The United States and Nuclear Politics of South Asia

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Dedicated

To

My Mother
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Abstract

The nuclear politics of South Asia – in the context of the protracted India-Pakistan conflict – has become one of the most debated topic of contemporary international systems analysis. During the four decades long US-USSR Cold War rivalry, South Asia was an epicentre of great power politics. The standing of New Delhi and Islamabad and their hostile relationship proved centrally important in the wider context of extra-regional power between the United States and Soviet Union. The importance of both India and Pakistan in the Cold War resulted in the US active involvement in the region and placed eventually both India and Pakistan with the United States. The proliferation of overt nuclear weapons in South Asia further intensified the role of United States in the politics of nuclearized subcontinent. The opening of complex bilateral relations by President Bill Clinton and initiation of a global war on terror by President George W. Bush marked a new chapter in the history of subcontinent for both of the principal contestants of South Asia. Subsequently, the administrations of Obama and Trump continued the policy of bilateralism and generated a plan of de-hyphenation for New Delhi and Islamabad by establishing separate relations with India and Pakistan. The strategic consequences of the US bilateral policy intensified the American role in South Asia, moving India closer to the US, while critically re-examining and re-evaluating the standing of Pakistan in the region simultaneously. Hence, the trilateral strategic relations between the United States, India, and Pakistan structured an American South Asian policy that proved ultimately to be perplexing. Indo-US and Pak-US complex relations have proven to be complex and, in past, reflect a dichotomy in American South Asian relations. Now, it is difficult to separate the American role from strategic competition of India and Pakistan. This dissertation is an effort to provide a scholarly dimension to the American South Asian engagement, which encompasses a complex and an extensive record of cooperative and estranged diplomatic interaction. Moreover, this study is an attempt to comprehend the triangular relationship of
power between these. The theoretical conception of neorealism is applied to understand the
South Asian nuclear arms race and its persistent growth in the presence of extra-regional
powers. The interconnectedness of South Asian regional sub-system to greater international
system carried the debate in this research which attempted to emphasize particularly the US
engagement with India and Pakistan. In the end, the research endeavoured to craft a proposed
the future scenarios of US South Asian engagement.
Introduction

The presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia amidst the vicious strategic competition between India and Pakistan has made the region a nuclear flash point. The overt nuclearization in 1998, with the proclamation of nuclear weapon capabilities by New Delhi and Islamabad, further intensified the already fragile regional security environment of the region. Coupled with the rapidly growing strategic contest between India and Pakistan, the nuclear weapons dramatically altered intricate dynamics of the regional strategic equilibrium. According to the Realist, security continues to be the primary imperative behind the nuclear race in South Asia. However, the Neorealist school of thought factors in the structural foundations of international system, which expounds that India acquired the nuclear weapons to deter China which escalated into an endless nuclear race in the region by heightening the threat perception for Pakistan.

Pakistan’s quest for acquiring nuclear armed status after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War led to the fall of East Pakistan. The tragedy of 1971 shaped the strategic preferences of Pakistan’s security establishment vis-à-vis malicious Indian ambitions towards the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Indira Gandhi’s ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosions, conducted on May 18, 1974, became a strong stimulus for Pakistan to achieving nuclear status. Consequently, the South Asian nuclear arms race began to unfold which attracted the attentions of international strategic community. The prevailing trends in the South Asian nuclear arms race occurred and forced a competitive strategic environment. The Indo-Pak hostility cemented in inflexible national standings, incompatible bilateral positions on several issues of regional and international significance along with several conflicting claims against each other continuously stirring a strategic competition.

The nuclear optimists believed the hostile relation between Indian and Pakistan would be stabilized in the aftermath of the overt nuclearization. They were optimised about the
strategic stability of South Asia because of the establishment of balance of terror between both nuclear contestants. This premise seemed right as nuclearization successfully averted the chances of a major armed conflict between India and Pakistan which largely highlighted the stabilizing role of nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan. Such balancing attributes of nuclear weapons substantiated the claim that a major war or an al-out conflict was less likely in a nuclearized South Asia. Based on the dynamics of world politics in the Cold-War era the Realists assumed that it was difficult to neglect the role of nuclear weapon as a “great equalizer” in world politics.\(^1\) Despite the presence of nuclear weapons in both states arsenals, India-Pakistan uneasy diplomatic interaction is a constant state of enmity, which is rightly viewed as a fundamental cause of unstable regional politics.

The role of extra-regional powers, especially the American involvement in the South Asian affairs, cannot remain unnoticed. The US has been playing an active role in diffusing the bilateral tensions by mediating the Indo-Pak crisis through its diplomatic influence. Yet the US policies are unable to instill the spirit of enduring peace in the strategic stability in the region. Therefore, it is hard to understand the nuclear politics of South Asia without factoring in the American role and studying the fluctuating patterns of its nonproliferation policy towards India and Pakistan. The inconsistent strategic moves of the US inherited in its greater South Asian policy determine unquestionably the merits and demerits for regional stability. American interest-driven foreign policy based on its geostrategic calculations dominates the regional politics of South Asia. The strategic inclination of Washington towards New Delhi and its precarious strategic proclivities toward Islamabad have resulted in an uncertain strategic environment of South Asia. Both nuclear powers, New Delhi and Islamabad, have been rapidly upgrading their strategic capabilities despite the US intense involvement in the region.

The strategic competition in the subcontinent resulted in a nuclear arms race. The US has, by and large, been an unabated strategic adherent for India and a relentless strategic castigator of Pakistan. The US has attempted to regulate through bilateral, multilateral and various other indirect diplomatic channels the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan. Nonetheless, its engagement with New Delhi and Islamabad has been unable to provide the desired results so far. As a global nuclear hegemon and hyper-nuclear power, the US is in a position to exercise its influence to fashion the politics of a nuclear South Asia in a constructive manner. The dynamics of its decades-long policy of creating alliances and counter-alliances in a nuclear world has developed opportunities for Washington to find an excuse to stay in the conflicted landscapes of South Asia. The conflict-ridden Indo-Pak relations fascinate the American policymakers. The perpetual conflict between New Delhi and Islamabad diverges from American influence. The bilateral interactions between the three nuclear armed states; US, India, and Pakistan; has become an unavoidable reality in international system analysis. Thus, South Asian nuclear politics and its connections to the great power politics has grown under an inevitable interconnectedness of regional and international.

The establishment of a peaceful and stable South Asia challenges the traditional strategic literature which is based on the Cold War experiences of nuclear politics where both nuclear powers US-USSR were managing their foreign policies independently without interference of a third nuclear power. Contrary to the four-decade long Cold War politics, the South Asian nuclear politics portrays an altogether different picture: the regional politics cannot effectively be managed without American influence. The bilateral equations between Washington-Islamabad and Washington-New Delhi considerably effect the scope of a stable regional strategic order on the subcontinent. The active engagement of the US in a consistently evolving South Asian nuclear order noticeably effects the regional strategic equilibrium.
Indian perception of Washington as a regional balancer is contrary to Islamabad’s conception of the US as a main source of the deterioration of regional stability raises serious questions on the future politics of India and Pakistan. A parallel account of varying strategic considerations of the US toward India and Pakistan raise further questions to the regional strategic balance. In this milieu, the advocates of the global nonproliferation campaign and its contradictory application in the nuclearized subcontinent, under the greater American leadership entail negative implications for a stable South Asia.

Regarding India-Pakistan hostile relations in the presence of US in South Asian region, the role of American South Asian strategy always remain critical. The recent phase of this triangular interaction of three nuclear powers started in the post nuclearized and post 9/11 environment. These two main events in the history of subcontinent turned the US attention towards New Delhi and Islamabad. The combination of regional and global political balance of power altered the traditional American South Asian strategy. The presence of Pakistan in the regional politics of nuclearized subcontinent, in contrast to Indian emerging role in the global politics, compelled Washington to revise its bilateral relation with both nuclear neighbors of South Asia. The US policy of separate bilateral ties with Pakistan and India largely considered globally as a policy of de-hyphenation.

The contemporary features of South Asian regional politics and the role of US in the region cannot be divorced from international politics. The role of New Delhi in the global politics is based on anti-China behavior. The US position in international politics is linked to various attributes of international system of South Asian political order. Unlike India, the role of Pakistan in the US-led war on terror in context of Afghanistan has raised the strategic position of Islamabad in the geostrategic calculations of Washington. In this way, American present engagement with India and Pakistan is purely based on regional and global geopolitical configurations of international system.
The fundamental aim of this research is to study the US involvement in South Asian nuclear race along with evaluating the future course of Indo-Pak rivalry. The future of South Asia strategic environment under US influence is an area of immense importance which requires utmost scholarly attention. Contrary to the previous studies done by various authors from diverse background, the central theme of this research is to emphasize the Neorealist-driven theoretical elements which have been stirring a perplexing debate on regional stability. Moreover, this research comprises the view that American strategic policy reflects a US dichotomy and confusion which instead of empowering the forces of stability in the presence of nuclear weapons sometimes undermines region.

Issues of regional stability demand an extensive study of the US role in the nuclearized and post-9/11 South Asia. Therefore, a comprehensive study of the New Delhi-Islamabad-Washington strategic triangle under the question of regional strategic balance is the central focus of this research. The American efforts towards facilitating a stable regional order can contain the possibility of forces sufficient for stabilizing the South Asian regional balance of power. This research is an endeavor to rationally study the contemporary geopolitical interest-driven US policy toward India and Pakistan which ultimately constitute an interesting yet highly intricate strategic equations in South Asia, operational at bilateral and multilateral levels.

The principal objective of this research is to objectively identify the causes behind the contemporary American role in the South Asian nuclear politics in the context of nuclear weapons and strategic stability in a volatile South Asia. The ostensible balancing character of nuclear weapons made the large-scale war between the archrivals a somewhat absurd notion. The consistently rupturing strategic environment, which is accelerating the regional arms race explicitly under greater American presence, is leading the regional politics towards more chaotic situations in which the US policy of bilateralism will augment the existing uncertainties
between India and Pakistan. Consequently, the deteriorating security situation in the region poses serious challenge for Washington.

This study also examines the scope of South Asian nuclear politics, in the intense engagement of the United States because the regional strategic environment based on Indo-US and Pakistan-US strategic relationships formulates the rationale for the examination of an ambiguous framework inherent in triangular relations between three nuclear powers. In order to consider the question of the regional stability under American influence, the research attempts to purposefully investigate US strategic behavior and the varying patterns of its inconsistent South Asian policy. Therefore, the analysis of the triangular relations discusses the history of strategic interaction between the three states. In the concluding analysis, the work focuses on the US strategic priorities in contemporary South Asia. It concludes by establishing the viable policy considerations for Washington after appropriately revealing the triangular interaction of US-India-Pakistan.

1. Significance of Study

This research is a significant effort to meticulously comprehend the US role in South Asian politics while investigating the history of Washington-New Delhi-Islamabad triangular relations. An assiduous examination of the strategic triangle among the three nuclear powers – US, India, and Pakistan – will try to forecast the future politics of nuclear subcontinent. An analysis of the growing regional standards indicates that these standards are deteriorating the strategic balance between New Delhi and Islamabad. In the end, a compact conclusion tries to venture on few scenarios which will enhance the vision of a balanced and stable South Asia.
The US nonproliferation behavior in South Asia contains a protracted history and revolves around the “nth country problem”.\(^2\) US foreign policy dealings with the nonproliferation problem affects the world politics considerably. The strategic calculation of Washington towards India and Pakistan offers a dichotomous account of US foreign relations with New Delhi and Islamabad. Parallel to an unsettling strategic regional balance, the active engagement of the US with India and Pakistan has become an unanswered question which is direly seeking scholarly attentions. Therefore, it is essentially needed to revisit the question of American involvement in the South Asian nuclear politics, because the consistently swelling Indo-Pak nuclear capabilities has altered the regional nuclear order. American preferential strategic consideration for India and discriminatory approach towards Pakistan are losing the legitimate grounds, which needs an investigatory study to examine the major driving forces behind the changing contours of the US strategic responses towards the nuclear rivals of South Asia.

The American role in the South Asian strategic landscape, exclusively in the post-1998 environment, cannot be divorced from its historical engagement in regional politics. The initial British colonial retreat from the subcontinent provided a suitable opportunity to the Eisenhower administration for expanding its anti-Soviet fight toward newly independent subcontinent, and it laid the foundations of the US greater South Asian policy. The principle objective of the American approach was deeply inherited in the emerging Cold War politics instead of addressing the problems of the newly independent states of the subcontinent. Thus, the structured containment of the Soviet Union influence in the world was the major strategic driver behind United States-South Asian relations.

This fundamental strategic consideration of the US also shaped Pakistan-United States ties when the two countries worked together in opposition to the Indo-Soviet friendly interaction. The shadows of the confrontation between the two superpowers not only effected the strategic culture of South Asia, but it also contributed to growing Indo-Pakistan hostility. The great-power rivalry in the light of their geostrategic interests proved inefficacious in keeping the New Delhi and Islamabad conflict away from indulging in a nuclear arms race. Eventually, Indira Gandhi approached the contesting attributes of regional nuclear race and forced the neighboring nations to follow the suit.

The most interesting episode of American South Asian policy came after the proclamation of overt nuclear weapon capabilities by Vajpayee and Nawaz governments in 1998. The interaction of the three nuclear armed states started to evolve into a precarious situation after the signing of an extended strategic cooperation agreement between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the US President Bush, under the Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) agreement in 2004. The actual bilateral collaboration of both states in the form of the 2005 civil nuclear deal complicated the strategic triangle of Washington-New Delhi-Islamabad. On that account, the nuclear arms race in South Asia – particularly, in the light of US engagement in the region which became a significant area of research. Numerous writers expressed their varying thoughts on the different extents of the Indo-Pakistan rivalry in the shadows of great power politics. The leading circles of intellectual communities around the globe have sought to understand the nuclear politics of India and Pakistan under the changing dynamics of the US influence. The contesting arguments presented in varying opinions have,

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in this way, constituted a gigantic layer of literature mainly studying the nuclear politics of South Asia.

To understand the security environment of South Asia, a comprehensive study has been carried out by an American scholar, Stephen P. Cohen where he has presented an enduring picture of Indo-Pak hostility. His book *Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum* (2013) has presented some viable prospects of normalization of New Delhi-Islamabad hostility. The seventh chapter of the book reveals the American interests and policy choices for a nuclearized subcontinent. Another co-authored study of Cohen, *Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization* (2010), presents an overview of consistently swelling armed capabilities of India. The last chapter of the book focuses the American role in upgrading Indian military modernization while ignoring hardcore regional realities. Along with his work on India, an edited volume of Cohen *The Future of Pakistan* (2011), comprises the views of seventeen writers from diverse regions on the role of Pakistan in regional politics coupled with its efforts to overcome its internal crisis. Regarding Indian emerging weapon capabilities and its impact on nuclearized subcontinent, Cohen has beautifully explained the quest of New Delhi for acquiring hegemonic status in the region while fighting for the territorial disputes with the adjoining states in his Brooking publication, *India: Emerging Power* (2001). Another study of Cohen, *The South Asia Papers: A Critical Anthology of Writings* (2016), has provided a combination of internal and external dynamics of Indian politics. While describing the various historical dimensions of Indian politics, he further pointed out the role of Kashmir, Pakistan, and the US in Indian foreign policy. An interesting phase of American induced Indian-inclined

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policy presents a brief survey of Indian and American interests in their bilateral interaction. In order to achieve its strategic autonomy, the Indian leaders are highly committed in polishing of New Delhi’s strategic muscles. An account study on Indian military modernization has been carried by Arvind Gupta in How India Manages its National Security (2018). This academic survey covers different dimensions of Indian strategic capabilities and its impact on Indian global standing.

The question of American strategic supplies to India has been addressed by various authors which reveal the role of the US in helping the New Delhi to build up its arms capabilities. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal in his research work, India’s Missile Capabilities: Regional Implications (Pakistan Horizon, 2001), has also provided a brief account of the foreign strategic supplies to India. Regarding Indian-American strategic relation, the recent account of literature provides a great deal of data on the contemporary patterns of two-sided partnership. The recent bilateral designs revolve around the question of a civil nuclear deal. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly in The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future (Asian Survey, July/August 2007) has discussed the nature of New Delhi-Washington strategic ties. Besides the contesting outlook of Indo-Pak writers, the leading circles of international intellectual community has agreed on the worse impacts of Indo-US strategic partnership on South Asian strategic environment.

The genesis of conflict in Indo-Pakistan relations has its roots deep in the partition of the subcontinent after the British colonial retreat as well as in their historical discourse while living together in the India ruled by the Muslims. How Indians view the departure of the colonial power from the subcontinent was succinctly explained by Jon Wilson in India

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Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire (2016)\textsuperscript{12} and Srinath Raghavan in India’s War: The Making of Modern South-Asia 1939-1945 (2016)\textsuperscript{13}.

Analogous to volumes of Wilson and Raghavan on the colonial history of India, eminent Indian politician and a former diplomat, Shashi Tharoor has explained the exploitative patterns of British rule in India in his book, An Era of Darkness: The British Empire in India (2016)\textsuperscript{14}. Certainly, the creation of Pakistan and India has, he argues, successfully terminated the colonial rule from the South Asian soil, but it has also initiated an era of unending New Delhi-Islamabad dispute. A former Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan, T.C.A. Raghavan, has narrated a personal account of the contentious Indo-Pak relations in his masterly analysis, The People Next Door: The Curious History of India’s Relations with Pakistan (2017)\textsuperscript{15}. The highly skeptical approach of India towards its neighboring states has forced the old leadership to adopt a belligerent policy against the territorially adjoining nations. Such patterns of managing foreign relations led Indian leaders to cultivate friendly ties with the world beyond neighbors. In the same vein, a comprehensive survey of Indian exceptional approach for formulating security policy has witnessed various fault lines which has been exposed by Jaswant Singh in India at Risk: Mistakes, Misconception and Misadventures of Security Policy (2013)\textsuperscript{16}.

In order to understand the history of South Asian politics under the regional conflicted environment, Ian Talbot-A History of Modern South Asia: Politics, States, Diasporas (2016)\textsuperscript{17} covers in five parts the history of subcontinent politics by revealing the role of various points

\textsuperscript{12} Jon Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and The Chaos of Empire (New Delhi: Simon & Schuster, 2016).
\textsuperscript{14} Shashi Tharoor, An Era of Darkness: The British Empire in India (New Delhi: Aleph Book Company, 2016).
\textsuperscript{17} Ian Talbot, A History of Modern South Asia: Politics, States, Diasporas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).
of disagreements between New Delhi and Islamabad. The debate on South Asian nuclear race has also been further highlighted by various other authors. For instance, Sumit Ganguly’s edited volume *India as an Emerging Power* (2005), and *India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (1999) by George Perkovich comprise readings on Indian interaction with the outside world for sustaining its strategic thrust. Including the US, the Indian foreign relations with China, Israel, France, and Russia are discussed by different authors in their respective chapters. The Indian foreign policy towards great powers has been comprehended by several writers including archival record-Russia and the United States in *India’s Foreign Relations: 1947-2007* (2011) by Jayanta Kumar Ray. In addition, Teresita C. Schaffer, Rollie Lal and Anja Manuel have also discussed Indo-US relations in *India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership* (2009), *Understanding China and India: Security Implications for the United States and the World* (2006), and *This Brave New World: India, China, and the United States* (2016) in their books respectively.

The debate on the Chinese role in South Asian politics and its economic connections to Islamabad have been discussed by various authors. A brief survey of recent books provided a comprehensive picture of Sino-Pak ties and its impact on broader South Asian politics. The Chinese gigantic economic growth has been discussed by Richard McGregor in *Asia’s Reckoning: The Struggle for Global Dominance* (2017). The contemporary plans of Beijing for the creation of its economic dominance in the world politics is fundamentally inherited in

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its ancient concept of Silk Road which is briefly explained by Peter Frankopan in *The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World* (2018). Frankopan in his study has highlighted the American reaction to the Chinese mega economic plans for the maintenance of its global economic order. Further academic accounts of Bruno Macaes *Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order* (2019), Francois Bougon *Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping* (2018), and Zhou Xinmin *Xi Jinping’s Governance and the Future of China* (2017) provided the details of Chinese economic rise. Chinese-sponsored global economic order under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is directly connected to Pakistan. An antipathy toward Chinese BRI and its global outreach has been described in *Dragon on our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power* (2017) by Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab.

During the Cold-War politics, Pakistan and India stayed in the opposite camps and supported their strategic partners, the US and the Soviet Union respectively. The estranged bilateral values between Washington and New Delhi evolved gradually when Nehru and Kennedy started viewing each other in terms of cooperation. Bruce Riedel in his book, *JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War* (2015) and Andrew J. Rotter in *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (2000) have primarily covered the clandestine operations of the US intelligence community to assist India vis-a-vis China during the McMahon Line crisis of 1962 which resultantly laid the foundations of Indo-US relations in the region. At the same time, American-Pakistani relations were strengthened by

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26 Ibid., 222-228.
the Kennedy administration as discussed by Robert J. McMahon in *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (1994). Indian relations with Pakistan, apart from US, remained significant during the Zia regime. The question of Afghanistan was important for Rajiv government. *The Great Game in Afghanistan: Rajiv Gandhi, General Zia and the Unending War* (2017) by Kallol Bhattacherjee has also tried to provide an account of unparalleled analysis on Cold War politics and its impact on South Asian region.

A substantial amount of literature has been produced purely on Indo-US relations debating several dimensions of cooperative interaction between two states. Moreover, a brief survey of South Asian security pertaining to nuclear order also contain the scholarly considerations on the emerging nuclear politics between India and Pakistan. The actual debate on the contemporary nuclear affairs of the subcontinent started in 1998 but got intensified after 2005 owing to Indo-US strategic cooperation under NSSP agreement. An edited work of Gray K. Bertsch, *Engaging India: US Strategic Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy* (2011) tried to describe the two-sided areas of bilateral strategic values between New Delhi and Washington. The scholarly debate of different writers from diverse regions in the book has emphasized the rapidly emerging nuclear politics of South Asia in the presence of Washington-New Delhi strategic bounds. Ganguly and P.R. Chari has also shared similar views in their seminal works. An edited work of Ganguly *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century: More Than Words* (2006) contains similar arguments that are expressed by Chari in *Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Seeking Synergy in Bilateralism* (2009). The convergence of strategic

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interests of the two states in a hostile regional environment was further explored by Haider K. Nizamani in *The Roots of Rhetoric: The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan* (2000)\(^{38}\), Rajesh Rajagopala and Atul Mishra in *Nuclear South Asia: Keywords & Concepts* (2014)\(^{39}\), Carl Paddock in *India-US Nuclear Deal: Prospects and Implications* (2009)\(^{40}\), and Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur in an edited volume *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb* (2009)\(^{41}\). The strategic partnership between India and United States reached unprecedented level during the Modi government. Shashi Tharoor in *The Paradoxical Prime Minister: Narendra Modi and his India* (2018) has explained the Indian role in the regional and global affairs under Modi.\(^{42}\) Moreover, an academic explanation of Indian influential role in the regional and international affairs has been examined by Shyam Sara in *How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century* (2017).\(^{43}\) It is primarily a study of India strategic thinking and its relevance to the contemporary world politics. The impact of this Kautilyan thought on Indian foreign policy resulted in hostile relations with territorially adjoining nations. *India and Pakistan: Neighbours at Odds* (2018) by Avtar Singh Bhasin has presented a concise history of New Delhi-Islamabad hostile diplomatic patterns cemented in an in-compatible national standing.\(^{44}\) Although the views of these writers largely attempt to draw a different sketch of nuclear South Asia, yet their work mainly shares similar viewpoints.

In addition to the Indian and western scholarly expositions of South Asian conflicted interaction of the two nuclear armed states under American active nonproliferation campaign,


\(^{39}\) Rajesh Rajagopalan and Atul Mishra, *Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014).


an extensive amount of literature has been produced on Pakistan. *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (2001)\(^\text{45}\) by Dennis Kux; *The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power* (2008)\(^\text{46}\) by Tariq Ali, *Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, The United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding* (2013)\(^\text{47}\) by Husain Haqqani are the studies that have discussed the nature of Pak-US relations in the light of a volatile South Asia. Another study of Haqqani *Reimagining Pakistan: Transforming A Dysfunctional Nuclear State* (2018)\(^\text{48}\) tried to examine the foreign policy of Pakistan through the prism of internal political turmoil. He adopts an irrational approach in his study and exclusively emphasizes the social, political, and economic crisis of Pakistan. He further tried to explain the cultural and ideological problems of the country. Presently, a number of authors such as Ayesha Jalal, Anatol Liven, T.V. Paul, C. Christin Fair, Christopher Jaffrelot, C. Raja Mohan, Zahid Hussain, Ahmed Rashid, Veena Kukreja, and Myra Macdonald in their writings have comprehensively analyzed the strength of strategic cooperation between Islamabad and Washington in terms of two-sided socio-economic and political aspects.

Indian induced US policy towards nuclearized South Asia initiated in the post-Cold War era and got elevated to its peak post-9/11. New Delhi-Washington strategic bounds has become an interesting field of an academic debate in Pakistan. Research work after the conclusion of civil nuclear deal between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush, revealed the prevailing estranged values in historical Pakistan-US relations. Zafar Iqabl Cheema in his study *Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security* (2010) has pointed out the US role in terms of India-Pakistan nuclear

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competition.\textsuperscript{49} The edited book of Zulfqar Khan, \textit{Nuclear Pakistan: Strategic Dimension} (2011)\textsuperscript{50}, and Naeem Salik’s \textit{The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective} (2009)\textsuperscript{51} has focused strategic position of Islamabad in South Asian nuclear context.

Naeem Salik has also contributed to Pakistan’s contemporary nuclear weapon status in his work \textit{Nuclear Pakistan: Seeking Security & Stability} (2018)\textsuperscript{52} on the lines of Zulfqar Khan. Some critical questions of international community regarding Islamabad’s nuclear weapon status has also been addressed in his book. The question of South Asian nuclear deterrence is further explored by Tughral Yamin in his research, \textit{The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia} (2014).\textsuperscript{53} He tried to compared the Indo-Pakistan nuclear rivalry with the US-USSR historical four decades-long confrontation. The nuclear journey of Pakistan started in the last phase of capitalist-communist global rivalry. Feroz H. Khan in his intellectual investigation tried to cover various aspect of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program. \textit{Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb} (2013)\textsuperscript{54} by Khan narrates the historical record of Pakistan’s nuclear program. The recent works of Zafar Khan \textit{Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence} (2015)\textsuperscript{55} akin to Naeem Salik’s \textit{Learning to Live with the Bomb, Pakistan: 1998-2016} (2017)\textsuperscript{56} has described Pakistan’s contemporary nuclear weapon status in response to the scathing criticism of international community around nuclear capability of Islamabad. The book is comprised of the various short essays written by different writers across the Indo-

\textsuperscript{50} Zulfqar Khan, ed., \textit{Nuclear Pakistan: Strategic Dimensions} (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011).
\textsuperscript{51} Naeem Salik, \textit{The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective} (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009).
\textsuperscript{52} Naeem Salik, \textit{Nuclear Pakistan: Seeking Security & Stability} (Lahore: University of Lahore Press, 2018).
\textsuperscript{53} Tughral Yamin, \textit{The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia} (Islamabad: The Army Press, 2014).
Pakistan border, and is compiled by Pervez Hoodbhoy, it tried to outlines the views of the nuclear scientists in *Confronting the Bomb: Pakistani and Indian Scientist Speak Out* (2013).\(^{57}\) Analogous to a critical study of Hoodbhoy carried on nuclear program of Pakistan, an unbalancing picture of Pakistan’s nuclear program with exclusive reference to A.Q Khan episode discussed by Hassan Abbas in *Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb: A Story of Defiance, Deterrence and Deviance* (2018).\(^{58}\) The edited book of Maleeha Lodhi *Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’* (2011)\(^{59}\) marginally tried to touch on the nuclear characteristics of the Indo-Pakistan hostility. The literature created by the Pakistani intellectual community predominantly reflects the nuclear status of Islamabad in the evolving regional nuclear order of the subcontinent.

The genesis of the present South Asian security environment is inherited in the post-Cold War era because the demise of the Soviet Union from international politics changed the geopolitical structure of world politics. The end of Cold War confrontational politics hampered the South Asian security environment and re-organized the regional development under the perpetual growth of Indo-Pakistan unfriendliness. Therefore, picture of the New Delhi-Islamabad quarrelsome interaction cannot be divorced from the external influence of the great powers. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheem, P.R. Chari, and Stephen P. Cohen in *Four Crisis and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia* (2007) have expressed the post-nuclear crisis situation between India and Pakistan, and American involvement in diffusing the tensions.\(^{60}\) George Perkovich and Toby Dalton worked on slightly different lines in *Not War, Not Peace:

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Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism (2016). Both Perkovich and Dalton have critically examined Islamabad’s position in the conflicted regional environment. The debate on South Asian peace has been further carried by a Pakistani author Asma Shakir Khawaja. In her book Shaking Hands with Clenched Fists: The Grand Trunk Road to Confidence Building Measures Between Pakistan and India (2018), she has explored the question of peace between New Delhi and Islamabad. Chapter fifth of Khawaja’s research has highlighted the significance of military and nuclear related confidence building measures. Inside Nuclear South Asia (2009) by Scott D. Sagan, and Asymmetrical Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (2009) by Peter Levoy compiled the two edited books which contain simultaneously parallel themes. Pakistani perspective of Kargil conflict with reference to India-Pakistan enduring rivalry has been maintained by Nasim Zehra. The journalistic analysis of Zehra From Kargil to the Coup: Events that Shook Pakistan (2018) has tried to explain the nature of New Delhi-Islamabad rivalry in the post nuclearized era.

The task to provide a complete review of the existing literature of the nuclear race between India and Pakistan, and its impacts on the regional strategic environment, is unquestionably a difficult one. The international community around the globe is persistently working to determine their varying intellectual positions on the subject. The academicians and policymakers mainly cover the three dimensions, past-present and future, of nuclear programs of India and Pakistan. They have also traced the evolution of this conflict in the shadows of the great power Cold War hostility among Beijing, Washington, and Moscow. Furthermore, this

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65 Nasim Zehra, From Kargil to the Coup: Events that Shook Pakistan (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2018).
dissertation analyzes the contemporary dynamics of Indo-Pakistan nuclear race in the existence of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal. A few authors, Mario Carranza E. Carraza in *India-Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy: Constructivism and the Prospects for Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament in South Asia* (2016)\(^{66}\) and Ashley J. Tellis in his intellectual examinations has tried to outline the ongoing American bilateral designs of South Asia under de-hyphenation.\(^{67}\) In addition to aforementioned books, Stephen P. Cohen has attempted to study the trilateral interaction of United States-India-Pakistan under de-hyphenation policy of Washington for treating New Delhi and Islamabad on separate basis. The American way of examining nuclear politics of South Asia by treating Pakistan as nuclear apartheid state mainly constructed under its de-hyphenated approach. It is contrary to support the nuclear program of New Delhi that reflect a dichotomous approach in the US greater South Asian Policy. American South Asian engagement realized the significance of Pakistan in the regional politics whereas Washington observed an important Indian role in the global politics. This scenario resulted in a separate bilateralism of Washington for Islamabad and New Delhi.

This way of managing foreign relations depicts US interest-driven foreign policy. It further results in various contradictory formats of foreign policy for managing India-Pakistan hostility. Moreover, a concise record of Pakistan specific American nuclear nonproliferation policy that articulates Islamabad specific sanctions was developed by Larry Pressler in *Neighbours in Arms: An American Senator’s Quest for Disarmament in a Nuclear Subcontinent* (2017).\(^{68}\) In relation to Pressler another study conducted by Rabia Akhtar, a Fulbright alumna, revealed the actual nature of Pak-US relations with reference to nuclear issue. She attempted to highlight in her research the role of Pressler amendment in nuclear

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efforts of Islamabad. The Blind Eye: U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan: From Ford to Clinton (2018) by Rabia Akhtar is an unparalleled story of five American Presidents and their engagements with Islamabad.69 A recent account of India-Pakistan hostile relations in the presence of United State in the South Asian region provided by an American-based Pakistani scholar, Moeed Yusuf. Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environment: U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia (2018)70 has appropriately comprehend the contemporary triangular relations of three nuclear powers. Prior to examining the Pak-US relations on nuclear issue, Moeed Yusuf carried a study on Pakistan role in the US led war on terror. This edited book Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Challenge (2014)71 is comprised of nine short chapters that contain various views of different scholars.

The support of Islamabad to the US counterterror operations in Afghanistan under the broader framework of global war against terrorism has been described by many authors. An autobiographical account of former intelligence chief Pakistan-based intelligence agency, Asad Durrani, has tried to portray an exceptional picture of Pak-US fight against terrorism. Pakistan A Drift: Navigating Troubled Waters (2018) has thinly emphasized Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan while discussing Pak-US relations.72 Another autobiographical survey of, Zalmay Khalilzad, a former US ambassador to Afghanistan has also presents a brief picture of American efforts for managing the security of Afghanistan. The author tried to unfold the American way of resolving political problems of Kabul with the help of Islamabad. The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey Through A Turbulent World (2016) has maintained a chronological survey of Khalilzad’s life and his ambassadorial services in

Afghanistan, Iraq and the UN. In order to understand the geopolitical features of Afghan land, an account of journalistic analysis *A Kingdom of Their Own: The Family Karzai and the Afghan Disaster* (2016) tried to highlight the politics system of Kabul while discussing the life of President Karzai.

The efforts of Islamabad in American initiated war against terrorism was analyzed by C. Christine Fair in *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War* (2014). The study of Fair is a distorted picture of Pakistan’s position at regional and global levels. A study of Brookings presents analysis of Islamabad’s ongoing fight against terrorism. Madiha Afzal from Brookings in *Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State* (2018) also attempted to provide a glimpse of Islamabad-specific counter-terror campaign. The research of Afzal is primarily a collection of various surveys and interviews that she conducted in Pakistan. The literature containing opinions on counterterror efforts of Islamabad generally contains fluctuating arguments on the one hand. On the other hand, the literature produced on nuclear status of Islamabad normally adopts critical lens to see nuclear Pakistan. In short, a major chunk of existing literature on the regional nuclear politics is also contained in the bilateral Indo-US and Pakistan-US standards instead of outlining the triangular interaction of the three nuclear armed states.

The triangle of Washington-New Delhi-Islamabad relations has been an area of less-scholarly attention especially in the presence of the precarious scenarios in the South Asian nuclear order. Therefore, this research is an endeavor to formulate a plausible argument on the basis of the previous work by various authors, policymakers and researcher from different

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backgrounds. The existing scholarly debates between different writers on the nuclear dynamics of South Asia and the impact of the American dichotomous and sometimes ambiguous nonproliferation policy and its impact on South Asian nuclear development is the main focus of this research. This research endeavors to provide a multidimensional work of imminent scholars and their varying views on the India-Pakistan nuclear competition. It also explores different elements in the Indian-inclined American policy introduced by Clinton and promoted by Bush and Obama. That American policy has serious implications for the nuclear equilibrium of South Asia. Some of the regional strategic thinkers develop their interpretations of the South Asian nuclear balance by principally studying the Indo-US strategic relations and its impact on Pak-US diplomatic relations. The area seeking intellectual attention is US de-hyphenated treatment of Pakistan and India in its larger South Asian policy which reveals the worrisome future of the region.

The merits of ongoing US policy towards New Delhi are potentially creating a shift in the South Asian balance of power toward India. It is inflicting a sense of isolation in the strategic mindset of Pakistan in which the government of Pakistan is trying to enhance its interaction with the outside world beyond US. Consequently, this situation further compelled the extra-regional powers to increase their involvement in the South Asian politics. Thus, the theoretical surveys by different authors and organizations mainly emphasize the Realist scenarios in addition to the recent study of Carranza – who debates the constructivism and its relevance to contemporary South Asian politics. The foundational conception of Realism, as it is usually visualized in nuclear politics, is formed within the Neorealism domain of world politics where the inevitable structural changes in the international system largely define state behavior. It further demands the national leaders or state governments to lead their countries in a specific direction. The strategic triangle under the broader prism of Neorealism has remained a largely unnoticeable academic domain in intellectual circles of international strategic
community. Therefore, this research is an endeavor to study the Neorealist conception of power in the nuclear world and its application in South Asia by studying the potential forces or the role of extra-regional states in intensifying the existing power-relations in the nuclearized subcontinent.

The role of US in the nuclearized subcontinent has been studied under the strategic calculations of great powers in terms of regional balance of powers. A persistent trend in great powers competition and the involvement of great powers in various regions remained a permanent feature of global power politics. The great powers attempt to dominate international system by increasing their role in different regions. The desire to expand their sphere of influence across the globe let the Realist-driven foreign policies models of great powers to dominate the politics of different regions. The effect of one superpower in a specific region unignorably receives the reaction of other powers. This cycle of action-reaction politics intensifies the security environment of a particular region. This pattern of power politics enhances the role of extra-regional powers in a particular region. In other words, a sub-system working under broader international system grow under the inevitable competition of great powers.

The sizable literature related to the central theme of this research starts from a classical theoretical debate within the Realist paradigm. The academic conception of Realism, and its main assumption about power relations, begins with Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War. A translated version of Thucydides description of power relations in the Greek city-state system formalizes the genesis of political Realism. The acceptance of Athens’s and Sparta’s upheavals in The History of Peloponnesian War under the Greek structure of Realist politics convention is evaluated in Niccolo Machiavelli’s work in The Prince, and in Thomas Hobbes’s writings De Cive and Leviathan. Machiavelli and Hobbes have provided a philosophical extension to the Realist explanation of power relations. Following thoughtfully the historical
texts on Realist-driven power politics, Carr’s *The Twenty Year Crisis: 1919 – 1939*, Hans Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations*, and Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* are significant pioneering studies. These studies highlight the consistent role of anarchy that is the absence of central authority in international systems which insecure states and force the state governments to acquire security guarantees from great powers. The anarchical structure of the world politics shapes structural changes in the international system, according to Waltz. The structure of anarchy further push states in certain direction. In reaction, the leaders and governments ultimately invest their potential to overcome security threats to their survival. The leading structural Realists emphasize the self-help and balance of power in defensive arrangements that are appropriate strategies of survival in the internationally ferocious anarchical environment. The Defensive-Realist states usually prefer to adopt a deterrent posture against the overwhelming wave of security threats emanating from rival nations which is considered the power maximizers under the theory of offensive Realism.

Regarding the role of great powers in regional politics, there are number of authors who try to explain the theoretical foundations of regional sub-system working under international political system. Lack of substantial work on the regional level analysis restricts the study to few authors, an appropriate example of studying regional sub-system growing under broader international system starts from the Middle Eastern region which always remained under the influence of great powers. Cameron G. Thies in *The United States, Israel, and the Search for International Order: Socializing States* (2013) has explained the role of United States in Middle Eastern affairs.\(^7\) Chapter five of the book has briefly highlighted the interconnectedness between regional sub-system and global system. A similar work has been done on African continent because African continent is analogous to Middle East. Michael O. Anda in

International Relations in Contemporary Africa (2000) has described the subsystem as a set of geographical proximate based on some interacting states. These states share a high degree of sense of identity and equally observes by external actors.\(^{78}\) The studies of Latin America and Red Sea as sub-regions is carried out by Joseph S. Tulchin and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. Two edited volumes Latin American in the New International System (2001)\(^ {79}\) and The International Politics of the Red Sea (2001)\(^ {80}\) attempt to explore more dynamics of regional sub-systems.

The regional sub-system progressing under a broader international system cannot be divorced from an unending strategic competition between great powers. Like all regions, South Asian region cannot be spared from the influence of global power politics. A number of authors have examined the South Asian political attributes and their unprecedented growth under great powers. Sten Rynning in South Asia and the Great Powers: International Relations and Regional Security (2017)\(^ {81}\), Nicholas Burns and Jonathon Price in American Interests in South Asia: Building A Grand Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (2011)\(^ {82}\), and William H. Overholt in Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics (2008)\(^ {83}\) endeavored to discuss the role of extra-regional powers in South Asia.

2. Statement of Problem

The inevitable connection of nuclear technology indubitably fabricates the strings of nuclear politics in the international system. The consistent growth of vertical and horizontal


proliferations in the nuclear world creates chaos and uncertainty in an international anarchical environment in world politics. The ongoing politics in the nuclear world can, in degrees, be explained by the association of the classical conceptions of anarchy and deterrence. The existence of nuclear weapons in world politics has altered the fundamental notion of power relations which was primarily associated with the unitary role of the states. An updated version of Neorealism, studying the structure of international relations, links these power relations of states to the structure of world politics. In this way, the evolution of Realist theoretical perspectives offers a great explanation of world politics by efficiently developing and analyzing the role of global anarchical structures. The features of anarchy under Neorealism explain the structure of US-USSR nuclear competition in the Cold War. Further extension of anarchy in the Cold War politics brings nuclear weapons in the world politics. Consequently, the balance of power politics structured the nuclear order of the Cold War. Therefore, from Hobbesian to Waltzian descriptions of power politics, anarchy persistently shaped the political attributes of states and leaders on the global stage.

Nuclear politics between the states began in the structural dynamics of the Cold War politics and the role of nuclear weapons in international system became centralized during the US-USSR confrontational period. The regionalized version of strategic arrangements in international structure inaugurated a new dimension to discuss various regional nuclear orders including South Asia. Various circles of intellectual communities across the world started discussion on nuclear politics between India and Pakistan. Eventually, the examination of localized nuclear debate of South Asia explores various stages of interstate strategic competition of Indo-Pak conflict under the theme of an intense security dilemma. Therefore, anarchy in the nuclear world including its regional application in South Asia describes a Realist security competition in the presence of a persistently deteriorating regional strategic balance.
The growing critical traits of Washington’s nonproliferation campaign and its South Asian direction explicitly project the perplexed role of America in the anarchical environment in which India and Pakistan are vying for power. Hence, the strategic culture of South Asia is a regional strategic concern for the US, with both Pakistan and India. In this context, this study attempts to investigate American strategic engagement in South Asia and the worrisome picture of the future course of Indo-Pak relations. The following research questions are addressed in the study:

What are the leading characteristics of the US South Asian policy that structure the evolving nuclear order between India and Pakistan?

1. How has the South Asian nuclear order been incorporated in the fragile regional security environment in the context of the Neorealist theoretical conception of anarchy?
2. How did Pak-US cooperative interaction cement the foundation of Indo-Soviet collaboration under the US-USSR confrontational global designs?
3. What factors expressively constitute the Indo-US strategic bonds in the presence of Indo-Soviet cooperative interaction?
4. How do the US strategic contemplations in South Asia determine the trends in the regional stability amidst the existence of Washington-New Delhi-Islamabad triangular interaction?

3. Hypothesis

American complex bilateralism in a nuclearized South Asia has seriously affected the nuclear order and stability in the region because the broader prospective of US regional policy under the broader framework of US global nonproliferation campaign reflects fluctuating patterns in its relations to New Delhi and Islamabad.
Keeping in view the aforementioned hypothesis of the research, the role of the U.S. that is rooted in the de-hyphenated treatment of India and Pakistan in different silos sometime compromises its own principle of non-proliferation campaign that affects the notion of peace and strategic stability in the South Asian region. Theoretically, Neo-realists conceived International System that is identified as ‘Anarchy’ plays a significant role in determining the relations of a state with the others. Therefore, International System induced role of the U.S. as a third party extra-regional actor is an independent variable that affects the nuclear order and stability between Pakistan and India in the sub-continent as dependent variables keeping in view the inter-connectedness of this strategic tri-angle.

4. Research Methodology

This study is qualitative in nature based on descriptive, explanatory and analytical methods to answer the research questions that are to explore the leading characteristics of the US South Asian policy shaping the evolving nuclear order between India and Pakistan. In addition, it highlights that how an extra-regional power intensifies the conception of regional security under Neorealist propounded anarchic international system. It eventually elucidates the role of US in stabilizing the regional security environment of South Asia. Since the idea of qualitative research is inextricably linked to interpretive school of thought that talks about exploration of multiple perspectives of a given subject matter therefore, this study is to explore and explain multiple characteristic of the US South Asian policy that effects mainly the South Asian nuclear order. Therefore, the orientation of the study is exploration, and explanation of the aforementioned research questions.

This is fundamentally a desk research using primary and secondary data collected through declassified archives, libraries search engines and other internet sources. The texts of different speeches and interviews of high ranked US, Indian and Pakistani officials, formal US policy documents, official statements and scripts of various multilateral and bilateral
agreements constitutes the primary data whereas, secondary sources have already been discussed in my literature review given above. Moreover, the empirical assessment of different institutions working in the strategic environment of South Asia, coupled with the opinions of the epistemic strategic community – based on eminent academicians and policymakers – are examined out to enhance the accuracy of the findings.

The success of US nonproliferation efforts is also equally essential and it is studied while understanding the critical aspects, historical evolution, dichotomous dimensions and contemporary trends in the changing patterns of US nonproliferation initiatives towards South Asia. By providing an historical analysis of the US role in South Asia, this study is primarily focused on the post-nuclearized South Asian politics by analytically reviewing the historical record of American engagement with India and Pakistan. The study is generally limited to the strategic interaction of the three nuclear powers: the US, India, and Pakistan.

5. Organization of the Study

The study is divided into four chapters. Each chapter covers a separate topic while addressing the core question of the research respectively. Therefore, the essentials of the debate are presented briefly in introduction, after formally introducing the central theme of the research. The subsequent part of the research is designed to highlight the theoretical dimension of the research. In order to scholarly comprehend the central theme of the study, the theoretical dimension of this research is maintained in the first chapter. The second and the third chapters attempt to explain the rationales behind Pak-US and Indo-US strategic relations by describing the historical developments of the bilateral relations among the three states. The fourth chapter highlights the perplexing bilateralism of the US with India and Pakistan separately under the broader framework of de-hyphenation policy and its effects on the regional politics of South Asia. The last chapter of the study contains concluding analysis which represents the main
findings of the research. In the end, the study endeavors to forecast the US role in South Asia regarding its nonproliferation campaign while presenting the US policy of treating both nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, differently.

1. Chapter one is about the theoretical conceptualization of the study. A brief survey of Realist theory and its relevance to international politics is the main focus of this chapter. The theoretical explanation of the evolving strategic triangle among the three nuclear powers – United States, India, and Pakistan – is studied in term of the structural dimension of Realism. Neorealism, studying the structural changings of nuclearized subcontinent thoroughly, explains the role of Washington in a perpetually conflictual India-Pakistan relation. It is anarchy which shapes the mainstream foreign relations between New Delhi and Islamabad in the presence of Washington in South Asia. Primarily the US role in the regional politics of South Asia shapes the ongoing nuclear politics between India and Pakistan.

2. Chapter two is to explain an analytical account of Pak-US relations. The debate in the chapter provides a brief historical survey of Islamabad-Washington relations. Evolution of the diplomatic ties starting from the days of the Cold War between the US and Pakistan gradually involved China in the greater Pak-US alliance. The nuclear issues brought an unavoidable era of the US sanctions towards Pakistan which resulted in estranged diplomatic interaction between the two states. Moreover, the post-nuclearized and post-9/11 environments further intensified the US-Pakistan bilateral values.

3. Chapter three provides a brief survey of Indo-American relations. A brief survey of the diplomatic values passing through various upheavals is the main theme
of this chapter. Indo-US bilateral ties gradually emerged during the Cold War when the non-aligned policy of the Nehru administration decided to apparently keep New Delhi away from the bipolar world politics. However, the gravitational force of US-USSR rivalry dragged the Nehru government towards power politics in the international system. Furthermore, New Delhi tried to create its own place among Moscow, Washington, and Beijing while highlighting the main turning points of Indo-US bilateral ties. This chapter emphasizes the structure of the strategic bounds between the two states.

4. Chapter four develops debates surrounding the element in the American complex bilateralism with New Delhi and Islamabad. This chapter examines the perplexing basis of the US bilateralism for its South Asian allies under the broader framework of de-hyphenation policy which dictates Washington treat both India and Pakistan on separate lines. The debate in this chapter mainly revolves around the broader contours of the US South Asian policy and the reflection of its dichotomous values.

5. Fifth chapter of this study attempts to provide a brief survey of whole research. This section of the study contains concluding analysis which tries to define the proposed future positions of US, Pakistan and India. A set of proposed policy behaviors in the end of this research endeavors to forecast a picture of stable and peaceful South Asia. In this way, the research attempts to formulate few applicable policy recommendations for the US and suggests an upgradation and revisitation of its South Asian engagement.
Chapter 01

Theoretical Framework

The politics of international non-proliferation regime, coupled with the politics of states with nuclear weapon capabilities and without nuclear weapon capabilities, have become an intense debate among various scholarly domains of international community. The theoretical version of political Realism assumes that the acquisition of nuclear weapons can ensure the survival of a state in the anarchical world where the maxim of self-reliance prevails. The anarchical structure of the global affairs obliges the states to seriously consider the principles of survival and security in their national policy making. Hence, the states endeavour to enhance their security through the interplay of their internal and external power for the sake of their survival and independence. The inevitable anarchy inherited in the interstate relations indisputably results in a war-prone international environment. Therefore, the inevitable existence of the continuously evolving notion of anarchy in world politics determines the multifaceted state of affairs in the international system. In a world of evolving power politics; the inconsistent policies, insufficient strategic planning, and unsatisfactory diplomatic values of international community have strengthened the exiting anarchical structure among the states instead of managing it appropriately.

The central theme of world politics revolves around the international anarchical environment, in which the lack of central authority or a competent government over the leaderless society of the states generate an unending contest in the world affairs. The scholarly debates of International Relations (IR) accept the problem of anarchy while embracing its chaotic attributes. Several multifaceted characteristics of anarchy (generally disorder, conflict under a persistent state of uncertainty) potentially covers the core assumption and the leading theoretical conceptions of world politics. The anarchical global
infrastructure predominantly, in this way, outlines the principles of world politics or strictly defines it as a power politics. Therefore, the operational domains of Realism profoundly rely on the conception of anarchy among states. The Realist-driven vicious cycle of world politics engenders a stringent power-gaining competition among states. The Realist premise emphasizes that the state is the unitary actor in the anarchical world politics and the national governments try to survive in the unpredictable international system by augmenting their means of power. Such environment forces the states to believe in rational calculations of power and further intend to deter adversarial connections of opponents. However, the distribution of power becomes the central theme of world politics and an undeniable element of foreign and strategic policy of a state. In short; state as an actor, anarchy as a structure, survival as a strategy along with power for maximization, rational policies for competition, use of threat for security, and relative calculation of power distribution are the main elements of Realism. The notion of government as an external element or as a third party with power to coercively manage the relations among the sovereign nations is an unacceptable phenomenon in world politics. The conception of third party as a government is considerably equivalent to the idea of a God with the absolute power to interfere the human affairs.¹

The anarchical nature of world politics develops an insecure environment of permanent fear and a constant state of uncertainty in international relations. The existence of utopian ideas such as Liberalism, Idealism or Moralism do not fit well in the rapidly evolving structure of power politics. The multi-layered processes of power-maximization among the states have become an inevitable reality of the world politics. In such a conflict-ridden global system, anarchy has become a permanent feature of the international relations. The growing anarchy in the international system demands states to empower their military capabilities by arming themselves against the unexpected threats of an attack from the potential rival states.¹

The state of war or potential conflict are the permanent features of international system. In such a system, the self-reliance is an appropriate strategy as suggested by various Realist scholars. The preparation of war and keeping well-equipped armies ultimately enhance the security of the states managing to survive under anarchy because the international anarchy scares everyone and secures no one. The sovereign states can be attacked anytime by anyone from anywhere. The anarchical structure of world politics, in this way, generates an unending global competition which compels states to actively pursue the means to ensure their survival. The quest to acquire powerful means for the strengthening of security leads states to adopt various defence strategies. An effort to pursue different means of power eventually enable the state leaders to maximise their benefits parallel to minimizing the losses in international system.

In the theoretical domains, the idea of anarchy has been addressed by various scholars. The mainstream intellectual groups belong to various schools of thoughts debate over anarchical structure of world politics. The debate among different intellectual communities accept the anarchy as a gravitational point of strategic debates across the world. The contesting attributes incorporated in the diverse opinions outline the notion of anarchy in dissimilar directions. The prevailing debate over the anarchical structure of international system, where the war is an undeniable reality and an unescapable truth, is always validated by the Realist school of thought. Sovereign positions of the states in the international system are less inclined to accept the status quo, and more likely to calculate the relative distribution of power which ultimately develop an unending strategic competition among the states. According to Realist thinking, the power politics always remains an overwhelming force over the mainstream foreign policy decisions of states. It further lead state governments to maximize their sphere of influence over other states instead of enhancing cooperative bounds towards others. Such directions derive the foreign policy establishment of the states towards
the maximum acquisition of their national interest. In this way, the ultimate objective of the state is to survive in the anarchical structure which constitute the uncertain walls of fearful environment around states because there is no “supreme law-maker or law-enforcer” to keep the order in an organized way. In this way, the intellectual efforts of Kenneth Waltz upgraded the Realist thoughts and departed the philosophical foundations of classical Realism. Waltz attempted to examine the classical maxims of Realism before the realities of new world. Waltz maintained that his version of philosophy as a Neorealism which is more relevant to the nature of power politics. He focused the evolving modern political system where the interaction among the states is purely based on anarchical structure of international system. The intellectual contribution of Waltz focused the principle of self-help, which is an appropriate strategy to protect the national interest of the states. According to Neorealism, the occurrence of war in world politics is an unquestionable reality which is sometimes defined “war is like love, it always finds a way,” Unlike the classical teaching of Realism, the idea of modern Realism outlined by Waltz has become more relevant to the international relations. Waltz in his work, Theory of International Politics (1979), emphasises the nature of anarchy and reformulates the question “how an anarchical political structure affects the behaviour of its constituents units” under the Modern Realism. A brief glimpse of changing world politics further elaborates an altered version of Realist foundations.

The aftermaths of the WWII changed the anarchical world order dramatically. The Soviet-American strategic competition for global dominance brought several changes in the traditional patterns of world politics. Additionally, the inception of nuclear arms race in the international system and the destruction of twin Japanese cities (Hiroshima and Nagasaki)

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3 Ibid., 533.
rang the security bells across the globe. No doubt, American nuclear capabilities successfully ended the destruction of WWII but the arrival of nuclear weapons in the world politics failed to end the strategic competition among the states. In response to American nuclear weapon capabilities, the communist leaders of Soviet Union preferred to extend the security of Moscow. It was an effort to counter the prevailing US dominating global status. The Soviet desired of overcoming effectively the American hegemonic plans led the Kremlin to acquire nuclear-armed capability. Eventually, the Kremlin’s attainment of nuclear weapon capability began to unfold the inevitable consequences of the nuclear dominions in world politics. Indeed, it inaugurated a global nuclear arms race and intensified international security mechanism. Finally, the inescapable nuclear politics declared a nuclear club of the five states and strengthened inflexibly the international anarchical structure. The acquisition of nuclear armed status by five states influenced the strategic designs of all the states of all the regions.

The inevitable nuclear arms race eventually affected the South Asian strategic environment. According to Realist conception of balance of power politics, the nuclearization of South Asia commendably established the strategic stability in the region. The growing nuclear capabilities of Islamabad and New Delhi and their strategic relation with Washington raised a number of serious questions on the South Asian strategic equilibrium. The anarchical regional order with the involvement of the extra-regional powers fostered the South Asian nuclear race parallel to enhancing the eventualities of crisis management between India and Pakistan. Therefore, it is essential to theoretically comprehend the notion of anarchy and its significance in the nuclear politics before debating its relevance to the nuclear race in South Asia.

1. Philosophical Contextualization
The centuries-old notion of anarchy generally refers to the state of disorder or the absence or non-recognition of a central authority in the international system. Historically, the conception of anarchy structured the Greek political system. From a philosophical perspective, the primary sources of anarchy are rooted in the classical Realist literature. The writings of Thucydides, Hobbes, and Machiavelli respectively provide the idea of anarchy by studying the hostile relations of the states. The classical texts of Realism highlight the recurring theme of anarchy and its undeniable significance in world politics. The main debate of Realist perspectives on the anarchical nature of state-system begins from The History of Peloponnesian War outlined by Thucydides. Unlike theoretical and philosophical studies, Thucydides provides a historical account of the Athens-Sparta conflict. The study of Peloponnesian war by Thucydides formally established the initial foundations of Realism. Parallel to the anarchical nature of Greek politics; anarchy, self-interest, power and negation of morality became the main findings of Realism which was developed by Thucydides. Thus, the original concept of anarchy originated from traditional political structure of Greece, but the strings of anarchy gradually spread across the globe. The uncontrolled riots, revolutionary unrest, rebellious uprisings, and social disturbance constitute mutually the tentative foundations of anarchy in the international system.⁵

The absence of a central authority in the international system is discussed by the Italian philosopher, Niccolo Machiavelli, in The Prince. He argued that the appropriate strategy for survival is “self-sufficient.”⁶ Such strategy is based on a combination of well-equipped army and abundance of the resources ready to fight a battle decisively. In an unchanged anarchical nature of political environment, survival is the principle concern of the

⁵ Ernest Howard Crosby, “Anarchy and Anarchy,” The Advocate of Peace 64, No. 01 (January 1902), 10-12.
Moreover, the philosophical genesis of anarchy is also inherited in an ancient version of Realism developed by Thomas Hobbes. The civil and revolutionary wars of England and France in the sixteen and seventeen century structured the Hobbesian conception of anarchy. To initiate the debate of anarchical social structure before the existence of the civil society, *De Cive* and *Leviathan* are reflected in the initial work of Hobbes. The state of nature, according to Hobbes, encompasses of independent humans who are ready to fight against one another for the preservation of peace. The ‘war of all against all’ in a society lays the foundation of self-defence which is the natural right of every individual. The individuals in a state of nature and sovereigns in international systems live in an anarchical realm which lacks an influential central power. The uncertainty in anarchical structure formulates a system of the strong and the weak, which sometimes fabricates a conflict-prone environment in which the weaker possesses enough capability to attack or kill stronger. Therefore, the force and violence are undeniable Realities of the anarchical political structure of the world.

The Realist intellects of Hobbesian and Machiavellian, inspired by Thucydides, mutually construct the idea of anarchy and maintain its inevitable relevance to world politics. The classical Realist philosophers assume that the lack of coercive authority over states allows the stronger to dominate the international system. Generally, the problems of anarchy and immorality provide the opportunities to stronger and inflict a sense of insecurity in the weaker under international anarchism. Moreover, the notion of anarchy primarily considered to be a state of freedom without any supranational law or government. This situation eventually leads the international system towards a protracted conflict. Such chaotic situation,

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9 Dylan Kissane, op. cit., 49-51.
under an unregulated superior authority, usually defines the lawlessness over people. Anarchy also refers to a situation of unrest for the prevention of unjustified power or the abolition of ferocious ruling hierarchies. The main debate on precisely defining the conception of anarchy has evolved throughout the history of international relations. The contesting arguments of the scholars measure the anarchy with different parameters under different theoretical domains.

2. Defining Anarchy

The concept of anarchy generally unfolds an uncertain situation where it is hard to imagine a sovereign over the sovereigns. Contrary to the domestic systems of the states, the non-existence of central authority to impose or regulate effectively an international system for the management of relations among nations create an anarchical world order where uncertainty predominantly prevails. In this way, the lack of a central political authority or the absence of a global rescue forces over states formulates a principle of self-help because the consistently prevailing insecurity forces the leaders to ensure the survival of their nation. In this way, the overwhelming wave of uncertainty directs the governments to design the adequate measure which can ensure the survival of a state in a constantly growing patterns of trust-deficit environment among the states. Therefore, the unavoidable forces of anarchy in the system of various protracted conflicts, multiple points of disagreements, several antagonising behaviours, and numerous incompatibilities emphasize the need to appositely comprehend the notion of anarchy. In short, the general idea of anarchy refers to a state of uncertainty where the unclear political scenarios cause unrest on the basis of political

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disorder, lawlessness, lack of central authority, and the absence of an effective governing body.

The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines the anarchy as “a situation in a country, an organization, etc. in which there is no government, order or control.” Another dictionary highlighting Australian version of politics explains “the anarchy is the absence of government (usual meaning) or minimal formal government (less common meaning)”.

Anarchy, not essentially chaos, is considered to be a situation without central government above the governments of states. The idea of anarchy more accurately refers to a state of uncertainty with unpredictable circumstances which creates unreliable international environment. This scenario pushes a state toward an unpredictable international system in which the fear of unknown encircles the national government. Such situation determines a system of disorder where no one exercises ruling power on anyone else in the absence of a central law enforcement force.

Theoretically, the absence of government evidently separates the international politics from the domestic spheres of a state. As Hans Morgenthau narrates that the nature of domestic laws, unlike international regimes, can be implemented through structural force to organise citizens within a state. Contrary to domestic infrastructure of the states, the international society of the sovereign states cannot construct a law-enforcing or law-imposing authority over the sovereign states. The presence of authority in the world and its connection to international system are unthinkable because the legitimacy coupled with authority can only function efficiently in the domestic affairs of the states. Different sources of legitimacy such as divine authority and government constitution empower an authority for

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12 Robert Corcoran and Jackie Dickenson, A Dictionary of Australian Politics (New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 2010), 05.
14 Ibid.
the implementation of rule of law in the internal affairs of a state. Contrary to internal political system of a state, the role of a central authority is absent in the international system.\textsuperscript{15} Internationally, the anarchical problem reflects two features which are the absence of central authority and unexpected use of force by anyone, anytime. In world politics, the use of authoritative power by state and non-state actors construct a culture of violence.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, one of the main definitions of anarchy also explains anarchy as a “lack of obedience to an authority, or insubordination.”\textsuperscript{17}

The structural study of international system under Neorealism explains an unreliable arrangement in which states are living in an uncertainty that prohibits the nation states from relying on one another.\textsuperscript{18} The notion of Neorealism developed by Waltz talks about the structure of international system. It provides a three-tier definition of international system which starts from anarchy, defining it as an ordering principle which impacts externally all the states. Contrary to the conventional wisdom outlined by Thucydides, Hobbes, and Machiavelli; the political features of the twentieth century altered the traditional foundations of anarchy where the Waltz’s way of observing anarchy on the basis of the structural changes of world politics seems suitable to comprehend the notion of anarchy and its relevance to international relations. In view of Kenneth Waltz study, the traditional work completed by various scholars on classical Realism is structured on non-structural changes of the world which consequently overlooked the structural features of world politics.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{15} Branislav L. Slantchev, Introduction to International Relations – State and Anarchy, Lecture, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, April 19, 2005, 07. \url{http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/ps12/02-state-and-anarchy.pdf} (accessed on May 11, 2016).
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 08.
\textsuperscript{17} Rexford Rex Louth, \textit{God Shed His Grace on Thee: The Christian Foundations of America and Your Responsibility as a Christian to Continue the Pursuit} (Bloomington: WestBow Press, 2014), 134.
The modern Realism formulated by Waltz emphasizes the three principles under the structural theory of international relations. These principles mainly treat the structural politics as “an ordering principle, a specification of the functions performed by the actors, and a distribution of capabilities or power across those actors.”\(^{20}\) Waltz, as a Structuralist-Realist says that the first ordering principle is anarchical, the second principle of primary units are states, and the third distribution of capabilities are the varying capabilities of states. While speaking about the modern international political system, Waltz argues that the states greatly intend to manage independently their own security.\(^{21}\) Hence, the system which is based on structural change leads the states towards “self-help and power maximization.”\(^{22}\) In reaction to the system, the unitary actors in the international system, states, prefer to power-balancing and alliance-building strategies which eventually try to bring stability, order, and security in the world.\(^{23}\) In short, Waltz’s structural model of Realism emphasises the complex political system which exerts pressures on its unitary actors, and these unitary actors mutually formulate an international system.

### 3. Other Assumptions

The contesting theoretical debates commonly produce counter arguments, anti-thesis or critique from the opposing sections of a particular school of thought. The Realist assumption of anarchy and its dominating patterns in world politics receive a mixture of analogous and contrasting elaboration of anarchy from the opposite philosophical groups.\(^{24}\) Unlike the Realist explanation of anarchy, other theoretical domains assert that the actors in

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\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Benno Teschke, op. cit., 14.

\(^{23}\) Ibid.

international system can effectively cooperate instead of involving in hostile conflicts. In an uncertain world of complaisant values, the unitary actors in the broader international system contain unexpected behaviours. Therefore, anarchy partially refers to crisis, conflict or disorder, according to non-Realist assumptions.

The negation of narcissistic and egoistic ambitions of states under anarchy are highlighted by other theoretical domains. The study of cooperative values, besides anarchy, are assertively ignored or underestimated by Realist scholars. An appropriate study to comprehend the cooperative ways of managing international anarchy carried out by various Liberalist scholars. The contrasting views replaced the core assumptions of Realism with institutional cooperation. The avoidance of Realist perception of world politics suggests the establishment of the global regimes for the effective management of anarchy and for the counterbalancing of uncertainty.25 The proponents of the Regime Theory advocate the cooperation as a suitable way under international institutions to control the anarchy which is overestimated or over-calculated by Realism.26 The emergence of multilateral frameworks under the two main formats of Liberalism, Neoliberalism and Liberal Internationalism, tries to move away from the state of anarchy among the states. However, the growth of various global platforms after the Second World War under the emerging nuclear politics of the Cold War diminished the scope of cooperation in international relations.27

The constitution of nuclear non-proliferation regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was positively established but evidently failed to curtail or limit the nuclear ambition of several states. The efforts to control or regulate the nuclear ambitions beyond the five nuclear armed states only advanced the global discriminatory standards instead of

25 Bhumitra Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: A Historical Analysis (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2004), 30-31.
inducing the nuclear behaviours of de-facto nuclear-armed states: India, Pakistan and Israel. Therefore, anarchy leads states towards a policy of self-help or self-reliance, and the foreign policy decision makers of a state prefer to adopt the policy of self-reliance in order to ensure the survival of their country in an international system of immeasurable discrepancies. The irregular consistencies in cooperative multilateral frameworks exploit the weakness of powerless states of the Global South. The subscription of international organisations, signing of treaties, construction of security alliances, adoption of economic agreements, coupled with several other strategies of temporary cooperative relations, a state adapts itself to enhance its capabilities and global standing in the international system. There are several efforts of arms control and disarmament along with enormous platforms to regulate the inexorable nuclear ambitions of states. All such arrangements are failing to overcome the potential challenges of lack of consensus and absence of a universal mechanism.

A parallel development of arms race and arms control domains of world politics depict an awful picture of international system in which a number of efforts by the nuclear weapon states try to regulate the nuclear ambitions of the non-nuclear weapon states. This situation results in an unending politics between the states with nuclear weapon capabilities and the states without nuclear weapon capabilities. In fact, the threats of nuclear weapon and their vertical and horizontal proliferations remained till date a serious threat to the global peace, but the efforts of arms control and disarmament for the managing of international security remained inefficient before the unquestionable politics of states with and without nuclear weapons. The creation of Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970\(^28\) has accepted the nuclear armed status of the countries which has tested their nuclear devices.

before 1967. The treaty has 191 parties, but the nuclear weapon statuses of the United States, Russian Federation, France, China, and United Kingdom (UK) have been recognized by the NPT. In this way, the five states became Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and rest of the states declared as Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS).

The division between NWS and NNWS added another dimension to the existent power politics among the states. These two groups of the states further divided the world politics into the ‘Haves’ and the ‘Have nots’. According to the NPT, the NNWS cannot carry out the nuclear activities for military purposes and, in return, the NWS would provide them the nuclear technology for civilian purposes and promise to disarm. Eventually, the ‘Have nots’ have fulfilled their promise but the NWS, ‘Haves’, have failed to fulfill their promise. Additionally, the aforementioned five members of ‘Haves’ group are the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) along with the ten-non-permanent members. In the group of the fifteen composed members of UNSC, the five nuclear weapon states possessed the right of veto, because the five states are considered to be the important states for taking care of “international peace and security”. Furthermore, the UNSC retains the political commitment under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP)

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
36 The principle of Responsibility to Protect was established in 2005 at a high-level UN-World Summit. The Summit hosted the 191 members of United Nations at New York and concentrated the need of formalized efforts of nations for the elimination of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity parallel to the declaration of Millennium Declaration Goals (MDGs). The efforts for the prevention of mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations under R2P has introduced a new pattern of destructive interventions or the violations of non – intervention principle of sovereignty. In the UN General Assembly
to stop or prevent the criminal civilian atrocities across the globe by taking all possible measures against the states facing risk of “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity”.

A study of Hardeep Singh Puri, *Perilous Interventions: The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos* (2016), discusses the R2P and its worse impacts on states’ sovereignty. Given that, the centuries-old Westphalia notion of sovereignty has been undermined under the contemporary politics of the UNSC.

Regarding the international non-proliferation regime which consists of a wide network of agreements and organizations, the proponents of global non-proliferation campaign established various platforms for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the world. The countries with nuclear weapons are called their group the Nuclear Club, and the member of this club are called the ‘Big Five’. Hence, the five nuclear armed powers of the world with their huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons have become the dominating forces in the world politics. The division between the five NWS and rest of the world has raised several questions on the validity of global non-proliferation efforts. Thus, the foundations of international non-proliferation have critically been viewed by several nations. Especially, the states which conducted nuclear tests after the creation of the NPT (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel) has raised their concerns on the discriminatory status of the NTP.

Meeting of September 2001, the thirty sixth Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, suggested the replacement of R2P with the Responsibility while Protecting (RwP). Because the R2P has brought massive destructions of political, social, and economic spheres of intervened states.


40 Ibid.


In response to the ongoing politics between NWS and NNWS, the advocates of
international Liberal Institutionalism accept the weak role of international institutions while
addressing the question of cooperation under anarchy.\textsuperscript{43} The effectiveness of international
institutions established for the enhancement of cooperation among states proved to be an
ineffective measure in the world of hard-core realities and unending strategic competitions
among the states. Although the formulation of different global multilateral arrangements to
control the prevailing insecurities and dominating fears in the main affairs of the states have
become a global norm, but the success level of these multilateral frameworks is very low.
The formulation of multilateral institutions has convinced the mainstreams state leaders to
acknowledge the cooperative role of one another without resolving their strategic differences
against one another. However, the creation of such international frameworks exploited the
reasons of anarchy instead of diminishing its role. From the Realist perspective, anarchy in
the international structure is more inclined toward conflict and competition among the states.
Furthermore, this unending competition reduced the chances of cooperation even when the
states have common interests and shared values. Though the creation of international
institutions under various multilateral framework is largely considered as an effort by
international community to overcome the conflicting attributes in inter-state relations. The
efforts to establish a cooperative word order have brought the states on an international table
without mitigating the effects of anarchy in their strategic calculations. Therefore, a power
gaining competition and an unstoppable struggle for maximizing the sources of power
remained an undeniable feature in world politics, and it has become an unescapable reality of
international system. In short, the emergence of various anti-Realist thoughts attempted to
treat anarchy differently in opposition to Realism, but all remained ineffective in overcoming
the irrepressible forces of anarchy in international relations. Hence, the power politics always

\textsuperscript{43} Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
remained a dominant feature of world politics. The academic studies of international political system, based on anti-Realist thoughts, tried to formulate the theoretical conception of anarchy without testing their appropriate application in the world politics.\textsuperscript{44}

4. Power Politics

The rejection of traditionally utopian basis of international community and a rational description of the relations among the nations in political Realism are the primacies of E. H. Carr who laid the foundations of modern Realism. He termed the US-sponsored development of interwar period futile and unreliable on the premise that, power, instead of morality, is the one of foremost guiding principles of international system.\textsuperscript{45} The study of Carr, \textit{The Twenty Year Crisis: 1919 – 1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations}, depicts his contribution to the Realist paradigm.\textsuperscript{46} In fact, power politics drives the states in an anarchical system of world politics, according to Carr. John Mearsheimer extensively supports Carr’s work of power politics. Mearsheimer believes that “states seek security as primary goal”\textsuperscript{47} which causes the war or conflict in the structural paradigm of international power.\textsuperscript{48} The idealist advancements after the WWI undermined the strategic goals of states for maximizing power over the expense of others. The quest for unrestrained and limitless power is the ultimate aim of the states. The idealism of interwar period was the fundamental concern of Carr’s Pure Realism – struggle for power.\textsuperscript{49} So, the consistent forces of power politics among


\textsuperscript{46} Edward Hallett Carr, \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations} (Edinburgh: R. & R. Clark, 1939).


\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.

the states are impossible to ward off. The findings of *Twenty Year Crisis* advocate the idea of “Might is Right” or “Might Makes Right” over the utopian idealist conception of world politics.\(^{50}\)

The departure of political Realism from its classical domain focuses the idea of power in world politics. The leaders of a nation (statesmen) generally translate the interests of a state in terms of power. According to the leading scholar of political Realism, Hans Morgenthau, the notion of power and its association with the main affairs of state is one of the major themes of Realism which are enshrined in its six principles and the guiding attributes of world politics.\(^{51}\) The reflection of the interests, defined in term of powers, are inherited in the foreign policies of the states. A principled version of a foreign policy adopted by a state attempts to minimize the threats parallel to maximizing the benefits. These efforts of foreign policy decision makers enable a state to surviving in global power politics. The well-articulated work of Realism by Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, elaborates the world politics as a struggle or competition of power. The interest, in term of power, holds rational ground in politics and the pursuit of power is considered as a norm of politics.\(^{52}\) The strategic ambitions for a state revolve around the acquisition of power, and the quest to obtain sufficient power increases the lust for more power. The question of how much power is enough still remains unanswered.

The acquisition and maximization of power has become a principle and an undeniable right of a state regardless of its internal political dynamics. The overwhelming pressures that global system puts on a state compels it to constantly focus the sources of power for the

\(^{50}\) Graham Evans, “E. H. Carr and International Relations,” *British Journal of International Studies* 01, No. 02 (July 1975), 93.


survival in a system of Hobbesian global values. In a world of continual conflict and unrest, the idea of anarchy in the interstate relation of the vicious disagreements suggests a state to focus the superiority in power similar to equality. The few Realist scholars try to explore the question of superiority in power capability, because the struggle for power is hereditary in state behaviour. In actual terms, an unending struggle for acquiring maximum power creates an anarchical world. The superiority instead of balance rarely results in imperialistic ambitions. The common intention for maximization of power rests in relative calculation of power. The permanent distrust and persistently increasing strategic differences between states increase the reliability on military capabilities. This worldwide trend eventually causes the militarized anarchy. Such Realist-driven behaviour finally results in international promotion of self-help principle. Thus, the leading security architectures of states heavily relay on the policy of self-help.

5. Security in an Anarchical World

The prevailing anarchical trends in world politics lead the states to calculate treacherously the economic abilities, strategic capabilities, and political intents of other. The unpredictable international environment develops an ambiguous scenarios of world politics where a state must emphasize the necessary measures to extend its security. The strengthening of security ultimately results in increasing military might which creates an inevitable security dilemma. The classical text of political Realism, developed by Thucydides, elaborates vividly the maximization of power by Athens which increased the fears of Sparta. An unprecedented growth of power by one state puts the security of others in jeopardy. In other words, the efforts to maximize the power by one state jeopardize the

security of exclusively territorially adjoining nations. The application of Thucydides study reflects the strategic clash of the great powers during the periods of the great wars and protracted conflicts. The absence of a central authority pushes the states to fight or challenge others for the preservation of their own interests.

The self-seeking international behaviour of the states is a rationale for other states to compete with one another in their pursuit of security. The security-driven competition generally results in intensified, ruthless and violent politics. As Kenneth Waltz explains:

“The state among states conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their neighbours. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war . . . not in the sense that war constantly occurs, but in the sense that with each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may break out at any time.”

