media convoys were taken to brief about the conduct and achievements of the operations, icons of war in shape of infantry, troops, tanks,
helicopters, and command structure was quite visible. Even the bombing that Pakistan Air Force did on terrorist hideouts was observed in real environment. As mentioned above Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad is not a military campaign that operates in a physical domain rather it is an operation which is going on in all times whether it’s a day or night. Intelligence based operations takes the lead which are continuously happening. IBOs are conducted in residential areas, where terrorists live like a common civilian while hiding their notorious intentions.

To capture these elements human and technical methods are used and therefore intelligence agencies play vital role in this process. Even to neutralize one target there are weeks, months or in some cases years involved. Each case is assigned a special officer that keeps an eye on sleeper cells and monitors their movement. When it is hundred percent confirmed that in the sleeper cell, a hard core terrorist is residing or about to arrive, the intelligence lead is forwarded to special forces to conduct the physical operation. These are dangerous operations as Pakistan had lost many of its brave officers and soldiers during IBO based operations such as Major Ishaq Shaheed was martyred in DI Khan while conducting a search operation (Naveed, 2017). Even at the last stage when operation is conducted there are chances of failure which happen due to sudden movement of the terrorists who got pulse or somehow moved out. Pakistan had conducted thousands of IBOs that helped to recover stockpiles of weapons, busted the terrorist’s networks and hundreds of incidents are averted. That is why the physical part of Radd-ul-Fasaad is silent though its fruits slowly emerge and contributed to install enduring peace.

Bajwa Doctrine played decisive role to combat not only ongoing terrorism but also brought positive results to mitigate the threats of extremism in Pakistan. Incorporating national resolve with that of highlighting national consensus, the doctrine has achieved great success in short span of time. For example, under the platform of International Islamic University
Islamabad, around 1854 religious scholars came together to denounce terrorism in Pakistan. The collective consensus of the scholars formed a national narrative under ‘religious fatwa’ which was printed as ‘Pegham-e-Pakistan’. The overstretched military operations of Pakistan army which were launched immediately after the incident of 9/11 had killed around 1100 Al-Qaeda terrorists, a remarkable contribution for install global peace. More specifically Operation Raddul Fassad under the Bajwa Doctrine has conducted massive intelligence based operations in Pakistan. For example “more than 80,000 combing and intelligence based operations were held around the country during which approximately five ton explosive material and 38,000 weapons were recovered” (Dunya News, 2019). Moreover, during Operation Raddul Fassad 56 terrorists have been sentenced to death by the military courts, which were established in the post-APS attack of December 2014. Only in year 2018, more than 131 cross border terrorists attempts were curtailed on Pak-Afghan border.

In 2014 immediately after the December 16 attack on Army Public School, all political parties of Pakistan came together and developed a National Action Plan (NAP). This was initiated by Pakistan army and through national consensus a plan of action was devised. Under point number 3 of NAP that dealt with ‘Proscribed Organizations,’ different extremist organizations indulged into suspicious activities were proscribed. As of March 05, 2019 there are around 70 organizations which are banned in Pakistan. Four other organizations are under-watch by the Government of Pakistan (NACTA, 2019). Special military courts were made. Anti-terrorist Force was raised. Altogether, 20 points were unanimously agreed in NAP, details of which are already given in Chapter Eight, ‘The Menace of Violent Extremism and Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Strategy’.
Parallel to NAP, Pakistan army was decisively fighting against terrorists of North Waziristan under Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which was a kinetic campaign. Due to physical campaign against terrorism not only Pakistan armed forces were engaged but also civil law enforcement agencies including police played front line role to combat the menace of extremism and terrorism. Efforts to combat extremism and terrorism continued with full zeal and zest. The successful completion of kinetic campaign against the terrorists, on February 22, 2017 General Bajwa declared Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad and reassured his commitment to go after the sleeping cells of remaining terrorists hiding inside urban and rural areas of the country. Two most important cardinal points of Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad were:

i. Implementation on NAP in letter and spirit.

ii. Execution of intelligence based operations (IBOs) throughout the country and launch of a de-weaponization campaign.

This showed Pakistan’s resolve and commitment to mitigate residual thought while negating the social space to its abettors and facilitators. Pakistan has travelled a long way to install peace and security. General Bajwa’s resolve has paved the way to achieve righteous stature of Pakistan with that of international expectations. Bajwa doctrine in this domain became the key direction and decisive policy posture of Pakistan unequivocal determination.

11.20.1. Military Diplomacy:

Today all the elements and players of 5th generation warfare are visible and who is who in this game is no more an untold story. The capture of Indian intelligence officer Commander Kulbhushan Yadev who was operating in Pakistan had been an exceptional success and there are few countries that have been successful to capture a spy of this rank and significance. During
investigation he confessed all his undercover activities and acts of terrorism that killed hundreds of innocent Pakistanis and created chaos and insecurity in the country. Kalbushan confessed that:

“...My name is Commander Kulbhushan Yadav and I am the serving officer of Indian Navy... I was picked up by RAW in 2013 end. Ever since I have been directing various activities in Balochistan and Karachi at the behest of RAW and deteriorating law and order situation in Karachi, I was basically the man for Mr. Anil Kumar Gupta who is the joint secretary of RAW and his contacts in Pakistan especially in Balochistan Student Organisation...” (The Hindu, 2017).

Kulbhushan Yadav activities were identified prior to his capture. He was tracked and allowed to continue for some time so that he could be taken as red-handed. Finally, in April 2017 he was detained by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan while having meetings with his Pakistani network. Kalbhushan Yadhav is another example and proof of hybrid warfare which has been launched against Pakistan (Khan, 2017a). Baluchistan is about 46 percent of Pakistan’s geography and hosts around 12 percent share of the population. Pakistan had continuously fought a war in FATA for about 17 years which hosts about 2.5 percent of the population and approximately 3 percent of the geography. Pakistan deployed around 200,000 troops to secure the territory and rendered huge sacrifices. Baluchistan is vast and its dynamics in light of CPEC project are strategic. While Pakistan was busy in FATA, the hostile intelligence agencies fasten their seat belts and established a huge network. Today government has started a program about ‘Khush-Haal Baluchistan’ [Progressive Baluchistan], which is to uplift socio-economic conditions of the province and armed forces are the key security providers to the project.

Pakistan considered the human plea of Kalbhushan Yadhev and arranged a meeting with his wife and mother that Indian government and media altogether ruined under propaganda (Siddiqui, 2017). Regardless of thankful to Pakistan’s big heart that it had accommodated the family of Indian spy, New Delhi opened fire at Line of Control on the very same day and killed three of Pakistani soldiers (The Express Tribune, 2017e). Pakistan armed forces official media
cell Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) time and again had exposed the dynamics of 5th
general warfare and hybrid warfare while taking the nation into confidence. ISPR had been
categorically denouncing all internal and external efforts whether they originate from India,
Afghanistan or United States. Pakistan army with its limited resources had been countering this
molded version of non-kinetic warfare. This in fact led to the origin of ‘Military Diplomacy’ in
Pakistan that General Bajwa proclaimed to balance the imbalance. He concluded numerous visits
to Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Oman, Iran, China, Russia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Australia and
Saudi Arabia to mention few. The purpose of military diplomacy was to protect Pakistan’s
national interest and on the other hand to counter new great game meant to isolate Pakistan (The
Nation, 2017).

The reason to do military diplomacy was in fact the failure of civil administration to
understand national security priorities and lead the country on international fronts. Moreover, all
the government machinery and offices were looking after the ousted Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif who was disqualified by the Supreme Court on famous Panama Verdict (Hashim, 2017).
Regardless of fighting against the looming threats emanating from hybrid warfare, the whole
government became part of 5th generation warfare and established anti army narratives. These
narratives appeared on national television PTV and private electronic and print media. The
armed forces and institutions that were supposed to receive government support to defend
national security and territorial integrity were severely under target of the political regime. Issues
such as Dawn Leaks (Khan, 2017b), Bombay Mantra (Yousaf, 2018), and Alien Force (The
Express Tribune, 2018b) are few to mention that clutched the armed forces and paved an ideal 5th
generation warfare environment to anti-Pakistan forces along with hostile intelligence agencies
to manipulate the situation both at internal and external fronts. Not a single government minister
during the crises charted out national security priorities and pleaded the case rather all of them were throwing fire on Pakistan army. Allocation of portfolio of Foreign Affairs that was given to Syed Tariq Fatemi as Special Assistant to the Prime Minister was regardless of serving the country dented the national security in ‘Dawn Leaks’. Mr. Tariq Fatemi was deposed from his post in the aftermath of an inquiry (Dawn, 2017b).

If one have a look at the ambassadorial appointments that civil regimes of Pakistan had been nominating for its Embassy in United States, the whole picture gets quite clear. Mr. Hussain Haqqani case could help understand the situation in an easy way. He was appointed by the then President of Pakistan Mr. Asif Ali Zardari, who was the Co-Chairman of the ruling party, Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians (PPPP). Mr. Hussain Haqqani’s credit is remembered as crafter of one of the most significant national security scandal ‘Memogate’. The scandal revealed that Mr. Haqqani being Ambassador of Pakistan was serving the interests of United States and maligning its own armed forces (Khan, 2012b). Even when one of foreign office diplomat Mr. Aizaz Chaudhry was appointed as Pakistan’s ambassador to US, his colleague Dr. Abdul Basit the then Pakistan’s High Commissioner in India, wrote him a letter and criticized his dubious character as diplomat (The News, 2017b). Last but not the least, the current Pakistan ambassador in United States is someone who had no experience of diplomacy neither had served in foreign office. Mr. Ali Jahangir Siddiqui is a businessman and hold close ties to the previous government of deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who wanted a close associate in Washington not to represent Pakistan but to sell anti-state mantra (Pakistan Today, 2018). Appointment of Pakistan’s ambassador to UAE by the Nawaz Sharif government was another example. There are lot of examples one could refer to establish a point that how different regimes have installed their
own stalwarts on diplomatic positions to serve vested interests with a purpose to entangle and isolate Pakistan.

Before this section of the study continue in explaining the diplomatic fronts of military strategy, it is important to highlight the deliberately propagated stigma around ‘Pakistan army’. Just like the cricket love of Pakistani nation, Army is another institution that unites the whole nation. In fact, when someone looks in the ranks of Pakistan army or specifically at uniform of soldiers, there exist no Pashtun, Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi, Saraiki, Kashmiri, Gilgiti, Balti, Sunni or Shia but a true Pakistani. The so-called narrative around civil-military relations is a vested effort to poison the trust that Pakistani nation as a whole cherish with its forces as the frontline defense of their integrity, culture, ideology and national survival. One of the biggest investments the foreign hostile intelligence agencies along with their governments have made is around exploitation of ‘civil-military relations’ in Pakistan. This has been done through continuity of published material with that of on-air discussions. Whether its social media, print or electronic; the world seems addicted and occupied with only one problem and that is ‘civil-military relations’ in Pakistan. That is why when the world media or scholarship was so occupied and busy with propagating and highlighting the issues of ‘civil-military relations’ in Pakistan; the Russian Federation dented the Presidential Elections in United States.

The challenges of 5th generation warfare and narratives, actions, policies and nexus developed by Pakistani mainstream political regimes to denounce the armed forces needs an answer and the questions could be: why they have done this? Does Pakistani political establishment deliberately allowed India to bash Pakistan at international forums? Which forces drove all this campaign against Pakistani national security institutions? The answers are the combination of explanations which are already given and are elaborated in next few paragraphs.
The homegrown 5th generation war is not out of context rather is very well connected with its masters like India who at the same very time were isolating Pakistan. Indian top officials without following any protocols and fulfilling security requirements were traveling to Pakistan to have private conversations with the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. On December 25, 2015 without any official plans Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a surprise visit to Lahore and attended Nawaz Sharif’s granddaughter’s wedding (Rediff News, 2015). The conman and the famous spy, Mr. Ajit Doval, who had operated in Pakistan as RAW agent for many years also accompanied the Indian Prime Minister. This time Mr. Ajit Doval entered in Pakistan as National Security Advisor to Indian Prime Minister (Khaleej Times, 2015). He was a man who crafted ‘Defensive Offence’ strategy to strangulate Pakistan on multidimensional fronts. His famous speech that he gave in 2014 while elaborating the strategy said that:

“In defensive offence we start working on the vulnerabilities of Pakistan--it can be economic, internal security, political, its isolation internationally by exposing their terrorist activities. It can be defeating their policies in Afghanistan--making it difficult for them to manage internal political balance or internal security… Pakistan's vulnerability is many times higher than that of India. Once they know that India has shifted its gear from the defensive mode to defensive offence, they will find that it is unaffordable for them. You can do one Mumbai, you may lose Balochistan. There is no nuclear war involved in that and there is no troop’s engagement. If you know the tricks, we know the tricks better than you” (Narayanan, 2016).