In order to survive effectively in the anarchical structure of world, a state usually prefers to increases its arms or improves its fighting capability by strengthening the military muscles. The states motivated or influenced by power politics think pessimistically. The rule of anarchy in power politics made war an undeniable and dreading reality which demands serious attention of the rulers.

In the light of above discussion, the debate of global anarchy revolves around the notions of peace and security. Enormous assumptions of arguing theoretical domains maintain several philosophical explanations of rationally connecting peace with security in international system of sovereign states. The threat of violence leads the states to enhance security for the maintenance of peace. The threat of violence and extension of security determine the interstate relations. In a world of countless disputes and multiplying conflicts, the unquestionable anarchical nature of international system cannot be denied. A state tries to

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ensure its survival in the world of constant threats, consistent fears and endless disputes. In order to sure the sovereign status of a state, its leading security architectures prefer to acquire advanced weapons against offensive capabilities of its rival states. This effort of a state usually empowers the concept of balance of power between two rivals in the international system. The inevitable power politics among the states lead them to a less moral and less cooperative system of temporary alliances. The balance of power is a vital option for the prevention of fear and elimination of war. The growing insecurities in the strategic calculations of the states lead the strategic thinkers to initiate defensive arrangement for the preservation of peace and stability.

The proponents of Neorealism, including Kenneth Waltz, study the structural changes of international system by incorporating the Realist ideas of Morgenthau. The *Theory of International Politics* echoes the Waltzian perception of political Realism which highlights the systemic pressures as a guiding principle for the states. Unlike classical Realist beliefs, the ideas of Waltz emphasize the overriding goal of security as one of the core assumptions of Neorealism. The anarchical construct of world politics is outlining a system of self-help, insecurity and uncertainty. The anarchical structure leads a state towards heavily relying on the maxim of balance of power against the key threats posed by its adversary. As Realist paradigm assumes that the anarchy does not only accelerate the eventualities of a conflict, but it pushes a state in an uncertain security environment in which the leaders decide to use the threat of use of force against other. The anarchical structure of international system and the threat of potential rivals demand the states to increase its security by adopting the principle of self-help.

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56 Ibid., 53-54.
The debate on the structural changes of world politics, under the modern formats of Realism, became the central theme of international relations theory for elaborating the broader structural effects of anarchy. The Waltzian model of international anarchical order consider such structural changes of international system beyond the Hobbesian conception of state of nature. The conventional notion of anarchy work on the states instead of calculating the nature of great power politics which evolved in the twentieth century. In this way, the essence of world politics developed on anarchy which complicated the unstoppable power gaining process in international system where the tripartite elements of ordering principles, functional differentiation, and distribution of varying capabilities prevail.\(^{57}\) Hence, the issues of security and acquisition of power for survival formulate an uncertain structure which hamper the traditional strategic thinking of states and eventually result in contesting behaviours states against one and other.

Further categories, inherited in the structural study of international system, nurtured the offensive and defensive aspects of Realism. While thinking in offensive dimensions, according to John Mearsheimer, states seek to expand their power by acquiring maximum elements of power which cause a power-maximizing behaviour. The logic of maximization of power shows a state’s worry for managing security. It shows generally the aggressive choices of the state government. As Mearsheimer, the great proponent of offensive Realism, maintains:

“this situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic. Great powers that have no reason to fight each other – that are merely concerned with their own survival – nevertheless have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other in the system.”\(^{58}\)


Hence, whatever the feature of leading policies of states, the international system developed on power politics always remained a ruthless affair. The uncertain and ruthless nature of international system never diminishes. Mearsheimer outlines five premises of politics among the states: the absence of central government in international system, states are capable of standing against each other while using force, uncertainty always prevails in international relations, all states seek to maintain territorial integrity and domestic autonomy, and states are rational actors in the world.  

Contrary to Mearsheimer’s analysis, Waltz advocates the state actions for maximizing the security against the prevailing threats from potential rival. These actions of states lead the governments to their sources of powers. The quest for building strategic muscles under offensive Realism leads the government to increase its military capabilities. An advanced version of such military capabilities jeopardizes the security of others. Therefore, the primary motive of threatening states is to ensure their survival against the primary power maximizing states. The states believe in defensive mechanisms to secure their status-quo because the nature of international system compels all the states to emphasize their security. Persuasion of security, according to Waltz, shows that the sensitive behaviour of states. The state governments usually remain sensitive for the protection of their sovereign status and autonomous standing in the international anarchical system. Such attributes create various option which cause leaders more inclined for creating allies and making alliances with others instead of maximizing power because “the goal system encourages them to seek security. Increased power may or may not serve that end.”

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59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid., 15.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid., 16.
The common point of discussion between Waltz and Mearsheimer is structured on anarchical nature of world order. In this way, the consequences of anarchy lead fundamentally to the policies of states which can efficiently be comprehended under Neorealism or Structural Realism. The main claims of both Mearsheimer and Waltz developed under the tenet of Realism are the new principles of offensive and defensive Realism. Contrary to Thucydides’ perspective presented in *The Peloponnesian War*, the modern foundations of Realism mainly structured by Mearsheimer and Waltz identify a system of states which effect the behaviours of states. In such system, states become the “political units of a system which they are comprised of”. Comparatively, Mearsheimer holds to the notion that the states try to acquire maximum power which sometimes provide a hegemonic status to the states. However, Waltz maintain that the states are less inclined to power maximization because the desires of acquiring more power are counterproductive. While studying the world politics academically, both tenets of Neorealism define their own positions under the consistently occurring structural changes of international system. Generally, both versions of Realism are formulated on the basis of uncertain global structure which inherits a perpetual state anarchy in the international relations. The anarchical nature of international structure constructs the irresistible and overwhelming forces of fear over the states, according to Mearsheimer and Waltz. In order to overcome the fear, the states adopt competing behaviours. In short, the combined works of the two Neorealist scholars are sometimes referred as postclassical Realism, which was initially established by Waltz and further extended by subsequent Realist intellectuals.

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6. Anarchy in a Nuclear World

Anarchy is unavoidable but the anarchical political environment can be managed instead of stemming its very existence. Since the consistently growing anarchical patterns in world politics cannot disappear permanently, the only appropriate way for survival is to create balance of power in international political system. There are various sources of power but the most preferred one is the military might. The strengthening of military muscles by acquiring moderately updated and technologically advanced defence infrastructure enable a state to create a balance against antagonistic arrangements of its rival.

The evolving concept of security under international anarchical structure radically changed in the post WWII international system. A major shift in the use of nuclear technology from peaceful to military domain resulted in nuclear weapons. The conventional foundations of security departed from its traditional patterns and ushered in a world of nuclear weapons. The Hobbesian and Machiavellian intellects upgraded the traditional view of anarchy in nuclear realm. The dominating role of nuclear weapons under nuclear dynamics during the intense period of Cold War greatly hampered the customary formats of threat perceptions and placed the international system under nuclear shadow. The inception of nuclear weapons in the global politics improved the strategic thinking of states and altered the strategic dynamics of international relations. The domino effects of American nuclear power were quickly transformed to the Soviet Union which did not only countered the Washington’s nuclear monopoly but also unleashed an unending nuclear arms race in the international system. The everlasting and unending nuclear arms race involved the UK, France and China in global nuclear order after preventing the American nuclear monopoly. The Soviet leaders
countered American hegemonic status in the nuclear world by inaugurated an international nuclear arms race.

The domino effects of nuclear weapons significantly proved the Hobbes’s state of nature along with aforementioned arguments of political Realism which prevail all the time among the states in a valueless world. The East-West confrontation in the Cold War era determined the security under nuclear weapons and eliminated the antagonistic planning of the potential adversaries meritoriously by creating a force of deterrence between Moscow and Washington. Both nuclear rivals – the US and the USSR – balanced each other in their contest of global hegemony. The long period of the Cold War, in the presence of nuclear weapons or the deterring role of nuclear capabilities, made the international community to enjoy the peace under balance of terror. It was the balance of power version of Cold War which shifted the international system under balance of terror with the existence of nuclear politics.\footnote{Mikkel Thorup, \textit{An Intellectual History of Terror: War, Violence and the State} (New York: Routledge, 2010), 115.}

The shift from multipolarity to bipolarity and the creation of a nuclear order changed the strategic dynamics of the world politics. In contrast to the history of uncertainty of anarchical international structure under multipolarity, the nature of bipolarity considerably minimized the chances of prevailing anarchy in the nuclear world. The long decades of bipolar world of Soviet – American global competition was more peaceful than old patterns of multipolarity. According to Kenneth Waltz, the role of nuclear weapons maintained peace in the post-war years. The study of Waltz provide the seven reasons followed by the key principles or convincible logic of self-help behind the nuclear order. The anarchical world under the growing nuclear politics eventually creates a balance of power system.\footnote{Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better,” \textit{Adelphi Papers}, No. 71 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), \url{https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm} (accessed on May 18, 2016).}
presence of nuclear weapons in international system, Waltz advocates the notion of status quo whereas Mearsheimer suggests the appropriate way of managing security is to eliminate the existence of potential rivals and their sources of powers. Mearsheimer advocates the idea of absolute security because he maintains that the states are “haunted by fear” whereas Waltz propounds that the states are less fearful and more inclined toward risk accepting behaviour which is called the modest amount of security.

Waltz, as a nuclear optimistic or a defensive Realist, advocates the idea of ‘More May Be Better’ under his analysis of spread of nuclear weapons. The international environment of perpetual anarchy leads a state to enhance its national security while protecting its very sovereignty. Therefore, security is the one of the major driving forces behind the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The analogous explanations of security are admitted by the pessimistic nuclear thinker. One of the three models of Scott D. Sagan overtly accepts the Neorealist logic of security as described by Waltz, which, he thinks, is the primary cause of nuclearization. The deterring effects of nuclear weapons compel a state to heavily rely on nuclear capabilities against the potential rivals. Another study of examining the rationales behind the decision of a state to acquire nuclear capabilities to overcome its security problems has been carried by William Epstein. This study highlights the superiority over enemy, prevention of perceived threats, maintenance of an effective deterrence against hostile

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70 Ibid.
nuclear state, obtaining nuclear weapons before potential adversary, and policy of self-reliance for military independence are the fundamental characteristics of nuclear race.73

The ultimate goal of a state is survival through constantly enhancing its security in a world of militarized anarchy. The notion of anarchy advanced under the nuclear politics introduced the nuclear weapons as an appropriate device to balance the fear of attack from the offensive adversaries. The balancing role of nuclear capabilities of the states made the decision of indulging into a war a hard choice.74 Contrary to the pessimistic overview of nuclear proliferation, the stabilizing effects of nuclear forces are unignorably significant. Generally, the nuclear proliferation debates on the replicating of nuclear peace of the Cold War in the various regions of nuclear rivals became the ongoing non-proliferation measures which proved inefficient in countering the spread of nuclear weapons. The two points of views divide the global strategic community into optimist and pessimist camps. The optimists, like Waltz, see the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons. Waltz believes that the states think “why fight if you cannot win much and lose everything.”75 In contrast to the Cold War history, the nuclear pessimists, such as David J. Karl, believe that the history of US-USSR nuclear rivalry under nuclear peace would cause dangerous consequences.76 A combined study of the leading nuclear optimist, Kenneth Waltz along with the chief nuclear pessimist, Scott D Sagan, in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (2012)77 presents contesting arguments on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their relevance to the world politics. Mainly the proliferation optimists pronounce their position by saying

76 Ibid.
“more may be better” contrary to the proliferation pessimists who advocate the idea of “more may be worse”.78

The advocates of arms control and disarmament tried to overlook the domino effects of military-oriented nuclear technology by formulating international non-proliferation regime, and by promoting the three apparatus pillars of the NPT in 1970. Three declared nuclear weapons states (India, Pakistan, North Korea), together with one ambiguous nuclear weapon state (Israel) decided to stay outside of the NPT. The establishment of international non-proliferation regime under the broader framework of the NPT failed to provide the security guarantee to the three states against the perceived threats of five nuclear weapon states. The monopoly of five de jure nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russian Federation, France, UK, and China)79 raised the serious concerns of de facto nuclear weapon states (Israel, India, and Pakistan).80 The denial to join the NPT by the nuclear weapon states of South Asia challenged the structure of global non-proliferation regime which divided the world into “Nuclear Haves and Haves Not” as explained earlier.81 The prevailing anarchy and the fear of threats from the potential rival states in the regional anarchical structure compelled the four nuclear weapons states (India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea) to rely on nuclear deterrence without subscribing to the NPT.

The self-help modules of world politics resulted in a minority of the states with nuclear powers but it underestimates the role of de facto nuclear powers. Principally, the discriminatory differences accentuated by the global non-proliferation community together with the incremental militarized version of nuclear technology spread the nuclear weapons

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79 “Nuclear Disarmament Resource Collection,” NTI.org, April 03, 2017, 
81 David Pattrikarakos, op. cit.
across the globe. The non-proliferation dogma raised critical questions on five nuclear armed states. At the end of the twentieth century, the nuclear politics departed from the US-USSR domains and arrived in South Asia. Hence, the notion of global nuclear stability entered in the South Asian region. The embryonic positions of South Asian nuclear powers together with their conflicted territorial claims and multilayer toxic bilateral value alarmed the international community.

7. Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia

The nuclear dynamics of South Asia, in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests, made the notion of security without nuclear weapons outdated. The triangular security competition between Beijing, New Delhi and Islamabad changed the nuclear dynamics of the Cold War. Chinese originated nuclear competition in South Asia assured international community that the deterring capabilities attached to nuclear weapons are continued to play a significant role in an anarchical structure of South Asia under the main arguments of Neorealism. The Indian nuclear posture for balancing China raised serious national security concerns for Pakistan.\(^{82}\)

Thus, the response of New Delhi to nuclear capabilities of Beijing triggered an endless nuclear race in the subcontinent. The nuclear politics between China and India later compelled Pakistan to strengthen its security by acquiring nuclear weapon capability. Eventually, the Sino-Indian territorial disputes parallel to Indo-Pak border clashes resulted in a nuclearized regional politics of subcontinent.

The international standard of global non-proliferation regime proved inefficient in implementing its core values in South Asia. The Hobbesian notion of anarchy compelled the South Asian states to admire the Waltzian model of balance of power. The Neorealists suggest that a state generally seeks to balance the hegemonic desires of potential enemy in an

anarchical world order, and according to Waltz, “power needs to be balanced.” The lack of balanced (or insufficiently balanced) power causes war in the absence of a supreme authority. Therefore, an unchecked and unbalanced power needs serious consideration in international system. The incontestable presence of anarchy and its unfailing connection with the state of affairs among the nations are the themes which, from Thucydides to Waltz, always remained active forces for generating the security dilemma in world politics.

A relentlessly dominating Realist depiction of world politics equates the search of security with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The adverse effects of global nuclear security dilemma affected the South Asian regional politics. The strategic chain reaction of nuclearized world touched South Asia in 1998 when the declared nuclear statuses of both India and Pakistan surprized the proponents of international non-proliferation regime. The growing insecurities and regional security dilemma or the dilemma of response proclaimed nuclear race between New Delhi and Islamabad became an undoable feature of South Asian politics. The hostile and tense Indo-Pakistan relations forced the security architecture from both states to believe in self-reliance while building their nuclear weapon capabilities.

The application of global anarchy in South Asia vividly provides an account of security threats, which causes an unavoidable nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. Nuclear weapons have provided an unprecedented security to the major rivals of subcontinent at moderately low cost. The advocates of possessing an explicit nuclear weapon capability support the idea of nuclear peace in the presence of strategic stability. The prevention of nuclear victory and the elimination of a full-scale war objectively activated forces of nuclear diplomacy in South Asia. Therefore, the conception of strategic stability in a fragile South Asian security environment declared an all-out Indo-Pak war an outdated phenomenon and an

impracticable notion. Nonetheless, it increases the probability of a limited war which introduced the stability/instability paradox in the South Asian strategic environment. The phenomenon of “stability/instability paradox” activated the different intellectual positions of nuclear scholars around the ground. In view of South Asian nuclear environment, the proliferation optimist says, the presence of nuclear weapons has introduced ‘long peace’ in subcontinent by making large-scale war importable apart from the limited war at Kargil in 1999. On the other hand, the proliferation pessimists argue that the existence of nuclear weapons in subcontinent between New Delhi and Pakistan has increased the chances of “crisis, accidents, and nuclear war.” This is how it has increased the third party role, the US, in stabilizing deterrence between India and Pakistan by entailing strategic stability in South Asia.

In the post nuclearized environment, the American involvement in the South Asian crisis highlights the serious concerns of Washington with regards to the regional peace and stability. Limited war over Kargil in 1999, ten-month military standoff in 2001-2, and crisis situation during the Mumbai terrorist attacks brought the American diplomatic mediating between New Delhi and Islamabad. The strategic engagement of Washington with both nuclear powers of subcontinent increased and considered to be an adequate measure in neutralizing the Indo-Pak tensions. American diplomatic involvement in the conflict-ridden South Asian has been discussed appropriately by a Brookings study of three authors, P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, *Four Crisis and a Peace Process:

Apart from nuclearization, the tragic event of 9/11 and the initiation of global war on terror further augmented the American role in nuclearized subcontinent.

Contrary to Cold War nuclear rivals, the South Asian adversarial nuclear powers offer an intense and extremely worrisome picture of nuclear politics where an extra-regional hyper nuclear power determines the merits and demerits for regional peace and stability. The evolving nuclear politics between India and Pakistan invited the extra-regional power—United States, to actively be involved in the regional politics. However, Washington’s global agenda resulted in its intense engagement with India. The New Delhi-inclined US South Asian policy initiated by the Clinton administration and further strengthened by President Bush. A historical deal for cooperating in civil nuclear field proved to be a landmark development between New Delhi and Washington which has improved the bilateral ties between two states. The subsequent administrations of Bush tried to warmly continue the strategic partnership with New Delhi. The vertical growth of diplomatic cooperation coupled with various avenues of horizontal collaboration expanded the bilateral strategic bonds between the two nations. It was the Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) that was concluded by the representatives of the two states in 2004.

The multidimensional US strategic relations with India and Pakistan started to play a vital role in South Asian nuclear politics. The US involvement in South Asian nuclear competition and the regional security dilemma define the regional political trends. An unavoidable wave of serious questions on South Asian strategic stability, based on

90 Ibid.
“insecurity breeds insecurity” principle, has now become a serious concern for the United States. The main apprehensions in US strategic calculations are inherited in its major national security interest, and their appropriate preservation. Such geostrategic designs of the US South Asian policy lead toward an ambiguous strategic environment of South Asia. The Pakistan-US and India-US strategic relations affect the regional stability. The unvoiced and unnoticed impacts of United States policy on the regional strategic stability result in an incessant arms race between the two arch-rivals of subcontinent.

The prevalence of peace under nuclear shadows effectively managed the delicate security environment in South Asia because an overt regional arms race between New Delhi and Islamabad overlooked by US grand South Asian policy. The strategic domain of US involvement in the nuclearized region reflects dichotomous standards while managing the instability between the hostile nuclear neighbours. The Hobbesian notion of insecurity in South Asian strategic environment dominantly empowered the Waltzian description of balance of power between potential rivals. Moreover, the Mearsheimer’s claims of offensive Realism maintain accurately their relevance to South Asian nuclear politics. In order to secure a regional strategic balance against persistently swelling strategic muscles of New Delhi over territorial and oceanic politics of subcontinent, Islamabad is determined to balance the Indian-oriented destabilizing forces. Therefore, an overwhelming force of anarchy under ongoing nuclear politics of South Asia can appropriately be comprehended by Neorealism in which the structural changes in the nuclear politics of subcontinent define Indian and Pakistani strategic behaviours.

As per the Neorealist claims, a shift form international systemic level analysis to regional level analysis reveals the stings of offensive and defensive Realisms in an anarchical South Asian strategic structure. The strategic imbalance between India and Pakistan can appropriately be marked by structural changes of nuclearized subcontinent where Indian
ambition for regional dominance befuddles the strategic thinking of Pakistan and forces the security architectures of Islamabad to pursue counterbalancing measures. In such environment, the role of the balancing forces further deteriorates with the involvement of the outsiders. An American Indian-inclined policy under the broader framework of New Delhi-Washington strategic partnership cannot simply be ignored in this regard. The varying dynamics of US strategic responses toward India and Pakistan echo a delicate balance of power in subcontinent. The US engagement in South Asia, in this way, explicitly hampers the regional anarchical patterns.

Theoretically, the changing security attributes of South Asian security environment can appropriately be studied under the structural model of Realism which primarily maintained by Mearsheimer and Waltz respectively. These two models are more relevant to nuclearized subcontinent where the structure is largely shaping the behaviours of two nuclear contestants. The change in structure with the involvement of extra-regional powers alter the strategic setting of South Asian in which the national attributes remain less significant in the face of balance of power.

The US grand South Asian strategy contains different standards for India and Pakistan in which the regional problem of India and Pakistan matters less for the US. It is evidently proved that the strategic differences of great powers usually increase their influence in the regional politics across the globe which is always considered a persistent trend in the international system. In order to strengthen their dominating role in the global politics, the leading state authorities of powerful states always try to influence the politic attributes of different region. The Realist driven international system always directs the great powers to accurately calculate their global standing without measuring the impact of their moves in various region. Therefore, an image of interconnectedness between regional and global
political systems emerges from international relations in which the regional sub-system always remains heavily dependent on great powers.

8. International System and Regional Sub-Systems

Various dynamics of international system theoretically describes a system of complicated interactions where different states go parallel and consistently change the behaviour of each other. It is generally called a concentrated relationship of dependant and independent actors and it usually depicts a complex picture of high-dimensional interaction of states structured on regional and systemic political features. 92 An overall global system and its connection to regional sub-system unambiguously explain a significant level of sub-system where an additional level of analysis emerges apart from traditional three levels of analysis which involves system, state and individual level analysis. 93 The powerful actors in the international system process various political attributes in the broader framework of global politics. It is considered as an attempt of strong actors to dominate the international system which effects different sub-system. Therefore, the study of international relations cannot simply be restricted to the role of strong states or the dominating actors in world politics. As a result, the dominating desires of powerful actors generally effect the different sub-systems. 94

The notion of regional sub-system originally arises from fundamental notion of international system because it is global balance of power which bring changes in its subordinate systems. The advocates of sub-systems analysis describe the world politics as a

92 R. Kutay Karaca and Muge Yuce, “The Analysis of the Regional Sub-Systems” in International Relations: South and East Asia as a Regional Sub-System,” 02, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322532012_The_Analysis_of_the_Regional_Sub-Systems_in_International_Relations_South_and_East_Asia_as_a_Regional_Sub-System (accessed on February 8, 2019).
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
network of various systems consisting of “global, regional, national, and local.” The conception dynamics of sub-system are unclear because there are multiple characteristics which constitute a regional sub-system. It is generally treated as an idea which constitutes changes under the greater conception of international system. In other words, it is an important component of a larger global system having its own identities consisting of a vast list of numerous factors. A common understanding of sub-system stresses the geographical description of different regions consisting of territorial boundaries.

The consensus on anarchy in the international system changes its nature when it applies at regional sub-system. An unpredictable environment in global politics structured on anarchical principle plays relatively different role at regional level, because the involvement of great power in regional politics is widely considered as an effort of great powers to manage the anarchical political structures in regional politics. Unlike international political system, the regional sub-systems are not so much autonomous. The political attributes of regional politics are heavily dependent on great powers which always try to promote their domination across the world by strongly effecting the political designs of different regions. Apart from hegemony, cooperation and competition are also essential components of great powers which define the nature of great powers involvement in regional balance of power of a particular regional sub-system. The engagements of great powers in the regional balance of power usually result in an alliance structure in which the regional actors became dependant on great powers. The superior capabilities of great powers do not only fascinate the regional players towards extra-regional powers, but the role of great powers in a region create their influence in a particular region. Under a strong alliances structure, the great powers seek to

96 Ibid., 93-96.
98 Ibid.
influence the regional balance of power by providing arms supplies, activating economic assistance, and strengthening diplomatic support to their core allies. Moreover, imposing sanctions, increasing trade opportunities, and introducing technological advancements are also observed as significant features of great powers involvement in the regional politics across the world.\textsuperscript{99}

These subordinate systems under the broader global system portray a complicated picture of great powers, equipped with superior capabilities, in a specific region. An effort to expand their sphere of influence usually activate the counterbalancing forces from opposing camps and it results in an impulsive competition of great powers in a specific region. The regional context of competition between powerful states effects the regional security environment and it results in a turbulent regional order.\textsuperscript{100} An analytical description of South Asian politics, as a potential regional sub-system, cannot be studied without considering the interaction of great power at global level. The regional sub-system aims to analyse the great power engagements in the regional affairs of South Asia and an inevitable role of extra-regional powers disturbs the regional political order of nuclearized subcontinent.\textsuperscript{101} Therefore, an undeniable interconnectedness between regional and global politics has become a permanent feature of South Asian political order.

9. Regional Sub-Systems and South Asia

This research revolves around the regional sub-system analysis which exclusively focuses the changing dynamics of South Asian region parallel to emphasizing the varying

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
attributes of global power game at international level. The impact of international power on South Asian political affairs under an intense India-Pakistan specific nuclear race can also be seen in Middle East where the international politics, designed by bipolar model of global system, altered the regional politics. Israel-Arab conflict has created a violent division in the Middle East in addition to another violent division of sectarian politics in the Arab world are the factors which fascinated the extra-regional power. The oil-rich Middle Eastern land actually let the international players to engage in this region during the twentieth century. The modern history of great power involvement in the Middle East started from the breakup of Ottoman in the end First World War. Then the end of British and French mandates after the Second World War further produced a space for the other global players, and later pushed the region into Cold War for a long time. A complicated matrix of interaction between great powers and their client states made the Middle Eastern region more important playground for superpowers. In other words, the Middle Eastern region is an area where the rivalries between great powers always took place.

United States and Russian Federation (former Soviet Union) were the chief external players in Middle Eastern affairs. Their policies are still containing contesting features for Middle Eastern region, and this trend is trying to determine the future of Arab countries mainly. The role of other powers, China and European Unions, is also important and both will actively try to engage more in Arab world in coming decades for various reasons. Their contemporary marginal role has become an opportunity for the Washington and Moscow, and the whole situation has proclaimed Middle East a battlefield for the great

powers. The four decades-long East-West conflict between Capitalist and Communist expansionist policies cemented in counterbalancing behaviour of Washington and Moscow against each other primarily effected the political landscape of various regions. An appropriate case of this geostrategic rivalry and an enduring race for the maintaining of global dominance remained between two primarily targeted the Middle Eastern and South Asian regions. An immeasurable race of creating alliance and counter-alliance in both regions has resulted in a nuclear arms race in addition to intensifying a competition for increasing conventional weapons in South Asian and Middle Eastern countries. The hostile features of East-West rivalry also intensified the security environment of African and South American regions.105

The recent account of conflict in the Middle Eastern region in inherited in Arab Spring which is merely a regional crisis of various political upheavals, but it renewed the global designs of Cold War politics. The recent wave of crisis linked to present Syrian situation has reintroduced the global power politics of twentieth century and increased the involvement of great powers in Arab world.106 Prior to Syrian issue, the American invasion in Iraq under its global counterterror campaign was observed as an apposite way to engage more in the region without taking care of international community. President Bush administration was failed to constitute the legitimate grounds for the Iraq invasion under the war on terror because the claims of Washington were proved irrational for invading Iraq and toppling the Saddam government.107 The present Middle East is engulfed with numerous political, social and economic changes as the consequent of various factors. A combination of ongoing civil

wars, the collapse of Arab political order, and unending arms race coupled with sectarian clashes in the presence of various non-state actors has provided sufficient opportunities for the extra-regional players.\footnote{Ross Harrison, “Shifts in the Middle East Balance of Power: An Historical Perspective,” \textit{Al Jazeera}, September 02, 2018, \url{http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/09/shifts-middle-east-balance-power-historical-perspective-180902084750811.html} (accessed on February 9, 2019).}

Akin to Middle Eastern security environment, this research exclusively emphasizes the South Asian politics where India and Pakistan are the two main players. The United States always remains a major player between New Delhi and Islamabad. The intense period of American-Soviet hostile interaction during the days of Cold War is an appropriate example for understanding the American role in the South Asian regional sub-system. The hostile relationship of two great powers at international level affected the regional attributes of South Asian system which can be understood under a complex interaction of general global system and regional sub-system.

The case of India-Pakistan rivalry has become unignorably an enduring feature of South Asian regional politics and it fascinates extra-regional powers towards the nuclearized subcontinent. The history of subcontinent after British colonial retreat witnessed the role of various great powers which tried to involve in India-Pakistan dispute by defending their own positions in the regional and global affairs. An international wave of decolonization in the aftermaths of Second World War efficiently prevented the British imperial rule from subcontinent. It further let the other great powers to redesign the political features of newly independent subcontinent. The nuclear ambitions rising from New Delhi and Islamabad further intensified the situation. The nuclear dimension of South Asia did not only highlight the New Delhi-Islamabad hostility at international arena, but it permitted the global powers to influence South Asian regional politics. In short, the regional dynamics of South Asian politics under intense security environment cannot be divorced from power politics between
great powers at international level.\textsuperscript{109} The contesting moves of the super-powers at global level effect, and shape, the behaviour of regional states. Such moves leave significant impact of various subsystems which can certainly be seen in various regions.

Presently the United States is determined to stabilize its position in South Asia where India and Pakistan are its core allies. In order to strengthen its role in the nuclearized subcontinent by preserving American South Asian engagement, the United States is committed to prevent the role of other global players in India-Pakistan affairs. In the geopolitical calculations of Washington, China and Russia are the potential powers which can influence the South Asian politics by undermining the role of United States. In order to address the emerging role of other great powers, the United States is dedicated to increase its involvement in new South Asian affairs. So, an emerging balance of power in the South Asia is an interconnectedness of global players and regional actors which is mainly inherited in the American South Asian strategy.

Chapter 02

**Pak-US Strategic Nexus: Inception, Evolution, and Continuity**

The South Asian political setting is always affected by the strategic competition of great powers and their incessant politics. The multifaceted antagonism between Moscow and Washington, during the Cold War, provoked the political culture of South Asian region coarsely. After the WWII and the end of dominion status of subcontinent, the decolonized regional landscape of South Asia failed to prevent the Beijing, Moscow, and Washington from getting indulged in the regional affairs during the Cold War. Contrary to China, the Soviet and American rivalry in the post-World War II politics initially extended toward South Asia. The post-independence political patterns of the subcontinent after the British colonial retreat, in this way, became a strategically fertile land for Washington-Moscow initiating a struggle to dominate the developing regions of the world.

The advent of the Cold War in South Asia and the partition of subcontinent laid the foundations of Pak-US multidimensional bilateral relations. No doubt, the wave of decolonization in South Asia terminated the British Indian rule and granted Independence to India, leading to the creation of Pakistan. However, termination of the British colonial rule brought Pakistan closer to the US and India to the Soviet Union. The global wave of US and Soviet expansionism in the Cold War era was largely viewed by the newly independent South Asian states as two antagonistic blocs were restricting various opportunities for rest of the world. The capitalist norms of the US, contrary to the communist canons of the Soviet Union, were the two handy options for India and Pakistan in the post-world war II scenario. In this milieu, India preferred the Soviet bloc in opposition of Pakistan, and Islamabad decided to select the capitalist bloc.
The combination of regionally hegemonic and strategically offensive Indian ambitions forced Pakistan to introduce explicitly its quest for aligning with an extra-regional power which could ensure its existence by protecting its sovereign status in the decolonized subcontinent. In addition to the protection of its sovereign values, the ideological insecurity of Pakistan and threats to its survival along with national integration made it apprehensive about its stable regional standing.\(^1\) In response to such troublesome regional environment, the geostrategic location of Pakistan became an opportunity for its leadership. Therefore, the geopolitical designs of Washington preferred Islamabad as a strategically ally over New Delhi. President Truman’s congratulatory message to the first Governor-General, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, on August 15, 1947, laid the foundations of Pak-US diplomatic ties.\(^2\)

The strategic location of Pakistan which connects the Middle East, South, and Central Asia, along with its closeness with Beijing and the geographical location to eye on Moscow, was viewed by the US policymakers as an appropriate Asian state to persistently check the politics of South, Central, and South West Asia.\(^3\) In this way, the United States opened diplomatic services in Karachi by establishing the US embassy under Charles W. Lewis, Jr.\(^4\) Pakistan accepted the United States as a partner state which could help to meet domestic needs parallel to managing its position in the regional security environment.\(^5\) Pakistan’s tilt towards the United States was a response to Indian implicit selection of the Soviet Union under the formal non-aligned stance. It was decision of Nehru to support Soviet communist


designs in opposition to American capitalist expansion. In this way, the construction of cooperative foundations between Pakistan and United States was due to Indian selection of Soviet Union’s communist bloc and preference of Moscow over Washington.

The British colonial legacy, coupled with inflexible national standings, was rooted in austere ideological variances between Islamabad and New Delhi which formulated the South Asian politics in the post-WWII scenario. The fundamental ideological dissimilarity inherited in the politics of subcontinent was the Muslim belief which created Pakistan while offending the main ideologically secular or anti-Muslim domains of India. It was formally defined as the Two Nation theory by Indian Muslims. Parallel to the strict ideological obstruction, the territorial irredentism over Kashmir issue resulted in Indo-Pak intransigent standards, were cemented in the estranged bilateral interaction. The viscous complexities of Indian hostility toward Pakistan, in this way, threatened the strategically sovereign status of Islamabad. The then national security apparatus of Islamabad decided to join the US as a strategic ally and a diplomatic partner for its core national security values in the region. The American pursuit of geostrategic interests equivalent to the decision of Pakistan to oppose Indian regional hegemonic ambition laid the initial foundations of Pak-US strategic relations. Additionally, the government of Pakistan perceived Indian anti-Islamabad attitude which became a serious threat for the newly created Muslim state of subcontinent. In fact, it was search of security to validate its regional standing, along with defense of its national security, and the preservation of its independently sovereign status which shifted Islamabad in the capitalist bloc where the combination of strategic and economic support could adequately empower the embryonically independent status of Pakistan.

The American acceptance of Pakistan as a sovereign Muslim state of subcontinent after the WWII and the decision of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to support Washington
during the Cold War started reflecting the bilateral desires of the two states for the establishment of multidimensional diplomatic ties. Contrary to historical diplomatic trends between two states, the post-Cold War scenario, post-nuclearized Indo-Pak rivalry, and post-9/11 South Asia represented differently an equivocal picture of the US policies toward Pakistan. The contemporary features of American South Asian policy emphasized the regional problems, accentuating the issues of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The contemporary stated policy according to the US Ambassador to Islamabad, David Hale, is purely intended to carry a balanced approach. On the other hand, American Indian inclined moves reflected a different picture of US South Asian engagement.\(^6\) During an official visit on October 24, 2017, the Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, outlined the main part of new South Asian strategy of Trump administration which is greatly underlining the Afghanistan problem coupled with the issue of terrorism instead of expressing US concern on Indo-Pak hostility.\(^7\) On Tillerson’s meeting with the state authorities in Islamabad, Ambassador Hale expressed his remarks by recalling the economic assistance to Pakistan.\(^8\) In the presence of stated goals of American relations with South Asia, the New Delhi-centric attributes of Washington had an implicit feature of American foreign policy.

Therefore, a brief survey of initial defence dilemma of Islamabad and Pak-US strategic interests in diplomatic bilateral values are the main argument of this chapter which discusses analytically a brief series of various perplexing phases of Islamabad-Washington strategic nexus. A thin layer of estranged diplomatic bond between both states continuously affected the bilateral cooperation, and such values resulted in several bilateral uncertainties


and befuddling dichotomies. An analytical survey of two-sided fluctuating diplomatic interaction is concisely debated in this chapter. The discussion on profoundly changing extents of Pak-US relations reflects the Realist-driven strategic interests of both states and an objective study of American foreign relations, which are more driven by Realist principles. The structural changes in the international strategic landscape affects the cooperative bonds of the two states, and it forces the two-sided foreign policy establishments to constantly alter the traditional patterns of their foreign policies. Therefore, the main purpose of this chapter is to conduct an analytical review of Pak-US relations, which depicts a pragmatic picture of ‘mutual dependence’ instead of ‘mutual respect.’ In other words, the central theme of this chapter revolves around the radical changes in American strategic calculations with reference to newly independent subcontinent. The position of Islamabad in US strategic preferences also remains a significant point of discussion.

1. Exploration of US Alliance

The diplomatic differences of Pakistan with the Soviet blocs, along with defensive behaviour against India, provided sufficient space to Islamabad in American strategic arrangements at the start of Cold War. The emergence of Pakistan as a South Asian anti-communist state and its adoption of politically democratic values highlighted the geopolitical significance of Pakistan in American strategic designs of Cold War. The question of territorial security while defending its border from Indian aggression parallel to American objective of countering the expanding Soviet influence were the initial basis of Pak-US bilateral relations. The combination of US support and Indian aggression compelled Pakistan to preferred American alliance over Soviet Union. Moreover, the ideological foundations and geographical proximity with the Persian Gulf make Pakistan attractive for the American
Middle Eastern strategy as well. Therefore, ‘it was a cross-side interaction between the two states’, as mentioned by Ambassador (Rtd.) Ali Sarwar Naqvi, the Executive Director of Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS). He added that the American purpose was to create an anti-communist bloc whereas Pakistani officials were determined to secure the sovereignty of their county. In fact, it was the reaction of the Indian nonaligned claims which was adopted by Nehru immediately after the acquiring of the independent status of India. The notion of non-alignment was further formalized in the Bandung conference, a gathering of twenty-nine countries of Africa and Asia. In April 1955, this inter-continental gathering in Bandung, Indonesia, defined the role of the third world in the US-USSR confrontational designs of the Cold War. Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, decided to stay away from the communist and non-communist divisions of the states under the pretext of non-aligned stance. Nehru, the chief architect of Indian foreign policy, explained the conception of non-alignment in 1948. He described non-alignment as “the great pursuit of peace.” The American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, called the non-alignment stance of Nehru as “an immoral and short-sighted conception.” Hence, the different claims of Nehru for adopting a neutral foreign policy were considered as pro-Soviet policy which led Pakistan to prefer Washington over Moscow to sustain its independence in the region.

Indian Soviet-inclined behaviour was considered to be an appropriate opportunity by Pakistani leadership. In reaction, the first Prime Minster of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan,

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11 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
decided to visit the United States. The Soviet Union, through Tehran, tried to invite Liaquat Ali Khan during his visit to Iran on June 2, 1949.\textsuperscript{16} Liaquat Ali Khan accepted the invitation of Joseph Stalin but postponed the tour later. His visit of the United States was a response to the American invitation of the formal tour to Nehru. In this way, the Oxford-educated Prime Minister of Pakistan tried to counter a planned US visit of Nehru. In December 1949, after conducting a meeting with Nehru, President Truman invited the prime minister of Pakistan for an official American visit.\textsuperscript{17} In May 1950, instead of touring Moscow, Liaquat Ali Khan preferred to meet the American officials. During his stay in Washington, he stated in his address to the National Press Club of the United States “our strongest interests, therefore, are firstly the integrity of Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{18} The prime foreign policy objective of Pakistan was to secure its position in the South Asian region, and to bring economic development which convinced the initial leadership to obtain the arriving opportunities.\textsuperscript{19} In the post-world war environment, the commitment policy of Truman preferred to support core American allies economically. This factor was having much fascination for Pakistan.

On June 5 1947, George Marshal, the Secretary of State under Truman administration, created an economic plan for the Western European countries.\textsuperscript{20} It was Marshal Plan which was approved by the Congress under Economic Cooperation Act in March 1948. A budget of more than US$12 billion was approved by Harry Truman for the American allies in Europe.\textsuperscript{21} The idea of George Marshal formalised the American foreign aid program internationally and made Secretary Marshal the first American general, a recipient of Nobel Peace Prize.\textsuperscript{22} It laid

\textsuperscript{18} A.Z. Hilali, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
the foundations of American financial assistance to its allies, and the principle of economically upholding allies became an integral part of US foreign policy. In this way, the Truman administration, most prominent in activating American foreign aid across the globe, maintained economic relations with Pakistan and provided US$11 million aid to Pakistan from 1949 to 1952.

The first decade of Cold War crisis formally defined the multifaceted foundations of the diplomatic designs between Islamabad and Washington. Islamabad requested the US for military aid to the US, in order to enhance Pakistan’s consistently threatening existence against belligerent Indian attitude. This request was maintained by the first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, and first Foreign Secretary, M. Ikraamullah. Therefore, the initial phase of leadership immediately after securing independence decided to become an ally of a superpower in the changing international security environment in which the communist forces supported by the Soviet Union were consistently challenging the American quest for permanence global superiority. The stringent division of international politics under the US-Soviet rivalry worsened the newly divided South Asian region by intensifying the regional politics poised by Indo-Pak polygonal conflict. Islamabad was committed to join the United States by refusing the offer of Moscow visit initially. It pursued Washington to support Pakistan in the forms of mutual defence pacts and bilateral economic deals to turn down the Indian fear. In short, Liaqaut-Truman diplomacy proved to be a milestone effort for the development of cooperative bilateral ties between two states.

The theoretical study of the bilateral bounds marks as the core-peripheral partnership which later introduced the asymmetrical designs of their mutual interests. The US was the

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23 Ibid.
developed nation of the first world, as a core state and Pakistan which was the underdeveloped nation of the third world, as a peripheral state, agreed to maintain their diplomatic foundations in 1950. Afterwards, the irregular bilateral relations proved to be more dependant and asymmetric in nature. The interdependency was obstinately uncommon between both states due to their unequal as well as different political stature in the global politics.

The state officials from the United States were more committed to increasing the dependence of Pakistan on US by supporting it against the emerging communist designs of the Soviet Union. Pakistan started receiving American strategic assistance. Washington provided US$630 million military aid along with US$55 million financial assistance for defence and US$55 million for the purchase of essential defence equipment to Pakistan.26 The formulation of Pak-US defence ties restrained the American arms sale to New Delhi. While describing the nature of American financial aid to Pakistan, the American ambassador to Pakistan, Christopher Van Hollen, stated that the aid that Washington provided to Pakistan is being used against New Delhi “but we went through the charade of highlighting the Soviet defeat.”27

To alleviate the economic hurdles and strategic demands of the newly created Muslim state of the subcontinent, initially, the first Prime Minister, Liquat Ali Khan explored the Truman as a supportive friend. The bilateral relations initiated a dependant phase of foreign was started in the government of Khan. The dependency on America was later augmented in the reign of President Ayub Khan. From the American side, the Eisenhower administration continued Truman policy of viewing Pakistan as a geostrategic ally and a potential anti-Soviet state in South Asia. The policy of containing Soviet Union and preventing its

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27 Ibid.
expanding influence across the world was adopted by Eisenhower. Moreover, the assertive nature of anti-communist policy was decided to assist the non-communist states across the globe which were ready to resist the communist threats emanating from the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{28} Finally, the US singled out Pakistan as the only friend and reliable ally in South Asia.

The bilateral basis of the cooperative alliance was shaken on the issue of non-proliferation. The apex of the Cold War politics convinced Washington to initiate a global campaign for prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. South Asian directions of non-proliferation directly affected the Washington-Islamabad alliance, because the nuclear aspirants of the subcontinent were ambitious to acquire nuclear arms status. The decision of Indira Gandhi for conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion forced Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto to start nuclear efforts which activated an era of American sanctions.\textsuperscript{29} The nuclear-related economic sanctions under Glenn, Symington and Pressler Amendments was a huge setback in Pak-US relations, but the Saur revolution in Kabul changed the situation dramatically.\textsuperscript{30}

The invasion of Red Army in Kabul forced Washington to empower Islamabad against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan instead of pushing Pakistan into nuclear domain. The end of Afghan war temporarily relaxed the tensions over economic strains, but the withdrawal of the Red Army from Kabul and the dismantlement Soviet Union refreshed the sanction debate in the American Congress. A refreshed version of Pressler Amendment, in the post-Cold War scenario, changed the cooperative nature of Pak-US relations. The

\textsuperscript{28} Jeremi Suri, American Foreign Relations Since 1898: A Documentary Reader (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2010), 103.
amendment in US Foreign Assistant Act introduced by Pressler affected Islamabad-Washington military-to-military ties and halted the sale of 28 F-16 to Islamabad. In this way, the genesis of the bilateral relations, which were traditionally rooted in geopolitical and ideological dimensions, were gradually disturbed after the Soviet disintegration.

The tragic incident of 9/11 again altered the nature of Islamabad-Washington alliance. The exceptional geostrategic location of Pakistan raised its significance in the White House. In the wake of 9/11, Islamabad became a frontline state in the US-sponsored war on terror. The strategic cooperation between both states ushered into an era of mistrust and deviation from formal values due to Indian involvement in Pak-US relations in addition to regional nuclear developments. The main gulf in the bilateral partnership was caused by the strategic dictations of American global non-proliferation campaign. The unbalancing South Asian directions of US non-proliferation efforts left worse impact on Islamabad. Therefore, the genesis of two-sided trust splintered gradually, parallel to the evolving geostrategic priorities of American foreign policy. The ability of Washington to improve the diplomatic ties with Islamabad while restoring the traditional foundations of bilateral values has increasingly become merely a diplomatic effort and a challenging task for Pakistan. The American ambitions to create a regional consensus between India and Pakistan on global non-proliferation regime has simply jolted the Washington-Islabad bilateral partnership. It is that the Indian hegemonic ambitions in the region were cemented in New Delhi’s anti-Islabad policies. This hegemonic ambition of New Delhi is leading the Indian leaders towards more nuclearization, which is likely to undermine the American counter-proliferation efforts.

31 Ibid.
The irrefutable historically account of antagonistic India-Pakistan relations provided sufficient space for US involvement in the South Asian region. Pak-US cooperative bonds are essential to analyse the historical prism of the South Asia. Contrary to the economic and strategic cooperation between Islamabad and Washington, the changing global security environment of the post-Cold War world exposed the overt inclination of the US toward India, besides its economic sanctions toward South Asia. Washington intends to impose sanction mainly raised serious challenges for Pak-US relations. The Pak-US bilateral cooperation further disturbed in the post-nuclearized environment. Diplomatic gaps between both nations were widened more under the war on terror after the tragic incident of 9/11. It was the time when Indian tilt toward America further augmented the existing trust deficit environment between Islamabad and Washington. The negative connotations of cooperative intentions of Pakistan were manipulated by India. The Indian lobby in the US tried to weaken the position of Pakistan in the US strategic calculus of South Asia. A negative translation of core national interests of Pakistan, attached to its nuclear weapons status, and an awful picture of its counterterror operations by Indian leaders enhanced New Delhi-Washington diplomatic nexus. Therefore, a brief survey of the historical accounts of Pak-US diplomatic efforts to address the regional challenges of South Asia helps comprehend the paradox of perplexing trust-interest directions of American foreign policy vis-à-vis South Asia. Evidently, the Indian factor has shaken the basis of cooperative Washington-Islamabad connection, but the unforgettable basis of the two-sided alliance was difficult to change. The evolution of Pak-US cooperative bonds started from the ideological foundations, on the eve of decades-long Cold War politics.

1.1. Ideological Cohesions
The imprints of global competition between the communist and capitalist forces affected the South Asian strategic environment. It was the extension of Cold War politics which heavily influenced the decolonized subcontinent after the British colonial retreat. The wave of decolonization effectively terminated the British rule from South Asia and made the region vulnerable to the vicious interstate disagreements. The division of subcontinent left the inflexible ideological confrontation between India and Pakistan unresolved. The unmanageable ideological clashes initially formulated various initial confrontations between New Delhi and Islamabad. The initial identity crisis, in opposition to non-Islamic and anti-Pakistani Indian ideological toxicity, posed serious threats to newly independent Muslim state of the subcontinent.

After acquiring independence from the British rule and separation from India, the issue of national recognition of Pakistan and acknowledgment of Pakistan as a sovereign state in the region were the primary features of Pakistan’s foreign policy. In the post-independence era, the initial leadership of this newly independent state paid more attention towards foreign relation. The promotion of a newly emergent Muslim state in South Asia region while securing an independence status from the British colonial rule provided a tentative mechanism for maintaining foreign relations. It later forced the initial leadership of Pakistan to gain international support which could empower its position in the regional and extra-regional affairs. The efforts to secure its independent and sovereign status, parallel to defending its Muslim identity separated from Indian non-Islamic and secular national character, initially forced Pakistan to search the supportive connection of a great power which could not only support diplomatically its newly independent status, but also provide economic and military assistance to empower its position in the South Asian geopolitical setting.
An ideological paradigm of Pakistan was initially defined under the Two Nations theory by the Muslim leaders of India. The proponents of a separate Muslim homeland before the partition of subcontinent promoted the notion of this theory in the world. This theory formalized the conception of an independent Muslim state in the subcontinent, and this demand was adequately communicated to colonial rulers. Contrary to Indian secular ideologues, the demand for a Muslim homeland was officially refused and practically declined by the leading statesmen of India. So, the pre-independence politics of subcontinent witnessed a protracted phase of inhuman ideological struggle in India between Muslim and Hindu communities. The secular attributes of India refused to admit the independent Islamic notions of Pakistan while mainstream Hindu leaders furiously attempted to suppress the Muslim voices.

The British partition plan for the creation of a separate country for Indian Muslims was mainly designed against anti-Muslim Hindu politics. Eventually, the creation of Pakistan under the great partition of subcontinent marked critical question on greater Indian vision of a secular state. The enduring rivalry between secular Indian politics and Pakistan as a sovereign Muslim state launched a debate of conflicting concept of nationhood in the divided subcontinent.32 The ideological denial of each other fully antagonised the South Asian political culture under Indian Independence Act 1947 – the formal partition plan passed by the British Parliament.33 Confronting ideological features of New Delhi and Islamabad later shaped the contesting foreign relations of both neighbours with other states generally and with extra-regional states particularly.

One of the biggest Muslim population states with democratic government and anti-communist sentiments acquired sufficient place in the Cold War’s contemplation of American foreign policy decision makers. The formative years of post-independence changed the primary formats of neutral and non-aligned foreign policy of Pakistan. The First Prime Minister of Pakistan decided to visit the United States, and later preferred to condemn the North Korean aggression against South Korea which significantly assured the support of Pakistan to the US during the Korean War. Hence, Pakistan gained the sympathetic support of Washington. Moreover, Liaquat Ali Khan supported the US peace treaty with Japan in 1951. These were two American supported initiatives, which Joseph Stalin vehemently opposed. In response to Pakistan pronouncement of joining American bloc formally, Eisenhower administration viewed Islamabad under ideological considerations of the Cold War. The ideological examination of US-USSR contest highlighted Pakistan as one of the convenient American allies against enlarging communist powers. Formulation of ideological bounds included Pakistan in extra regional multilateral security mechanism for the protection of American interest. The decision to support America, on two occasions related to South Korea and Japan, proved that the Pakistani leaders were efficacious defenders and valuable protractors of American interests beyond South Asia.

Indian pretention of nonalignment stance reflected vividly as an adherent ideology of neutrality covered in the communist influence which was perceived by the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in 1947 as an anti-American act of

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
Jawaharlal Nehru.\textsuperscript{37} Dulles further called the nonalignment as an “immoral neutrality.”\textsuperscript{38} Initially, the ideological difference and identity crisis converted into strategic differences produced various issues related to border clashes, territorial conflicts and the division of resources between India and Pakistan. The first generation of leaders from New Delhi and Islamabad translated their ideological differences into strategic clashes which invited the extra-regional powers to actively jump into South Asian politics. The defence of a sovereign status, the pursuit of an equal status to India and search for a strong ally, forced Pakistan to view the US as a great equalizer in the South Asian politics. The strategic alignment, under strong diplomatic collaboration with a great power, necessitated Pakistan to prefer the United States against emerging Russia-India cooperation.

Inclination of India toward Soviet ideology not only highlighted Pakistan before the US but it also integrated Pakistan in the greater American alliance. The decision of Pakistan to oppose Indo-Soviet ideologies stimulated the South Asian policies of Washington and triggered a phase of Washington-sponsored worldwide anti-Moscow campaign in the subcontinent. Politically, the promotion of anti-communist or pro-American notion of democratic values and their sufficient protection against rapidly expanding Soviet influence shifted Islamabad in American peripheral politics. The collective Pak-US efforts to contain Soviet communism gradually became a critical bilateral development and later proved less mutual and more interest driven game of managing foreign relations between aforementioned core-peripheral relationship of two states. The decision of two states from developed


\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
(US) and developing (Pakistan) worlds altered the geostrategic landscape of subcontinent.

In the mid-1950s, Islamabad became US strategic ally to vigilantly remain a check on the ideological growths of Moscow and Beijing. The United States involved Pakistan in its main defence pacts Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). In order to prevent a full spectrum Pak-Soviet and Pak-China alliance, the leading American foreign policy commentators preferred to prevent the chances of close relationship of two communist forces (Moscow and Beijing) with Pakistan. Therefore, a communist India was acceptable by the United States in the absence of USSR-China-Pakistan alliance which deteriorated Pak-US bilateralism with the changing patterns of the Cold War politics.

The geopolitical features of US foreign policy and its strategic dimensions toward Pakistan sparked a debate on the South Asian politics in the White House. The leading congressmen started to analyse the role of contesting South Asian neighbours in the prism of Washington-Moscow hostility. In this way, the initial designs of the American Cold War politics preferred to proclaim their support for Pakistan. The traditional basis of the mutual cooperative bilateral framework was initially designed by the United States to support Pakistan in the South Asian politics, which was an immediate target and severe victim of Indian-afflicted aggressive behaviour. The Indian opposition heightened the sense of insecurity in the strategic mind-set of Pakistan. The acute territorial belligerence of New Delhi and its Soviet diplomatic proclivity forced Pakistan to gain American support by maintaining effectively diplomatic ties with the United States. In short, preservation of its ideological identity along with the defence against the neighbouring rival state were the core security
issues of Pakistan. These ultimate security demands became the essential principles of Pakistan foreign policy and its direction towards the United States.

1.2. Territorial Politics

The historical antecedent of conflicting territorial assertions caused three major wars and numerous border skirmishes along with Indian Anti-Pakistani overtures in the region. Such bellicose policy, which was structured and furthered by Nehru, raised the necessity to secure the support of a major power for Islamabad. The inflexible territorial claims revolving around Kashmir and the Line of Control (LoC) widened sternly the gulf between Islamabad and New Delhi while defining their hostile positions against each other. Peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute parallel to countering the territorial aggression of New Delhi against Islamabad convinced the decision makers of Pakistan to join American alliance. The rationale behind the joining of US alliance was attached to American substantial support. Washington was considered to be an appropriate support since it could help Islamabad to overcome its territorial vulnerability before India. In this way, the initial phase of Pak-US bilateralism began. Furthermore, the conflicted politics over the Indian basin water treaty along with the border clashes were the critical point of worry for Pakistan. The conflicted border issues such as LoC and the Durand Line necessitated a quest for a considerate support from international community for Islamabad. Thus, the mainstream foreign policy decision makers of Pakistan preferred to strengthen the position of Islamabad against the issues of troubled borders.

Pivotal statecraft strategy for the resolution of interstate disputes across the globe was adopted by President Kennedy and tried to apply the same on Kashmir
problem. The Kennedy administration sought to resolve the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir, in 1963. It was an attempt to make peace in South Asia by resolving the Kashmir problem. The Pivot strategy restricted the United States from providing any military aid to India due to its friendly ties with Pakistan. An effort to create peace between India and Pakistan showed the American will of creating a peaceful South Asia. Under a broader vision of peaceful regional atmosphere, Washington realized the need of peaceful resolutions of various disputes between rival nuclear neighbours of South Asia. The application of pivotal statecraft on Indo-Pak politics was a way to keep South Asia in American support during the first phase of Cold War. American-originated peace talks for Kashmir issue initiated in 1962, left the conflict unresolved and the pivotal strategy insignificant. The outbreak of the Sino-Indian war over Tibet in 1962, ended the temporary phase of the Pivot strategy, and the vision of peaceful settlement of Kashmir issue remained merely an American theoretical commitment. The Kennedy administration, instead of arranging the formal meeting with Nehru and Ayub, remained ineffective in convincing India and Pakistan to arrange bilateral comprehensive initiatives. The original idea of addressing Kashmir problem was coined by President Ayub Khan who demanded Kennedy the compensation of its non-intervention in Sino-India war of 1962.

The American role in the war was effective, because President Kennedy started supporting Pakistan on various regional issues. Kennedy administration later stopped President Ayub from the opening of another front for India similar to Tibet.

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40 Ibid.
42 Bruce Riedel, “JFK’s Overshadowed Crisis,” The National Interest, No. 120 (July/August 2012), 54.
Actually, President Kennedy wanted Ayub Khan to join India against China over Tibet issue. But, Ayub refused to accept the proposal of American President. The suggestion of Kennedy without settling appropriately the Kashmir problem on an equal basis was not acceptable for Ayub government.\textsuperscript{43} From 1962 to 1963, the six rounds of talk were arranged for the settlement of Kashmir dispute. However, they ended with unproductive results. It was considered as a part of American-active foreign policy toward South Asia. The Ayub Khan era, in this way, witnessed a significant growth of Pak-US relations. the diplomatic interaction of two states the association of Pakistan with Western bloc of states. Pakistan aligned formally itself with the American alliance and activated its role in the politics of Cold War.\textsuperscript{44}

In order to add American support for Pakistan over the disputed land of Kashmir, the cooperative policy of Islamabad prevented Washington from the backing of Indian violent Kashmir policy. The continuation of incompatible and uncooperatively inflexible claims of Nehru administration over Kashmir marked Kashmir issue as an unsolved and unmanageable crisis of subcontinent. The objective of the territorial settlement along with strengthening of proper recognition in the region were the driving forces which closed diplomatically the two-sided governments. The preliminary bonds within the diplomatic realm of Pak-US relations started a journey of bilateral collaboration on various regional and international issues. The efforts of Islamabad for the resolution of territorial disputes, followed by several proposed solutions, were always hindered by New Delhi’s inflexible approach towards its national identity and projection of national power in the region. Besides, the shadows of American-Soviet rivalry, which initially emerged from the Pacific

\textsuperscript{43} Altaf Gauhar, "PAKISTAN: Ayub Khan’s Abdication," \textit{Third World Quarterly} 07, No. 01 (January 1985): 112.

\textsuperscript{44} Bruce Riedel, "Lessons from 1963 for India – Pakistan Relations," op. cit.
Ocean, soon began to loom over the Indian Ocean affecting the Indo-Pak conflicted regional politics. The aim of Washington to cultivate a pro-American South Asia consisting of both New Delhi and Islamabad could contain strongly the communist strings of the USSR and its expansion in the Indian Ocean (according to the American policymakers). In this way, the Soviet-American confrontation also led both India and Pakistan towards the oceanic politics.

During the decades-long period of Cold War, mutual geostrategic interests and frequent visits of Pakistan and the US officials concluded several agreements. These bilateral meetings primarily designed to appropriately condemn the Russo-Indian partnership. The close security requirements of the two states were initially derived by South Asian territorial politics which pushed Pakistan into perilous circumstances on the account of the Indian hegemonic desires and stubbornness towards Pakistan. The Indian leadership was not ready to recognise an independent and sovereign status of Pakistan. In addition to opposing the creation of a Muslim state in subcontinent, the mainstream Indian leaders decided to undermine the status of Pakistan in the regional and extra-regional affairs. Therefore, the core territorial interests of Pakistan created US support in South Asia even at the very eve of the Cold War.

In order to strengthen its position in the regional politics, the initial leaders of Pakistan decided to stand against India while protecting the sovereign status of Islamabad. An appropriate approach for protecting the ideological foundations of the country was become the core strategic objective of Pakistan which coincided with the American aim of preventing the communist expansion in South Asia. The combination of two-sided interest laid down the foundation of mutual cooperation, which convinced the leading state authorities from both sides to arrange reciprocal
visits. The bilateral meetings between two states concluded several cooperative agreements. The concrete steps for the formulation of effective foreign policy supporting the American role in South Asian politics were linked to territorial issues and water disputes of Pakistan with India.

1.3. Military Aid

The increasing clout of the Communist ideology pushed the US to contain the Soviet expansion and search for its proxies in the world. American interaction with Pakistan and its close alliance were evident of this fact. Indian closeness with the Soviet Union and its desire to maintain non-aligned foreign policy left Pakistan with the only viable strategic option: To ally with the US. Strategically weak and politically fragile young Muslim state of the subcontinent, Pakistan, decided to structure the cooperative ties with America. Hence, the first prime minister of Pakistan accepted an invitation of President Truman to visit the US. Through the subsequent exchange of visits, the intent of Pakistan for empowering its strategic position by acquiring military equipment was conveyed to the US officials.

President Eisenhower initially determined the eligibility of Pakistan as an ally and a recipient of American economic and strategic assistances. The leading American officials from the US Departments of State and Defence recognized Islamabad as an appropriate American ally, and both representatives of states concluded the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in 1953. The MAP was a two-pronged pact:

Military and non-military.\textsuperscript{47} During the Cold War, the MAP remained as a prominent feature of US foreign policy. In order to avoid direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, Washington preferred to adopt a deft strategy of providing strategic aid to other states particularly its allies.\textsuperscript{48}

Initially, the leadership of Pakistan conveyed to the US officials that the country was in need of US$ 170,000,000 for financial and military aid, US$ 75,000,000 for air force, and US$ 60,000,000 for naval development along with US$ 14000 million for industrial and agricultural developments.\textsuperscript{49} In 1954, the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement became an instrument through which the two sides agreed on to maintain the military alliance in order to exert pressure on communism.\textsuperscript{50} In this way, the military-to-military bilateral values substantially formalized the initial basis for Pak-US strategic ties in the form of SEATO and CENTO pacts.\textsuperscript{51} The idea of creating military-to-military relations was originally emerged in Truman administration who signed Mutual Defence Assistance Act in 1949.\textsuperscript{52} A real need to finalise the military defence deal with Pakistan was felt by Washington, which further fastened the US strategic ties with Islamabad. The rapid evolution of two-sided interaction was because of Soviet military preparedness. While threatening American global status, the Soviet Union overtly experimented the first thermonuclear experiment of Hydrogen bomb.\textsuperscript{53} In reaction to swelling strategic capabilities of Moscow, Pak-US state official increased their bilateral cooperation and concluded

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} William H. Mott, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{49} Mansoor Akbar Kundi, op. cit., 197.
\textsuperscript{50} Anam Mian, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
another US-sponsored agreement for military assistance to Pakistan. The establishment of Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) further extended the Pak-US strategic ties.\textsuperscript{54}

After the Second World War, the deteriorating security situation in the Middle East endangered the American role in the Muslim world. In 1951, the bilateral dialogues between the British and American officials, held in London, acknowledged Pakistan’s ideological attachment to the Muslim world by concluding the Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO).\textsuperscript{55} In order to maintain a strategic balance in the Cold War, the broader vision President Eisenhower inherited in New Look Policy emphasized military assistance, economic cooperation and political support to American allies across the world. Hence, the US extended its support based on more flexible and selective responses to the communist expansion. John Foster Dulles envisioned that the two defence pacts with the Asian nations would empower American standing in Asia.\textsuperscript{56} The national security policy under Eisenhower, in this way, chose Pakistan over India for the extension of its defence pacts. The Asian versions of US-sponsored defence pacts included Pakistan in the broader geostrategic designs in the Cold War.

The entry of Pakistan in the US-designed regional defence pacts of SEATO (1954) and CENTO (1955) for the protection of its Asian allies from the formidable threat of communism were landmarks in Pak-US relations. Both military pacts architected by the US Secretary of Defence, under Dwight D. Eisenhower, showed more US interest toward South Asia generally and for Pakistan specifically. A strong


defence against India instead of communism was mainly fundamental objective of Pakistan in joining of the American strategic defence alliances. To defend the territorial borders of a newly independent Muslim state against foreign aggression in the region was the main driving force behind Pakistan defence policy. It further reflected in joining of SEATO and CENTO treaties.\textsuperscript{57} American interest to secure the entire Asian region against the Soviet threat, parallel to security concern of Pakistan against India, strengthened the bilaterally aligned Washington-Islamabad partnership. Indeed, the CENTO (former Baghdad Pact) attracted likeminded states of the Muslim world (Iran, Iraq, Turkey) which ideologically support Pakistan’s position in international relations.

The military-to-military relations between both states were further enhanced under the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM or CENTCOM) established on January 01, 1983.\textsuperscript{58} This development augmented US strategic engagement with Islamabad by creating military surveillance bases in Pakistan. In short, the search of a strategic assistance to defend its fragile position in the region while countering the offensive attributes of its hostile neighbour, India, pushed Pakistan to enter into American alliance, and receive its strategic assistance. A report of the Council on Foreign Relations describes the initials military-to-military ties between Washington and Islamabad. The report, \textit{U.S-Pakistan Military Cooperation}, discussed the desire of Pakistan for ensuring its security against India which was

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{“The India-Pakistan War of 1965,”} Office of the Historian, Department of State, \url{https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/india-pakistan-war} (accessed on December 20, 2017).

equally important to the United States quest for countering communist expansion in the subcontinent.\textsuperscript{59}

1.4. Economic Assistance

The donor-recipient relationship between Washington and Islamabad was established to grant financial assistance for economic development to newly independent Muslim state of South Asia, Pakistan. Fighting with economic and political problems along with threats from India, Pakistan was in search of an unequivocal support of a great power. In order to financially empower its regional position, Pakistan realized that it should pursue US support. The US economic aid to Pakistan marked both states the favourite allies and good friends. The trade bilateralism for broader financial communications let the two-sided state authorities to explore various economic joint ventures. Cultural ties, along with joint venture of commerce, opened the doors for social interaction among the citizens of both sides. The frequent visits of commercial travellers increased further two-sided business engagements as well.

Initially, the economic package under the Point Four Program to support the faltering economic conditions of the developing states showed the readiness of President Truman to actively participate in world politics. The Point Four economic package was launched in July 1949 and designed to meet the four main objectives of US foreign policy: To support the major infrastructure of UN, to energetically continue the economic recovery programs around the globe, to promote the vision of

freedom-loving nations, and to strengthen the role of the developing countries by providing technical aid and resources. The Point Four economic plan under International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949 enacted by the US Congress addressed the economic problems of Pakistan. Hence, the US foreign policy mainly emphasized various bilateral economic assistance plans equivalent to supporting multilateral economic development institutions globally (particularly for Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Asia).

In line with the American growing economic engagements with different states, Pakistan concluded a treaty with the US on November 2 1959. It was Friendship and Commerce Treaty which came into force in 1961. In Washington, the representatives from both sides agreed on enhancing of bilateral bounds to ensure closer economic cooperation under twenty four articles of the treaty. Both nations agreed to promote a conducive environment for beneficial investment and multidimensional economic interactions.

Ayub Khan administration took landmark initiatives for ensuring US financial aid to overcome the economic deficiencies of Pakistan. In order to secure the prosperous future of his nation, Ayub Khan requested economic assistance from the US, and Washington reciprocated it by recognizing the financial requirements of Islamabad through its enormous financial aid package. An acknowledged aid package

62 Ibid.
to accomplish the economic desires of Pakistan brought the US closer to South Asia. The economic support brought Pakistan closer to the US, as a result of the reciprocal visit of Ayub Khan and vice president Johnson in 1961. In this way, an overwhelming wave of reciprocal visits by the leading state authorities resulted in close Pak-US alignment.

US economic aid always remained a substantial and key element of American foreign policy, apart from strategic cover of Pak-US relations. A wide range of cooperation in different fields increased the diplomatic connections of both states. In other words, ideological disparities, strategic divergence, and the prevailing economic crisis in the post-colonial scenario enhanced the US role in the subcontinent. An active US standing against communist expansion shaped the South Asian politics generally and Indo-Pak rivalry particularly. The later trends in American economic aid to Indian Five Years Plans for national development, in the Nehru administration, was an attempt to convert New Delhi into a strong American ally. Washington realized the Indian potential equal to Pakistan and tried to add New Delhi in the Western bloc of states.

2. Geostrategic Interests

Geostrategic values rooted in the conventional arrangements of geopolitics had always been one of the major driving forces of foreign policy-decision making process. The geographical features of the world politics mainly affect the political and strategic arrangements of international relations in which the foreign policy decision making apparatus

of states cautiously calculate the changing geostrategic organizations of the world politics. The formidable connections in the matrix of changing geopolitical arrangements and national security mechanism of a state were forced to change. Such complex arrangements impacted the mainstream leadership as well as the key architectures of foreign policy-decision making process. Hence, the main foreign policy-decisions makers remained deeply concerned with geopolitical dimensions of international relations. The discussion on non-territorial and strong diplomatic collaboration between the United States and Pakistan can principally be studied through geostrategic prism of main foreign policy structures of both states. The exceptionality in the common goals of defeating the threats of communism formulated the initial consistency in the bilateral diplomatic values.

The first generation of leaders from Islamabad accessed the geostrategic position of their respective country in the emerging world order after the WWII. Inception of the Cold War further changed the geostrategic outlook of Asian region by increasing the importance of South Asia in the world politics. South Asia emerged as an active part of Asian international politics which earlier had been revolving around Japan, China, and Pacific. So, non-aligned course of Indian foreign policy and its alliance with the Soviet Union resulted into an environment which was conducive for furthering Pak-US cooperative ties, as mentioned earlier.

The American political cooperation inherited in the geostrategic interests convinced the fifth Prime Minister of Pakistan, Huseyn Suhrawardy, to approve the leasing of Peshawar air station against the Nikita Khrushchev regime during the Eisenhower administration in 1960.67 In order to avoid the direct confrontation with the Soviets Union, the US preferred to establish a secret intelligence facility in Pakistan to observe Moscow’s Central Asian

proximities along with its strategic intentions. Before the scheduled Four Power Paris Summit, Washington intended to accurately estimate the Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. On May 01 1960, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) approved flight of U-2 high altitude surveillance revealed the collaboration of CIA with National Security Agency (NSA). The CIA-NSA joint venture increased the American strategic engagement with Pakistan. The Soviet aerial surveillance was observed passionately by leading US officials on one hand. On the other hand, it resulted in four active US military bases in Pakistan. Along with Badaber air base in Peshawar, the other US military bases in Pakistan were the Malir and Lahore Cantonments for the USAF coupled with Army Signals Corps in Model Town, Lahore. Therefore, four US military established one station in Peshawar, another one in Karachi and two in Lahore. The establishment of the four US bases succinctly reflected the geostrategic interests of Washington in Pakistan.

A change in US geostrategic managements in the mainstream arrangements of US foreign relations occurred during the Kennedy administration with the start of Tibet conflict. The geostrategic dimension of US foreign policy made India as an appropriate partner parallel to Pakistan during 1962 Sino-India war over Tibet. The border conflict between New Delhi and Beijing sparked a military clash over McMahon Line as a consequent of Indian-forward policy against the Chinese controlled territories. The application of forward-policy against China, designed in 1961 by Nehru on the successful annexation of Goa. The victory

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70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
in Goa encouraged the Indian government, therefore, Nehru started publicly speaking against China.\(^74\)

The Chinese directions of forward policy initiated Indo-China enmity. Indian armed forces plotted the Operation Vijay to end the 451 years of historical rule of Portugal over Goa and eventually Goa became an India occupied state in 1987.\(^75\) Therefore, the Chinese threats of Russo-Indian alliance and Indian strong influence on Goa consequently caused the 1962 border skirmish between New Delhi and Beijing. American geostrategic desires to convert India from a pro-Soviet to an anti-Soviet state were weakened by the Cuban missile crisis, during the Beijing-New Delhi border clash, because the American interference was restricted by a thirteen-day Soviet clash with the US over Cuba. In other words, President Kennedy avoided intervention in subcontinent during the Tibetan clash because the war between India and China was coincidental with the Cuban Missile Crisis. The US Caribbean policy to prevent the prevailing threats of communism in its neighbourhood was immediate concern of Kennedy administration.

In 1964, Chinese nuclear status revealed internationally in reaction to the growing global nuclear arms race and the expanding effects of competing politics between the major nuclear rivals of the world, America and Soviet Union. Indo-Pak border clash, from April to September 1965, was South Asian crisis developed equivalent to the disastrous Vietnam crisis. Pak-US relations, in the wake of the Indo-China border skirmish, considerably deteriorated due to Washington’s support for New Delhi against communist Beijing. In this way, 1960 was marked as most eventful decade in the history of South Asia after partition on the basis of Indo-China war, Indo-war and Chinese nuclear test. Stephen P. Cohen, Brooking

\(^{74}\) Ibid.

Institute’s India Project scholar, highlighted during an interview at Hudson Institute that the
decade of 1960 activated American aid to India and it was a major misestimate of Pakistan.76

The evolving world politics, after the World War II, provided favourable environment
and sufficient opportunities to the Soviet Union against the United States by placing New
Delhi and Beijing in the communist camp. The nuclear status of Moscow along with its
communist expansionist policy portrayed a detrimental picture of world politics for
Washington. The combination of strategic and ideological arrangement of the Soviet Union
created a worrisome picture of world politics in which the geostrategic significance of
Pakistan became accentuated in US strategic calculus. The geographical proximity of
Pakistan made it a suitable point for US to check the growth of Middle Eastern, Central
Asian, South Asia, and the Gulf states. Pakistan attracted Washington towards subcontinent
and its border with the communist China, strong connections with the Muslim world, and
anti-Soviet behaviour were perceived as appropriate options for American policymakers.

Such developments forced the leading decision makers in Washington to redefine the
salient priorities of the US foreign policy toward Pakistan. Larry Pressler pointed out in his
book, Neighbours in Arms: An American Senator’s Quest for Disarmament in a Nuclear
Subcontinent, that “Reagan said publicly in those meeting with me, containing communism
was far more important to him than Pakistani efforts to get a nuclear weapon.”77 While
highlighting several evidences about nuclear efforts of Zia regime, the Reagan administration
preferred not to exert pressure on Islamabad due to broader politics in the Cold War.

76 “50 Years After the 1965 War: What Has Changed in India-Pakistan Relations?,” Youtube Video, 1:48, Posted
by “Hudson Institute, September 10, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F35WoTC2dko (accessed on
77 Larry Pressler, Neighbours in Arms: An American Senator’s Quest for Disarmament in a Nuclear Subcontinent
Moscow’s worsening relations with Beijing and Islamabad along with its opposition to emerging Sino-Pak supportive relations observed by leading US policymakers. Chinese and Pakistani anti-Soviet behaviour was welcomed by Washington. The growing fondness between Pakistan and China was viewed by the US as an opportunity to curb the influence of the Soviet Union. The geostrategic interests of Washington in South Asia were always harmonized by the South Asian directions of American foreign policy which formally revolved around Pakistan. American secret war, based on CIA-sponsored clandestine operation in Kabul, revealed the American geostrategic interest in Pakistan. The creation of Mujahedeen by the end of the Cold War and the initiation of war on terror in the post-9/11 scenario were the key features of US foreign policy which unambiguously exhibited the significance of geostrategic interests in Pak-US diplomatic relations. The roots of mutually beneficial relations, based on diplomatic partnership generally in economic and strategic dimensions, were further increased by prevailing geostrategic interest, traditionally inherited in foreign policies of both states.

3. Cooperative Foundations of Bilateralism

The South Asian version of US foreign policy was too weak in the Post-World War scenario. Reconstruction of Western Europe under Marshal Plan of economic assistance and emergence of Soviet threat were the leading domains of American foreign policy which discouraged the South Asian voices initially in the American Congress. The British colonial legacy in South Asia was another factor which stopped the US from engaging actively in newly partitioned subcontinent. No doubt, the post-WWII decolonized Indian region eroded the colonial rule of American ally, England, but the Indian adaptation of non-aligned foreign policy disappointed the US. The non-aligned policy adopted by the first Prime Minster of
India, Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1954 was a tactical move of New Delhi. Nehruvian vision of non-alignment convinced Russia on Indian anti-American course of foreign policy. In 1955, the official visit of Nehru to Russia chalked out the initial plan of Indo-Russian friendship and thwarted American vision of South Asia. The territorial closeness of Pakistan to the Soviet Union and ideological proximity to the Persian Gulf were the main sources of attraction for American policy makers. It was practically observed by embracing Pakistan in the greater American Alliance. Washington was interesting in maintaining a military base close to Moscow and Kennedy regime was determined to enhance its position in the Gulf politics while securing the main oil supplies.

The visit of Governor General of Pakistan, General Ghulam Muhammad to the US in 1953 marked the initial phase of Pak-US strategic relations. General Ghulam Muhammad had a pleasant meeting with Eisenhower and discussed the diplomatic matters after getting a medical treatment. The Operations Coordinated Board, maintained by Eisenhower in 1953, reported the key drivers of US South Asian policy. Furthermore, the NSC 5409, prepared by the officials of State Department, envisioned the future of South Asia while estimating the role of Kabul, Islamabad, New Delhi, Kathmandu, and Colombo (Ceylon). The state officials from Washington tried to view South Asia as a part of the British Commonwealth, an independent and a non-communist entity, and these were the fascinating features of

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79 N. Jayapalan, *Foreign Policy of India* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 2001), 94.


81 Ibid.


Pakistan. Washington decided to involve Islamabad in its strategic plans and concluded Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in 1954. President Eisenhower finalised the strategic aid plan for Pakistan by signing 1954 agreement, and marked American South Asian imprints in world politics. The US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in the Eisenhower administration announced Pakistan as an anti-Communist state and a formal US ally while critically evaluating the neutral or non-aligned position of India.\textsuperscript{84} The Southeast Asian model of collective defence under SEATO, signed in 1954, registered Pakistan formally as a potential American ally outside the Southeast Asian region. The nascent bilateral values further resulted in Agreement of Cooperation in 1959.\textsuperscript{85} The developments in the Kissinger and Nixon era brought several changes during the intense period of Cold War. The inclusion of Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO did not only enhance Pak-US relations but these defence pacts clearly communicated the support Islamabad for Washington. Thus, an alliance of US and Pakistani officials decided to stand against Moscow. Both military alliances proved the bilateral commitment for security cooperation and declared Islamabad’s association to Soviet-opposing bloc of American states. The U-2 incident exposed US intense engagement with Pakistan and annoyed the communist supporting Moscow from Islamabad. The direct confrontation between Islamabad and Moscow made New Delhi a very close South Asian ally of the USSR and Pakistan a strong US ally.

The strategic move of Kennedy administration toward India during Sino-Indian border clash of 1962 raised serious concerns of Pakistan. In the 1961 State of the Union Address, John F. Kennedy mentioned the communist threats from India, South Vietnam and

\textsuperscript{84} Peter Lyon, \textit{Conflict between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopaedia} (California: ABC – CLIO. Inc., 2008), 54.
\textsuperscript{85} Devin T. Hagerty, \textit{The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia} (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), 68.
Laos. The ideological connection between Moscow and Beijing were viewed as a threat to the US presence in South Asia. The US policymakers thought to counter the Soviet-sponsored communism in India and Cuba simultaneously. After the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, the main objective of President Kennedy to support India against Chinese communists. The US diplomatic efforts toward South Asia and multiple attempts of addressing the toxic patterns of Indo-Pak conflict started showing an Indian-inclined US policy under Kennedy. This realization compelled Ayub government to explore the world beyond United States. The subsequent years Indo-Pak war of 1965 forced Islamabad to join Beijing and accept Chinese as reliable neighbours. The weak commitment of Washington to protect Islamabad from New Delhi, in addition to the US arms supplies to India, forced Pakistan to cultivate tacit support from neighbouring great power – China. Such ferocious developments alarmed Pakistan and shake the conventional strategic mindset of Islamabad because Nehru government successfully established a covert linked to Kennedy instead of its proclaimed pro-Soviet position. The structural alignment of Nehru with communist Soviet leaders and capitalist American officials was a fundamental push for Sino-Pak friendship.

In this way, the decade of 1960 proved to be a landmark step for economic and strategic cooperation between India and the United States, which encouraged New Delhi to launch another attack on neighbouring state, in the 1962 war with China and with Pakistan in 1965 war. India-Pakistan territorial confrontation repeated in 1971, and it hampered the strategic thinking of Islamabad. In reaction, the leading state authorities under Bhutto administrated decided to strengthened traditional security mechanism of Islamabad. The

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87 Ibid.
regional security structure of South Asia further disturbed by Indian first nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974.90 Smiling Buddah (coded name of first nuclear test of India)91 was intentionally planned to announce India’s peaceful use of nuclear technology.92 It was a covert message by Indira Gandhi to the neighbouring states about the strategic preparedness of New Delhi under nuclear arrangement. Later on, the end of East-West contextualization of world politics after the demise of the Soviet Union began a new chapter in the South Asian history. A critical moment came when India revised the main designs of its foreign policy and decided to become a close friend of US. In short, Islamabad-Washington diplomatic relations can be traced back to the post-independence era which grew gradually, fractured persistently, and embraced an unending era of mistrust.

4. Beijing-Islamabad-Washington Axis

Pakistan was the only nation from South Asia which was aligned with China parallel to United States during the Cold War. The US considered this as an opportunity to engage diplomatically with the second communist nation of the world. Islamabad played a significant role in normalizing the diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing. It also facilitated laying the foundation of bilateral relations between the communist state, China, and the democratic state, the US. However, the prevailing tensions between both nations became a major conflicting point during the communist revolution of China. It happened when, in 1949, the Washington decided to support the nationalist leader Chiang Kai Shek

91 Ibid.
instead of the communist leader, Mao Zedong.\textsuperscript{93} Chiang fled with his supporters to Taiwan and gained American support against the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC). The United States limited its diplomatic connection with the communist China in the initial phase of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{94} The outbreak of the three-year Korean War and the first clash of US-USSR further widened the diplomatic gulf between America and China. In support of the communist North Korea, Chinese retaliation of the US-backed South Korea considerably damaged the diplomatic connections between Washington and Beijing. In 1958, the deployment of the seventh American naval fleet\textsuperscript{95} during the Taiwan Strait Crisis was an attempt of the US to prevent a major clash between China and Taiwan.

It was contrary to providing financial and strategic assistances to Taiwan under the Foreign Assistance Act, Mutual Security Act and Act for International Development, which were passed by the US Congress.\textsuperscript{96} Moreover, the Tibetan uprising following the Indo-China border dispute in 1962 highlighted the American antipathy toward China. It was evident when the US supported New Delhi against Beijing. Afterwards in 1964, the inclusion of Beijing in the Nuclear Club made China a state of global stature, and it became another serious concern of Washington. Moreover, the beginning of Sino-Soviet split over their ideological differences led to the border skirmishes between Beijing and Moscow in 1969. Nonetheless, it eventually opened an era of US-China rapprochement.\textsuperscript{97}

The era of the Cold War started with the Beijing-Washington bilateral relations which moved the global balance of power toward the US. It happened because it left the communist


\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
forces of the Soviet Union weak and increased the strength of the US-sponsored western bloc. Pakistan played a vital role in transforming the Cold War politics into American favour and began to further enhance the cooperative Sino-US relations. Islamabad facilitated the US twice in its friendly overtures towards China. First in 1971, it facilitated the American authorities to pay a visit to China, second when it arranged the secret meetings of President Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger, which impregnated a diplomatic matrix for the future cooperation of the two countries. The then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, endorsed Chinese stance on Taiwan and abrogated its Mutual Defence treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan).

The Taiwan Relations Act approved by the US Congress in 1979\(^98\) maintained the non-diplomatic status and continued the commercial and cultural relations of Taiwan, along with the protecting of Washington-Beijing diplomatic values. The then President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, brokered a meeting between President Nixon and the Premier Zhou Enlai in February 1972. This development too enhanced Pakistan’s alliance with both superpowers, China and US.\(^99\) Hence, the Ping-Pong diplomacy of China for the establishment of its diplomatic ties with the United States normalized the bilateral ties between the two nations. Through this diplomacy, inking of the first Sino-US joint communique and the successful quest of Beijing for securing a permanent seat in the UNSC raised Chinese significance in the global politics. Both superpowers, China and US, appreciated Pakistan’s role in facilitating Nixon meeting with Zhou Enlai.\(^100\)


\(^100\) “Getting To Beijing: Henry Kissinger’s Secret 1971 Trip,” op. cit.
Chinese strategic ties with Pakistan were initiated during the Cold War politics when President Kennedy altered its South Asian policy and started focusing India alongside Pakistan. The initial nuclear assistance to India under Atoms for Peace Plan of the Eisenhower even disappointed Pakistan in 1960s when it preferred to help India and left Pakistan at the aggression of New Delhi. During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, China picked Pakistan as an all-weather friend and a strategic ally.

The geostrategic magnate of Pakistan attracted China, which it considered equivalent to the US support during the international rivalry of communist and capitalist forces. The superpowers, the US and the USSR along with the peripheral power, China, alerted the diplomatic history of Islamabad amidst the nefarious security designs of India.\textsuperscript{101} Therefore, Pakistani astute bilateralism, coupled with the Nixonison version of foreign policy, formulated a China-Pakistan-America triangle.\textsuperscript{102} The conciliatory relations of China was unexpectedly a diplomatic move of Zhou Enali to end the communist isolation and to start a new future of Beijing with the help of Islamabad. In this way, the competition of the superpowers provided the opportunities to Pakistan for the strengthening of its position in the regional politics while securing its sovereign status against archival India. In order to fulfill its strategic ambitions, New Delhi preferred to announce its nuclear capability globally.

5. **Smiling Buddha: Responses from Islamabad and Washington**

Indian aggressive regional designs resulted into separation of the Eastern part of Pakistan, present day Bangladesh, from West Pakistan in 1971. For the sake of nuclear weapons, Indian nuclear scientists were engaged at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre


\textsuperscript{102} Harvey Starr, “The Kissinger Years: Studying Individuals and Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly* 24, No. 04 (December 1980): 466.
(BARC). The BRC unleashed the nuclear quest of New Delhi. The manufacturing of nuclear devices and their tests at Pokhran Test Range (PTR), Rajasthan, undermined the regional security environment and pushed Pakistan toward an unavoidable nuclear-arms race. The Smiling Buddha dragged the attention of international community toward South Asia generally, while diverting the tenets of the international non-proliferation regime toward subcontinent specifically.

Following the nuclear paths of the great powers (the US, the USSR, and PRC), PNE or the non-military purposes nuclear tests provided India along with the Latin American states (Argentina and Brazil) to introduce their nuclear capabilities globally under the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Instead of considering the peaceful or non-peaceful natures of nuclear program, India, by introducing the nuclear paradigm to the Asian politics, jeopardized the security of its neighbouring countries. After the 1971 along with the detonation of Smiling Buddha, New Delhi heavily undermined the strategic environment of South Asia.

In the presence of the evolving nuclear order, geostrategic compulsions of Pakistan became severe in an insecure environment of the region. A nuclearized South Asia became a major concern for the Carter administration in which the nuclear ambitions of Islamabad accentuated particularly in response to Indira Gandhi decision of PNE in 1974. This development accelerated American non-proliferation efforts for Indo-Pak confrontation. In 1978, the US withdrawal from the sale of 100 F-5E fighter aircraft, equivalent to the suspension of US$ 40 million development aid, were considered as a strict action of Washington to curtail the nuclear aspiration of Islamabad.

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This ultimately forced the Zia administration to secure the French supplies of Mirages to F-5Es.\textsuperscript{105} India’s acceptance as a nuclear power state by the western countries pushed Pakistan toward France. Paris agreed to help Islamabad in building of its Nuclear Power Plant (NPR) at Khusab in 1976 for meeting its growing energy demands.\textsuperscript{106} In 1960s, the France-Pakistan relations gradually improved and the state officials from both sides agreed to maintain cooperative ties, particularly in the two-sided Atomic Energy Commissions.\textsuperscript{107} However, the French role in the South Asia nuclear politics was vehemently opposed and extremely criticised by United States.\textsuperscript{108}

Under the US pressure, in 1978, the French suspension of nuclear assistance to Pakistan \textsuperscript{109} created an enmity in Pak-US relation since Washington had exercised influence in its allies to curtail the Pakistani quest for acquiring nuclear weapon. The primary objective behind the message was to stop Pakistan from receiving support for its nascent nuclear program from other states.\textsuperscript{110} The American strict behaviour for Pakistan was basically planned to refrain Islamabad from acquiring the nuclear weapons capability.

In 1972, prior to the Indian PNE, Pakistan proposed a nuclear-free South Asia.\textsuperscript{111} The proposal to develop South Asia nuclear weapon-free region was presented by Munir Ahmed Khan (Pakistan representative) at the 16\textsuperscript{th} annual meeting of the United Nation Atomic Energy Conference.\textsuperscript{112} Bhutto invented a peacemaker image of Islamabad under a nuclear-

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 217.
\textsuperscript{108} Rajesh Rajagopalan and Atul Mishra, Nuclear South Asia: Keywords & Concepts (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014), 130.
\textsuperscript{109} Humaira Dar, op. cit., 216.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
free South Asia analogous to Latin America under the Treaty of Tlatelolco signed, on 14 February, 1967 in Mexico City. In 1974, Bhutto’s ambition for a nuclear-free region was later tarnished by Indira Ghandi.\textsuperscript{113}

Moreover, Indian concerns were expressed at several international platforms, which further showed its official rigidity to accommodate the peaceful regional goals sponsored by Pakistan. Indira Gandhi government did not only undermine the suggestion of Bhutto for making whole South Asian region as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) but it also shadowed the scope of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) by plainly refusing to sign it.\textsuperscript{114} Bhutto’s vision of making a nuclear-free zone reflected in his objective to eliminate the chances of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, which could ultimately address the security concerns of Pakistan appropriately.\textsuperscript{115}

A heightened sense of insecurity in the mind-set of Pakistan, in the wake of Indian acquiring of nuclear weapons, created a likelihood of triggering a vicious arms race in South Asia. It further became a matter of utmost concern for the Carter administration. In the presence of Indo-Pak competition, President Jimmy Carter’s commitment of increasing the scope of the newly established non-proliferation regime under the NPT was one of fundamental challenges to the US foreign policy. President Carter tried to pressurise Prime Minister Bhutto so that he might abandon the nuclear research.

A severe security demand against Indian nuclear status convinced Pakistan to join the prestigious nuclear club while establishing a balance of power in the South Asian region. The US diplomacy towards recurring Indo-Pakistan rivalry became a serious challenge for Carter.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
American foreign policy started to emphasize the non-proliferation of WMDs (Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons) particularly in the areas of space systems (such as ASAT) along with the promotion of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB) by Jimmy Carter.\textsuperscript{116} President Jimmy Carter was sanguine to convince India on CTBT which would profoundly limit the nuclear mission of Islamabad.\textsuperscript{117}

The American efforts to curtail South Asian nuclear contest were intensified when Washington emphasized the nuclear program of Pakistan. President Reagan decided to prevent the ambition of Pakistan for testing and acquiring of nuclear devices during Zia regime. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan under Saur Revolution in December 1979 changed the whole scenario. Communist intervention of Kabul hampered the non-proliferation efforts of Reagan administration. The Soviet intervention eased the American sanctions on Pakistan because Ronald Reagan was highly committed to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but Moscow-Kabul alliance changed the scenario abruptly.

The combination of the Saur revolution of Afghanistan in 1978 and the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979 exerted pressure on Carter and forced him to revisit the priorities of the American foreign policy. Moreover, the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet support to the Kabul communist forces urged America to shake hands with Zia. Therefore, an instable Iran and an anti-US Kabul were considered as immediate threats to American interest and required Washington to act accordingly. This entire situation persuaded the US to accept the nuclear reality of Pakistan and to review its policy options for Pakistan instead of solely focusing on the non-proliferation agenda. On October 3 1980, the meeting of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security advisor of the Carter administration turned the conventional

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{116} “Counter – Proliferation During the Carter Administration,” \textit{Department of the State}, \url{https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/non-proliferation} (accessed on December 20, 2016).
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
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non-proliferation standards of the US foreign policy before the outbreak of Afghan war, as proved by a declassified document of National Security Archives.\textsuperscript{118}

6. Shadows of the Afghan War

The Soviets invasion in Afghanistan transformed the American foreign policy objectives. Washington decided to increase its economic and military aid to Islamabad, which made Pakistan the second largest recipient of US aid after Israel. The apprehensive Pakistan for securing moral and diplomatic American support in the region to fulfil its security needs against India became a central debating point in US Congress. The outbreak of the Afghan war, under Pak-US strategic partnership, proved to be the marriage of convenience which, for the time being, prevented the Soviet Union from dominating in Afghanistan rather helping Islamabad to follow successfully its nuclear pursuit.\textsuperscript{119}

The debate of the US-USSR rivalry is incomplete without factoring in the role of CIA in carrying out anti-Soviet operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The anti-Soviet US campaign in Pakistan was a result of American diplomatic efforts at the end of the détente era. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was considered as a serious security threat by the Carter administration and described as a gravest threat to the international peace since the end of WWII.\textsuperscript{120} American efforts to transform Afghanistan into another Vietnam for the Soviet Union was a millstone in Pak-US relations. Initially, the American intelligence activities were started to keep an eye on the Soviet activities. The US intelligence community was

\textsuperscript{119} Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Impact of the Afghan War on Pakistan,” Pakistan Horizon 41, No. 01 (January 1988): 40.
\textsuperscript{120} Glen Jeansome and David Luhrssen, War on the Silver Screen: Shaping America’s Perception of History (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 139.
determined to deeply observe the Soviet ballistic missile program which engaged the CIA more with Pakistan.121 The anti-Soviet arrangements of CIA with its Pakistani counterpart were multiplied further during the Afghan war. It is dubbed as the last crisis of the Cold War and the last episode of Pak-US cooperation during the decades-long East-West confrontation.

Jimmy Carter decided to help Pakistan against the Soviets invasion in Afghanistan by exploiting the Muslim culture of Jihad against un-Islamic forces of communism. Instead of supporting Islamabad against non-Muslim India, the American officials limited their support to the Soviet-controlled Afghanistan only. The promotion of Islamic notion under Jihad culture was mainly the central theme of Pakistan foreign policy under Zia. The reorientation of mainstream foreign policy values during Zia regime changed the nature of Pak-US relations. Besides securing American support, in order to create a stable and peaceful regional environment, Zia proposed several suggestions to India. He tried to convince India simultaneously on signing the NPT, in addition to mutually conclude an agreement for placing all the nuclear sites under the surveillance of IAEA.

The proposals of Islamabad to New Delhi about IAEA and NPT were considered to be a revised version of its vision of nuclear-weapon free zone in South Asia.122 Interestingly, Zia who was a non-democratic and critical leader, became a frontline ally of the United States at the outbreak of Afghan war. Washington provided US$ 400 million for economic and military developments to Pakistan, which was sneeringly termed as ‘peanuts’ by Zia.123 The economic aid extensively reconsidered and increased in 1981 when Ronald Reagan replaced

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123 Ibid.
Jimmy Carter. A package of US$ 3.2 billion financial assistance encouraged Islamabad to actively perform an anti-Soviet role.\textsuperscript{124}

The continuation of the economic aid to Pakistan against the intervening communist forces in South Asia was the primary objective of US foreign policy, as discussed by Brookings scholar, Bruce Riedel, after serving thirty-years at CIA. Riedel’s book, \textit{What We Won: America’s Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-89}, explained the major goal of Washington: To create Kabul a “Soviet Vietnam for their own reasons.”\textsuperscript{125} Riedel’s record explained the history of Afghan politics, he said, “it was an intelligence war between the United States and its allies and the Soviets and their allies.”\textsuperscript{126} The CIA was assigned a task first by Carter and then by Reagan to make Kabul a “Russian Vietnam”.\textsuperscript{127} In this way, the mission of White House was to manipulate Riyadh and Islamabad to fight against Moscow while securing US greater geostrategic interests in the region.\textsuperscript{128} The Saudi government remained very active in supporting Pakistan and its role in fighting against Soviet Union. Saudi authorities were more active in helping Islamabad for addressing the Afghan refugee problem which emerged after Afghan war.\textsuperscript{129}

A conflicted environment of political and strategic clash helped South Asian states in acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities. Nuclear weapons, as an appropriate mean of strengthening security, was the ultimate objective of Pakistan while actively pursuing American support in the Cold War. However, the final phase of the Cold War, throughout the communist occupation of Kabul, closely aligned Islamabad and Washington. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan left India with the tense foundations of Pak-US bilateralism.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Bruce Riedel, \textit{What We Won: America’s War in Afghanistan, 1979-8} (Washington: Brooking Institution, 2015), xi.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., x.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Naveed Ahmad, “Pakistan-Saudi Relations,” \textit{Pakistan Horizon} 35, No. 04 (Fourth Quarter 1982): 54.
Moreover, the significance of Islamabad diminished in the geopolitical priorities of Washington at the end of the Cold War with the withdrawal of Moscow from Kabul, according to a report of the Council on Foreign Relations. The report says that the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan raised the non-proliferation concerns of White House about Pakistan.  

7. Bilateral Values in the Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War with the demise of the Soviet Union resulted in a peaceful end of Communist-Capitalist ideological competition. It dramatically changed the traditional patterns of the world politics. The vanishing of the Soviet threat from Europe, in addition to the disappearance of the Soviet states from international system, shaped the unipolar attributes of the world politics. The collapse of the Soviet forces, from the political landscape of international relations parallel to the end of communism, globally terminated the four-decade long strategic competition between Russians and Americans. Consequently, the latter emerged as a supper power in international relations. A disturbed international security environment and its serious aftermaths proved to be more favourable for the bilateral collaborative values of Washington and Islamabad. In 1992, the participation of Pakistan in the United Nations Protection Forces in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) as a UN Peacekeeping force for Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina granted sufficient chances to Islamabad to raise its significance in international politics. The outbreak of Yugoslav wars in 1991 and Pak-US joint efforts in the UN peacekeeping forces further enhanced the diplomatic bonds between Washington and Islamabad.  

130 Greg Bruno and Jayshree Bajoria, op, cit.  
The political trends of South Asia based on Islamabad-New Delhi bilateral interaction changed after the demise of Soviet-supported communism from the international system. It further affected the regional dynamics of South Asia in the post-Cold War scenario. The issues of non-proliferation did not only encircled South Asia, but it also directed the attention of the international community toward Indo-Pak nuclear efforts. The proponents of global non-proliferation regime termed South Asia as a most dangerous zone in the presence of antagonistic Islamabad-New Delhi race for acquisition of the nuclear weapon status.132 The vision of Pakistan for creating a nuclear-free South Asia was again conveyed to the international community immediately after the demise of Soviet Union. A delegation of Islamabad presented a proposal of the five nations gathering (The US, the Soviet Union, China, India, and Pakistan) to discuss the growing nuclear order of South Asia in the State Department.133 The suggestion of five-nation conference coined by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif remained merely a theoretical document in June 1991. Indian refusal to this conference further intensified the security requirements of Islamabad.

The demise of Soviet Union shifted immensely the balance of power in favour of United States since the beginning of the 1990s. The shift from bipolar to a unipolar world in which the Western alliance under the US leadership did not only left Islamabad solely at the consequences of Cold War, but it also raised serious American concern over nuclear ambitions of Islamabad. The disintegration of Soviet Union let the US to resume its sanction-driven South Asian policy for Pakistan. Moreover, American disengagement from problematic Afghan question opened another disturbed border for Pakistan. Politically instable Afghanistan based on a tribal system of warlords emerged another border problem along with troublesome Indian boundary. Core foreign policy objectives of Islamabad were

seeking to acquire security of disturbed borders, adequate defence against nuclear India, and an attainment of respectable bargaining position over Kashmir issue.\textsuperscript{134}

The nuclear drive, as a central point of Islamabad foreign policy, added Pakistan in the list of undeclared nuclear weapon states equivalent to Israel and India. The goal to acquire nuclear weapons for the maintenance of robust deterrence against archival neighbouring state became a difficult task for Islamabad.\textsuperscript{135} Western world of American alliance increased pressure on Pakistan to subscribe to NPT while opening all nuclear facilities for the IAEA’s inspection. The critical debate on a peaceful nuclear program of Pakistan further introduced Pressler amendment coined by Senator Larry Pressler, passed by Congress, and signed by Reagan administration in 1985.\textsuperscript{136} Instead of acquiring security guarantee against the conventional imbalance of power in South Asia, and Western denial of maintaining security against nuclear India, Pakistan was placed under the economic sanction imposed by United States.

The struggle of Pakistan for neutralizing Indian nuclear edge enabled Islamabad to acquire nuclear weapon status. The leading decision makers of Islamabad decided to develop nuclear weapon capability simultaneous to India. The nuclear contest between two neighbouring nations increased the role of US in the region. The emerging nuclear politics in South Asia further disturbed Pak-US historical alliance. While introducing the main stands of American foreign policy, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary, John Mallott, during his visit to South Asia in 1993, on one hand cleared that the American objectives are; to prevent war along with the countering of proliferation of WMDs, to convince both India and Pakistan on

\textsuperscript{134} Tehmina Mahmood, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Post-Cold War Period,” Pakistan Horizon 50, No. 03 (July 1997): 102.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
joining of NPT, to enhance the military contacts, and to preserve the unrestricted maritime and naval transit rights, on one hand.¹³⁷

On the other hand, the Soviet dismantlement changed American strategic thinking dramatically which resulted in the execution of Pressler amendment, particularly after Afghan war. The geostrategic significance of Pakistan reduced in American foreign policy priorities and it resulted in economic sanctions on Pakistan in 1985. Thus, Washington terminated its economic and military supports to Pakistan.¹³⁸ In 1995, a state visit of Ms. Benazir Bhutto to the US revisited the Pressler amendment and, through Brown amendment in September 1995, restored some of the economic and military assistance to Pakistan.¹³⁹ In short, the peaceful end and elimination of decades-long US-USSR international contest for the global dominance placed Pakistan under challenges of unintended American sanctions.

8. US Dilemma during Sanctions

The genesis of sanction era began in the environment of mistrust to the toxic politics of South Asia under the broader designs of the Cold War politics. Pakistan’s shared border with China and its geographical proximity to the USSR attracted the United States, but Indian presence in the South Asian politics has always remained an attractive state to the American strategic enclave. The strategic significance of Pakistan in US strategic calculations were compromised in the aftermath of the Cold War. Simultaneously, the US confidence in the Indo-US strategic partnership to balance the increasing influence of China in the Asian

¹³⁷ Tehmina Mahmood, op. cit., 104.
¹³⁹ Philip G. Schrag, A Well – Founded Fear: The Congressional Battle to Save Political Asylum in America (New York: Routledge, 2000), 126.
politics improved the strategic significance of New Delhi for Washington. Consequently, it inflicted a sense of insecurity in Islamabad.

The Sino-Indian war of 1962 was a major setback for Pak-US alliance because the end of the clash between Beijing and New Delhi invited American support for India against Red China, which shocked Pakistan. Apparently, neutral and non-aligned India tried to become an important South Asian state and an active recipient of US military and economic assistance. A pro-New Delhi attitude of Washington ignored the fact that the US strategic support to India would be used against American strong and long-term South Asian ally, Pakistan, in the future. The formal stance of President Kennedy to attract India disappointed Islamabad. He opined, “Pakistan needed a strong and independent India for her very survival.”

The Americans protection of India against the communist China along with pulling of New Delhi out of Soviet bloc further disenchanted the association of Islamabad to Washington. New Delhi tilt of Washington unsecured Pakistan in South Asia and weakened the position of Islamabad in American bloc. The Chinese government also perceived the emerging bounds of Indo-US collaboration before the Tibetan clash. A cable Overview of India’s Foreign Relations in 1961 from the Chinese embassy in India revealed the embryonic nature of rising anti-China wave during the Nehru administration followed by a visit of Nehru to the United States.

The American decision of supporting India against China by providing US$ 120 million as a short-term military aid for meeting its security needs left disastrous impacts on Pakistan. In addition to failure Kashmir talks, the financial assistance to New Delhi opened

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140 Pontian Godfrey Okoth, USA India Africa: During and After the Cold War (Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 2010), 110.
an area of mistrust in Pak-US relations which forced China to jump into South Asian politics from Pakistan side.\textsuperscript{142} So, the actual genesis of mistrust was inherited in post Indo-Pak war scenarios of 1965 and 1971. The unclassified document from the US Department of State revealed that the wars with Pakistan were an Indian attempt of imposing its hegemonic designs in South Asia and the Indian Ocean as cleared by Indira Gandhi in a briefing on Indo-Pak war on December 12, 1971.\textsuperscript{143} Prior to the 1971 clash, the aftermaths of 1965 war brought ten years arms embargos on both India and Pakistan, but Pakistan solely depending on the US weakened its position against India.

President Johnson realized its role in the Indo-Pak conflict and preferred to remain away from this border crisis which emerged in 1965. As it was less relevant to American interest, Washington claimed the Soviet responsibility to settle the Indo-Pak border clash. Contrary to the last phase of Cold War, South Asia region was not so important for the US. South Asian politics were less important for Washington as compare to like European and Middle Eastern regions. Therefore, President Johnson preferred to restrict American direct involvement in the war. President Kennedy was covertly active in helping New Delhi against Red China in 1962, but the main officials from the State Department were interested in altering their strategic priorities in addition to the Soviet arranged Tashkent agreement in 1966.

The US stopped strategic aid to Pakistan in order to acquire Indian favour. Further diplomatic prosperity damaged in the 1971 war of East Pakistan which resulted in closer Ghandi-Nixon ties and stationing of American nuclear aircraft carrier in the Bay of Bengal. The placing of American seventh nuclear-powered aircraft carrier was an actual deterring

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\item \textsuperscript{143} U.S. Department of State, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Briefing on Indo-Pak War, \textit{Intelligence Information Cable}, December 12, 1971, \url{https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e7txt/50163.htm} (accessed on December 13, 2017).
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intend of Washington to China. According to Sumit Ganguly, the presence of the USS enterprise witnessed the zenith of Pak-US ties. The naval fleet apparently supported Pakistan, but it was originally planned to communicate American strategic position against communist geostrategic interests of Soviet Union. The American efforts to win the non-aligned India and converting it against the Soviet Union was a clandestine effort to keep New Delhi in the American alliance analogous to Islamabad.

The diplomatic ties strictly derived from twisted interests and Realist resultant foreign policy began an era of economic sanctions under Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act. The Section 620E shaken the foundations of a bilateral agreement signed between the governments of Pakistan and US in 1959. The alliance of both nations relating to the Soviet threats in the form of communism or communist dominated states got a major setback.

The enforcement of international non-proliferation regime under the auspices of NPT coincided with American sanctions approved by the American Congress against its non-nuclear states. The Symington Amendment under Section 669 and the Glenn Amendment under the Section 670 Acts of Foreign Assistance singled out Pakistan – a close strategic ally of US – on the nuclear issues in South Asia. Both Arms Control Acts adopted in 1976 and 1977 were applied on Pakistan in 1979 and 1998 respectively. The Indian lobby worked against Pakistan in the State Department, Congress, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It eventually resulted in a considerable reduction in economic and strategic aid to

\[145\] Ibid., 32.
Pakistan under Symington and Glenn Amendment. In addition to Pakistan, the Glenn Amendment against the nuclear testing effected India as well.\textsuperscript{148}

The proposed sanctions were designed to eliminate the determination of Pakistan to match its strategic capabilities with India. The application of the Pressler amendment in 1988 showed American revision of foreign policy towards its strategic partner of Cold War. The success in Afghan policy, by eliminating the influence of Red Army from the international system, created a new political global environment which required the leading foreign policy decision-makers to unleash their vested interests.\textsuperscript{149} An additional format of sanction further victimised Pakistan in 1993 under Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

A strong belief of the Congress on the allegedly established Pak-China relations on missile development further critically cornered Pakistan.\textsuperscript{150} The abrupt changes in American behaviour for Pakistan inflected an insecure feeling in Islamabad. The sanction era cemented considerably in various diplomatic differences on nuclear issue instigated tensions in bilateral foundations of Pak-US relations due to Indian nuclear ambitions.\textsuperscript{151} Hence, the nuclear politics of South Asia sabotaged the position of Pakistan in the region instead of curbing the New Delhi’s nuclear desires.

The effort of Pakistan to strategically stabilize the South Asian region by conducting nuclear explosions was a retaliation of similar tests carried by India. The nuclear race overtly inaugurated by New Delhi brought the economic sanctions on India and Pakistan simultaneously. Washington exerted economic pressure on New Delhi and Islamabad by

\textsuperscript{151} “Pakistan's Sanctions Waivers: A Summary,” op. cit.
using international financial institutions including the IMF and World Bank in addition to the suspension of the American loans.

The sanctions on Pakistan did not only disappointed Islamabad but it also besmirched its regional and global political standing. The degraded status of Islamabad in the international politics marked by American economic pressures later caused mistrust in converging bilateral cooperation between Islamabad and Washington. The transformation of diplomatic bounds from the convergence of interest to unintended trust-deficit standards began to emerge between state officials from both sides. Pakistan, the first South Asian country elongating its unconditional diplomatic relations with the United States gradually lost its position in American strategic calculus.

The post nuclearization era of South Asian history witnessed a refreshing outlook of American economic sanction during the Clinton administration. The United States, committed to curtailing the spread of nuclear weapons across the globe according to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA, P.L. 95-242) under Carter administration152, reacted to Vajpayee and Nawaz decisions of detonating of nuclear devices. A report of the Congressional Research Services (CRS), Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategies for South Asia, provided a glimpse of the US non-proliferation efforts and their South Asian directions prior to India-Pakistan nuclear tests.153

The report said that, in 1994, the Clinton administration emphasised the emanating threats of nuclear race from South Asia in order to keep both rivals states of subcontinent away from the nuclear arms race.154 However, the nuclear tests in May 1998 changed the

154 Ibid., 06
South Asian history by declaring the nuclear weapon statuses of India and Pakistan. The United States imposed economic sanctions on India and Pakistan and asked the two-sided governments to urgently subscribe to international non-proliferation regime renouncing the further tests.\textsuperscript{155} Clinton further pressured New Delhi and Islamabad to subscribe to CTBT which was plainly refused by both states. Strobe Talbott, the US Deputy Secretary of State said, the sanctions were necessary because it was an important part of the law and it would help in keeping disincentives for nations from exercising the nuclear option.\textsuperscript{156}

The post-nuclearized environment was the single factor affected the position of Islamabad in US South Asian calculations in 1998, but the change of government in 1999 further brought American sanctions for Pakistan.\textsuperscript{157} The Section 508 of the Annual Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act targeted Pakistan under the coup related to the economic sanctions in 1999.\textsuperscript{158} The Section 508 states that any fund under the foreign assistance prevented the American government to expand any financial assistance to a non-democratic country.\textsuperscript{159} The leading state authorities from Washington decided to continue sanctions until a democratically elected government has taken in Islamabad.\textsuperscript{160} An uncertain era of various sanctions abruptly turned the main course of Pak-US relations in 2001, when the tragic incident of 9/11 shaken traditional security apparatus of United States.

9. War against Terrorism

The hijacking of commercial passenger plans in the United States by terrorists and attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, were the symbolic attacks on American global standing.\(^{161}\) It was considered as an attack on the American global symbols of power and influence, and the attacks were planed and conducted by Al-Qaeda.\(^{162}\) President Bush called the 9/11 a dangerous day of American history which has raised a different and new kind of enemy against the United States.\(^{163}\) President Bush later called it an attack on the entire civilised world, and it required all states to be united against those who are looking for exporting terrorism, and who are providing shelter to them.\(^{164}\) A global alliance against terrorism was initiated by Bush, and the American call of a united alliance gained momentous support across the world. On the three month anniversary of 9/11, 120 nations including India and Pakistan supported American notion of a war on terror.\(^{165}\)

In order to effectively carrying the global agenda of combating terrorism, it was realized in the White House that the continuation of sanctions on the nuclear states of South Asia could not serve the security interests of Washington.\(^{166}\) The governments of India and Pakistan welcomed this thinking of President Bush and considered it a positive development. The fears of Washington attached to nuclear non-proliferation were subordinated to a global commitment to countering terrorism.\(^{167}\) An international coalition to fight against terrorism was came into being and New Delhi-Islamabad joined it. Secretary of State, Collin Powell


\(^{162}\) Ibid.

\(^{163}\) Ibid.


\(^{165}\) Ibid.


\(^{167}\) Ibid.
visited India in October 2001 and refreshed the Indo-US alliance under the war on terror by encouraging New Delhi to perform an active role in fighting against Al-Qaeda network.\textsuperscript{168}

In response to US call for joining its global anti-terror coalition, New Delhi portrayed itself the victim of terrorism in the world and showed its willingness to support US-led counterterror campaign.\textsuperscript{169} In a television message on September 14, 2001, Vajpayee announced its full support to the United States and emphasised a strong link of India with the international fight against terrorism.\textsuperscript{170} In response to the Indian claims and American offer for joining global war on terror, Musharraf government decided to join the United States. In his book \textit{In The Line of Fire: A Memoir}, Musharraf narrated that the Colin Powell on a telephonic conversation asked Musharraf “You are either with us or against us.”\textsuperscript{171} In the presence of emerging Indo-US relations, Islamabad decided to join the United States because it was considered “as natural to join the war against terrorism because Pakistan had been a victim of sectarian and external terrorism for years,” Musharraf further added in his memoir.\textsuperscript{172}

After 2001, a renewed aid package activated the economic assistance of Washington to Islamabad under greater counterterrorism mission and the United States started to provide economic assistance to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{173} A number of laws and amendments containing economic sanctions were waived by President Bush in 2001.\textsuperscript{174} Pakistan became a frontline ally in the US-led war on terror and the sanctions related to nuclear program were eased. Additionally,

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\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 292.
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\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 223.
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\textsuperscript{173} Saeeda Sultana et. al., op. cit., 33.
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the sanction linked to Musharraf coup were also alleviated and replaced with huge aid packages. The aid packages made Islamabad the third largest recipient of the US economic assistance after Israel and Egypt.175

War against terrorism proved to be the elements of considerable attraction for the United States, and forced Washington to closely work with Islamabad in its South Asian domain of foreign relations. American vested interests restructured Pak-US relations once again on the old patterns of Soviet-American tussle. A repeated version of history in Islamabad-Washington partnership declared Pakistan a major Non-NATO ally of the United States and a frontline states fighting against terrorism.176 The US Secretary of State under Bush administration clarified the status of Pakistan by saying, “We’ll designate Pakistan as a major non-Nato ally for purposes of our military-to-military relations.”177 A startlingly phase of Pak-US relations inaugurated in the post-9/11 world in which the two states stretched hands for more stronger and more cooperative relationship.178 The tragic event of the World Trade Center and the initiation of an American-sponsored war against terrorism considerably began a new phase of Islamabad-Washington diplomatic closeness in this way. The presence of Taliban in Afghanistan seemed to serve well the geostrategic designs of Washington towards South Asia by renewing its Cold War association with Pakistan.

A relaxed set of sanctions (Symington, Pressler, and Glenn) refreshed American support to Pakistan in return for Islamabad decision of joining the American terror-fighting global coalition. National security interests of Washington reordered American foreign policy towards international wave of terrorism. National Security Strategy (NSS), defining major

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177 Ibid.
national security concerns of the US published in 2001 and in 2006, outlined the primary goal in the fight against terrorism, which was “to establish a lasting normative prohibition on both states and the non-state actors against engaging in supporting the terrorist activities.” The US grand strategy for eliminating the global network of terrorism reordered the foreign relations of Washington and demanded their old allies to join American mission.

President Bush-initiated global campaign to eradicate the global culture of militancy increased American international engagement and declared Musharraf regime a supreme strategic supporter of Bush administration. The fight against transnationally functioning clandestine network of al-Qaeda encouraged Bush-Musharraf from Washington and Islamabad to review the bilateral diplomatic values of their nations respectively.

The reordering of US traditional foreign policy patterns in the response to 9/11 attacks placed Islamabad again a frontline state to fight for American interests in the region. American President asserted “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” He further asserted, “This is not, however, just American fight and what is at stake, is not just America’s freedom, this is the world fight, this is the civilization fight.”

Pakistan, the only South Asian state in diplomatic connection with Taliban, decided to join Bush-initiated global alliance against terrorism. Consequently, President Bush relaxed sanction on Pakistan by signing a law waiving sanctions on October 2001 and made Islamabad again a recipient of American military and economic aid.

The US allies in the traditional East-West contest for expanding influence once again became good friends in the US-sponsored counter-terrorism fight. However, the frequent

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180 Ibid., 177.

drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan showed the diminishing role of Islamabad in the US strategic calculations. In the presence of counterterror operations conducted by Pakistan army to curb the terrorism from Pakistani soil, the American strike openly conveyed trust-deficit US behaviour to Islamabad.\footnote{Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, “Pakistan – US Policies on the ‘War on Terror’ and the Taliban: Allies at Loggerheads,” Pakistan Horizons 63, No. 02 (April 2010): 60.} The reinforcement of American interest on Pakistan under the war on terror fabricated an environment of demanding more cooperation in various fields. However, New Delhi’s role in the US Congress enticed the architectures of American foreign policy to merely not rely on Islamabad-sponsored counterterror operations.

President Musharraf while accepting the American-designed war on terror stated, “Our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and forth our Kashmir cause.”\footnote{Muhammad Ilyas Ansari and Iram Khalid, “An Appraisal of Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy During War on Terror,” A Research Journal of South Asian Studies 31, No. 01 (January – June 2016): 24.} The Indian lobby further created complication about the nuclear status of Islamabad by influencing Washington to critically examine the safety and security standards of Pakistan nuclear program. In short, the cooperation in war on terror furthered the probable threats of nuclear terrorism to Pakistan instead of positively analysing Islamabad-backed counterterror efforts. The question of nuclear security placed the nuclear status of Islamabad at high levels of the critical congregation in the international community, exclusively by the United States.\footnote{Rolf Mowatt – Larsen, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism,” Arms Control Association, July 09, 2009, \url{https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/Mowatt-Larssen} (accessed on December 23, 2016).}

Indian PNE left Pakistan with an unquestionable security threat which not only endangered the strategic thinking of Islamabad but it also sparked the nuclear exertions in Pakistan. The self-restraint posture adopted by Islamabad ended in 1998 when the nuclear weapon tests conducted by Vajpayee government intensified the regional security environment of South Asia. The changings in the international security environment,
however, altered the US defence and foreign policies and forced Washington to include Pakistan in its global mission of combating terrorism. The principle developments in the American strategic thinking structured the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was incorporated in the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) issued in 2001, showed American preparedness for nuclear politics. The reassessment of the threat perception and alternation in the traditional vision of strategic thinking in the Bush administration redefined the American foreign relations.

Under its greater vision of countering international terrorism, Washington realized the potential of Islamabad in its revised foreign relations particularity after the major terrorist attack on America. The US initiated global anti-terror efforts which enhanced the position of Islamabad in Washington. Immediately after 9/11 attacks, President Bush decided to root out the clandestine networks of terrorism and formed an international counterterror campaign. The American President launched a global campaign against terrorism and launched an international alliance against terrorism. In his Address to the Joint Sessions of 107th Congress, the American President designed a strategy for dealing the international wave of terrorism which has touched the American borders. President Bush called it a war between good and evil, and announced a strategy for invading Afghanistan along with Iraq. In order to cultivate a legitimate ground for invading Kabul, President Bush mentioned a report of CIA in which the director of American intelligence agency, George Tenant, assured to the President the presence of Osama Bina Laden in Afghanistan. It further verified a close association of Bin Laden to the ruling government in Kabul. The decision to invade Kabul was based on the nature of Washington-specific counterterror strategy, and a specific war

186 Ibid., 124.
187 Ibid.
against Al-Qaeda extended to Afghanistan. With the help of Islamabad, the Bush administration decided to launch a war on Afghanistan and proclaimed Pakistan a close ally in its war on terror.

10. Afghanistan Conundrum

The decision to include Afghanistan in the list of state sponsoring terrorism was taken by Bush administration as the President clearly mentioned in his address to the nation on September 11, 2001.\footnote{Address to the Nation on the September 11 Attacks, “Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush 2001-2008,” White House Archives, 57, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf (accessed on February 10, 2019).} From Oval Office, the American nation along with international community embraced a new policy of Washington for dealing the future threats of terrorism. The declaration of invading Kabul in order to prevent the roots of terrorism generally, and Al-Qaeda specifically, President Bush informed the world on October 07, 2001 the military strikes backed by the United States had been initiated.\footnote{Ibid., 75.} Washington planned to destroy the terrorist training camps decisively and their military installations from Afghanistan. The Taliban regime from Kabul is supporting Al-Qaeda parallel to maintaining the militant camps of Taliban, observed by Bush regime. It was called “Operation Enduring Freedom”, and it was primarily initiated to precisions freedom of American nation in addition to defending the freedom across the globe, mentioned by President Bush.\footnote{Ibid., 76.}

The success of Kabul-specific Operation Enduring Freedom was heavily dependent on Pakistan because General Musharraf declared his support to America-sponsored counterterror alliance and joined the US-led war on terror. While sharing its borders with Afghanistan and establishing Taliban for the anti-Soviet fight under Islamic Jihad during the
Zia regime, the significance of Islamabad raised before Bush administration. This 43rd President of the United States made Pakistan a frontline state in war on terror and realized the strategic potential of Musharraf regime in dealing with Kabul.\textsuperscript{191} In this way, the two states emerged in a close alliance once again on Afghanistan and the leaders of both nations accepted again the irrefutable reality of their close interaction.

The war on terror began an attack on the strategic positions of Taliban in Afghanistan with the help of Musharraf regime. Pakistan’s emerged as a strong supporter of American anti-terror efforts by launching an operation against Taliban and their ideological supporter (Al-Qaeda) parallel to the US-led NATO troops. As a neighbouring state of Afghanistan, Pakistani operation in the seven tribal areas (known as agencies) under the Federally Administrative Areas (FATA) proved to be greater support for the United States.\textsuperscript{192} The resistance to the US operation from Afghan soil was equally pressed from Pakistani side due to the critical nature of Pak-Afghan border. The border known as Durand Line remained critical between Islamabad and Kabul throughout the history due to its geographical nature. This border has divided the ethically common Pashtuns between two states.\textsuperscript{193} A close Pak-US coalition is linked to Islamabad security more, because the Pak-Afghan border became a serious security issue for Musharraf government. An overwhelming wave of security threats emerged from Durand Line in the post-9/11 scenario when Washington started responding to the Taliban’s regrouping against American counterterror operations. It further hampered the conventional security mechanism of Islamabad for managing internal security issues. A massive wave of suicide bombing across the country pushed Pakistan into serious security

problems and caused economic crisis, societal unrest, and political instability in the country.\textsuperscript{194} The worse impacts of this anti-terror operation of two states disturbed the ideological foundations of Pakistan by deteriorating the religious identity of Islamabad.\textsuperscript{195}

The reason to align with Bush regime for countering terrorism was rooted in a conversation between Musharraf and Bush in which the American President provided a policy choice to Musharraf. It was an offer to Musharraf government for joining and supporting the US way of combating terrorism.\textsuperscript{196} Another telephonic talk between Musharraf and the American officials mentioned “it would bomb Pakistan into the Stone Age if it did not support the US in the Afghan war.”\textsuperscript{197} The need of Islamabad’s support in attacking Kabul was the need of time for Bush administration because the American intelligence agency described FATA, the homeland for Pashtun tribes, is the most dangerous area and a potential threat for the United States internal security.\textsuperscript{198} The Pak-Afghan border became a potential area for American targets because it was believed that a wave of resistance against Coalition forces may appear from this bordering.

CIA began aerial strike through drones in the areas neighbouring Afghanistan in 2004.\textsuperscript{199} The drone strike caused hundreds of civilian casualties as “collateral damage” and it was accepted as an appropriate counterterror strategy.\textsuperscript{200} In May 2009, Leon Panetta, CIA director claimed the drone strike as the only efficient counterterror measure to confront or try to disrupt the Al-Qaeda leadership.\textsuperscript{201} In response to the aerial strike through predator drones,

\textsuperscript{194} Pervaiz Nazir, “War on Terror in Pakistan and Afghanistan: Discursive and Political Contestations,” \textit{Critical Studies on Terrorism} 03, No. 01 (April 2010), 65.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 71.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{198} Brian Glyn Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign,” \textit{Studies in Conflict & Terrorism} 33, No. 10 (March 2010), 871.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., 872.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 877.
the mainstream religious parties under Musharraf administration started raising voice against Pakistan’s involvement in US-initiated operations in tribal areas alongside the Afghan border.

The growth of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in Pakistan and its alliance with Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) created a new government in 2002, but later the MMA stood against PML-Q’s decision of joining the US. Consequently, it resulted in a widespread wave of anti-American sentiments across the Pakistan. Instead of facing countless challenges at internal and external fronts after participating in Bush-initiated war on terror campaign, the demands of “Do More” started encircling Islamabad. President General Musharraf tried to convey the level of sacrifices of Pakistani nation to the mainstream American leadership. The claims of United States did not only underestimate the role of Islamabad in the ongoing war against terrorism, but it also communicated US unsatisfactory approach for dealing Pakistan. This disappointing American approach attached a stigma to the national image of Pakistan, and the international community started believing the country of Musharraf as a dangerous place in the world.

While fighting with different terrorist groups, Washington tried to create peace in Afghanistan which ultimately will provide a reasonable exit to United States from Kabul. The task of maintaining a terror-free atmosphere on Afghan land by preventing the presence of Taliban has become a difficult task for Washington. An alliance between two governments brought the leaders from Washington and Islamabad on Afghanistan problem, and the both

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203 Saima Ashraf Kayani., op. cit., 11.
205 Ibid.
sides realized the potential of each other which is necessary to stabilize Kabul politically.\textsuperscript{207} A peaceful and stable Afghanistan is an ultimate goal of United States, but the achievement of this goal is more harder than invading Afghanistan. In the presence of a downward spiral of Pakistan-United States relations, the question of peace is difficult to address.

As the endgame is approaching, American officials are now attempting to embrace the notion of a stable Afghanistan based on a developed society free from terror. The vision of a terror free Afghan land is carrying an ambiguous approach of the US. The approach based on a principle of carrying war by increasing or sustaining the presence of American forces combined with the ambition of building of peace by preventing terrorist installations proved counterproductive.\textsuperscript{208} A peaceful Afghanistan is in favour of Islamabad and Washington accepted by both states, and the leaders of both state are trying to maintain peace and stability in Kabul. Islamabad is expecting to improve its trade and diplomatic relations with Kabul and the pursuit of this ambition is highly dependent on a peaceful Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{209} But the question of a peaceful Afghan land is highly linked to the US role in Afghanistan. The maintenance of peace on Afghan land is difficult to achieve without the involvement of Islamabad and it has been accepted by Washington.\textsuperscript{210} The leading decision makers of Bush administration have endorsed the essential involvement of Pakistan in addressing the Afghan problem. American former ambassador to Afghanistan also highlighted the significance of Pakistan in US fight against terrorism. An autobiographical account of Zalmay Khalilzad \textit{The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My Journey Through a Turbulent World} (2016)

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\item \textsuperscript{207} Huma Yusuf, “Conspiracy Fever: The US, Pakistan and Its Media,” \textit{Survival} 53, No. 04 (August/September 2011), 112.
\item \textsuperscript{208} Astri Suhrke, “Waging War and Building Peace in Afghanistan,” \textit{International Peacekeeping} 19, No. 04 (August 2012), 478.
\end{itemize}
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discussed his efforts in keeping Islamabad active in American counterterror efforts. While working under Trump administration, Zalmay Khalilzad, emphasized the need for gaining active cooperation from Pakistan in Afghanistan. Khalilzad, US diplomat and special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation, suggested to Trump administration the cooperation of Islamabad could lead decisively America towards a peaceful Kabul.

Apart from involving in Afghanistan for eradicating the roots of terrorist and their mainstream leadership under Al-Qaeda and Taliban, the major shift in the American grand South Asian strategy occurred after 1998. After nuclearization, the India-Pakistan hostility forced Washington to increase its South Asian engagement. In this way, war on terror and nuclearization of region, are the two main driving forces behind the contemporary American role in the nuclearized subcontinent. It is more appropriate to say, these two factors completely turned American attentions towards South Asian region.

11. Post-Nuclearized South Asia

The role of nuclear weapons, viewed by Pakistan as an ultimate source of tackling effectively the aggressive Indian ambitions, changed the strategic environment of South Asia. Following Indian nuclear aspirations, Islamabad tried to maintain its deterrence against New Delhi in 1988 when the Vajpayee government decided to detonate the nuclear devices. The five nuclear weapons test under the Pokhran-II conducted by Indian army at Pokhram Test

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Range in May 1998.\textsuperscript{213} The explosion at Pokhran forced the Nawaz government to declare its nuclear weapon status. The signing up to the global nuclear politics by the South Asian neighbouring states altered the post-Cold War role of the US in the region. Pakistan responded to Indian denotation of nuclear devices by testing its conducting its own tests and secured its nuclear status independently. The decision of Nawaz government for responding Vajpayee in the nuclear domain made Pakistan the first Muslim nuclear weapon state of Muslim world and second in the South Asian region. The security interest of Pakistan, in the presence of asymmetrical conventional balance, forced Islamabad to overcome its disadvantageous position vis-à-vis India. The pursuit of a strong security and appropriate survival in the region, while preserving the balance of power in South Asia, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif decided to announce the nuclear status of Islamabad globally.\textsuperscript{214}

The decision of Nawaz government to acquire nuclear weapons status in order to balance the Indian nuclear capability provoked the United States. Proponents of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime generally, and the United States, specifically started focusing the Indo-Pak nuclear arms race. The nuclear politics in South Asia again became a central theme of American foreign policy, and a central point of gravity in the international non-proliferation debates. Under the anti-terror alliance with the United States, the economic and strategic assistance became critical in post-nuclearized South Asia. No doubt, the Bush regime extended economic and strategic aid to Islamabad by declaring Pakistan as a Non-NATO ally in 2004, but the renewed diplomatic ties began a new era of distrust by initiating an episode of drone strikes under the war on terror.

In post 1998 South Asia, nuclear Pakistan gained considerable support in American priorities. Prior to 9/11, Pakistan was under five types of sanction, but the initiation of the global war on terror waived sanctions on Pakistan.\textsuperscript{215} On the other hand, the strategic relations with India started in the Kennedy administration for enabling India to effectively fight against China in 1962 became a strong alliance in 2005 when Washington and New Delhi agreed on a civil nuclear deal triggered by the Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). The strategic partnership between both states convinced Americans to provide nuclear help to India against rising China which pushed Beijing towards Islamabad.

12. Indo-US Nuclear Deal and Pakistan

The element of trust-deficit eroded the foundations of Pak-US cooperation in 2005 when the joint Bush and Manmohan statements chalked out a new plan for the strategic relations by designing a nuclear deal. The unsafeguarded dimension of Indian nuclear program has acquired precious opportunity in the pursuit of strategic objectives against Pakistan.\textsuperscript{216} In 2007, the finalized draft of the deal declared India as a responsible nuclear weapon state which can separate its civilian nuclear reactor from military reactors and it will purely use American provided nuclear fuel for civilian purposes while placing its civil nuclear facilities under the IAEA.\textsuperscript{217}

The civil nuclear deal made India eligible for getting benefits from international nuclear market working under Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) further.\textsuperscript{218} In this way, nuclear India has become the only nation which qualified to modernize its nuclear program with the

\textsuperscript{215} “U.S. Legislation on Pakistan (1990-2004),” op. cit.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.
connivance of nuclear supplier group without becoming a member of NPT. The strategic partnership with Washington, hence, showed American willingness to help India in strengthening of its nuclear weapon status without accepting the norms of the global non-proliferation regime. A study by Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, *Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Altering Global Nuclear Order*, examined the impacts of New Delhi-Washington’s civil nuclear agreement on the international non-proliferation regime. While explaining the benefits of the American sponsored nuclear deal which placed New Delhi in an advantageous position, Dr. Jaspal highlighted statement of Prime Minister Manmohan in the Lok Sabha. Manmohan said the “nuclear agreement will end India’s nuclear isolation and apartheid.”

The signing of the nuclear deal, initiated by Bush-Manmohan diplomacy, was a major shift in American foreign policy towards New Delhi. The nuclear deal between New Delhi and Washington had eliminated Indian isolation from the international nuclear market. Section 123 of US Atomic Energy Act or commonly known as 123 Agreement primarily emphasized the formulation of bilateral relations for civil nuclear cooperation. It was an amended format of act to start nuclear trade with India. Indo-US strategic partnership undermined Pakistan’s significance in Washington’s strategic calculations.

Under the Hyde Act, passed by Congress in 2006, the US government permitted President Bush to negotiate and finalize a nuclear deal with its Indian counterparts. Therefore, the Hyde Act authorized the state officials to conclude a nuclear deal under 123

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222 Ibid.
Agreement with New Delhi. Mutual trust and cooperation increased by civilian nuclear cooperation enhanced the bilateral cooperation in diverse areas between both countries. The bilateral partnership of New Delhi and Washington had a worse impact on the geopolitical realities of South Asia in which the Indian-initiated nuclear race compelled Pakistan to consistently build its strategic muscles.

Pakistan was unable to principally oppose the deal, and facing the pressures of the American global non-proliferation campaign due to A.Q. Khan saga. Furthermore, White House did not intend to conclude a similar nuclear agreement with Islamabad because President Bush clearly stated in 2006 during his visit of South Asia that the “India and Pakistan were different countries with different needs and histories that were kept in view while designing American strategy.” Washington viewed New Delhi as a counterweight against rising China in the world politics. The exceptional nuclear behaviour of India, in this way, secured a nuclear agreement from America contrary to Pakistan and has become a gravitational point of American critical nuclear standards.

Such standards after upholding India started to reflect dichotomous principles. No doubt, the Indian strategic growth under an advanced nuclear program can empower New Delhi against Beijing, but it will simultaneously disturb the South Asian security environment in which Islamabad will try to secure every right to match its standing with India in regional politics of nuclearized subcontinent. American civil nuclear cooperation will further help India in becoming a regional power by stretching its strategic muscles against its neighbouring states, China and Pakistan especially. Moreover, the deal granted a waiver of

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226 Ibid.
the non-proliferation regime to India and enabled New Delhi to exceptionally participate in international strategic trade with various states, especially with the United States.

13. Estranged Pak-US Ties

The India PNE in 1974 brought an era of economic sanctions in the form of Glenn and Symington amendments in 1979. The era of sanctions brought further pressures after the nuclear explosions in 1998 but the American geostrategic interests relaxed the sanctions during and after the Cold War. The Afghan war and war on terror significantly forced Washington to ease the imposed sanction on South Asia. The phase of an estranged Pak-US ties started on the nuclear matters after the revelation of A.Q. Khan network in February 2004. The Strategic Dossier of IISS, *Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Network: A Net Assessment*, explains the A.Q. Khan story. According to the IISS study, the Iranian and Libyan nuclear programs declared the A.Q. Khan involvement in building their nuclear capabilities. The Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed his role in the clandestine activities regarding nuclear export on television, and apologized to the people of Pakistan on February, 2004. In his memoir, Musharraf discussed the American behaviour which was cemented in number of critical question about Pakistan nuclear program

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228 Ibid.


without concrete evidence prior to A.Q. Khan Affair.\textsuperscript{232} During his visit to the United Nations Summit on September 2003, Musharraf came to know the existence of A.Q. Khan Network.\textsuperscript{233}

On his return, Musharraf arranged a meeting with A.Q. Khan and “confronted him with evidence”, and after his apology, to the nation, this nuclear scientist was confined to his house and interrogated further.\textsuperscript{234} Another study of Abdul Sattar, \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy-1947-2009: A Concise History} narrated the clandestine network of Khan was international. A number of states from Europe, Asia, and Africa were involved in this proliferation network.\textsuperscript{235} Mainly the traders and manufacturers of Khan team were from “Britain, Switzerland, Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.”\textsuperscript{236} An Islamabad based academician, Rizwana Abbasi, in her research \textit{Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo: Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control Regime}, expounded that the personal interests and ambition of Dr. Khan led him to create an international network of likeminded individuals.\textsuperscript{237} The Khan’s association to Islamabad and his underground network let the international community to evaluate the nuclear capability of Islamabad critically.

Apart from A.Q. Khan episode, the leading state officials from Washington raised their concerns on several other incidents. The matter of Raymond Davis was another important point of confrontation between Pakistan and the United States in 2011. The issue attracted international community when the police department registered a case against Davis

\textsuperscript{232} Pervez Musharraf, op. cit., 289.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., 290-291.
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., 293.
\textsuperscript{236} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{237} Rizwana Abbasi, \textit{Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo: Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control Regime} (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012), 207.
for the killing of two Pakistani nationals on February 27, 2011. In response to the criminal charges on an American citizen, Washington tried to provide diplomatic immunity to Davis.

Davis was believed to be an active person of CIA and did not qualify for diplomatic immunity. In response to allegations of Pakistan government, the American embassy highlighted the diplomatic passport of Davis along with a valid Pakistani visa. The US embassy further mentioned in Davis case that the authorities of Islamabad were violating the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The completion of judicial process released Davis and appropriately permitted him to fly back to his country, but the incident of the former Special Forces soldier Raymond Davis degraded diplomatic ties of two countries. The confrontational matter of Davis was immediately eclipsed by Osama Bin Laden killing.

The Abbottabad operation was conducted by the United Nation Navy SEALs in the Abbottabad city of Pakistan on May 02, 2011. In the night, the US Special Forces entered 120 miles in Pakistan after flying from a nearby base located in Afghanistan and conducted the operation. The operation is given the coded name in the military jargon “Geronimo EKIA” (EKIA refers to Enemy Killed in action). The mastermind of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden was killed in the Air Force One jet on May 2, 2011.

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239 Ibid.
240 Ibid.
241 “Pakistan and the World (Chronology: January – March 2011),” *Pakistan Horizon* 64, No. 02 (April 2011): 105.
242 Ibid.
246 Ibid.
Laden (OBL) was coded name “Geronimo”, and after his death, the White House received a message “Geronimo KIA”. The death of Osama was confirmed by a television address of President Obama on May 02, 2011 in which he briefly recalled the history of 9/11 by sharing the details of US war on terror efforts. CIA under Leon Panetta, the director of CIA, took the task of the killing of Osama seriously keep it at top priority and eventually eliminated the international symbol of Al-Qaeda, according to Obama. Obama said, “Justice has been done” and the CIA eventually cornered the Osama successfully. The state officials from the United States accused Pakistan of harbouring and hiding the OBL in Pakistan, the charges were refused by the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari.

In a Washington Post article, President Zardari accused the United States for not cooperating in the OBL operation instead of having full cooperation of Islamabad to the international community generally, and Washington specifically. President Zardari also said that Islamabad took the war on terror as serious as Washington was taking, and recalled the price his country is paying while fighting a counterterror war along with the United States. The alleged claims of the international community worrying about the presence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan after OBL raid, was believed that the United States had acquired

248 Ibid.
250 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
the possible means to repeat a similar operation on the nuclear assets of Islamabad.\textsuperscript{255} Hence, a diplomatic gulf eroded the cooperative foundations between two-governments, and further fractured after the Salala check-post Incident.

On November 26 2001, a NATO helicopters attacked a military check-post at Salala, near Pak-Afghan border, left 24 soldiers dead while 12 injured.\textsuperscript{256} Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gillani, gave an emergency call for a cabinet meeting, and within few hour the decision to close the NATO supplies for Afghanistan was taken.\textsuperscript{257} General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the then Chief of Army Staff, condemned the incident and demanded an investigation.\textsuperscript{258}

Moreover, the state officials from Islamabad raised serious concerns and conveyed their apprehensions to Washington on an investigation report prepared by Brigadier General Stephen Clark.\textsuperscript{259} Pakistani authorities asked for the additional details from the American officials. The incident was considered as a violation of the US/ISAF mandate which is purely limited to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{260} The US Secretary of State in the Obama administration, Hillary Clinton, conveyed his apology message to Islamabad by saying “sorry” for the loss of military personals at Salala,\textsuperscript{261} but attack was considered to be a threat to the sovereign values of Islamabad, and endangered the integrity of Pakistan. In reaction to the Salala attack, the

\textsuperscript{258} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., 23.
Shamsi Airbase located in Baluchistan was vacated by the US forces, and Islamabad boycotted the Bonn Conference in 2001.\textsuperscript{262}

The year 2011 embraced a phase of mistrust and crisis in Pak-US relations, and on one hand the cooperative interaction between both governments started to get disturbed. On the other hand, Indian increasing significance in US South Asian policy coupled with its anti-Islamabad obsession effected the American engagement in the subcontinent. In this way, an active role of Islamabad in the war on terror was overshadowed by the White House. The demands of ‘Do More’ emerging from Washington undermined the cooperation of Islamabad in the global war on terror.\textsuperscript{263} The persistent claims of demanding Pakistan for cooperating more with United Sates to stop the ferocious wave of terrorism miscalculated the contribution of Islamabad in the global counterterror efforts.

\section*{14. Post-Nuclearized Indo-Pak Hostility}

The role of Washington in the post nuclearized subcontinent cannot simply be ignored in managing the conflict-ridden regional environment because the nuclear arms statuses of New Delhi and Islamabad in the presence of their protracted hostility enhanced the American engagement in South Asia. The American role in brokering of peace between India and Pakistan while diffusing of tension in the post nuclearized South Asia is unignorably important development.

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The first clash erupted between two nuclear arms states of subcontinent over the Kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir region in 1999 when the categorical denial of the direct involvement of Islamabad in the conflict annoyed India. Moreover, Pervez Musharraf, the then Army Chief of Pakistan showed his readiness for countering any aggression emanating from India. The role of Indian media importantly augmented tensions by negatively portraying Pakistan, and the voices for punishing Pakistan gained momentum across India. New Delhi believed that it was the planning of Islamabad for separating Azad Kashmir from its Indian occupied part. American President Clinton jumped into the crisis and initiated his role in the telephonic conversations with the prime ministers of both South Asian states.

Simultaneously, a resolution passed in the G-8 summit focused the Kashmir problem and emphasized the Kargil escalation. The personal involvement of President Clinton was considered to be an essential step for managing the Kargil issue by defusing the two-sided tensions of nuclear armed powers. It was an easy task for Clinton to manage the crisis because the United States already had maintained a team for negotiating any situation in the nuclearized subcontinent with India. The US consulted to the international community mainly Russia, China, Turkey, China, and the countries of Gulf region, it was an effort to discuss the matter with other nations. Washington started the meeting with Indian and Pakistani authorities because it was widely believed that the Kargil crisis contained sufficient potential to jeopardize the scope of regional stability, and such crisis could change the

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265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
268 Zaffar Abbas, op. cit.
269 Ibid.
271 Ibid.
existing status quo. Moreover, it could create a more dangerous situation of Pakistan’s internal security by rising the Talibanization. The leading officials of State Department accepted finally that all those who initiated fight at Kargil came from the Pakistani side, and this believe turned US policy against Islamabad. Eventually, Clinton urged Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for withdrawal and settled the Kargil issue, but the post-Kargil situation revealed a changed American behaviour for Pakistan.

On March 2000, Clinton arranged a visit to South Asia and hold a meeting with Indian and Pakistani authorities. President Clinton, during his visit, stayed five days in India and six hours in Islamabad. The discussion on the industrial development, economic cooperation, and the India diaspora in America remained the core points of various meetings of Clinton with Indian authorities. On the other hand, a short stay of Clinton in Islamabad focused Kashmir issue. It was a significant visit for India because President Clinton attempted to warm the Washington-New Delhi diplomatic interaction by omitting the bilateral estrangement of Cold War era. The leaders from both sides institutionalized their positions on various global issues. The interaction of two-sided leaders changed the history because the American authorities conveyed their intentions of keeping New Delhi in their South Asian priorities.

Apart from Kargil war, the border confrontation of 2001-2012 raised the tensions in the nuclearized subcontinent. It was a military standoff between New Delhi and Islamabad.

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273 Ibid., 61.
276 Ibid.
277 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
and continued from December 2001 to October 2002.\textsuperscript{280} In 2001, the conflict initiated from a terrorist attack on Indian parliament on December 13 following by an attack on Kashmir Legislature Assembly on October 01.\textsuperscript{281} In reaction to the Indian parliament attack, Indian Home Minister, L.K. Advani accused Pakistan of carrying the ferocious terrorist acts in India on December 18 2001,\textsuperscript{282} and the same day New Delhi launched Operation Parakram by deploying 800,000 soldiers at Pakistan-India border.\textsuperscript{283} The main mobilization of military forces along the border after the two terrorist incidents was eventually resolved by American involvement. Bush government pressured Musharraf to cease the cross-border terrorism and place the Jihadi elements under control.\textsuperscript{284}

No doubt, the attack of Indian parliament exerted international pressure on Islamabad Kashmir policy, but it portrayed India a victim of terrorism analogous to the United States.\textsuperscript{285} The President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, assured to the United States that he would carry actively the agenda of counterterrorism by not allowing terrorist to use the soil of his country.\textsuperscript{286} Islamabad was further forced to take tough steps in preventing all terrorist groups from Pakistani soil and Kashmir.\textsuperscript{287} On January 2000, New Delhi and the United States established U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Terrorism, and the representatives of both sides were agreed to accomplish the mission of counterterrorism.\textsuperscript{288} Consequently, the


\textsuperscript{283} P.R. Chari et. al., op. cit., 153.

\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., 159.

\textsuperscript{285} Sanam Noor, “Pakistan-India Relations and Terrorism,” \textit{Pakistan Horizon} 60, No. 02 (April 2007): 71.

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid.


terrorist attacks on Indian parliament resulted in a closer New Delhi-Washington interaction and pushed Islamabad into critical circumstances.

Another incident of terrorism diverted the critical cannons of the hawkish leadership of New Delhi towards Islamabad on November 26 2008, when a wave of terrorist incidents encircled India. A number of sites of Mumbai including a Hotel, Cinema, Café, Community Centre, and a College coupled with famous Taj Mahal building were targeted. Mumbai, the capital city of Maharashtra, shocked entire India; and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh directed the Indian anger toward Islamabad because Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) discovered the associations of terrorists to Pakistan.

The Bush administration condemned the tragic incident and announced his support to Manmohan Singh for the investigation of Mumbai incident. Moreover, President Bush also directed the American state and defence departments and main federal agencies to provide every essential help along with human expertise for dealing Mumbai tragedy. The US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, urged the Zardari government to cooperate the Manmohan regime in finding the responsible elements of the Mumbai terrorism. Eventually, a Pakistani-born Ajmal Kasab was identified as responsible along with an

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290 Ibid.
291 George Perkovich and Tobby Dalton, Not War, Not Peace: Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016), 01-02.
293 Ibid.
international network of America and Canada based individuals.\textsuperscript{295} Kasab was jailed and later hanged in Pune jail on November 12, 2012.\textsuperscript{296}

The US-sponsored global war on terror and its South Asian directions fascinated India and Pakistan, and the two-sided governments joined the US counterterror alliance. A subsequent incident of 9/11 in the nuclearized subcontinent affected the significance of Pakistan in broader framework of American South Asian policy. Contrary to Islamabad, New Delhi emerged not only a close partner of Washington in its anti-terrorist campaign but it also became a close strategic partner of the United States. The ongoing American South Asian policy under Trump administration significantly altered its conventional patterns.

Trump strategy for dealing Afghanistan and South Asia maintained new paths in August 2017.\textsuperscript{297} By emphasizing Afghanistan, President Trump opposed the idea of “hasty withdrawal” which will create a vacuum, and let the terrorist organizations to fill it.\textsuperscript{298} He further called Pakistan along with neighbouring Afghanistan a place of 20 American-designated terrorist organization.\textsuperscript{299} By slightly appreciating the efforts of Pakistan in the war on terror, Trump administration marginalized Islamabad-specific counterterror operations. President Trump said, Pakistan often provided “safe heaven to agents of chaos, violence, and terror.”\textsuperscript{300} He further mentioned the threats of a major clash between nuclear armed India and

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\textsuperscript{295} “Mumbai Terror Attacks Fast Facts,” CNN, December 12, 2017, 
\textsuperscript{296} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{297} White House, Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, August 21, 2017, 
\textsuperscript{298} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{299} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{300} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
Pakistan. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America further cleared Washington South Asian policy in December 2017.\textsuperscript{301}

The National Security Strategy (NSS) focusing South Asian composes analogous analysis to Trump speech of August 2017. The NSS mentioned the threats of terrorism the United States is facing from Pakistan, and the Indo-Pak hostile relations could cause a nuclear exchange which is a key concern of diplomatic attention.\textsuperscript{302} While defining the priority actions of Washington, the NSS treats India as a strategic partner, and the United States is intended to support India in Indian Ocean security on one hand.\textsuperscript{303} On the other hand, the Trump administration is not interesting to develop a partnership with Pakistan and more committed to pressing Pakistan on counterterror issues.\textsuperscript{304} The State Department under Trump administration is persistently evaluated the role of Islamabad in war on terror on critical ground. Parallel to accepting Pakistan a key ally in the US-led counterterror campaign, the leading policymakers of Trump regime are failing to appreciate Pakistan.\textsuperscript{305} In order to overcome the widening gaps in diplomatic relations of countries, US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, visited Pakistan in September 2018.\textsuperscript{306} The Secretary of State was determined to discuss the Afghan peace issue with the Prime Minister Imran Khan. Prior to Pompeo visit, various statements of President Trump undermined Pakistan’s counterterror efforts. Washington’s alleged claims proclaimed Pakistan as a “terrorist heaven”,

\textsuperscript{302} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{303} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{304} Ibid.
by Bruce Riedel at Brookings.\textsuperscript{307} In this way, the contemporary patterns of US South Asian policy explicitly treated India as a close friend and strategic partner unlike Pakistan, and critically degraded the position of Islamabad in the region.

15. The US and South Asian Regional Order

South Asia is a region suffering from enduring rivalry and perpetual tensions between India and Pakistan. The region remained a tug of war under the global bipolar division during the decades-long capitalist-communist rivalry. A combination of complex alliances during the Cold War era emerged from this region and the great powers persistently tried to influence this region by preventing the role of counterbalancing forces.\textsuperscript{308} An ending race to dominate the world politics by expanding the sphere of influence remained a central theme of Cold War politics. An appropriate prevention of counterbalancing role of states was the gravitational feature of international system during the US-Soviet competition. This competition of two great powers affected the traditional security apparatus of various regions, including South Asia. The dominating patterns of foreign policies emerging from two centres of powers tried to regulate the hostile political features of India and Pakistan. A dramatic change in the end of Cold War with the demise of Soviet Union from international system provided sufficient space to US for influencing the world politics. This unipolar dimension of global politics permitted Washington to increase its engagement particularly in South Asian region.\textsuperscript{309}

As the end of post-Cold War era is approaching. The international system progressing under American unipolar values has started embracing the changing dynamics of world


\textsuperscript{308} Shamshad Ahmad, “Imperatives of Peace in South Asia,” \textit{Cambridge Review of International Affairs} 15, No. 02 (2002), 313.

\textsuperscript{309} R.S. Siwach, “The U.S. Post-Cold War Diplomacy in South Asia,” \textit{International Journal of Asian Affairs} 16, No. 1/2 (June & December 2003), 123.
politics. No doubt, the absence of Soviet Union and its threats to South Asian subcontinent let United States to enhance its ties with New Delhi and Islamabad, but the territorial connections of this region with China and Russia always remain worrying point for the United States. Both biggest states of international system having communist political orientations contain sufficient potential to influence South Asian geopolitical configurations. So, the prevailing uncertainty in the regional security environment of South Asia augmented. It additionally permitted Washington to rationally consider the potential of India and Pakistan in its geo-strategic calculations.