This pinched the national security institutions as Indian military was destabilizing Pakistan through its covert operations in Baluchistan, Karachi, and FATA. The situation at Line of Control was out of control as every day Indian troops violate the ceasefire and target civilian population living inside Pakistan. Also in Kashmir, Indian military had been violating human rights and using pallet guns blinding hundreds of Kashmiri youth. Furthermore, Sajjan Jindal an Indian economic tycoon and right hand to Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelled in Pakistan and met Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in hill resort of Murree. First, Jindal made a surprise visit and secondly he did not have a visa for Murree. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif without security
clearance and visa sanctioning took him to Murree and had a secret meeting without any government official around him. Until today there is no official record of their communication and no one knows what was discussed between the two.

This further gave rise to speculations in Pakistan and raised eyebrows in national security institutions (Miraj, 2017). Above this Maryam Nawaz the daughter of Nawaz Sharif tweeted, “Mr. Jindal is an old friend of the Prime Minister. Nothing ‘secret’ about the meeting & should not be blown out of proportion. Thank you” (Pakistan Observer, 2017a). If one looks Maryam Nawaz’s tweet in context to their political campaign to put pressure and denounce Pakistan army that Nawaz Sharif did through Dawn Leaks (Khan, 2017b), Bombay Mantra (Yousaf, 2018), and Alien Force (The Express Tribune, 2018b); the whole picture gets a clear visual and lead connected with Indian interactions.

On official fronts, Indian State too had been actively pursuing a parallel route to isolate Pakistan from its decade’s old strategic friends. Such as Narendra Modi was travelling to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and UAE to mention few where he was presenting anti-Pakistan narrative and poisoning the brotherly space available to Islamabad. One of the biggest narratives that India wanted to sell against Pakistan is related to terrorism. New Delhi tags Pakistan as a terrorist state while forgetting its own record of sponsoring terrorism. Kulbhushan Yadhev is glaring example of that. Moreover, New Delhi has placed a condition for all regional and international stakeholders interested in its politics, economy and security to standby with its anti-Pakistan narrative. Unfortunately, other than few good friends of Pakistan many became victim to Indian trap. For example, Pakistan and United States had been partners since the inception of liberal order, when the world at large required Islamabad to stand in front of Soviet Communism.
Pakistan played its role at bilateral, regional and international stage while signing SEATO and CENTO in mid 50’s, agreements meant to contain the Soviet extension.

Also Pakistan played frontline role during 80s to counter Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and last but not the least the post 9/11 war against terrorism was not possible without Pakistan’s unlimited sacrifices and contributions. Even this prolonged and all weather strategic relations with the United States were compromised when India imposed a choice of ‘Pakistan negation’ as a precondition to Indo-US strategic partnership. Ironically, the ill experienced and unknown to US history, Clinton, Bush and Obama changed the course of history. Moreover, in continuation to his predecessors, Donald J. Trump was also playing like a ‘fool’, the word he used in his tweet for his predecessors about their policy towards Pakistan. President Trump tweeted:

“...The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they [Pakistan] have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” (Baynes, 2018).

This was Trump’s first tweet of the year 2018 and one could foresee what was waiting for Pakistan ahead. He not only stood by with New Delhi narrative but cunningly negated the exceptional sacrifices of Pakistan. The environment in which hybrid warfare operates is tagged between conventional and unconventional domains. Transformation towards any of the domains is solely dependent on diplomatic capability exercised by a state both at political and military fronts. Therefore, the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Muslim countries and its evolving strategic relations with United States comes under ‘diplomatic maneuvers’ which is a precondition to transform and tilt the hybrid warfare towards conventional domain. The diplomacy which previous governments were supposed to do particularly through Ministry of Foreign Affairs is already exposed in the previous paragraphs. It was that situation which invoked the need for ‘Military Diplomacy’ and General Bajwa visited different country’s to expose both internal and
external environment clutchèd by the elements of 5th generation warfare. Today, Pakistan has new Prime Minister in office, which not only cherishes a greater trust but also champions the professionalism and sacrifices rendered by the armed forces. Prime Minister Imran Khan in his speech delivered on Defense Day ceremony held on September 06, 2018, said that:

“The way our armed forces fought, the way our security institutions took up the nature of this war and the way they fought, no one else could do this. Our army and our security institutions are the only ones that remain intact because there is a system of merit and professionalism in it” (Insaaf, 2018).

Failure to use diplomatic means to mitigate the challenges of hybrid warfare was an inside collaboration to isolate Pakistan at international level and the task was fulfilled through amalgamation of both external factors and internal political collaborators. Pakistan has unresolved issues with India which are pending since decades. There will be no peace in the region until pending issues are not resolved. The Indian incapability to adopt direct strategy against Pakistan makes indirect strategy the most viable option for New Delhi to be applied against Islamabad. This in fact invokes the ‘Doval Doctrine of Defensive Offence’ which is very much in practice. Anything which brings peace in Pakistan goes anti to the interest of India. That is the reason why India has been sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan. There are lots of evidences that complement state terrorism of India that it had been conducting while using Afghanistan soil. Even Pakistan army during Bajaur Operation retrieved Indian currency and medicines made by Indian pharmaceutical companies.

The above evidences are just mentioned to establish the point otherwise there are hundreds of proofs including Kulbhushan Yadev and confessions of TTP leaders that establish Indian involvement in Pakistan. Under the prevailing circumstances its Indian responsibility to avoid acts of defiance and have to understand if Pakistan is instable so do they. The incumbent government in Pakistan had emphasized the importance of dialogue to settle unresolved issues
and Prime Minister Imran Khan wholeheartedly invited its Indian counterpart to resume bilateral talks. Pakistan’s offer was initially accepted and talks at foreign minister level was finalized (Times of India, 2018). This was considered a breakthrough to resume the dialogue process which was stalled since many years. Unfortunately, within a day India not only cancelled the agreed foreign ministers meeting on the sidelines of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session but also started war mantra against Pakistan. The Indian Army Chief Bipin Rawat threatened Pakistan on the very same day of cancellation of talks, which was responded by Pakistan through its commitment to dialogue (Rehman, 2018). This shows that how much Indian military is politicized. Regardless of keeping professional code of conduct as their pride, the Indian army chief immediately rushed to endorse Narendra Modi’s back out from the dialogue.

Pakistan’s efforts to install peace in the region are evident from its sacrifices. For example when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was running away from the dialogue and Indian Army Chief was dreaming for war, Pakistan army soldiers were conducting IBO operation in North Waziristan. Seven of Pakistani soldiers including Captain Junaid embraced ‘Shahadat’ in the operation by killing nine of the terrorists (The Express Tribune, 2018c). The world must understand that there is a price for peace and Pakistan had left nothing to show on its balance sheet as it had invested everything including its young future. On Indian deviation from dialogue and propagating warmongering, Pakistani Prime Minister reacted to New Delhi’s insanity and arrogance with disheartened feelings and reflected his disappointment through a tweet and wrote:

“Disappointed at the arrogant & negative response by India to my call for resumption of the peace dialogue. However, all my life I have come across small men occupying big offices who do not have the vision to see the larger picture” (Hindustan Times, 2018b).

The situation is unfolding and the strategic stability is completely at risk keeping in view Indian intolerance and use of violent tactics to sabotage peace in the region. Hybrid warfare has
not only exposed political and diplomatic vulnerabilities of Pakistan but economic domain also became fundamental challenge for the nuclear nation which is very much at play in the hand of internal and external anti-state elements.

**11.20.2. Economic Degradation:**

The second most important element used in hybrid warfare is the variable of economics. Pakistan has been victim of geo-economics and the situation not only clutched the state economy but also trapped the inbuilt capacity of national growth. This situation in fact erupted immediately after the 9/11 incident when Pakistan decided to stand with United States and became frontline state to counter Al-Qaeda and elements perpetuating violence and terrorism under the famous ‘Global War against Terrorism’. Based on English proverb “he that blows in the sky shall fill his own eye”, Pakistan was being wounded at his own. The insecurity that prevailed out of its partnership with United States started squeezing economic orientation of the country. Acts of terrorism gave impetus to insecurity and political environment became unfriendly to foreign direct investment. The leadership sharpened their priorities which preferred the projects giving them political mileage rather stability to deteriorating situation. This took the nation to a complete different phase of lowest GDP growth. All this, did not happened over nightly neither political stakeholders responsible to fix the economy were unaware of the evolving crises. In fact, they lead the crises deliberately and corrupted the immunity of inbuilt capacity to resist economic downfall. They also borrowed billions of dollars which sucked the very potential of socio-economic development that was necessary to mitigate challenges of national security. Until May 2018, the external debt of Pakistan was reached to US $91.8 billion (Rana, 2018).
The Nawaz Sharif government in office which remained in power from 2013 to 2018 faced enormous challenges of corruption even the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif himself was disqualified from the Supreme Court of Pakistan on the issue of Panama Scandal. Now he is convicted from the Accountability Courts and facing imprisonment (Asad, 2018). As explained in detail earlier that how he has exploited the domain of diplomacy by putting his own people on important foreign positions is not an exception. Mr. Nawaz Sharif not only corrupted his family but crooked the whole bureaucracy while converting them into personal stooges. The political clout he raised around him was another tier of incompetent lot that he placed on important government ministries. For example, the Finance Minister Ishaque Dar was his relative who crafted all ‘fudge figures’ and lies to convince the nation that the economy is booming. In fact, it was not the economy rather Mr. Ishaque Dar himself along with Prime Minister and his family were booming. Mr. Ishaque Dar ran away with all its corruption and assets to United Kingdom and is facing cases in the Pakistani courts. The main charge he faces belongs to money laundering and accumulation of assets beyond known sources of income and others. He is absconder and to bring him back the government in Islamabad is chasing him on court orders (Dawn, 2018). Mr. Ishaque Dar made fun of the courts in Pakistan when he submitted the so-called proof to justify about 90 percent increase in his wealth and assets. He produced three letters supposedly signed by Sheikh Nahyan bin Mubarak Al Nahyan, who heads UAE Ministry of Culture, Youth and Development. The letters claimed that Mr. Ishaque Dar being ‘Finance Advisor’ have been paid the amounts (Rana, 2017).

Irony of the fact is that these Sheikhs have produced readymade letters to provide relief to corrupt mafia of Pakistan. Dar got letters from UAE and his Prime Minister got letters from Qatar. Being Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Nawaz Sharif regardless of providing acclaimed
evidence that he promised to give to Supreme Court during his speech in the Parliament and later on a televised speech to nation preferred a run away while submitting a letter from Qatari Prince (NDTV, 2016). The letters along with trust deeds were bogus and thereafter faced court sentences on charges of corruption.