Under the broader framework of war against terrorism, Musharraf’s decision of accepting US alliance on the Afghanistan issue declared Islamabad a close Washington’s partner globally. It became a privileged ally of Bush administration and globally proclaimed as a Non-NATO ally and frontline state in the war on terror.\textsuperscript{310} The initial knowledge of Pakistan regarding Taliban parallel to having a territorial border with Afghanistan raised significance of Musharraf regime before Bush administration. Moreover, President Bush sought to overthrow Taliban regime from Kabul and declared Islamabad a tactical partner of Washington analogous to India. New Delhi was considered a close strategic partner Bush regime. As the result of US increased interests in Kabul, an era of enhanced economic and strategic cooperation began between Pakistan and United States. The economic assistance of US focused five key areas: Economic development, agriculture growth, education reforms, improved health facilities, and improving energy sector. Additionally, a special economic assistance for the stabilization of less-developed areas which are awfully vulnerable for extremism was also included in the bilateral collaboration of two states.\textsuperscript{311} Apart from

\textsuperscript{310} A.Z. Hilali, Ibid.

civilian package, Washington began to provide security assistance to Islamabad which was an effort to strengthen the counterterror and counterinsurgency capabilities of Pakistan.312

President Trump decided to redefined the South Asian strategy of the US by reviewing the efforts of previous administrations. He defined three-prolonged objectives which were focused by predecessors, mainly Bush and Obama. First, the improving of conception of American interests in Afghanistan which are strictly inherited in engaging counterterror troops in Afghan land. The involvement of military in Afghanistan is not purely restricted to Taliban and Al-Qaeda, mentioned by Trump. Second, prioritizing the US cooperative relationship with Islamabad which will ultimately empower the two sided governments in abolishing the terrorist shelter points across Pak-Afghan borders. Third, improving Indian integration with the US which could play effective role in regional security calculus. Washington believes, the New Delhi can play a role of natural balancer against Beijing.313

In the South Asian region, Pakistan became a critical and essential ally of the US. The American goals of efficient prevention of terrorism, effective promotion of non-proliferation campaign, accurately stabilizing the region strategically, and implementing a durable peace in Afghanistan compelled the US foreign policy decision makers to add Islamabad in American South Asian policy.314 It inaugurated a new era of American engagement with Pakistan in which Islamabad became an important factor in the leading national security interest of America.315

312 Ibid.
314 “The United States in South Asia: The Pakistan Factor,” op. cit.
Presently, the Trump administration is determined to achieve the fundamental goals of US foreign policy towards South Asia where the hostile relations between two nuclear neighbours have reached at alarming level. Regarding Pakistan, the state officials under Trump are committed to enhance bilateral cooperation in the region while countering efficiently the threats of terrorism. The New South Asia Strategy of Trump announced in 2017 preferred to adopt a comprehensive approach for the fulfilment of its goal of countering Taliban insurgency and preventing its footholds from South Asia.316 With reference to dealing with Taliban militants, the main focus of Trump is on Afghanistan where the winning of war against terrorism is a challenging task. Islamabad is facing persistent pressure from US for its active cooperation in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, the New Delhi is receiving American instruction for enhancement of its investment in Afghanistan. Indian leadership has decided to play a significant role in the broader framework of American South Asian engagement.317

The central theme of American South Asian strategy revolves around Pakistan because the success of war on terror is highly linked to the nature of Islamabad’s engagement with the United States. With the ending of post-Cold War era, the main characteristics of US-South Asian relations realized the need of Islamabad as a cooperative ally in the region. White House further accepted the need of supporting and upholding Pakistan in the regional politics of South which could determine the future of Washington in nuclearized South Asia.318

317 Ibid.
15. Conclusion Analysis

The decolonized areas of British Empire, exclusively in the South Asian subcontinent, became a battleground for a proxy war of capitalist and communist forces immediately after the Second World War. The contesting ideological narratives of India and Pakistan pushed both states toward Washington and Moscow. India obsessed with anti-Pakistani aspirations and laced with the ambition for regional dominance preferred to stay in Moscow-supported periphery of Soviet Union which shifted Pakistan in American alliance spontaneously. The Islamic orientation of Islamabad foreign policy towards Muslim world fascinated the United States. Therefore, an era of common ideological threats emanating from the Soviet Union and India against the United States and Pakistan respectively shaped cooperative bounds between Washington and Islamabad. South Asia, as a part of American global strategy to deter communist expansion and Soviet plan for communist expansionism, became an integral part of global bipolar politics.

The combination of regional and global forces strongly affected the foreign values of both Islamabad and Washington. The changing regional and global circumstance resulted in troubled Pak-US relations. The quest of Islamabad to counter Indian conventional asymmetry laced with its regional hegemonic ambition in South Asian pulled Pakistan toward the United States. The maintenance of a balanced regional equation between India and Pakistan was the primary objective of Islamabad while establishing its diplomatic associations with Washington. The first meeting between Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and President Henary Truman laid the initial formalities for Pak-US diplomatic ties. The visit of first official delegation of Islamabad to Washington was sought to bring stability in the nuclearized subcontinent by communicating their American counterparts a vision of peaceful and stable South Asian.
The maintenance of stability in newly decolonized subcontinent demanded a larger role of Washington. The armed forces of Pakistan and political leadership of Islamabad along with an exceptional geostrategic position of Pakistan were considered significant geopolitical points of attraction for the US. Akin to Pakistan, India was considered equally important by leading US authorities. In 1949, an invitation of Truman to Nehru was merely an anti-Soviet move which sparkled tensions in emerging Pak-US relations. The government of Liaquat Ali Khan was consistent to generate a stabilizing force in the region by joining the US alliance. Such determinations of Pakistan resulted in cordial bilateral relations with America which ultimately made Pakistan dependant on the United States as stated by Dr. Adil Sultan. During an interview, Dr. Sultan (a visiting research fellow in the Department of War Studies-King’s College London) mentioned American South Asian policy which was more active in exploiting the dependence of Islamabad on Washington instead of fulfilling the major security concerns of Pakistan vis a vis India.319

The existence of regionally Offensive-Realist paradigm and its predominance in Indian strategic thinking became the principle driver of strategic mind-set of Pakistan which adopted a defensive approach to protect its evolving sovereign values and national integrity. On the other hands, Pakistan was viewed as an opportunity by US policymakers. The vicious hegemonic designs of New Delhi for the entire subcontinent jeopardized the existence of newly independent Pakistan after the British retreat. Therefore, the end of the Cold War and terrorist attacks of 9/11 showed dramatic changes in the US strategic calculations for South Asia generally, and for Pakistan particularly. The radical departure of the Soviet Union from world politics and the emergence of terrorism at global stage brought major changes in American foreign relations. Moreover, the consistently swelling nuclear capabilities initiated a global arms race which touched the strategic landscape of South Asia during the US-USSR

319 Author email correspondence, December 07, 2017.
confrontation. The intense era of US-Soviet arms race spread the notion of nuclear weapons and their deterring capabilities around the world. Eventually, the inflexible patterns of nuclear proliferation from the Cold War politics reached to the South Asian region in the end of Cold War.

In short, the US-sponsored security arrangements under multifaceted strategic partnership for India from Nehru to Modi has now shaken the traditional basis of Pak-US ties. America, the most allied ally in Asia, initiated political and military relations with Pakistan under the diplomatic fabric of both nations in the post-partitioned South Asian subcontinent. The post-partitioned South Asia left Pakistan with numerous surrounding problems sparked a quest for economic assistance along with strategic support to secure its stable position in the regional politics. The shared interests of both states for the effective security and stability of South Asia changed its pattern significantly in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 and post-nuclearized South Asia.

Presently, Pakistan is hanging between problems of two critical borders, Durand Line and Line of Control. The troubled eastern and western borders of the country are creating uncomfortable regional political order for Islamabad. The American presence in the region always preferred Pakistan with reference to Afghanistan. The major shift in the Pak-US relations recently occurred in the post 9/11 era when the Bush administration preferred Musharraf government for the promotion of its global counterterror campaign. Under Musharraf, the main security architectures of Islamabad launched an American-initiated global fight to prevent terrorism from South Asian region. The question of terrorism brought both nations closer and compelled Washington to support Pakistan in the region.

A large global wave of anti-Americanism cemented in an aggressive international antipathy towards American counterterror policies emerged generally from highly populated
Muslim countries. This wave swiftly encircled Pakistan and pushed the whole country into serious social, economic and political crisis.\textsuperscript{320} The loathed American reputation in Pakistan resulted in an annoyed Muslim emotionalism and it heavily disturbed the cooperative foundations of Pakistan-United States relations, because the civilian causalities as the result of drone strikes exasperated Pakistani society. In reaction, a mega collaboration of religious parties in Musharraf government decided to stand against Pak-US anti-terror alliance. The Washington-led intervention in Kabul let New Delhi to degrade the cooperative image of Islamabad in its fight against terrorism. Consequently, the Indo-US alliance started considering Pakistan a state harbouring terrorist installation in the region.\textsuperscript{321}

The Indian factor once again emerged as a main hurdle in Pak-US relations and Indo-US diplomatic ties reached into its zenith in the post 9/11 environment. The mainstream American leadership started looking towards Indian leaders after the demise of Soviet Union, and the post-Cold War international system forced Washington to realized Indian potential. The post-Cold War era compelled the US to achieve political, economic, and strategic benefits from India.\textsuperscript{322} A close strategic association of both nations hampered the traditional tactical foundations of Pak-US relations.\textsuperscript{323} A strategic closeness of New Delhi with the US further marginalized Pak-US alliance in Washington started ignoring Islamabad in the regional politics of South Asia. Thus, an overwhelming wave of multifaceted Indo-US nexus became a serious challenge for Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{321} Alexander Evans., op. cit., 68.
\textsuperscript{323} Ibid.
Chapter 03

Indo-US Strategic Nexus: Inception, Evolution, and Continuity

The diplomatic anthology of Indo-US multidimensional bilateral relations is commonly based on mutual interest and shared notions of the political systems, which is mainly inherited in their gigantic democratic setups. The shared values of multidimensional bilateralism encompass the areas of economic cooperation, strategic partnership and diplomatic convergence in the transforming international geopolitical affairs. The state officials from both sides seem to reap the benefits by ascertaining economic opportunities while crafting different avenues for a closer strategic relationship.¹ The mutual benefits are, in this way, rooted in a structural model of bilateralism which grants America the status of a great power in Asia generally, and an influential extra-regional player in South Asian politics specifically.

The Republic of India and the US viewed each other reluctantly in the post-decolonized subcontinent. The declension of the British Empire as a result of Second World War did not only grant independence to British India, but it also provided it apposite diplomatic ventures for maintaining of foreign relations independently. The British rule was over with the enactment of the Indian Independence Act of 1947 which evidently ended the colonial influence from the subcontinent and declared the independence of India, parallel to the creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947.²

On November 1 1946, the United States formally established an embassy in New Delhi. Apart from opening of American embassy in the subcontinent, the Truman administration supported the British partition plan. President Truman further recognized an in

dependant status of the Union of India on August 15 1947. India decided to adopt non-interference from emerging patterns of powers politics at the start of Cold War under non-alignment policy covered in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The first Prime Minister and most influential political leader of Indian history, Jawaharlal Nehru, envisioned the fundamental structure of Indian foreign policy. Soon after independence, the quest to Indianized the South Asian region, in this way, was introduced by Nehru who started to maintain the initial phase of Indian foreign relations with the great powers. Nehru attempted to place New Delhi in the great power politics which was an attempt of Nehru to gain maximum support from international community.

The foreign relations induced by Nehruvian ideology partially tied the diplomatic knot of India with the great powers, because the non-aligned position of Nehru stopped him from openly maintaining of close relations with two blocs of Cold War politics. It is widely believed in India that the initial thinking of defining non-aligned stance was based on two reasons. First of all, Nehru was mainly engaged in calculating the cost of defense spending by jumping into the East-West rivalry. Secondly, the Nehru government was greatly concerned with the protection of the newly achieved independence of India. Contrary to this thinking, Nehru decided to support Stalin after meeting with Truman in 1949. Eventually, the persuasion of the outsiders, hence, caused the regional imbalances of South Asia which were greatly inherited in the Indian strategic behavior for the neighbouring nations.

Formal foundations of a strategic partnership with the United States besides the Soviet Union began in 1962 as a result of McMahon line border clash with China. The help calls of

4 Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, “Explaining Sixty Years of India’s Foreign Policy,” India Review 08, No. 01 (January-March 2009): 06.
5 Ibid.
New Delhi to Washington against Beijing activated American India-inclined foreign policy. In other words, the Indo-China war over Tibet laid the initial foundations of Indo-US relations. The illicit desires for strategic cooperation were exposed under Indian intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), during the 1962 Indo-China war. A clandestine network of RAW on McMahon Line and its association with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) proved to be milestone between RAW and CIA. The intelligence communities of both states defined the basis of bilateral cooperation against common threats. A thin wave of distrust during the Cold war era damaged the bilateral relations. The two-sided leaders immediately realized prevailing trust-deficit environment and replaced it explicitly with the cooperation in political, economic and strategic dimensions. Thus, India and United States during 1962 Indo-China crisis accurately observed the potentials of each other. In this way, Nehru-driven non-alignment stance vanished gradually from Indian foreign policy while the mainstream leaders from New Delhi approved a plan of structural alignment with great powers.

Moreover, the post-Nehru era resulted in a principally modified and structurally aligned foreign policy of India.\(^7\) Apparently, it was the non-alignment stance that led India toward the maintaining of foreign relations with suitable partners. As discussed by a faculty member of the Department of National Security Affairs, US-based Naval Postgraduate School, Feroz Khan. Mr. Khan said, during an interview from Monetary, “it was, in fact, a policy of Indian nonaligned alignment which let New Delhi to cultivate a coalition of suitable partners.”\(^8\)

After the 1962 border clash with China, India observed Pakistan’s counterbalancing role against New Delhi more violently. The Sino-Indian crisis resulted in the improvement of

\(^7\) Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, op. cit., 08.
\(^8\) Interview with Feroz Khan, Islamabad, December 25, 2017.
bilateral understanding between Pakistan and China. Indeed, it was a frustrating development for India. The state officials from New Delhi obsessed with anti-Sino-Pak friendship preferred to turn the Indian foreign policy toward the United States. The hardliners from New Delhi decided to activate strategic connections with Washington against emerging anti-Indian alliances of the neighbouring states. Clash with China carried by a series of further military disputes resulted in 1967 (Nathu La and Cho La Incidents) and 1987 (Sumdorong Chu Valley) border differences. Beyond New Delhi, the American intelligence community was fully aware about the clandestine nuclear plan of India. A declassified document of CIA which was released in 2009, emphasized the same reasons in its assessment of India’s Nuclear Weapons Option. The document outlines the threats from China and maintained that its association with Pakistan was the key driver behind the nuclear aspirations of Indira Gandhi.

The nuclear desires of New Delhi were initially echoed by Nehru because, as the founding father of India, he was disappointed in the US liberalism towards the world particularly by the destruction of twin Japanese cities under American atomic attacks at the end of Second World War. He decided to initiate the nuclear journey of his country which would save the future generations of India, Nehru believed. Prime Minister Nehru was determined to create successfully a sense of nuclear-armed status in his nation. He believed that his country “would not miss out on the nuclear revolution” parallel to gaining the major

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11 Raj Chengappa, “Nehru and the Bomb: On Nuclear Weapons, Nehru Proved to be an idealist and a pragmatist. While he was dead against the bomb, he believed that when India called for a nuclear-free world, it must do so from a position of strength,” The Tribune, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20141116/ground.htm (accessed on January 25, 2018).
political, financial and military benefits in the international system.\textsuperscript{12} Jawaharlal Nehru accepted that the start of a nuclear program initially for peaceful purposes would be beneficial for India because it will enable New Delhi to independently use it for other purposes in future.\textsuperscript{13} A study of Zafar Iqbal Cheema \textit{Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development, and Implications for South Asian Security}; explained the role of Nehru in generating the idea of nuclear India in the newly independent subcontinent. The study of Cheema described the nuclear path of Nehru government as an “India’s doctrine of nuclear ambiguity” and the maintenance of such ambiguity was intentionally created in order to start a nuclear course of New Delhi.\textsuperscript{14}

The final phase of the Cold War witnessed the substantial interest in recognising the Indian economic and strategic demands in the regional and global affairs. With regards to Indo-US relations, the formal meeting between Nehru and Kennedy was considered as an important American diplomatic engagement in the South Asian affairs which continued in Gandhi era. The increasing bilateral cooperation was witnessed by the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD),\textsuperscript{15} formulated in the Reagan administration. The NSDD 147 described the “U.S. policy towards India and Pakistan” while discussing the importance of decolonized and partitioned subcontinent in the American global interests.\textsuperscript{16} This declassified document further focused the reduction of the Soviet military supplies to India parallel to taking advantage of the vision of Indira Gandhi for the United States.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Nationals Security Decision Directives (NSDD) were maintained and issued by President Ronald Reagan government. The purpose of NSDD was to adopt a consensus based official national security policy for the guidance of mainly defence, intelligence, and foreign policy establishments of the United States government.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
The visit of Ms. Gandhi on June, 1985 concluded a Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and India for the sharing of information technology along with discussing of the scope of business and commerce between two governments.\(^{18}\) In response to the communist-supported Islamic and Saur revolutions of Iran and Afghanistan respectively, Washington considered the geostrategic significance of South Asia. The enlarging influence of Soviet Union in Tehran and Kabul eventually resulted in closer Indo-US and Pak-US strategic relations. It was widely believed that the US economic and strategic backup to New Delhi was designed primarily to lure India into the capitalist bloc. During the Bush administration, such decisions were taken to increase Indian dependency on Washington. It was explicitly a conclusive American dream to dismantle the swiftly increasing Soviet sphere of influence over the South Asian subcontinent. Such American interest was considered to be an opportunity for New Delhi, which helped India in altering of its position in the last decade of Soviet-American confrontational politics.

During the Afghan war, the Indira Gandhi government viewed Kabul under Soviet occupation a problem for the South Asian region, because communist takeover in Kabul forced Reagan government to retaliate. American support to the opponents of Soviet influence in Kabul coupled with the US massive strategic supplies to Zia considered to be a significant factor which would leave destabilizing effects on the subcontinent, according to Gandhi.\(^ {19}\) Indira Gandhi had serious reservations on CIA’s engagement with Zia. However, ironically she had been seeking to create a respectable position in American alliance as witnessed by a declassified document of CIA *India-USSR: Strains in Relations*. The assessment of American intelligence agency revealed the Indian need for advanced

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

technology and computers systems from Western world generally, and the United States specifically.\textsuperscript{20}

To improve the Indian economy, the Gandhi regime was seeking American assistance for improving its military capabilities. Since the beginning of 1985, the military trade with the Soviet Union decreased from 80 to 55 percent and increased with West from 20 to 45 percent.\textsuperscript{21} On the basis of military modernization equivalent to economic progress, Gandhi started to believe that the Western nations including America, without the Soviet Union, were the natural partners of her country.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, an anti-Pakistani behavior of Gandhi increased with the emergence of Zia-Reagan meetings because she was trapped in Khalistan issue.\textsuperscript{23} The 1980 decade raised Sikh nationalist in Amritsar under a united independence movement, and New Delhi believed the foreign connections mainly from Pakistan were empowering the Sikh violent voices in Indian Punjab.\textsuperscript{24}

The desire of rolling back expected Indian opposition of US, and in the response of the Chinese alliance with Pakistan, created new avenues in the South Asian geostrategic culture where Indian hostility overtly showed an antagonistic behaviour of New Delhi against territorially adjoining nations. In this way, a new competition between nuclear-capable Beijing, Islamabad, and New Delhi provided sufficient chances for Washington to more intensely engaged in emerging South Asian nuclear order. An improved version of stubborn Indian diplomatic values observed by America as an appropriate platform for the projection of US vested interest in South Asia while fighting against the Soviet expansionism.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
Moreover, surprising the international community generally and the American intelligence services specifically, India’s completion of its initially peaceful and then military-oriented nuclear status sparked overtly an endless regional nuclear competition in South Asia. Although CIA assessed the nuclear preparation of New Delhi, it was their “inability to predict the actual event” as mentioned by a declassified memorandum of CIA.25 It was a highly confidential document which was prepared on July 18, 1974; and approved for release on November 21, 2006. In this way, the growth of nuclear order in decolonized subcontinent further remained unchecked by the United States initially, but later attracted Washington under its broader non-proliferation campaign.

The US nuclear sanction and its desperation for shoring up the nuclear non-proliferation regime toward Indo-Pak nuclear competition resulted in estranged bilateral values between India and the United States. The American attempt to prevent India from converting its peaceful nuclear technology into military dimension further disappointed White House and its global allies from a rhetoric commitment of Nehru for keeping his country away from nuclear weapons. The Indian defiance of keeping the options of nuclear weapons off from New Delhi triggered an unstoppable nuclear race in the subcontinent. Eventually, the Indo-Pak rivalry placed under nuclear domain by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in 1998. The final push in covert nuclear efforts of rival neighbours introduced by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee who attracted international strategic community toward subcontinent. The delusional and aggressive strategic thirst of the Vajpayee government announced the nuclear weapon capability of New Delhi in May 1998 and forced the Nawaz government from Islamabad to follow the suit.

In the post-nuclearized environment, the cooperative foundations of a joint venture between New Delhi and Washington appeared prominently at the international level in the form of the strategic cooperation which was relatively a minor development in the bilateral relations. However, the nuclear deal negotiated in 2005 symbolized huge impact on the South Asian strategic equation. India and America, located territorially on different continents ambitiously agreed on converging values by agreeing with each other on economic and security terms in addition to the signing of a civil nuclear deal. Traditionally, it was US determination to place India in the American alliance while keeping it out of Soviet orbit, which later resulted in another phase of growing cordiality in Indo-US relations.

The strategic foundations of the bilateral cooperation further improved when President Bush announced a joint cooperative agreement under the Strategic Framework in 2001.26 This initiative communicated the American way of supporting allies by helping them in the building of the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program.27 India viewed it as an appropriate opportunity to upgrade its strategic position in South Asia.28 President Bush and his India-inclined policy considered as an offer to Vajpayee. This offer further helped New Delhi in implementing its hegemonic designs against territorially adjoining nations mainly Pakistan and China.29 The addition of BMD to Indian arsenals affected negatively the South Asian strategic environment. However, the American commitments for supporting New Delhi enhanced the scope of two-sided strategic cooperation by empowering Indian navy.

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27 Ibid.
In 1992, the navies of the two countries started a series of annual exercises “Malabar”, and later added other nations (Japan) in their naval alliance. With the addition of Tokyo, the bilateral naval alliance became trilateral in 2007. The annual exercises Malabar further augmented the significance of India in White House, during Obama administration. President Obama started to view Indian role in Asia, the Indian Ocean and beyond, as mentioned in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR especially highlighted the area of maritime cooperation and the role of Indian navy in it. Hence, a dream of New Delhi for dominating the territorial politics of South Asian did not only remain to the regional geopolitical domain. The leading security architectures of New Delhi started thinking of asserting Indian influence in the maritime politics of Indian Ocean. An Indian desire to dominate the territorial and oceanic politics of South Asia started receiving substantial support of United States.

The promotion of the US global non-proliferation norms by advocating the universal application of nuclear non-proliferation regime became a subsequent feature of American foreign policy in the eve of Bush-originated counterterror campaign in the post-9/11 world which changed Indian position dramatically in American foreign policy. The global strategic partnership estranged frequently the state authorities from both sides over various issues. Especially, the estrangement after distancing New Delhi and Washington on nuclear issues recovered. It became more evident when, in 2005, Bush and Manmohan concluded a long-term strategic cooperation particularly for the extended defense relations. Eventually, June 2005 changed histrionically the bilateral cooperative scenarios concealed in upgraded formats.

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31 Ibid.
33 Ibid.,
of defense partnership which defined the scope of various cooperative fields between the two
governments in the domains of maritime, humanitarian, and counterterrorism collaboration.\textsuperscript{34}

After concluding the deal for civil nuclear cooperation, a series of strategic dialogues
were finalized between two governments. Bush-Singh diplomacy conducted several meetings
and increased the strategic cooperation between their governments. Washington viewed India
as a potential ally in South Asia and a close friend in the world politics. It is widely believed
that the Hindu leadership under Manmohan regime can be appropriate in ensuring American
strong position in world politics. Moreover, American support of Indian permanent seat in the
UN Security Council, coupled with advocating the New Delhi’s inclusion in Nuclear Supplier
Group (NSG), further deepened the two-sided cooperation in the existence of an unwinnable
nuclear contest in subcontinent. This contest had its foundation in the Nehru doctrine, which
was later pursued and consolidated by Indira Gandhi, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan
Singh. These overtures of New Delhi further enhanced Indian relevance in American foreign
and strategic calculation in particular and strengthened Indian position in regional and global
politics in general.

The central theme of this chapter is to analyze the different trends occurred in Indo-
US bilateral ties contrary to Pak-US relation. Along with analysing the reasons for the shift in
US policies from Pakistan to India, this chapter is an endeavour to comprehend the role of
actively engaging American diplomatic forces in the South Asian region parallel to
empowering the role of New Delhi in regional and international politics. The historical Indo-
Pak quarreling and antagonistic bilateral values, in the presence of American involvement,
have become a more austere reflection of South Asian politics. Apart from its disparities
inherited in Russo-Indian cooperation and alliance with Pakistan in the Cold War era. How

\textsuperscript{34} New Framework for the India-U.S. Defence Relationship, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis,
Indo-US strategic partnership gradually increased is the fundamental argument of this chapter. The US shift in regional orientations of its South Asian policy for Indo-Pak turbulence under nuclear shadows paints a different picture in which an appropriate understanding of Indian strategic thinking is essential feature before debating the further aspects of Indo-US multidimensional cooperation.

1. Indian Strategic Thinking

The territorial dissonances of India against neighbouring nations theoretically is Realist-driven strategic circles of New Delhi. A complex record of its territorial disputes and a long history of conflicts, in which India remained obsessed with regional dominance always tried to acquire the support of great powers exclusively located outside the region. The internal incoherent social attributes combined with external threats created a circle of complex strategic dilemmas for the initial leadership of India after independence in 1947. The demoralized Indian political interaction cemented in hawkish attributes for adjacently bordering countries forced the first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to polish the strategic muscles of his country by pursuing a policy of structural alignment with superpowers. Indian objective to prevent the powerful status of its neighbouring states remained a fundamental feature of Indian strategic thinking. While actively securing the economic and strategic supplies of great powers under the rubric of non-alignment, New Delhi attempted to erode the support of the international community for other states of South Asia, particularly Pakistan.

The prevention of external support for territorially adjacent nations to New Delhi was considered a threat to India. The declining role of British imperial forces in the post-World War era granted a self-governing rule to India and placed the secular nation of subcontinent under Premier Nehru. Termination of the British colonial rule in South Asia resulted into a
resolution expressing the aspiration of Indian National Congress for the enhancement of cooperative relations with neighbouring nations in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{35} Critically looking at the imperialist armies, the Congress maintained its anti-aggression stance to support the role of nationalist forces during the 1930s.

Gradually, a wave of decolonization provided independence to India and let the first government under Nehru acquire prominently an autonomous place in world politics.\textsuperscript{36} In this way, the journey to describe a coherent strategic uniqueness and an exceptional identity started after the independence because India, as a part of the third world, was ambitious to acquire an important place in world politics.\textsuperscript{37} The desire to become a part of the modern world by separating it from the third world led the initial leadership of India to prefer unique policy. The non-alignment policy was adopted only to communicate a different position of India in world politics contrary to other nations of the third world.\textsuperscript{38}

In the post-independence period, the Nehruvian political notion dominated the Indian politics. The political attributes of first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, considered to be one of the prominent fathers of Indian Independence Movement. He possessed firmly an extrusive place in pre and post decolonized or partitioned India.\textsuperscript{39} The political passion and administrative notions of Nehru were largely welcomed and heavily embraced by several independent nations. The vision of a newly independent India was structurally organized to promote internationally by the initial Hindu leadership. The Nehruvian dominated foreign policy of India settled a stage for modern India, and it unequivocally outlined the foreign


\textsuperscript{38} C.P. Bhambri, “India’s Foreign Policy,” Social Scientist 10, No. 10 (October 1982): 55.

\textsuperscript{39} Suranjan Das, op. cit., 02.
relations, diplomatic strengths, and economic reforms of New Delhi. The prevalence of Nehru ideology in New Delhi shaped the initial formats of Indian political infrastructure.

The expansion of Indian army for the maintenance of Indian dominant position coupled with consistent revitalization of foreign policy based on necessary changes for fulfilling of strategic demands of India was an attempt to make New Delhi as an epicenter of international relations. The decisions to attract the major powers for empowering the status of India in the regional politics echoed the theoretical strings of Indian strategic greasepaint. The ambition to persuade the bordering nations swelled up Indian Armed Forces abnormally, and constructed unconventionally the India foreign relations of India with great powers in opposition to bordering states.

In this way, the main mechanism for bilateral coordination with powerful states after immediately securing an independent status formulated the Indian foreign policy. Hence, Nehru’s non-aligned policy was not purely a neutral stance of India. The non-aligned stance was preferred by Jawaharlal Nehru only to prevent the foreign intervention in Indian internal affairs on one hand. Nehru sought to acquire an influential role of his country in the international system on the other hand. Hence, an astute way of placing India in the power politics of the international system was introduced by Nehru which later became Nehruvian Internationalism.

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40 C.P. Bhambri, op. cit., 52.
42 Bhikhu Parekh, “Nehru and the National Philosophy of India,” Economic and Political Weekly 26, No. 1/2 (January 5-12, 1991): 43.
43 Ibid.
By staying partially in the Soviet camp and frequently pursuing American assistance led India to strongly fight two-front wars.\textsuperscript{45} The security threats posed by China and Pakistan proved to be two main strategic drivers of Indian strategic thinking. Indian predominant ambitions to the undue partition of the subcontinent by negating the very legitimate creation of Pakistan, ideologically a Muslim state, laid the foundations of its modern strategic thoughts. Nehru and his daughter, later Prime Minister Indira Gandhi incorporated such strategic attributes to the foreign policy of their country which initiated an unending confrontation with Islamabad and Beijing.\textsuperscript{46}

In order to meet its strategic goals by implementing an anti-neighbourhood policy, Nehru selected the Soviet Union as a guarantor of Indian strategic interests. The Indian ambition to isolate Pakistan diplomatically resulted into acceptance of American role in defeating the communist powers under Kennedy administration. Indian quivering commitments to the Soviet Union and America simultaneously was a deliberate endeavour to protect the greater Indian interests in South Asian and the Indian Ocean.

Fighting with Pakistan and China started increasingly to reflect the belligerent formats of Indian foreign policy. Such behaviour resulted in a competition with the regional and extra-regional states. It led New Delhi to fight with the neighbouring countries which caused three wars with Pakistan (in 1947, 1965, and 1971) and one with China (in 1962). Combination of the regional and global struggle for power made India more vulnerable and inadequately more dependent on outsiders. The politics of Nehru for the defence of Indian national interests led his nation toward an abnormal growth of conventional and nonconventional armed capabilities. It was a strategic formula for upgrading Indian strategic muscles.


\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., 49.
The treaty to define the boundaries between the British India and China was signed in Calcutta on March 17, 1890\textsuperscript{47} over the areas of Tibet and Sikkim. This instrument became a confrontational point between India and China after the British colonial retreat. The clash over the conflicted areas erupted from the Tibetan uprising of 1959, which converted into a war between Beijing and New Delhi. The war between the neighbouring states started in July 1962 and ended in November 1962 with Chinese unilateral ceasefire.\textsuperscript{48} The detail of the Sino-Indian border clash over Tibet is discussed in the later part of this chapter. In order to resolve the Sikkim problem, the government of India signed a treaty with Tashi Namgyal, the Maharaja of Sikkim, in 1950.\textsuperscript{49} The thirteen articles of the treaty declared Sikkim a protectorate state of India.\textsuperscript{50} Sikkim after facing several political crisis became the 22\textsuperscript{nd} Indian state in April 1975.\textsuperscript{51} This Indian annexation of Sikkim showed Indian desire of expanding its influence over other states which was not acceptable by its neighbouring states.

The Nehru government, which was diplomatically weak, failed to invent friendly connections with China and Pakistan. The rejection of ostensibly prevailing utopian fundamentals of Nehruvain policy of neutrally formulating foreign policy of India lost its significance in the East-West division of international relations. Apparently, it was the desire of Nehru to proclaim Indian neutral stance in the world politics. The strategic autonomy of India compromised noticeably before the growing economic needs of the newly independent country. The subsequent decades of independence led Nehru government to pursue a policy of diplomatic cooperation with developed countries. The maintaining of high diplomatic


\textsuperscript{49} “Indo-Sikkim Treaty”, \url{http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/150445/16/16_appendix.pdf} (accessed on January 26, 2018).

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
position in the international community disturbed the foundations of Indian neutrality. An overt design of the strategic bilateralism with the US, similar to Pakistan, became a permanent feature of the Indian foreign relations after the end of East-West hostility. In this way, post-Cold War era combined with post-9/11, and post-nuclearized South Asia firmly placed India under American influence.

The nuclear-armed India and Pakistan were heavily involved with the United States by institutionalizing their bilaterally equipped strategic connection. Such bilateralism had resulted in the growing New Delhi-Washington and Islamabad-Washington interactions. The Indian desires of securing its status of a regional hegemon inherited in the Indian hawkish strategic thinking. The Indian strategists convinced the US to view India as a rising power in the region which can comradely serve the US interests by counterweighting anti-American Asian powers. Contrary to the traditional reluctant aligning bilateral diagrams of both government, the recent phase of updated relations upgraded the reciprocal fundamentals of political, economic, security, and cultural values. A well-calculated American foreign policy based on geopolitical standards desired to keep India in its close alliance and thereby Washington is committed to supporting New Delhi in world politics beyond the limits of the decided strategic conglomerate. The US strategic partnership with India desired to balance assertive Russia and rising China. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of United States, under the Trump administration, pinpointed the threats of rising Russian and Chinese to American global standing. In order to counter the emerging anti-American states from the

Asian continent, United States intended to empower its allies, and India proclaimed in the NSS as a “Major Defence Partner” of America.\textsuperscript{55}

2. Evolution of Indo-US Bilateralism

The pre-independence diplomatic ties between the US and India under British Raj were ordinarily thin and internationally unknown, which later gradually constitute significant improvements – patently witnessed by several ups and downs. With the onset of decolonization era in the Cold War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt supported the Indian independence movement and positively regarded the notion of sovereign Indian and it was completely rejected by British authorities.\textsuperscript{56} British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and the Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, concluded the Mountbatten Plan of partition in August 1947 and divided the subcontinent.\textsuperscript{57} The partition created two independent states for the Muslim and Hindu societies of subcontinent. Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, both Prime Ministers of newly independent states of subcontinent sworn the government of the two decolonized states and started looking for substantial support of great powers. Such demands of both newly independent states fascinated the United States. The combination of economy and security in the strategic calculus of India and Pakistan portrayed a perplexed picture of American involvement in the decolonized subcontinent. The overt alliance with Pakistan and the covert partnership with India gradually replaced the British sway with American influence.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 47.
The post-independence South Asia sketched a different and thorny political picture in which the initial leadership of decolonized India selected an anti-Western option deceptively and overtly decided to refuse American alliance. The strategic quest of Nehru for securing a fresh autonomous status of his nation and an inflexible desire to redefine Indian borders raised various clashes with territorially adjoining countries. Moreover, he observed the American entry in subcontinent immediately after independence as an imperialist attempt of Washington for acquiring British place in the Indian Ocean. The presence of the Soviet navy in the region was a fundamental point which let American arrive in the newly partitioned subcontinent. In this way, the issue of Indian Ocean created initial differences in Indo-US relations. Withdrawal of the British colonial rule forced India anxiously to cautiously calculate the role of superpowers in world politics, and the Nehru regime preferred apparently to stay away from emerging great power rivalry.\(^{58}\)

London Declaration of prime ministers conference of Commonwealth in 1949 continued Indian membership in the multi-state forum of Commonwealth and India accepted British as a head of the group of Commonwealth nations.\(^{59}\) Besides joining the international platform of the Commonwealth, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru scheduled a long tour of US to communicate the Indian goodwill gesture to President Truman in October 1949.\(^{60}\) In the aftermaths of the British colonial rule, India decided to act neutrally in the rising politics of Cold War, as the first Prime Minister Nehru stated in an address “I have come here, therefore, on a voyage of discovery of the mind and heart of America and to place before you our own mind and heart. Thus, we may promote that understanding and cooperation which, I feel sure,


\(^{59}\) Harish Kapur, op. cit., 55.

\(^{60}\) “Harry Truman,” op. cit.
both our countries earnestly desire.” An official proclamation of Indian neutrality expressed the desire of secular state of the subcontinent for acquiring the American support. The first tour of the state officials, hence, echoed an initial tone of Indo-US relations. The first reciprocal visit of the American authorities was conducted after a decade. On December 1959, President Eisenhower visited New Delhi and met his Indian counterpart and addressed the parliament. Bilateral relations were extended during a three days visit of Kennedy on January 1978, and the address of the President Kennedy to the Indian Parliament communicated his cooperative intentions to New Delhi. The visit of Kennedy was responded by Indian Prime Ministe Moraji Desai for a six-day visit of Washington in the same year. In 1982, another phase of the bilateral visits occurred between the state authorities from both sides especially during the unforgettable eras of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and George H.W. Bush, the then Vice President of the United States. Both leaders talked about alienating two-sided diplomatic connections.

During the forty years-long phase of the Cold War, both India and America remained reluctantly ambitious for maintaining strong cooperative bounds. The Indian desire of reserving superpower support besides the Soviet Union was a dream which could mainly empower New Delhi in meeting its strategic demands and overcoming economic deficiencies. On one hand, both areas were principle Indian objectives for pursuing Washington obliquely. On the other hand, Washington was committed passionately to victoriously defeating the Soviet influence and its ideology of communism.

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Washington believed that the pro-American Nehru policy, in contrast to its pro-Soviet stance, could lead the United States to fight more effectively with two major communist powers of the world, Moscow, and Beijing particularly. Both communist powers were not acceptable for the United States under the communist influence. Regarding New Delhi, a frequent phase of unfriendly dissatisfaction from American supportive tilt initially for Pakistan then for China kept India continually close to USSR. Therefore, the Cold War period witnessed lack of substantial progress in India-United States strategic ties.

Analogous to the Indian stay of an anti-American camp during the Cold War, the issues of nuclear proliferation and American support of anti-Indian neighboring states showed an estranged version of diplomatic inhospitality. The frequent proposals Washington that India should join the international proliferation regime remained a fundamental point of disagreement between two states.\(^{64}\) The pressures of NPT further augmented with the refusal of New Delhi for signing the CTBT. Such developments greatly exasperated the Americans.\(^ {65}\) Following the nuclear tests in May 1998, President Clinton traveled to India and discussed mainly the options for signing the CTBT with Indian counterparts, but his efforts remained fruitless.\(^ {66}\)

In short, instead of rejecting entirely New Delhi’s significance in the American foreign policy, White House remained always ambitious to focus the abnormal growth of diplomatic ties with India instead of accepting the unexpected reaction of India. A historic


visit of Clinton to India forced him to spend five days with Hindu officials in March 2000.67

A brief detail of this visit was discussed by the former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, T.C.A. Raghavan, in his historical account, *The People Next Door: The Curious History of India’s Relations with Pakistan*. Raghavan said that the address of Clinton to the Indian parliament was a milestone for the improvement of two-sided relations. Clinton said, “It was clear that all the old acrimony of the India-US interface was now part of an older, closed chapter.”68

Traditional standards of collaboration between the two nations improved radically when the two governments were agreed for broader cooperation under various areas of strategic and economic collaboration. Furthermore, a series of naval and air exercises conducted by forces from both sides extended the roots of bilateral cooperation. Swelling nature of defence cooperation finalized a nuclear deal under the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative in July 2005. Following the Bush’s nuclear package to India, President Obama inaugurated first strategic dialogues with India in June 2010 and hosted politicians from New Delhi in Washington.69 The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton called “India as an indispensable partner” and a close companion for the twenty-first century.70 This was an updated phase of bilateral values between both nations and Indian inclusion in the greater American geopolitical strategy in response to the political desires of New Delhi for adopting a revised foreign policy. Indian demands for civil nuclear cooperation and access to dual-use

technology in addition to American larger cooperative role in space program of New Delhi were marked as prerequisites for inaugurating a new era or post-9/11 relations.⁷¹

The architectures of upgraded strategic relations from both sides negotiated a joint framework of defence collaboration in 2005 analogous to civil nuclear deal.⁷² The combination of defence and nuclear cooperation under a new format of Indo-US bilateral interaction not only surprised the leaders from the main capitals of the world but it also communicated clearly the strategic expectations of both states for each other. The Indian strategic community believed that the ongoing patterns of the bilateral relationship had inaugurated a new era of multidimensional diplomacy before the emerging challenges of the twenty-first century. Similar arguments are mentioned by Gurmeet Kanwal during an electronic interview. The piece of writing prepared by this New Delhi based Indian strategic analyst mentioned the significance of Indo-US strategic cooperation in the evolving geopolitical challenges of the international system.⁷³

Historically, during the early foundational developments of the Indian constitution, the Nehru administration envisioned an ambitious plan of economic development, social progress, and political reforms. Frequently changing undiplomatic values of Indian foreign policy turned into aligning and cooperative collaboration with major powers for the completion of Nehruvian political journey. This journey altered the conventional formats of New Delhi foreign policy and bracketed Nehru and Kennedy in a joint cooperative framework. Kennedy administration induced Nehru by proclaiming globally India as a close friend and strategic partner at the peak of the Cold War politics. It was an appropriate decision to counterbalance the escalating communist forces approaching from China.

⁷³ Author email correspondence, December 29, 2017.
attempt to reduce the prodigious effects of the Soviet-supported communism was a major shift in Nehruvian foreign policy which always emphasized the promotion of national values over the expanse of adjacent states and disliked the alignment of a neighbouring state with the great powers.

3. India’s Concern on Pak-US Relations

The decision of Islamabad to join American led Western bloc against communist forces of Soviet Union contributed negatively to India-Pakistan relations. The choice of Pakistan for augmenting its pro-US role resulted in two defence pacts (SEATO, CENTO). Both defence pacts heavily made neighbouring hostile India more unfriendly antagonistically. Contrary to the decision of Pakistan for joining the Western alliance, the anti-Pakistani foreign policy dragged New Delhi towards the Soviet Union explicitly. The multidimensional diplomatic attributes of both states began in the 1950s on the eve of Cold War crisis. The choice of Joseph Stalin for handshaking with Nehru was an attempt of USSR to construct a closer strategic bonds with Third World nations.74 In 1951, a trade agreement between the two nations formally initiated the cooperative two-sided interaction.75 Stalin saw the newly independent state of Gandhi as an appropriate counter-American force which would not only defend communist interests of Moscow, but also become a counterweighting force against capitalist influence in the subcontinent.

The glorious Soviet-Indian foreign relations were, in this way, heavily rooted in Stalin era when the communist leaders visualized differently the non-aligned bloc of states (or a Third Force in the bipolar world). Bilateral trade deals were further signed to uphold the

75 Ibid.
friendly ties between the two nations. The Indian leadership was highly impressed by the socialist propensities of both Stalin and Khrushchev along with Soviet economic reformes and technological advancement. The Indian economic backwardness and political weakness persuaded the foreign policy decision makers of New Delhi towards USSR, and encourage them confidently for acquiring the support of a communist superpower.76

The combination of Stalinist and Nehruvian ideologies in the decolonized subcontinent was in the Cold War era mainly based on Soviet assessment of independence struggle under Gandhi. Additionally, the power shifting attitude of British as a consequent of Second World War resulted evidently in an India-specific foreign policy. In response to a cooperative behaviour of Stalin coupled with his friendly imagination of Nehru, Indian government accepted the USSR as a suitable superpower supporting the newly decolonized India economically and strategically. On one hand, desperately insecure and committedly critical towards neighbours, mainstream Hindu leadership decided predominantly to enjoy the Soviet-provided military, economic and diplomatic support against neighboring nations. On the other hand, in the early years of independence, the state officials under Nehru concluded a policy of non-intervention in the great power competition apparently. There were contradictory standards for managing the foreign relations objectively under the Realist values of Indian foreign policy.

In this way, frequent changes in the foreign relations of New Delhi under the fluctuating international realignments were the major attempts of Nehru for placing Islamabad away from its allies. The diplomatically warming behaviour of the US under Pak-US relations, especially, in a post-Indo-China dispute over Tibet was prominently a major shift in Nehruvian foreign policy and an unequivocal turning point in Indian foreign relations.

Indian non-aligned and a neutral stance gradually transformed into a structurally aligned foreign policy. Moreover, several other factors hampered the traditional standards of Indian foreign relations.

A number of factors involving generally, the Chinese nuclear explosion, the internationally evolving debate of nuclear non-proliferation regime, the changing political patterns of Soviet leadership, the growing Sino-Pak diplomatic ties, and Nixonion diplomatic tilt towards Beijing with the help of Islamabad, mutually exerted an unavoidable pressure on New Delhi. This development forced the Indian leadership to depart from its traditional and non-aligned formats of foreign policy. More importantly, the death of Ms. Gandhi and removal of the Khrushchev regime altered the conventional foreign policy dynamics of their respective countries. The death of Nehru was a natural event in contrast to the removal of Khrushchev from government. The Soviet regime change due to Soviet-Beijing conflict and the impact of this change welcomed Leonid Brezhnev as a successor of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964.\textsuperscript{77} Likewise, the Tashkent agreement, a Soviet effort, led by Alexei Kosygin for the peaceful resolution of the Indo-Pak war was noticed by Prime Minister Shastri as a Soviet friendly move for Pakistan.\textsuperscript{78}

Apparenty, the Tashkent spirit was perceived to be a positive measure for mediating the peace between Ayub and Shastri, but the death of Shastri left the Indo-Pak issues unresolved.\textsuperscript{79} Under the United Nations, Soviet Union arranged a meeting between Shastri and President Ayub Khan to compel New Delhi to enhance its diplomatic efforts in the international system beyond the Soviet Union. Therefore, the resilient bilateral bounds rooted deeply in post-World War environment to uphold the newly independent India strategically

\textsuperscript{78} Michael Edwards, "Tashkent and After, "International Affairs 42, No. 03 (July 1966): 383.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
and financially began to deteriorate between India and the Soviet Union. The political survival of Moscow-New Delhi friendship did not last for a long time because both states shake hands for not only fighting against Western (especially American) influence but also for meeting their vital national interests.

The pro-Soviet foreign policy cemented in neutral patterns of non-alignment remained a temporary strategy of India, because the leading architectures of such policy were more concerned in achieving Indian strategic interest against neighbouring China and Pakistan. It was in line with the Soviet policy under Stalin government which was primarily concerned with preserving the extended role of communism instead of empowering India in world politics. Therefore, Indian disputes with Beijing and Islamabad hampered the strategic calculations of New Delhi and forced the leading Indian foreign policy experts to build cooperatively strong strategic bound with powerful nations. Consequently, ‘thinking beyond Soviet’ became an unavertable option for India during the 1960s and 1970s. No doubt, American support to India during Indo-China war was an attempt to drag Nehru away from the Soviet Union. However, Nixon visit to Beijing in 1972, and Chinese support to Islamabad against New Delhi forced both USSR and New Delhi to formulate similar security policies against common enemies. The common security threats concluded an Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971.80 The signing of cooperative treaty with the USSR was an attempt to stay at advantageous position against the emerging crisis in East Pakistan coupled with strengthening of Indian position against rising Washington-Beijing friendship.81 The Indian efforts of supporting Bangladesh against Pakistan, and opposing Sino-US ties under Nixon were assessed by White House. The Chinese tilt of Nixon along

81 Ibid.
with increasing American friendly desires for China was accurately perceived by CIA.\textsuperscript{82} The decision of Pakistan for joining American alliance and further fertilizing the grounds for Sino-US rapprochement provided an opportunity to India for more closely standing by the USSR. Additionally, such scenario let Moscow to essentially view Nehru regime as a close strategic ally.\textsuperscript{83} The extended bilateral terms of non-aggression equivalent to the close friendly ties were proved to be long term bilateral bounds of Indo-Soviet alliance. Both nations agreed on developing cooperation through an enhanced framework of diplomatic communications.

A rational geostrategic assessments of Stalin convinced him to accept India as a reliable partner in response to American-preferred policy of Pakistan against the Soviet Union. The radical improvement in the Soviet foreign policy convinced Stalin to view Indian role greatly in Indian Ocean which could defend Soviet vested interests against American expanding influence in Pacific Ocean.\textsuperscript{84} Therefore, the disturbing New Delhi-Beijing and Moscow-Beijing bilateral ties and emerging Pak-US relations laid the foundations of Indo-Soviet strategic cooperation. The interest-oriented diplomatic impetus reluctantly placed India formally close to Moscow, and left it ambitious for US support.

Unlike US, the USSR irritated India during its clash with China, and Nikita Khrushchev first decided cautiously to act as balancer between the two states fighting over Tibet. Afterwards, Soviet started arming India to counter growing Indo-US defence relations.\textsuperscript{85} After the war with China over the border issues, New Delhi accepted Moscow as

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84} Geoffrey Roberts, “Moscow’s Cold War on the Periphery: Soviet Rivalry in Greece, Iran and Turkey, 1943 – 8,” \textit{Journal of Contemporary History} 46, No. 01 (January 2011): 92.
\textsuperscript{85} Directorate of Intelligence, “Indo-Soviet Relations,” op. cit.
the main provider of Indian diplomatic and strategic support. In this way, a fractured New Delhi-Moscow-Beijing triangle provided sufficient space for US intervention. The Soviet isolation, as a result of Sino-Soviet conflict and American diplomatic tilt towards China followed by India, raised unequivocally an increased anti-Soviet noise in the South Asian subcontinent.

Contrary to a position of permanent status-quo, the foreign policy directives of the Nehruvian ideology were rooted in the Indian cynicism. Instead of subscribing to the Soviet camp completely, the non-aligned status of New Delhi kept India active in secretly enjoying multi-dynamic supports of Moscow. The economic, strategic, political, and military support under the Indo-USSR diplomatic collaboration encouraged Nehru to invented an anti-Pak-US foreign policy. In order to stand against Islamabad-Washington alliance, the state authorities under Nehru decided to support clearly the communist expansionism. Apparently, India showed its reluctance of joining the Western colonial and imperialist nations, and decided to initiate a movement for protecting the sovereign positions of the group of states subscribing to NAM. However, Nehru placed his country in an anti-US bloc covertly. The influential role of the great powers in the newly decolonized subcontinent, in this way, left both India and Pakistan to stand against each other by staying in opposite camps.

4. Indian Non-Alignment Policy

Apparently a non-aligned Indian stance in Cold War crisis reflected the non-involvement of newly independent India in the world politics. The viable option to stay away from global competition of the great powers were appreciated by several leaders of diverse regions who supported Nehruvian vision greatly and accepted the optimistic visualisation of

86 Ibid.
Nehru about international relations. Public proclamation of non-alignment was rooted in the Bandung Conference (also known as Asian-African multi-states platform) organized in capital of Java province of Indonesia, Bandung, in 1955.\textsuperscript{87} It was the first Afro-Asian conference, which was designed fundamentally to advance cooperative economic ties between twenty-nine participating states against the colonial rule of the Western countries. The first president of Indonesia and a leader of independent struggle against Netherlands, Sukarno, declared his attentions for the arrangement of the conference in 1954.\textsuperscript{88}

Formally accusing and condemning all the manifestations of colonialism, delegates of different nations endorsed unanimously the ten-point declaration for the promotion of international peace and cooperation, and integrated it with the UN Charter. Chinese active role in the gathering of Afro-Asian nations threatened the US dominance in the Cold War. The American response in the form of “working Group on the Afro-Asian Conference” associated the future threats of colonialism to China and the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe under Soviet sponsored communist bloc.\textsuperscript{89} Adam Clayton Powell, an American politician, appeared in the conference and supported mainly the American foreign policy while agreeing with the non-aligned idea discussed by participatory leaders.\textsuperscript{90} It was considered a personal decision of Powell for visiting Indonesia because the State Department was not happy on the gathering of non-aligned nations.\textsuperscript{91} A declassified telegram of the US

\textsuperscript{87} Naveed Ahmed, “The Non–Aligned Movement and Pakistan,” Pakistan Horizon 32, No. 04 (Fourth Quarter 1979): 82.


\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
State Department further cleared the position of Washington on Powell visit of Djakarta.\footnote{Circular Telegram, Department of State, \url{https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP58-00597A000200090056-2.pdf} (accessed on January 26, 2018).} The document directed the US Embassy in Djakarta to consider the Powell as a journalist instead of an American official representative.\footnote{Ibid.}

President Eisenhower attempted seriously to measure the emerging role of the Third World on the non-aligned platform. Further meetings of the Afro-Asian nations, hosted by Cairo and Belgrade in 1957 and 1961 respectively, was an attempt to provide momentum to NAM. Anti-colonial and anti-imperialist thinking under further meetings were planned in 1965, but failed to take place due to the Chinese opposition to the participation of the third Secretary General of the UN which was considered as an American involvement. In this way, China opposed the inclusion of UN or US parallel to opposing the role of Soviet Union in the Afro-Asian conference calling it traditionally a European state.\footnote{Alan Lawrance, \textit{China’s Foreign Relations Since 1949} (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 1975), 174 – 177.} Nehru respected Chinese stance and showed Indian loyalty toward its policy of non-alignment. For instance, the meetings of decolonized states from Asia and Africa under Nehruvian ideology accepted the incorporated five principles of \textit{Pansheel} (or commonly known as Pan Shila).\footnote{Russel H. Fifield, “The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence,” \textit{The American Journal of International Law} 52, No. 03 (July 1958): 504.} The Principles of peaceful coexistence, incorporated in Pan Shila, included the respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each other, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and cooperation based on mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence.\footnote{Ankita Pande, “Reflecting on China’s Five Principles, 60 Years Later,” \textit{The Diplomat}, June 26, 2014, \url{https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/reflecting-on-chinas-five-principles-60-years-later/} (accessed on January 26, 2018).} Nehru believed in the doctrine of Pan Shila. He envisioned that its acceptance by the Asian states would be a magical formula to
help India in creating its supremacy over establishing the foreign relations with other nations because the idea of Nehru created the biggest and largest gathering of the Third World.97

The popularity of Nehruvian philosophy was confined to the Asian states instead of touching the communist borders of Moscow. The Asian leaders avoided the direct criticism on threats of communist invasion like European colonial rule. Such behaviour of the participating nations of NAM communicated the neutral and impartial vision of their gathering.98 The notion of Pan Shila was, actually, the preamble of Beijing-New Delhi trade agreement with Tibet which was mutually agreed and signed in 1954. This agreement was concluded by the first prime ministers of both states, Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai (or Chou En-lai).99 Later on, nine nations – Hanoi, Belgrade, Cairo, Phnom Penh, Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, and Kathmandu – confirmed their recognition of Pan Shila and signed the declaration of five principles with New Delhi. Naypyidawn (capital city of Myanmar) refused Pan Shila by calling it merely a theoretical policy without having its universal application and compatibility with international political system.100

The non-aligned policy was adopted primarily to avert the threats of wars by denouncing the world alliances which pushed the participating nations eventually into conflicts. Avoiding the association of New Delhi with pro-West or Western states, India selected the bloc of Eastern states led by Soviet Union. The bigger strategic purposes of Moscow were not aimed at completely isolating India from the global politics. The first clash of the US and the USSR for global competition over Korea introduced the formal version of non-alignment internationally.101 The appointment of Vengalil Krishnan Krishna Menon, a

98 Ibid., 896-897.
99 Russel H. Fifield, op. cit., 504.
100 Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (Mumbai: Jaico Publishing House, 2007), 481.
close aide and an active diplomat of Nehru administration, as an Indian official representative in the UN, publically announced the nature and objectives of NAM.\textsuperscript{102} The non-aligned position for the prevention of Indian economic backwardness became a serious challenge at the eve of its clash with China in 1962 over the buffer state, Tibet.

Staying away from the strict international alignments of Washington-Moscow proxy war was no more a suitable option for Indian foreign policy. The non-aligned position lasted for eight years only and soon became an outdated policy before the security requirements of New Delhi. Internationally recognized and widely accepted principles of Pan Shila changed gradually with the changing dynamics of international system.

Out of the British and French imperial influences, the newly independent Asian and African states desired to achieve their independent positions subscribed to Nehruvian notion of ‘Asians’ which was embodied to the conception of resurgent Asia.\textsuperscript{103} The main idea congenital to resurgent Asia was an internationalized Indian foreign policy for the maintenance of prosperous relations between two largest nations of Asia – China and India. The resurgence of Asia was planned to signify the Indian global engagement, maintained on three principles, Indian geostrategic location in the continent, its cultural connection in the evaluation of other nations, and keeping Asian states away from economic and political dominance of colonial master.\textsuperscript{104} Nehru did emphasize the importance of regionalism for the creation of a more peaceful and cooperative atmosphere before the challenges of post-World War politics.

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\textsuperscript{104} R R Sharma ed., India and Emerging Asia (New Delhi: Sage, 2005), 53.
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Initially, Nehru offered a friendship deal to China which was an appropriate settlement of contradictory claims of both states over Tibet. The clash between New Delhi and Beijing over Tibet was analogous to Nepal. The Chinese and Indian policymakers had developed hostile positions over Nepali and Tibetan borders.\textsuperscript{105} In order to avoid the antagonizing Mao regime, Nehru signed a peaceful agreement over naïve Pan Shila, and it was not a long term deal between both governments.\textsuperscript{106} The Chinese claims of Indian presence in the Tibet appeared in 1956,\textsuperscript{107} and an initial stage for border war unveiled the actual face of non-alignment before the changing milieu of communist-capitalist politics.

The policy to refrain from power politics of the international system was inherited in Nehruvian idealism which compelled Nehru to adopt a policy of neutrality in the emerging clash of Soviet-American forces. The utopian spirit of idealism associated to neutral grouping of nations was a temporary behaviour invented by Nehru. It was known as Indian position of neutrality covered in NAM.\textsuperscript{108} The denouncing of Indian active role in conflict-ridden political transformations rising after the Second World War environment soon proved to be an archaic choice for managing Indian foreign relations.

Apparently non-aligning Nehru’s policy merely emphasized the internal situation of his country and preferred to stay away from the international conflict-provoking political development. However, it forced India gradually to actively participate into world politics while partially aligning with the communist Soviet Union, fighting against communist China, and seeking help from capitalist America. Therefore, the main focus of Nehru was to gain

\textsuperscript{105} Madhukar SJB Rana, “China Meets India in Nepal: A Historical and Future Perspective,” \textit{Indian Journal of Asian Affairs} 26, No. 1/2 (June-December 2013), 60.

\textsuperscript{106} Ankita Pande., op. cit.


maximum space in the world politics and maximum benefits from power politics superpowers. Such determination of the Nehru government led India towards practically applicable regional hegemonic designs, which were rooted in power projection vis-à-vis its neighbouring nations, and for acquiring the great backup of powerful countries.

5. The Regional Belligerence of India

In March 1947, before securing independent status, hosting of the world leaders in Delhi for Asian Relations Conference led Nehru to introduce the idea of continental unity among the Asian nations. The birth of India out of British colonisation invented the idea of pan-Asia, which gathered different countries, divided in thirty-two delegations. Tibet was treated as a sovereign entity. Tibetan status of an autonomous state annoyed China and it widened up the Sino-Tibet dispute. Hypothetically a non-political gathering of three hundred international and two thousand local participants on the call of Nehru travelled to Delhi to discuss the future of Asian continent.

The substantial political advancements of Burma, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam and Korea, along with the changing continental circumstances highlighted the political aspirations of people coming from all corners of Asia. Ten days of conference sponsored by India focused few important points such as the freedom from the colonial rule; political independence without economic dependence on the imperial system; establishment of relations with foreign power while securing the sovereign economic status; rising the

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\[\text{maximum space in the world politics and maximum benefits from power politics superpowers. Such determination of the Nehru government led India towards practically applicable regional hegemonic designs, which were rooted in power projection vis-à-vis its neighbouring nations, and for acquiring the great backup of powerful countries.}\]
Prosperous levels of agricultural community; and building of shipping, communication, weapon and transport industries.\textsuperscript{112} Moreover, improving the living standards of labour, role of industrial development in nation building, the upgradation of financial infrastructures of the states by defending their sovereign positions, offering Asian support to the UN mission of peace preservation under nuclear clouds, and upholding of freedom movements over the continents were the main focusing points.\textsuperscript{113}

The short-term life of communism and its dominating directions beyond Moscow were absent in main agenda of the conference. Different points of disagreements among the participating nations were not pointed out for consultations and peaceful resolution of conflicting issues. Cultural promotion among the states, along with Gandhian maxims, were emphasized generally in the conference. During the struggle of nationalist movements in the Asian continent, Nehru tried to maintain India close to diplomatically connecting with entire continent by focusing the future prospects of Asia.\textsuperscript{114}

The enactment of NAM, in this way, gathered several states across the continent under Indian conception of staying impartial in the emerging vehement division of international system. A big denial from involving in power politics of great powers was a covert mission planned by the initial Indian leadership. The symbolic neutralism survived partially in main foreign policy decisions of the non-aligned states and it restrained member states absurdly, including India, from engaging bloc politics of superpowers. The biggest security threat emanated from China over the McMahon Line, coupled with controversial Line of Control toward Pakistan, resulted jointly into the gradual disappearance of non-

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
aligned position of India and turned the main patterns of its foreign policy towards both superpowers.\textsuperscript{115}

In order to consolidate its regional position, India focused generally on the South Asian political affairs while emphasizing the Indian Ocean equally. The maxim of power projection engulfed the traditional foreign policy orientations of New Delhi closely. The regional hegemonic ambitions were inherited in the aforementioned strategic conception of Jawaharlal Nehru. Thus, India focused to articulate the role of Indian armed forces beyond the territorial borders. The conventional knowledge build certainly on traditional attributes of early Indian leadership under Nehru believed widely that the accurate projection of power can serve greatly the national interest of their country.\textsuperscript{116} Such behaviour resulted into the interventionist behaviour of Hindu leaders in the internal affairs of neighbouring states.

Historically, the decision of Nehru for the development of Indian armed forces which are linked genetically to the footsteps of East Indian Company was an attempt to follow colonial armed patterns. The British traders under East Indian Company recruited the local Indians as watchmen to guard their equipment and settlements.\textsuperscript{117} Later functions showed the duties of local Indians defined by the British Raj were the security of colonial boundaries externally, and the effective implementation of the colonial rule internally. The undeniable imperial imprints of the British colonial rule effected largely the fundamental strategic arrangements and the growth of Indian armed forces. Thus, the armed forces of India evolved

\textsuperscript{115} Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “Will India Become the Pivot of Asian Security,” \textit{The Diplomate}, October 05, 2016, 


\textsuperscript{117} “Nehru and the Indian Armed Forces,” May 05, 1973, 
under the antecedent British Raj. Contrary to the neighbouring strategic development, New Delhi decided to launch a comprehensive plan of combined enlarging role of three armed forces (land, sea, and air) for accomplishment of its hegemonic missions.

While strictly adhering to the strategic priorities of India, the initial leadership was determined to create various platform with the help of foreign connections for the empowerment of their strategic capabilities. Such intentions resulted ultimately in Indian regional belligerence. In 1949, establishment of the National Defence Academy (joint services academy of Indian Armed Forces) exposed the regional bellicosity of Nehru regime. The National Defence Academy (NDA) officially started its functions on January 16, 1955. The idea for the establishment of NDA was derived from the Nehruvian vision of Indian dominance in the region by empowering Indian armed forces. It was believed that the advanced Indian forces would be helpful in resolving the Kashmir and Tibet issues. Krishna Menon, incumbent Defence Minister of India of that time convinced Nehru to empower the armed forces. Further infrastructural developments introduced by the first Indian Prime Minister established National Defence College in 1959. This college was approved by the Cabinet Defence Committee for the starting of a broad base military training centre. Moreover, Nehru proposed a future of Indian nation equipped with nuclear capability, and established the Atomic Energy Commission on August 1948.

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120 Sushant Singh, op. cit.
Under the government directives, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) defined the functions of commission which are; to carry the scientific research, to conduct the training of nuclear scientists to advance the culture of nuclear research through establishing countrywide network of laboratories, and to find out the atomic minerals. The DAE was created in 1954 to carry a culture of nuclear research and development in the country.  

Presently, the DAE contains “five research centers, three industrial organizations, five public sector undertakings and three service organizations.” Moreover, the DAE has actively been engaged in supporting the institutions imparting nuclear education. The quest for a greater nuclear infrastructure led the DAE to sign various agreements with the states like Japan, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Australia, Republic of Korea, Republic of Kazakhstan, Argentina, Canada, Russian Federation, France, Vietnam and United States.

Indian regional belligerence was directed first towards the second-communist state under Mao Zedong. Mao viewed the role of Indian Armed Forces in Tibet as an intentional intervention in the internal affairs of the People Republic of China. The Voice of Hindi – Chini Bhai – Bhai started to disappear. Clash over Ladakh, started from Tibet, spread across the McMahon Line (a border between India and China marked by the British during the Simla Accord in 1941). British Lieutenant Colonel, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, was a famous English military officer of India who divided the Tibetan region into Inner and Outer Tibet respectively which later became a controversial territory between New Delhi and Beijing.

124 Ibid.
The Indian involvement in the British-defined Sino-Tibet boundary witnessed a bellicose behaviour of Nehru government against neighbouring nations. Hence, the border issue with China resulted into Indo-China war in 1962. The initial force deployment appeared in Tibet from both sides was largely a part of Cold War fight. The Sino-Indian fight placed both Washington and New Delhi in a close strategic association against China as a common enemy. Initial foundations of the diplomatic relations between two states were laid down by John F. Kennedy and Nehru. The whole story of the Kennedy-Nehru meeting against the emerging conflict over Tibet was outlined briefly by a senior research fellow of the Brookings Intelligence Project, Bruce Riedel in his study, *JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, The CIA, and The Sino-Indian War*.

Riedel mentioned in his book that the devotions of Nehru family for the cultivation of American friendship resulted in a 1961 visit of Jawaharlal Nehru to Washington. Nehru, along with his daughter visited Washington in order to start the diplomatic cooperation with the US. Nehru and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, decided to appoint Indian new ambassador to the United States. Braj Kumar Nehru, Indian ambassador in Washington, started and continued formally the diplomatic journey between two states. Indira Gandhi was a close political aide and a chief confidant of Nehru. She was in the favour of developing foreign relations with the powerful nations. In this way, Nehru-directed foreign policy converted into natural alliance. The war with China over Tibet laid the foundation of American explicit engagement with India, and triggered the role of CIA in the foreign relations of New Delhi.

Pakistan, embroiled with internal clash with its Eastern part, unmasked the neighbouring bellicosity of the Indian National Congress. An interventionist policy of Indira Gandhi followed by 1965 aggression hampered the strategic thinking of Pakistan and clearly

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128 Ibid.
communicated anti-Pakistan behaviour to leaders of leading capitals of the world. Beyond China and Pakistan, the history of Sri Lanka is also a witness of the Indian victimization and involvement in the internal affairs of Colombo. Instead of admiring the political developments of the neighbouring states positively, and investing the diplomatic efforts for upholding the friendly ties with bordering nations, the mainstream Hindu leadership always viewed the adjoining nation as their competitors which could be controlled and supervised under an injected regional monopolized political framework.

The support from outsiders, in this way, was visualized as a great source of keeping the Indian strategic missions active and dynamic according to the changing regional political features of South Asia. Consequently, the bilateral contentions, with the bordering countries structured in coercive diplomacy, reflected the Indian aspirations of expanding its sphere of influence over the region. The continuation of such a belligerent policy with its neighbourhood hampered frequently the chances of regional peace and stability, and constituted an environment of unbalanced and asymmetrical power structures.

6. Indo-China Border Clash

The Tibetan uprising, started from Lhasa, was in violation of the seventeen-point agreement which was signed between Tibet and China in 1951. The signed agreement between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and fourteen Dalai Lama fissured openly and deteriorated the dispute fixing deals between Beijing and Lhasa. In the early days of the conflict, the Tibetan leaders tried to contact America, but the CIA official demanded the formal request from Lhasa instead of receiving informal help calls from the Kham province.

Later on, the role of American intelligence helped the rebellions, and the uprisings confined to Amdo and Kham areas covered the Lhasa region swiftly. The anti-Chinese voices from Tibet began to rise, and the trivial clash became a full-scale conflict. Khampa rebellion (or Kham uprising), in this way, sparked a ferocious fight between Tibetan rebellions and the People’s Liberation Army from capital area, and engulfed the whole Tibet rapidly.\textsuperscript{130}

Nehruvian pacifism fractured in a decade when the Indian bellicosity was directed to China over the Tibetan issue. The McMahon line, a territorial boundary between India and China, was actually a border agreement signed between the colonial British and Tibet in the first Simla Conference. In 1914, the Tibetan and British authorities in exchange of letters recognised the border formally in the conference without the Chinese consent which raised serious apprehensions of Beijing.\textsuperscript{131} The post-colonial British rule made the McMahon line a source of potential competition between India and China. During the US-USSR tussle for global dominance, the unresolved Tibetan border issue involved New Delhi and Beijing in an armed struggle.

The decades-old Indo-China rivalry had various other contesting attributes as well. The traditional trade connection developed on maritime connection of China and India changed surprisingly. It was India that opposed Japanese position over Manchuria\textsuperscript{132} by implicitly supporting China. Afterwards, the Japanese claims over Manchuria in 1937 witnessed an indirect support of New Delhi to Chinese position in the Sino-Japanese clash.\textsuperscript{133} The subsequent visit of Chiang-Kai-Shek to India increased bilateral diplomatic bonds

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between two China and India. The independent India, obsessed by border disputes, changed dramatically the conventional patterns of diplomacy with China on border issue.\textsuperscript{134} The advancement of extra-territorial claims by New Delhi jeopardized the scope of regional security. The territorial conflict with China over 2,175 miles\textsuperscript{135} long border resulted in three military confrontations (1962, 1967, and 1987). The territorial fight began in 1962 over the troubled Sino-Tibetan ties parallel to explicitly reflecting the Sino-Indian war.\textsuperscript{136}

The American connections revived by the mainstream policy makers under Nehru administration and US-India strategic bounds were constructed from both sides. American help in containing Chinese anti-Indian postures translated by Washington as an act of communist aggression toward other states, as observed by CIA.\textsuperscript{137} American involvement in the widening Indo-China border rift was secretly started a clandestine role of CIA in the Tibetan uprising.\textsuperscript{138} CIA’s covert anti-China operation of American intelligence began in 1959. In order to ground the communist regime of Mao, along with elimination of probable expansion of the Chinese influence on Tibet. This move structured the Tibetan program of CIA.\textsuperscript{139} The US Security Council Committee 303 to overview the covert intelligence operations was maintained under National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy.\textsuperscript{140} The planned Vietnam escalation of Bundy showed the zenith of his anti-communist thoughts.

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\textsuperscript{134} “The Sino-Indian Border Dispute,” CIA/RSS, op. cit., iii-iv.
\textsuperscript{136} Dawa Norbu, op. cit., 1086.
\textsuperscript{137} “The Sino-Indian Border Dispute,” CIA/RSS, op. cit., vi-vii.
\textsuperscript{138} Bruce Riedel, \textit{JFK’S Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, The CIA, and the Sino Indian War}, op. cit., 38.
\textsuperscript{140} “Note on U.S. Covert Actions,” Department of State, \url{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/actionsstatement} (accessed on January 26, 2018).
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The secret operation of St. Circus was the lengthiest program of CIA for an anti-China planning in the form of guerrilla training of Tibetan rebels. Moreover, St. Barnum was designed to provide essential help of CIA to its agents coupled with supplying the necessary equipment to the Tibetan insurgents. St. Bailey, like Circus and Barnum, was a code name of the confidential operation for propagating of information in the targeted areas. Overthrowing the communist rule of Mao was a policy invented by Washington, promoted by John Ackerly (the leading president of international campaign for Tibet) and executed by Roger McCarthy (creator of secret CIA’s Tibet operations), and Bruce Walker (who supervised an established training site for Tibet insurgents in Camp Hale of Colorado).

Tibet, the home of CIA’s secret activities equipped covertly and supported the local insurrectionary financially, and evidenced the signs of Tibet-US relationship clearly. The Chushi Gangdruk located in the Kham, eastern part of Tibet, generally famous as “Four rivers-Six rangers” force which tried to overthrow the Chinese rule with the foreign support. The volunteer insurgent or the Chusi guerrilla streams began in 1958 and gained American funding vibrantly. The training of the Tibetan militia was organized at Camp Hale. Andruk Gonpo Tashi, a leader of the paramount rebellious forces of Tibet, gained substantial support from Chiang Kai-Shek of Taiwan (or Republic of China in Taiwan). The militia of

142 John B. Roberts II and Elizabeth A. Roberts, Freeing Tibet: 50 Years of Struggle, Resilience, and Hope (New York: AMACOM, 2009), 82.
Tashi was set up in coordination of Dalai Lama by uniting the series of different nascent uprisings under the wide conception of four river-six ranger force. In June 1958, the united Gangdrug paramilitaries declared their anti-Chinese agenda in Lhasa.\textsuperscript{146} The precarious bilateral relations between Tibet and United States increased exponentially along with the emerging regional interest of America after communist occupation of China.

American commitments of providing essential support to Dalai Lama contain the communist impacts on Tibet under several covered operations. These clandestine operations increased the engagement of CIA in South Asian affairs. To empower anti-Chinese Tibetan for making them powerful enough to violently resist PRC was the broader part of American policy. The era of intense communist-capitalist indirect rivalry pulled American toward South Asia by stabilizing its influence in Tibetan crisis. Additionally, the geostrategic location of India and its growing border hostility inherited in Nehruvian antipathy towards China were deeply observed by CIA. The American intelligence community realized the communist activities of Mao in Tibet. India, as a facilitator of the United States in its war against China, altered the traditional basis of its foreign policy illicitly and departed thinly from the conventional domain of its international non-aligned standing in world politics.

The contradictory foundations of Indian foreign policy, formulated by the first leadership exacerbated, and a visible departure from non-aligned stance put forwarded the essential defence demands which could be fulfilled by connecting New Delhi to major powers. The Forward Policy of Nehru incorporated in foreign policy as a preferred response over the disputed territories around India in 1960s.\textsuperscript{147} Western military assistance from Britain, United States, and the Soviet Union against China supported Indian position in the war. The ideologies of Mao government was deteriorated with Nikita Khrushchev. Therefore,

\textsuperscript{146} Kallol Bhattacherjee, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{147} Huiyun Feng, \textit{Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership, and War} (New York: Routledge, 2007), 57.
the weakening Sino-Soviet cooperative connection placed Moscow on Indian side against the China-Tibet relations.

The Moscow-Beijing rift was confidently considered to be a favourable opportunity for Washington to counterweight the Soviet Union effectively. Since the treaty of alliance concluded by communist leaders from both capitals agreed the China and Soviet Union for the creation of an anti-capitalist alliance in 1950.\footnote{Chen Jian, “The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union,” \textit{Journal of the Cold War Studies} 08, No. 03 (Summer 2006): 89.} Multi-layered strategic connections under strong political and ideological bonds overshadowed minor territorial clashes between both communist powers. The agreement on the creation of a joint administrative setup for the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) or widely recognised as Far East Railway of China witnessed a trivial territorial confrontation in the pre-Bolshevik era between China and Russia. Manchurian Railway or CER was the Trans-Siberian railways construed by imperial forces of China which were a source of the clash between two governments and settled in 1952 when the Joseph Stalin granted all rights of CER to PRC.\footnote{Bruce A. Elleman, “Return of the Chinese Changehun Railway to China by the USSR,” in \textit{Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History}, ed. Bruce A. Elleman and Stephen Kotkin (New York: Routledge, 2015), 185.}

On one hand the Soviet Union translated the Tibet-China hostility as a legitimate grievance of Tibet rebels. On the other hand, Moscow, the main supporter of New Delhi, was wrestling profoundly with the anti-Soviet world of American values in Cuba over the issue of ballistic missile deployment. The Soviet missile deployment in Cuba parallel to American similar action in Turkey and Italy engaged both superpowers in an active fighting domain and left China and India to engage in a border dispute. The thirteen-day (October 16-28) Washington-Moscow concerning ballistic missile positioning race left India (initially) to fight alone against neighbouring aggression over Tibet. The compromise over establishing foreign lands of Cuba, Italy, and Turkey as a potential military basis for hosting Communist and
Capitalist missile dragged Washington immediately towards Indo-China Clash.\textsuperscript{150} A decade after 1962, the Indo-China territorial dispute and American support to New Delhi during Kennedy administration, President Nixon turned US foreign relations towards China surprisingly.

Arranged by Pakistan, the official visit of President Richard Nixon to Beijing ended an anti-China stance of Washington covered in the clandestine activities of CIA. The decision to normalize relations with China proclaimed Nixon the first American president of modern history for replacing the Cold War Chinese enmity with initiation of a friendly era of diplomatic rapprochement. It was a turning point of the US-USSR fight which agreed both Nixon and Mao administrations to confront Leonid Brezhnev mutually. The larger frame of world politics convinced White House to alter its grand Cold War strategy in post-Vietnamization policy and sided by PRC with the help of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{151} Therefore, the worry of New Delhi was not limited merely to border issue with Beijing. The Chinese compassionating behaviour for Pakistan was an actual concern of India. Hence, the promotion of anti-China behaviour of Indian leaders attracted the Chinese adversaries or competitor internationally to heavily support India. The unbearable rise of China and the global reach of its economic filaments had further complicated the international order in which Indian alliance with anti-Chinese states had become a visible political fashion.\textsuperscript{152} The American involvement in the conflict fabricated a new scenario and placed China away from India and the Soviet Union. Later regional developments put the United States and China in a close diplomatic interaction.

\textsuperscript{150} Bruce Riedel, JFK’S Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, The CIA, and the Sino-Indian War, op. cit. 51-55.
7. Indo-Pak Wars and the US Role

The post-partition subcontinent embarked with a global wave of decolonization created two independent states in the subcontinent. No doubt, the British colonial retreat from subcontinent ensured the autonomous positions of Pakistan and India, but this partition began an unending era of enduring Indo-Pak rivalry under the wider notion of South Asian politics. The contesting territorial and ideological claims between India and Pakistan gave birth to multifaceted competition over the issues of water, border, and Kashmir. Frequently occurring wars, border skirmishes, and military stand-offs engulfed the independent positions of Pakistan and India. The undeniable properties of the decades-long Soviet-US competition for global dominance initiated after Second World War made the complex post-colonial South Asian region a whimsical battleground. Both South Asian superpowers (India and Pakistan) defined their positions under antagonistic politics of two superpowers of the world. The ferocious bipolarity cemented in Washington-Moscow antipathy against each other, hence, augmented the enigmatic Indo-Pak rivalry in an analogous way.

In order to decisively defeating the increasing influences of the Chinese and Soviet communist designs for India and Pakistan, fluctuating involvement of Washington in South Asian affairs was an endeavour to keep New Delhi and Islamabad safe from domino effects of communist world. The diplomatic efforts from New Delhi and Washington for each other covertly cultivated a discrete alliance of states. One was ambitious for regional dominance (India) and the other had desires for global hegemony (US). The American determination to save India from the Soviet influence was equally important to converting New Delhi against communism and preparing it for fighting against anti-American nations. Parallel to explicit Pak-US alliance, the implicit Indo-US partnership witnessed a sizeable growth of strategic
partnership between both states. Such discrete diplomatic attributes coupled with frequent sanction periods devalued the position of Pakistan more than India.

One of the largest arms-trading client of the USSR, India, was more enthusiastic in receiving strategic assistance from both superpowers, and less reluctant in turning the foreign acquired weapons against neighbouring countries. The quarrelsome foreign relations of New Delhi with territorially adjoining nations intensified overtly by the Soviet Union and covertly backed by America inaugurated an era of unending borders disputes in South Asia. Following the clash with China after annexing the Goa in 1962,\textsuperscript{153} Indian regional aggression diverted toward Pakistan and caused 1965 war. The war with Pakistan proved a stronger strategic bond between the United States and India and inflicted thinly a sense of mistrust in the strategic quarters of Pakistan. The nascent diplomatic breach between Islamabad and Washington was measured by Mao regime confidently. Foreign policy planners of Washington ranked India cautiously as a more valuable strategic prize than Pakistan which was cherished by the US gradually, and became an unquestionable feature of American regional policy in the subcontinent.

The separation of East Pakistan fuelled by India was an unpardonable act of New Delhi and an unforgettable catastrophe for Pakistan. India systematically trained and prepared Bengali militants force (Mukti Bahini) steadily.\textsuperscript{154} It was considered an attempt to demolish the very creation of Pakistan in 1971. The same year witnessed New Delhi-Moscow Treaty for peace, friendship, and cooperation which widened strategic ties between India and USSR, but it resulted in a parallel alliance of Islamabad-Washington-Beijing. No doubt, the Soviet assurance of neutralizing Indian threats of Pak-US and Sino-US alliance supported New Delhi confidently, but American undeclared diplomatic proposals for Islamabad was a part of

\textsuperscript{154} H. N. Gardezi, “This War,” \textit{Pakistan Forum} 03, No. 02 (December 1971): 03.
its grand Cold War policy. Clash of East Pakistan further revealed an anti-neighbouring attitude of New Delhi by interfering the internal affairs of bordering countries. The third clash between India and Pakistan during the Nixon administration impacted Indo-US ties negatively and pushed New Delhi toward Moscow further. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union undermined the American-Indian cooperation and posed the serious question of an Indian-coined notion of neutrality under NAM.

The unavoidable impacts of Cold War left South Asian states at the center of world politics divided by American and Soviet forces. The second communist and fifth nuclear power, China, emerged potentially an influential power in South Asia besides the Soviet Union and the United States. The involvement of Beijing in conflict-ridden South Asian environment effected portentously the strategic environment of the British-partitioned subcontinent. Therefore, the unfriendly interaction of two South Asian nuclear-armed states was provoked intensely by three nuclear armed powers of Cold War era. This interaction of nuclear powers later resulted in a triangular strategic contest among Beijing, New Delhi, and Islamabad.

Collapse of the Soviet Union created a power vacuum in the region, which later made the region a volatile area for Sino-US antagonism. No doubt, the strategic bilateralism constructed by various US presidents towards their South Asian allies provided weapons against overwhelming communist influences of Beijing and Moscow, but the supplied arms left disastrous consequences on Indo-Pak bilateral animosity. Instead of generating the opportunities for durable peace between New Delhi and Islamabad by defusing the vicious diplomatic anomaly and engaging both neighbouring states in normalization process, the prominent American politicians were highly determined in abandoning the anti-American development and proclaiming South Asia as a pro-US and an anti-communist region. In
short, the political and geostrategic consequences of American grand strategy during the intense rivalry with USSR manifested rigorously Indo-Pak politically unfriendly imperatives for each other.\textsuperscript{155}

The quest for global hegemony by expanding American sphere of influence and containing the role of the Soviet Union and its allies while implementing arms trade policy parallel to arms control plans on India and Pakistan did not divorce the subsequent goals of US foreign policy. For instance, to make India and Pakistan close American partner and active allies of Washington in fighting against the Soviet Union and preventing the emerging influence of communism from South Asia always dominated the other foreign policy goals of the United States. The advancement of freshly created NPT and its wider extension across the globe was affected acutely and proved to be an insufficient measure in 1974.

The government of Indira Gandhi was not willing to accept the non-proliferation measures designed by superpowers particularly and the United States specifically, as mentioned in an assessment of CIA. A declassified document containing the American assessment of evolving nuclear competition of subcontinent maintained on September 06, 1985 explained explicitly Indira’s uncooperative behavior for the promotion of global non-proliferation regime.\textsuperscript{156} Later on, the nuclear domino touched South Asia and the prominent advocators of American non-proliferation mission stunned by Indira Gandhi. Indira regime arranged its first nuclear test by exploding a nuclear device peacefully. It was measured undoubtedly as an attempt of New Delhi for jumping into the existing nuclear club of five states.

\textsuperscript{155} Gregory S. Sanjian, “Cold War Imperatives and Quarrelsome Clients: Modeling U.S. and USSR Arms Transfers to India and Pakistan,” \textit{The Journal of Conflict Resolution} 42, No. 01 (February 1998), 98-100.

8. Smiling Buddha: An Irritant in Indo-US Relations

The nuclear program initiated by Nehru who was the founding father of the Indian nation and a nuclear aspirant who was ambitious highly for empowering his country with nuclear armed status. He was desired for proving a hegemonic position to his country in the regional and international politics. No doubt, the Nehru government laid the foundations of nuclear program, but this was completed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The major credit went to the Indian nuclear establishment, structured by Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha, a close entrusted and dedicated nuclear scientist of Nehru government. Dr. Bhabha, the pioneer of Indian nuclear program, considered to be a father of Indian bomb. He managed his services devotedly at Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) and Trombay Atomic Energy Establishment (now Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, BARC).157 As an acquaintance of Nehru, he kept the unwritten secret of national nuclear policy as a confidential matter between him and Nehru. With death of Nehru, the supervision of Indian nuclear quest was transferred to his successor Lal Bahadur Shastri who realized the need of nuclear armed status in response to Chinese detonation of nuclear devices in 1964. Shastri continued the mission of Nehru, but died in 1966, and the government was handed over to Indira Gandhi. Prime Minister Gandhi decided to acknowledge Indian nuclear program after the death of Dr. Bhabha in a plane crash on January 24, 1966.158

The first state to declare its nuclear status outside the five-member nuclear club was India. The nuclear weapon states and permanent members of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) were surprised by peaceful nuclear tests conducted by Indira regime. The

American-led alliance of Western states missed the Indian preparation for Smiling Buddha in 1974. The crisis-ridden era of thirty-seventh American president (Richard Nixon) blinded the US Congress from the nuclear development of subcontinent.\textsuperscript{159} The leading policy-makers under Nixon administration gave low priority to the Indian nuclear development instead of receiving reports on nuclear preparation of the Indira Gandhi.\textsuperscript{160}

The Soviet trap of Vietnam war along with Chinese dispute over Tibet appeared the bigger landmark developments of biggest communist powers of the world. These developments lowered the nuclear India in US broader agenda of confronting counterbalancing forces of Cold War. In 1972, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) working under the State Department predicted the nuclear intentions of Gandhi regime. The NPR further observed the nuclear plans of Indira Gandhi which could initiate an unstoppable nuclear race in the region by secretly conducting the nuclear tests.\textsuperscript{161} The NPR was an active branch of US intelligence community and it was founded by Secretary of State, George Marshall, in 1947.\textsuperscript{162} American foreign policy was mainly aimed at curbing the expanding influences of Moscow and Beijing in adjoining areas by exporting the very anti-American ideology. The American grand strategy prioritized modestly the watchful intelligence reports on the initial nuclear growth of South Asia.

The American-Canadian collaborative efforts for supplying nuclear reactor technology to India for meeting its rapidly increasing energy demand surprised the


\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{162} “Bureau of Intelligence and Research”, U.S. Department of State, \url{https://www.state.gov/s/inr/} (accessed on March 9, 2017).
international community in 1974.\textsuperscript{163} The Canadian-Indian Reactor Uranium System (CIRUS) at BARC provided by Canada in 1954 turned critical in July 1960. Additionally, American provided heavy water to CIRUS became another critical element of Indian nuclear program.\textsuperscript{164} The CIRUS was decided to be used for peaceful purposes initially. It later became critical when it enabled New Delhi to conduct its first nuclear test.\textsuperscript{165} The CIRUS went perilous and sparked a ferocious wave of frustration among Indian supporting great powers or main suppliers of its nuclear facilities. It was an intentional endeavour to enter in the nuclear clubhouse on the shoulders of the United States and Canada because both nations made New Delhi to operate smoothly its nuclear reactors in the presence of NPT.\textsuperscript{166} Instead of accepting the maintained safeguard standards of IAEA for carrying the peaceful nuclear activities, the Indian authorities started to critically examine the role of IAEA and its criteria for developing safeguards for nuclear reactors.\textsuperscript{167} The American authorities learned the critical nature of CIRUS which was provided by Canada.\textsuperscript{168}

In reaction to PNE, President Jimmy Carter under Non-proliferation Act suspended nuclear help to India in March 1978 and required New Delhi to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA for inspection. The decision of Carter was denied gaudily by India. The Reagan era viewed India substantially as a reliable future partner and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was agreed to meet White House on strong footings. Western intelligence institutions were failed to detect the preparation for the nuclear test at Trombay, the South-eastern suburb of


\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{168}
Mumbai. A secret visit of Kissinger to China arranged by Pakistan communicated clearly Nixon on tilt towards Islamabad and Beijing, which undermined the position of India in White House. Indian diminishing priority in White House did not only result in unnoticed nuclear developments for the first test, but it also caused Indian refusal for joining the NPT. The decision of Indira Gandhi for staying away from NPT remained an unimportant issue for Kissinger and Nixon.

President Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-147) for accommodating Indian demands in 1984, especially for the supply of dual-use technology for the improvement of bilateral relations. The NSDD-147 was architected mainly for South Asian allies in response to communist expansionary thrust towards Kabul and Tehran, as discussed earlier. The Soviet support to Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979 and Saur revolution of Afghanistan in 1978 alarmed American global interests and pinpointed the geostrategic importance of Indo-Pak subcontinent. Raising New Delhi-Beijing rapprochement in addition to Indo-Pak enhanced bilateralism with the United States initiated the final phase of Cold War. President Reagan outlined the US objectives in South Asia such as the normalization of Indo-Pak relations, support to Zia regime, implementation of NPT, and thwarting the Soviet influence in the region. Reagan administration involved both Indian and Pakistani authorities in various high-level meetings coupled with focusing the defusing of the inflexible basis of enduring Indo-Pak rivalry. Parallel to providing strategic aid to the Islamization policy of Zia for the empowering of Jihad culture under an anti-Soviet move, American President stressed to sell arms to India along with technology transfer. Washington started to think, White House needed to accept the structuring of strategic ties


170 The White House, U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan, op. cit.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.
with New Delhi which could reduce Indian dependence on Moscow, and that would strengthen American role ultimately in South Asia.\textsuperscript{173}

During the 1980s, the landmark development changed Indian fate by creating an ideal position of New Delhi in White House in the end of Cold War period. The declining role of Soviet Union in world politics and its dismantling position of expansionary foreign policy calculated by Indira Gandhi cautiously. Indian diplomatic tilt towards the United States, during the second term of Gandhi as the Prime Minister, forced White House to realize Indian strategically significant role in the regional and global politics. An increased role of America in Indian foreign policy convinced New Delhi ultimately to explicitly denounce Soviet alliance, and such action would be considered the US support for defeating communism.\textsuperscript{174} On the Indian side, the efforts to become a member of UN Security Council, to strengthen its position over Kashmir issue, and to deter Pakistan along with its developing ties with China were the fundamental objectives of Ms. Gandhi for joining the American alliance.

The governments in world capitals were surprised not only by Smiling Buddha but the un-safeguarded standards of Indian nuclear program which alarmed the great powers. Bhopal Leak incident in December 1984 (also known as Bhopal disaster) in Union Carbide Limited (UCIL) pesticide Plant complicated the diplomatic connection of New Delhi with Washington.\textsuperscript{175} Indian unsuccessful attempt of extradition of American chief executive of UCIL on criminal charges further harmed the Indo-US bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{176} The leading research organizations around the globe, including American, started to believe suspiciously the sensitive safeguarded standards of Indian nuclear program. This global response to the

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\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
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UCIL incident raised several critical and unanswered questions to Indian nuclear installations. Instead of running the unsafeguarded nuclear facilities against the rising criticism of international community, the Hindu political elite was anxious about a close relation of Reagan to the sixth President of Pakistan (Muhammad Zia ul Haq). Such action of Reagan administration translated by India as an act of standing by Islamabad and opposing or coercing Indian position in regional politics. Both Prime Ministers of Gandhi family (Indira and Rajiv) were, in short, more apprehensive about the growing significance of Islamabad before the United States instead of its revisiting Indian hostile behaviour for Pakistan.

The roots of Reagan-Zia partnership fostered the collaborated connections two-sided intelligence communities. Historically, the anti-communist collaboration between ISI and CIA scared RAW temporarily which was established immediately after the Sino-Indian (1962) and Indo-Pak (1965) border clashes. In 1968, the weak domain of Indira Gandhi (the foreign intelligence) emphasized the creation of a secret intelligence agency for execution of external plans, according to a report of Council on Foreign Relations. An enthusiastic US policy of Zia was an explicit outcome of Indian nuclear aspiration. No doubt, India’s nuclear program was primarily a response to nuclear China, but it had a worse impact on the strategic calculations of Islamabad. Hence, the American intelligence community calculated the level of Indian threat perception accurately. In this way, a fully supported economic and strategic connection with superpowers fighting against Indian-allied Soviet Union worked towards becoming a suitable foreign policy option of Islamabad.

9. Aftermaths of Smiling Buddha

178 Ibid.
The proclamation of peaceful attention of first nuclear test, conducted by Indira Gandhi, was an endeavour to avert the criticism of world capitals because the Gandhi government used the acquired peaceful nuclear energy for announcing of the nuclear status of her country globally. The states helped in CIRUS (Canada and US) reacted critically to the Indian peaceful nuclear tests in the light of ongoing debate of international non-proliferation regime under newly created NPT, because New Delhi denied the options ingenuously to become a signatory of NPT.

The foreign supplied assistance for the intended functioning of Trombay nuclear facility activated the foreign responses swiftly in the post-1974 era. The international efforts to avert the further proliferation of dual-use nuclear technology, related devices, and material under the NPT focused Indira Gandhi.\(^{179}\) The nuclear club of five states responded consequently and utterly emphasize the necessary countermeasures against Pokhran-I. The Pokhran-I was the coded name of first peaceful nuclear explosion which was arranged under the supervision of BARC. The nuclear explosions of a non-nuclear weapon state and a non-member of NPT sparked an international debate, and the international community considered seriously the spread of Indian model of misusing dual-technology. The creation of NSG was an immediate response from the five major proponents (including the US) of the international non-proliferation regime against the Indian first nuclear explosion.\(^{180}\)

The NSG was created in 1974 in response to Smiling Buddha and in order to strictly check the global proliferation of nuclear technology, and to prevent the conversion of peaceful nuclear technology into non-peaceful dimensions.\(^{181}\) The nuclear tests of a non-nuclear weapon state was a serious set-back for international community and it alarmed the

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\(^{179}\) Daryl G. Kimball, “Next Step: The NSG,” *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 36, No. 06 (July/August 2006), 03.


bells of newly established non-proliferation regime. An American Jew of German origin, and National Security advisor of Nixon Administration, Henry Kissinger, pinpointed reluctantly the notion of establishing an international group of states against Indian opposition of global non-proliferation norms by violating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main motivations of Kissinger persuaded the proponents of non-proliferation to support the creation of NSG against the peaceful nuclear aspirations of Indira Gandhi. The United States induced the American allies to support the conception of supplier group certainly. By addressing the Indian nuclear question, the primary objective of Washington was to keep the United States engaged equally in the changing politics of all regions while encouraging its allies to provide cooperation for American decisions.\footnote{182}{William Burr, “The Making of the Nuclear Supplier Group, 1974 – 1976,” 

The peaceful nuclear shock from subcontinent further received an American-specific response in 1978 in the formulation of Nuclear Non-proliferation Act (NNPA) which was passed by Congress for the suspension of technological assistance to Indian nuclear reactors situated at Tarapur, Maharashtra.\footnote{183}{Sharon Squassoni, Looking Back: The 1978 Nuclear Nonprolifertaion Act,” \textit{Arms Control Today}, December 08, 2008, \url{https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/lookingback_NPT} (accessed on March 13, 2017).} The Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) started functioning in 1969 followed by a US-India agreement, which was signed in 1963, for the construction of atomic power plant.\footnote{184}{John Walsh, “Critics Dispute India – U.S. Nuclear Trade – Off,” \textit{Science}, Vol. 22, No. 4610 (August 1983), 532.} The US federal law enacted Non-proliferation Act against the emerging perilous threats belonged to the non-peaceful consumption of nuclear technology which was realized a bigger threat to international peace.
The Act was formulated to maintain a more resourceful and proficient mechanism for the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear devices.\footnote{“Nuclear Non – Proliferation Act of 1978,” \url{https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Legal_documents/national_provisions/UnitedStatesofAmerica_NuclearNon-ProliferationAct1978_100378.PDF} (accessed on March 12, 2017).} NNPA was a mindful attempt to tighten the criteria of American nuclear cooperation, particularly with India, a non-member state of NPT. The application of full-scope safeguards on the provided nuclear assistance was considered surely to be an unavoidable prerequisite for nuclear cooperation agreements between the United States and other nations. The main debates in the Congress revisited the controversial nuclear trade with India which undermined the role of US global non-proliferation campaign and non-proliferation laws.\footnote{Sharon Squassoni, op. cit.} Several critical questions encircled the US-based exponents of making effective and efficient non-proliferation laws for the strengthening of newly established NPT. Gandhi regime after PNE criticised openly the role of advocators of non-proliferation, she also undermined the NPT by calling it a “discriminatory” platform. The nuclear activities from the states, especially which were the non-party to NPT and the recipients of American nuclear assistance, were placed under international criticism.\footnote{Zafar Iqbal Cheema, op. cit. 85.} Such developments underestimated the growing global norms related to the principles of the international non-proliferation regime.\footnote{Michael Brzoska, “Is The Nuclear Non – Proliferation System a Regime? A Comment on Trevor McMorris Tate,” \textit{Journal of Peace Research} 29, No. 02 (May 1992): 218.}

The political elites from New Delhi protested against the denial of White House for accepting legitimately the Indian nuclear tests and maintaining of aforementioned punitive measures in response to Smiling Buddha was cause by an anxious post-1974 environment. Because American apprehensions to avert the nuclear chain-reaction was highlighted to foster the counter-proliferation efforts generally sponsored by the United States. The Carter regime was highly committed to widening the scope of global non-proliferation norms. Therefore,
Carter government coined the notion of NNPA and viewed Indian nuclear explosions a threat to US global mission of stabilizing international system.

American demands of placing all nuclear facilities of India under international inspection were viewed by New Delhi as an attempt of coloring Indo-Pak strategic relations according to worldwide non-proliferation arrangements inaugurated by NPT.\textsuperscript{189} The reformed US cooperative law was intended to culminate comprehensive responsive values for formulating international initiatives along with designing of severe export restrictions for revising the main patterns of its foreign relations.\textsuperscript{190} The Congress demanded that the recipients of American nuclear supplies should fulfill the legal standards outlined by IAEA for nuclear power plants which would leave unambiguously the controversial Tarapur sale behind cooperative connections of both states.\textsuperscript{191}

The Indians refusal to end its nuclear weapons ambitions annoyed Canada and United States, and both states ceased the nuclear supplies to initial nuclear reactors. The breach of peaceful pledges of confining nuclear technology to the promised purposes remained merely a matter of inexcusable or unexplainable importance for Indira Gandhi. The future nuclear journey of New Delhi forced the Hindu nuclear lobby to accept agreeably the international inspection (safeguards) for nuclear reactors, established by the international suppliers. In this way, the nuclear facilities of Tarapur and Rajasthan enabled Indian nuclear lobby to invest local efforts in Madras by duplicating Canadian designs because the copying of foreign designs was not a bidding clause of the Indian-Canadian agreement.\textsuperscript{192}

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\textsuperscript{189} P. R. Chari, “An Indian Reaction to U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” \textit{International Security} 03, No. 02 (Fall 1978), 57-60.
\textsuperscript{190} Frederick Williams, “The United States Congress and Nonproliferation,” \textit{International Security} 03, No. 02 (Fall 1978): 45.
\textsuperscript{192} Gary Milhollin, “Stopping the Bomb,” \textit{The American Journal of International Law} 81, No. 03 (July 1987): 596.
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For Madras, the Chinese supply of heavy water was received to overcome the shortage of heavy water in 1983.\textsuperscript{193} Canadian assisted Rajasthani nuclear reactor again copied for the building of second Madras nuclear facility (Dhruva).\textsuperscript{194} The DAE’s second largest wing next to the BARC was established in 1971 – the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR). The IGCAR positioned in Kalpakkam, Chennai (Madras) is responsible for the substantial growth of Indian nuclear program. In 1985, the IGCAR constructed Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) with French assistance.\textsuperscript{195} The enactment of NNPA for banning of further nuclear support to India highlighted the significance of Paris before New Delhi, and France was preferred as a reliable partner. As Paris jumped in deteriorated Indo-US relations and activated its own supplies for Tarapur reactor in 1982.\textsuperscript{196}

The claims of Indira Gandhi for stopping the US supplies would consider a breach of the signed contract between two nations despite its weak standing in world politics. Washington got Paris to complete the scheduled supply and avoided the option of the showdown. A substantial space for diplomatic remedies did not eliminate the Indo-US cooperation in other fields. The high technology trade including the engines of fighter jets remained active.\textsuperscript{197} Therefore, frequently occurring acrimonious diplomacy between New Delhi and Washington replaced the traditional bilateral pattern of both sides with new realities in the absence of Soviet Union. The unipolar world in the absence of a communist passion of expansion after the disappearance of Soviet Union from the map of the world was a responsible factor for a close Indo-US strategic interaction.

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 608.
The fall of Berlin wall did not only end the dividing forces of Cold War from Germany, but it also marked a milestone step toward the overhauling of world politics by ending the decades-long US-Soviet rivalry. The constructing of the Soviet-less world of Cold War-free principles and rules for the world politics perceived to be a world of economic opportunities and strategic incentives. The vanishing hegemony of bipolar system hampered the conventional wisdom of foreign policy decision-makers around the globe. The abrupt changes in the international political equation required several nations, including India, to redefine their position in the international system and adopt new designs of unconventional foreign policy choices.\textsuperscript{198}

In the light of the non-traditional response to the changing global scenarios, the Indian politicians were agreed to involve in evolving bipolar-competition free global culture of the embryonic unipolar American system. The Indian quest for security in a post-Sovietism environment was the chief concern of New Delhi which could perversive its freedom while enlarging its role in regional and international systems. The only pre-eminent state from the subcontinent, India, decided to define its role as an anti-Western country or a Soviet-client nation initially.\textsuperscript{199} The later invention of US friendship and formally aligning of core foreign values with Americanized world were considered to be most suitable options by leading architectures of Narasimha Rao government.

The Indian political circles after the breakup of Soviet Union preferred an American inclined policy because a collapsed communist system transferred many states towards a unipolar center of international relations which was considered mainly as an appropriate way

\textsuperscript{198} “Clinton’s Foreign Policy,” \textit{Foreign Policy}, No. 121 (November – December 2000): 22.
to address the approaching challenges of the twenty-first century. The American serious endeavour to embark a reciprocal response was constructed on Indian image of a potential ally in the Asian larger geostrategic landscape. White House perceived India as an emerging Asian power of the twenty-first century and a source of counterbalancing the anti-American forces. George H. W. Bush observed India evidently as a ‘strategic partner’ for the new millennium. The Narasimha Rao regime was keenly interested in seeking greater economic reforms in the forthcoming globalized future of world and the Rao government adopted a rationalist approach for accepting the leading economic cooperation of Bush regime.

The Clinton administration with a fresh look welcomed India (a former Soviet-client nation) and began a phase of the matured framework of confidence building with its new South Asian ally. Both states recovered the traditional differences constructed mainly on bilateral mistrusts and skeptical disbeliefs. The new swing of Washington watched India in the global paradigm of established American preferences of non-proliferation, human rights, democracy, and promotion of NPT. The ninth and first non-Hindi speaking Prime Minister of India, Narasimha Rao, and his economist Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh introduced major economic shifts to incorporate their country with the new realities of the world free from Sovietism. Rao, the first post-Cold War Indian Prime Minister, reflected a thinly reluctant attitude toward Clinton due to abovementioned American concerns.

The potential of acquiring nuclear capability was reached its zenith during Rao government, and the successor of Rao, Vajpayee, accepted brusquely the nuclear growth of

his country while admiring the role of previous administration in 1996. The intentions of Narasimha Rao to proclaim the nuclear status of New Delhi were impeded by the US pressure in 1995. December 19, 1995, was originally planned to detonate the nuclear devices in the deserts of Rajasthan but President Clinton dithered Rao. The proofs of American satellite about the continuing preparation for nuclear tests were conveyed to Rao government by Clinton administration. The Indian diplomatic response to the US inquires delayed the nuclear tests efficaciously, but the pressures of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) surrounded Indian parliament. In order to keep the Clinton into Indian support, while keeping New Delhi away from the debate of CTBT, the decision of testing nuclear devices was halted. In this way, the postponing of a nuclear test by preventing the pressures from President Abdul Kalam diverted the political discussions toward CTBT.

Moreover, the efforts of Indian Ministry of Defence for the research and development of missile program, under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), raised further the strategic significance of New Delhi. The initial phase of IGMDP in the last decade of Cold War became a critical issue of Rao government due to Indian relevance to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR, an informal group of 35 states, is fundamentally established to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for chemical, biological, and other nuclear attacks. The main tenants of MTCR highlighted the IGMDP in their debates after the tests of Prithvi and

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204 “Narasimha Rao, not Vajpayee, was the PM Who set India on a Nuclear Explosion Path,” July 06, 2016, https://scroll.in/article/810874/narasimha-rao-not-vajpayee-was-the-pm-who-set-india-on-a-nuclear-explosion-path (accessed on March 14, 2017).
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
Agni missiles. The failing attempts of MTCR to hinder missile development program in India slowed the progress of IGMDP noticeably. Additionally, the extensive space development carried by Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) in the form of Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) and Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) highlighted India internationally. Furthermore, the call of Clinton for initiating a multi-state convention for the banning of fissile material usable for the production of nuclear weapons or its existence outside the international safeguards further tightened the nuclear ambitions of New Delhi. The combination of the missile, space, and nuclear-related restrictions of Clinton administration, in this way, communicated clearly the world community in general, and India in particular, the US non-proliferation mission of post-Cold War system.

The effort to monopolize the nuclear politics by restricting the nuclear weapon status to five states was viewed as a discrete theme of CTBT by Prime Minister H. D. Gowda who viewed CTBT analogous to discriminatory NPT. The pressure to become a member of global test banning association of states was observed an attempt of great powers to seriously consider Indian nuclear weapon status. The international pressure to sign the treaty for banning the nuclear tests troubled New Delhi in 1996. Prime Minister Deve Gowda raised Indian concerns on the signing of CTBT while viewing it as an extension of NPT and another attempt of five nuclear weapons states to bend India. The short prime ministership of I.K. Gujral after Gowda attempted to improve foreign relations with regional and the extra-regional powers. The Gujral Doctrine was an optimistic overview of making faithful and

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213 Ibid.
trustful foreign policy for engaging neighbouring countries, except Pakistan. It was an endeavour to create a good image of India. Gujral shared his views with the world during the 52nd session of UN General Assembly and pinpointed the application of sustainable economic development program in developing regions.\textsuperscript{215} He also discussed the peaceful resolution of Kashmir issue during a meeting with Clinton.\textsuperscript{216} The second term of BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee diverted the critical dimensions of White House towards New Delhi when Vajpayee decision of nuclear explosion violated the US-led global counter-proliferation model deliberately.

A search of a more reliable partner than former, the Soviet Union in a world of the communist retreat was an unavoidable demand of India in the post-Soviet world order. In the last phase of Cold War, Moscow forced India to think about the world beyond Soviet Union. Apparently, India supported Soviet invasion of Kabul, but it was a surprise for New Delhi. Because it was Soviet invasion of Kabul without confidently informing New Delhi which forced Indian leaders to search for an alternative friendship among the great powers.\textsuperscript{217} A revised Indian foreign policy even focused an improved diplomatic connection with the Western bloc and decided to depart from the Eastern world of vanishing powers. The multilateral framework at regional and international levels was also highly prioritized by New Delhi in order to cultivate a reasonable position in the changing dynamics of the international system.\textsuperscript{218} In this way, the end of Cold War marked a new age of Indo-US bilateral ties, as discussed by Dr. Adil Sultan, a visiting research fellow at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Dr. Sultan during an interview outlined the emerging interaction of

\textsuperscript{215} Sumit Ganguly, “India in 1997: Another Year of Turmoil,” \textit{Asian Survey} 38, No. 02 (February 1998): 129.
\textsuperscript{216} B.M. “For a Date with Clinton,” \textit{Economic and Political Weekly} 32, No. 36 (September 6 – 12, 1997), 2237-2238.
two states by saying that the substantial growth of two-sided diplomacy started explicitly in the post-Cold War environment.  

Decision of the nuclear explosion frozen thinly the mutual diplomatic initiatives of both states and pushed back their bilateral connections in an era of a slapped-sanction. Indo-US relations effected by pro-Pakistani American policy barely recovered by New Delhi-Washington state authorities in the post-Soviet period and the South Asian nuclear arms race sparked by Vajpayee government in 1998 placed the bilateral diplomatic efforts into a new phase. The elected Prime Minister BJP introduced internationally its “Hindu Bomb” in 1998, as mentioned by Ian Talbot in his narration on the politics of subcontinent, A Modern History of South Asia: Politics, States, Diasporas. An improved image of India from an anti-American ally to a close-US partner again attached a stigma to New Delhi in the broader vision of US policy response to South Asian politics. The Indian view of securing US support parallel to the global proclamation of Washington as its strategic partner interested communicated the robust foundations of Indo-US nexus. The desire of Washington for upholding Indian vision of becoming a regional power became temporarily an unavoidable reality for the leading policymakers of the Vajpayee government.

11. Post-Nuclearized South Asia

The Indian dream of becoming a regional power did not only result in offensive hegemonic behaviour of New Delhi against territorially adjoining nations, but it also let the Vajpayee government to expand its influence over the expanse of its neighbouring states. Moreover, a desire for obtaining substantively the support of superpowers replaced the Soviet

219 Author email correspondence, December 07, 2017.
Union with the United States in the post-Cold War period. The fundamental objective of securing American backup was attached undeniably to the rational decision of securing American support for the achievement of the status of a great power within South Asia, and an influential power in the world.\footnote{Ummu Salma Bava, “India’s Role in the Emerging World Order,” \textit{Briefing Paper}, Fes New Delhi, March 2007, \url{http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04372.pdf} (accessed on January 27, 2018).} The application of non-proliferation norms on South Asia became one of the principal objectives of US foreign policy in the world of disintegrated Soviet forces after the peaceful end of Cold War.\footnote{William C. Potter, “India and the New Look of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy, \textit{Nonproliferation Review} 12, No. 02 (July 2005): 341.} The emergence of a unipolar world for the advancement of enduring American values, and perceiving of India as a future economic power became main priorities of Washington. Such scenarios led White House to adjust and reshape the outmoded patterns of its foreign policy according to the new realities of the world.

Traditional political configurations of South Asia transformed overtly into nuclear politics in 1998 when Operation Shakti alarmed world capitals by detonating of five nuclear devices under Pokhran-II (the second episode of 1974 Pokhran-I).\footnote{“India’s Nuclear Weapon Program: Operation Shakti,” March 30, 2001, \url{http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaShakti.html} (accessed on January 27, 2018).} Prime Minister Vajpayee decided to lead the nuclear lobby of his nation and convinced his government influentially on nuclear explosion. Indian strategic quest of dominating the region by threatening Pakistan and China alongside adding New Delhi to the existing five states nuclear club. American reaction concluded a series of sanction and enhanced the pressure on New Delhi for becoming a party to CTBT.\footnote{Michael Krepon, “The 1998 Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Test,” \textit{Arms Control Today} 38, No. 04 (May 2008): 52.} Immediately after the nuclear test, President Clinton emphasized the application of CTBT in South Asia.\footnote{Ibid.} The state authorities from Washington translated the nuclear explosion in serious wordings and proclaimed the Vajpayee decision a
ferocious Indian move in the history of the subcontinent. China and Pakistan, besides the United States, started to examine the Indian nuclear weapon status seriously.

The endeavour of Pakistan to neutralize the Indian advantageous position in the regional strategic landscape of South Asia was undermined. No doubt, the BJP leader Vajpayee granted a nuclear-armed status to his country successfully, but he failed to control the domino effects of its nuclear weapons status on neighbouring states. In reaction to the Pokhran-II, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif planned categorically to design a suitable reply. Similar to India, Pakistan averted American pressure and finalized Chagai-I and Chagai-II (coded names of nuclear explosions) on May 28, 1998 after fifteen days of Pokhran-II. On next day, Prime Minister Sharif acknowledged formally the detonation of nuclear devices in response to India.

The strategic circles of international community along with the leaders from world capitals started to view cautiously nuclearized South Asia under Indo-Pak protracted conflict. The efforts to fabricate a conducive regional environment for durable peace and stability were eternally halted. In response to the nuclearization of the two archrivals states of the subcontinent, the UNSC passed a resolution on June 06, 1998. The Resolution 1172 condemned the India-Pakistan specific nuclear development of subcontinent and urged both states to subscribe to NPT and CTBT in Geneva. The nuclear test of two states considered to be a threat to the regional peace and stability. The economic contingency plans for addressing the expected phase of Washington designed

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227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
sanctions followed by other states encircled the nuclearized subcontinent largely. The deliberate reliance on the acquisition of nuclear status provided a legitimate reason to India for claiming of its entry into the great powers club of nuclear weapons states, but it cracked Indo-US strategic ties temporarily.

The United States decided to adopt punitive measures against India under the anti-proliferation act of 1994 passed by Clinton administration. The act dictated the American government to impose economic sanction on a state if it found involved in transferring or receiving the nuclear explosive devices or detonate the nuclear explosive devices.231 Washington terminated the economic aid to New Delhi but did not stop humanitarian assistance which was $ 142 million annual.232 The sanction barred the supply of specific kind of material relevant to defence and technology. Under the broader financial actions, the sanctions ended the credit along with credit guarantee to New Delhi.233 Moreover, Clinton opposed the role of international financial institutions in providing economic assistance to India. Clinton highlighted the World Bank which provided approximately US$ 1.5 billion to New Delhi.234 The Shairf government was also placed under sanction when it replied nuclear tests conducted by Vajpayee regime on 28 May 1998. The above-mentioned non-proliferation act passed in 1994 imposed seven different economic sanctions without making humanitarian aid ineffective.235

The strategic disaster of South Asia which started in 1974 dragged the whole region under the deliberate nuclear shadows. Indian hawkish leadership made South Asia a more

233 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
dangerous and less stable region of the world. The strategic community across the globe began to worry about Indo-Pak dispute in the existence of nuclear weapon capabilities of two states. The strategic competition between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan generated an impression about unthinkable catastrophic future of the region. In this way, the great responsibility of taking Indo-Pak strategic competition started seriously to rely on the US, a sole great power involved simultaneously with both India and Pakistan diplomatically.

The 9/11 brought a shift in American South Asian policy when American Congress enabled President Bush to waive India-Pakistan specific sanction. The decision for lifting sanctions demanded cooperation from Vajpayee government in the war on terror. During an interview with media, Yashwant Sinha, the Indian Finance Minister, appreciated the Bush decision of waving off the sanctions and considered it a positive move. President Bush lifted all the economic sanctions on September 22, 2001, except the sanctions which were proliferation-related trade. The Bush administration viewed friendship with India as a strategic priority because New Delhi could not only serve the greater American interest under the global war on terror, but it would also help Washington in counterbalancing Beijing. Immediately after testing nuclear devices, Prime Minister Vajpayee communicated clearly to Clinton government the nuclear threat emanating from bordering China. Eventually, the strong diplomatic bounds of Washington declared Pakistan a close non-NATO ally, and a close strategic partner.

Apart from Pakistan, the relations between India and the US strengthened by broadly covering multiple areas of cooperation instead of facing global criticism over the signing of a deal for civil nuclear cooperation. The global condemnation of New Delhi’s proclamation of

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237 Ibid.
239 Izuyama Marie and Ogawa Shinichi, op. cit., 63.
its nuclear status internationally harmed thinly the collaborative foundations of Indo-US relations, but the damaging diplomatic trends between both governments recovered in 2005. No doubt, the imposition of the sanctions under Clinton administration was an annoying factor harming the American cooperative connections to India, but the imposed sanction first eased, then erased with the approval of US Congress in a year under George W. Bush. Moreover, President Bush changed the course of history by considering India a close strategic partner. The Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, proved to be a landmark improvement in the South Asian strategic landscape.240

12. Post Nuclearized Indo-Pak Hostility

A dramatic change in South Asian engagement if Washington began to emerge when Clinton government viewed India as a potential state for US. On one hand, President Clinton attempted to recalibrate the foundations of Indo-US relations. On the other hand, Vajpayee government perceived it as an appropriate opportunity for the gaining of substantial position in American South Asian priorities.241 Later New Delhi realized its importance in White House and started to convert Clinton against Sharif government. It was considered as coercive diplomacy of New Delhi for managing bilateral relations with Washington.242 Vajpayee sought to change Clinton anger which was the result of Indian decision of detonation of nuclear devices.

Clinton expressed his anger at a closed-door meeting in White House. The role of Pakistan in the Kargil dragged the US away from Islamabad when Clinton started to criticize Sharif regime publically and its position over Kashmir. The main circles of American policymakers supported Vajpayee government, and India gained considerable support on Capitol Hill. A resolution for Pakistan withdrawal from Kargil was passed in the US House of Representatives along with another resolution calling for stopping financial assistance to Islamabad by suspending the major loans of World Bank. The second resolution passed by the House International Relations Committee tried indirectly to exert pressure on Islamabad. Kargil was the first incident when Washington decided to remain one-sided by supporting Vajpayee and examining Sharif government critically. The US Central Command’s officer, Anthony Zinni, visited Islamabad and arranged a meeting of Sharif with Clinton. This meeting urged Islamabad to withdraw from Kargil.

In addition to Kargil war, from 2001 to 2002, the US response military standoff after a terrorist attack on India parliament in December 2001 further provided an opportunity to New Delhi for enhancing of its position in Washington. In response to Indian military mobilization and American pressure under the pretext of war on terror, President Musharraf reformed the internal security situation of Pakistan by banning the various extremist and

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243 Harish Kapur, op. cit., 370.
245 Ibid.
246 Ibid.
247 Myra Macdonald, Defeat is an Orphan: How Pakistan Lost the Great South Asian War (London: Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2017), 64.
248 Ibid., 65.
249 Ibid.
sectarian organizations.\textsuperscript{251} However, the US pressures for fighting more in counterterror campaign encircled Islamabad unlike New Delhi.

Besides Kargil, and the Indo-Pak military standoff, the cooperation between United States and India was significantly strengthened during the subsequent crisis of South Asia. On November 26 2008, in India at the tip of Mumbai peninsula shocked the international and regional politics of South Asia.\textsuperscript{252} The tragic incident of Mumbai was condemned by the leading state authorities around the globe including Pakistan. However, the role of Mohammad Ajmal Amir Kasab\textsuperscript{253} diverted the pressure of international community toward Islamabad. Pakistan a frontline state in US-led global war on terror was highly criticised and the counterterror efforts of Islamabad were underestimated. The Mumbai attacks were considered again as an opportunity by Hindu leadership from New Delhi and it augmented its significant position in American South Asian priorities. Parallel to Mumbai attack, the year 2008 concluded the historical Indo-US civil nuclear deal which was started in 2005 between President Bush and the Premier Manmohan.\textsuperscript{254} The war on terror resulted into exacerbating the element of mistrust in Washington, bringing India closer to Washington. Although the United States acknowledged the geostrategic significance of Pakistan in the war on terror and appreciated its cooperation for fighting in Afghanistan, but New Delhi became more important than Islamabad in its greater South Asian designs.\textsuperscript{255}

India emerged as an important US ally because of its vast size, democratic political system coupled with its scientific and strategic potential, and unignorably a “big emerging

\textsuperscript{251} Ian Talbot, “Pakistan in 2002: Democracy, Terrorism, and Brinkmanship,” \textit{Asian Survey} 43, No. 01 (January/February 2003): 201.
\textsuperscript{252} Shivshanker Menon, \textit{Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy} (Haryana: Penguin Random House, 2016), 89.
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.
market.” Moreover, an anti-Beijing attitude of New Delhi and its desires for becoming a hegemonic state in the territorial and maritime politics of South Asia and beyond became fascinating points for Washington. In this way, the post-nuclearized era of subcontinent witnessed a considerable support of United States to India.

13. Indo-US Nuclear Deal

A revised version of the post-Cold War and post-war on terror designs of the US geostrategic policy augmented Indian significance in the broader framework of US South Asian engagement. Negotiated in 2005, the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation became an unquestionable reality of world politics in 2008 when American Congress approved the deal finally. By paving a new path for further collaboration, the governments from both sides undoubtedly agreed to improve strategic differences, to uphold India economically and in the field of energy security, and to invest national potential for the strengthening of international non-proliferation regime. In order to engage India actively against emerging China, and to support economically the financial growth of New Delhi, Washington showed its commitment for bringing its South Asian strategic partner close to international non-proliferation regime despite of overriding Indian negation of becoming a signatory to the CTBT and NPT.

The deal outlined superficially a close format of bilateral strategic interaction, and it caused unimaginable long-term consequences, because the civil nuclear deal acknowledged formally the de-facto nuclear status of India and started showing a dichotomous aspect of

American international non-proliferation campaign. The US efforts to counter the proliferation of nuclear devices and related material beyond five recognised nuclear weapons states were seriously undermined. The nuclear deal made Washington and New Delhi agreed on a strong strategic relationship under a close interaction of achieving common interests. The agreement for carrying future civil nuclear cooperation declared India a sole beneficiary of American strategic aid in South Asia, and it lacked adequate guarantees from India for adhering to its commitments defined in the deal. International community believed widely the foreign supplied nuclear assistance would let India to meet clearly its growing energy needs by fully devoting its local nuclear fuel for weapons production. A similar point was made, in an Islamabad based study, Indian Unsafeguarded Nuclear Program: An Assessment.

In order to meet its growing energy demands which were largely affected by the conversion of peaceful nuclear energy into non-peaceful directions, New Delhi convinced the US to sign a civil nuclear deal with India. A vibrant trend of military abnormality led India to convert its unusually growing convention weapon capabilities into nonconventional armed competences. Evident from history, the peaceful nuclear explosion was addressed insufficiently by the international community generally and the US specifically. It further encouraged the Indian strategic quarters to instigate a nuclear arms race in South Asia. The long-term ambitions of Pakistan for keeping the region refrain from nuclear shadows was annulled fully by first Vajpayee government following the Gandhi regime. Instead of impartially analysing the nuclear records of both India and Pakistan, President Bush agreed to sign a multidimensional strategic agreement with Singh government. In addition to objectively examining the impacts of nuclear capabilities of two rivals in the larger prism of


260 Adeela Azam et. al., Indian Unsafeguarded Nuclear Program: An Assessment (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2016).
their vehement record of toxic interaction, the Bush administration preferred to finalize a nuclear agreement with India and attempted to leave Pakistan strategically in an isolation.

In the presence of growing global political order, the strategic bilateralism under agreed civil nuclear cooperation carried substantial power to prevent adequately the rising effects of American counterbalancing forces. Beijing, an emerging economic giant which was the main challenging force against American global dominance started evaluating critically the emerging Bush-Singh diplomacy. Thus, Beijing decided to target fundamental the broader designs of Indo-US strategic collaboration. At the same time, the governments of two states were highly ambitious in attaching their financial ties with China for procuring the commercial advantages, parallel to containing the Chinese claims over Pacific region. The military power of Beijing, in addition to its expanding economic intensities, was posing a probable future threat to American proxies globally. American-designed anti-Chinese alignment to counter the Chinese claims over the South China Sea resulted in a stronger Indo-US bilateral bound parallel to South Asia. An example of such anti-China collaboration had shaped the naval exercises under Malabar, as discussed earlier.

In order to strengthen its position in the Southeast Asian region, the traditional format of Indian Look East Policy (LEP) was altered by Prime Minister Modi. The fundamental purpose of LEP is to strengthen the regional standing of New Delhi among the states of the Southeast Asian region or gaining substantially an influential position in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).²⁶¹ In the early 1990s, the policy of LEP was proclaimed in order to transfer the conventional formats of Indian foreign policy from “ideology” to “national interest.”²⁶² The promotion of LEP cemented in the Look East diplomacy caused Chinese uneasiness, because the central theme of LEP emphasized the “contain China

²⁶² Ibid.
While adopting LEP, the Rao government focused the Southeast Asian neighbours which diminished the role of states of Central Asian, Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf regions. On May 2014, Modi government changed the LEP and Act East Policy (AEP), and announced it during the India-ASEAN Summit meeting.

The AEP the next or an improved phase of LEP became one of the important themes of New Delhi foreign policy under Modi government. LEP was mainly adopted to augment the role of New Delhi in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea while countering the Chinese role. In this way, the aim of New Delhi for defining its anti-China position by following American global footprints positively influenced Indo-US strategic partnership. Furthermore, the Indo-US maritime cooperation cemented in regular naval exercises was persistently alarming China. Therefore, the governments from New Delhi and Washington are, now, seeking a combined approach based on common positions in Indian and Pacific Oceans threatening China which could get a reciprocal response from Beijing.

14. Two-Sided Strategic Bilateralism

British India during the WWII was agreed to serve American geostrategic interest by becoming a major US base commonly. The China Burma India Theatre (CBI) was a main military designation of Allied forces in Pacific Ocean against Japan, for China and Southeast Asian nations. The wider defence cooperation of land, naval and air forces under military exercises coupled with sharing of research and technologically developed defence equipment

263 Ibid.
and devices gradually produced its roots between two states. An improved and updated version of reciprocal diplomatic relations dragged both nations significantly closer during the East-West rivalry. On December 11 2015, the US ambassador to India, Richard Verma, during a conversation at Brookings Institution acknowledged the emerging of bilateral ties between two nations which was a by-product of the two-sided years-long even decades-long efforts and hard work.267

A substantial development started to occur at the end of the US-USSR rivalry when the final decade of bipolar Soviet-American competition witnessed a closer depiction of increased defence cooperation and a closer strategic bilateralism. The landmark improvement in defence ties between India and the United States appeared in the last phase of Cold War when the Islamic revolution of Iran toppled the Pahlavi regime and creation of Islamic republic by the supporters of Grand religious leader changed the fate of Tehran.268

The end of Pahlavi dynasty shifted the Tehran under the religious directions of Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the mastermind of revolution in Iran and the creator of an anti-US behaviour countrywide. Because the prior regime of pro-American Shah Mohammad Reza Shah which was established as a result of White Revolution in 1963269 was highly considered a Westernized reform program of Iran by the religious authorities. In 1978, the Shah government weakened gradually, and a political shift as a result of revolution brought an unforgettable disagreement between Tehran and Washington. The anti-US policies of Tehran became a pro-Soviet behaviour of the newly established Iranian government and it was a greater threat to American wider role in the international system.

269 Ibid.
Besides Islamic revolution of Iran, the Saur revolution of Afghanistan also became a great concern for 39\textsuperscript{th} President of United States. President Jimmy Carter faced the challenge of increasing reliance of Kabul on Soviet support. The violent end of Daoud government by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was globally translated as a Saur revolution inflamed by the Soviets.\textsuperscript{270} The Soviet intervention in Kabul and Iranian hostage crisis mutually forced Washington to decisively contain Soviet expansionism. Reagan government under National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 166 decided to punish Soviet Union in Kabul,\textsuperscript{271} parallel to dealing the situation in Tehran under hostage crisis. The hostage crisis was a historical diplomatic breakup between Tehran and Washington. It happened when the Islamic students attacked US embassy in Tehran and took the diplomatic staff as hostages in the reaction to American support of Shah.\textsuperscript{272} Dramatically changed political situations of Kabul and Tehran were largely installed anti-American governments in both countries. The political changes in both countries were heavily supported by Leonid Brezhnev. Political changes in both states hampered American geopolitical interests and demanded Washington to enhance bilateral values with other states. Such strategic changes dragged American attention toward South Asia. Consequently, India emerged as a potential state to secure US geopolitical interests in the region. The uncomfortable White House with the Nehruvian non-aligned status was conveyed effectively to Indian policymakers for the significance of revised bilateral values.\textsuperscript{273} The revision, in this way, was emphasized from both sides simultaneously. The 40\textsuperscript{th} president of United States, Ronald Reagan, chalked out a

\textsuperscript{271} Iwan Morgan, Regan: American Icon (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 260.
new plan for turning South Asian allies against the Soviet Union by involving India parallel to Pakistan in American grand strategy.  

An updated era for the betterment two-sided cooperation emerged during Carter administration. The bilateral relations of two started tentatively witnessing a friendly inclination of Jimmy Carter towards Moraji Desai, the Prime Minister of India, in 1979. Carter-Desai friendship framework concluded in a reciprocal visit of two states dignitaries. Bilateral negotiations agreed on the two-sided state authorities on an improved format of defence cooperation. No doubt, Washington kept Pakistan in its South Asian priorities and relaxed the sanctions of Symington Amendment, but India started becoming a close US ally. Carter, in this way, activated the military and economic aid to Islamabad which was a great concern of India. Keeping the American aid of Pakistan away from its anti-Indian utility build confidence between New Delhi and Washington. In this way, an era of strategic bilateralism structured embryonically.

In 1982, Indira Gandhi travelled to the US and conveyed efficiently the security concerns of her state in order to gain US strategic support of defence supplies. A major shift in the White House behaviour towards India was an endeavour to cultivate more allies for contributing the widespread anti-Soviet fight. For the greater promotion of bilateral values, President Ronald Reagan and Mrs. Gandhi discussed the changing political dynamics of the abovementioned situation in the light of new formats of American foreign policy. In short, the Soviet intervention of Kabul, the change of Iranian government, and an improved

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version of Reagan relations with Zia were the main apprehensions of India which demanded the leading American foreign policymakers to rethink the US position in South Asian politics. A closer defence collaboration between two states severely affected the balance of power in subcontinent. The task of creating a balance in the South Asian region was a difficult task for Carter in the presence of protracted Indo-Pak rivalry. Subsequently to Indo-China war over Tibet, the end of détente period followed by Soviet-supported communist invasion of Kabul buried the past Indo-US differences. The combination of Indian quasi-allied Moscow oriented policy covered in non-aligned or anti-Western policy changed its traditional pattern.

A reversed era of American non-proliferation policy began in Bush Administration. Three decades of stopping more states from acquiring of nuclear weapons surprisingly changed the White House behaviour. This was a change toward nuclear non-proliferation regime (NPT and NSG) generally, and India particularly. Indo-US strategic partnership entered in an age of long-term strategic cooperation and it affected profoundly the global and regional balance of powers. The unexpected nuclear deal between two nations and Americans mistrust on the cooperation of Pakistan in the war on terror deteriorated significantly American relations with Pakistan.

Hence, the contemporary standards of reciprocal partnership started clearly to reflect two-sided expectations. For India, the active participation of the US in the world politics can free India from the pressure of international non-proliferation regime, and it will help the Hindu leadership to secure more strategic and technological autonomy in the international system. The reconsideration of American alliance could serve the greater global ambitions of New Delhi by securing a competitively more influential and enhanced role of India over neighbouring states particularly. A dominating role of New Delhi in South Asia with the help of United States could affect the security of other regional states coarsely.
Now, Washington is exceedingly sought to remain a major player in emerging Asian order while empowering New Delhi against emerging strong economies. Four main powers of Asia (China, India, Japan, and Russia) have prepared a complex strategic regional landscape for American involvement. The United States, as a distant actor from Asian politics, is greatly aspiring for extending its relations beyond Japan. New Delhi, in this way, has started playing a dynamic role on various fronts, economic and security mostly. In future, the American economic designs will be emphasizing India for increasing the existing strength of US financial powers which are mainly linked to extensive trading landmarks. Moreover, the strategic arrangement covered in close collegial alignment to fulfil the Indian desires of keeping the New Delhi at high ranking in international power hierarchy will become a critical attribute of American South Asian policy.

15. Strengthening of Multidimensional Relations

Americans decision to support Pakistan as a pro-Western state against emerging threats of communism on the verge of US-Moscow competition shifted India partially in the Soviet bloc. Moderately proclaiming its support for anti-American camp, cemented in professed neutral status, was an attempt of initial Indian leadership to preserve the strategic autonomy of the country. The diplomatic connections between world’s largest democratic nation and world’s oldest democratic country were remained unpredictably estranged. Indian nuclear ambition along with sparking a nuclear race in South Asia, and its Soviet inclined foreign policy by refusing the American support in the pretext of preferring the incompletely non-aligned status were proved to be responsible factors in widening the diplomatic gaps between New Delhi and Washington.
Apart from strategic bilateralism, other spheres of the bilateral cooperation continued to grow. The multidimensional ties between India and America formulated various bounds of cooperation in countless fields. Several initiatives to institutionalized deeper diplomatic ventures from both sides resulted in economic, political and cultural ties. Mr. Larry Pressler in his book, *Neighbours in Arms: An American Senator’s Quest for Disarmament in a Nuclear Subcontinent*, spelled an interesting detail of Indo-US initial basis of friendship which were inherited in several organizations such as “the US-India Friendship Council, the Indian-America Security Leadership Council, the US-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC), the Indian-American Leadership Initiative (IALI, and the Indian-American Republican Council (IARC).\(^\text{278}\) Hence, an influential role of the Indian diaspora in the United States cannot be simply ignored. The United States Immigration Act of 1990 for mainly regulating the foreign immigrants in America\(^\text{279}\) has created a substantial path for Indian immigrants. In this way, numerous skilled professional has settled in the United States and actively creating the more avenues for Indian American community\(^\text{280}\).

During the Nehru period, Indian quasi-socialist political system with partially pro-Soviet support depicted apparently the anti-capitalist economic system. The search for economic support parallel to strategic needs always remained a high priority agenda in India, and it forced every government to pursue financial foreign support from multiple directions. Hence, it was practically impossible for New Delhi to completely depend on a sole superpower and to associate India to a single great power completely.

While staying partially in the Soviet camp, in contrast to Pakistan alliance with the United States, Nehru administration attempted to create opportunities for establishing


\(^{280}\) Larry Pressler, op. cit.
economic ties with Kennedy administration. The major economic breakthrough occurred with the demise of Soviet Union. Prior to the diffusing of global US-USSR tension, Rajiv Gandhi, after the death of his mother assumed office and choose to overhaul Indian foreign relations.\textsuperscript{281} It was an upswing in Indo-US relations when the outcome of a Indira Gandhi conversation with Ronald Reagan defined new economic paths for bilateral commercial collaboration.\textsuperscript{282} Rajiv Gandhi was intended to seriously consider the American friendship in the mainstream foreign relations of his country but his death changed the situation dramatically. The assassination of Rajiv in 1991 was calculated by CIA before five years and the report \textit{India after Rajiv} was communicated cautiously to the high officials of Central Intelligence Agency, according to a declassified twenty-three pages report prepared in 1986.\textsuperscript{283}

The mission of Rajiv Gandhi was appreciated and followed by his successors, and Narasimha Rao introduced major economic reforms to minimize the devastating effects of economic crisis in 1991 under a sweeping economic transformation plan. A plan of Rao’s to stabilize the deteriorating financial situation of his country extended the US role in Indian politics. The then Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh (later became the first non-Hindu and 13\textsuperscript{th} Prime Minister) overhauled the economic infrastructure of New Delhi and cured it on the directions of Rao. To reform the ongoing economic infrastructure of the country was the significant area of economic progress introduced by Rao. With the help of his finance minister, Manmohan Singh, Rao applied the five-year economic agenda in India.\textsuperscript{284} In order

\textsuperscript{281} Harish Kapur, op. cit. 218.
\textsuperscript{284} Harish Kapur, op. cit., 299.
to change the economic fate of his country, Manmohan introduced a fiscal adjustment plan, and a budget under him marked a major shift in revenue collection.\textsuperscript{285}

In short, Manmohan Singh in Rao government set a roadmap for economic reforms under a greater economic liberalization plan.\textsuperscript{286} Moreover, the economic initiatives of I. K. Gujral later considered being a milestone effort for overcoming economic crisis by integrating foreign policy with international economic giants. A further boost in economic ties of two nations started by Manmohan-Bush diplomacy. The financial dimension of both states extended closer and joint economic venture in 2010. Timothy Geithner, American Treasury Secretary, formally visited Manmohan government and finalized a new initiative, US-India Economic, and Financial Partnership.\textsuperscript{287}

The flow of American capital in Indian market viewed New Delhi as an emerging economic power adjoined to China, another economic giant and American competitor. Therefore, the very bilateral foundations of two states interactions dragged the leaders from both sides to prioritize the growth of economic infrastructure of India by taking reciprocal initiatives. A comprehensive plan of economic reforms with the help of foreign aid could not only be limited to upholding the vision of India as a regional power, but it was also designed to enable New Delhi to counterweight the emerging economic powers of Asia. Washington was ambitious to include its strategic partner, India, in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a multilateral framework of twenty-one states which was established in


1989 for enhancing the economic interdependence of Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the bilateral commitments reflect American willingness to integrate India in the further international economic platform such as Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), another multistate platform of the thirty-five-countries established after WWII for the promotion of economic cooperation instead of punishing the defeated nations. The target to make New Delhi a key partner of International Energy Agency (IEA), a group of the twenty-five states founded in 1974 was also an irrefutable part of the bilateral economic venture. In this way, the broader economic preparedness of America admired the economic dreams of India, and it was trying to help New Delhi to play more influential role in regional and global economic competitions.

Economically emerging India can help America by formulating several bilateral trade and economic opportunities to stabilize the contemporary unipolar designs in international relations. Bilateral trade and investment eased American driven nuclear sanctions on India and inaugurated a phase of multidimensional relations beyond economic and strategic fields. The cooperation in agriculture filed has supportive historical relations. The US Department of Agriculture joined hands with Indian Agricultural Research Institute in 1962 and laid the foundations of bilateral agricultural cooperation. The recent phase of warm bilateral ties witnessed an equivalent growth of agriculture sector. On March 2010, the representatives of

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two sides concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in the fields of agriculture and food security. During an official visit to India in 2010, Obama shared the interest in promoting Indian agriculture industry and promised to make India a model for the world. In this way, the vision for upholding New Delhi resulted in various cooperative development in several fields.

Clinton administration during a visit of New Delhi formulated an Indo-US Science and Technology Forum in March 2000. A historical MoU, on July 19 2001, was finalized between the United States and India for the creation of a safer cyberspace under a wider spectrum of cybersecurity perspective. The US Deputy Secretary from the Department of Homeland Security, Jane Holl Lute, completed the cybersecurity agreement in New Delhi with R. Chandrashekhar, the Indian Secretary from the Department of Information Technology. The cooperation in cyberspace for the sharing of critical information stabilized the bilateral national postures of both states. The coordination between both governments was based on US first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) which indicated the “safeguarding and securing cyberspace” included in the five targeted priorities of homeland security. The American ingenuity for the governance of the cyberspace invited Indian government for the implementation of a “multi-stakeholder approach”, and such approach could involve the official, private companies, non-governmental entities in a wider bilateral setup.

295 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
Therefore, the acquisition of substantial forums for the advancement of American interests in South Asian regional politics was one of the prominent key objectives of US foreign policy which attracted Washington toward New Delhi. In order to counter the rising strategic and economic powers of China combined with isolating Pakistan from American alliance were the key elements which drifted New Delhi toward Washington gradually.

India always remained ambitious to attain an influential status in the regional politics of South Asia parallel to securing a reputable position between the great powers. The dream to stand visible in the world politics was the fundamental pursuit of Indian foreign policy and various foreign policy paradigms in India under different governments remained same with reference to the changing dynamics of international politics. Regardless of changing nature of world politics between developed nations, the Hindu leadership always tried to stand with powerful states. It is widely believed that a close multidimensional interaction with economically developed and militarily strong states would assist New Delhi in meeting of its strategic ambitions. Consequently, the wish to fulfill its strategic desires of dominating the territorial and maritime affairs of South Asia made New Delhi rationally a proxy of powerful states in the political affairs of subcontinent. In short, India has been perceived at international level as a rising power and its emerging status in the global politics has been seen as an attempt of New Delhi for becoming powerful in its home region and the world beyond its region.299

16. India and World Politics

Indian leaders always attempted to change their foreign relation according to the fluctuating dynamics of world politics that was strictly constituted in the contesting interaction of great powers. The structure of big power politics always kept an important factor in defining the essence of Indian foreign policy. An updated and improved model of maintaining foreign relations always convinced New Delhi to establish its momentous position at international level. In order to cultivate cooperative and friendly ties with great powers, the Hindu leadership determined to stand with powerful states.\(^{300}\) In order to keep his country active in the global affairs, the present Modi government defined two significant themes for managing its foreign relations. An improved foreign policy under both themes, “Area of Influence and Area of National Security Interest” cherished a new era of foreign relations in India under Modi.\(^{301}\) Before discussing the role of New Delhi in the power politics of world, it is vital to comprehend the conception of great powers politics which influence various regional systems including Indian home region.

The status of powerful state primarily refers to the notion of great powers in the field of International Relations (IR) that explains the role of most powerful state-actors in the world. It also explains the status of top most influential nations within the international system.\(^{302}\) The conception of world politics or global politics revolves around the interaction of one or more than one actors in the international system. This interaction contains generally the influential and important engagements of states at global level.\(^{303}\) It can also be explained by understanding the position of states having greater effect in the world or their effective role more than other states. These great powers possessing sufficient potential for greatly


\(^{301}\) Manjeet S. Pardesi, op. cit.


\(^{303}\) Ibid.
effecting the worldwide political system usually define the behaviours of various state located in different regions. In other words, a great power can be recognised as a state determined to increase its power capabilities which will enable its government to exert its influential role in international affairs. It further denotes the role of state having enough ability to exercise its influence position at global scale. The status of great powers can be measured through calculating of different capabilities of a state consisting mainly on economic and military resources. An improved level of such capabilities encourage the powerful states to effect the positions of several other states across the globe.

The notion of power and its relevance to the great powers varies because an unending power competition between the great powers intensifies international security environment generally. The leading foreign policy decision makers from different corners of the world believe that the acquisition of powerful status benefits the state governments in global politics. The most powerful nations enjoy an autonomous status in the regional and international politics. Their governments relish an influential impact not only on neighbouring states but also remain capable of exerting pressure on the world beyond territorially adjoining nations. Presently, a combination of economic and military capabilities allow the state governments to protect and maintain their own security matters parallel to influencing the political affairs of other states. Sometime, the leaders of powerful states prefer to increase allies in order to prevent the probable emergence of state having counterbalancing potential. This attribute of international relations formulates a worldwide

306 Ibid.
307 Vladislav B. Sotirovic, op. cit.
308 Ibid.
great-power system in which a special relationship between or among powerful countries shape various changes in the international political system.  

The greater international system inherited in the notion of great powers politics fascinates various states from different regions towards powerful states, because the powerful states confine their roles to their own regions rarely. The leaders of great powers project their interest generally in the world by making allies in different regions. The appropriate example of influential roles of great powers in different regions through making allies can easily be seen in Indian case. The mainstream leadership from New Delhi is determined to keep their country in close alliance with great powers. A close interaction with developed states structured on the principle of “maximization of their power capability” usually shapes Indian foreign relations with powerful states. A close association of power with the development of international system defines the position of great powers which ultimately let the regional states to revise their priorities in their foreign relations. In reaction to the changing dynamics of great powers politics, the aspirants of powerful status change the conventional designs of their foreign policies while locating at different regions. Indian leadership obsessed with the aim of achieving a powerful status always prefer to keep New Delhi active in the great power competition. These patterns can clearly be observed in the different models of New Delhi’s foreign policies and their association to the developed states. The Hindu leaders try to remain active in calculating the various concerns of great powers because an apposite estimate of powerful states permits New Delhi to define its position in the international system. The major developments in the politically fragmented and
strategically uncertain system of great powers let, in this way, New Delhi to concentrate the power capabilities of various developed states.

17. Modi and Global Power Politics

In order to act according to the distribution of power capabilities between developed states, the Modi administration is presently determined to secure an influential role in the world politics by cultivating diplomatically close ties with the powerful nations. The main course of New Delhi foreign policy under Modi has been translated by people from world’s leading capitals as a revolutionary measure in Indian politics. The pursuit of making close ties with developed world resulted in multiple foreign visit of Modi. After winning elections from Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s platform in 2014, prime minister Modi conducted thirty-five foreign tours and visited fifty-three countries. A combination of improved policy initiatives at internal and external fronts titled as Modi’s Doctrine in the international community. A cooperative diplomatic interaction across the globe is considered widely a response of New Delhi to the changing geopolitical balances of the world politics. The areas of South and Southeast Asian regions remain primary focus of foreign policy decision makers of Modi government.

The aim to secure an unprecedented level of strategic autonomy along with gaining of an equal position to great powers led Modi government to increase its cooperation with the

313 Ibid.
developed countries. An important departure from conventional structure of foreign policy laid the contextual foundations of an updated and improved agenda for managing foreign relations in New Delhi. The manifesto of Modi (commonly known Modimantra) introduced different internal and external initiatives for the enhancement of Indian position in the regional and global politics. It was a fifty-two page document underlining the new agenda for upgrading Indian economic, political, social, and foreign policy issues. This document outlines the role of New Delhi in numerous bilateral and multilateral forums at regional and global levels. It further tried to attract the international community by opening of numerous areas for investment in India. Modi introduced India-first policy and decided to set a broader narrative of New Delhi at various global issues. In order to gain favour from different powerful countries, Modi visited Saudi Arabia, Israel, UAEA, and Iran immediately after becoming prime minister. It was an effort to connect New Delhi with the Western Asian region by touring Muslim countries coupled with the Jewish state of Israel. Various other

initiatives such as Make in India\textsuperscript{320} and Digital India\textsuperscript{321} were also introduced to enhance the scope of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).\textsuperscript{322}

In order to improve the worldwide standing of his nation, prime minister Modi showed his intent of overhauling the traditional arrangements of national security issues. Military modernisation coupled with the revision of nuclear doctrine by creating a worldwide web of allies were considered substantial moves of Modi government.\textsuperscript{323} Unlike the traditional non-aligned stance, the Modi government decided to adopt a policy of multi-alignment as an effective mean for the achievement of New Delhi’s core national interests and uncompromising ideals from international relations. The implementation of this policy brought an era of multiple development in India’s foreign policy mainly involving engagement in multilateral institutions and developing of strategic partnerships with different countries. Since the nuclearization of South Asia in 1998, New Delhi has developed strategic ties with thirty nations from different regions.\textsuperscript{324} The signing of strategic agreements mainly during the government of Vajpayee and Singh provided Modi a way to maximise the national interest of his country in the international political order.

For the upgradation of its naval powers, Modi government has concluded naval cooperation agreements with the United States, and Japan along with signing of defence deals

\textsuperscript{320} Make in India is a Modi’s initiative introduced in September 2014 under the broader theme of India national-building through standing India internationally and making it a manufacturing hub. It was an effort of Modi to align his country to the global designs of world politics.  
\textsuperscript{321} Digital India is one of the leading initiatives of Modi government in which the government of India is determined to provide a wide range of digital services across the country. It is a significant move to stand New Delhi visibly in the digital age and increasing India’s significant role in the global cyberspace.  
\textsuperscript{322} Dhruva Jaishankar, op cit.  
\textsuperscript{323} Ian Hall, “Is a ‘Modi Doctrine’ Emerging in Indian Foreign Policy,” \textit{Australian Journal of International Affairs} 69, No. 03 (February 2015), 249.  
\textsuperscript{324} Ian Hall, “Multialignment and India Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi,” \textit{The Round Table} 105, No. 03 (2016), 277-278.
with the states with highly sophisticated military industrial complex. The development of navy in order to meet the dream of blue water navy is inherited in the pursuit of expanding influence through maritime power. The fulfilment of this dream shifted Modi doctrine from Look East policy to Act East policy and it led India towards a close naval cooperation with the US, Japan and Australia. Furthermore, it extended the foreign relations of New Delhi towards the states of South East Asian and pacific regions. The naval cooperation with the US and its major allies is the broader part of Indo-US strategic partnership for intensifying the presence of states in the Asia, Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Moreover, the quest of increasing its naval role in the Bay of Bengal, an Andaman and Nicobar Command in the Andaman and Nicobar islands were established. This strategic move has started functioning under the Indian Bay of Bengal Security Initiatives which enabled Indian navy to keep an eyes on regional sea lanes.

The desire to stretch its strategic muscles over territorial and maritime affairs of South Asia, the Indian leadership is decisive in augmenting the nuclear capabilities of its state. The country has signed civil nuclear agreements with United States, United Kingdom, France, South Korea, Russia, Czech Republic, Canada, Argentina, Australia, Kazakhstan, Magnolia, Japan, and Namibia. The inclusion of Indian navy in the strategic planning of the country

326 G.V.C. Naidu, “India and East Asia: The Look East Policy,” Perception XVIII, No. 01 (Spring 2013), 69.
has resulted in a nuclear submarine (Arihant) in 2009.\textsuperscript{330} The Arihant has started its sea trials while possessing four sea-based ballistic missile tubes capable of hosting up twelve short-range ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{331} This submarine started its sea lane trials in 2014 and shocked the Oceanic politics of South Asia. In December 2017, Indian Navy Chief, Admiral Sunil Lanba, confirmed a plan of building six-nuclear powered submarines which would ultimately augment New Delhi’s naval capabilities.\textsuperscript{332} In this way, Modi regime inaugurated a nuclear race in the Indian Ocean and started developing naval relations with the supporting countries.