5th generation warfare ideally operates in the social domain to corrupt the minds of youth bulge which is the first and the last line of defense. This highlights the role of schools, colleges, and universities as the front line of defense against the 5th generation warfare. Under the prevailing environment of 5th generation warfare it will not be wrong to write that, ‘nations are built in class rooms and they are destroyed in class rooms’. Unfortunately, masters of the 5th generation warfare corrupted the political elite of Pakistan. Does an opponent of Pakistan need to corrupt the youth bulge when they have successfully corrupted the whole political elite? When Prime Minister and his cabinet is corrupt and using all illegal means to plunder state resources then why anyone should invest massively to exploit social fabric. The whole government was sucking the economy and helping their international masters to strangulate all opportunities to uplift the GDP. This was not for the first time when Nawaz Sharif, Ishaque Dar and their team members came into power in Pakistan. They have been ruling and plundering the resources of Pakistan since many decades. It was military coup of General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 that almost took them out of power. The incapability of General Musharraf to understand political dynamics gave them opportunity to enter in a deal which allowed them to stay out of politics for next decade. Benazir Bhutto was living abroad in self-exile and all of them came together in London and signed ‘Charter of Democracy’ (COD) in 2006 (Dawn, 2006). Other then rift with the armed forces of Pakistan, corruption was the most common problem for the two mainstream parties, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
(PMLN) of Nawaz Sharif. Within a year through United States and United Kingdom, General Musharraf was compromised to promulgate the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). NRO was signed on October 05, 2007 and gave amnesty to almost 8,000 politicians and government officials including Nawaz Sharif, Benazir Bhutto, Asif Ali Zardari to mention few. Under the ordinance charges of corruption, embezzlement, money laundering, murder, and terrorism from January 01 1986 to October 12, 1999 were officially pardoned. Though in 2009 Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the NRO promulgation unconstitutional and left the beneficiaries in limbo (BBC, 2009).

Why the United States and United Kingdom played decisive role to compromise General Pervez Musharraf to promulgate NRO to provide clean chit to people who were corrupt? Was that an effort to install 5th generation cronies who were easily manageable to fulfill international agenda in Pakistan? Did Ishaque Dar play the role of an economic hit-man? If yes then Benazir Bhutto, Asif Ali Zardari, Nawaz Sharif, Ishaque Dar, and many more thousands were offered amnesty due to United States and United Kingdom. Regardless of serving Pakistan their primary job was to offer their services to their regional and international masters. It could be assumed that if 5th generation cronies are trapped today their saviors will do their best to take them away from the clutches of rule and law, so that they can be reinstalled again. The reality prevails around the debt of US $91.8 billion that has almost made the national security vulnerable to both internal and external threats.

Critics could argue that when all this was happening and people conscious to such hybrid threats were ringing the bells, why national security mechanism failed to address the situation? Or no one knows that what is financial terrorism and how cronies in shape of economic hit-man paralyze the national economy? Was everything happening under a planned and organized
strategy to economically jeopardize the nation and seek control of its nuclear assets? The dilemma of the situation is in fact very much related to economic outlook of Pakistan. It’s the economy which defines security and political stability of a nation. Only economically stable country could enjoy political development and prosperity. Nation’s portfolio with declining economic indicators not only compromises the development but place national security at stake. This was done by the successive political regimes that deliberately created ‘fudge figures’ and lied to nation. Pakistan remained undefeated on military fronts particularly when it comes to war against terrorism and imposition of sub-conventional warfare.

Unfortunately, on geo-political and geo-economic fronts the national leadership failed to protect interests of Pakistan. Possessed with an exceptional geography that is decisive to define geo-economics and geo-politics of regional and global powers; Pakistan failed to exploit it for her own interests. The fault does not belong to geography rather it was the priorities of successive political regimes that made all efforts to compromise Pakistan’s ability to bargain its leverage over strategic environment. Even the self-confidence was shattered and ability of nuclear power was deemed necessary to made subservient to international protocols. Moreover, self-reliance was compromised both in economics and diplomacy. It is to understand that military is not the overall climax of national progress rather it’s the last defense line that at times of extreme insecurity plays its part. Even Pakistan armed forces had done a remarkable job to takeout Pakistan from the mess of terrorism and militancy but could not ultimately take off the nation to new horizons. It had done an excellent service to protect national cause and interests at times of vulnerability and crises. The defense is unbreakable so does the national resilience but the political cadre too have to respond amicably.
The first and foremost step in this direction could be to establish due process of law and without following ‘plea bargain’ tactics corrupt and dishonest elites shall be investigated. In case of proven guilty no deals alike NRO shall be offered. If that has been already done then people like Hussain Haqqani and Ishaque Dar would not be able to run away. If NRO is a good thing then why not this offer should be extended to Al-Qaeda, ISIS, TTP, TTA, and many hundred militant outfits that maintain fear, terror and a good track record of economic corruption and embezzlement? Interestingly, for some political commentators Nawaz Sharif during his government has done NRO with terrorists (Zuberi, 2016). This is further complimented through his exceptional friendship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who being Chief Minister of Gujarat State is known as ‘Butcher of Gujarat’ for facilitating and ordering massacre of Muslims in 2002 and being Prime Minister had been providing patronage to its military that raps, torture and murder innocent Kashmiris struggling for their legitimate right of self-determination. Due to his crimes against humanity and terrorist conduct, Modi was also denied United States visa back in 2005 (Tisdall, 2016).

The story of Modi’s terrorist activities through its prime intelligence agency RAW and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval has been already described. Modi was not the only friend of Nawaz Sharif. In fact he has been once a buddy to Osama Bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda Chief and received money from him to overthrow the then civilian government of Benazir Bhutto (Khaleej Times, 2017). Well, this is all politics and there are so much to say but the purpose of this section of the study is to highlight the nature of 5th generation warfare which infiltrates into political clout of a nation and do the maximum economic damage to its national security. Since, the above named political personalities have remained in-charge of the highest offices meant to protect
economic interests that is why a balanced analysis on their role was necessary to built and plead the arguments.

11.20.3. Information Warfare:

As explained above that the most important cronies who played decisive role to inflict diplomatic and economic domains of national security are out of country. The price is being paid by Pakistan on both diplomatic and economic fronts. Though, these two variables in terms of diplomacy and economics are not the only elements that 5th generation warfare targets. There is another important domain that 5th generation warfare exploits, which is information warfare. Up to what level the civilian regime under Nawaz Sharif was in compatibility with its national security institutions is adamantly clear from the scandal of ‘Dawn Leaks’. The news claimed that the Prime Minister has warned the military leadership in a National Security Meeting that they have to “act against the militants or face international isolation” (Almeida, 2016). Contrary to the claims of the news, there was no such discussion happened or warning issued by the PM. Rather it was a deliberate attempt by the Prime Minister Office to malign the army and provide sufficient material to international print and electronic media to fabricate hundred and thousands of anti-military publications that was busy in fighting terrorism inside Pakistan.

This propaganda not only demoralized the army but also sent mixed signals around the country about counter terrorism operations. The same happened internationally where Pakistan’s diplomacy was already facing crisis. The Nawaz Sharif government had built a narrative against its own institution which was used by the international community as charge sheet. Irony of the fact was that the Pakistani Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif was bashing its own institution but maintaining criminal silence over Indian spy Kulbhushan Yadhev, who was red-handedly captured in Baluchistan (Dawn, 2016b). Furthermore, on this issue when Pakistan pleaded the
case in International Court of Justice (ICJ), it was assumed in Islamabad that the match is fixed between Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi (Times of Islamabad, 2017). On the other hand Indian Prime Minister had been publically confessing about role of Indian military to break Pakistan apart in 1971, when it raised an army of militia under ‘Mukti Bahini’ in East Pakistan. Narendra Modi confession in Bangladesh about East Pakistan debacle was not only an endorsement of Pakistan’s long maintained stance that it was New Delhi that intervened into its internal affairs but also a proof how it [India] uses terrorism as a tool to disintegrated and suppress it neighboring states (Zaman, 2015). Even time and again Indian ministers were threatening Pakistan to break into parts but Nawaz Sharif government regardless of giving rebuttal to Narendra Modi and its ministers adopted to stay mum on national security issues (Times of India, 2017).

Unfortunately, Pakistan was not taken care and prepared to respond to informational aspect of hybrid warfare. Also the governments in office did not bother to make it priority rather themselves used it against the army. As explained earlier that in hybrid warfare it’s not the only military that has to respond rather whole of the national approach is required to mitigate the threat. There is no distinction in the role of any institution as all works as a team to deny the space for hybrid warfare.

11.20.4. International Law:

When comes hybrid warfare, there is no distinction between the options applied against a victim state. International laws also become a tool to squeeze and twist the states. For example, how Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has placed Pakistan into black list is somewhat full of political motives that create economic vulnerability for already dangling economy (Miraj, 2018). The trickle down impact of the economy inversely offshoot the national security challenges
enhancing the pressure on defense, which is the ultimate variable of survival. Political stooges have done their job and now it was a time for international masters to isolate Pakistan. People who immediately crafted solutions with fudge figures were not looking at the broader picture rather once again fooling the nation to push the economy into the most vulnerable phase of ‘total collapse’ (Tirmizi, 2018). The episode of ICJ where India filled a case to halt death sentence of Kulbhushan Yadheev was compromised by the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who sent a weak legal team that deliberately compromised the case. Moreover, the conduct of the court was evidently clear that they were ready to issue ‘stay’ over the death penalty. What they were waiting for was Indian move to file the case (Pakistan Observer, 2017b). This became quite reflective when on February 20, 2019, the ICJ was hearing the case on Kalbushan Yadeve, Indian lawyers used Nawaz Sharif interview to *Dawn News* to build their argument. Indian senior advocate Mr. Harish Salve said that “prominent Pakistan newspaper Dawn carried (Nawaz) Sharif’s interview in which he acknowledged Pakistan’s role in 26/11? This interview has not been denied” (Mahmood, 2019).

You do whatever you want to do such as corruption, human rights violations, or even terrorism. If trapped within state, you will be taken care of but if clutched by the system then doesn’t worry international law is always at your service. That has happened with Pakistan. It is the biggest victim of state sponsored and non-state terrorism but still the world looks towards Pakistan with ambiguity and suspicion. It is understood by the fate of international politics that the so-called champions of democracy talk something else but worship their own national interest. Pakistan’s bad luck is vested in its own national interest which is to ensure political, economic, and strategic stability that unfortunately contradicts with the interests of so-called regional and international powers. They want to see an instable Pakistan both politically and
economically so that its nuclear status can be compromised through international propagation of nuclear terrorism or assets falling into wrong hands. Pakistan has taken all precautionary measures that ensure safety, security, and safeguard mechanism of nuclear weapons. Over the period of time it had proved its credentials as a peaceful nuclear state and the only role it foresees for the nuclear weapons is to deter the aggression. Pakistan had already signed Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Even Pakistan has agreed to sign CTBT and FMCT. It’s the Indian strategic ambitions that halt Pakistan’s unilateral entrance into treaties. Both India and Pakistan are not signatories to NPT, which is the only legal instrument giving birth to global non-proliferation regime, had been strengthen through legal and non-legal instruments.

It is important to highlight that Pakistan never wanted to stay out of NPT rather it was the act of Indian political regime under Indra Gandhi who decided to go nuclear in 1974 when she detonated the device and named the test ‘Smiling Buddha’. It was India that patronage the nuclear environment in South Asia and gave birth to arms race both conventional and strategic. Moreover, because of Indian nuclear tests, the world at large displayed displeasure and established Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meant to curtail Indian like acts. This went on. Neither India was curtailed nor NSG behaved like a body to squeeze nuclear proliferation. It in fact became a cartel for political maneuverability to blackmail the states even signatory to NPT. The biggest blunder the body did was sanctioning of the wavier for India to accommodate Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal in 2008 by killing the very plea on which its foundation was resting. This was not the only violation of international law. There are hundreds of examples, how international law has been manipulated and used to make independent nations subservient to global powers. Even the so-called custodian of international peace and security, the United States
also changed its constitutional obligation to strengthen non-proliferation regime and inked the ‘123 agreement’ to accommodate Indian bid for nuclear technology. If Pakistan is the victim of hybrid warfare so does the international law.

There is no doubt to the fact that India has opened multiple avenues to exercise hybrid warfare and frame Pakistan as its core objective. Military option becomes the last resort if all goes well in hybrid warfare. This is in fact a classic example of 5th generation warfare that Pakistan is currently going through. The biggest problem is the absence of national resolve on political fronts to address the issue of hybrid warfare. Pakistan is the only country along with its armed forces that has defeated the sub-conventional warfare launched under the umbrella of global war on terror. As General Bajwa pointed out that:

“Despite the seeming frustration, very few countries have achieved as much success that we have in our war against terror. With over 1100 Al-Qaeda operatives killed and other 600 handed over to US, Pakistan is instrumental in disruption and decimation of Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the struggle continues as the threat is morphing. Intelligence agencies of multiple countries have confirmed the on-going relocation of fleeing Daesh fighters to Afghanistan. Being worst-hit by perennial instability in Afghanistan, Pakistan has legitimate concerns about this new threat joining the roster of over 20 terror outfits. So far we have been successful in denying any foothold to Daesh in Pakistan, but we are very concerned about its unchecked growth in the neighborhood. We need to counter the threat much more proactively through collaboration and cooperation” (Dunya News, 2018).