The changing nature of world politics always forced Indian leaders to change the conventional patterns of their foreign relations and alter them according to the changing structure of international system. The structural changes at global level in the international distribution of power occurred particularly in the post-Cold War era, and it forced the Hindu leaders to revise or change the traditional course their foreign relations with other nations. A Soviet-less world in the presence of a worldwide system based on American dominating status did not only introduce the unipolar arrangement of international system, but it changed the geopolitical configurations of different regions. In order to align actively in the newly emerged unipolar structure under American leadership, New Delhi preferred to enhance its strategic interaction with the US. The meaningful strategic partnership with the United States and its leading Western and Asian partners showed the Modi’s intent of moving close to Trump which would let both nations to secure their core national values in the world.\textsuperscript{333}


\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{333} Subhash Kapila, op. cit.
18. US, India and World Politics

An international consensus on the very nature of international system predicts an uncertain interaction of great powers cemented in their competing behaviours and it always remains an inevitable feature of evolving world politics.\textsuperscript{334} The contesting attributes of great powers usually reflect varying patterns of various foreign policy paradigms of states in which a permanent connection between power and the changing positions of state governments can easily be analysed. In the contemporary international system, the present nature of world politics generally emerged from post-Cold War scenario in which the unipolar designs of international system are progressing under American leadership. Unlike bipolar model of Cold War, the demise of Soviet Union from world has granted a privilege to Washington to spread American values in the world. Moreover, the promotion of human rights and supporting of democracy introduced a new world of liberal values. An American-supported “liberal democratic world” and its expansion across the globe has inaugurated a new competition in the world and various ambivalent behaviours has started rising from different directions.\textsuperscript{335}

Under the unipolar configuration of global politics, the role of United States has been flourished due to its vibrant economic development, robust military capabilities, and constitutional stability. The efforts of Washington to strengthen its presence across the globe has created a worldwide web of strong allies and close partners. The combination of allies and partners designed initially by Washington in order to gain maximum support for American leading role in the international system.\textsuperscript{336} In order to stand actively in the contemporary global politics, the American leaders planned to cooperate selectively with

\textsuperscript{335} Vladislav B. Sotirovic, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{336} Walter Russell Mead and Sean Keeley, op. cit.
their allies which could not only support the global standing of Washington, but they could further protect the American greater role in the international politics. In this way, the quest for preserving the extant primacy of unipolar worldwide politics convinced Washington to develop strong strategic ties with New Delhi.337

India has attained an important status in the contemporary international relations. It is the largest democracy of the world and an aspirant of securing a dominating role in its home region.338 It is a country of second largest English speaking population in the world.339 As a champion of oldest democracy of the world, the United States respects India as state with largest democracy globally. The ideological connections between both states have led the two-sided leaders towards various multi-dimensional joint ventures.340 The leaders of both states have developed several cooperative areas generally involving “trade, investment, immigration, and technological cooperation” under a broader spectrum of bilateral collaboration.341 The American global calculation relevant to the Asian balance coupled with keeping the counterterrorism campaign active internationally and implementing the agenda of global governance convinced Washington to create a strategic partnership with New Delhi.342 The Trump administration has realized the Indian potential in its strategic calculations because the New Delhi is committed to keep the balance of power in the pacific region in its favour. The drive to preserve its influential role in Indo-Pacific region has led Hindu leadership towards massive armed build-ups, developing Indo-Pacific security partnerships,

338 Walter Russell Mead and Sean Keeley, op. cit.
339 Ibid.
342 Ibid.
deeper strategic interactions with more states, intensifying eastward connectivity and actively participating in Asian institutions.\textsuperscript{343}

The Indian strategic thinking directs prime minister Modi to rise his country in the world politics by gaining substantial support of powerful nations. This ambition has let New Delhi to increase its position in Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and African regions in addition to the South Asia. The desire to make its presence prominent in the world politics has resulted in Indian close cooperative and strong strategic ties with various great powers generally, and American allies particularly. Moreover, the broader framework of Modi foreign policy sought to achieve the goals of economic prosperity and reinforcing of its security problems with territorially adjoining nations.\textsuperscript{344} The ambition of standing between great powers gas started to exhibit the dream of New Delhi for joining the club of powerful nations. The dream has attached further the efforts of Modi for securing a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). During Obama regime, Washington has acknowledged the status of rising India and proclaimed its support for Indian UNSC seat in 2010.\textsuperscript{345} Additionally, the Washington is investing its full support for Indian inclusion in the forty-eight members group of NSG by overriding the global norms of international non-proliferation regime. A study of Shyam Saran \textit{How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century} (2017) unfolds the debates on India’s special treatment under for the membership of NSG.\textsuperscript{346} A clean wavier received by India has alarmed the global bells and international

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{343} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{344} Aakriti Tandon, “India’s Foreign Policy Priorities and the Emergence of Modi Doctrine,” \textit{Strategic Analysis} 40, No. 05 (August 2016), 352.
\item \textsuperscript{346} Shyam Saran, \textit{How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century} (New Delhi: Juggernaut Books, 2017), 227-239.
\end{itemize}
community is raising its concern on Indian inclusion in the NSG with the help of United States.\textsuperscript{347}

Regarding its hostile relations with the neighbouring nuclear states, the Indian leadership wants the superpowers to keep distance from South Asian internal issues. The non-interferences in South Asian region adopted by great powers is in favour of Modi because it keeps extra-regional powers unaware about India’s belligerent attitude against neighbouring countries. A study of Shashi Tharoor \textit{The Paradoxical Prime Minster: Narendra Modi and His India} (2018), spells out the Indian expectations from extra-regional states generally, and from the United States particularly.\textsuperscript{348} Throor quotes the US ambassador the words of Robert Blackwill “India wants the US to invest, India wants the US to keep its markets open.”\textsuperscript{349} It further wants America to provide more visas to Indians, American needs to support New Delhi over Kashmir, stand against Pakistan in South Asia, “India wants this, India wants that”.\textsuperscript{350} A long list of expectations is purely allowing the United States to increase its India-specific role in the South Asian region without taking into consideration its impact on the regional security environment. In response to expecting an unconditional US support at different levels, the Hindu leaders are willing to stand with Washington in international affairs.

The fundamental aim of Modi administration is to counter Beijing and Islamabad, because the leaders of both nations are determined to support each other separately and jointly under a broader framework of economic cooperation.\textsuperscript{351} The axis of both states are perceived as a potential threat for New Delhi and it led the Modi regime towards American-

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\textsuperscript{347} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{348} Shashi Tharoor, \textit{The Paradoxical Prime Minster: Narendra Modi and His India} (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2018), 446.
\textsuperscript{349} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{350} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{351} Subhash Kapila, op. cit.
\end{flushright}
led alliance of Western nations. The world beyond South Asian engagement is the prime objective of Modi, and the extension of cooperative ties with particularly developed nations will ultimately enable Indian leaders to strengthen the position of their country in the territorial and maritime affairs of South Asia.\textsuperscript{352} In addition to Chinese economic cooperation with Islamabad, the broader designs of Chinese expansionism under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the prime concern of New Delhi which has dragged the Modi regime close to the United States.

The geostrategic objectives of both New Delhi and Washington for the extension of their global influence analogous to strengthening of their positions in domestic matters have been challenged by Beijing. The economic rise of China under the BRI plan has threatened the positions of Modi and Trump in the world politics. A competition between Beijing and Washington parallel to an antagonistic interaction between Beijing and New Delhi convinced Modi and Trump governments to stand together against China.\textsuperscript{353} Modi regime has been viewed by Washington as an appropriate actor in constraining China that could effectively dent the potential of Beijing for undermining Indo-US alliance. This cooperation has opened further the doors of multiple opportunities for the both nations, and the two-sided leadership has decided to uphold each other in the various multilateral forums. Modi government has planned to seek a close cooperation with the US in order to fill the qualitative, quantitative and technological gaps in its military infrastructure.\textsuperscript{354}

While helping Modi regime in security and defence sectors, the Trump regime is now committed to connect its leading weaponry industry with the New Delhi. A militarily strong


\textsuperscript{353} Dhruva Jaishankar, op. cit.

India is not only in US favour, but it will also support American Asian strategy while keeping the Asian balance in US favour. On the one hand, the Modi regime is willing to support the US against China by adopting an anti-Beijing attitude. On the other hand, a strong American role in Asia will let New Delhi to certainly fulfill its strategic aims.⁴⁵⁵

Now, the emergence of other great powers based on ambivalent behaviours are going to alter the conventional structure of world order progressing under Washington. The rise of counterbalancing powers from different parts of the world is threatening American leadership in the unipolar world. Chinese and Russian emerging roles can change the strategic landscape of the international system which is unignorably a worrying point for the United States. A persistent growth of military capabilities of Beijing and Moscow are jeopardising the American global standing, and both countries possess substantial potential to undermine the US role in the international system.⁴⁵⁶ In response to these probable future scenarios of international relations, the Trump administration is committed to search more allies while deepening its existing strategic ties with Modi government.

19. Concluding Analysis

The inception of NAM in the foreign policy of New Delhi reflected the Indian non-interference in world politics while pursuing its regional hegemon aspirations. Not accepting the aligning cooperation from both blocs of Cold War showed Nehruvian ideology. Prime Minster Nehru adopted the non-aligned stance in order to gain support broadly from all direction instead of relying on a single superpower. Combination of economic and tactical support from undefined and unspecified direction resulted in a cooperative behaviour of

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⁴⁵⁶ Vivek Mishra, 11, op. cit.
international community towards Nehru government. The Indians early generation of leadership endeavored to pursue multiple connections for empowering of Indian regional position. Vanishingly minor but arguably major result of Indo-China border clash showed the Indian refusal to view Islamabad in direct opposition to New Delhi in the regional and global strategic environment. The geographically big, economically developed, ideologically strong, and strategically equipped with nuclear power, China became a preferably great threat to India. Further Sino-Pak alliance to balance Indian primacy in South Asia upset New Delhi and made Indira Gandhi to spark a nuclear arms race in the region.

Possession of nuclear weapons by New Delhi and Pakistan prevented the probabilities of traditional war and insured the balance of power in the region successfully, but the nuclearized Indo-Pak politics signified a deepened American role in South Asia. The US involvement more with New Delhi diminished profoundly the scope of efficacious Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) between nuclear capable and territorially adjacent arch-rivals of the South Asian subcontinent. The Americans tilting multiple supportive packages for India vanished gradually the chances for a durable peace and permanent settlement of disputes between India and Pakistan. Additionally, a civil nuclear deal signed in 2005 and completed in 2008 extended the vision of security and economic cooperation to boost the bilateral standards between Washington and New Delhi which worsened the strategic regional environment of South Asia. The only unsubscribed state (India) to NPT allowed by the proponents of global non-proliferation efforts (US) to become a potential beneficial of the global nuclear market.

In order to keep an eye on emerging Asian order coupled with opposing Chinese and Russian emerging influences in world politics has become a permanent feature of American foreign policy. While countering the role of emerging anti-US forces from Asian continent
particularly, the leading foreign policy decision makers from Washington have decided to involve in South Asian politics. Thus, the greater American role in the South Asian political order has intensified the Indo-Pak enduring rivalry. The American presence in the region started to effect heavily the conflicting relations between both nuclear capable or declared nuclear-armed states of South Asia. The nuclear romanticism hit by the international media shocked the leaders residing in world capitals in 1998 first, and then, in 2005 again, it surprised the international community.

Historically, South Asia was unable to secure its divorce from Cold War divisions of world politics and remained a central point of US-USSR confrontational politics. Its closeness to the two biggest communist states of international system placed the region under multidirectional fighting arrogances of Moscow and Washington. The British departure did not only inaugurate an unstoppable competition between major powers of South Asia, India, and Pakistan exclusively but attracted the hostile policies belong to Eastern and Western centers of international politics.

The main counters of communist-capitalist confrontations attached to the US, USSR and PRC embroiled the Indo-Pak enmity under their vested geopolitical interests. In response to the contesting features of great powers, New Delhi and Islamabad fixed their positions against each other. Pakistan aligned with the US initially, decided to stand with China later. Contrary to its Muslim neighbor, India decided to adopt a different route of remaining neutral under NAM initially, and later it decided to acquire the supporting connection from the Soviet Union, China and then America. The covert status of non-aligned policy introduced by Nehru revealed gradually its aligned position with the Soviet Union and the United States.

The frequently changing antagonistic policies of Beijing-Washington-Moscow widened the constantly striking animosity of New Delhi-Islamabad. The imprints of the
global competition of great power caused series of war in South Asia. Indian war with neighboring states resulted in several border clashes among newly decolonized South Asian nations. The rational foundations of Indian foreign relations outlined by mainstream Hindu leadership always sought to secure the support of superpowers which can help them in achieving the status of the great power (initially) and global power (ultimately).

Therefore, an estranged era of mistrust with the US tried to overcome with repeated attempts of Indian leading foreign policy decision makers. No doubt, Indian huge market was a fascination for White House, but its Russian departing policy attracted Washington remarkably. In the broader prism of world politics coupled with a wider spectrum of US foreign policy priorities, the American leadership viewed India as a potentially counterweighting state against anti-American circles of the international strategic chessboard. In this way, the conventional wisdom assembled on the alienated diplomatic connection of two sides changed significantly and both nations became strategic partners and inaugurated dramatically a new age of strategic partnership in 2005.

American leadership under Trump administration views India under Modi as a potential actor which can play effectively a role of global balancer against the anti-US states. The states possessing enough potential for undermining Washington’s global standing can easily be controlled with the help of New Delhi, and this situation has resulted in a multidimensional Indo-US relationship. The Trump regime has identified the dream of Modi government which is strong-minded on continuing of a prominent presence of India in global political affairs. The combination of its economic and military growth obsessed with acquiring of a regional hegemonic and globally prominent status are the strategic ambitions
of Indian leadership. This emerging role of India is not only leading Modi government more towards powerful nations, but it is also relevant to the American state officials particularly.\footnote{Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “India’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World,” \textit{The Diplomat}, September 20, 2018, \url{https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/indias-foreign-policy-in-a-changing-world/} (accessed on February 18, 2019).}
Chapter 04

The Evolving Contours of US South Asia Policy

The presence of nuclear weapons and their vertical and horizontal patterns of proliferation undermined the conventional wisdom of American foreign policy. Additionally, a global contest with the Soviet-sponsored communist forces, particularly in economic and political spheres, was a less significant goal in the wake of the nuclear proliferation during the Cold War for the United States. No doubt, the anti-communist world patterns, under the containment strategy, advanced the trends of interventionism and militarism in US foreign policy immediately after the Second World War. However, the multi-layered domains of nuclear politics posed new challenges and the potential threats to America. This forced largely the foreign policy-decision-makers to prepare the White House and Congress for an effective global non-proliferation campaign. The competing standards and conflicting criteria of the nuclear world became one of the significant characteristics, parallel to the traditional enduring values and principles, of the US foreign policy. These characteristics include the advancement of peace and prosperity, stability and security, and democracy and defence in the world politics. Regarding arms control and disarmament efforts, the mainstream agenda of the American foreign affairs emphasized active persuasion of non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives.¹

In order to pursue such objective especially, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was established on September 26 1961, under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.² The primary purpose of this agency was to enhance the scope of the United States

national security by carrying different measures relevant to arms control and disarmament.\(^3\)

In this way, the nuclear shadows over US foreign policy designed the goals of prevention of nuclear proliferation, promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and banning of military-oriented nuclear experiments.\(^4\) The creation of the agency for this purpose cleared the American position on Arms control and disarmament. Indeed, it was the first step in international system managing the nuclear threats by curbing arms race and reducing the armament.\(^5\) The American non-proliferation global campaign flourished mainly during the era of severe tensions between Washington and Moscow. In short, the clash between Americans and Russians in the post-WWII was multifaceted. It was the clash of ideological, economical, geographical, and historical standards: a blend of all the four elements equivalent to the nuclear politics. The terrible dilemmas of the nuclear world and its multidimensional security threats demanded appropriate responses from the United States in order to empower its global non-proliferation policy which was one of the perilous rudiments of the containment strategy during and after the Cold War period.\(^6\)

The inevitable effects of global nuclear chain and its significantly increasing role in upgrading the traditional security mechanisms of states gradually became an undeniable reality, which touched South Asia in the last phase of the US-USSR decades-long confrontation. The arrival of global nuclear arms race in South Asia in the presence of Indo-Pak perpetual rivalry attracted the proponents of arms controls and disarmaments around the world, who placed the regional politics as a fascinating topic for the international strategic communities. The mainstream leadership from New Delhi and Islamabad remained highly committed to building their strategic muscles under the global politics of nuclear weapons.

\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^5\) Ibid., 80.
The nuclear ambitions of India and Pakistan sparked an explicit nuclear race in the post-1998 era when Prime Minister Vajpayee from India declared the nuclear status of his country. He pushed his counterpart from the neighboring state, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in similar directions.

In this way, the decades-long rivalry of both South Asian neighbors caused by four wars, frequent military clashes, countless border skirmishes, departed from the conventional domain of hostility and jumped into an unending nuclear-armed race. Both India and Pakistan started to seek the support of extra-regional powers and tried to activate their diplomatic connections with the great powers for the enhancement of their strategic positions in the region. The initiation of the nuclear race between the arch-rivals of subcontinent could not manage to escape from the influence of great power politics. In a larger context, the United States, in this way, became an active part of South Asian politics. The American extended strategic plans included both New Delhi and Islamabad in its global calculation of the unipolar world.

Historically, an increasing American role in the South Asian politics can be traced back to the newly independent nations in Asia, as discussed in pervious chapters in detail. The main architect of American foreign policy in the Cold War politics, considered Pakistan a permanent ally parallel to India as a potential regional power which could stand against communist blocs, China and the Soviet Union. The evolving confrontational division of the Cold War resulted in amity between Pakistan and US while deepening the gulf between India and the United States. In this way, a sheer geographical size, coupled with a geostrategic location, placed Pakistan in the top geopolitical priorities during the strategic competition with the USSR generally.

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The quest to maintain its increasing role in post-Soviet global politics while preventing the communist leftovers in international system engaged Washington prominently in advancing the American values across the world. In contrast to the conventional political landscape of international system in the Cold War, the altered designs of the international system in the absence of widespread anti-American and Soviet-sponsored forces intensified the US role in the world affairs. The US perception of South Asian essential relevance to its commitment of global dominance by achieving American political and strategic international goals resulted in a close association of United States with India and Pakistan.

An interesting era of American interaction with the South Asian states, India and Pakistan, began particularly after 1998. A nuclearized South Asia affected adversely the international non-proliferation regime and hampered the US-backed global non-proliferation campaign. The geostrategic thrust of Washington diverted the non-proliferation directions of US foreign policy towards South Asia. An international wave of criticism further viewed the deteriorating version of American-supported global non-proliferation efforts and their perplexing standards of application towards India soon after the Kargil crisis in 1999. The historical visit of Clinton showed a dramatic change in American foreign relations by viewing India as an important state and a potential strategic partner. This visit of President Clinton overlooked the estranged record of Indo-US relations during the intense days of Cold War. The historical shift in the bilateral values was endorsed by two-sided leadership. As a Director of the Department of Planning and the President of Council on Foreign Relations, Richard N. Haass, mentioned the change in the bilateral relations during his visit to India in 2003. Haass stated that “we will need to deepen our economic relationship; we will need to develop new habits of consultation and collaboration in our diplomatic relationship, and we

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will need to make our military relationship more robust.”\(^{10}\) Richard Haass narrated in his memoir, *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order*, that the United States realized the economic and strategic potential of India and the major breakthrough occurred in 2005 with the nuclear deal dialogues initiation.\(^{11}\) Therefore, American role inherited in the de-hyphenation policy which changed the main structure of US engagements with nuclear powers of Asia.

The altered diplomatic equation for treating India and Pakistan differently resulted in a new format of American confounding bilateralism which proclaimed New Delhi as a close strategic partner of the United States, and Pakistan as a frontline state in its global war on terror. Afterwards, the application of de-hyphenation policy began to cause a worrisome future of South Asia in the presence of prolonged Indo-Pak dispute. The inking of the civil nuclear deal with India along with an increased maritime cooperation between Washington and New Delhi under an increased bilateral strategic interaction in multiple areas showed a major paradigm shift visibly in the United States-South Asian relations.

An analytical examination of US non-proliferation policy reveals that it is deeply rooted in geostrategic values also. The South Asian strings of the US policy helped to comprehend the rationale behind American role in South Asian nuclear politics. How did the US set the priorities of its South Asian policy while treating mainly India and Pakistan on separate basis? How did Washington try to respond the nuclear ambitions of India and Pakistan in the contemporary arms race between them? What factors did force the United States foreign policy decision-makers to indulge actively in the nuclear politics of Islamabad and New Delhi? These are the queries which are lacking the theoretical responses and appropriate answers. Therefore, this chapter is an endeavor to understand this particular

\(^{10}\) Ibid.

theoretical dimensions of US non-proliferation campaign cemented in Pak-US and Indo-US bilateralism.\textsuperscript{12}

While addressing the aforementioned questions, the central theme of this chapter is to attempt to highlight the American bilateralism and its dichotomous reflections associated with its perplexing engagement with India and Pakistan. The main debate in this chapter revolves around the theoretical foundations of the contemporary American foreign behavior which formulates the varying patterns and fluctuating trends for New Delhi and Islamabad. The main debate in this chapter highlights the appropriate conceptualization of the strategic dimension of the US foreign policy for the nuclear politics in South Asia. Moreover, the discussion in this chapter mainly attempts to explain the US South Asian policy by studying the main drivers behind various patterns of American South Asian engagement.

1. Cold War and Soviet Union

The hostile clash between United States and Soviet Union has added a new chapter in the history of mankind, because the two nuclear powers stood against each other across the world. The incompatible national standings of US and Soviet leaders affected the political orders of various sub-regional systems. The efforts to expand the sphere of influence across the world covered in capitalist and communist designs involved Washington and Moscow in a decades-long rivalry. This multifaceted hostility between expanding Capitalist-Communist forces did not only attempt to divide the world into two blocs, but their antagonistic interaction created a bipolar international system. The two divisions of international system were defined antagonistic behaviours of two blocs and resulted in the Soviet Union and its allies standing against the United States and its allies. Both blocs of states adopted belligerent

positions while leaving substantial impacts on each other.\textsuperscript{13} Due to different geographical proximities, this bipolar competition between two superpowers spread the antagonistic politics across the globe and effected various regions. Lack of territorial links between both contestants of Cold War further intensified the international relations by adopting an alliance and counter-alliance policy.\textsuperscript{14}

A concise theoretical survey of Cold War politics at large extent describes the influence of two great powers equipped with nuclear weapons in the world. It was an era of rough parity between great powers because the two communist giants (Moscow and Beijing) stood against Washington, and this global competition reached every continent of the world.\textsuperscript{15} The global agendas of the two nuclear powers under the bipolar division of the international system effected the politics of European, African, Middle Eastern, Asian and Latin American regions. It was East-West struggle of total victory and total defeat which was largely considered as a conflict of geopolitical and ideological nature.

A broader examination of multiple causes, numerous events and eventually the consequences of East-West global competition unfolded the action-reaction formats of the conflict from 1945 to 1991. The preoccupied conception of Capitalist-Communist rivalry under the broader rubric of Cold War politics was a US-Soviet competition rooted in action-reaction formats. The phenomenon of action-reaction was considered a major force which created various layers of Cold War confrontation between both contestants. An unending cycle of action-reaction moves primarily initiated with the notion of satellite states mainly consisting of Central and Eastern European countries who decided to stand with Soviet


\textsuperscript{14} Stephen M. Walt, “I Knew the Cold War, This Is No Cold War,” \textit{Foreign Policy}, March 12, 2018, \url{https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/12/i-knew-the-cold-war-this-is-no-cold-war/} (accessed on February 20, 2019).

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
Union. The annexation of Eastern Germany to Soviet Union brought the first major conflict of Cold War. It was Berlin Airlift or Berlin Blockade associated to the decision of Soviet leadership for blocking territorial connections of West Germany, and a massive airlift was organized by Western allies in order to continue the supplies to the people of Western Germany. It was the Russian expansionist model that compelled various countries to fall under Soviet dominations, and it later compelled Truman to take the threat seriously. President Truman announced its doctrine of providing military, economic, and political support to all democratic countries and declared their assistance in managing of internal and external crisis. Truman doctrine was a reorientation of US foreign policy mentioned in a speech delivered by American President in a Joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947.

President Truman decided to provide economic and military support to Turkey and Greece under the broader designed of assisting the countries in living free against the threats of communist. It further introduced Marshall Plan after providing $400 million to Turkey and Greece in order to stand defensively in a communist fight. Marshall Plan was an economic initiative to help Western nations or mainly the US allies and it was initially described by George Marshall, Secretary of State on June 05, 1947. This economic recovery program passed in 1948 was a part of Economic Recovery Act established on April 03, 1948. The Soviet reaction in similar lines introduced the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), an economic plan founded in 1949 to help Eastern bloc of states in addition to

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21 Ibid.
communist states across the world. COCOMECON received American reaction when a
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was established in 1950
by the Western allies to control the export of sensitive material and equipment to the
members of Soviet bloc. It was the start of Cold War politics when both centres of the
communist and capitalist worlds added an economic war along with sanction politics in the
decades-long East-West rivalry.

The European countries were divided into bipolar divisions of the international
system and the governments of European nations proclaimed their association to communist
and capitalist epicentres of powers. It was termed as the Iron Curtain, described by Winston
Churchill in a speech at Missouri, US, on March 05, 1946. This physical boundary dividing
Europe between Communist Eastern Europe and Democratic Western Europe inaugurated a
new debate in the literature. An Iron Curtain across the Europe was explained and defined by
various authors in order to comprehend the geopolitical nature of US-USSR hostility.
 Moreover, an intergovernmental military alliance under North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) came into being on April 04, 1949. NATO (or commonly known as North Atlantic
Military alliance) was created by the US in order to provide collective security to Canada and
different Western European allies against the emerging threats of communism. The NATO
treaty was the first peacetime military alliance which let the United States to jump into global
politics outside the Western Hemisphere.

In response to the politico-military alliance of Washington, Soviet Union adopted a
reactionary approach and singed Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance

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22 James K. Libbey, “CoCom, Comecon, and the Economic Cold War,” Russian History 37, No. 02 (2010), 133.
23 Tor Egil Forland, “‘Economic Warfare’ and ‘Strategic Goods’: A Conceptual Framework for Analysing
24 Ignace Feuerlicht, “A New at the Iron Curtain,” American Speech 30, No. 03 (October 1955), 188.
26 “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949,” Office of the Historian,
with its Socialist Republics and Czechoslovakia in Warsaw, Poland on May 14, 1955. The seven Soviet satellite states from Central and Eastern Europe were bound to act strategic policies of Kremlin. It was reaction of NATO and the strategic engagement of Western Germany with NATO. Despite the creation of defence alliance under Warsaw Pact, the supreme communist leaderships from Moscow decided to continue their progress in the nuclear field. In order to match their military capabilities to the United States, the communist leaders of Soviet Union preferred to acquire nuclear weapon status by detonating nuclear devices at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, on August 29, 1949. Joseph Stalin decided to counterbalance Washington in the nuclear politics by achieving nuclear weapon capability under the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project. The decision to proclaim nuclear weapon status internationally by communist leaders under Stalin alarmed the United States, and Washington tested its thermonuclear device in 1951. After the American test of thermonuclear device (commonly known Hydrogen Bomb or H-Bomb), Soviet Premier, Georgy Malenkov conducted first thermonuclear test of Soviet Union on August 12, 1953. As a result, the Cold War era inaugurated a nuclear race between communist Soviets and capitalist Americans. From 1945 to 1992, the United States tested 1032 nuclear devices whereas the Soviet Union conducted 715 nuclear tests from 1949 to 1990.

Apart from nuclear competition, the intense period of Cold War launched a space competition in the bipolar world. The Soviet Union was at disadvantage position in its competition with the United States in the fields of information technology and skilled

30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
development. The technological backwardness was due to lack of intellectual freedom and the absence of economic progress.\(^{34}\) The centralised mechanism for managing economic resources of Soviet Union shocked the world on October 04, 1957 when the Sputnik (first artificial satellite in the world) was successfully launched from Russian land.\(^{35}\) The scientific progress of the Kremlin surprised United States and initiated a new space race in the US-USSR rivalry under Khrushchev government. Launching of Sputnik was an awakening call for the US and it was considered seriously by the Congress. In July 1958, the US Congress passed National Aeronautics and Space Act and this Space Act later created NASA.\(^{36}\) The launching of Sputnik reflected the level of scientific approach of Soviet Union by opening the doors of a space age in the world. United States was forced to respond the Soviet space-oriented move, and launched a satellite Explorer I on January 31, 1958.\(^{37}\) This space race between communist Soviet Union and democratic, capitalists United States started another episode of East-West hostility. So, the space race emerged another potential arena for communist-capitalist struggle.

Apart from ideological, economic, strategic, and space competition, global intergovernmental forums failed to stay away from violent bipolar designs of international relations. The motives of the Soviet Union were mainly defined in a communist enmity against the United States and its allies in the world. Immediately after the Second World War, the creation of United Nations (UN) in 1945 was a successful step towards the strengthening of peace and security in the world,\(^{38}\) but it provided sufficient space to both Soviet Union and United States for spreading of their beliefs in the international system. The creation of UN

\(^{34}\) Christoph Bluth, “The Soviet Union and the Cold War: Assessing the Technological Dimension,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 23, No. 02 (May 2010), 284.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 287.


was a landmark development in the history of international relations, but it remained less effective in preventing the action-reaction cycle of bipolar world. An unprecedented growth of action-reaction cycle adopted by Soviet and American officials introduced an unending arms race in the world by providing security commitments to their allies. The alliances evolved during the superpowers rival models coupled with the strategic engagements with their allies in different regions resulted generally in an arms race. A stable arms supplies to various states exhibited an equilibrium between the relationship of both superpowers. Finally, this political pattern supported by communist and capitalist powers constituted a picture of regional aggression mainly in the third world under the wider action-reaction cycle.

2. Cold War Geopolitics and Soviet Union

The geopolitical dynamics of East-West rivalry ensured that the communism and capitalism cannot work together and this concept prevailed heavily in the world politics. An unmeasurable antagonism between Soviet Union and US leaders spread across the world and encircled the whole international system. The first step towards this geopolitical competition under the broader framework of East-West confrontation was initiated from Europe when the European continent was divided physically into two blocs. The subsequent events of this decades-long hostility witnessed a dominating geopolitical discourse in the global politics. In other words, the regional level aggression in the bipolar world extended the global Communist-Capitalist hostility to the Third World. The US-USSR competition in the Third World developed a patron-client relationship with different underdeveloped countries. This pattern of the strategic involvement of two great powers in the Third World further activated the arms supplies to their various allies. The arms sale to various states became a preferred

40 David Kinsella, 213, op. cit.
mean for curtailing the influence of opposite bloc and made various regional politics as an active part of globe struggle.

The decades of the Cold War conflict unfolded various expansionist moves of communism supported by Soviet Union and these geopolitical moves of Kremlin shaped American foreign policy. The mainstream leadership from Washington preferred to move geopolitically by covering the world from Berlin to Cuba and Vietnam to Afghanistan.\(^{41}\) The enduring regional hostilities mainly at Korean Peninsula, Middle East, Africa, Persian Gulf and South Asia regions transferred the global competition between two superpowers in different continents. Generally, the territorial clashes between North and South Korea, Israel and Arab states, Iran and Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and India and Pakistan became potential areas for communist-capitalist clash. Both superpowers tried to prevent the influence of opposite bloc in different regions. A perplexing combination of ideological, security, political, and economic matters maintained roughly the very nature of US-USSR hostility and resulted in series of conflicts in extra-regional rivalries.

Various phases of high-tensions in the Middle Eastern and South Asian regions in the presence of two competing superpowers intensified the enduring hostile approaches between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states, parallel to anti-neighbourhood policy of India. The situation of South Asia remained an important area of superpower competition due to the presence of two nuclear aspirants and territorially adjoining rivals. Unlike Middle East where the clandestine nuclear weapon status of Israel established a complicated regional security environment, the rivalry between India and Pakistan attracted United States towards South Asia. Pakistan, a state touching the borders of two biggest communist powers, raised the significance of India-Pakistan hostility for the US and the American greater South Asian strategy started looking towards New Delhi and Islamabad.

\(^{41}\) Dennis Merrill, 28, op. cit.
The Indian desire to play an active role in the great power politics was the main driving force behind the Nehruvian ideology of creating a non-align movement. It invited the states of African and Asian continents to support Indian standing in the international politics. It was an attempt of highlighting strategic potential of Nehru at the larger global politics, and the ambition to become a stronger regional state further underlined Indian significance before superpowers. The foreign policy pronouncements of Nehru defined the neutral Indian position which was inherited in a non-interference approach towards the bipolar division of international relations. Additionally, the initial foreign visits of Nehru to United States and Soviet Union revealed the desire of first Indian prime minister for placing his country in the great power politics. The initial Hindu leadership under Nehru was committed to formulate the foreign policy in the best interest of the country. It was apparently a self-imposed isolationist policy of Nehru and a unilateral choice of not joining any bloc of great power fight. The actual purpose of declaring a neutral position by consolidating the group of likeminded states was an attempt of Nehru to declare a third bloc of non-aligned states parallel to communist and capitalist epicentres of powers. Moreover, the initial meetings of Nehru with American and Soviet leaders was a political effort to communicate the strategic needs of newly independent India after British colonial retreat. The decision of staying away from communist-capitalist ferocious division of international relations under the Nehruvian politics made India and the group of its non-aligned states as appropriate opportunities for both great powers.

The communist Soviet leaders viewed India under Nehruvian non-aligned foreign policy as an appropriate place for expanding its influence. First trade agreement with India

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42 Nihal Henry Kuruppu, Nonalignment and Peace versus Military Alignment and War (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2004), 78.
was concluded in December 1953 and it was an attempt of Soviet leadership to enhance cooperative relations with the states outside the communist bloc. Instead of developing ideological connections, the Stalin was convinced to gain maximum support in the world generally, and from non-aligned camp particularly. Nehru government was also in search of maintaining cooperative relations with the world outside British Commonwealth in order to diversify its economic relations. Indian embassy in Moscow appreciated the Soviet support of New Delhi because the communist leaders started appreciating neutral and independent policy of Nehru. Additionally, the Soviet leaders were willing to support the newly independent country of Nehru economically and militarily. It was communist plan of Moscow for limiting the US role in Asian continent. The USSR helped New Delhi economically and strategically throughout the decades-long Washington-Moscow clash. The governments of Nehru and Indira Gandhi received Soviet assistance for the development of steel and heavy electronic equipment, parallel to modernizing its land, air and naval forces.

In order to renew the Soviet-Chinese diplomatic relations based on Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed in 1945, the new China under Mao decided to restructure its ties with the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union. In order to set a new pattern of their diplomatic alliance, Mao and Stalin preferred to define new foundations of two-sided cooperation by signing Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.

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46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
along with several other cooperative agreements in February 1950. The two representatives of two countries agreed to preserve two-sided security, to maintain peace in the Far East and the world beyond East, to strengthen people-to-people contacts, and to promote the socialist constructions of both countries. The higher norms of ideological consolidation on communist maxims increased the role of Stalin in China and the Mao government accepted the Soviet political support. Soviet leaders controlled the key positions in Chinese Communist Army, Communist Party, and Communist government under Mao Zedong. Joseph Stalin supported China financially and provided economic assistance to Mao on the Taiwan issue. Stalin did not only support the position of Mao on Taiwan problem, but Kremlin decided to assist Beijing in military modernization. In February 1950, Stalin granted loans to Mao for the arms purchase and helped Beijing later in the construction of military facilities in China. The position of Beijing on Taiwan was primarily motivated by its ideological commitments and solidarity with the communist movement supported by Stalin regime. China was considered globally an alternate centre for the communist world and it was heavily supported by the neighbouring Soviet Union.

The rise of American-supported Western bloc and its fear of spreading communism to Western Europe and worldwide forced Washington to jump into Asian continent. The geopolitical dimension of American foreign policy in the post-World War era was mainly derived by Soviet communist moves and it led Washington to contain communist influence in Asian continent. Containment was preferred to be a suitable strategy described in a foreign policy announced made by President Truman. The containment was considered an appropriate response of enemy’s communist expansionism. The Truman Doctrine after

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50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
53 Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “Taiwan and the Soviet Union During the Cold War: Enemies or Ambiguous Friends?,” Cold War History 05, No. 01 (February 2005), 77.
54 Ibid., 83.
immediately the WW-II became a fundamental guiding principle of US foreign policy throughout the Cold War and it resulted in various geopolitical moves. The geopolitical dimension of US foreign relations was selected as a suitable response of communist expansionist approach.55 Truman approach was derived originally from the principle of maintaining anti-communist and pro-Western alliances in the Asia. The Asian balance, primarily focusing the areas of Southeast Asian region, led Washington to support Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The nations from Southeast Asia were vulnerable before communist threats emerging from Soviet Union and China, and their governments started seeking American help.56

The American Cold War policy was fundamentally based on two principles: a Cold War plan for defending its allies by providing them effective security, and enhancing of American economic powers.57 Both objectives were designed to increase American position in the Asian continent while keeping the communism out of Asian politics. In 1950s, the United States designed Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in order to defend Asia from emerging threats of communism. Pakistan joined both alliances and decided to gain American support against Indian aggression in the region. The US traditional view of Asian region, which was limited to China and Japan along with Pacific, was altered and the subcontinent became an unquestionable part of American strategic calculations.58 It was Asian security game which

58 Mussarat Jabeen and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, “Security Game: SEATO and CENTO as Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan” Pakistan Economic and Social Review 49, No. 01 (Summer 2011), 110.
extended towards subcontinent and the inclusion of Pakistan in American grand anti-communist agenda later increased US engagement in South Asia.

In the broader geopolitical context of US-USSR hostility, the geographical value of Pakistan was deeply observed and appreciated by the US. In addition to both intergovernmental defence pacts, SEATO and CENTO, the actual strength of Islamabad was measured President Nixon when the Richard Nixon decided to change the traditional course of US foreign policy and planned to visit People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1972. A seven-day visit of Nixon to three Chinese cities was initially designed by his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger. Prior to Nixon, Kissinger visited the PRC with the help of Pakistan and settled a ground work for the President tour. Pakistan, a territorial neighbour and close friend of PRC, became an important actor unignorably for the Nixon administration when a political rift emerged between USSR and PRC.\textsuperscript{59} Bhutto government and its close ties with Mao regime became, in this way, an opportunity for Richard Nixon. Later development augmented the position of Pakistan in American calculations in the last phase of Cold War.

The security attributes of Cold War cemented in geopolitical interest of both superpowers further unfolded in the end of East-West confrontation when Pakistan gained more significance in Washington. President Ronald Reagan planned to defeat Soviet Union decisively and its prevailing shadows from subcontinent by making an alliance with Zia-ul-Haq. Initially, President Carter and his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, laid the foundation of Pak-US alliance against Indo-Soviet nexus.\textsuperscript{60} Both nations designed a strategy of joint intelligence operation in order to not only keep communist Soviet away from subcontinent, but also planned to defeat Soviet empire conclusively.


\textsuperscript{60} Paul J. Smith, “The China-Pakistan-United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the War on Terrorism,” Asian Affairs 38, No. 04 (December 2011), 204-205.
The grand Cold War strategy of the United States carried by different Presidents was mainly revolving around geopolitical moves of the USSR from 1949 to 1991. An effective containment of the expanding communist forces supported by Soviet Union was the prime objective of Washington. It further defined various patterns of American global engagement in different regions. The domino effects of communism and its rising influence in the surrounding areas started resulting in communist political takeovers in the territorially adjoining nations. The initial extension of communism towards Indochina was translated by President Eisenhower as a Soviet act carrying domino principle. An expanding wave of Soviet influence towards Indochina was the fundamental factor which forced Truman administration to jump into the global politics. Further events of the capitalist-communist struggle effected the regional politics of different continents. In the sub-regional levels, contradicting interest of both Soviet Union and United States became a major conflict. Even the South Asian region gripped in Indo-Pak rivalry was failed to secure its presence from the toxic effects of Cold War politics and the conflicting attributes of communist and capitalist global fight remained active in the South Asian region.

3. The Perplexing Bilateralism of the US

Without factoring in the role of great powers, the debate on Indo-Pak dispute, particularly the nuclear aspect, remains incomplete. Pakistan stood out as a permanent American ally, on contrary to it, India had been proved as an occasional US friend throughout the Cold War. Therefore, the absence of a permanent bilateral structure between India and US attracted Soviet Union towards subcontinent. The Indian leaders decided to become an integral part of expansionist policies of Soviet Union. Simultaneously, various frequent Soviet-inclined actions of New Delhi annoyed the United States. In this regard, the

The opposition to Indira Gandhi and her supervised nuclear facilities, coupled with Soviet confirmed position after fighting with China in 1962, cleared briefly the position of India and Pakistan in the Cold War. On May 18 1974, the peaceful nuclear explosion of The Smiling Buddha approved by the Gandhi administration triggered a defensive response from Pakistan. The strategic communities from Islamabad preferred to acquire nuclear technology which sparked a nuclear arms race in South Asia. At the same time, the international community believed that the spread of “peaceful” intention for acquiring the nuclear technology was a dangerous development in world politics because it increased the chances of nuclear weapons proliferation. The growth of nuclear programs in the international system was considered equally to be the increasing probability of proliferation of the nuclear weapons across the globe.

India and Pakistan strategic competition, in this way, unleashed a nuclear arms race in South Asia and added a new dimension to the regional politics. The nuclearized South Asia was mainly affected by Indian nuclear ambitions and its strategic autonomy. Indian quest for strategic autonomy included the search for a great power status, pursuit for the regional hegemony and effectively countering the Chinese nuclear capabilities. Such attributes affected the strategic calculations of Pakistan and raised security threats to its survival. With reference to gaining the support of a great power, Indian leadership endeavored to place the United States against Pakistan by converting it a close friend of New Delhi. In order to lay down the foundations of a strong bilateralism, the two governments initially agreed on naval

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64 Ibid.
cooperation in 1992. The annual Malabar (US-India joint naval exercise) were designed to show the military preparedness of two states.

Following the 1992 exercises, 1995 and 1996 were the years that witnessed the landmark improvement in sea-based strategic capabilities of both states. However, 1998 nuclear tests resulted into temporary suspension of naval cooperation with America which was later resumed in 2002. Since 2015, the Malabar included Japan and communicated to the international community a shared understanding for creating the mutually cooperative sea-based environment. In order to enhance the bilateral collaboration in the oceanic politics, the US Secretary of the Navy, Richard V. Spencer, stated during a visit to India in December 2017, “The relationship between the United States and India is based on our shared values and desire to preserve peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and across the seas.” The US National Security Strategy of conducting naval exercises promised to make India a balancer against the increasing influence of China in South Asia, Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea.

Prior to the Bush regime, the desires of bringing India into a closer embrace in the American alliance was evident on the Clinton regime too. In the pre and post-Kargil crisis, the Clinton administration started to bracket New Delhi in a closer diplomatic framework. It was pro-Indian position in the US over Kargil issue because Washington first time sided with India publicly instead of adopting a balancing approach. A diplomatic record of Clinton government changed significantly the historical perception of India and the United States for

66 Ibid.
each other. President Bush continued the vision of Clinton administration and acknowledged the strategic significance of India.\textsuperscript{71} The Bush regime called India a natural ally of the US on the basis of its larger democratic status, and its determination for political advancement and economic freedom.\textsuperscript{72} Moreover, its ambitions for enhancing its commercial influence in the Indian Ocean was the fascinating point for the United States.\textsuperscript{73} In this way, the bilateral commitment for the long-term cooperation grew abruptly from the two sides, and was reciprocally admired by the Bush-Vajpayee governments.

A thin layer of military-to-military cooperation directed the governments from both sides in humanitarian direction. The accurate example of proving this fact is the tsunami 2004, which affected the South-eastern parts of India mainly Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India.\textsuperscript{74} It was the third largest earthquake and resulted consequently in a close New Delhi-Washington military association in the Indian Ocean. The joint rescue activities expanding from Indonesia to mainland India welcomed evidently the forces of Japan and Australia. These developments enhanced Indian strategic assertion in the oceanic politics with the greater help of US. The four states alliance (The US, Australia, Japan, and India) further involved the four naval forces in the maritime interdiction operations respectively.

Beyond naval exercises, with the help of its global influence America tried to involve India in its central command. On the contrary, the status of Pakistan as a permanent US ally and a close state to the Muslim world left India outside the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM or CENTCOM) which was created in 1983.\textsuperscript{75} Contrary to CENTCOM, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) established in the post-WWII environment in

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{71} T.V. Paul, \textit{The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World} (Haryana: Random House, 2014), 121.
\bibitem{73} David Brewster, \textit{India’s Ocean: The Story of India’s Bid for Regional Leadership} (New York: Routledge, 2014), 163.
\bibitem{74} Daniel P. Aldrich, “Separate and Unequal: Post Tsunami Aid Distribution in Southern India,” \textit{Social Science Quarterly} 91, No. 05 (December 2010): 1369.
\end{thebibliography}
1947, helped to cultivate the cordial ties with India and conducted military exercises. With reference to Indian cooperation, the United States African Command (U.S. AFRICOM or USAFRICOM created in 2007) had also successfully founded cooperative lines with India. CENTCOM embraced a challenging task of placing India and Pakistan in one sphere. Presently, the American-driven global commands had prioritized the naval cooperation with New Delhi, unlike Islamabad. Moreover, the objective of becoming a regional power by securing foreign help convinced Indian Air Force (IAF) to participate in the joint exercises with US Air Force, conducted from 2004 to 2006. In this period, these exercise formally known as Cope India persuaded the two countries to repeat the same exercise in 2009. The very purposes of the bilateral exercises were to remain prepared against the future contingencies.

Presently, Indian mainstream leadership panicked by Pakistan and Sino-Pak increasing cooperation in economic and strategic dimensions, consequently showed a more belligerent and confrontational foreign policy. The response of Modi government to the strengthening role of Islamabad in world politics on the basis of enlarging Sino-Pak diplomatic cooperation changed the conventional patterns of Indian foreign and security policies. The changing policy postures of New Delhi witnessed an intense era of Modi engagements with the great powers in order to enhance the global standing of his country while carrying the actual designs of Indian regional hegemonic models. The Indians desire of acquiring a relatively prestigious status in world politics by acquiring a reasonable place among great powers in addition to its regional dominating ambition is cautiously observed by America. The new outlook on American South Asian policy started showing structural

79 B. M. Jain, op. cit., 87.
changes in American traditional approach for treating India-Pakistan and balancing the hostile interaction of both nuclear countries.

On one hand, the US conventional standards for managing the conflict-ridden security environment of South Asia in the existence of the strained Indo-Pak relations while diverting the global non-proliferation debate toward South Asia became an obsolete feature of American foreign policy. On the other hand, the participants of South Asia nuclear arms race always showed their reluctance for joining the international non-proliferation efforts while staying away from multinational counter-proliferation arrangements of the international community. In this way, the ongoing patterns of US-India-Pakistan triangular relations in view of the aforementioned scenario are based on de-hyphenating equitation of American foreign policy. The pretext of such policy emphasized the maintenance of bilateral relations of Washington with both nuclear powers of South Asia which could not be overshadowed by the regional security issues. In this way, the prism of a one-sided overview of the quarrelsome South Asian environment, dominated by the latest version of American South Asian policy.

The genesis of the unequal footing of the US South Asian policy became visible immediately after Kargil crisis, because the immature behaviors of newly nuclear-armed states of subcontinent alarmed the Clinton administration.80 The efforts to avert the threats of a major nuclear escalation between Nawaz and Vajpayee governments became a vibrant trend in the post-nuclearized subcontinent. These efforts tried to involve deeply both India and Pakistan in military Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) which would ultimately keep both nuclear-armed rivals away from the probable threats of war. After the last tour of American officials to India under Carter administration, it was Clinton who decided to change the traditional orientations of US South Asia policy in the era of the nuclearized

The two governments, under Clinton and Vajpayee leaderships, agreed to construct bilaterally cooperative bounds by inaugurating a new age of multidimensional relations between two major democratic nations of the world. American support to Indian position while exerting pressure on Nawaz government was considered to be an initial effort to facilitate Vajpayee in the regional politics.

The decisive shift in American South Asian policy initiated by a series of talks between the representatives of both states – Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh – over the non-proliferation issues. The nine rounds of dialogues emphasized mainly the US unhappiness of insignificant development of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the refusal of New Delhi for signing it which was discussed at length in the US Congress by leading American authorities. The Indian denial of subscribing to CTBT was considered to be a challenge to American global non-proliferation campaign.

This challenge was positively observed by the White House. It echoed a new format of engaging India by minimizing the main concerns of both states over nuclear issues. In 2000, the two governments agreed to move toward tangible steps for constructing diplomatic progress. Talbott and Singh, the Deputy Secretary of State and the Minister of External Affairs respectively arranged their fourteen meetings in different countries and negotiated the potential future avenues for economic and strategic cooperation parallel to discussing the unsettled nuclear issues between their countries. The future of both nations, marked by the state authorities from both sides as an era of immense importance, is dependent on cordial Washington-New Delhi relationship.

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82 Ibid.
84 Paul R. Dettman, India Changes Course: Golden Jubilee to Millennium (Connecticut: Praeger, 2001), 188.
In order to de-escalate the tensions between nuclear-armed states over Kargil by pushing Sharif government on unconditional withdrawal from Kargil, the Clinton administration engaged in the conversation with Pakistan. During his visit to Islamabad, Talbott conveyed the desires of President Clinton for managing the nuclear arms race of subcontinent by implementing the norms of international non-proliferation regime, by convincing Islamabad to become a member of CTBT. In August 1998, during a meeting with Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Shamshad Ahmed, Talbott discussed the position of Pakistan on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) parallel to debating the CTBT. Talbott conducted seven rounds of dialogues with Shamshad Ahmed and Jaswant Singh separately while carrying the American diplomatic efforts for bringing non-proliferation regime to nuclearized subcontinent.

Mainstream American leadership believed that the democratically strong and rising powerful status of India could craft adequate opportunities immensely for the United States. With the help of New Delhi, Washington can achieve its strategic interests and rightly can advance its values across the globe. Hence, the building of the long-term Indo-US strategic partnership became one of the highest priorities of the United States which will lead America ultimately to meet its actual determination of international balance of power. A structured pattern of bilateral relations covered in political, economic, and military values was started to grow during Clinton and Bush administrations. Both Presidents initiated categorically the phase of US bilateral involvement with India on a new basis including wide cooperative areas covering from scientific and technological collaboration to a civil nuclear agreement. Such

evolving patterns of joint efforts surprised the people from world capitals because the state officials from Washington believed that the new engagement with India will help the United States in stabilizing the South and East Asia by aligning with democratic nations.89

The achieved level of common strategic vision placed the governments from New Delhi and Washington in a more pragmatic format for the counterbalancing of their common threats. In the presence of their geostrategic interests, the very foundations of a new alliance between two states departed vividly from their conventional standards of looking each other through the prism of Cold War politics. The revised versions of bilateralism association defining the very nature of the ongoing Indo-US relationship and the strategic needs of both sides eliminated the reluctant mind-sets of their leaders for each other.90 Such collaboration guaranteed more political freedom and strategic autonomy to India which prevented significantly the pressures Washington on New Delhi and caused awkwardly a more assertive Modi government in the region.

The adaptation and appreciation of such values rooted in strict foundations of bilateralism separated Pakistan or Pak-US alliance from Indo-US alliance. It refers generally to American De-Hyphenation Policy or Only India Policy. The tendency to keep India active in American foreign relations by providing technology for military advancement and nuclear assistance without taking into consideration its impacts on neighbouring states was the actual spirit of US approach of de-hyphenating New Delhi from other states in its South Asian engagement.

In order to comprehend the ongoing designs of American relations with South Asia structured on a separate treatment for India and Pakistan based of de-hyphenation policy, the

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90 Phillips Talbot, op. cit.
essence of term de-hyphenation is needed to be explored briefly. The nature of term de-hyphenation can be understood by describing a concise review of existing literature.

4. What is De-Hyphenation in World Politics

With reference to the foreign relations of a country, the term de-hyphenation usually refers to delinking of relations of a country from other countries. In other words, it is called a policy of maintaining the relations of one country with another country on standalone basis without considering the impact on a third country.91 This plan of managing foreign relations means the foreign policy of a country structured on non-traditional basis. It directs the foreign policy decision makers to think more pragmatically by adopting an essential need-based approach. The dynamics of de-hyphenation usually compel the leaders to maintain foreign relations on geopolitical basis instead of relying on traditional ethos of foreign policy mechanism.92

Another explanation of de-hyphenation policy articulates the dealings of two countries having antagonistic relations parallel to standing against each other in the international system. The country adopting de-hyphenating policy attempts to maintain its relation with both adversarial states in an independent manner.93 The nature of this policy dictates the main decision making circles of foreign policy to develop the foreign relation with one country, without considering its impact on others. It can also be said, the maintaining of foreign relations with one states while ignoring the complexities of its relations with other states.94 In international politics, this policy suggests the governments to less emphasize the impact of two states relations on third states. Such policy states adopt

92 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
usually when the two states are involved in an enduring rivalry covered in incompatible and inflexible national standings. An appropriate application of de-hyphenating standards in foreign relations can easily be seen in US contemporary policy vis-à-vis New Delhi and Islamabad. This policy treats both nuclear rivals on separate basis without getting the effects of their adversarial interaction. The United States has decided to adopt this policy for India and Pakistan because Washington is now determined to strengthen its presence in the ongoing geostrategic alteration of nuclearized subcontinent.

In the changing geopolitical dynamics of South Asia, the United States preferred to adopt a de-hyphenation approach which guides Washington to avoid involving in regional politics of South Asia. It instructs the leading American officials to pursue strictly the national interest of Washington while establishing relations with a state. It directs also the leading state authorities from Washington to pursue the core national values without considering the impact of its foreign relations on other countries. In this way, the contemporary designs of American foreign relations with South Asia is pursuing a policy of separate treatment with India and Pakistan.

5. The De-Hyphenation Policy of Washington

In order to enhance the American superpower status parallel to the preservation of contemporary unipolar structure of world politics, the post-9/11 foreign relations of Washington focused primarily the need for revitalizing American allies. In response to the tragic terrorist attack in 2001, President Bush decided to create an international coalition against terrorism. This decision changed the United States relations with India and Pakistan overnight. The American initiation of the global war on terror supported by its allies was envisioned to protect the international leadership of Washington, and it was designed to

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95 Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?* (New York; Routledge, 2002), 163.
neutralize ultimately the emerging standing of counterbalancing states. No doubt, the initiation of global anti-terror campaign by Bush government received the support of Chinese and Russian leaders apart from the NATO allies, but the emerging role of Moscow and Beijing in the international relations was perceived to be a major threat to global standing of Washington. The challenging role of Moscow and Beijing raised serious American concerns because the persistent growth of anti-US behaviours of states was seemed to undermine Washington’s position in the international system.

The worries of the White House for preserving the rival-free worldwide environment emerged in post-Soviet era forced the Bush administration to chalk out a new plan for altering the conventional attributes of American foreign policy. In order to changing precisely the conventional attributes of South Asian priorities, the Obama administration followed by President Bush decided to architect a more applicable policy different from his predecessors. Such policy refers normally to the independent involvement with New Delhi and Islamabad, and help the United States importantly in achieving its strategic interest instead of losing the main objectives of its reigon policy by indulging in hostile behaviors of both nuclear-armed nations. A logical way of pursuing such goal was to construct an autonomous bilateralism generally called de-hyphenation or dual-hyphenation.

The decoupling plan for treating both India and Pakistan in a distinct diplomatic framework under a grand South Asia policy denotes to the duple formulation of American foreign relations towards nuclear-armed states of the subcontinent. Such plan vividly represents separate standing of New Delhi and Islamabad in broader priorities of Washington. The fundamental nature of de-hyphenation policy gradually echoed its objectives which

98 Ibid.
include the application of US bilateralism in South Asia instead of following the multilateral engagement. American policymakers preferred to pursue strictly the geostrategic interests of their nation by counterbalancing the role of emerging anti-American forces or counterweighting the role of states which could probably challenge the contemporary unipolar designs of international system. These objectives later led Washington to realize the potential of India and Indian aspiration for becoming a powerful state in regional politics of South Asia.\textsuperscript{99}

Moreover, the de-hyphenating characteristics of US foreign policy are not restricted to India, it marked Pakistan a significant non-NATO ally and a frontline state in the war on terror.\textsuperscript{100} It is also believed that without the help of Islamabad, it is hard for the United States to achieve the desired objectives in carrying the counterterror fight in Afghanistan. In short, the de-hyphenating features of US foreign policy realized the need to formulate a new policy which could be based on considerably decoupling India and Pakistan, realizing Indian potential, and recognizing significance of Pakistan in the ongoing war in Afghanistan for further actions.\textsuperscript{101}

The formulation of abovementioned objectives articulated the main formats of de-hyphenation approach and measured both India and Pakistan considerably necessary for the US and importantly relevant to its geostrategic interests. The proponents of the ongoing South Asian policy of the United States, dealing India and Pakistan in different conducts, purely based on its observation of appreciating Indian assertive role parallel to underestimating the potential of Pakistan in the world politics. A visible shift toward India

advocates clearly the American support of New Delhi due to its huge geographical size, large economic market, identical political system, and enlarging military power.

The notion of the de-hyphenation policy was originally coined by Clinton, structured by President Bush, and formally adopted by Obama. Moreover, two officials of Bush administration, Douglas Jay Feith from the Department of Defence and Robert Blackwill as an American ambassador to India, communicated initially the momentous role of New Delhi to Washington in the swiftly changing world politics. In the presence of abrupt changes in post 9/11 terrorist attack and post-1998 nuclearization of South Asia, American search for more likeminded allies highlighted India in the greater US South Asian plans. The main format of this policy emphasizes the promotion of US values by improving its relations with both rival neighbors of South Asia separately. Such behavior structured the strategic ties with India without substantially considering Pakistan.

The first concrete step for increasing defense cooperation and changing the traditional views of both states for each other was Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). The pioneering agreement NSSP signed in 2004 was considered to be a start-up of a gradual process of expanding the military and strategic relationship between two countries. The agreed framework of NSSP outlined the three areas of bilateral cooperation such as civil nuclear cooperation, collaboration in space programs, and maintenance of joined ventures of high-technology. Additionally, the initiation of dialogues on missile defense was also finalized. Bilateral consensus on missile development slightly echoed the military traits of NSSP. Another pioneer step taken by Indian Defence Minister (Pranab Mukherjee) and US Defence Secretary (Donald Rumsfield) was the New Framework in the India-US Defence Relationship in 2005 for chalk out a plan of future strategic interaction.

104 G D Sharma, op. cit., 22.
The widening up of American engagement in Kabul refers to the ending of the US presence in Afghanistan was a plan chalked out in the White House without involving India. The American-led global war on terror which brought Pakistan close to the US internationally by declaring it a frontline state in global counterterror campaign help both states in managing of their bilateral ties. The continuation of de-hyphenating foreign policy agenda of Bush administration was precisely twisted by Obama in 2009, when the unexpected move of war on terror discovered the Af-Pak policy.\footnote{Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Af-Pak and Regional Peace in China’s Perspective: A Critical Appraisal,” Pakistan Horizon 64, No. 04 (October 2011): 30.} This policy decided to consider terrorism-effected Afghanistan and Pakistan on similar patterns. The invention of the Af-Pak strategy was generally a revision of US Afghanistan strategy for meeting the desired unachievable results during the former Bush administration. The central theme of the policy emphasized the single challenge of addressing terrorism belong to two different countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan). The decisive operation of eliminating the cross-border infiltration of insurgents on porous Pak-Afghan border (Durand Line) was highly emphasized.\footnote{Ishtiaq Ahmad, “The U.S. Af-Pak Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 37, No. 04 (2010): 193-194.} It was regional approach introduced by Obama, but it clarified the vision of treating Islamabad beyond the diplomatic interaction of New Delhi and Washington.

The increased strategic cooperation between the United States and India increased the consensus of both states on enhancing the collaboration over Indian nuclear capability, but it effected the future of South Asia – a region of perpetual instability and protracted hostility. Clinton administration was keen in upholding the role of New Delhi in the regional politics and announced partially an Indian-inclined policy, which was further completed by President Bush when the civil nuclear deal captured the bilateral relationship. The engaging India policy under proposed nuclear cooperation for civil purposes ceased the pressures of the non-proliferation regime on India and encouraged Manmohan government to stretch the strategic
muscles of his country while retaining New Delhi away from the pressures of NPT. In this way, the American support averted significantly the critical status of Indian nuclear capability by relaxing the main concerns pertaining Indian non-cooperative role with the global non-proliferation regime.

Instead of agreeing on the multi-layered patterns of cooperative bilateralism, the leaders from two-sides remained ambitious for the advancement of a more vigorous strategic joint ventures under the broader mutual framework. The American promises of helping India in modernizing military equipment, advancing the defense infrastructure, increasing nuclear capabilities, and arranging joint military and naval exercise show the strategic commitment of both states in the major areas of territorial and oceanic politics.

The de-hyphenating treatment on individual basis did not clearly ignore Pakistan from its fundamental framework, but it kept Pakistan alive simultaneously in the United States foreign policy by declaring it an essential state actively participating in its global mission of combating terrorism. The demands of Islamabad for acquiring the parity with India in strategic affairs of South Asia were always inventively tackled by Washington. Usually the demands for equal treatment rooted in a balanced approach averted by foreign policy elites of United States by marking comparatively different policies for different countries. Equivalent to India, Pakistan was called a valuable ally in the war on terror instead of keeping it at same lines with India since the dawn of 21st century. Therefore, lack of a common policy for both nuclear-armed states of subcontinent raised several unanswered but serious question on the new formats of Washington-South Asian relations. Less importance in managing the bilateral points of disagreements between New Delhi and Islamabad coupled with the separate patterns of bilateral engagement with both nuclear-armed powers, in this way, outlined a simple US policy seeking to secure American geopolitical interest in the region.
6. Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation

The fundamental patterns of de-hyphenation alerted the main courses of Indo-US interactions and brought the two nations in a closer strategic domain. The notion of de-hyphenating India and Pakistan in broader US alliance was invented by Clinton and further polished by President Bush when the strategic promises of New Delhi were doubled by White House. The term of President Bush from 2001 to 2009 continued the South Asian plan of Clinton and decided to overthrow three decades long non-proliferation deadlock with India because the main foreign policy canons of the United States recognized the importance of Indian power in emerging international system of new realities.

The proposed nuclear cooperation between both governments shocked the international community by purely articulating the matters of bilateral strategic values. The decided agreement in Singh-Bush diplomacy had serious consequences on the South Asian strategic environment, which could not be simply overruled. The reciprocal overview of each other opened the new doors of multidimensional avenues, covering the areas of civil nuclear cooperation, military hardware deals, economic ventures, and space technological collaboration. It was widely considered a major paradigm shift formally known as a de-hyphenation approach.

A cordial rapprochement for close cooperation started in 2004 with the NSSP. According to the planned agreement NSSP, India is allowed to access civil nuclear technology, and the 2005 Bush-Singh summit promised to expand its nuclear program under New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship and the final format of a civil nuclear deal concluded in 2008. No doubt, the nuclear deal between two states hampered the international non-proliferation efforts, but the initiation of war on terror as the result of 9/11 attacks subordinated the American counter-proliferation efforts to the other challenges of the

In South Asia, the shift in foreign relations converted the American foreign policy from non-proliferation to the post-proliferation domain, because the initiation of the global war on terror required the greater cooperation from India and Pakistan. The sanction episode directed toward India as result of NPT ended and a landmark nuclear deal exempted the New Delhi from the limitation of the global non-proliferation regime. The genesis of NPT inherited in the President Johnson administration when he opened the debate on NPT in American Congress on July 09 1968, by calling it “the most important international agreement in the field of disarmament since the nuclear age began.” Moreover, the nuclear-related worries of Washington under Carter government worked on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) in 1978. The NNPA was primarily an effort of legalizing the American counter-proliferation mission. Now, in the age of twenty-first century, Washington has changed the course of history by dealing the nuclear affairs of New Delhi out of the NPT.

The changing nature of two-sided strategic relationship promised to support the nuclear status of a non-NPT state by involving it in a civil nuclear cooperation instead of convincing its leaders on subscribing to the NPT. The formal debate on providing the civil nuclear assistance was outlined in NSSP in 2004, and it was the first close military-to-military interaction of New Delhi and Washington after 1964. The first phase of NSSP

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activated the Indian space program in 2004, and the following or second phase in the next year initiated a talk about the civil nuclear deal. The cultivation of strategic relations with India under NSSP was, no doubt, a door which deepened American intense involvement in the South Asia region, but it widened the avenues undeniably for further nuclear proliferation.\textsuperscript{112} No doubt, the critical strategic circles of international community translated the nuclear deal between two states is landmark achievement of two-sided strategic commitments, but it defeated discreetly the South Asian directions of the global non-proliferation regime. After finalizing the deal in 2008, it became a difficult task for United States to redefine or relaunch its arms control and disarmament campaign in the subcontinent because an undeclared departure from historical counter-proliferation mission was easy to imagine for the US, but difficult to practice.

The civil nuclear initiative fostering two sided strategic ties was negotiated in 2005 and approved by American Congress under Hyde Act in 2006.\textsuperscript{113} One year-long debate between Congress and Senate concluded the Hyde Act introduced by Republican congressman (Henry John Hyde) officially entitled “The Henry J. Hyde United States – India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006.”\textsuperscript{114} The US Atomic Energy Act passed in 1954 was a landmark principle of American global non-proliferation campaign rooted in Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which allowed US government to maintain foreign relation for supporting civil nuclear cooperation with other nations as a part of larger Atoms for Peace program of Eisenhower.

In 2006, Hyde Act adjusted the Atomic Energy Act of US according to Indo-US strategic ties and made it flexible for supporting civil nuclear program of New Delhi despite it was keeping and advancing its nuclear arsenal. A study of SASSI provides the details of

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{113} Daryl G. Kimball, “Contradicting Plague U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal,” \textit{Arms Control Today} 38, No. 02 (March 2008): 03.
\bibitem{114} Rajesh Ragagopalan and Atul Mishra, \textit{Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts} (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014), 143.
\end{thebibliography}
Hyde Act and its association with Indo-US nuclear.\textsuperscript{115} The Hyde Act primarily allowed Washington to conclude a civil nuclear deal with New Delhi.\textsuperscript{116} The Hyde Act relaxed four clauses of US Atomic Energy Act includes sub-section a. (2) of Section 123(seeking the IAEA specific safeguards on existing nuclear equipment), Section 128 (additional criterion along with measures stopping the United States from developing nuclear cooperating with India), sub-section a. (1) of Section 129 (refrain American from cooperation in nuclear field with a Non-Nuclear Weapon State involve in nuclear relevant events).\textsuperscript{117} The three waived parts of American pioneering efforts for setting the global trends of nuclear non-proliferation exertions changed the passage of nuclear history in 2005.

The deviation from the historical Prague speech of Obama has raised several critical questions to India-specific Hyde Act. In opposition to the Prague speech of April 2009 which emphasized momentously the creation of a world free of nuclear weapons, it was the vision of newly elected first black American President Obama.\textsuperscript{118} The Prague speech introduced the vision of Obama for the developing a nuclear-free world, but the continuation of the civil nuclear deal was an effort to provide nuclear assistance to a state which is not willing to accept the norms of the international non-proliferation regime.

This vision of Obama was designed to show his commitment and pledges for the persuasion of nuclear disarmament parallel to the continuation of a policy of his predecessors for positively bringing India toward nuclear politics of great powers.\textsuperscript{119} The consequent scenario of the Indo-US nuclear agreement, to some extent, showed the promises of Bush-Obama for accepting India as a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). The reluctant legitimacy to


\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{117} Rajesh Rajagopalan and Atul Mishra, op. cit.


the nuclear status of New Delhi raised serious concerns globally, but the constant attempts of remaining active the nuclear dialogues between two states disappointed international strategic community generally and South Asian states specifically. In the regional politics of nuclearized subcontinent, the state authorities from Islamabad disappointed more than international community.

No doubt, the nuclear deal is restricted to civil purposes according to sign the agreement, but many analysts around the world claimed that the said deal would contribute to India’s nuclear weapon program. This nuclear agreement considered a sweetheart deal for New Delhi as explained by Michael Krepon. This deal is designed to allow New Delhi to improve its nuclear program, according to Krepon. Moreover, this deal is containing sufficient potential for boosting an open competition of conventional and non-conventional strategic capabilities between India and its territorially adjoining countries. This Washington-sponsored nuclear agreement has convinced India for restricting the acquired technology for peaceful purposes, meeting the safety standards required by IAEA, and it will convince India for fully cooperating with the international non-proliferation regime.

The agreed condition of the deal portrays, no doubt, a challenging future for India, but presently, it has changed the prime status of New Delhi in the world politics. Unignorably, India is ambitious to become an unquestionable part of great power politics where the Great Power Club of five states valued the importance of New Delhi without realizing its assertive role in South Asia, and without placing much importance on resolving its chronic disputes with neighboring states.

4. The Efforts to Uphold India in World Politics

Modernizing Indian military capabilities parallel to enabling New Delhi in refining its nuclear proficiencies contain more promises of United States for providing a more prestigious status in world politics which could eventually lead India to rationalize the dream of its power-projection in international relations. The upgradation of present Indian status in South Asia and its promotion in world politics proclaimed the new realities of Indo-US cooperation which is apparently a matter of bilateral relation of two states, but its consequent future will accommodate American geostrategic interest. The transformed relationship between two countries in future will be a strong opposition for a third state when the application of strong alliance of two states will jeopardize the position of the third state. The leading foreign policy advisors of particularly Bush administration decided to support India not only in South Asian region but also in an international system. The Bush regime observed the potential of Singh government and considered it as an apposite partner for counterweighting the challenging Asian forces. The emerging anti-United States forces from Asian continent gradually became a serious security issue for President Bush.  

The Indian dream of entry into the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) is originally introduced and supported by the Obama Administration. The American efforts behind Indian membership to the NSG while advocating its application for entry has introduced a state-specific approach. New Delhi specific nepotism of Washington has, in this way, undermined the prerequisite steps for obtaining NSG membership. The American preferential treatment for India has launched a conflict on required benchmarks for membership of supplier group. The clash on criteria-based or state-specific approach created a chaotic situation for new entrants. The overriding of existing norms, rules, and principles is a colorful exploitation of an informal structure of NSG and its non-binding guidelines.

The American campaign in support of Indian standing for achieving the membership of supplier group is originated from Indo-US strategic partnership. The strategic nexus of both states has designed several initiatives which have direct effects on the strategic equilibrium of South Asia. The Indian inclusion of NSG is a serious threat to the regional strategic culture of South Asia which will largely foster the existing arms race in the region. The Washington-New Delhi strategic partnership which has resulted in a nuclear deal has already fractured the scope of a strategically stable South Asia. The leading state officials from Islamabad are trying repeatedly to raise their voices globally against the American support of India. The core concern of Pakistan about South Asian strategic stability remained unanswered by Bush and Obama administrations. An overwhelming wave of serious question on the regional strategic environment of South Asian inefficiently addressed by the international community. The inequitable efforts of United States to provide a discriminatory wavier on September 06 2008, to India shows unquestionably the US strategic inclination toward New Delhi which will shatter eventually the vision of regional stability.

The efforts to proclaim India as one of the power centers of the international relations by accurately understanding and addressing the main concerns of New Delhi have become one of the main attributes of American South Asian policy. Hence, the traditional South Asian policy of Washington decided to constantly accommodate India in maintaining its influence beyond its territorial jurisdictions. The fundamental virtues of a renewed Indo-US cooperation witness the unannounced promises of Washington for increasing Indian role in world politics parallel to granting it a prestigious status in American broader alliance. Such

American concerns have jeopardized scope of the international non-proliferation regime.\textsuperscript{125} The coalition of both states is reflecting an intense augmentation of bilateral commitments which are against Islamabad and Beijing individually, or Sino-Pak alliance mutually.\textsuperscript{126} Therefore, a careful professional response by creating joint Indo-US ventures in territorial and oceanic politics have become vibrant lines of cooperation against rising Pak-China friendship (as discussed earlier).

8. Balancing Rising China

The fundamental principle for maintaining of strong bilateral relations constructed the alliance between states aspirants of maintaining superpower status (US) and regional power status (India). Vajpayee regime was considered to be a potential era which could prove India committedly as a potential candidate for becoming a great power in South Asia. The realization of such energy of New Delhi was accurately perceived by Bush administration under the zenith period of Neo-conservatism (Neocons), such as the Vice President Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice.\textsuperscript{127} The main neoconservative agenda was based on “assertive multilateralism”, and designed to promote the unipolar structure of the world politics advanced by American global values.\textsuperscript{128} It was the reflection of “unilateralist” nature of Washington.\textsuperscript{129}

In South Asia, the Neocons provided greater significance to emerging India and perceived it as a suitable option for containing China, but the merits for building strategic connections with India was chosen to be on separate directions besides Pakistan. In 2005,

\textsuperscript{126} Mehmood Hussain, op. cit., 13.
\textsuperscript{127} Albert L. Weeks, The Choice of War: The Iraq War and the Just War Tradition (California: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2010), 56.
\textsuperscript{129} Ole R. Holsti, Making American Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2006), 280.
during an official visit of New Delhi, the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, cleared the vision of Neocons. She said, “We and India have taken our relationship to a new level through the NSSP.”\textsuperscript{130} She further added “Our defense cooperation is strong in military-to-military contacts and joint exercises. The United States looks forward to enhancing that defense cooperation over the next several years.”\textsuperscript{131} The application of Beijing-containment strategy by divorcing Pakistan from New Delhi-Washington alliance resulted in close Sino-Pak relations. Therefore, Indo-US and Sino-Pak alliances started to become an unavoidable reality of changing the geostrategic landscape of South Asia. Perhaps, the signing of a nuclear deal with India has no doubt enhanced the Indo-US diplomatic connections, but it left unignorably deteriorated impacts on Pak-US relations.\textsuperscript{132}

The Bush administration cultivated New Delhi as a close partner and important strategic ally and left Islamabad to find a more accommodating and extra-supportive superpower. A surprise combination of containing Beijing and talking tough to Islamabad during the Indo-Pak conflict in post nuclearized South Asia further consolidated Sino-Pak friendship.\textsuperscript{133} The Bush regime under neoconservative agenda emphasized the advancement of American pre-eminence in South Asia which was mainly emphasizing countering of its major competitors. During an interview to a former ambassador of Pakistan, Zamir Akram claimed the strategic partnership of Washington with New Delhi is purely a way of counterweighting Chinese economic rise.\textsuperscript{134} The economic emergence of China at the global level has been accepted by several American officials. Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, during his remarks before the U.S.-

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid
\textsuperscript{134} Interview with Amb. Zamir Akram, Islamabad, January 12, 2018.
China Economic and Security Review Commission endorsed the rise of Beijing and its increasing influence in the international system.\textsuperscript{135} The study of Henry Kissinger’s \textit{World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History} treats China as the potentially powerful states in the international system and its role in world politics made India a peer competitor.\textsuperscript{136} Therefore, the United States preferred to realize emerging role of New Delhi in the Asian continent generally, and against Beijing particularly. It was an exceptional way of meeting American national security interest in the nuclearized subcontinent in the post-9/11 environment.

Bush-Vajpayee determination of neutralizing the Chinese economic rise started to segregate China in territorial and maritime politics of Indian Ocean. China was explicitly excluded from the alliances of four naval forces started in 2004 for carrying the rescue activities in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{137} The complex humanitarian relief operations indicated the covert strategic alliance cemented in rescue operations. The strategic cum humanitarian efforts communicated the strong two-pronged bounds between New Delhi and Washington against the potential threats emanating from opposite directions like China. A closer outlook of Indian role under Vajpayee was mainly promoted by Neocons administration led by President Bush (2001-2008).\textsuperscript{138} The peak of American foreign policy during Neocons regime clarified their geostrategic plans of preserving the unipolar infrastructure of the international system which could largely support American dominance and make India to play a significant role of balancing the anti-American uprising especially from China. The main \textit{The influential cannons of Neocons under Bush regime distinguished themselves from}\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{137} Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, op. cit., 169.
predecessor Presidents and shaped an India-centric policy. It was technically an American effort of revisiting the main formats of US-South Asian relations.

Bush regime perceived India as an essential partner and it can play an effective role in counterweighting China. It was an application of Cold War model of Kennedy and was refreshed by Bush administration in twenty-first century. During the 1962 Indo-China border clash over Tibet, Kennedy decided to arm India against its neighbor China (as discussed in previous chapters). Once again the Indo-US coalition in twenty-first century decided significantly to approach anti-Chinese actions. The strategic arrangement against China is the reassurance of both states for addressing mutually a common challenge. Before Bush, President Clinton and after Bush, President Obama, viewed China through the same lens.

It is considered to be more an American competitor contrary to a loyal trading partner. Instead of engaging China appropriately in South Asian hostile political order, Washington preferred to empower New Delhi against Beijing. The elite circles of a foreign policy decision-makers from the United States were more inclined to balance China, and less motivated for cooperating with China. The principle commitment of Washington by strategically consolidating the Indian potential and encouraging it for becoming a center of international relations communicated clearly its geopolitical influx in Asian affairs. Such behavior would eventually lead the United States to remain a close eye on China, analogous to historical framework of Cold War politics. Moreover, it is widely believed that Chinese military modernization will empower the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and further it will enable Beijing to surpass Washington in the international system.