Pakistan on multiple occasions has warned the international community while sharing its apprehensions about the role neighboring countries has been playing against Pakistan. It had submitted dossiers and given proofs of anti-state activities perpetuating form Afghanistan and India. Everyone turned a deaf ear and waited for a time when Pakistan could be consumed by its internal and external threats. How long it could sustain since the economy of the state was about to flush away. General Bajwa stressed on international community to understand the dynamics of
insecurity and its origins. In Germany while addressing to the audience of security experts and military officials from rest of the world, he said that:

“Out of the last 131 terrorist attacks in our border areas last year, 123 were conceived, planned and executed from Afghanistan. We understand their predicament therefore we do not blame them, but instability in Afghanistan is also hurting us badly – and it is happening despite the presence of the most powerful alliance in Kabul” (Dunya News, 2018).

Regardless of apprehensions Pakistan along with its nation sustained and remained successful against all the blockades, whether they were economic, political, diplomatic, and military. With trillions of dollars and having one of the biggest and most powerful military alliances, United States along with NATO failed to achieve the political objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq; whereas Pakistan with its limited resources and with all vulnerabilities at the same very time achieved its political objectives. Even still only one voice echo in the political orchestration of United States, which is ‘do more’. In the same very conference General Bajwa too echoed ‘do more’ mantra and this time it was a job needed to be done by the United States. He said:

“Unfortunately, Afghanistan, success of 2003 was lost when resources were pulled out prematurely for war in Iraq. Today, after spending more than 1.4 Trillion, the situation can best be described as a stalemate. But to my reckoning the cause of stalemate is not only the Haqqani Network or TTA, as they had almost been defeated 13 years ago; it was the pursuit of a wrong strategy which led to their resurrection. Let me say that the popular assertion of TTA not being defeated in totality due to presence of part of their leadership in Pakistan, is not correct or whole truth. We defeated Al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and Jamat-ul-Ahrar, while their safe heavens still exist in Afghanistan at a mere fraction of resources employed on the other side of the border. Now instead of blame games, it is time for NATO and allies to conduct an audit and introspection to find out causes for this stalemate” (Dunya News, 2018).

Countries that failed to deliver their promises were shifting the blame on Pakistan and asking to ‘do more’. Pakistan has done its job well and will never be shifting its success in others basket. The fight it had to do for international community is already done and finished. More
than 35,000 brave Pakistanis lost their life and about 48,000 are seriously wounded and entered to disabled years. The set-back to the economy had jumped over US $250 billion. Now it’s time for the world to fight for Pakistan. United States have to change the flight of its drones towards those areas where anti-Pakistan elements are perpetuating and planning terrorists acts. May be the flight would end up in New Delhi. If drones equipped with missiles cannot fly to New Delhi then officials of United States must put diplomatic pressure just like Mr. Chuck Hagel (The Express Tribune, 2013).

International community must understand that if today Pakistan is trapped tomorrow belongs to them. If international community will not stand together then terrorists will win. Terrorists only own fear, violence, and killing. Today’s master could be tomorrow’s victim. It is Pakistan that has taken stringent measures and have out casted the plunder of insanity. The world need to help Pakistan, acknowledge Pakistan, appreciate Pakistan and support Pakistan, so that the nation who had sacrificed the most must be cherished utmost.
CHAPTER TWELVE

CONCLUSION

The premises of this study were established on the concept of changing dimensions of warfare and how Pakistan’s military response mitigated the overall security dilemma. Primary objective of the study in this domain attempted to answer the question, has Pakistan dealt with the threats of 21st century effectively or the country is ill-suited to the new style of war? In fact, this revolved around the theoretical assumption of General Sir Rupert Smith who in his book “The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World” acclaimed that the world has gone into another mode of war toward the finish of the 20th and start of the 21st centuries, which he calls "war amongst the people", and that the Western, industrialized armed forces are ill-suited to the new style of fighting (Smith, 2008). It is obvious from his writing that the development of the nuclear weapons in 1945 rendered the idea of modern fighting out of date and challenged the very basis of conventional war doctrines to mitigate the sub-conventional war. Though, in the post WWII period the US and the USSR continued adherence to the concept of old-styled industrial war, due to which one was defeated in Vietnam and the other faced humiliation in Afghanistan.

The ill-suited military approach to deal with aspects of sub-conventional war brought about huge annihilations, for example, for French in Algeria (1830-1962), the US in Vietnam (1965-75), the USSR in Afghanistan (1979-89), and exposed serious challenges for NATO forces in the Balkans (1992-2004), and afterwards for the Western coalitions in Afghanistan (2001-to-present) and Iraq (2003-to-present). Moreover, situations around Libya (2014-present), Syria (2011-present), and Yemen (2015-present) are no different rather invoked multifaceted challenges to military strategies which are predominantly influenced by industrial warfare.
When it comes to traditional concepts of military preparedness, Pakistan is no different to the strongest militaries like US, UK, France, and the Russian Federation; that invested heavily on the symbols of war to materialize the concept of industrial warfare. Pakistan has been facing the threats of both conventional and sub-conventional wars since many years mainly from its arch rival, India. Immediately after the 9/11 incident, when Pakistan became part of US-led-alliance on war against terrorism; the threat of sub-conventional war became quite a challenging national security issue.

In contextual view to General (retd) Sir Rupert Smith, Pakistan was no different than the US and UK militaries. The study hypothesizes the point that it is quite applicable that being an industrialized army Pakistan military was also ill-suited to the new style of warfare. The industrialized armies are confined with the predominant notions of conventional war, whereas the new war is in fact a sub-conventional war and requires a dedicated response. This study therefore contested the Smith’s assumption and deliberated an objective investigation to answer the primary question ‘has Pakistan dealt with the threat of sub-conventional war effectively or the country is ill-suited to the new style of war’.

Due to complexities involved in the nature of warfare that the 21st century has evolved, the study had to divide the response mechanism of Pakistan with that of changing nature of warfare. This demanded deliberate efforts to efficiently postulate the dilemma of national security which has been fed through dynamics of regional and international politics. This in fact exposed the very survival of the nation since inception of its sovereign identity that over the period of time evolved from direct conventional threats and swung from one pole of direct threat to her territorial integrity to the other pole of indirect threat to its national cohesion. The objectivity of the study therefore had to address threat perceptions of Pakistan and its response
from the national security institutions particularly from the military to delve upon the circumstances. It altogether generated an academic debate with qualitative analysis involving mixed method approach of data collection. The lengthy accounts of military history with that of national purpose of Pakistan were aligned with epistemological and ontological premises of the subject matter, which expanded the overall outlook of the study. Since, it is a PhD study that is why to retain the perspective alive and get it affiliated with threshold of military learning extensive data was analyzed to make it sure that the perspectives are carrying the mandate of scientific investigation. Some of the key components of chapters already investigated to entail examination of research objectives and questions are summarized below.

Chapter one ‘Introduction’ provided the requisite foundation to build upon the the study on philosophical, methodological, and theoretical premises. It also deliberated foundational basis to generate major argument with that of research objectives and questions. The academic roadmap of the study put forward the scientific conduct of the investigation and inserted the required confidence to deal the subject matter objectively.

Chapter two ‘Evolution of Military Thought and Contours of Warfare’ addressed the question ‘how does doctrine relate to learning within a military’. The investigation was done while incorporating an analysis of the doctrinal aspects of military strategy that are vested in organizational cultures of industrial armies. A controlled debate was placed to better understand the concept of war and how it relates to military preparedness. Explanations of different concepts of war starting from Napoleon to Clausewitz and force preparedness based on their ideas have helped to set the tone of doctrine, strategy and military learning. Questions such as what is doctrine, what is strategy, what is military learning, and how military learning helps to formulate an appropriate doctrine and strategy?; were at the core of analysis in this chapter which used
historical research design. To understand relationship between military learning, doctrine, and strategy; few of the most important strategic thinkers such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu along with their thinking were made part of the discussion.

Chapter three ‘The Nature of War in the 21st Century’, made an attempt to address the question, ‘what is the nature of warfare in the 21st century and how it relates to learning within military’. Specifically, chapter two made an effort to initiate a brief account of military history to better understand the limitations and changing dynamics of battlefield which has shaped the contemporary outlook of warfare. From ancient to 4GW militaries of advanced countries along with developing nations have travelled a long way that led the power from swords and arrows to icons of war in the 21st century. The complications of the global world with softened borders have ignited the fault lines that have never been used before as ingredients of war. Chapter three forwarded the debate towards kinetic and non-kinetic nature of warfare being the classic variables of 5GW and has shed light on the prevailing context of 21st century hybrid warfare. This in fact helped to shape the premises of Pakistan’s military response with that of nature of war that it has been facing in the 21st century particularly in the post 9/11 scenario of ‘war against terrorism’.

Chapter four ‘Pakistan and the Genesis of its Threat Perceptions’ addressed the question of ‘what are the genesis of Pakistan’s military thought and how threat perceptions emanating out of British partition of 1947 had impacted on its security’. Due to the very relationship of a theory, doctrine and its practice at the operational level, this chapter attempted to build an interactive context of this troika by explaining the dynamics of conventional and sub-conventional war that Pakistan has been engaged with since the very inception. To achieve such a complex research task, this section of the study briefly highlighted the debate around, how the
concept of war shifted from conventional to sub-conventional? Was it a slow change or happened instantly? Whether such a change was recognized in a doctrine to address the complexity inherent in sub-conventional war? It is important to understand the theory behind the doctrine; if it’s holding the same old context of industrial warfare then how such a doctrine could mitigate challenges posed by the sub-conventional war. This chapter highlighted the core thinking tools in a military thinking that addresses the complexity inherent in the transformation of conventional theater into sub-conventional war. Since the nature of 21st century is complex and evolving with hybrid nature, therefore, the inquiry of the genesis of Pakistan’s military thought and how threat perceptions emanating out of British partition of 1947 had impacted on its security, filled the gap to build the investigation with that of deliberate exposure to identify Pakistan’s geostrategic compulsions and security vulnerabilities.

Chapter five ‘From Conventional to Sub-conventional: Facing the Hindutva Warfare’ addressed the question of ‘what is ‘Hindutva Warfare’ and how it has sponged the Indian military thought to isolate, terrorize and destabilize Pakistan. It is important to understand the transformation of Pakistan military thought with that of its threat perceptions. To settle this transformation, understanding Indian proximity of military modernization with that of its ability to impact on Pakistan’s national security creates the ‘cause and effect’ variability, which Pakistan has maintained under ‘active-reactive mode’. In fact, it is the ‘Hindutva Ideology’ of India which allowed it to utilize both conventional and sub-conventional elements into South Asian security environment particularly against Pakistan. Therefore, understanding Pakistan preparedness and response to changing dimensions of warfare it face in 21st century are linked with the ‘Hindutva Warfare’ of India. That is why a middle point was necessary to develop to
understand the transformation of warfare in South Asia. It helped to evolve the genesis of Pakistan’s threat perceptions from pre-to-post 9/11 security environment.

Chapter six ‘Dynamics of Nuclear Threshold and Pakistan’s Force Preparedness’ addressed the question ‘how satisfactorily Pakistan Army had worked on its kinetic capabilities to ensure its territorial integrity’. In this chapter an effort was made to evaluate the readiness of Pakistan to counter conventional threats under traditional mode of warfare that has been the fundamental challenge to its national survival and territorial integrity. Therefore, chapter six made an effort to evaluate the post-1998 dynamics of warfare attached to nuclear threshold and Pakistan’s force preparedness. Pakistan has taken all necessary measures to ensure peace and stability in the region. To establish deterrence, it has not only strategically increased the nuclear threshold with the development of intermediate cruise and ballistic missiles but also on the eve of Indian military adventurism of limited war, it managed to lower the nuclear threshold by developing tactical nuclear weapons. Since conventional mode of warfare include both traditional military power with and without nuclear weapons, therefore, Indian wish to distinguish between conventional and nuclear threshold massively undermines Pakistan’s territorial security. That is why whether it’s conventional or nuclear threat, Pakistan has only one option to control conflict escalation and that is the use of nuclear weapons. That is why, under the prevailing nuclear threshold, the Indian political thinkers are joining hands with their military strategic pundits who have adopted strategy of pro-active military operations (PAOs) against Pakistan, which provides them an option of limited war scenario practically executing the ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ along with sub-conventional warfare.