The mainstream American leadership observed Indian strategic demands against China and Pakistan individually, and Sino-Pak collaboration mutually. Additionally, the

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140 Ninan Koshy, Under the Empire: India’s New Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Leftword Books), 277.
vision of New Delhi for placing India at the center of world politics was further observed by Obama administration (2009-2016) when the efforts of placing India among the great powers and generating the debate of providing it the NSG membership became vibrantly an irrefutable fact for Pakistan. As a result, an additional environment of mistrust and anxiety engulfed the fracturing Pak-US cooperative bounds.

The leading US officials have already accepted an upset future of South Asia which could be caused by Chinese emergence. Indian ambition of acquiring the great power status could only be a viable option for the United States which could rightly be advanced against the economic rise Beijing. Therefore, in the presence of such situation, the future of South Asia is portraying a worrisome picture of New Delhi-Islamabad-Washington triangle. In order to keep the South Asian politics peaceful and stable, on one hand, a comprehensive overview of ongoing American engagement with two nuclear powers of the subcontinent is needed. On the other hand, the presence of great power politics cannot simply be ignored while estimating the future of India-Pakistan hostile relations. In addition to explaining the US involvement in the nuclear politics of subcontinent, the role of other extra-regional powers and their emerging ties with the South Asian nuclear neighbours cannot be overlooked. The cooperative interactions of New Delhi and Islamabad with the world outside their home region is important and it leaves substantial impact on American South Asian engagement.

9. Pakistan-China Relations under CPEC

The ongoing patterns of Pakistan-China relationship cannot simply be comprehended without studying the mega economic corridor project between both nations. State representatives of both countries agreed to follow a broader vision of regional connectivity through China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. By signing this project with
Beijing, Islamabad has opened a window of economic opportunities for the surrounding states including Iran, Afghanistan, India, and the five Central Asian Republics.\(^{142}\) The government of Pakistan is determined to involve other regional states in CPEC which will effect directly the strategic position of Washington in Asian continent generally, and South Asian particularly. This mega economic plan is containing numerous financial projects which are primly designed to increase geographical contacts between different states and it is going to change the regional landscape of South Asia. The leaders of PRC are now committed to increase their economic alliance with neighbouring South Asian state, Pakistan. Chinese leaders are dedicated to increase their global reach by using their cooperative association with Islamabad.

The genesis of Pakistan-China economic engagement is inherited in the days of Cold War when the US and USSR were emerging in ideological clashes gripped in their communist and capitalist maxims. After recognizing PRC on January 04 1950, the initial government of Pakistan under Liquat Ali Khan decided to outline the diplomatic interaction with Beijing.\(^{143}\) A reciprocal era of official visits from both sides improved the diplomatic ties of both nations and resulted in first trade agreement on January 1963.\(^{144}\) Same year witnessed a border agreement between both countries and their foreign ministers Chen Yi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto were agreed on a boundary between both nations.\(^{145}\) A major boost in bilateral relations occurred after 1965 India-Pakistan war when Johnson administration imposed embargo on both contestants of South Asia. It pushed Auyb Khan towards Beijing

\(^{145}\) Ibid.
and China was willing to support Pakistan economically and militarily. Later decades observed a more closed alliance between Beijing and Islamabad.\(^{146}\)

Despite knowing the ideological association of Beijing with Moscow, the Pakistani officials avoided any direct or indirect confrontation with Chinese and preferred to maintain cooperative diplomatic ties with China. Even the government of Pakistan decided to play vital role in bringing Kissinger and Mao diplomatically close. In the end of Cold War, the United States and China helped Pakistan in liberating Kabul from Soviet influence and the demise of communist Moscow from world politics caused a more closed diplomatic communication between Islamabad and Beijing. On one hand, Chinese and Pakistani leaders remained committed with each other at diplomatic fronts. On the other hand, the United States was unable to sustain its cooperative relation with China and a diplomatic rift between two superpowers added antagonistic values in Sino-US relations. The era of rapprochement facilitated by Pakistan started vanishing on Taiwan issue and a complete diplomatic breakdown occurred after Tiananmen Square protest incident.\(^{147}\)

A consistent pattern of multi-dynamic cooperation in different fields remained an important factor between Pakistan and China. Unlike the United States, Pakistan decided to keep diplomatically cooperative and politically friendly behaviour with China. Both neighbours realized the potential of each other and unambiguously planned to collaborate in various fields.\(^{148}\) Two-sided governments have collectively decided to expand their roles at various regional and international forums and their long-term economic collaboration has unfolded numerous fields of common interest. The major breakthrough between two states


occurred in July 2013 when economic corridor project was concluded and the two-sided governments were agreed to link Gwadar Port located at Arabian Sea to Kashghar, China.149

In order to formalise the corridor project, the first meeting of Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) was arranged in Islamabad in August 2013.150 The efforts to enhance strategic relationship similar to economic alliance, Beijing proposed a plan of financing $6.5 billion to Pakistan in the nuclear field.151 This economic assistance was decided to construct two power project in Karachi with the 1,100 megawatts capacity.152 The vast economic areas under the broader CPEC initiative started twenty-two project initially with the investment of $18.9 billion.153 These projects were aimed to cover the areas of transportation infrastructure development and energy. In the end of 2018, an analytical survey of Chinese Embassy in Pakistan showed the progress of past five years in which eleven projects were completed and another round of eleven projects is in progress.154 In sum, overall twenty-two projects of around $18.9 billion were introduced by Chinese government in different areas of Pakistan. In future, both countries are agreed on twenty more projects which cover four major areas; energy, infrastructure, Gwadar Port, industry cooperation, coupled with job creation and social responsibility.155

The consensus of two countries under CPEC is primarily a significant part of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is a gigantic economic project containing a global network of rail and road transport along with development of ports in order to connect European, Asian, and African countries to China. Beijing finalized the BRI as an economic instrument for investing sixty-five countries across the globe and revealed countless

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149 “Chronology of China-Pakistan Relations,” op. cit.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
investments destinations in different continents.\textsuperscript{156} In the first five years, the economic cooperation with different nations across the world resulted in sixty-nine agreements for the development of roads, maritime routes and railways under the broader vision of BRI.\textsuperscript{157} Chinese model of connectivity through international massive infrastructure investments is strictly dependent on Gwadar Port which is the only way to penetrate Indian Ocean. Other major projects, Pan-Asia Railway to link Singapore and high-speed rail tracks throughout Eurasia, are also important to understand a plan of global reach introduced by China.\textsuperscript{158} President Xi Jinping introduced the BRI plan to access various countries from East Asia to Europe and across Eurasia. This plan is primarily designed to increase the economic influence of Beijing in the world which is an effort to renew the Chinese ancient Silk Road model accessing international system from Atlantic to Pacific.

An economic strategy for enhancing international outreach sponsored by the vision of Xi Jinping has been perceived by anti-Chinese alliances as a potential threat to their positions in the international system. India from South Asian region is constantly opposing the economic emergence of Beijing and the Hindu leadership is trying to promote a campaign against BRI by maintaining that it is a Chinese way of dominating the world.\textsuperscript{159} The Western world from New Delhi to London is fearing from geo-economic rise of Xi which is considered as a broader part of String of Pearls\textsuperscript{160} strategy. The Chinese emergence is covering the areas of South and East China Seas in addition to Indian Ocean Region (JOR).

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{160} The notion of String of Pearl refers to a geopolitical thought that explains the Chinese intention for creating influence in India Ocean. It explains an economic plan of China to connect various states of Indian Ocean region to China. It is a broader economic plan of Beijing which intends to maintain Chinese naval influence in its own territorial waters along with controlling neighboring oceans.
In these three areas, Beijing is going to implement the idea of “Peaceful Development” and the creation of “Ocean of Peace and Cooperation.” The String of Pearls strategy initially defined by an American scholar in 2005 is raising serious concerns of Western world. Instead of rationally evaluating the Good Neighbourhood Policy of China, the critical circles of international community is keeping the BRI as a potential challenge and it is going to alter the global strategic landscape.

An overwhelming wave of criticism rising mainly from the United States and its major allies is negatively viewing the BRI and its associated projects in different countries. People from Western capital are treating Jinping’s BRI plan as a way for ensuring China’s economic rise and it is intended to reshape the global economic order. The United States and its key allies are taking possible measures to strengthen their position in international system while undermining the dream of Jinping for controlling the world through economic policies. Primarily, the BRI and its association to CPEC is a direct challenge to the Washington and its role in the South Asia subcontinent. American close strategic partnership in the South Asian region (with India) is mainly threatened by Chinese BRI project. The involvement of Pakistan in the BRI through CPEC is considered a potential threat to the regional standing of New Delhi. Presently, the mainstream Indian leadership is marking the mega economic initiative of Xi Jinping as an attempt for becoming a strong trading power. It is also considered as an effort to reshape the economic order of international system. In order to appropriately containing the economic emergence of Beijing, New Delhi has altered the conventional framework of its foreign policy and decided to contain the emerging role of Beijing in world politics by creating more space in the international relations.

162 Ibid.
164 Ibid., 12.
10. Indian Global Outreach

The mainstream Indian leadership is unsettled with neighbouring China and its cooperatively pleasant ties with the other neighbours of New Delhi, Pakistan. On one hand, the diplomatic collaboration mainly in security and economic affairs between Beijing and Islamabad gained unprecedented growth due to their common animosity with New Delhi. On the other hand, the leading policymakers from New Delhi decided to increase their significance in the anti-Chinese circles of international community. The state obsessed with Chinese antipathy preferred to develop friendly ties with India and an alliance with New Delhi enabled the anti-Beijing countries to stand against BRI.\(^{165}\)

Under the leadership of United States, Western states mainly consisting of American allies are determined to preserve American global standing while opposing China in the world politics. The leading circles of American allies translated the BRI plan of Xi Jinping as an important factor which could jeopardize the US status in world politics. President Jinping sought to bring prosperity mainly in Asian continent and emphasized the countries lacking major infrastructure development.\(^{166}\) US translated Chinese model of accessing foreign markets as an economic strategy for obtaining a role of global leader. As a counterbalancing strategy against Chinese global economic initiatives, Washington selected India from South Asia as an appropriate country containing counterbalancing potential against China.

In response to evolving Chinese influence in South Asian and Pacific regions, the India leadership is taking appropriate measure for the enhancement of its position in the international affairs. The superpower status of Beijing and its aspiration for creating a


Chinese-dominated world is going to challenge directly the hegemonic strategic designs of New Delhi for the regional and extra-regional affairs. An appropriate planning for preserving the Asian balance in Indian favour is the strategic desire of New Delhi which is going to undermine by Chinese officials. Additionally, the maritime affairs of IOR under People’s Liberation Army Navy is also leaving worse impact on the Indian naval position in IOR.\textsuperscript{167} In order to push PRC in a disadvantageous position, the leading state officials from New Delhi are seriously engaged in revising of their conventional foreign policy mechanism, because an updated and improved foreign policy is an appropriate measure which will not only help India in meeting its strategic ambitions, but it will also help New Delhi to improve its standing in the world politics.

In order to comprehend the Indian role under Modi administration in the world politics, the present government of Modi is taking various measures for the improvement of Indian role as an active anti-Chinese factor. An active engagement with the US and its close political and economic interaction with the major allies during the past few decades marked a new chapter in the history of New Delhi’s foreign relations. The forces of globalization, economic liberalization along with the changing geo-strategic environment particularly after the Cold War hampered the conventional model of Indian foreign policy and pushed the Hindu leaders towards an improved format of foreign relations. Additionally, the initiation of war on terror as the result of 9/11 incident further augmented the Indo-US ties.\textsuperscript{168} A brief overview of Indian foreign relations and the increasing engagement of Modi with different countries are essential to comprehend before calculating the potential of New Delhi in the world politics and its increased significance in Washington.

\textsuperscript{167} Shishir Upadhyaya, op. cit., 64.
\textsuperscript{168} James Chiriyankandath, “Realigning India: Foreign Policy After the Cold War,” \textit{The Round Table} 93, No. 374 (April 2004), 202.
A pragmatic assessment of national interest compelled the Indian leaders to increase the economic and strategic engagements of their country with different nations. As discussed in chapter three, the Indian government has concluded various strategic initiative with thirty nations. After becoming a nuclear weapon state in 1998, the Vajpayee regime finalized strategic engagement with six power; Germany, France, Iran, Japan, US, Russia.\textsuperscript{169} The government of Manmohan Singh extended the strategic alliance with Afghanistan, China, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and South Korea. Singh further focused the states from Asia-Pacific and members of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Furthermore, the Central Asian Republics were added in close strategic framework.\textsuperscript{170} Three Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan coupled with Brazil, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria were also added in the list of close strategic partners of Manmohan government.\textsuperscript{171} In addition to Vajpayee and Singh, Modi engaged Canada, Mongolia, Oman, Seychelles, United Arab Emirates and United Kingdom in strategic collaboration with India.\textsuperscript{172} Prior to announcing nuclear weapon status, Prime Minister Deve Gowda singed a strategic agreement with South Africa and the state officials of both countries were agreed to cover the various economic and strategic fields for the mutual cooperation in 1997.\textsuperscript{173}

The quest to polish strategic muscles in the nuclear field led New Delhi to increase nuclear relation with other countries. In the nuclear field, Indian government finalized different agreements with fourteen countries. Civil nuclear agreements with Canada, Australia, Argentina, Czech Republic, Japan, Mongolia, Nigeria, Namibia, and South Korea in addition to four permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, apart from

\textsuperscript{169} Ian Hall, “Multialignment and India Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi,” The Round Table 105, No. 03 (2016), 277.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 278.
PRC, provided sufficient opportunities to Modi regime for the upgradation of its nuclear capabilities. The nuclear journey under Modi is upgraded with the help of different countries and it is intended to start a plan of nuclear modernisation by keeping New Delhi outside the international non-proliferation regime. The Indian leaders are envisioned to increase their strategic interaction more with other nations and the mainstream decision makers of Modi administration are planning to engage more international community with India.

The passion to become a regional hegemonic nation parallel to standing influentially in the great power politics has convinced Modi government to raise arms trade with other countries. Prime Minister Modi moved closer to the international community and developed contacts with various developed nations. The states with the highly developed Military Industrial Complex (MIC) viewed India as a potential state for the weapon export. The global analysis on the international arms trade ranked India as the largest weapon importer of the world under Modi while sharing 13% of the global arms trade. According to a report of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), New Delhi is persistently increasing its arms trade across the globe and Modi government is heavily engaged in weapon imports from other countries. The SIPRI Year Book 2018 mentioned India as an active state in tension with the territorially adjoining nations, China and Pakistan, and this aggressive behaviour of New Delhi has turned into armed conflicts with neighbouring countries.

The SIPRI analysis ranked India top in the list of five largest military spending countries with the $63.9 billion defence expenditures after US, China, Saudi Arabia, and

Russia. The Modi government is avoiding to cooperate international community by not sharing the details of its military spending to the United Nations Report in Military Expenditures. This report is primarily designed by the UN to estimate the global military expenditures transparency. Further estimates of the SIPRI declared India as top country in the list of arms imports by sharing 12% in global arms import. Another report of SIPRI marked Russia, US, and Israel, the big three countries which are consistently supplying weapons to India and the New Delhi is the only biggest customer of Israeli weapon industry with 49% weapon trade.

The MIC of Israel is actively connected to India and the Tel Aviv is providing defence equipment related to “aircraft, air defence systems, armoured vehicles, artillery, missiles, naval weapons, sensors, ships” and highly developed different other weapons. The leading weapon industry of Tel Aviv consisting of Maf’at, ELTA Systems under Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), RAFAEL and Advanced Defence Systems have singed various projects with India companies. In response to Israeli military industry, TaTa Power Strategic Engineering Division (TaTa SED) and Indian Bharat Electronics Limited India (BEL) along with Larsen & Tourbo (L&T) have taken several reciprocal step. The IAI has finalized a deal to supply Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) which is called as the “eye in the sky”. The mutual cooperation between two states has reached its

177 Ibid., 06.
178 Ibid., 07.
179 Ibid., 08.
181 Amit Cowshish, “India-Israel Defence Trade: Issues and Challenges,” Strategic Analysis 41, No. 04 (June 2017), 403.
183 Amit Cowshish, op. cit., 404.
zenith and the leaders from both sides have agreed to continue their strategic cooperation beyond the procurements of military equipment.

The quest of acquiring powerful status has led Modi regime to develop military-to-military relation with the international community beyond Israeli weaponry industry. President Vladimir Putin has signed a deal with Modi government to provide advanced version of five surface-to-air missile S-400 and it became one of the few largest defence deals of New Delhi.\textsuperscript{185} The S-400 missile is known as Moscow’s strongest long range missile defence system with the 380 kilometre range along with an upgradation from S-300 to S-400.\textsuperscript{186} The manufacturer of S-400, Almaz-Antey Corporation, attached the Russian MIC to New Delhi and planned to work further for the enhancement of strategic cooperation between India and Russia.\textsuperscript{187} Maintaining strategic connection with Moscow started exhibiting the fear of Modi for the keeping Asian balance in its favour.

The fear of rising China has directed the Modi government to expand arms imports beyond Russia and jumped into anti-Russian camp. The struggle to stand among great powers has compelled Modi to keep India active in its relations with great powers which resulted in Indo-US close strategic nexus and linked American MIC to New Delhi. Trump regime recently has provided Strategic Trade Authorization-1 (STA-1) status to Modi regime and declared India the third recipient of STA-1 status from Asia, after Japan and South Korea.\textsuperscript{188} Internationally, India became the 37\textsuperscript{th} country which received the STA-1 status by the US and the US government further declared New Delhi a potential country for defence trade. The STA-1 status under the Department of Commerce generally reduced the license requirements

\textsuperscript{185} “India Russia S-400 Missile Deal: All You Need to Know,” \textit{The Times of India}, October 05, 2018, \url{https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-russia-s-400-missile-deal-all-you-need-to-know/articleshow/66066460.cms} (accessed on February 28, 2019).

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.


for hi-tech armed trade with the US, and Washington usually grant this status to NATO members. The gaining of STA-1 status has augmented the Indian role in Washington and Trump declared Modi regime an important defence partner of the US.

The desires to enhance the core strategic capabilities with the help of technologically advanced and industrially developed nations has become prime objective of Modi administration. An updated format of foreign relations in order to acquire a strong position in the regional and global politics has directed New Delhi towards massive arms buildup. The United States has recognised Indian potential and declared it a major defence partner under the broader framework of bilateral strategic partnership. The acknowledgement of Modi regime as the potential strategic partner in Asian continent is an accurate manifestation of of the geopolitical calculations of Trump. Washington under Trump is now determined to support India under Modi against the rising role of China. The hostile US-China interaction has led US to see India as efficient player to advance American interests in the Asian continent. In other words, the contemporary status of India in the world politics convinced Washington to support New Delhi in Indian Ocean and larger Indo-Pacific Region. It is broadly observed as an American effort to keep the Asian balance in its favour while counterweighting the rising role of other superpowers.

11. The US Restructuring in Asian Context

The intellectual communities around the world spell out the contemporary clashes emerging between Russia, China, and the United States as the New Cold War in which the

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leaders of three countries are heavily preparing their nations for the global competition.\textsuperscript{191} When it comes to defining the recent competition of great powers mainly between Russia and US over Syrian and Ukrainian crisis, then the strategic circles of international community prefer to call it a new Cold War. The uncompromising behaviours of both superpowers augmented the traditional hostile relations and forced the leaders of both sides to again jump in a strategic competition. The Russian leaders under Dmitry Medvedev and American state officials under President Obama started calling this new clash a new Cold War.\textsuperscript{192}

Further extension of new Cold War added the Chinese economic rise and became a major concern for the United States. An economic plan of BRI introduced by President Xi Jinping in addition to a plan of Putin for recovering Russian powerful status by overcoming the economic and strategic hardships reached at alarming level. The leading academic circles from Moscow are also started calling it a new Cold War or an addition in the unfinished Cold War politics. Dimitri Trenin, the head of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from Moscow termed the ongoing US-Russia hostility as the state of Cold War over Crimean issue.\textsuperscript{193} Akin to Russian intellectuals, the forty-eighth and current US Vice President Michael R. Pence translated the clash with China and Russia as the part of broader Cold War political model.\textsuperscript{194} Both Russia and China declared as biggest enemies of America by Trump administration and the hostile interaction of three members of the UNSC intended to change the ongoing structure of global governance under an updated conception of Cold War.\textsuperscript{195}


\textsuperscript{192} Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, “US – Russian Relations: The Middle Cannot Hold,” \textit{Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists} 72, No. 03 (April 2016), 150.

\textsuperscript{193} Vasile Rotaru, “Instrumentalizing the Recent Past? The New Cold War Narrative in Russian Public Space After 2014,” \textit{Post-Soviet Affairs} 2019, No. 01 (October 2018), 29.


\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
Unlike the US-Russia armed clash over Syria and Ukraine, the geoeconomic competition between Washington and Beijing turned into a geostrategic confrontation due to Chinese increasing economic alliances with neighbouring nations. Apart from its own BRI plan, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between ASEAN members and six other states of East Asian region included the PRC in broader economic integration of East Asian countries. It is a free trade agreement which brought the ASEAN members along with Japan, India, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia close to China. It is group of ASEAN+1 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) which sought to increase the economic integration of the region through discovering various trade and investment opportunities.196 The principle objective of creating multilateral cooperation mechanism based on the FTA mechanism of ASEAN partners is to uphold the scope of regional economic integration. This group of sixteen states from East Asian region made the ASEAN region a potential area for comprehensive free trade.197 The initial idea of RECP is inherited in an announcement of President Xi Jinping on the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in ASEAN summit of 2013 in Indonesia.198 Chinese plan of creating a global trading routes is mainly based on the construction of maritime trade routes by developing a web of ports in IOR. The ports will enable Beijing to trade from ASEAN region to all the way to East African region.199

In order to keep internal economic position stable and strong, the government of PRC has introduced Made in China (MIC) 2025 initiative which seeks to upgrade Chinese industry. The MIC 2025 will not only improve the internal economic position of China, but it will also let Chinese companies to compete foreign companies in the global markets.200 By

197 Ibid.
198 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, op, cit.
199 Ibid.
launching the MIC, the PRC proposed a plan consisting of three stages and eventually making China one of the leading manufacturing powers by 2049.\textsuperscript{201} The Jinping government aimed to make Chinese nation a power one on completion of first century of the founding of PRC by 2049. A report of Council on Foreign Relations Is ’Made in China 2025’ a Threat to Global Trade? explains the implication of MIC 2025 which is apparently a state-led industrial policy for the domestic industry of China. It is a ten-year plan, initiated in 2015, primarily designed to manufacture the products of next-generation information technology. The actual plan of MIC 2025 is designed to enable Beijing technologically powerful enough to dominate international markets of hi-tech products.\textsuperscript{202}

The expansion of Chinese influence in the surrounding areas is not merely limited to economic affairs. President Jinping sent a large number of its troops in a joint military exercise (Vostok 2018) arranged by President Vladimir Putin. The largest ever military drills between two countries held in Southern Siberia was observed by Putin as a sign of close tie with Xi Jinping. President Putin said, “we have trustworthy ties in political, security and defence spheres.”\textsuperscript{203} This joint military exercise conducted in Far East is an attempt of strengthening the bilateral preparedness of two counties in multiple strategic directions.\textsuperscript{204} The leaders of two nations participating in military exercise shared a common worldview on different global issues and accepted the strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing as an important factor in the changing international security environment. The two-sided leaders were further agreed to test the capacities of their respective armed forces and decided to


\textsuperscript{204} Mathieu Boulegue, “Did The Russian General Staff Experiment with Free Play During Vostok-2018,” Defence & Security Studies 35, No. 01 (January 2019), 103.
communicates their bilateral strategic cooperation to Western world generally, and US allies particularly.\textsuperscript{205} In response to the rising network of NATO members and American allies, Putin and Jinping preferred to consolidate their counterweighting potential. Putin awarded his Chinese counterpart highest order of Russian Federation and called their renewed bilateral ties as a “comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation.”\textsuperscript{206}

A report of \textit{Rand Corporation} further highlighted the significance of Sino-Russian ties and called it the largest military exercise sponsored by Russian. The military cooperation between Beijing and Moscow started in 2005, and the subsequent years witnessed the naval exercise between two countries.\textsuperscript{207} In 2016, both states conducted joint naval exercises in South China Sea which could be broadly translated as a response to the American naval exercises. The decision to start joint naval exercises in the Pacific region was taken by Washington immediately after the demise of Soviet Union. In 1992, US selected India as a permanent partner in the series of annual naval exercises. Moreover, it was American response to major change in the Indian foreign relations and the major shift in New Delhi’s approach towards Indo-Pacific Region.\textsuperscript{208} The security calculus of both counties compelled their leaders to arrange joint naval exercises and invite other nations as well in order to change its nature from bilateral to multilateral. In 2015, Japan was added as the permanent member besides non-permanent members consisting of navies of Australia and Singapore. Now it has become a trilateral naval cooperation between the navies of US, India, and Japan.\textsuperscript{209} In the contemporary changing geopolitical landscape of world politics, the naval

\textsuperscript{205} Jonathan Stevenson, “Russia’s Vostok 2018 War Games,” \textit{Strategic Comments} 24, No. 08 (October 2018), iv-vi.
\textsuperscript{206} Tom Roseth, “Moscow’s Response to a Rising China: Russia’s Partnership Policies in Its Military Relations with Beijing,” \textit{Problems of Post-Communism} (March 2018), 01.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid.
cooperation between New Delhi and Washington is the reflection of their combine vision of addressing security challenges in Pacific region.

The question of counterbalancing Chinese economic preparedness and a plan of stretching its economic muscles across the globe presented by Xi Jinping has encircled Trump administration. In response to the BRI, Washington proposed a mega economic plan under the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP or commonly known as Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement is rooted in Obama administration when the Secretary of State, John Kerry proclaimed a new shift in the US foreign policy and called its “foreign policy is economic policy.” The economic vision of John Kerry was further converted into practical steps by President Obama and two massive economic integration initiatives were finalized. The combined efforts for upgrading the economic integration of states from Asian and Pacific Rim resulted in eleven-member and twenty-eight-member multilateral agreements. The TPP and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) became two platforms for increasing American investments in mainly Pacific and Atlantic regions.

Obama administration was intended to keep the Asian balance in US favour and the leading decision makers of Obama administration decided to retain the Asian balance in their strategic calculations. A visible shift in US foreign policy occurred in November 2011, when Obama declared his main focus on Asia Pacific region during his address in Australian parliament and decided to maintain the presence of a strong military in this region. It became the East Asian strategy of Obama for keeping the countries of Pacific region in US alliance equivalent to preventing the emerging challenges to American status in the region. The Pivot to East Asia was formalized in January 2012 while signing the document of

212 Ibid.
Strategic Defence Guidance. The document Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense explains the American economic and security involvements from West Pacific and East Asia into the IOR and South Asian regions. The officials of Department of Defense (DoD) maintained their position regarding the rebalancing role of US in the Asia-Pacific region which proved to be a milestone in Asia-Pacific security, and it allowed Obama government to emphasize its core allies.

The creation of multilateral economic cooperative agreements started to exhibit the rising tensions between Washington and Beijing. It is Trump-Jinping trade war in which their respective countries have jumped into a long-term worldwide geoeconomic confrontation. President Obama started taking serious actions with reference to China and in the presence of economically assertive foreign policy of President Xi Jinping. Obama administration added the strategic significance of Asia in the list of Department of State key geopolitical priorities. The “pivot” or “rebalance” Asia was selected as superlatively a rational response to the global economic based foreign policy of Beijing. The word “pivot” was initially described by American scholars as the US way to increase its emphasize on Asia. It was formally become an integral part of US foreign policy in 2011 during Obama administration. Secretary of State under Obama, Hillary Clinton said, “the United States is back in Asia” by defining the scope of American strong presence in Asian continent. The Asia Pivot became an appropriate US strategy under Obama’s first term and it shifted American attentions from

214 The strategic guidance is a document describes the US key military mission under the Department of Defense (DoD). It explains the projected security environment and the global military engagement of US.
217 Wei Ling, “Rebalancing or De-Balancing: U.S. Pivot and East Asian Order,” American Foreign Policy Interests 35, No. 03 (November 2013), 149.
war on terror to Asian power balances. It was a shift from power cooperation to power of balance and resulted in various multilateral, minilateral and bilateral initiatives in the Pacific region.\textsuperscript{219} An analysis of Brookings \textit{The Response of China’s Neighbors to the U.S. “Pivot” to Asia} describes the cooperative role of US allies to Pivot strategy and the major allies (mainly Japan and India) called it a significant approach of Obama for contributing in regional stability.\textsuperscript{220}

It was a new resolve of managing Chinese economic rise in the region of economic opportunities under the broader theme of balancing against China policy. The rise of China hampered fundamentally the conventional foreign policy mechanism of Washington and forced President Obama to rationalise the goal of national interest maximization in global politics. The persuasion of this goal under the broader domain of Asia Pivot strategy continued in Trump administration. Trump regime started to remain strict to the vision of Asian balance introduced by President Obama. An altered design of US foreign policy focused by Obama continued by Trump under the broader framework of post-pivot strategy in November 2017.\textsuperscript{221} In his address at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Papua New Guinea (PNG) on November 2018, President Trump emphasized the Asia-Pacific and announced his policy of condemning the trade war with China.\textsuperscript{222} The escalation of trade war between Beijing and Washington was called by Trump as “Cold War or hot war” which will produce no winner in the international system.\textsuperscript{223}

An appropriate way to address the geopolitical challenges of Asia-Pacific region, the Trump government decided to bolster cooperative ties with new partners. Trump regime

\textsuperscript{219} Wei Ling, op. cit., 148.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
adopted a pragmatic policy to preserve the US position in the Asia-Pacific region by investing those capabilities that will permit Washington to retain the Asian balance in its own favour. The maintenance of strategic influence across the vast Pacific region is observed by international strategic community as an appropriate move in which the strategic differences between great power started to persistently prevailing in the international system. The return of Cold War thinking in the US foreign policy is the narrative in the international system that accepted by great powers. Additionally, this new pattern of competition between great powers is less American inclined. So, the updated version of Cold War clash is less likely to support the global standing of Washington. The unfavourable behaviour of new Cold War towards US is analogous to the conventional notion of Cold War in which the rivalry of great powers at international level affected the sub-regional systems.

A wave of crisis rising mainly from Russia and China against American global hegemonic status has become an inevitable feature of contemporary international system. It is widely called a strategic environment of new world. It is a twenty-first century great-powers competition cemented in new tensions of three nuclear powers, Washington, Moscow and Beijing. Their competing behaviours are leaving worse impacts on the different regional sub-system including South Asia. Indo-Pakistan hostility and their nuclear weapons programs cannot be spared from strategic struggle of great powers. The role of United States in the South Asian subcontinent coupled with US strong relations with both India and Pakistan under the new domain of Cold War contains dichotomous attributes of American grand South Asian policy. An overview of American South Asian engagement under the new conception of Cold War unfold various complexities in which India and Pakistan have started receiving a dissimilar US treatment.

12. South Asian Politics and United States
The new phase of Cold War is more complex and complicated from its older notion because the clash between United States, Russia and China is intended to continue for decades. The officers from the Department of State translated the contemporary phase of global politics and its antipathy pattern towards Washington as the era of Pacific politics. The future of international relations is heavily dependent on Asian politics and the Asia-Pacific is observed as a prime driver of global politics.\textsuperscript{224} The American responses to the emerging Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation is a potential challenge for US presence in Asia. Putin started adopting a comprehensive strategy to collaborate with China, and both countries moved toward a pragmatic approach for a strategic partnership. The leaders of two countries felt the greater responsibility of managing international peace and stability, being the permanent members of the UNSC.\textsuperscript{225} Their combined potential for developing economic and strategic contacts with other nations across the globe alarmed the security bells of United States. The custodians of US national security are now engaged in interpreting the recent wave of great power competition as the new Cold War in which Moscow and Beijing have become potential challenges for Washington.

The prime security threat emanating from Asia-Pacific region demanded the US to retain its role active in the world affairs akin to President Clinton who defined the unipolar structure of world immediately after the fall of Soviet Union. The future challenges rising from global policy of BRI announced by President Jinping shocked the Obama administration. This fear of BRI translated by Washington as a potential factor that could undermine the US leadership in the Pacific region. It has inaugurated a competition between


Trump and Jinping over the Pacific region in addition to ocean and countries of its rim.\textsuperscript{226} Chinese moves in the Pacific, South and East China Seas have become serious challenges for the US. Washington has started considering the economic policies of China as a serious challenge and it further resulted in an Asia Pivot strategy. The Asia Pivot strategy adopted by Obama administration was based on building alliances to Asian countries in order to counter Chinese hegemonic actions in the Asia Pacific.\textsuperscript{227}

An updated version of Cold War politics arrived at South Asian shores when Washington decided to recruit India in its broader strategic vision of world politics. The naval cooperation between US and India laid the initial foundations of a formal strategic alliance of two states. The navies for two countries started participating in joint exercises in 1992. The military-to-military collaboration of two states under annual Malabar naval exercises further added other states of pacific regions as well.\textsuperscript{228} Moreover, a revised version of Indian foreign relations after the end of Cold War with major US allies across the globe mainly with Israel, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan augmented the important role of New Delhi in Washington. The leading state authorities from both sides decided to support each other in the Pacific region while sharing common areas of cooperation. Further common areas of joint collaboration were developed in a combined anti-China behaviour.

Indian economic reforms in the post-Cold War era under a greater economic liberalization program was a sign of Indian aspiration for standing progressively in the world politics. In the global economic order, Indian dream of becoming a powerful state is challenged by neighbouring China. The hostility between Beijing and New Delhi perceived by Washington as an appropriate opportunity which compelled the US to increase its diplomatic cooperation with India. As a result, a close strategic partnership between Bush and


\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{228} B.M. Jain, \textit{India-US Relations in the Age of Uncertainty} (New York: Routledge, 2016), 86.
Singh was emerged and it started opposing the economic rise of China generally, and its rising position in the Pacific region specifically. The collaborative bilateral efforts of both countries forced their respective governments to design various anti-China initiatives.\(^{229}\)

During Obama administration, the DoD suggested US government to exclusively focus Manmohan regime while expanding the network of allies and partners throughout the Asia-Pacific region. It was realized an apposite step which will ultimately develop a sense of common security interest.\(^{230}\) A close strategic partnership with Manmohan was an attempt to support India due to its ability to serve as an important factor in Asian strategic affairs. India was also considered a potential economic anchor and prime provider of security to US in the IOR. The National Security Strategy of United States in 2018 *Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge* further highlights the role of Modi government against the Jinping-Putin alliance.\(^{231}\) An overwhelming wave of emerging Chinese and Russian influence in the surrounding areas along with the support of Jinping and Putin to their allies has become a serious threat to Trump administration.

The major threat is emanating from Beijing due to its efforts of reordering IOR and keeping the region for its own advantage. Additionally, a persistent trend in the military modernization and its appropriate projection in the Far East is considered by DoD as an attempt of creating its hegemony in IOR parallel to displacing US role in the near-future. In addition to countering Russian emerging role in the world politics, the leading state officials of DoD claimed China as a long-term strategic competitor. The persuasion of sustaining US presence in the key regions while exclusively emphasizing the Indo-Pacific states became one of the prime defence objectives of the DoD. The priorities in the preparedness of the war

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considered Indo-Pacific along with Middle East and Europe as a potential area where a robust deterrence is needed to address the fear of anti-US aggrieved forces in the region. An appropriate way to deal the potential threats from Indo-Pacific region, the extension of the web of alliances and strategic partnership became a preferred strategy suggested by Jim Mattis, Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{232}

The evolving geoeconomic world order convinced United States to develop cooperative multidimensional ties with India and the geopolitical competition between great powers in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century provided an important place to New Delhi in American grand strategy. The Department of State considered India not simply an emerging power, but an emerged power in Asia and across the international system. A close partnership under the greater collaboration of Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) between Bush and Singh marked a new opening of two-sided strategic affairs. The multidimensional defence cooperation between Bush and Singh observed India as an inevitable part of US rebalancing Asia-Pacific strategy. It was a strong strategic partnership and the political leaders from Washington and New Delhi expanded their joint collaborating efforts towards cultural, military, economic, and strategic affairs. The two-sided leader also agreed to enhance their cooperation in the fields of intelligence sharing, counter terrorism and space technology. The major improvements of bilateral interaction occurred exclusively in defence sector due to a close association of American MIC to India.\textsuperscript{233}

The milestone steps between two countries were taken during Manmohan and Obama administrations. The forty-fourth President of United States, Barack Obama, adopted a policy of greater American activism and decided to increase US involvement in the Asian affairs

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., 1-11.
which dragged New Delhi closed to Washington. A major shift in Indo-US relations occurred in 2014 when the BJP candidate Narendra Modi became the fourteen prime minister of India. The traditional mechanism for managing foreign relations was again revised under Modi and the cooperation with Obama government increased substantially. The bilateral cooperation between two states started to unfold various areas of mutual collaboration under the main fields of security and defence. Washington under Obama declared New Delhi as a close strategic partner and the Hindu leadership from India welcomed the American presence in the Asia-Pacific region. consequently, Indo-US strategic engagement became a permanent feature of Pacific politics.

The recent phase of Indo-US relations in the presence of Trump and Modi governments became a new episode of two-sided multidimensional collaboration. In order to remain their allies active by securing US role in Indo-Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South Asian regions, Trump government preferred to support unambiguously its strategic partners including India. Modi regime started taking reciprocal steps in response to an Indian-inclined policy of Trump in the Pacific and South Asian regions. President Trump described the term Indo-Pacific to explain the largest area of American interests in the Asian continent. Later description of the term recognized the unescapable connections between the regions of Indo-Pacific and Western Pacific. On one hand, the region is important in order to secure American global leadership and it became a top-level regional priorities of the Trump administration. On the other hand, Indian desire for becoming influential actor in the world politics is welcomed by Trump. The Modi government is determined to support Trump not

\[\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{234}} Robert Sutter, “The Obama Administration and US Policy in Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, No. 02 (August 2009), 203-204.}}\]


only in the Southeast and Northeast Asian regions, but also in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Islands of Indian Ocean and the Eastern coast of African continent.\footnote{Ibid.}

Regarding South Asian security environment, the Modi regime is much concerned with the weapon status of Islamabad and its close ties with Beijing. An anti-Chinese behaviour coupled with an overt antipathy towards Sino-Pak friendly ties, the India leadership joined American strategic alliance in order to improve its position in the regional and global politics. The conventional pattern of Indo-US strategic nexus further intensified by the change of governments in both countries. The arrival of Trump and Modi in the politics of their respective countries revolutionized the bilateral strategic partnership of two countries.\footnote{Weixing Hu, “Trump’s China Policy and Its Implications for The “Cold Peace” Across the Taiwan Strait,” \textit{China Review} 18, No. 03 (August 218), 70-71.} The geopolitical values for maintaining Indo-Pacific and South Asian region in their own favour, Tump-Modi alliance is destined to gain economic and strategic superiority in the regional and international politics.

Unlike New Delhi, the American strategic planners considered the role of Islamabad in the regional politics of South Asia generally, and with reference to Kabul particularly. The territorial links of Pakistan with Afghanistan made Islamabad an inevitable part of US grand South Asian strategy.\footnote{Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich, “Beyond the Tweets: President Trump’s Continuity in Military Operations,” \textit{Strategic Studies Quarterly} 12, No. 02 (Summer 2018), 67.} The US presence in Kabul with or without installing peace and maintaining a stable political order in Afghanistan made Islamabad an inevitable actor in the South Asian affairs. Pakistan possesses basic knowledge of Taliban insurgency and its presence in Afghanistan due to its traditional links to Taliban regime forced Washington to not ignore Islamabad in its greater South Asian policy. Initially originating from the last phase of Cold War, the empirical knowledge about Taliban compelled the main architectures of Afghan policy from Washington to not discount the role of Islamabad in broader counterterror campaign of the US. The Defense Secretary, Jim Mattis, under Trump also
acknowledged the cooperative role of Islamabad in addressing the question of peace in Afghanistan and suggested the essential engagement of Islamabad in defining the future of Kabul.\textsuperscript{240}

Under the broader theme of American South Asian involvement, India has gained much significance as compare to Pakistan. The role of India in the regional and global politics is highly dependent on the strength of its bilateral cooperation with the US. The significance of India is directly linked to its role as a regional balancer due to its long-term rivalry with China. Beijing-Islamabad economic nexus let New Delhi to involve its strategic partnership with Washington which has not only resulted in an alliance politics in South Asia but it has also fascinated the great powers more towards South Asia. The custodian of American national interest from the Department of State viewed the role of Pakistan in the regional politics of South Asia while considering the potential of Islamabad in maintaining the peace in Afghanistan. Parallel to Pakistan, the American geopolitical calculation of international system intended to not ignore the potential of New Delhi in global politics. It is widely believed that the two nuclear contestant of South Asia contain dissimilar importance for the US. In response to the different geopolitical standings of both India and Pakistan, the United States decided to adopt a bilateralism framework for treating New Delhi and Islamabad on separate basis.\textsuperscript{241}

The strategic rubric of American bilateralism towards Pakistan and India on separate basis became a vibrant trend in the US grand South Asian strategy. Trump administration, akin to its predecessors, continued the policy of de-hyphenation for nuclearized subcontinent and followed the bilateral designs of its South Asian engagement. While overlooking the role


of Islamabad in its global counterterror campaign, Washington started treating Pakistan with reference to its war on terror.\(^{242}\) The American presence in Afghanistan has convinced Washington to remain Islamabad active in its Kabul-inclined war on terror campaign. In contrast to Pakistan, the de-hyphenating patterns of US grand South Asian strategy declared India as a close strategic partner which is helpful for Washington in global politics. No doubt, the de-hyphenating designs of US South Asian relations are constructed on the basis of global geopolitical calculus of Washington, but the consistent persuasion of de-hyphenating policy will be counterproductive in near-future.\(^{243}\) Therefore, the Trump administration needs to reconsider the contemporary patterns of its involvement in the South Asian affairs. An improved version of ongoing de-hyphenating South Asian policy under Trump could let the US to properly achieve its geostrategic objective.

### 13. Options for Re-Hyphenation Policy

The term re-hyphenation refers to a process of re-thinking of de-hyphenation policy. It suggests Washington to revise or upgrade its ongoing designs of South Asian policy, mainly toward India and Pakistan. In other words, the re-hyphenation means the re-evaluation or re-calibration of foreign policy and make it according to the undeniable hard-core realities of nuclearized subcontinent. Another description of re-hyphenation proposes the re-defining of de-hyphenating policy instead of abandoning it and completing changings its course from foreign policy.

Unlike the four-decades history of US-USSR hostility, when it was indispensable for the United States to keep both India and Pakistan on its alliance, Washington preferred to secure its own position in the subcontinent. It was also difficult for the US to launch both,

\(^{242}\) Paul D. Taylor, “India and Pakistan: Thinking About the Unthinkable,” *Naval War College Review* 54, No. 03 (Summer 2001), 41.
New Delhi and Islamabad against the expansionary forces of communism emanating from Moscow and Beijing. In the presence of both challenges, much focused of Washington was on resolving bilateral problems of New Delhi and Islamabad. It was observed to be a difficult task for treating both rival neighbors on a separate basis, and the territorial disputes (Kashmir) coupled with border clashes remained a significant point of American engagement with India and Pakistan simultaneously. The prevention of the disputes by defusing the tensions between arch-rival countries of subcontinent remained a central point of US-South Asian relations, and a number of efforts designed by various United States Presidents were endeavored to stop New Delhi and Islamabad from the fight against each other. But the post-nuclear tests situation surprisingly changed the historical passage of Washington-New Delhi-Islamabad interaction.  

Aftermaths of Kargil crisis along with the US presence in Afghanistan showed visibly a paradigm shift in US policy. The overwhelming wave of de-hyphenation policy issued a new instruction for nuclearized South Asia, neither the application of non-proliferation principles nor the peaceful resolution of Indo-Pak tensions remained the foremost objectives of American foreign policy. Analogous to the old days of Cold War, when a permanent South Asia policy rooted in fixed decision remained rarely helpful in attaining of ambitious results. Therefore, the de-hyphenation policy directed toward cultivating India as a close strategic partner, countering Chinese rise, and alienating Pakistan came into existence. The adaptation of such policy will less likely to be a suitable option for the United States in long-term future because the post-Cold War period has embraced the nuclear realities of South Asia. In order to gain Indian support in South Asian politics, American desire of making India as an anti-Soviet state started prior to the end of Cold War. The Soviet invasion of Kabul annoyed New Delhi, and it created mistrust between India and

244 Vinay Kaura, “India’s Changing Relationship With Russia,” The Rusi Journal 163, No. 01 (February-March 2018), 56.
the Soviet Union. The bilateral relations started to spoil, because the communist leaders of Soviet Union, obsessed with their own geostrategic interest, decided to invade Afghanistan without consulting their Hindu partners. This was a great opportunity for Washington.²⁴⁵

A revised version of American commitments preferred to forestall the challenging forces functioning against US interest, and chalking out an inclusive plan of counterbalancing the anti-American features of international system have resulted in different moves by avoiding a common policy toward India and Pakistan. The drawing of separate paths for two nuclear rivals sketched a troublesome picture of US political arrangement. In this way, a privileged diplomatic cum nuclear interaction between Washington and New Delhi came into being and proclaimed it impossible to address the South Asian nuclear race.²⁴⁶ The great emphasize on the promotion of peaceful regional environment needing a serious approach for the advancement of a meaningful arms control regime for India and Pakistan has become an open-ended question. This unanswered question is desperately seeking a recalibrated American diplomatic role in disputed Indo-Pak affairs concealed in an opposite method of convincing both nuclear powers equally on arms control and disarmament principles.

A complete refusal or turning back from the quarrelsome region is more probable of causing disastrous consequences. As the custodian of the unipolar international system and a promoter of an international norm, the great responsibility lies at American shoulders. The advancement of especially global non-proliferation norms on universally equal basis by a great power evidently provide remarkable results. In this way, an unbalanced method of supporting strategically one state by strengthening its multidimensional ties in contrast to critically examining the role of another state in South Asia will never let Washington to play an effective role successfully in the region. Putting the agenda of arms control in leading top

²⁴⁶ Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2009), 192.
priorities of its South Asian policy while addressing the Indo-Pak conflicted relations can only enable the United States to introduce the chances of peace and stability in the region.

Despite of a thin layer of occasionally voicing criticism on a decoupling South Asian policy adopted by President Bush, the international community remained reluctant in appreciating the US involvement in the nuclearized subcontinent. An unbalancing treatment cemented in its preferred bilateralism toward India and Pakistan compelled the leading US policymakers to continue the de-hyphenation policy which started to represent the dichotomous faces of American South Asian policy. In the absence of a broader approach addressing the main obstacles in manufacturing the avenues for regional peace and stability, the future of ongoing separate trends for placing India and Pakistan on different paths is difficult to provide desired results to the United States. An opposite adjustment of New Delhi and Islamabad in American South Asian policy is becoming an inevitable demand. The absence of a balanced approach could jeopardize the contemporary basis of US role in the South Asian political affairs. The smooth functioning of a permanent phase of US presence in the subcontinent is incontestably dependant on re-thinking or reconsidering of its regional policy.

India obsessed with anti-Pakistan behavior painted in its regional hegemonic designs for denying the very existence of neighboring nuclear-armed state coupled with contemporary American obsession of de-hyphenation policy or facilitating Indian pursuit of great power policy is gradually drifting the United States away from Pakistan. Precisely, the counterbalancing forces are gradually emerging. The merits for revising the hyphenating placement of two nuclear-armed powers in American foreign relations can cause a more balanced and less partial role of Washington in nuclearized subcontinent which can generate objectively the suitable measures for replacing the historical Indo-Pak enmity with a lasting amity.
The revising principles of American structured de-hyphenation policy should rationally analyze the ground realities of India-Pakistan conflict. The adaptation of a confidentially pragmatic approach without accepting the contesting claims of India-Pakistan against each other could possibly assist Washington in addressing the actual security problems of nuclear-driven politics South Asia. The decoupling of two nuclear rivals from larger US alliance and replacing it with a strengthened context of Indo-US coalition started to inflict a segregating or isolating sense in Pakistani policy-makers, which could fracture American regional diplomacy for the persuasion of longer-run goals.\textsuperscript{247} The escape from Indo-Pak dispute can damage the core South Asian policy objective of United States, and the only choice to operationalize a multilateral framework of including equally both nuclear neighbors in the broader strategic calculation of US could be a viable option for revising contemporary de-hyphenating standards.

The application of American individualism under de-hyphenation towards India-Pakistan has, no doubt, convincible logics defined by the proponents of contemporary South Asian policy, but the application of such policy in the present situation has become a difficult task when the clouds of unstoppable arms race and uncontrollable genie of terrorism have become an unthinkable nightmare for the United States and challenged the less relevant US policy to the scope of peace and stability. The apparent sense of de-hyphenating the two nuclear powers by treating them differently portrays a complex picture of South Asia where the Indian political elites are sceptical by translating the first American-structured seriousness for New Delhi. On other hands, the political elites from Islamabad take it as a defiant policy of Washington which has clearly washed out the archives of cordial Pak-US history.

The central theme of the de-hyphenation policy which upholds India, committed to mature the nuclear capabilities of New Delhi along with slightly admiring the role of

\textsuperscript{247} Subarno Chattarji, \textit{Tracking the Media: Interpretations of Mass Media Discourses in India and Pakistan} (New Delhi: 2008), 196.
Islamabad in war on terror. This policy is also constructing the critical walls around the nuclear program of Pakistan. In short, the policy of de-hyphenation clearly communicates the America least interests in managing South Asian problems relevant to complicated Indo-Pak conflict. Therefore, the US diplomatic involvement in the subcontinent is merely related to its geostrategic agenda could eventually guarantee the preservation of its national interests, and it is less inclined to embrace the desired results. Moreover, a more integrated and comprehensive overview of subcontinent-specific strategic affairs is an area of immense importance and lacking serious considerations of American political elite. A practical adaptation of such approach required a balanced method of United States for India-Pakistan under a re-hyphenation or reverse-hyphenation policy.

14. Concluding Analysis

The recent pattern of Cold War politics is different from previous one in which the communist forces threatened the US position in the global politics. The political escalations originating from Russia and China has jeopardised the US role in the global politics and Washington has perceived the emerging threats from Moscow and Beijing. The threats rising from Russia and China comprise extensive potential to undermine American global standing. The political escalation between US and Russia along with economic escalation between US and China inaugurated a new competition between great powers. This situation started exhibiting the Cold War scenario and its extension towards different regions has disturbed the strategic equilibrium of various region. This strategic competition between great powers has touched the South Asian region and it has further resulted in a clash of US, Russia, and China. The American attempt of counterbalancing the role of emerging anti-US forces shaped the US role in South Asia. Presently, the India-Pakistan hostility in the presence of emerging

\[248\] M. Ehsan Ahrari, “The Beginning of a New Cold War?,” European Security 08, No. 03 (Autumn 1999), 125.
role of Russia and China contains considerable potential to hamper the South Asian geopolitical landscape. Consequently, Washington preferred to adopt the policy of de-hyphenation and decided to secure US geopolitical interests by treating both nuclear neighbours of South Asia separately.

The strategic consequences of de-hyphenation policy unequally intensified the American role in South Asia by placing India close to the US, parallel to critically examining the position of Pakistan in the region. The principle point of de-hyphenating New Delhi and Islamabad in American revised regional policy contains different South Asian priorities. Leading spokesmen of US government heavily believe that India with technologically advanced military capability coupled with augmenting its nuclear armed status would help America in sustaining its position in South Asia, because the advancement in conventional and nuclear directions will enable the Modi regime to meet effectively the strategic interest of his country in the regional and global politics while sportingly staying in American camp.

The strategically strong India with the help of United States will be able to avert the potential threats emanating from two neighboring nuclear countries. In this way, the Indian power projection in the regional and global polities increased the cooperative friendly bounds between New Delhi and Washington and communicated the strategic strength of both states to the international community in general, and to Pakistan and China in particular. Therefore, the future strength of Indian defense and the advanced structure of its arms forces depend on foreign assistance. The Modi government, by carrying the policies of its ancestor leadership, is highly committed to actively pursuing American alliance.

The American endeavor to maintain a distance from Indo-Pak enduring rivalry led Washington to formulate a different policy for bilateral treatment of both nuclear-armed powers of the subcontinent. The policy of de-hyphenation revolutionized American regional policy of South Asia by proclaiming Islamabad as a close ally in its global fight against
terrorism and declaring India as a close strategic partner.\textsuperscript{249} Moreover, the policy shows high commitment by eliminating the forces underestimating the chances of regional stability coupled with undermining the core values of the global non-proliferation regime, because the South Asian nuclear order is one of the major challenges of US foreign policy in the presence of less stable and more quarrelsome interaction of two neighbouring nuclear powers.

The question of how to work with New Delhi has greatly been resolved by de-hyphenation policy, but the question of involving Pakistan in American broader South Asian policy is still unanswered due to the lack of India-Pakistan normalization. Bush regime engaged India, and an intense environment of mutual engagement was later realized during Obama administration when the efforts to integrate New Delhi in broader South Asian approach became an undeniable reality. The application of such approach made Bush and Obama to remained reluctant in pursuing India to their commitments of keeping international non-proliferation regime active. While becoming an active part of global arms control campaign, the leading foreign policy decision makers of United States seemed to compromise American-designed South Asian directions their international non-proliferation campaign. Hence, the Americans provided technological help for military build-up in addition to the civil nuclear cooperation could cause a more worrisome security setting in South Asia.

It is widely believed that the addition of military and economic assistance to two nuclear powers of subcontinent can possibly cause regional imbalance. American strategic support to India will considerably enable New Delhi in improving its main infrastructure against two neighboring nuclear powers, China and Pakistan. It will fabricate a more dangerous situation between nuclear-capable three neighbors – Beijing, New Delhi, and Islamabad. No doubt, an increased India-US strategic alliance guarantee New Delhi in enhancing its national pride and confidence in regional as well as global politics, but its

deteriorating effects on other states – Pakistan and China – should not be purely deteriorating. Already the vibrant format of close India-United States strategic alliance has resulted in Sino-Pak cooperative ties. The details of such cooperation have been discussed briefly in a recent study of Ghulam Ali *China-Pakistan Relations: A Historical Analysis*. Ali mentioned the major change in the New Delhi and Washington cooperation initiated in post 9/11 environment, and the further growth of bilateral ties was the result of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Therefore, the ongoing bilateral interaction of India-United States lacks the ability to regulate the direct impact of their strategic romanticism on other states.

Apparently, the Indo-US relations show the bilateral interaction of two states which is trying to offset the expanding Chinese role in world politics generally, and towards South Asian politics specifically, but actually it is a political wrestling of four nuclear states – Beijing and Islamabad, United States and New Delhi. The contesting alliances of two superpowers with two states aspirants of regional powers fabricating a worrisome strategic competition in South Asia where the expected Russian entry could make it a more dangerous region, and evidently experiencing the complex politics of five nuclear powers. In this way, the whole debate of de-hyphenation policy reveals objectively its worse impacts in the region and drawing an awful future of South Asian, because it is indirectly an Indian policy mainly formed to support India. That is why, most of the senior politicians from New Delhi are carrying the annoying questions on the US aid to Pakistan, and persuading Washington to pressurize Pakistan on various issues of Indo-Pak bilateral ties.

The conflicted Indo-Pak relations under nuclear shadows demand a cautious American approach rooted in the sensitive calculation of South Asian strategic culture. Whether American policymakers accept it or not, it is an incontestable fact that the addressing of Indo-Pak bilateral disputes (mainly Kashmir) and appropriate implementation

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of an effective arms control regime are the major obstacles in implementing its US-South Asian policy. The transformation of de-hyphenating into re-hyphenation or reverse-hyphenation for treating two nuclear rivals needs serious attentions of Washington. Such seriousness could lead Washington to conclude an exclusive plan of viable options suitable for India-Pakistan specific nuclear order instead of fracturing the existing thin layer of stable nuclear equilibrium which has made the war less likely in South Asia.

The discovery of an applicable approach beyond dealing two nuclear neighbors separately is becoming gradually an indispensable demand for American policymakers, because the de-linking policy by adopting separate or different principles for India and Pakistan may help the United States in achieving its short-term strategic interests. The long-term properties of such policy which is highly acceptable for India individually will not only destabilize South Asian strategic environment but it will also weaken American role in the region.
Chapter 05

Conclusion

The intricate dynamics of the alliance politics has been the most significant element in the Indo-Pak nuclear equation and kept the two superpowers of subcontinent actively engaged in the South Asian affairs. The conflicting claims, cemented in the inflexible national standing along with the incompatible strategic behaviours of New Delhi and Islamabad, make both states dependent on the great powers. Especially, America, China, and the former Soviet Union made the South Asian region explicitly as an area where they fight for their vested interests while persistently endeavouring to extend their spheres of influence. The notion of the regional security and a stable geostrategic environment of South Asia, in this way, has largely been sabotaged by the great power politics and their contested geopolitical attributes.

A theoretical survey of South Asian politics under the influence of great power politics can easily understood by applying the conception of Neorealism. Various characteristics of India-Pakistan conflict in the presence of great powers generally, and United States specifically, shape the regional security environment of South Asia. The changing attributes of India-Pakistan conflict fascinates the extra-regional players towards South Asian region and permits the extra-regional powers to involve in New Delhi-Islamabad conflict. Thus, the imbalancing attributes of regional security environment of South Asian subcontinent create sufficient space for great powers involvement in the region. It further let the outsiders to not only jump into interstate conflict between India and Pakistan, but also to determine the structure of power politics in the region. In short, the structural changes in the South Asian regional politics is a consequence of great power competition at international
level. The regional attributes of Indo-Pak dispute cannot manage escape from the influence of global power politics.

The interstate hostile interaction of India-Pakistan and its relevance to the global power politics can be comprehended appropriately by adopting regional level analysis. The changing patterns of regional politics and fluctuating security dynamics of South Asia evolved consistently under the shadows of great power politics. The power struggle between great powers in the international system left profound impacts on Indo-Pak rivalry and intensified the South Asian security. Thus, a quest for dominating the region instigated an unending power struggle between India and Pakistan which progressed parallel to the power struggle of great powers in the international system. This archrival interaction of South Asian nuclear rival in the regional level analysis unfolded various alliance politics of India-Pakistan in which an interconnectedness between global and regional politics explained the impact of international power politics on South Asian regional politics. The overall global system and its links to the regional sub-system of South Asia can be seen in the history of subcontinent. The US-USSR decades-long confrontation and its impact on India-Pakistan rivalry raised from the notion of international system. The impact of this connection between superpowers and regional-powers on regional sub-system started describing the alliance formations and balance of power pattern in South Asia. In other words, the bipolar structure of international system laid the foundation of alliance politics during the Cold War era. The post-Cold War attributes of unipolar international system placed both nuclear rivals of South Asian under American alliance.

Historically, the South Asian designs of the Cold War-era primarily encircled the newly independent subcontinent immediately after the British withdrawal in the post-World War II scenario. The fragile positions of both India and Pakistan created the vacuum for the

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1 Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Neorealist Theory and the India-Pakistan Conflict-II,” Strategic Analysis 22, No. 10 (July 2008), 1533.
US and the USSR to intervene in the South Asian affairs. India-Pakistan strategic competition and the US-Soviet global confrontation determined the contending attributes of both states of subcontinent. The hostile interaction of New Delhi and Islamabad for acquiring a superior and advantageous position over each other placed them in the opposite camps of the decades-long East-West rivalry.

The worse effects of Moscow-Washington rivalry for global dominance introduced the unavoidable attributes of politics of alliance in South Asia. In this milieu, China, the United States and Soviet Union established economic and strategic linkages with India and Pakistan, as an extension of their hegemonic policies, and deteriorated the already tense environment of South Asia. Hence, the Realpolitik model of the Cold War politics influenced the strategic setting of subcontinent and left the imprints of Moscow-Washington conflict on New Delhi-Islamabad hostility.

In the presence of US-USSR confrontation, Washington attempted to minimize the role of the two major communist powers of the international system, China and Soviet Union, from the subcontinent. The US similar to the Soviet Union, aimed at converting South Asia a pro-US region which could curtail the increasing clout of communism of Moscow and Beijing decisively. The cooperative connections of Washington, initially with Islamabad, and later with Beijing and New Delhi, was a strategic opening, which brought with it abundant opportunities of spreading its ideology in South Asia. In this way, American support enabled both India and Pakistan to strengthen their regional standings against each other.

Therefore, a never-ending race unleashed between India and Pakistan for gaining the support of superpowers which incorporated the desperately growing model of American alliance politics with South Asia. Initially, the secular ideology of India developed under social-democratic government of Nehru refused to accept the United States as a guarantor of Indian hegemonic designs in the region. The denial of Nehru to the United States directed
Truman toward Pakistan after the historical visit of Liaquat Ali Khan. The US fight for preventing the spill-over effects of communism openly bracketed the US with Pakistan and resulted in structurally aligned Indo-Soviet relationship.

An era of complicated politics, initiated by American intelligence community, established several secret air bases of CIA in both India and Pakistan for spying on China and the Soviet Union. The U-2 incident opened a phase of profound American involvement in the South Asian political affairs against the communist powers. The bilateral ties, for a close diplomatic cooperation from the United States, provided adequate incentives to India and Pakistan.

Pakistan, the most allied-ally of the US in its fight against the Soviet expansionism laid the foundations of American bilateral ties with the fighting nations of the subcontinent. Ayub Khan from Pakistan and Jawaharlal Nehru from India viewed Kennedy administration as an appropriate supporter for the protection of their strategic interests in the regional and global politics. In 1962, the Kennedy administration attracted India briefly against the communist China. However, the diplomatic moves of subsequent American presidents annoyed India that consolidated its pro-Soviet status in the 1970s. The hostile attitudes of the South Asian states for standing in the opposite directions started gradually to place them under an alliance of a single state. In response to the changing geostrategic dynamics of South Asia, the leading decision-makers of US foreign policy promised the considerable amount of their economic and military aid to both prime ministers, Khan and Nehru, against the mighty communist powers—Beijing and Moscow.

The American geostrategic interest added a new chapter to the political history of South Asia during the last decade of the Cold War. Several decisive moves of Washington against the expanding ties of Moscow proclaimed sufficient aid to its allies. Such decision further accelerated the New Delhi-Islamabad race for acquiring of strategic parity in White
House. However, the intentions of President Kennedy for improving the relations with Nehru government brought trust deficit factor in Pak-US ties which diminished the position of Islamabad humiliated in American geostrategic priorities. It further inaugurated an era of persistently deteriorating Pakistan’s relations with the US.

Moreover, the embarrassing features of the post-1965 war sanctions started to weaken the position of Pakistan further in South Asian conflicted environment. It happened because unlike India, the initial leadership under first Prime Minister, Liquat Ali Khan, decided to establish the bilateral relations preferentially with the United States instead of securing the multiple foreign connection from different superpowers. It was in sharp contrast to Nehru, who refused to accept the Roosevelt-sponsored package of multidimensional aid, and decided to send his renowned politician (his sister), Vijaya Lakshmi Pundit, to the Soviet Union as the first formal ambassador for cultivating pleasant Indo-Soviet enterprise. In fact, the crisis-driven Nixon regime, by adopting the suggestions of Kissinger, preferred Pakistan unequivocally as a suitable option for constructing diplomatic links with China. The Kissinger-Nixon diplomacy also attempted to turn Mao government against the Soviet Union. These were the strategic moves of the Cold War which annoyed India temporarily. The opening of China, US support of Pakistan crisis of East Pakistan, and American opposition to peaceful nuclear explosions of Indira Gandhi were the troubling realities for New Delhi, which showed the American tilt toward Islamabad briefly. Washington felt the weakening role of its non-proliferation campaign which was failed to neutralize the nuclear aspirations of New Delhi appropriately. In addition to Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, the American cooperative connections were considered to be insufficient for attracting India towards the United States. These developments became obviously a serious concern of the United States.
The efforts to eliminate the communist rule from international relations convinced the United States to persuade the South Asian states to actively participate in its fight against communism. Pouring from Washington, the financial and military aids were originally a larger part of the US Cold War strategy. This development empowered the antagonistic politics of South Asia heavily while viciously enabling New Delhi and Islamabad to stand against each other. In addition to the US strategic supplies, the Western financial institutions were also energetic in helping the states of the third world especially, India and Pakistan. It was again an American way of helping both the contestants of the decolonized subcontinent to overcome their financial hurdles. All these American-sponsored developments in the South Asian affairs in the existence of Indo-Pak prolonged hostility were primarily the American way of looking subcontinent through the prism of the Cold War politics rather than managing New Delhi-Islamabad conflict.

The hostile politics of Cold War was a US-USSR clash for maintaining global hegemony by extending the sphere of influence. This competition of great powers started initially from the expansionism of Soviet backed communism and resulted in fifteen Soviet republics. The financial assistance under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and strategic assistance under the Warsaw Pact further introduced Soviet plans of enhancing its influence across the world. The efforts of Moscow for dominating the international relations were initiated from 1949 when Joseph Stalin conducted nuclear tests in Kazakhstan. The subsequent events witnessed the desire of Stalin to empower Soviet Union in the world by creating allies in different regions. It alarmed the security bells of Washington and compelled the Truman administration to stop the Soviet expansionist models in European, African, and Asian continents. The geopolitical approach of US adopted containment strategy in American foreign policy in order to manage the expanding fear of communism. Thus, a four-decade long rivalry of action-reaction, alliance-counter alliance,
and East-West political struggle started between both superpowers. The US-USSR fight of Cold War left worse impacts on different regions including South Asian subcontinent.

The involvement of the two rivals, Soviet Union and the US, in the South Asian affairs affected the regional politics of India and Pakistan significantly. The decolonized South Asia which was initially viewed as an area for the US policymakers to secure the US interest in the greater Asian continent became a fascinating point for the White House gradually. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union and creation of the Russian Federation under Boris Yelstin further improved the US position in South Asia. The deep engagement of Washington mainly with the states from the European and Pacific regions was highly greeted by disappearance of the Soviet Union, but alarmed worryingly by Chinese economic rise. The leading decision-makers of American foreign policy preferred to discover more allies in the international system rather than relaying merely the traditional structure of Cold War alliances. It was President Clinton who decided to leave an American-annoying Indian policy which was greatly caused in 1970s. The efforts to neutralize the opposing directions of Indo-US diplomatic ties started to change its course. The Clinton administration emphasised the need for more US allies for overcoming the challenging dynamics of a globalized world effectively.

President Clinton was cognizant of Indian significance in American greater role in South Asia. Therefore, he invited Indian Prime Minister to change the history of missed opportunities. A reasonable shift in US foreign relations for upholding India in international politics occurred because of disappearance of the US and the USSR rivalry and vanishing of Indian traditional stance of the non-aligned nation. Moreover, the economic reforms introduced by Indian Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, under Rao government in 1992, communicated President Clinton the Indian dream of rising in the Soviet-less world of
American dominance. The subsequent events, after the disappearance of Soviet Union and its Indian supporting attitude, resulted surprisingly in Indian search for another great power.

The Indian role in the post-Cold War environment changed before the US due to a revised foreign policy mechanism adopted by New Delhi. A change in the foreign relations of New Delhi placed the Narasimha Rao government close to Clinton administration and an era of new cooperation between two states started. The economic reforms under Rao increased Indian significance in the global economic order in 1990s. The government of Rao liberalised economy and increased economically cooperative ties of New Delhi with major American allies. Further developments changed Indian role in the Pacific region and President Clinton started considering Indian active role in the world politics. Indian increasing role with US allies mainly in the Pacific region along with Indian conventional antipathy towards China initiated defence and security relations between two states. Indian concern about Chinese increasing role in the Indian Ocean Region and American worries on Chinese growing influence in Pacific region resulted in close Indo-US naval cooperation under Malabar naval exercises.

In 1992, the naval cooperation refreshed the bilateral foundations of Indo-US maritime interdiction. The structural changes, from a bipolar to unipolar world, left New Delhi with no second option except the United States. The geopolitical dynamics of the international system diverted India toward Washington. Clinton felt the strategic needs of New Delhi deeply and welcomed the Vajpayee government affectionately in an altered format of American foreign policy. In short, the post-Soviet structures of the global politics resulted in a revisited foreign policy standard of both India and US. These developments forced the governments of the two countries to depart profoundly from their conventional foreign relation arrangements for each other.

The fight against terrorism, analogous to fight against communism, attracted the White House toward the geostrategic significance of Pakistan and formed a warm diplomatic interaction. The close formats of Pak-US ties witnessed frequently a thin layer of trust-deficit environment between both the governments because of American abnormal tilt toward India, without taking Pakistan into consideration. The military-to-military relationship, covering the three forces of India started to cause a more assertive India against territorially adjoining states generally, and Pakistan specifically. Therefore, the fight against terrorism placed successfully two nuclear-armed states of the subcontinent under the United States. However, an American bilateral-inclined foreign policy for New Delhi and Islamabad remained ineffective in neutralizing the various hostile points of disagreement between the two arch-rivals countries of the subcontinent. In short, the absence of effectively operational multilateralism, for both India and Pakistan, for the establishment of enduringly stable and long-term peaceful environment in the nuclearized subcontinent always remained a theoretical commitment of White House merely.

The dramatic turn in American foreign relations started to occur after May 1998 when the Clinton administration began to view both South Asian rivals differently. The US diplomatic messages, carrying a strategic shift, left behind the US concerns over India regarding its nuclear-armed status and Indian Cold War alliance with anti-American circles of the Soviet Union. It was Kargil war which lured Washington to change the traditional patterns of its South Asian engagements and facilitate India economically started annoying Pakistan. This approach of Clinton administration showed a non-conventional way of viewing the Indo-Pak hostile interaction. Such approach was designed to lead New Delhi toward achieving its strategic goals. In this way, the inadvertent chapter of mutual distrust began to change, and both states realized the need to overcome the historical estranged bilateral values.
The fluctuating strategic concerns of the United States changed and both governments agreed on an enhanced feature of bilateralism. The process of change was initiated by President Clinton and significantly matured by the Bush and Obama administrations exclusively. The Indian detonation of nuclear devices and pushing South Asia toward nuclearization annoyed the United States temporarily. In the post-Cold War environment, a short period of American worries regarding the South Asian strategic politics entered in a new phase when the President Clinton attempted to overcome the diplomatic gaps between Washington and New Delhi. After the summer 1999 Kargil crisis, Clinton regime redefined the US geopolitical priorities for the South Asian region. The representatives, from both sides, projected the Talbott-Singh diplomacy (1998-2000) based on the fourteen rounds of negotiating meetings as a productive avenue for facilitating a successful visit of Clinton to India. This visit chalked out an initial plan of bilateral cooperation. The multiple rounds of negotiations between the representatives from both sides were proved to be the first strategic rounds of Indo-US engagement. Therefore, the fifteen years of disturbed Indo-US diplomatic engagement moved forward positively and transformed the historical bilateral estrangement.

The new direction of the US foreign policy began to look South Asia differently while treating both nuclear allies, India and Pakistan separately. President Clinton introduced a shift which facilitated the Indian strategists for looking India as a counterweighting forces against emerging China. The prevalence of such thinking in the mainstream foreign policy decision-making process laid the foundations of a renewed Indo-US strategic partnership. The friendly initiatives of Vajpayee and Clinton led their countries to become strong allies and cooperative friends for addressing the common future challenges.

The governments from both sides agreed to counter the Chinese rise parallel to visualizing Pak-China friendship negatively. The continuation of Clinton mission envisioned by American strong footing in Asia resulted into worse impacts on the South Asian security
environment. As a result of emerging strong Indo-US bilateral bounds, the US tilt towards India encouraged Vajpayee and his succeeding Prime Ministers to pursue more aggressive policies against the neighbouring nations. Evidently, strategic calculations of Clinton dragged India in American alliance, but it affected the position of Pakistan in the region. An unleashed version of the US South Asian engagement troubled both Presidents, Bush and Obama, for controlling the aftermaths of their New Delhi-specific approach before extremely uncertain and greatly instable Indo-Pak dispute.

The contemporary position of China and its economic ties with Pakistan has hampered the traditional diplomatic bounds between India and US. An economic corridor project of Beijing has planned to improve the economic conditions of Pakistan by accessing the Gwadar port of Pakistan which will ultimately lead Beijing towards the success of its BRI initiative. This situation is resulted in a Pak-China close economic cooperation in opposition to Indo-US strategic relations. The signing of corridor project between Beijing and Islamabad has increased the geostrategic significance of Pakistan not only in the South Asian region, but it let Islamabad to improve its international standing as well. Thus, a change in Pakistan position due to China-sponsored geoeconomic plan has posed a serious challenge to ongoing pattern of American South Asian engagement.

The record of the vicarious South Asian environment is further deteriorated by new turns of the US policy of engaging India for its geostrategic interests. In the post-nuclearized subcontinent, the United States started to prefer India as an appropriate state for his country over other South Asian nations. In view of abovementioned scenarios, to balance India and Pakistan in equal basis has become a serious challenge for the United States which could be addressed appropriately by applying a comprehensive approach for understanding the staunch ground realities. The efforts to bridge the widening diplomatic gaps parallel to the prevailing trust-deficit environment need a rational analysis of the conflicted South Asian politics.
instead of carelessly implementing a policy purely loyal to its geostrategic agenda. Therefore, it is essential for the leading political decision-makers of the US to comprehend cautiously the following facts before finalizing their South Asian policy.

Firstly, the US-upgraded South Asia policy started by Clinton and further continued by Bush and Obama actually reflects the American Indian policy, which shows the hawkish attributes of two states under the Modi and Trump administrations. The US inclination toward a single state, either India or Pakistan, is carrying imbalanced standards by putting strong foot in New Delhi and constructing the strategic canons against Islamabad while witnessing the disputed relations of both nuclear neighbours. The continuation of an imbalancing policy for South Asia is a matter of immense significance. Moreover, India-Pakistan unresolved disputes and the potential areas of conflict are seeking an appropriate response from Washington. The inevitable consequence of the toxic interaction of both nuclear weapon states could be managed by considering it a major concern by the United States. The actual spirit of de-hyphenation policy led the US toward abandoning of its symmetrical involvement in the regional affairs of South Asia. However, still the mainstream American leadership can play an effective role in creating various avenues for reducing the New Delhi-Islamabad historical tensions.

Secondly, the American tilt toward New Delhi has started depicting purely a new arrangement of Indo-US ties by overlooking Indian three-decade long decision of staying outside the international non-proliferation regime and underestimating the role of NPT. The US-sponsored civil nuclear deal has ended the Indian isolation caused by its nuclear program consequently. Moreover, an eased format of the nuclear sanctions has further encouraged India to continue its nuclear program. Thus, the civil nuclear cooperation between the two states has also considered as an American effort of
fracturing the critical wall of international community constructed around Indian nuclear-armed status.

Such efforts of the United States for treating nuclear India exceptionally out of international non-proliferation regime question the US seriousness for strengthening the scope of its global counter-proliferation mission. The global ambitions of implementing the non-proliferation regime in South Asia by convincing both Islamabad and New Delhi on subscribing to CTBT, NPT etc. cannot truly achieve progress in any direction. Hence, the leading decision-makers of US South Asian policy need to consider the significance of the international non-proliferation regime and its application in nuclearized subcontinent.

Thirdly, besides the international non-proliferation regime, the most serious question is the dichotomous reflection of Indo-US nuclear deal, which was originally designed to force India in cooperating of international non-proliferation regime gradually. Conversely, a concreted alteration of the US Atomic Energy Act helped New Delhi provisionally in sustaining its nuclear capabilities. The contemporary approach of Washington for managing the strategic partnership with India, in this way, is showing predominantly the geostrategic concentration of the US in its South Asia policy instead of enhancing the role of its own global non-proliferation efforts.