Chapter seven ‘The Environment of Indian Pro-active Operations (POAs) and Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy’ addressed the question ‘do limited war strategies (CSD) and proactive military
operations (PAOs) threaten Pakistan’s territorial integrity’. The chapter was dedicated to elaborate Indian proactive military operations and answers the question what strategy Pakistan has adopted to deal with the Indian threat of limited war scenario/pro-active military operations (PAOs) under the nuclear threshold? It is once again important to narrate that the 21st century warfare though brings sub-conventional warfare at the forefront with aspects of evolving 5GW but Pakistan has been unfortunately trapped in both traditional and modern generations of warfare, which include both conventional and sub-conventional. Therefore, it has to get ready and prepare adequate response mechanism in military domain.

Chapter eight ‘The Menace of Violent Extremism and Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Strategy’ addressed the question ‘why violent extremism took over 21st century Pakistan and how Pakistan’s counter-terrorism-strategy addressed this threat. This chapter took non-traditional approach to elaborate response mechanism of Pakistan as a whole to expose the socio-political vulnerabilities of society that trapped the very structure and fabric of the nation, which was amicably exploited by the non-state actors and hostile intelligence agencies. The legacy of ideological mishandling and later deliberate allowance clutched the glory of Pakistan. Though, militarily remained quite successful in responding any aggression, internal fault lines were somehow compromised. The post-9/11 security environment particularly the shift of war on terror from Afghanistan to Pakistan made the nation prone to ‘legacy of ideological mishandling’. Ultimately it was decided to get rid from violent extremism which was the ideal feed to sub-conventional warfare in Pakistan. The national resolve was the factor of uprooting the comprehensive response mechanism in Pakistan that altogether generated decisive blow to terrorists by utilizing both civil and military instruments.
Chapter nine ‘Crawling Towards Peace: From National Security to Global War on Terror’ addressed the question ‘how Pakistan came out of ‘frying pan of territorial integrity’ and ended up into the ‘fire of global war on terror’. Since 1947 till 9/11, the national security dynamics and military preparedness of Pakistan was more of regional nature and does not have global posturing. During ‘war in Afghanistan’ Pakistan did fight an American war but Afghanistan’s close geographical proximity being the neighboring state and Soviet intensions to excess warm waters ignited the fundamental response of Pakistan to contain Soviet extension. So, it became a mutual war of US and Pakistan. Contrary to Afghan war, Pakistan has no interest neither any role in the 9/11 incident. It was the US that brought the war into Afghanistan under ‘global war against terrorism’ and dictated Pakistan to join the alliance and play a frontline role to facilitate the war. Later on, the so called global war ended up into regional war and took over the whole of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, this chapter attempted to address the international political landscapes that shifted the national security of Pakistan from regional discourse to a more complex global paradox.

Chapter ten ‘Four Generals One War: Posturing the Dilemma of Unconventional Warfare’ addressed the question ‘were lions led by donkeys in the sub-conventional warfare’. Chapter ten contested the generalship of Pakistani military commanders who being at the forefront of national security mechanized the response to fight with the changing dimensions of warfare. When generals make mistakes in war it has catastrophic consequences for the military campaign. Failure in generalship brings disorder in command which inevitably put the soldiers at risk. The campaign ends up as fighting faulty wars with massive impacts on survival of the state. This had been the case of British military experience in the First World War when its generalship was coded as ‘Lions led by Donkeys’. The poor training and unwise strategic decisions of the
generals cost about a million soldiers to British Empire in the WWI, a disgrace the British generals can never get away. Therefore, this chapter contested Pakistani generalship under the notion of ‘lions led by donkeys’. To understand the above mentioned phenomenon of British experience during the World War I, which is referred as ‘Lions led by Donkeys,’ this chapter therefore was dedicated to expose four generals which included General Musharraf, General Kiyani, General Raheel, and current army chief General Bajwa; who have commanded Pakistan army and fought the blurred war with low intensity context immediately in the aftermath of 9/11. For what achievements and failures these generals must be remembered for, was the main context of this chapter as without decoding the generalship of these four Generals, understanding Pakistan’s resolve against the 21st century warfare cannot be evaluated.

Chapter eleven ‘The Spectrum of Pakistan’s Military Response-An Evaluation’ addressed the question ‘has Pakistan effectively applied military power for the achievement of sustainable political outcomes challenged by the ‘new style of war’. To effectively evaluate Pakistan’s military doctrine and its preparedness, it was important to analyze military operations that it launched to combat the threats looming out of the sub-conventional warfare. Moreover, an evaluation of Smith’s theoretical conclusion that “Western industrialized armies are ill-suited to the new style of warfare,” entailed a dedicated effort and highlighted the very important answer to find out: Is Pakistan military ill-suited to the new style of warfare? The holistic analysis and application of the Smiths theory of ‘Utility of Force’ helped the study to understand relevance and readiness of Pakistan’s military doctrine. Sub-questions such as; how many military operations Pakistan army has conducted in response to sub-conventional war?, when and why those military operations were conducted?, what was the main objective and purpose behind those operations?, how the application of military power in each of the operation was used to
achieve particular aims?, and what are their results in-terms of achievements or failures?; were
provided detailed response and analysis.

12.1. Pleading the Discourse:

Pakistan’s national security challenges that came out immediately after independence and
were furthered in the aftermath of 1948 war, 1965 war, 1971 war, 1984 Siachen conflict, 1980’s
Soviet war, 1999 Kargil war, and the post 9/11 global war on terror, one feels astonished to look
at how this nation has survived and remained resilient to protect its integrity. India being the
perpetual threat had deeply invested in the national security dilemma of Pakistan whether it was
conventional threat or unconventional. On conventional front, Pakistan with its meager resources
managed to confront hostile forces well but failed on unconventional front when its Eastern wing
came under threat of indirect warfare perpetuated by India who raised a militia under ‘Mukti
Bahini’ and fueled unrest. This was further complimented by direct involvement of Indian
military intervention. As a result, East Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971. Pakistan with such
drastic change in its geography remained resilient to develop and set the path of growth and
development. Finally, as a result of Indian nuclear explosions of May 11, 1998; Pakistan in an
attempt to fix the conventional asymmetry once for all on May 28, 1998 conducted its nuclear
tests. Though, this was not the end of the conventional threat arising out of Indian aggressive
designs but provided much needed confidence to address the conventional asymmetry. On
September 11, 2001 the United States came under threat and declared global war on terror
against non-state actors particularly Al-Qaeda operating from Afghanistan. The post-9/11
security environment took Pakistan by surprise and demanded a front line role to curb the
menace of terror. The aftermath of which exposed the tribal areas of Pakistan as safe heaven to
terrorists operating in Afghanistan who flushed inside and established strong footholds. The war
which Pakistan was to facilitate in Afghanistan now entered into its own territory and without any choice became compulsion to fight. This gave impetus to Indian ambitions that began to invest on proxies and created a network of intelligence havoc inside Pakistan.

At time of 9/11 incident, Pakistan does not have any military planning because that was a sudden incident and within few weeks the ISAF forces started operating in Afghanistan. Though, the aftershocks of military operation in Afghanistan by the United States pushed the terrorists into Pakistani tribal areas but still the country was totally out of context from the evolving nature of unconventional war on its territory. Pakistan did respond some of the events from 2001 to 2008 in the tribal areas but due to mild experience along with issues of articulation, training and state of capability, military was not in line to fight the sub-conventional war. Traditionally, Pakistan has invested heavily to fight the conventional war which exposed the gap immediately. Thereafter, Pakistan gradually built its forces along the Pak-Afghan border from 2001 to 2008 and started selective operations in the tribal areas. Due to the nature of porous border stretched over 2611 kilometers; seven agencies of FATA were almost crowded by TTP terrorists and also the Malakand Division of PATA (KP Province) came under their influence.

In 2008, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani sworn into the office of Army Chief and decided to develop a proper campaign plan to get rid from the TTP and associated foreign militants operating in the tribal belt of Pakistan. After this Pakistan started its formal military operations against the strategic hideouts of terrorists and the first campaign was launched in Bajure which ended with Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014 that cleaned the areas of North Waziristan and Khyber agencies. Being frontline state to facilitate global war against terrorism, Islamabad has faced enormous pressures from the United States that wanted Pakistan military to start operations in North Waziristan which in their view was the hub of terrorists operating against the ISAF forces
in Afghanistan. General Kiyani also felt the heat from Americans and was peddling between Pakistan’s national security and United States priorities. At times of 2008, there were three options with the Pakistan armed forces to mitigate the looming threats of sub-conventional warfare.

i. Option one was that Pakistan should have sufficient force and simultaneously start operation in FATA and Malakand to clear the areas. Pakistan does not have capacity to concurrently start the operations to eliminate the terrorists.

ii. Second option was that Pakistan army should target the hub of terrorists that were in the North Waziristan and then move into periphery areas. The disadvantage of going into North Waziristan and to crush the hard nut was that it could spread the threat to the rest of country.

iii. Third option was that Pakistan army should start operations first in the periphery areas and push the terrorists to one place and ultimately give final blow at that spot to eliminate them once for all.

That is why North Waziristan was the last in Pakistan’s military campaign but United States wanted it at the top. To facilitate US demand to go into North Waziristan, Pakistan had always discussed few preferred conditions with the ISAF forces. Some of were domestic and the remaining were related to ISAF itself. The foremost domestic condition about North Waziristan was attachment of the political angle that required political ownership of the operation. As a precondition ‘All Parties Conference’ (The Nation, 2014) and ‘give peace another chance’ (Dawn, 2014) initiatives were taken to acquire political ownership of the operation. Therefore, with popular public support Pakistan army decided that we will go into North Waziristan. The other condition associated with North Waziristan operation was related to ISAF forces and the condition was when Pakistan army will start operation in North Waziristan then on the opposite side in Afghanistan ISAF forces should be stationed on operational positions. The strategy was
when terrorists will rush into Afghanistan; ISAF forces will get them down. From 2008 till 2014, on the opposite side of North Waziristan ISAF forces never came to block the infiltration of terrorists. That is why Pakistan has to give priority to its own national security and since popular public support was gained, armed forces decided to go into North Waziristan and started the operation.

The nature of military operations in FATA as well as Malakand division were complex and of different nature altogether. Both the areas posed different environments for the army to operate. For example, operations in Malakand were severe and complex in nature due to intensive population. Terrorists were not on the mountains rather were using social space and hiding within population. Use of extensive force with fire power was challenging for the army to clean the area and also issues of collateral damage could jeopardize the whole objectivity of the military campaign. On the other hand, FATA particularly North Waziristan had borders with Afghanistan and absence of ISAF force on the other side of the Afghan border gave comfortable runaway to the terrorists. Though, use of extensive force along with fire power was quite an easy thing to do due to terrorist’s hideouts in the mountains.

Related to issues of coordination with that of ISAF and Afghan security forces, positive insights were absent for almost first twelve years of the war against terrorism. It was until 2012 that Pakistan, ISAF and Afghan security forces came close to fix the communication issues and develop a tripartite system of border management. The 2012 Tripartite Border SOP developed a good environment for overall coordination related to post to post communication, incorporation of liaison officer and their coordination centers, establishment of Office of the Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRP) hosted in the United States Embassy in Islamabad (Dawn,
2012). With the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan on December 31, 2014, the validity of the document also finished.

After Tripartite Border SOP, to manage the border related issues Pakistan proposed to Afghanistan a Bilateral Border Coordination Mechanism but due to Kabul’s deteriorated interest concrete development failed to come forward. Though, on April 06, 2018 during a high level meeting between Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Pakistan Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, both agreed on “Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS)” for diplomatic coordination, forces coordination, custom and immigration coordination and the most important border management (Tolonews, 2018), which got final approval on May 15, 2018. Under the agreement Pakistan’s liaison officers will be based in Kabul and Afghanistan’s liaison officers will be based in Islamabad. Through this agreement, a positive environment was created to amicably address the issues of border management between both neighboring states.

The war Pakistan had been fighting has consumed four generals who in good, bad or worst strategic environment commanded the army with all their best abilities and reach to a stage where dangling national security threats were rooted out completely. General Pervez Musharraf stood firm to absorb the international pressure that erupted in the aftermath of 9/11 incident. Regardless of pushing the state towards isolation he successfully addressed all international concerns. General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani knowing the temper of turmoil decided to bring an end to the growing militancy in Pakistan and started dedicated military campaign in tribal areas. The success of his campaigns took the space back from the militants and the country got an opportunity to restore its stability. General Raheel Sharif took the campaign a step further and involved the whole nation to stand against the terrorists who after losing their areas desperately started attacking the soft targets in Pakistan.
Among many the most glaring was the incident of December 16, 2014 when terrorists attacked Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar and killed around 149 including 132 students (BBC, 2014). The attackers came from Afghanistan on behalf of TTP and included one Chechan, two Afghans and three Arabs (Roberts, 2017). The motive of the attack was to sabotage Pakistan’s commitment and resolve against the militants that recently got impetus due to Operation Zarb-e-Azb. The operation was started on June 15, 2014 in the wake of June 8, 2014 terrorists attack on Jinnah International Airport, Karachi (Ghazanfar, 2016). General Raheel Sharif made it clear to the sub-regional militant outfits aided and abetted by the neighboring states that there is no discrimination between “good” and “bad” Taliban. In January 2015, a National Action Plan (NAP) was reached to ascertain the national resolve by bringing a new systematic state response to root out the aiders and abettors of the terrorists.

General Qamar Javed Bajwa as the current army chief is tirelessly running after the hideouts of the terrorists that they have established in the mainstream Pakistan. To achieve durable peace, General Bajwa is facing quite a challenge as compared to his predecessors. As the physical military campaign has almost reached to its conclusion terrorists have created small pockets in the country from where they ambush and run amok. Pakistan army is now after those sleeping sells that occasionally come to surface and hide or provide shelter and material support to the militants. To stay in harmony, General Bajwa has successfully consolidated the exceptional achievements of his processors and is moving forward in a balanced way to uphold the good grades achieved. In that very context, Pakistan army on February 22, 2017 started ‘Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad’ all around the country, which was not a physical combat rather intelligence based operations (Dawn, 2017).
This operation is different from all the previous operations for example starting from Operation Al-Mizan till Operation Zarb-e-Azb all the operations were in physical domain where combat was seen along with large convoys moving and fighter planes and helicopters firing the bullets and bombs. Contrary to that, in Radd-ul-Fasaad it takes weeks and months to materialize the target and through intelligence feed operations are conducted. Sometime, regardless of accurate intelligence feed, operations do not end up with hundred percent successes as targets disappear. Though, this operation is physically less visible but its effects are more fruitful for the durable peace. That is why since the execution of the operation thousands of intelligence based operations (IBOs) have been conducted around the country that has recovered thousands of weapons, busted hundreds of networks, and lot of terrorist’s attacks are averted.

That has somehow evolved the guide around ‘Bajwa Doctrine’ which foresees all elements of national power as an amalgamated approach to address 21st century national security challenges (Dawn, 2018a). Salient features of the doctrine are:

i. To retain the gains achieved by successive civil and military regimes, the doctrine envisioned to complement the domestic, regional and international efforts as an interlinked projection that must prevail at real times.

ii. Secondly, isolating and eliminating the terrorist’s aiders and abettors operating at different places in the mainstream Pakistan that are camouflaged under Afghan migrants. Taking them out and eliminating the possibilities of such a nexus against the state is an important part of the operation Radd-ul-Fasaad.

iii. Thirdly, on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border issues of management have been resolved to stop terrorists cross border infiltration and illegal movement. Pakistan in this context has already started fencing the 2611 kilometers border with Afghanistan and forts are being built at dedicated places that count almost 1000 military posts (Akram, 2018). On December 15, 2018, DG ISPR shared the information with media and general public that Pakistan Army had already
completed fencing at 802 kilometers along with construction of 233 forts. DG ISPR in his tweet said that the overall completion of priority-1 area will be finished by December 2019 (Dawn, 2018b).

On the other hand on Afghan side of the border there is no presence of military and the number of posts is almost zero. The reason is Afghanistan’s incapacity to bring ‘boots on ground’ and to secure the border on a serious note. Though, previously ISAF forces and now United States ‘residual support mission’ could help the Afghans to manage the border. They have technology with them and hold superior surveillance means than Pakistan. Regardless of border blame game, it is important to share intelligence leads regarding presence of militant leadership to each other as was true in case of Mullah Fazalullah who ran into Afghanistan during the Peochar operation. It is good news that he is now killed in a drone attack inside Afghanistan (Branigin, 2018). Therefore, strengthening border management and sharing intelligence around terrorist leadership could help sustain peace in both states. The success of this will be beneficial for both the states.

iv. Fourthly, a de-weaponization campaign has been launched in Pakistan as part of the Radd-ul-Fasad operation to denounce the presence of illegal weapons anywhere in the country.

v. Finally, the doctrine strives to achieve a normalized Pakistan. For example, it want to take the state to a stage when there were no illegal weapons in the country, no suicide bombings were happening, when there was no terrorism and the people of Pakistan lived in peace and harmony.

Moreover, the success of Pakistan is dependent on the defeat of all those who have intensively invested to destabilize the country. For example, India has been a perpetual threat to Pakistan’s national security on its East and failed to squeeze Pakistan in the aftermath of South Asian nuclearization. When the direct strategy became no more relevant, India through indirect strategy intervened in Pakistan. The episode of last 18 years of indirect war that Pakistan has been fighting is greatly invested and sponsored by India. For example, in the aftermath of 9/11
incident when ISAF forces started operation in Afghanistan, Pakistan has to strengthen its security on its western border alongside Afghanistan. India knowing the fact that Islamabad is busy on its western border started escalation on eastern border and put enormous pressures over Pakistan’s national security. Few of glaring examples of Indian efforts to put pressure and detract Pakistan include:

a. Within one month period of post 9/11, on December 13, 2001 India deployed its forces on Pakistan border under a pseudo claim that its parliament was attacked by Pakistani based militant organization (The Telegraph, 2001). In fact, the reality was the other way around. Some Kashmiri freedom fighters fighting against the atrocity and illegal occupation of Kashmir took revenge from the political leadership and registered their anger against the country. Regardless of fact finding and formal investigation of the incident, India deployed its forces and drummed the war mantra. Pakistan has to respond to Indian war mongering madness and it did while taking reciprocative measures. Defending both borders was out of Pakistan’s capacity. Absence of forces on any of the side would benefit the enemies. It was impossible for Pakistan to ignore Indian escalation and have to compliment its forces on eastern border to manage the evolving Indian threat. So, Pakistan mobilized its forces towards eastern side, which gave enough room for the terrorists to shelter inside Pakistan.

b. When the then Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani developed a thorough plan of action against the militants in Pakistan, India once again mobilized its forces on Pakistan’s eastern border in the wake of so-called ‘Bombay terrorist attack’ that it projected a parallel to 9/11 under the title ‘26/11’ (Oppel Jr. & Masood, 2008). Pakistan once again has to move its troops from the Afghan border that allowed the terrorists to reinforce themselves.

c. India had sabotage all efforts of peace that Pakistan has taken to ensure stability in the region. In this context, if one looks at the ceasefire violations of India from 2003 to 2017, one shockingly understands the pressure that India wanted to put over eastern border of Pakistan. For example, all the ceasefire violations along the
eastern border of Pakistan that India did from 2003 to 2016 equals the violations in the year 2017 alone. Operation Zarb-e-Azb of 2014 and Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad of 2017 had not been digested by the Indian stalwarts who at any cost wanted to send a message to Pakistani nation that the country is insecure from all dimensions and had failed to grip terrorism.

d. Evidence of Kalbushan Yadev further compliments the conclusions that Pakistan had made out of Indian extra-regional terrorist activities (Dawn, 2016).

e. To undermine the geo-economic importance of Pakistan with that of disallowing the nuclear nation come out of economic burden which it has compromised due to 18 years long war on terror, India once again created ‘false flag operations’ to blame Pakistan. For example, In February 2019, when the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia was on an official visit to Pakistan to invest more than US$20 billion; India crafted a ‘false flag operation’ under ‘Pulwama incident’ and within half an hour put the blame on Pakistan. On February 26, 2019; India launched an attack inside Pakistan that Islamabad had to respond back. All this was done to isolate Pakistan while creating another round of undermining geo-economic potential of Pakistan. Saudi Crown Prince was not the only dignitary to visit in Pakistan. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir Mohammad along with Turkish President Tayeb Erdogan was among the few to visit in February 2019. The connotation of the attack were not only limited to the phenomenon of ‘surgical strikes’ rather it was an attempt to destabilize Pakistan as according to Government of Pakistan there were two more counties including Israel to help India attack Pakistani installations (Bokhari, 2019). Even the bombs ‘Spice 2000’ that were dropped by the Indian Air Force in ‘Jabba’ area of Pakistan were Israeli (Haaretz, 2019). The dramatic conclusion of Indian ‘false flag operations’ under surgical strikes is evident of its motivation to stall development and peaceful progress of Pakistan.

f. How India has been using Afghanistan’s soil to aid and abet terrorism in Pakistan has not more an unanswered question. Former TTP spokesperson Ihsanullah Ishan confessed in the custody of Pakistani law enforcement institutions that Indian intelligence agency is providing logistics, finances, training, weapons and target guidelines to conduct terrorist activities in Pakistan (Yousaf, 2017).
In nutshell, India has proved through its actions inside and against Pakistan that it would not let Pakistan to succeed bringing peace and harmony for its nation.

With all looming threats, here comes the 5GW. The fifth generation warfare without choosing the physical force relies to target and influence the minds of the people. Currently, the fifth generation is at play in Pakistan and also in other parts of the world. Enemy operates in the social space and pollutes the minds of the people to push them against the state. When someone refers Daesh as bigger threat then Al-Qaeda, TTP or Tehreek-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA); he means that they are in fact polluting the minds and ideology of the people. The same is very true in case of Pakistan where both state and non-state actors are grabbing their share to launch fifth generation warfare. This kind of war carries three entities such as one is the local population; other is the terrorists and third is the state whose part is the forces. Population will always stand with that entity whose writ and influence is in the area. In 2008, the influence of the terrorists was increased in FATA and Malakand region. Some supported them due to pressure and few stood with them being an ideological follower. In response, when state showed its power terrorists were isolated and local support tilted towards army. To sustain the local support for durable peace state had to do lot of things so that terrorists should not be able to return neither people’s aspiration go in vain. Keeping this in view, Pakistan army started many developmental projects such as over 900 kilometer roads were constructed, schools, cadet colleges, hospitals, markets, and sports ground were made to ensure basic need necessary for a smooth lifestyle.

Comparing Pakistan and United States efforts to combat terrorism is somehow not possible mainly due to the strengths both countries militaries possessed. Pakistan with meager resources and technologically less equipped military cannot be compared with technologically advance and materially well invested army. Though, both the militaries have been allies to
combat the war on terror. At most occasions, Pakistan has not received its due share of appreciation to fight the war rather has been encountered with ‘do more’ mantra (Dawn, 2018c). Was it possible for the United States and ISAF forces to claim success in Afghanistan without Pakistan’s support? The answer is obviously ‘No’.

The primary objective of the coalition was to combat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. They could have never defeated Al-Qaeda without cooperation and support from Pakistan. All the logistics travelled through Pakistan, all the air logistics flew through air space of Pakistan and all the necessary intelligence to capture and eliminate Al-Qaeda was shared by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies with United States. But as a matter of fact the achievements Pakistan has claimed on its side, the United States had failed to sum up on the other side of the border in Afghanistan. The American basket is empty with tangible results of peace and security in Afghanistan, whereas Pakistan with its meager resources has successfully won the battle. Now making Pakistan a scapegoat to run from the reality is not a valid claim.

Let’s take the US stance for a second that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorated by the terrorists coming from Pakistan. How many are they in numbers? With more than one hundred fifty thousand troops inside Afghanistan, with all the technology and with over 1-trillion dollars war expenditures inside Afghanistan; it is believed in Pakistan that how Washington can blame Islamabad for lack of doing inside Afghanistan. With less than one percent of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) for Islamabad, Pakistan has done its part successfully and gave hundred percent results. With over ninety-nine percent of the CSF spent inside Afghanistan the result is merely a reflection of scapegoat mantra wrapped with ‘do more’. Though late but right on track as the US President Donald Trump’s recent request to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran
Khan to facilitate the peace dialogue in Afghanistan is clear manifestation of accepting the positive role of Islamabad.

The strategy of the military operations that Pakistan had carried out in tribal areas has four phases:

- i. clear
- ii. hold
- iii. build
- iv. transfer

When any operation was started, most of the time consumed ‘clear phase’ and afterwards ‘hold phase’ was launched that with the passage of time involved ‘build and transfer phase’ which is inversely proportional. For example, after the military operation in Swat, Pakistan cleared the area and got strong hold, which then entered in the phase of build and transfer. As soon as ‘build and transfer phase’ was completed, burden on the ‘hold phase’ got minimized. Therefore, Pakistan has completed all its military operations under this strategy. Currently, over 200,000 troops are deployed in FATA region mainly due to two reasons.

- i. Firstly, the strategic threat still resides across the border in Afghanistan. In case the situation in Afghanistan gets settled, Pakistan would immediately withdraw its fifty percent forces from the border but risks cannot be taken in view of current state of affairs in the country. Pakistan has successfully overcome the threats but surrounding region is still incapable to defeat the looming threat of militancy.
- ii. Secondly, the build and transfer phase is still in progress and would take time to shed developmental fruits to the residents of tribal areas. As a result stability will take its firm grounds and civil administration would spread political satisfaction among the people. In return, the role and presence of army in the area will be
minimized though could not be finished to sustain durable peace in the region (Times of Islamabad, 2018).

On the other hand, this also signifies Pakistan’s resolve against hostile agencies operation in Baluchistan. Baluchistan is about 46 percent of geography and comprises around 12 percent population of the country. It shares 9009 kilometers border with Iran. Pakistan has fought the war for about 18 years in FATA that composes about 2.5 percent of Pakistan’s population and around 3 percent of its geography. Pakistan deployed around 200,000 army in FATA and did a great effort to secure the territory; whereas, Baluchistan is vast and strategically of great importance for Pakistan mainly due to evolving ‘China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)’. While Pakistan was busy in FATA, the hostile intelligence agencies were rapidly increasing their influence and establishing strong baseline in Baluchistan. The government of Pakistan has started a developmental project under ‘Khushhaal Balochistan’ which was inaugurated by General Bajwa and provincial Chief Minister Nawab Sanaullah Zehri in November 2017 to uplift the socio-economic domain (Pakistan Observer, 2017).

Pakistan army is committed to provide security for the project and had reorganized its focus towards the province to mitigate visible and invisible dynamics of deprivation that are potential threat to national security of Pakistan. CPEC is composed of geo-economic competitive strategic interests for the region that Pakistan at any cost wants to materialize. The hostile forces have somehow exploited the socio-economic vulnerabilities of Pakistan that through the successful completion of CPEC would end up instantly. That is why the focus of the state and its law enforcement agencies has increased on Baluchistan, which is expected to grow more over the coming period of time.
Taking the war on terror to its absolute conclusion where positive peace is achieved would count many years though relative stability has been achieved. As stated above there are three important facets of sub-conventional war which include the population, terrorists and the state itself. To retain the confidence of the people on state to achieve enduring peace is only possible when aspirations of the local population are addressed through development and visible economic uplift. In absence of this, possibility of going back to zero point will become definite faith. In the aftermath of Army Public School incident Pakistan has evolved 20 points National Action Plan (NAP), which is awaiting full implementation of its points. There are lots of reforms and administrative liaison is pending that is necessary to achieve the post operation results. The good thing is that when back in 2007 army was tasked under Article 245 of the constitution to take over the control of the Malakand division and start military operation, it replaced the civil administration. Today, almost all the seven districts are handed over back to the provincial government that is now taking care of the law enforcement issues including policing and security posts earlier installed by the army (Khankhel & Yousafzai, 2018). Handing over civil administration was not an easy task. Almost 470 Pakistani soldiers including officers embraced martyrdom during the operations. The government rehabilitated more than 300 schools which were destroyed by the terrorists and constructed 32 new schools to expand the outreach of education in the region (Asad, 2018).

Moreover, FATA has been made part of KPK province and is no more under the FCR system (Mohmand, 2018). Though, reforms in FATA did accommodated the 2018 General Elections but still awaiting elections on provincial assembly seats along with control of the civil administration (Dawn, 2018d). FATA has been receiving Rs. 20 billion for annual development and under the merger plan which is already done, it will receive additional Rs 90 billion for the
next ten years (The News, 2017a). The government of Pakistan until 2017 has complete more than 1100 projects in seven agencies of FATA. Some of the key projects included:

“Establishment of FATA University, removal of deficiencies in educational institutions, up-scaling of Governor Model Schools to quality and excellence of Cadet Colleges, creation and strengthening of laboratories in colleges for smooth transition to introduction of BS programme in FATA, extension of mobile health facilities in FATA, strengthening of secondary health care facilities, solarization of Drinking Water Supply Schemes and irrigation tubewells, Roads Linking Mineral and Natural Resource bearing areas in order to improve economic linkages, Law Enforcement Agencies facilities, establishment of Value Chain & Market linkages, introduction of high yield and environmental friendly genetically modified crops/seeds, introduction of Community based Non Timber Forest Products (NTFP) and Fast Growing Timber (FGT) schemes, focus on consolidating & improving municipal service delivery at existing municipalities and formation of FATA Youth Assembly and sports clubs” (APP, 2017).

Along with resettlement of more than 2, 91,082 families, the Federal government have been keenly working on the skill development of youth in FATA. It is important to highlight that the transfer of power to the civil administration both at PATA and FATA will not sent the military back to their barracks rather Pakistan army will remain in the area to keep an eye on the changing security environment. Moreover, the local population also wants the military to retain peace in the region while having boots on ground. The army will have permanent cantonments in the area to observe the situation in Afghanistan that could potentially disrupt stability and peace in Pakistan (Khattak, 2018).

From the maneuvers of physical combat to dilemma of 5GW, Pakistan is now looking in to social fabric of its society. There is no discrimination carried out between civil and military in the 5th generation warfare and at choice of ease both are targeted. The elements applied in 1st to 4th generation of wars are used altogether in the fifth generation warfare. That is why in 5th generation warfare there is no distinction between combatants and non-combatants. The strategies include politics of engagement and execution of estrangement to meet the final goals.
State is damaged so does the population and that is the war which Pakistan is confronted with; an invisible enemy who is attacking from all dimensions.

Right now to fight the 5th generation warfare, Pakistan army is the best trained and battle hardened military but tackling the monster of 5th generation war cannot be the only responsibility neither capacity of the armed forces. A national approach is required to efficiently counter the impact such as through diplomatic maneuver which is purely a responsibility of the civil government. There is economic front where national leadership has to prioritize its investment such as off shooting the economic growth to stable heights by avoiding all unnecessary investment that sucks the financial power. Putting the economy into debt in fact shackles the foundations of national security along with vested resilience that is necessary to take actions against proxies.

The developmental strategy is again responsibility of the civil government that primarily uplifts those factions which have been used by the militants to be recruited as mercenaries. If the discontented or leftover society is happened to be ending up with terrorists due to unemployment then civil government has to fix this issue at priority. Issues of human development also come in the domain of civil government, so that equal opportunities should be shared with all. Merit based system, strengthening of institutions and judicial backup; all provide basic support to fight 5th generation warfare and come under the domain of civil leadership. The task of firefighting that law enforcement institutions has to play is lead by Pakistan army which is best prepared, battle hardened and genuinely motivated to fight this war. Army is aware of this fact that the nature and character of war requires national response. Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa during his talk with ISPR Youth Internship program said that:

"The youth should stay determined and defeat all such threats to take Pakistan forward to its rightful destination as part of the nation" (The News, 2018).
Contemporary Pakistan is far better than the troubled times of 9/11 and well prepared to counter any threat visible or invisible, conventional or unconventional. That is why to counter threats beyond military range, a national response where youth can play a decisive role is deemed necessary. Today, the writ of the government, general and local body elections, free mobilization of the people, commercial operations of banks, markets, post offices, police stations, schools, sports, hospitals, political administration, communication, traffic, and tourism is operational. For example, the Swat Operation was a rare feat of highly astute employment of kinetic means duly augmented by non-kinetic means which brought the Malakand region back to normalcy. Military option used as last resort after acquiring a national consensus had caused millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Return and rehabilitation of such a large segment of society was a colossal task, which Pakistan Army achieved through special arrangements. Special Support Group was formed which coordinated all national resources along with international aid to arrange temporary settlement, return and rehabilitation of IDPs. The return of IDPs was followed by an extensive re-construction campaign to restore and normalize the social life of the affected region. These operations helped winning the goodwill and cooperation of the local population which was paramount for consolidating the transient success achieved through kinetic means. Headquarters in the conflict areas created organizations and cell to plan, direct and monitor these non-kinetic operations duly incorporating civilian subject specialists.

12.2. **Acknowledgement by the International Community:**

Pakistan as a nation has fought the menace of terrorism most validly giving unparallel sacrifices. Its armed forces have set an example for the whole world in cleansing these barbarians from their portholes. The success has been acknowledged the world over particularly by the United Kingdom (The Express Tribune, 2016a), Russia (Irfan, 2018), Turkey (The News, 2016),
Iran (TINS, 2017), and Jordan (The Express Tribune, 2017) to mention few. Senator John McCain also visited Pakistan in 2016 and appreciated country’s countless sacrifices on its role to fight war against terrorism. The US delegation comprised Senator McCain being Chairman Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Senator Lindsey Graham being Chair Senate Appropriation Committee along with Senator Donnelly and Senator Ben Sasse. Senior officials from the US State Department also accompanied the delegation. Pakistan Foreign Office released a statement and said that “Senator McCain and his colleagues deeply appreciated the enormous success achieved by Pakistan in its counterterrorism campaign” (The Express Tribune, 2016b). Moreover, back in 2015 during ‘Strategic Dialogue Meeting’ the US Secretary of State John Kerry appreciated Pakistan army efforts to combat militancy in North Waziristan. He said:

“Pakistani forces deserve enormous credit for the ongoing military operations that they have already undertaken in North Waziristan and elsewhere, and these operations have already produced significant results” (Syed, 2015).

In continuation to appreciation of peace and exceptional military success the world at large applauded stability in Pakistan. A friendly cricket match between UK Media XI and Pakistan XI was arranged at a newly constructed Younis Khan Stadium in Miranshah, North Waziristan. The cricket match was played under the umbrella of Peace Cup series sponsored and organized by Pakistan Army and Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) along with Pakistan Super League (PSL) franchise ‘Peshawar Zalmi’ (Pakistan Today, 2017). That was a series of many events organized to send message of peace to international community. Later on, Brazilian football legend Ronaldinho traveled to Pakistan along with seven other players to witness sacrifices and achievements that the nation rendered to bring peace in the region and for the
world at large (The News, 2017b). General Qamar Javed Bajwa complimented the work and efforts of Pakistan army and marked himself a privileged solider. He said:

“I am grateful to Almighty Allah for bestowing his honor and pride on me to command such a brave, professional and dedicated army. And I have no hesitation in saying that our is the best army in the world…Not only have we survived the worst onslaught of terrorism in modern history, we have reversed the tide. In fact, security has now achieved conditions to help development take off” (Pakistan Army, 2017).

On the other hand, there is no precedence in the history of warfare where an army starts a war on its own territory by dispersing more than 2.5 million people and after clearing the area settles them back within three months (Dawn, 2010). Pakistan army has done this marvelous job, which no other army in the history has ever done. Afghanistan that is the neighboring state had failed to bring back their refugees since 1980s and whenever Pakistan facilitates Afghan refugees return, all different international stakeholders come together and pressurize Islamabad to halt the process by giving them more time. There is something wrong with Pakistan that is unable to tell his story of such an exceptional hospitality and still faces the criticism of not doing enough.

12.3. From Terrible Times to Hope of Economic Revival:

The problem that Pakistan has been facing during its so-called alliance with United States was related to justification of bilateralism. Starting from General Musharraf till Imran Khan, no one has ever achieved such a confidence that could allow them to convince the Pakistani nation that our relationship with US is based on mutual interests. That means, when US need us, we are there and when Pakistan is in need, the US will stand with us. Unfortunately, this has never been the case between Pakistan and United States. Without repeating the course of history, contemporary conduct of United States would provide ample examples of isolating and abandoning Pakistan at times of dire need.
For example, Pakistan has been fighting the US-led-global war against terrorism since 2001 as a frontline state. The war which was supposed to be fought in Afghanistan immediately changed its course towards Pakistan and the whole nation suffered the worst consequences in return. Not to forget and dishonest to brave countrymen, it is important to bring their sacrifices into context as about 35,000 Pakistanis sacrificed their life in this eighteen years long war. More than 48,000 entered into lifetime disability. Above US$250billion economic loss the nation absorbed during the war. The price it has been paying due to deliberate propaganda on political, diplomatic, socio-cultural, and economic fronts has no recorded value altogether. And when Pakistan’s economy was strangulated, squeezed and entered into crises; regardless of joining hands of this nation with cordial heart, the US started bullying its trustworthy friend who has always been standing at front to protect its interests.

Was it a difficult situation for the US to stabilize Pakistan’s economy, since it has poured almost $1.3trillion in Afghanistan over the period of last 18 years? Does international politics has no norms, no values, no respect, no dignity, and no integrity at all that could allow nations to hold hands of their friends when they are in crisis? United States political clout has even misguided its own nation, who has been never told truth about Pakistan. Well the truth is that Pakistan does have true friends who at times of need do not dialogue but straightforwardly respect and cherish the bond of trust. This study is referring towards China, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.

Exceptionally reliable and strategic relations are evolved between two nations of Pakistan and China. ‘Terrible times’ is the climax of their trust and cordial relations. China has never put at front any conditions that demanded 35,000 lives of Pakistani, 48,000 disabilities, and $250billion worth of economic strangulation rather it stood firm at times of crises and
need. The initiation of ‘China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)’ project is the adamant example of bilateral trust between the two nations. At times when CPEC was being inaugurated, Pakistan was propagated as the most unstable nation in the world. The only news which surface at all streams of global media was related to terrorism, extremism, fundamentalism, and ‘safe heaven’ of militancy. No one looked at the sacrifices and contributions of Pakistan. The pity was made the fate of Pakistan by the Western capitals. This was the environment when China under CPEC prepared a planned investment stretched over 15 years making it about $62 billion in Pakistan (Gul, 2018). Only a friend can trust on a friend. The world at large was isolating but China was extending its economic outreach to Pakistan. Moreover, when Imran Khan formed his government in 2018, the country was facing acute shortage of economic resources both in cash and balance of payment. China extended its help once again and offered Pakistan about $6 billion to mitigate the financial shortfalls with immediate release of $2 billion in January 2019 (The News, 2019a).

When it comes to Pakistan’s relations with UAE, it also agreed to provide “US$3.2 billion worth of oil supplies on deferred payment”. It also deposited US$3 billion in the State Bank of Pakistan to help address the issue of ‘balance of payment’ (Dawn, 2019). In total $6.2 billion was offered by UAE to help mitigate the economic crises of Pakistan.

Saudi Arabia on the other side is a nation that has no comparative analogy when it comes to cherish brotherly and ideological bondage with Pakistan. Both nations are jointed together in bondage of Islamic polity. How come Saudi Arabia remains at a side when Pakistan was facing terrible betrayal by one of its proclaimed international ally, the United States? It immediately rushed in and poured $6 billion to help sustain Pakistan’s economic crisis. It gave US$3 billion to help address the issue of ‘balance of payment’ to Pakistan. To mitigate Pakistan’s energy needs,
Riyadh also agreed to provide “one-year deferred payment facility for oil imports”. In extension to this, the February 18, 2019 visit of Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman initiated a new era of strategic relationship between the two nations and invested more than US$20billion in different projects of Pakistan. This has been the highest public known investment of the Kingdom in Pakistan. Specifically, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed 8 MoUs that included “investment, finance, power, renewable energy, internal security, media, culture and sports” (The News, 2019b). To put the relationship on strategic discourse, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan Shah Mahmood Qureshi in a press briefing stated that “with the visit of Prince Muhammad bin Salman, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are going to witness an unprecedented level of closeness based on solid economic integration” (The News, 2019b).

The overall climax of renewed diplomatic upsurge has been lifting the economic portfolio of Pakistan. CPEC has been the climax of it and now Saudi investment is bringing the required sustainability to Pakistan’s economic portfolio. It is important to mention that since Beijing has been the main bidder of CPEC project, therefore Chinese political posturing in successful completion of the project is decisive. To that addition, China categorically has welcomed the Saudi inclusion in the economic growth of Pakistan in particular and the region in general (Gul, 2018). Moreover, on March 10, 2019 while speaking to a public gathering in his hometown ‘Multan’, Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said that Pakistan and China has finalized a “next phase” of strategic CPEC (92 News, 2019).

Other then China, UAE, and Saudi Arabia; Russians are also stretching their financial leverage to invest in Pakistan. As of February 6, 2019 Russia agreed to invest $14billion in Pakistan, which is also one of the biggest investments of Moscow since inauguration of the bilateral relations between two nations (Times of Islamabad, 2019).
Today, Pakistan is on track of progress and political stability with that of economic reforms necessary to achieve the desired place in the comity of international society for which it had sacrificed the most. The closed doors of international diplomacy are opening up. Projects like CPEC are successfully flourishing and new partners like Saudi Arabia, UAE and Russia are investing to improve the portfolio of Pakistan. Financial resources are being poured into Pakistan to stabilize its economy. China, UAE, and Saudi Arabia have given billion of dollars to mitigate the looming issues of economy.

It is to remember that Pakistan fought the US war on terror and lost all its economic, political, and diplomatic glory in the fight. Pakistan did not fight the war of China, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Russia but at times of need they are the ones who have extended their cordial hands to save Pakistan. Pakistani nation is still awaiting the response of American nation as it never wished to abandon the glorious history of mutual friendship.

12.4. Future Projections of Warfare:

The possibilities of changes in the character of warfare in next five to ten years time period is somewhat difficult to be deconstructed since the nature of regional and international political environment is decisively shaping the strategic posturing. This makes the overall picture less predictable and more un-certain. In future inter-state warfare is likely to continue given the Thucydides realism of ‘fear, honor and interest’ (Evans, 2014). The nature of warfare in the future will remain driven by intense use of violence and for varying political pursuits.

a. Future Politico-Military Environment. Features of future wars will be determined by political, social and technological changes in the world, and these will be stemming from progress in robotics, genetic engineering and bio-industry.
Wars irrespective of between states or with NSAs will however breed change in military thought to achieve desired objectives on ground.

b. **Volutility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity (VUCA) Driven Operational Environment.** Future conflicts are expected to be volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous under an operating environment which would be highly congested, contested and casualty heavy due to its protracted nature. A single adversary may constitute an amalgam of regular, irregular, insurgent, terrorist and criminal.

c. **Enhanced Violence, Amorality and Contagious beyond Borders.** Future conflicts will grow more violent with total disregard to human values, extreme tactics of inducing terror and will act beyond any international norms, border, discipline and law.

d. **Fourth Industrial Revolution in Conventional Domain.** The conventional wars though unlikely but if fought will be intense and casualty heavy due to increased precision, C4ISR, cyber-attacks, reach and lethality of the modern weapons. Fourth industrial revolution will play important part in any future war is promising a level of change comparable to that brought about by steam power, electricity and computing. While according to Russian President Vladimir Putin, “Artificial intelligence is the future, not only of Russia, but of all of mankind” (Vincent, 2017). Complementing Russian projections, adaptability of the notion of ‘artificial intelligence’ by US with that of Chinese increasing capability is leading the discourse of warfare into new heights (Dai, 2019).

e. **Projected Technologies affecting CMT.** Projected technologies specific to continental military thought (CMT) and their effects on future conventional and sub-conventional wars are:-

- Battlefield transparency through advance radars and satellite based surveillance means for future militaries, the night will no longer be nights.
- Long range accuracy and precision in tactical and operational domain with munitions like ERPGMS (Enterprise Resource Planning Global Management System).
- Net-centricity bringing all force elements into a monolithic force.
- Increased lethality in the fields of munitions and land based weapons – weapons like corner shot to engage a target without being exposed.
• Enhanced battlefield mobility undermining traditional obstacles.
• Increased protection in the face of emerging threats including use of battlefield robotics.
• Enhanced developments in the fields of stealth in land based weapon and equipment endeavouring to challenge battlefield transparency.
• Cyber-attacks causing a widespread disruption and damage.
• Satellite based communications enhancing potency of connectivity.
• Advancements in emerging concepts like directed energy weapons, battlefield robotics, and nanotechnology will further change the character of warfare.

f. **Future Notion of Victory.** In a changed warfare amongst the states and non-state actors with blurring lines of ends, the notion of victory will lose its traditional sense. It is likely to shrink inward discarding extremes of victory and defeat narrowing into a bracket of ‘Not Winning-Not Losing’ (Adnan, 2012).

g. **From 4GW to 5GW, Hybrid Wars and Gray Zone Conflicts.** Future warfare will see transit of conflict from 4GW to hybrid and 5GW. This study foresees that both Hybrid and 5GW are evolving concepts and seems to collide and mix in the essential character. However according to Mark Safranski, “at the high tech end, 5GW would be precisely targeted to window out ‘bad guys’ in a souped-up version of Operation Phoenix but at the low-tech end, we could see campaigns that would be indiscriminate, involving death squad campaigns that shred 4GW networks by the same merciless logic that led the Allies to firebomb German and Japanese cities in WWII” (Safranski, 2005).

h. Future conflicts and CMT would revolve around the interplay of diverse and dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, criminal and the bystander interests and capabilities.

i. Regime changes through violent protests and in the form of ‘Colour Revolution’ is yet another possible form of future conflict. According to Eva Golinger, “Colour Revolution is a form of hybrid warfare and occur in a nation with strategic natural resources like gas, oil, military bases and geopolitical interests” (Golinger, 2014). It is a regime change through violent protests and use of extreme coercion by the aggressor state on to the target state.

j. Modern military theorists also believe that in future the states dissatisfied with the status quo and determined to change important aspects of it would resort to a
measured aggression in a limited encounter called Gray Zone Conflict (GZC) (Mazarr, 2015). In short the future military thought will be far more complex and uncertain offering graver challenges for future and forces.

k. **Predominance of Territory.** Like most of the wars in the past where the influence of air power remained significant, it were the boots on ground which capped victory in the end. Whatever the future form and character of warfare evolves into, territory will remain at the centre stage of military thought and hence CMT will continue to shape future military thought.

The current Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov who is the deputy defence minister had spotted the nature of 21st century warfare being hybrid in nature when he observed that:

“In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template….The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures—applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population” (Sputnik International, 2017).

Keeping in view the projected global environment, it is evident that the world would continue to be driven by conflicts. Pakistan due to its geo-strategic location and its geo-political alignments is likely to remain affected by emerging global conflicts and political developments. The multitude of threat, the character of future war outlined by Hybrid Warfare and Pakistan’s internal and external dynamics will put a lot of strain on the development and shaping of its political, economic, diplomatic, and military thought. The land forces will require responding multiple threats so do the national governments. With limited resources at hand and given the multitude of challenges, the military theory will have to be intelligently developed and applied to meet the future challenges. In short the future military thought will be far more complex
featuring challenges for future land forces. Pakistan will not be an exception to be impacted by evolving concepts of the people centric hybrid warfare, the technological developments and the prevalence of net-centricity jointness, information, cyber and space.
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