The 2006 Hyde Act explained the American concern of dealing India outside of its own decades-long non-proliferation mission. While unequivocally favouring India under the Hyde Act, the US global non-proliferation became critical feature of US South Asian engagement. The US efforts for defining and promoting the foundations of the international counter-proliferation regime became a controversial development of world politics. Furthermore, from Clinton to Trump, the dichotomous attributes of US foreign relations have been partially helping the Modi government in
further building its strategic muscles against the neighbouring states. Such imbalanced
directions of the mainstream American foreign relations and their South Asian
directions could not only undermine the credibility of the international non-
proliferation efforts as discussed earlier, but it will also reduce the scope of India-
Pakistan arms control endeavours. Moreover, it will also reveal the controversial
position of Washing on its own mission of the global non-proliferation.

Fourthly, the strategic triangle of New Delhi, Islamabad, and Washington
cannot simply be marginalized under the new bilateral formats of Indo-US and Pak-
US relations. The interaction of the three nuclear-weapon states could be estimated
cautiously before deciding any move for triangular relationship of the three nuclear-
armed countries. In fact, the desire of stabilizing the Indo-Pak hostile diplomatic
interaction always expected to change the traditional rivalry of both nations under
nuclear shadows. Nonetheless, the multidimensional strategic packages of the United
States partially support India, without considering its impact on nuclear Pakistan.

The nuclear marathon of the three states made India a close strategic partner
along with Pakistan a frontline state in war on terror, in the post 9/11 environment. In
2005, it was further revealed a new dimension of American South Asian engagement
which turned the directions of US South Asian policy towards Pakistan. The
nuclearized subcontinent required that the American leading decision-makers to
consider the Indo-Pak nuclear weapon status, along with their hostile interaction
before crafting any move in South Asia.

Fifthly, the theoretical discussion on the culture of anarchy in the nuclearized
South Asian region revolves around India and Pakistan, because the political
landscape of subcontinent has undeniably been effected by the strategic enterprise of
two states. The US tilt towards India and the combination of its economic and
strategic assistances to New Delhi did not only finalize a civil nuclear deal, but also jeopardized the security of other regional states. The US nuclear assistance to New Delhi is designed fundamentally to empower Indian assertive designs in the South Asian regional politics. Contrary to the Cold War politics, the new orientations of American foreign policy needed a comprehensive overview of the unavoidable realities of the South Asian strategic environment. The spirit of increased bilateralism was considered to be an attempt of Washington for balancing its ties with New Delhi and Islamabad separately.

This anarchical environment, amidst the nuclear politics, forced Pakistan to search a superpower for balancing Indo-US strategic partnership. China offered a multidimensional relationship package to Pakistan. Furthermore, the Russian emergence is considered to be another factor of equal importance. As Marin Katusa viewed in his study, *The Colder War: How Global Energy Trade Slipped from America’s Grasp*, Moscow as a potential competitor of Washington.° Therefore, American involvement in the South Asia political affairs largely activated the role of the extra-regional powers in India-Pakistan strategic wrestling. The international community had already accepted the future of Asian continent where Chinese emergence offset the traditional balance of power. Chinese economic rise under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) introduced a new geoeconomic plan of Beijing which is intended to increase Chinese global outreach. The BRI compelled Washington to improve its geostrategic plans of managing international relations along with empowering its core allies against China. The competition of geoeconomic and geostrategic approaches of China and US altered the security environment of South Asia in which India is determined to increase its weapon import. In opposition to

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increasing economic ties of Islamabad with Beijing, New Delhi preferred to augment its strategic ties with Washington.

Sixthly, the US engagement with New Delhi, cemented in sustained strategic cooperation, has been seeking the seriousness of the US in addressing the challenges of South Asian nuclear order. The Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), started in 2004, encouraged India to serve the greater American geostrategic interests, but its impact on nuclear Pakistan cannot be ignored. A full consideration of Indo-Pak conflict by prioritizing an environment of peaceful cordial relation between both nuclear powers can lead the United States towards its productive role. An environment of long-term pleasant diplomacy is, no doubt, a difficult task, but the presence of outside powers, the United States, can engage India and Pakistan into a productive diplomatic relation. The application of such scenarios have been heavily relaying on multilateralization of the South Asia problems, which are in contrast to the actual spirit of de-hyphenation policy.

In opposition to the ongoing bilateralism, the application of a multilateral approach towards the conflict-ridden environment of South Asia, could have produced positive outcome. The ongoing conflict of inflexible and incompatible India-Pakistan national standings cannot be neutralized by merely focusing on a single state. The efforts to generate suitable opportunities for replacing the disputing diplomatic connections of New Delhi and Islamabad have failed to achieve the desired outcomes, in the presence of different bilateral aspects of United States for both nuclear powers of subcontinent. The desire of minimizing conflict remains unfulfilled and the nuclear competition in the region seems to linger on. The Indo-US attempts for crafting the potential avenues for regional stability are presently easy to
imagine optimistically without applicably incorporating it with hard-core realities of South Asian security milieu.

Seventhly, the Af-Pak approach of President Obama, separating India from Afghanistan parallel to dealing Afghanistan and Pakistan under a single umbrella, in war on terror needs a comprehensive revision. The Indian involvement in Afghanistan along with pleasant Kabul-New Delhi ties cannot simply be left without calculating their impact on Pakistan. Indian Afghan policy attempts to convert Kabul as an annoyed neighbour of Pakistan, which is a broader plan of isolating Pakistan in the region, and preventing its access to Central Asia. The Afghan policy of New Delhi has been demanding the US to look South Asia beyond its Af-Pak approach. An Indian study of Arvind Gupta How India Manages its National Security mentioned the significance of Afghanistan for India. Gupta explained in his book the crucial status of Kabul in broader Indian security framework.\(^4\) The recent National Security Strategy (NSS) of Trump administration further associates Islamabad to a state purely suitable for fighting against terrorism. The troika of Afghanistan, Pakistan and United States cannot simply be ignored in the absence of durable peace in Kabul. A report of Wilson Center U.S. Policy in South Asia: Imperatives and Challenges mentions the American critical role in troubled countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan.\(^5\) The question of peace in Afghanistan has encircled Trump administration and Washington has introduced its determination to improve Pak-Afghan relation by reducing the threats of terrorism from South Asian region. The custodian of Afghan peace under Trump


needs to comprehend the Indian role in Afghanistan which is the main concern of Pakistan.

Finally, it is essential for Washington to comprehend the aftermaths of its de-hyphenating policy and its impacts on the South Asian allies by discarding its preferential approach towards certain South Asian states. Such bilateral treatment serves adequately the American interests without calculating the future of South Asian strategic environment. America aims to stop India from augmenting its nuclear weapon capabilities by easing the US pressures of international non-proliferation regime. A relaxed version of non-proliferation global concerns, under nuclear partnership designed and applied by President Bush, presented a worrisome picture of the South Asian strategic environment in which the nuclear competition between two rivals needs to be seriously addressed instead of placing India out of the nuclear restrictions (as discussed earlier).

The worse phase of South Asian nuclear competition is the by-product of de-hyphenation policy: the civil nuclear agreement without appropriately maintaining a legal framework for legitimizing the nuclear program of India. American ambitions for creating close strategic ties with India leaves Washington neglectful about conflicted security environment of South Asia. In the presence of de-hyphenation policy, the vision of global non-proliferation regime attached to NPT, CTBT, and FMCT have become the difficult tasks for the international community. The civil nuclear cooperation between the two states has been considered to be an American effort of pulling its strategic partner out of non-proliferation regime by averting the critical debates of global strategic community.

It has also been observed internationally an American endeavour to help India in improving its nuclear capabilities against the pressures of counter-proliferation efforts. Moreover, the Bush administration, by granting the promise of civil nuclear cooperation to
India, accepted New Delhi as a de-facto nuclear weapon state. The exceptional consideration for India, as a nuclear weapon states outside NPT, showed American commitment of revising the main principles of international non-proliferation regime by making it India friendly. Therefore, Indo-US nuclear deal did not only surprised the whole world but it also hampered the conventional wisdom attached to the global efforts of arms control and disarmament. The nuclear deal let the main criticizers from both sides to discard their traditional records of distrust and diplomatic estrangement instead of calculating the effect of nuclear cemented strategic bilateralism on the region broadly. Regardless of considering the concerns of other regional states generally, and Pakistan particularly, India and the United States started to encourage each other for working together under a closer bilateral strategic framework.

A comprehensive review of the United States South Asia policy which covertly expelled India from major pressures of international non-proliferation regime is an essential demand of time. Because the aftermaths of long-term strategic bilateral framework carry inevitably extensive probability for nurturing the conventional and nuclear arms race in conflict-ridden South Asia. The joint military exercises, improved conventional competences, enhanced nuclear capabilities, advanced space program, increased intelligence sharing networking under global coalition of war on terror, and cooperation in science and technology are considerably the main areas of bilateral cooperation finalized by two states – India and United States – under a shared strategic vision. The worse impacts of such cooperative areas on other states cannot be overruled simply.

Although the strategic joint ventures flourished the military or strategic position of India by helping the New Delhi in modernizing its conventional and nuclear capabilities. Such steps will eventually result in an assertive behaviour of the Modi government in the region. Premier Modi is investing the best potential of his country in acquiring Trump support in the regional and global affairs. A US South Asian policy, hard bent on
accommodating India, as formulated clearly in NSS 2017, by the Trump administration, is likely to continue the vision of Obama for adjusting India in fundamental priorities of American foreign policy. The civil nuclear deal dominates greatly the strategic interaction of the two states along with the economic and cultural ties by supporting the symbolic rise of India in South Asian and international affairs. The long-term objective of the US policy-makers in South Asia has presented India a ‘natural ally’ of the US, particularly in Asia where China is about to maintain its leadership.

The ongoing strategic overdose to India and critical appreciation of Pakistani role in war on terror are communicating unambiguously the current patterns of American South Asian policy (discussed in the fourth chapter). Such patterns are purely based on its own observation of avoiding the common treatment for both India and Pakistan. For US, both nuclear contestants of South Asia contain dissimilar significance in the broader framework of American South Asian policy. Trump administration intends to treat differently the both arch-rival states of nuclearized subcontinent due to their different roles in the international system. A comprehensive framework of different treatment developed under the broader vision of de-hyphenation policy restricts the role of Islamabad in the regional politics of South Asia. Trump regime considers the essential role of Pakistan in its fight against terrorism and the Trump government perceives the significance of Islamabad with reference to Kabul.

Unlike Islamabad, Washington realises the potential role of India in global politics and considers the Indian role as a rising Asian power. India is an emerging market and it is an appropriate place for American export. The Department of State started treating India a close American economic partner which has developed cooperative ties with major US allies. Additionally, the Department of Defense started considering India as a close strategic partner due to emerging role in the international system. Indian geopolitics interest in South and Southeast Asian regions along with traditional bellicose attitude towards China has dragged
Modi government towards Trump. The leading decision makers of Trump administration have accepted the Indian transformation from “South Asian” power to an “Asian” power.\(^6\) The Indian strategic thinking of expanding its influence beyond the home region has been translated by Trump as an apposite opportunity which could let Washington to keep the Asian balance in its own favour. The economic and strategic engagement of Modi government with different countries across the world further augmented Indian role in American geostrategic priorities. American dream of counterweighting Chinese economic rise now heavily dependent on Modi regime, because the Modi government did not only explore numerous avenues of cooperation with great powers, but it increased its multidimensional collaboration with the US.

The ongoing American South Asian approach is based on key priorities of managing Afghanistan issue by withdrawing from Kabul, keeping the strategic balance in its favour by preventing the emerging role of anti-US forces, and combating effectively the war on terror by eliminating the clandestine terrorist networks.\(^7\) The central theme of South Asian policy of the US is designed to enhance defence cooperation with India and to develop more areas of common strategic collaboration. In addition to India, empowering Pakistan in pursuing the counterterror campaign has become a fundamental priority of Washington. The active engagement of Islamabad with Washington in continuing the joint combat operation against terrorism across Pak-Afghan border has compelled Trump administration to not leave Pakistan in isolation. Regarding Afghanistan, the South Asian policy of US is designed to resolve the problems of security and political governance of Kabul. The three geopolitical courses of US foreign relations with reference to South Asia is intended to keep India,


\(^7\) Michael Kugelman, op. cit.
Pakistan, and Afghanistan in American favour. Thus, a broader framework of continued US involvement is structured on an increased strategic significance of South Asia.

The fundamental alterations in South Asian priorities, at the eve of the major strategic breakthroughs, demands that the US foreign policy elite show their determination of bringing the peace and stability in nuclear South Asia. The accomplishment of such mission, which was initially advanced by the Bush administration, is confronted with various challenges, which are discussed at length in this research. The age of globalization has fabricated a new strategic environment in which the transnational challenge of terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons forced the major foreign policy circles of the United States to upgrade the conventional patterns of their traditional policy choices according to the new realities of the world. However, the revised version of the US South Asia policies has only complicated the security situation in the region instead of stabilizing the region strategically. The aforementioned scenarios still remain unaddressed, which require Washington to play its due role. The recommended policy options in the fourth chapter could be a productive feedback, developed on the basis of undeniable ground realities, and it could be considered as the positive impetus for change.
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Annexures
Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategies for South Asia

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May 3, 1994
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NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGIES FOR SOUTH ASIA

SUMMARY

Continued expansion of the nuclear weapons capabilities of India and Pakistan, coupled with ongoing conflict between them, raises the probability of nuclear war in South Asia. A nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan could also harm efforts to discourage other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. United States policy opposes the spread of nuclear weapons because proliferation increases threats to U.S. national security and to world peace and stability. However, there is debate on the dangers of an escalating arms race in South Asia.

Steps taken by the United States and other countries to persuade India and Pakistan to end their nuclear weapons programs have had limited success, at most slowing down their pace. A complicating factor is that India maintains a nuclear capability in part to deter China, whereas Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability is aimed at deterring India's superior conventional and nuclear capabilities.

Analysts and policy officials are divided on how to avoid an arms race in South Asia. The Clinton Administration has renewed efforts to break the deadlock over nonproliferation, but longstanding obstacles have blocked progress. Pakistan favors a regional approach to nonproliferation, while India insists on a global approach that treats the nuclear powers on an equal basis with non-nuclear weapon countries. This report analyzes the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan and reviews several options for U.S. nonproliferation policy in South Asia.

Current questions for Congress and the Clinton Administration are:

1. Should the present U.S. nonproliferation policy towards India and Pakistan be continued?

2. What else might be done to dampen the nuclear aspirations of India and Pakistan? What incentives might be attractive?

3. Are the projected benefits from new nonproliferation measures likely to be worth their potential costs and risks?
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NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGIES FOR SOUTH ASIA

NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Both India and Pakistan admit to being capable of producing nuclear weapons, but each denies possessing a nuclear arsenal. Thus, their capabilities fall into a category between the five declared nuclear weapon states (United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, China) and nearly all other nations, which have foresworn nuclear weapons. Together with Israel and perhaps one or two others, the nations in this middle category are known as threshold states.

India

Nuclear Infrastructure

India began a broad-based nuclear program in the late 1940s and accelerated it in the 1950s. It intensified its efforts following China's 1965 nuclear test and exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device (with a yield of less than 12 kilotons) in 1974. India has an extensive nuclear infrastructure that includes ten power reactors, five research reactors, uranium enrichment facilities and two plutonium separation (reprocessing) factories. India has plans to expand its nuclear power program, but financing for new nuclear power plants is reportedly in short supply.1 Operating at full capacity, its existing reactors are capable of producing about 360 kilograms of plutonium per year, with a total reprocessing capacity of about 150 kilograms per year. Actual production and reprocessing has been much lower. Most published estimates put India's separated plutonium inventory at about 300 kilograms -- enough for approximately 50 nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Posture

Indian officials confirm that India can build nuclear weapons in a short period of time, but deny possessing a nuclear arsenal. India is presumed to possess components for nuclear weapons including the actual fissile material "pits" or "cores" for weapons. Analysts conclude that India could build plutonium fission bombs, and possibly even thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs). India could deliver nuclear weapons with various aircraft and with

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1 "Lack of Capital Deters Russians from Building VVERs in India," Nucleonics Week, October 1, 1992; "India Eyes Joint Ventures with Nuclear Plant Vendors," ibid, August 27, 1992; "India may Seek Export for Surplus Heavy Water as Reactor Funds Cut," ibid, July 29, 1993.
short-range (Prithvi) and probably with intermediate-range (Agni) missiles it is
developing.

Nonproliferation and Arms Control Commitments

India refuses to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on the
grounds that the treaty discriminates between the five countries that are
allowed to possess nuclear arsenals and all others that are locked into
permanently inferior status as non-nuclear weapons states. India advocates
replacing the NPT with a global disarmament treaty that would treat all
countries equally. India favors a comprehensive nuclear test ban and is a party
to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. In late 1993, India and the United States co-
sponsored United Nations resolutions supporting a global test ban and a ban on
the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices or outside of
safeguards. India opposes regional arms control measures that would treat India
differently than the five declared weapons states, particularly China.

India is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
allows IAEA safeguards on materials and facilities acquired from foreign
suppliers, but not on others indigenously developed or associated with its
weapons project. India plans to enter the market as an exporter of nuclear
technology; it is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, but does
require safeguards on its nuclear exports. It does not, however, require full-
scope safeguards as a condition of sale. (Full-scope safeguards apply to all
nuclear activities in a recipient states, whereas limited safeguards apply only to
a particular facility where an imported item is installed.)

India and Pakistan are implementing a bilateral agreement not to attack
each others' nuclear facilities. The 1991 agreement provides for an exchange of
lists of nuclear facilities. Although the agreement is essentially a confidence-
building measure, such limited cooperation may be a first step toward more
substantive arms control arrangements in the future. India has proposed
expanding the agreement to ban attacks on population centers.

Pakistan

Nuclear Infrastructure

Pakistan has a modest nuclear program consisting of several research
reactors and one power reactor purchased from Canada. It is building a large
power reactor with Chinese assistance. Pakistan’s nuclear weapon project uses
enriched uranium from its Kahuta enrichment facility, which probably produces
in the range of 23-38 kilograms of weapons grade uranium per year. Pakistan
is also building reprocessing facilities, but these are not yet functioning.
Experts estimate that Pakistan has produced between 130-216 kilograms of

2 "Capability of Exporting Critical Components Noted," The Times of India,
April 27, 1993, and "India to Export Nuclear Reactor Components," Deccan
weapons-grade uranium, which would be enough for 6-13 fission bombs.\(^3\) (The variation in the estimates reflect uncertainty about the enrichment levels of materials produced at the Kahuta uranium enrichment facility.)

**Nuclear Posture**

Pakistani officials have confirmed that Pakistan has produced "cores" for nuclear weapons, but maintain that the weapons production program has been "frozen" and deny possessing a nuclear arsenal.\(^4\) Speculation about the weapon design reportedly provided to Pakistan by China suggests that Pakistan would probably build a solid sphere uranium fission bomb.\(^5\) Pakistan could use transport aircraft and/or U.S.-supplied F-16 jets to deliver nuclear weapons, provided that certain modifications were made to the F-16s.\(^6\) Pakistan is developing its own short-range missiles (HATF II) and has purchased M-11 medium-range missiles from China. These missiles could be nuclear-capable if Pakistan has developed sufficiently small and light warheads.

**Nonproliferation and Arms Control Commitments**

Pakistan has said that it would join the NPT when India does. Pakistan favors a regional approach to nonproliferation such as establishing a nuclear weapons free zone for South Asia. Pakistan has proposed convening five-power talks among India, Pakistan, China, the United States, and Russia to discuss nonproliferation in South Asia, but India has rejected this regional approach.

Pakistan is a member of the IAEA and allows inspections in some, but not all, nuclear facilities. The Kahuta enrichment plant is not under safeguards. Despite early fears that Pakistan would produce an "Islamic bomb" for friendly states, there is no public evidence of clandestine nuclear exports by Pakistan.

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6 Gordon Oehler, Director of CIA Nonproliferation Center, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, February 24, 1993.
NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

Despite estimates that both India and Pakistan could assemble and deliver nuclear weapons within as little as a few days, if not sooner, little is known about either side's nuclear doctrine. Strategic analysts from India and Pakistan (and a few in the United States) assert that the existence of undeclared, or "opaque," nuclear capabilities in South Asia can create a stable nuclear deterrent relationship. These analysts think that an overt nuclear arms race between the two countries can be avoided, and that military conflicts such as those over Kashmir do not pose unacceptable risks of nuclear escalation. To the contrary, in their view nuclear capabilities are believed to deter conventional as well as nuclear war. Pakistan may view nuclear weapons as a counter to India's conventional superiority. According to this view, nuclear deterrence in South Asia need not follow the U.S.-Soviet model, but can evolve to fit the unique circumstances of the region. In a nutshell, low-level, or "non-weaponized," nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan is said to already exist without the need for nuclear testing or the necessity of having assured second strike capabilities to deter a disarming first strike.

It is uncertain whether nuclear planners in either country view nuclear weapons exclusively as retaliatory weapons, weapons of last resort, or have contingency plans for preemptive strikes or limited war. Similarly, little information is available about what types of targets -- military or civilian -- would be considered legitimate. The two countries have a bilateral agreement not to attack each other's nuclear installations.

The Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, expressed a different view in testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee when he said "the arms race between India and Pakistan poses perhaps the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons." (Woolsey testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, February 24, 1993 and before the House Foreign Affairs Committee , Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights, July 28, 1993). This perspective was supported by media reports that U.S. intelligence officials concluded during the Kashmir crisis of spring 1990 that India and Pakistan were on the brink of a war that could have escalated to nuclear war. Military preparations in both countries reportedly supported this assessment. Consequently, many analysts take issue with the argument that nuclear weapons can contribute to peace and stability in South Asia. Instead, they argue that New Delhi and Islamabad could arrive at their own version of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but fail to avert disaster.

China complicates the deterrence scheme in South Asia. While Pakistan views its nuclear capability as a deterrent to India's superior conventional forces and more extensive nuclear capability, India is concerned not only about Pakistan, but also about China. Although India's relations with China have improved since the Sino-India border war of 1962, some analysts believe that China, not Pakistan, is the primary justification for India's nuclear capability. Pakistan and China maintain close relations that include significant nuclear
cooperation. China has reportedly supplied Pakistan with nuclear weapon design information, nuclear materials, nuclear reactors, nuclear-capable missiles, and participated in Pakistan's uranium enrichment program.\(^7\) India maintains that a regional approach to nonproliferation would be unacceptable unless it treated China's nuclear weapons and those of all other nuclear powers on an equal basis.

**U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA: PAST AND PRESENT**

In the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA, P.L. 95-242), Congress declared that "the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices or of the direct capability to manufacture or otherwise acquire such devices poses a grave threat to the security interests of the United States and to continued international progress toward world peace and development." [92 STAT. 120]. Accordingly, it has been U.S. policy to oppose the further spread of nuclear weapons, to encourage nations that have not joined the NPT to sign the treaty and open their nuclear activities to IAEA inspections, and to seek solutions to regional tensions such as those in South Asia. These objectives were confirmed in January 1993 by President Bush in an annual nonproliferation report to Congress required by section 601 of the NNPA, and were described in detail in a required report to Congress on proliferation in South Asia issued in May 1993. The report states the U.S. objective "is first to cap, then over time reduce, and finally eliminate the possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery."\(^8\) The U.S. opposes the transfer of certain nuclear and nuclear-related technology to India or Pakistan, including certain advanced computers and missile technology. U.S. diplomacy has sought to reduce regional tensions

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\(^8\) The White House, Report to the Congress on Progress Toward Regional Nonproliferation in South Asia, as required under section 620F(c) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for 1993, April 28, 1993.
through bilateral and multilateral discussions, including support for five-power talks.

The Clinton Administration in early 1994 renewed efforts to break the nonproliferation deadlock in South Asia with a proposal to offer new incentives for capping India's and Pakistan's nuclear programs. The proposal incorporates President Clinton's call for a global ban on the further production of fissile materials for weapons and includes a request that Congress allow a one-time exception to permit the delivery of some 38 F-16 fighters produced by Lockheed Corporation that were already paid for by Pakistan. It is still not clear what incentives might be offered to India, but the offer to Pakistan would be contingent on Islamabad agreeing to cap its production of enriched uranium and other steps. The proposal seeks to find a way around the impasse that has developed as a result of past efforts to halt nonproliferation in South Asia.

Cutoff of Military and Economic Aid to Pakistan

The main U.S. response to Pakistan's continued progress toward acquiring nuclear weapons has been to condition U.S. economic and military aid on the status of Pakistan's nuclear program. The U.S. first terminated aid to Pakistan in 1979, but restored it in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The cutoff was resumed in 1990. (See CRS Report 93-1036F, Pakistan's Nuclear Activities: Legislation Related to the Cutoff of U.S. Aid.)

The Glenn-Symington Amendments

In 1976 and 1977 Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to require the President to end economic and military assistance to countries that receive or supply unsafeguarded uranium enrichment or reprocessing equipment. President Carter invoked this law to cut off aid to Pakistan in 1979. The law also contained a waiver that enables the President to continue aid to Pakistan if the President determines that it is in the interest of the United States to do so, but only if he has reliable assurances that Pakistan was not developing nuclear weapons.

The Pressler Amendment

In 1985 Senator Pressler sponsored an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act that required the President to certify that "Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device..." [Sec. 902 of P.L. 99-83] as a condition for waiving the aid cutoff (required by Glenn-Symington). Presidents Reagan and Bush provided the certifications until 1990, when President Bush did not provide the certification, causing economic and military aid to be cut off. Despite the aid cutoff, the Department of State continued to issue licenses for commercial sales
of military parts to Pakistan because the State Department did not interpret the Pressler amendment to prohibit private commercial sales.\(^9\)

The Clinton Administration proposed eliminating the Pressler Amendment as part of its effort to rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act, and more recently as part of its nonproliferation policy for South Asia. The proposal was apparently dropped in response to congressional resistance. Another more recent proposal would involve asking Congress to waive the Pressler amendment to allow the United States to deliver 38 F-16 aircraft to Pakistan as an incentive to accept limits on its nuclear development. The limits would require Pakistan to agree to allow the IAEA to verify that it is not producing weapons grade fissile materials and bilateral inspections to verify that F-16s have not been modified to carry nuclear weapons.

Supporters of the proposal argue that Washington should accept that U.S. policy failed to stop Pakistan (or India) from acquiring nuclear weapons and should now adopt new policies aimed at controlling the arms race in South Asia. Opponents argue that the proposal continues the practice of providing arms to Pakistan in exchange for hollow assurances of nuclear restraint, and would reward Pakistan for its defiance of nonproliferation norms. They argue that other potential proliferators could interpret the lifting of sanctions and delivery of fighter aircraft as a weakening of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Several Members of Congress, including Senators Glenn and Pressler, oppose the Clinton proposal. Others support it.

**Ending Nuclear Cooperation with India**

One U.S. response to India's nuclear weapons program was to end nuclear cooperation between the two countries. The U.S. and India entered a thirty-year agreement for nuclear cooperation in October 1963. The agreement authorized General Electric to sell two power reactors and supply low-enriched nuclear fuel for the Tarapur reactors. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 required the United States to renegotiate all of its bilateral agreements for nuclear cooperation because the law required all non-nuclear weapon states to allow full-scope safeguards on all of their nuclear activities as a condition of continued nuclear cooperation. India refused to renegotiate the original agreement and does not allow safeguards on some of its nuclear operations, although it does allow some safeguards at the Tarapur nuclear station. The United States cut off the supply of nuclear fuel for Tarapur, but agreed to allow France to begin supplying fuel for Tarapur in 1983. However, France has since acceded to the NPT and adopted a full-scope safeguards policy that prohibits continued supply of nuclear fuel to India.

The United States still claims it has legal rights over the use of U.S.-origin nuclear fuel supplied under the original agreement, and that safeguards

\(^9\) Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Interpreting the Pressler Amendment: Commercial Military Sales to Pakistan," July 30, 1992. See also the *Congressional Record*, March 19, 1992, S3950.
requirements at Tarapur did not expire when the agreement expired in October 1993. India claims that U.S. rights over the fuel and the requirement to allow safeguards at Tarapur ended when the agreement expired. After negotiations failed to resolve the issue in 1993, both countries agreed to defer the dispute for another year. However, India indicated that it may allow expanded IAEA safeguards on its two reprocessing plants.

If India cannot find another supplier of nuclear fuel for Tarapur, it may attempt to operate the reactors with mixed plutonium oxide fuel (MOX). India claims it could produce MOX using plutonium from its own unsafeguarded plutonium reprocessing plants without external assistance. However, questions remain about the economic and technical viability of using MOX fuel in the Tarapur reactors. Moreover, the Tarapur reactors are thirty years old. India expects to operate them for another ten to fifteen years before decommissioning, but questions about nuclear safety and controversy over the fuel issue could affect the cost/benefit analysis of the reactors’ utility. Tarapur provides about 10 percent of the electrical power for the surrounding region. A decision to use (unsafeguarded) plutonium as an energy resource would be controversial, despite the fact that a few countries such as Japan and perhaps Russia retain an interest in developing a plutonium fuel cycle. India could create a "closed" fuel cycle using plutonium separated from its own spent nuclear fuel, but a decision to do so would complicate discussions with the U.S. on nonproliferation issues.

Although there has been discussion in Congress about applying the Pressler amendment to India, any attempts to condition U.S. aid to India on its nonproliferation behavior are not likely to have much effect. United States aid to India is minimal, leaving Washington with very little leverage.

OPTIONS

Proposals for breaking the nonproliferation deadlock in South Asia range from accepting India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons states to continuing the status quo, or some modified version thereof. Because of the different interests involved, finding middle ground on which to negotiate solutions has been extremely difficult. Nevertheless, several distinct options can be identified.

Managed Proliferation

One extreme approach to proliferation in South Asia, sometimes referred to as "managed" proliferation, advocates accepting India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons states and providing them with technical assistance to improve the command, control, and safety of their nuclear capabilities to reduce the risks of accidental nuclear war. While such assistance might reduce the risk of

accidental nuclear war, it would also legitimize India’s and Pakistan’s status as nuclear weapon states. Many nonproliferation specialists object to this approach because it would replace the present U.S. policy of opposing the addition of new nuclear weapons states with a new policy of accepting new members in the nuclear weapons club. Such an approach could encourage other aspiring nuclear weapons states to demand similar treatment. The goal of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons would yield to a policy of preventing the use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Restraint

One variation on the managed approach advocates creating a special category for India, Pakistan, and perhaps other threshold states. The new classification would cap their nuclear weapons programs to prevent further production, assembly, or deployment of nuclear weapons, but would not attempt to eliminate their nuclear weapons. In effect, nuclear restraint would attempt to formalize non-weaponized deterrence. A policy of nuclear restraint could include regional agreements not to build nuclear weapons and could be supplemented with global initiatives that would include the nuclear threshold states (India, Pakistan, Israel...) on an equal basis with the five declared nuclear weapon states. President Clinton’s proposed ban on further production of fissile material for nuclear explosives, for example, could include India and Pakistan without requiring them to disclose past production or current fissile material inventories.

While this approach might be more acceptable to the threshold states, it would also legitimize their current nuclear stockpiles. Many questions remain about the verifiability of such nuclear restraint. One unintended consequence of this approach could be that instead of de-legitimizing the role of nuclear weapons in world politics, giving equal status to threshold states such as India and Pakistan could weaken the credibility of U.S. nonproliferation policy and reinforce the value of having even a low-level nuclear weapon capability. Other countries could then be tempted to defy the norm of nonproliferation.

Full-Scope Safeguards Regime

A variation on nuclear restraint would be to establish full-scope safeguards on all nuclear facilities in both India and Pakistan. A similar arrangement with the IAEA has brought Argentina and Brazil, both former threshold states, gradually closer to ratifying the Latin America Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Tlatelolco). According to some proponents of this option, full-scope safeguards would not necessarily eliminate either country’s future nuclear options or require either to join the NPT, but could enable both to restore economic and technological cooperation with the West. Neither country would retain nuclear weapon components, and its nuclear operations would be monitored by the IAEA to give timely warning of a diversion of nuclear materials. For either country to exercise a weapons option it would have to violate its safeguards agreement. New Delhi and Islamabad might wish to
augment IAEA safeguards with a bilateral and/or regional verification agreement.

Acceptance of full-scope safeguards could enable India to negotiate with the U.S. (or France) to supply fuel for Tarapur, and for Pakistan to be eligible for U.S. aid and arms transfers. Full-scope safeguards could enable the President to certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device, although past violations of U.S. nonproliferation laws and policies would have to be forgiven. So far it appears unlikely that the incentives of nuclear cooperation and a restoration of U.S. assistance to Pakistan would be sufficient to persuade India or Pakistan to accept full-scope safeguards.

Continue the Status Quo

Another option is to stay the course and continue to press New Delhi and Islamabad to end their nuclear weapons programs. This approach would continue support for a regional approach, including support for establishing a verified nuclear-weapon free zone, and could be coupled with support for additional confidence-building measures such as the existing agreement to exchange information and pledge not to attack nuclear facilities. The United States could provide technical support and/or intelligence information to support verification of agreements to end fissile material production or dispose of nuclear materials. Traditional nonproliferation standards would not be lowered to accommodate threshold nuclear states.

This approach would continue to search for solutions to underlying security problems -- such as the conflict over Kashmir -- that might reduce tensions surrounding the nuclear issue. The search for negotiated solutions to nonproliferation problems in South Asia is constrained by domestic political considerations in both countries which tend to narrow political options for dealing with the nuclear issue. The ultimate goal of the status quo approach would remain to cap and eventually roll back nuclear weapons programs in both countries. Rollback could include a variety of bilateral and international verification options, backed by offers of economic and technological incentives for progress. Significant progress, such as signing the NPT, could be rewarded with U.S. security assistance or other security assurances. This approach would avoid policies that would have the effect of giving legitimacy to India or Pakistan possessing nuclear weapons. It would, however, continue to complicate bilateral relations with both countries and offers little hope for breaking the deadlock on nonproliferation.

A Global Nonproliferation Strategy

The status quo approach could be enhanced by efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. The regime embodies the norms, treaties, laws, export controls, and policies aimed at stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. The regime has been relatively successful in preventing all but a few countries from attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. The NPT, which ends its twenty-five year initial term in April 1995, is the centerpiece of the regime. The United
States maintains that nonproliferation norms and the NPT benefit all nations, not just the weapons states. Moreover, deep reductions in post-Cold War nuclear arsenals should satisfy the expectations of non-nuclear weapon states for progress toward ending the nuclear arms race. Instead of altering the NPT regime to accommodate new weapons states, a global nonproliferation strategy would go further in addressing the concerns of NPT critics by reducing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials, but at the same time would strengthen the nonproliferation regime. India and Pakistan would be encouraged to join a global rollback strategy.

The Clinton Administration's policy to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing and enter negotiations on a global test ban treaty is widely viewed as strengthening the U.S. position on nonproliferation.\(^\text{11}\) The test ban policy enhances U.S. diplomacy to extend the NPT in perpetuity and without conditions when it comes up for review by its members in April 1995. Other global nonproliferation efforts such as an end to the production of fissile materials for weapons (already U.S. policy), strengthening the inspection system of the IAEA, building the nonproliferation enforcement powers of the United Nations Security Council, timely implementation of START I and II by all of the former Soviet republics, controls on world stockpiles of plutonium, and progress toward establishing nuclear-weapon free zones could all complement a global nonproliferation strategy. As non-weapon states, India and Pakistan could participate in key components of the global strategy.

**POLITICAL LIMITS**

Efforts to resolve nuclear nonproliferation issues in South Asia are generally viewed within a broad context of competing foreign and domestic policy objectives in each of the countries involved. These objectives include geostrategic, economic, and political considerations. Domestic political factors are important for Indian and Pakistani leaders, who wish to avoid perceptions of accommodating U.S. nonproliferation preferences which can be unpopular with domestic audiences. Nuclear programs have symbolic and political importance in both countries and are believed to have defense/deterrence value that cannot be achieved through any other means. Significant arms control or nonproliferation agreements could face considerable opposition in both countries.

Some in the United States also question the high priority given to nonproliferation policy and favor subordinating nonproliferation to other foreign policy interests. Nonproliferation is seen as an obstacle to improving U.S. relations with India and Pakistan. Others, including many Clinton Administration policy makers, view nonproliferation as a top priority for U.S.

\(^{11}\) White House Fact Sheet, Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, September 27, 1993; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, statement on the President's decision to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing, March 15, 1994.
and international security. United States initiatives face the challenge of persuading India and Pakistan to cap and roll back their nuclear programs without giving legitimacy to their covert possession of nuclear capabilities, and without overturning existing U.S. nonproliferation laws and policies.

ADDITIONAL READING

General Background


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India’s Reactions to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan

Special National Intelligence Estimate
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN— Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT— Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN— Caution—Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY— NFIB Departments Only
ORCON— Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL...— This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to . . .
FGI— Foreign Government Information
SNIE 31/32-81

INDIA'S REACTIONS TO NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN

Information available as of 1 September 1981 was used in the preparation of this Estimate.
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Treasury.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
OVERVIEW

Pakistan is pursuing a nuclear explosives development program which, if carried to the production of weapons, would be regarded by New Delhi as a direct threat to India and to its regional and global ambitions. The available evidence is insufficient to predict India’s response to this threat. Prime Minister Gandhi has dealt with the problem through indirect pressure and, although that course is unlikely to be adequate over the long run, we do not believe that Gandhi has made a decision to take any direct action. India is developing contingency options for destroying Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, for responding to a Pakistani nuclear test by exploding an Indian test device, and for coping with an established Pakistani nuclear weapons capability.

An uncertainty in estimating what Gandhi will do about the Pakistani problem in the near term is the extent of Indian concern about US arms sales to Islamabad, particularly the F-16 aircraft. India has long exaggerated the threat posed by US arms sales to Pakistan in order to discourage the United States from providing Islamabad with sophisticated arms.

The US proposal to sell F-16s to Pakistan is now being associated by New Delhi with the potential Pakistani nuclear threat. Reporting received since 7 June, when Israel used F-16s to destroy a reactor in Iraq, indicates that high-level officials in the Indian Government are genuinely alarmed about F-16s going to Pakistan and the extent to which this limits India’s options for dealing with Pakistan’s nuclear activities. India fears that, with the F-16, Pakistan has the capacity to counterattack effectively against some Indian nuclear facilities. Moreover, it fears that a rearmed Pakistan backed by a US commitment will become more adventurous and hostile toward India.

In the extreme case, if Indian concerns increase over the next two or three months, we believe the conditions could be ripe for a decision by Prime Minister Gandhi to instigate a military confrontation with Pakistan, primarily to provide a framework for destroying Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. We judge that the sense of urgency in New Delhi is not likely to dissipate in the coming months.

Over the next 12 to 24 months, our estimate nonetheless is that India will follow a wait-and-see strategy—waiting for Pakistan to conduct
a nuclear test, with the intention of exploding an Indian device in response and assessing Pakistan's further ambitions. If Pakistan persists toward nuclear weapons production, or if Pakistan moves to acquire a strategic stockpile of nuclear material, then New Delhi will face a choice of accepting the high probability of a nuclear arms race or destroying Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Any final Indian decision is likely to depend critically on political and strategic circumstances prevailing at that time.
DISCUSSION

Present Situation

1. India is following Pakistani progress toward a nuclear weapons production capability with growing concern. In India’s view, Pakistani production of nuclear weapons would pose a direct threat to Indian national security. India’s broader goal of becoming a major global power through its preeminence in South Asia would be threatened by a Pakistani nuclear challenge to such preeminence. It would dilute the effectiveness of India’s superiority in conventional military capabilities and would require New Delhi to authorize a costly Indian nuclear weapons production program. Therefore, the Indian Government has been considering ways to prevent Pakistan from becoming a nuclear weapons state.

2. Pakistan is approaching a capability to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in a nuclear explosives development program. Prime Minister Gandhi evidently responded to the threat by authorizing Indian nuclear test preparations. In February, excavation was begun in the Thar Desert to permit the underground explosion of an Indian test device on short notice.

3. In May preparations had been completed by India for a 40-kiloton nuclear test—presumably preparation of the device itself, as excavation at the test site was still under way. India reportedly was to explode the device about one week after the expected Pakistani test. [omission] India did not intend to try to prevent Pakistan from conducting a nuclear test. Evidently, the Indian Government calculated that a Pakistani nuclear explosion per se would not constitute a national security threat, and that the damage to India’s image of preeminence in the region could be minimized by a resumption of the peaceful nuclear explosive (PNE) program.\(^1\)

4. A small group of Indian strategists who have argued for nuclear weapons production since China’s nuclear test program began are now citing the Pakistani nuclear program as a requirement for an Indian nuclear deterrent on two fronts. Prime Minister Gandhi approved the publication of a long editorial by one of these nuclear weapons advocates. Work under way is intended to give India by late 1982 its first supply of plutonium totally unencumbered by any international controls and therefore usable in nuclear weapons. We believe, however, that India probably is preparing for contingencies rather than beginning a weapons production program. As New Delhi’s primary objective is to prevent Pakistan from producing nuclear weapons, Indian deployment of nuclear weapons would be

\(^1\)There is some evidence that India’s plans for resuming its PNE test program include efforts to develop a thermonuclear device. After India’s test in 1974, Indian scientists spoke of plans to develop a thermonuclear PNE as a logical next step in their explosives program. That program appears to have ceased shortly after the 1974 test, but recent indications are that various laboratories in India’s Department of Atomic Energy have been tasked to work on the development of a hydrogen test device. Estimates of the time and effort required to design a successful thermonuclear device vary widely, but the complexity of the design problem probably would not deter the Indians from attempting the development of a thermonuclear explosive. India is aware that China’s third test was thermonuclear and that it occurred only 17 months after the first Chinese test in 1964, and much useful information has been published since then. Pakistan’s explosion of an initial fusion device would pale in the light of an Indian thermonuclear test, serving New Delhi’s objective of showing to Islamabad the futility of a nuclear arms race and attempting to show to the rest of the world that India’s regional preeminence remained secure.
likely in the near term only if other efforts failed to stop the Pakistanis.²

Indian Strategy

5. Since June high-level strategists in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of External Affairs have been focusing more closely on various plans for military action against Pakistan. The impetus almost certainly comes from Israel’s use of US-supplied F-16s to destroy the Ostrak nuclear reactor in Iraq and the announcement days later of US plans to supply F-16s to Pakistan. Before the Israeli raid, Indian leaders may have been resigned to the sale of F-16s over their protests and they seemed to regard Pakistan’s nuclear activities as a separate threat. Since then, however, Indian concern about the two threats has intensified. Top officials in the defense establishment have expressed concern about possible Pakistani attacks against the Indian nuclear facilities, and similar warnings by top officials in the Ministry of External Affairs indicate that this reaction by the military probably is widely shared. The Indian Government probably is concerned that its options are narrowing—that its contingency plans for stopping the Pakistani nuclear program by force could not be implemented without inviting reciprocal attacks which, if conducted with F-16s, could not be adequately thwarted by existing Indian air defenses.

6. In mid-July the Indian service chiefs reportedly were to consider Indian arms requirements as a result of Pakistan’s expected acquisition of US arms. The results of the intended meeting are not known. At the time of the meeting a senior Indian defense official reportedly was considering the possibilities of starting a military confrontation with Pakistan before F-16s began to arrive. Earlier in July a senior Indian defense official stated that, though no decision had been made to attack Pakistan, contingency plans calling for a late 1981 surprise attack did exist. India reportedly would use border skirmishes to justify such an attack. India’s exaggerated media treatment of border incidents in recent weeks indicates that the government may be keeping this option ready.

7. India’s ability to carry out the military option is not in question.²

²For a discussion of incentives and disincentives for India to produce nuclear weapons, see the annex.

The enrichment plant would be a soft target, particularly if it were in operation at the time of attack (when the spinning centrifuges would be likely to self-destruct from the concussion of explosions). No dangerous radioactive materials would be released from the plant. The difficulty of acquiring necessary components and rebuilding the plant probably would rule out production of highly enriched uranium for several years.

8. Damage to the reprocessing plants would be more uncertain because of the extensive concrete shielding surrounding the equipment. Nevertheless, enough damage almost certainly would be done in an initial strike to preclude any operation of the facilities for many months. Problems resulting from local radioactive contamination could make repairs infeasible indefinitely.³

Probable Developments

9. Prime Minister Gandhi probably has not yet made a decision to exercise a military option against Pakistan. In the extreme case, if India’s concern about deliveries of F-16s to Pakistan increases before the optimum time for exercising the military option (in October or November, according to one report), the conditions could be ripe for Prime Minister Gandhi to carry out the contingency strike plans. Our best estimate, however, is that India will follow a wait-and-see strategy. As the shock of the Israeli strike fades, Indian military strategists probably will become more confident of their ability to cope with the Pakistani F-16s before the first deliveries—the timing of which is still under discussion. Political strategists probably will focus attention on the potentially extreme political costs involved in attacking Pakistan, including the possibility of a Muslim oil embargo against India.

10. The Indians now believe that the Pakistanis would be able to conduct a nuclear test within a year.³

³The reprocessing facilities will begin to contain highly radioactive material as soon as they begin to treat irradiated nuclear fuel, or to store such fuel. India’s apparent plan earlier this year to await a Pakistani test before taking any serious action suggests that Gandhi did not consider the possibility of local radioactive contamination to be a driving factor in determining the feasibility or timing of an Indian attack.
Gandhi has been told that, if the United States were to halt the sale of F-16s, Pakistan would undoubtedly test and produce nuclear weapons. India probably would react to a Pakistani test by conducting an Indian test in response. New Delhi would hope that an Indian test (and the predictable wave of international pressure) would deter the Pakistanis from proceeding with a nuclear weapons program, but in all probability Pakistan would continue producing weapons-useable nuclear material. If that were the case, India would have to consider whether to try to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear facilities before a nuclear stockpile rendered the military option ineffective. Alternatively, Pakistan may decide to delay a nuclear test while awaiting the full implementation of the US arms deal. If Pakistan defers nuclear testing, the Indians will face the prospect of Pakistani accumulation of a significant stockpile of nuclear material for eventual weapons use. Thus, in this case too, India would confront a decision either to strike Pakistan’s nuclear facilities or to face a high probability of eventual Pakistani production of nuclear weapons.

11. A critical factor in estimating what Gandhi would do, when ultimately faced with the choice of either attacking Pakistan or allowing Pakistan to produce a stockpile of weapons-useable nuclear material, is her attitude toward exercising India’s own nuclear weapons option. If the Indians were adamantly opposed to developing their own nuclear weapons, they probably would try to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear facilities before a significant stockpile of nuclear material could be produced. If, on the other hand, the Indians are seriously considering the establishment of their own nuclear strike capability against China, destruction of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities would become a less attractive option. From the Indian perspective, it would have the serious drawback of inviting Chinese intervention. Moreover, the international reaction to an Indian attack probably would be severe. Reliance on the option of building a nuclear deterrent force to deal with the Pakistani nuclear threat would extend India’s time for reaction until nearly the point when Pakistan actually began to produce deployable nuclear weapons, which probably would not occur before late 1983. This would give India time to conduct additional PNE tests, perhaps permitting a thermonuclear test.

12. Recommendations have recently been made in favor of exercising the nuclear weapons option and that the detailed recommendations were circulated widely in the Indian Government. We have also noted that Gandhi has at least some interest in this viewpoint. But we do not know whether the Prime Minister favors that course, and we have not observed any activity by the Indian military that would suggest authorization for a nuclear weapons program. The considerations discussed in the annex suggest that India would ultimately choose to meet the Pakistani nuclear challenge by establishing a superior nuclear force, but the decision is likely to depend critically on the prevailing political and strategic circumstances.

13. If India chose to rely on nuclear deterrence, the present pace of Pakistan’s nuclear program would point to nuclear testing by both countries in late 1982 or 1983. India’s basic objectives (as noted in paragraph 1) would require Indian efforts to be more impressive than Pakistan’s accomplishments. It is possible that Pakistan would be sufficiently impressed by India’s capability to decide that its best course lay in avoiding a nuclear arms race. Even so, mutual suspicion and miscalculation probably would defeat such restraint.

14. If, on the other hand, India chose to attack Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, the hostilities would escalate quickly. Pakistan would need outside help to avoid a defeat, presenting the United States with the dilemma of direct involvement or seeing the defeat of a security partner. The Soviet Union might attempt to exploit the hostilities, for example, by launching limited strikes under Afghan colors against insurgent camps across the Pakistani border.4

4For a discussion of possible Soviet actions against Pakistan, see SNIE 11/02-81-2, "The Soviet Threat to Pakistan, 12 August 1981."
ANNEX

India's Nuclear Weapons Option

The strategic argument in favor of producing nuclear weapons applicable to use against China includes two Indian considerations. The first is that China poses a threat to Indian freedom of action in South Asia. Either by coercive diplomacy or by supporting insurrection in small neighboring states, China is likely eventually to restrict India's control over events in the region unless deterred by a strong and determined government in New Delhi. The second consideration is that China poses a more direct threat to India's security because it is likely to encourage and support Pakistani aggression against India by providing military equipment to Islamabad or by tying up Indian troops along the northeastern border during an Indo-Pakistani conflict. Nuclear weapons, according to Indian proponents, would end the present dangerous degree of asymmetry between China's power and that of India and could, in time, produce a climate conducive to improving relations between the two countries.

2. Also, Indian nuclear weapons advocates regard production of nuclear weapons as a means to reassert India's regional preeminence in the face of increasing Soviet and US activity in the area. Events in Iran and Afghanistan and the subsequent reactions by superpowers probably have led many Indians, including Gandhi, to conclude that New Delhi is nearly helpless to influence the resolution of important problems in the region. Nuclear weapons, according to some Indian strategists, would lead the superpowers to accord India greater respect, if not as the nation having overall responsibility for maintaining peace in the region—the status to which India ultimately aspires—then at least as an equal participant in resolving regional crises.

3. Despite these incentives, there are several technical and political reasons why the Indian Government might prefer to delay launching a nuclear weapons program. India's early pledges to use its Canadian-supplied research reactor only for peaceful purposes, for example, may make Gandhi reluctant to use this facility for weapons production, and India's other operational reactors are covered by international non-proliferation safeguards. India is building a research reactor and a power reactor that will be able to begin producing unsafeguarded plutonium in large quantities in late 1980, if all proceeds according to plan. Thus, Gandhi would find it expedient to defer weapons production, at least until about 1983. In the meantime, unsafeguarded plutonium from the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor could be used to conduct "peaceful" underground nuclear tests.

4. The Indians would have some economic considerations in deciding whether to become a nuclear weapon state. Although the cost of producing a small stockpile of fission bombs would probably not be great, Gandhi probably would realize at the outset that embarking on a nuclear weapons program would entail a commitment to ever-increasing defense budgets. One Indian proposal is to spend $10 billion over five years—presumably by increasing the defense budget somewhat from its current level of about 3.5 percent of India's gross national product—to pay for the production of several hundred nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft recommended for deployment against China. Another major cost of establishing a nuclear deterrent would be the expense required to...

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*The plan includes using domestically produced heavy water in the reactor. India's persistent problems in producing this water, and its critical need to increase electrical power generating capacity, will create conflicting desires. India will want to start up the power reactor as soon as possible, which means using heavy water available from the Soviet Union under safeguards. The Indians would like to operate the power reactor without safeguards, however, which might require postponing the startup date. India might choose to keep its new research reactor free of safeguards—to support a weapons program—while using safeguarded heavy water in the power reactor to ensure its timely startup; this course would argue for a deferral of overt weapons development until the Soviet Union had finished supplying the desired heavy water.*
create a nuclear strike force with adequate personnel, training, and command and control procedures. Hidden costs would take the form of increased requirements for nonnuclear equipment and capabilities—costs relating to enhanced early warning systems, for example.

5. Costs would not prohibit India from becoming a nuclear weapon state, but they would relate importantly to the pace at which India's nuclear force would grow. Although India could rapidly outpace Pakistan in the deployment of simple fission bombs without straining its economy, the government would wish to minimize the time between declaring itself a nuclear weapon state and establishing a credible deterrent to Chinese aggression. The present state of Indian nuclear and missile capabilities is such that the creation of a nuclear weapons force in the near future probably would call for a greater infusion of funds—more of a crash effort—than would be required later in the decade.

6. India possesses the technology necessary to develop a ballistic missile system of sufficient range and payload capabilities to strike important Chinese targets. This technology is embodied in work being done by the Indian Department of Space, which has produced and tested a satellite launch vehicle, designated the SLV-3, similar to the US Scout. Designed to be capable of placing a satellite into a circular orbit, the system potentially could deliver a nuclear payload to a target kilometers distant. A strap-on booster engine under development could increase either the range or payload. India, however, lacks the production capability needed to support a ballistic missile program. Also, a more accurate guidance system probably would be required by the military. Several years probably would be required; therefore, before India could begin to produce intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

* Historically, the military has not been noted to be involved in the work of India's Department of Space, although the Ministry of Defense is believed to be developing missile-propulsion and inertial guidance systems.
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Congressman informs Department Indonesian Foreign Minister will provide him accommodations at Bandung and has made own arrangements to be met arrival Djakarta. Amembassy Djakarta need not meet and should consider visit unofficial giving only type assistance given American journalists.

Amconsul Singapore and Amembassy Bangkok requested make required hotel reservations, meet on arrivals and assist as appropriate.

\[Signature\]

\[Signature\]

Drafted by: HjMEJensen 3/28/55

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Intelligence Memorandum

Indo-Soviet Relations

CIA

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4 December 1972
No. 2440/72
Indo-Soviet Relations

Irritants have developed in the Indo-Soviet relationship during 1972. The USSR's popularity in India seems to have peaked in the second half of 1971 with the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation and the full display of Soviet support for India's efforts to free Bangladesh.

Since then, India's recurrent nightmare of big power interference, fixed on the US and China during the 1971 war with Pakistan, has begun to home in on the Kremlin. President Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow aroused New Delhi's fears, never far from the surface, that arrangements detrimental to Indian interests were being negotiated.

Nevertheless, the leaders in New Delhi believe that Indian and Soviet views on South Asian political dynamics are still compatible in the broadest sense and that, at least in the short run, India's interests are best served by maintaining close ties with Moscow. The Soviets have discovered that the Indians can be very scratchy partners, but are apparently willing to put up with them as long as they serve Soviet interests in the area.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
4 December 1972

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Indo-Soviet Relations

Historical Development

An undercurrent of suspicion has marred Indo-Russian relations since the days of the British Raj when London’s proconsuls played the Great Game to thwart Czarist ambitions on the subcontinent. After British troops departed in 1947, the threat posed by a hostile Pakistan was India’s first concern abroad. Next in line stood the Soviet Union. With India protected from China by the Himalayas, the USSR was seen as the only other country that might present a real challenge to Indian interests.

Strains between Indian and Soviet leaders had developed as early as the late 1930s and early 1940s. While Nehru and other Congress Party figures were in British jails for their part in the independence movement, the Moscow-supported Communists, after Hitler’s attack on Russia, were backing the British war effort and in the process gaining strength at the expense of the imprisoned Congress leaders. After independence, the Communists were in active and often violent opposition to the new government. Although the Communists have since adopted milder tactics, Indian leaders remained chary, finding it difficult to forget Moscow’s support of Communist efforts to incite violent revolution in the immediate post-independence period.

Up to the mid-1950s relations between India and the USSR were generally correct—limited to trade, cultural, and unexceptional diplomatic exchanges. Then, after the death of Stalin, the Soviets fastened on India as a major target in a new foreign policy aimed at limiting Western influence in the underdeveloped world. Prime Minister Nehru was invited to Moscow in June 1955, and Moscow won a return trip for Bulganin and Khrushchev the following November and December. During this visit Khrushchev first declared his country’s support for India’s stand on Kashmir. The Soviet move came when New Delhi was particularly receptive to approaches from new

NOTE: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.
friends with fresh support. Pakistan had just joined SEATO and was about to join the Baghdad Pact—later to become CENTO. As Pakistan was moving toward the US, difficulties were beginning to cloud New Delhi’s relations with the Chinese Communists.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, while India’s relations with China were going from bad to worse and the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute was intensifying, Indo-Soviet relations were growing more cordial. Nehru’s official position did not change. He maintained that India’s security was best protected by its role as a buffer between superpowers, and he opposed formal alignments or military pacts. Nevertheless, the Indians leaned more heavily on the Soviet Union as their border problems with the Chinese increased. Many Indians managed to convince themselves that, in the event of real trouble with the Chinese, the Soviet Union would offer active support.

When the Sino-Indian border war erupted in 1962, Indian expectations were not fully realized. Although the Soviets continued to supply military and economic aid and let it be known that they would build a MIG aircraft factory in India, they did not give the kind of dramatic support New Delhi had hoped for. The Soviets avoided taking sides as long as possible (they were coping with the Cuban missile crisis at the time); then they issued a pro forma statement in favor of China. This statement, coupled with the rapid and humiliating defeat suffered by Indian forces, continuing Chinese hostility, and Pakistani-Indian friendship, led Nehru to declare that India must “have adequate armed strength.” Not wishing to be only a pawn in big power politics, Nehru’s government began to revamp national priorities so as to achieve effective military and economic power as soon as possible—the ideal of self-reliance which his daughter Indira Gandhi would proclaim as Indian policy nine years later.

The achievement of self-sufficiency is a long process, and even as Nehru worked toward that goal, the nation was drawn into closer involvement with the Soviet Union. In February 1962, the Soviets shipped India four of an initial order of 12 MIG-21 fighters, and work began on a complex of MIG assembly plants in India. In September 1964, the Soviets confirmed their readiness to assist in the construction of the huge Bokaro steel plant and to boost further their stock with the Indian government they continued to admonish the Indian Communist Party to follow a peaceful, parliamentary path. Meanwhile, tension persisted along the Sino-Indian border, and India engaged Pakistan in a brief and inconclusive border fracas over a dispute in the Rann of Kutch—a remote area near the southern terminus of the Indo-West Pakistani border.
By mid-1965, the Soviet Union was India's major source of diplomatic and military support. When a full-scale Indo-Pakistani war broke out in September 1965 the "special relationship" looked good to New Delhi. Unlike the US and Great Britain, the Soviet Union continued to give military aid and other support. Total support, however, did not last long.

Moscow, in the person of Premier Kosygin, was soon calling for an immediate cease-fire. Once the war was brought to an end, Moscow moved further away from New Delhi in an obvious effort to improve its credentials as a mediator at the Tashkent conference. Moscow's motives in doing this were a mixture—a desire to be seen as a peace-maker, a recognition that India's continuing ties with the US and UK had not been appreciably loosened, and a wish to improve its standing in Pakistan and weaken that country's growing dependence on China.

The new Soviet strategy, seen in New Delhi as an attempt by the Soviets to develop Pakistani at the expense of Indian power, led to a Soviet decision in July 1968 to supply military aid to Pakistan. The reaction in New Delhi was predictably negative, but stopped short of open denunciation. Although the Indians kept up a steady stream of protests, they could not ignore their need for Moscow's unqualified support in the UN for their claims in Kashmir. New Delhi continued to side with Moscow on issues vital to Soviet interests. Thus, New Delhi refused to condemn the Soviets for the invasion of Czechoslovakia and in April 1969 came out in support of the Soviets in their border dispute with the Chinese.

Still, New Delhi did not actively support Party Chief Brezhnev's suggestion for a system of collective security in Asia, and in mid-1970 the Indians suspended discussions on a possible Soviet-Indian friendship treaty.

During 1970, Indian concern over the Soviet role on the subcontinent grew. The fundamental difference was over Soviet arms to Pakistan, but friction appeared in several relatively minor areas. Problems cropped up, for example, over the administration of economic and military aid, over the continued publication of official Soviet maps that showed disputed areas on the Sino-Indian border as belonging to the Chinese, over the Soviet Union's construction of a cultural center in the south Indian city of Trivandrum without informing Indian officials, and over India's hesitation in taking a stronger public position in favor of Soviet positions on Vietnam and the Middle East.

At the same time, the Soviets were complaining of the Indians' inability or unwillingness fully to utilize Soviet aid. As a result of poor management, strikes, and lagging production of domestic components, some Soviet-aided
plants were not being completed on schedule and others were being inefficiently operated. The recession in 1966 had led conservative Indian fiscal administrators to hold down government investment. Lagging investment sharply curtailed the use of Soviet economic aid earmarked for the construction of heavy industrial plants. Moreover, reduced government demand for investment goods among other things caused many completed plants to operate below capacity, further reducing the need for the type of aid the USSR was furnishing. Moscow's refusal to allow New Delhi to reallocate project aid to import industrial raw materials meant that more than $200 million of Soviet credits were not allocated. The Indians must have compared Moscow's stipulations unfavorably with Western economic assistance where non-project aid made up about 85 percent of the total.

Despite all these difficulties, the Indians remained dependent on the Soviets for advanced weapons. Since Soviet military aid to India was first initiated in November 1960, Moscow has delivered more than $1.1 billion worth of equipment. These deliveries, which averaged over $130 million annually after 1965, include MIG-21 jet fighters, SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, MI-8 helicopters, OSA-class guided missile patrol boats and tanks.

A Wartime High Point

In 1969 the Soviets concluded that their attempt to curry favor with Pakistan was losing them more good will in New Delhi than they were gaining in Islamabad. Military aid deliveries to Pakistan were accordingly suspended, and by 1971 the Soviets were restricting themselves in Pakistan to economic development projects. As a result, the leaders in New Delhi again convinced themselves that Moscow would support them in a serious confrontation with Pakistan. While their experience indicated that Moscow would prefer a quick and peaceful means to defuse the explosive Indo-Pakistan situation, Mrs. Gandhi seemed confident that she would be able to obtain Soviet support once the Kremlin leaders understood there was no alternative to war. She was right. In the event, the Soviets decided not to risk their "special relationship" in a futile effort to prevent war.

As events on the subcontinent moved inexorably toward full-scale hostilities, New Delhi took steps to coordinate its diplomatic and defense strategies with Moscow. In addition to ensuring a continuing flow of military supplies, Indian strategists were anxious that all precautions be taken to guard against Chinese intervention. The Soviets were in a position to offer assurances in regard to both.

Throughout the summer of 1971, Soviet arms shipments continued to arrive in India. The significance of this aid could not have been lost on
Peking. Indian strategists had already calculated that winter weather in the Himalayas would make it difficult for China to engage in diversionary action along the border, and Peking's less than vigorous public support for Islamabad increased Mrs. Gandhi's confidence. Nevertheless, the Indian prime minister was anxious to obtain a commitment from the Soviets that would leave the Chinese no room for doubt that Moscow would protect its client.

To this end, she suggested in the summer that the friendship treaty first proposed by the Soviets in 1969 be dusted off for early signature. Moscow, only too anxious to accommodate Mrs. Gandhi on an arrangement that provided long-term gains for the Soviets, quickly agreed. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation was signed in August. It called for immediate consultations in case either India or the Soviet Union were attacked or threatened, and for both sides to refrain from giving assistance to any third power engaged in an armed conflict with the other. Thus, India secured Moscow's written promise that in the event of Indo-Pakistani hostilities, Soviet assistance to Pakistan would stop. New Delhi also had the commitment it needed to counteract the Chinese. Although billed to continue for at least 20 years, the treaty preserves a certain flexibility for New Delhi by providing for mutual consultations in the event of differences over interpretation.

In the months that followed its signing, abundant evidence of increased cooperation appeared, including an exchange of visits by Indian and Soviet government leaders undertaking full consultation prior to the outbreak of hostilities. This show of amity was capped by a conspicuous military airlift in November.

When war finally erupted in December, Soviet support for India was all that the leaders in New Delhi could have desired. The Soviets had already stocked the Indian arsenals and most likely promised to replace materiel lost in the war. In addition, Moscow promised to veto any draft submitted to the UN Security Council that called either for troop withdrawal before the Indians had accomplished their objective or for a political settlement that was not acceptable to the Bengalis. Finally, the Kremlin's propaganda machine was turned up full blast on behalf of New Delhi, and warnings to "outside powers" to stay out of the conflict were beamed directly at Peking. For their part, the Soviets asked two things—that the Indian armed forces accomplish their goals quickly and that they confine their objective to the liberation of East Pakistan, i.e., that they forego the destruction of West Pakistan.
But Problems in Peneftime

The “special relationship” may have hit its peak during the war. Almost as soon as the fighting stopped, old suspicions and differently perceived national interests re-emerged. Soviet offers to act as a go-between were interpreted in New Delhi as a sign that Moscow was eager to revert to the role of mediator by loosening its ties with India and wooing Pakistan away from China and the US. The Indians made it clear that peace negotiations would be carried out by the principals alone and that third-party interference—Soviet, UN, or other—would not be welcome. They were quick to take offense at any Soviet action that could be interpreted as pressure on them to settle affairs with Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi’s frequent and derogatory remarks about the sinister machinations of “big powers,” although aimed primarily at the US, appeared to be warnings to the Soviet leaders as well. For the most part, Moscow has gone along with India, but the Soviets have found it difficult to refrain from low-keyed efforts to push India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to some sort of formalized acceptance of their new relationship.

Celebrations held in India in August 1972 to commemorate the signing last year of the Friendship Treaty were kept to a minimum. Mrs. Gandhi paid tribute to Indo-Soviet friendship, but she described the treaty as a “benefit to the rest of the world” and was careful to highlight the unusual circumstances—“when our nation faced a major challenge”—surrounding its signature.

There have been other irritants. Although there has been a dutiful increase in Indian appearances at Soviet-sponsored commemorative occasions and at Communist-front meetings, New Delhi has not failed to notice, with growing alarm, that Soviet consular officials are now more in evidence outside the capital city and, that, building on their established base within the leftist press, Soviet representatives are placing news stories in publications not previously open to their material. Two Indian wire services recently agreed to exchange materials with TASS, and TASS news photos for the first time are being used in other than the pro-Moscow publication, Patriot. The Soviets inaugurated a new House of Soviet Culture in Madras in February; in April the Trivandrum cultural center opened, although with an all-Indian staff; and construction is continuing on a new cultural center in Calcutta. There has been a country-wide increase in new Indo-Soviet cultural societies and more Soviet-sponsored cultural events.

This has, of course, led to the presence of large numbers of Soviets in India. Indian statistics indicate that approximately 5,350 Soviet nationals are now in the country.
Old annoyances have cropped up again this year. The Soviets have not stopped publication of official maps showing territory claimed by India as belonging to China. Indian trade union leaders are concerned at what they see as Soviet-inspired pressures to replace Western contacts with ties to the Soviet Labor Federation. Top armed service personnel—the majority of whom are western oriented—have revived their chronic complaint that the Soviets refuse to give India the best arms; Moscow, they say, goes on substituting quantity for quality.

Strains are continuing in the economic relationship. Despite frequent high-level economic contacts and new intergovernmental economic agreements, on a long-term basis, Moscow's capacity to absorb increasing amounts of Indian consumer goods is questionable. Moreover, India's demand for non-military Soviet manufactures has already stagnated due to New Delhi's own excess industrial capacity in sectors competitive with Soviet exports.

Although the Soviets have agreed to provide limited amounts of key items such as fertilizers, non-ferrous metals, petroleum and chemical products, the record suggests that the Indians will continue to face hard bargaining on these items. There is no evidence to suggest that the much-vaunted Joint Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, established in Moscow last September, will elevate economic coordination much beyond previous levels.

Meanwhile, Soviet aid deliveries are also stagnating.

Relations between the Ruling Congress Party and the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India, which had been one of Mrs. Gandhi's main sources of support, have deteriorated. The Communists have adopted a critical attitude toward the Congress Party government. Their aim is to appear as vigorous champions of the poor and disadvantaged with an identity separate and distinct from the Congress Party, and while they do not seek primarily to denigrate Mrs. Gandhi, she does not fully appreciate the distinction and is indignant. The Communists' new position reportedly was
approved by Moscow, probably with a view toward placating party activists, but it has reminded Mrs. Gandhi that the Soviet Union has interests in India that do not coincide with those of her government or her party. She is certainly wary of Soviet contacts with Indian Communists, and her intelligence service keeps a close eye on such things.

Yet the thorniest issue in Indo-Soviet relations during 1972 was the Kremlin's decision to welcome President Nixon to Moscow for summit talks. The Nixon visit, on the heels of new US moves in Vietnam, was particularly galling to New Delhi because it was interpreted as another example of the willingness of the big powers to reach accommodations at India's expense. More to the point, New Delhi had come out strongly against US bombing and mining north of the 17th parallel, doubtless believing that Moscow was preparing to react sharply and scuttle the summit. The Indians found themselves way out on a limb, and they resented Moscow's failure to keep them informed. Soviet leaders met with their Indian counterparts in a hurried attempt to soothe the Indians, but it is doubtful that New Delhi was satisfied.

The Indians remain suspicious of Soviet attempts to expand their presence in Asia and despite considerable pressure from Moscow, New Delhi remains as aloof as possible from the Soviet proposal to establish a Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security system. When Indians do speak of the collective security concept they emphasize its economic as opposed to its military aspects, a ploy calculated to do the least possible damage to their prospects for an improved relationship with Peking.

What Now? The View From Moscow

These difficulties notwithstanding, Moscow is not likely to abandon its nearly 20-year courtship of New Delhi. Already the dominant force on the subcontinent and a potential great power, India is important to Moscow as a counterweight to China. Good Soviet-Indian relations make a big contribution to Moscow's ambition of denying South Asia to Chinese and US influence. Another, but lesser, factor is the influence India still has among the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia and other nations in the Afro-Asian, underdeveloped, and nonaligned worlds. Moscow can therefore hope that New Delhi will ease the way for an expansion of Soviet influence in the countries where Indian views count.

Moscow also has some practical economic reasons for keeping its ties with India in good order. The Soviets have, for several years, been willing to allow New Delhi to run a deficit in its current account to service outstanding debt obligations. They have accepted manufactured products from India as
repayment for Soviet economic and military aid, and have agreed to slight increases in the quantities of raw materials they will supply India. The Soviets will send more steel shapes, non-ferrous metals, and newsprint, but they still refuse to provide non-project aid under credits. More important, they have been willing to provide considerable amounts of modern military hardware to the Indians; the Soviets have been the largest supplier of such items for some years—thus far in 1972 India has concluded some $300 million worth of arms contracts with the USSR—and this element of Indian dependence is not likely to change in the near future given India’s appetite for new weapons.

There are, of course, definite limits to how far the Soviets will let their identification with India carry them. They have found that their role in India places significant limits on their freedom of maneuver in the rest of Asia. They must also be alive to the risks involved. The lessons of Indonesia and Egypt are there. Moscow’s experience this summer with Cairo can only be a painful reminder that there are always dangers in dealing with such touchy foreigners.

The Indian Predicament

For their part, Indian policy makers worry about what they see as a growing detente not only between the Soviets and the US but between the Chinese and the US. With relations between New Delhi and Washington at a low point and in the absence of indications that Peking is ready to respond favorably to New Delhi’s proffers of friendship, the Indian leadership must rely on the Soviet Union for support.

It is not a comfortable position, since, as the Indians see it, their country gets low priority in Moscow’s scheme of things. The Indians think that Moscow wants most of all to avoid a situation that might bring it into conflict with the US and China. Mrs. Gandhi believes that this overriding interest could lead the Soviets, for example, to join with the US and China in seeking to bolster Pakistan against India. Thus, she is no longer really sure of the Soviet response should the Indians call for military aid when war threatens.

The fact that India’s defense plans aim at a rapid improvement in weapons technology heightened Indian dependence on foreign suppliers, particularly the USSR. This dependence leaves New Delhi even more anxious and vulnerable; it also makes it more difficult for India fully to capitalize on its relations with Moscow and easier for the Soviet Union to claim special privileges in India.
Mrs. Gandhi may be under pressure to grant special privileges to the Soviet Union in return for Soviet support in recent years, but so far she has shied away from any sort of blanket concessions. She has not and probably will not give Moscow permanent naval facilities on Indian territory, though she may well award the Soviets special favors on a case-by-case basis including allowing Soviet ships to be serviced at some Indian ports. Her government's discouragement of visits by US ships in recent months may have been partly designed to forestall an increase in Soviet port calls. Ad hoc permission for specific Soviet flights over India en route to Hanoi or in support of Soviet space efforts has been granted, but a general clearance is likely to be refused.

Demands like these make India uncomfortable. Mrs. Gandhi would like the added maneuverability a wider range of suppliers and supporters would give. Specifically, she would like to develop better economic relations with the US and the developed West, where there are countries better equipped to meet Indian needs. She is accordingly exploring several avenues of escape from India's present dependence on the Soviet Union.

For one thing, she is determined to keep her lines open to Western capitals. She was, for example, quick to scotch press stories that India would participate in CEMA, a significant move in light of CEMA's recent efforts to cast itself as a viable partner for the lesser developed countries. The USSR and Eastern Europe have not met, and very likely cannot meet, the gap in India's commodities needs, notably for fertilizer, that was created when US aid was halted. So she searches for improved relations with the West. Aid cutbacks by the US and other Western countries, however, make the present a poor time to look for substantial help from this quarter.

Another of the alternatives Mrs. Gandhi has been exploring is an understanding with the Chinese. In 1969, she and other government spokesmen, including Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, publicly expressed hopes that a way could be found for New Delhi to resolve its dispute with Peking. There was intense interest in New Delhi in 1969 when Chairman Mao appeared to reciprocate these sentiments by extending a cordial greeting to the Indian chargé at May Day celebrations in Peking. The chargé scurried home for consultations, and during the summer Indian officials noted that Peking's treatment of their diplomats had begun to improve. To keep the ball rolling, New Delhi up-graded its representation at Chinese functions, and amid repeated reports of ambassadorial contacts between India and China in foreign lands, Indian hopes for an imminent exchange of ambassadors grew.

Hopes subsided, however, when in April 1971 Peking spoke out for Pakistan and against India. This action had not been unexpected, and the
Indians tried to minimize its effect upon their long-term relations with the Chinese. In November 1971, Mrs. Gandhi told newsmen that Chinese statements on the Indo-Pakistan situation would not affect India's interest in improving relations with Peking. When, however, Peking continued to support Pakistan, New Delhi lessened its efforts to improve bilateral relations. Ambassadors have not been exchanged since the Indians will not yield to the Chinese insistence that an Indian ambassador be posted to Peking before a Chinese ambassador appears in New Delhi. Indian officials are reluctant to make the first move without firm assurances that Peking will reciprocate.

At present, New Delhi is concentrating on its problems with Pakistan and Bangladesh, and a breakthrough in Sino-Indian relations is unlikely until the situation on the subcontinent stabilizes. Once that is accomplished, New Delhi seems likely to resume its cautious courting of Peking. In a major parliamentary statement on 30 November, Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh pointed the way, stating that "it is our firm belief that India and China can and must normalize their relations" and that "India is willing to consider an exchange of ambassadors" with China.

At the same parliamentary meeting Singh asserted that his country was ready to normalize its relations with the US. New Delhi, he said, "would do everything in its power" to bring about a rapprochement with Washington. A senior Foreign Ministry official later stated that Washington would be expected to treat India as the dominant power in South Asia and abandon the former US policy of looking upon Pakistan as a counter-balance to India. This, of course, is similar to the line New Delhi has been pushing on the Soviet Union.

Over the long run, it appears that New Delhi would like to forge a new set of power relationships in southern Asia. The first step—the emergence of India as the dominant power on the subcontinent—has already been accomplished. The next steps toward these goals will be more difficult. As she moves along the road, Mrs. Gandhi hopes to find sources of Western economic and military assistance and to reach a detente with China that will lessen her need for Soviet protection and thus increase her nation's independence. Until she succeeds in these endeavors, she will have to nurse along India's relationship with the Soviet Union and trust that Moscow will be responsive.
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India After Rajiv

An Intelligence Assessment
India After Rajiv

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with contributions from Office of Central Reference, and analysts in the Office of Soviet Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.

Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA.
India After Rajiv

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi faces at least an even chance of assassination before his tenure in office ends in 1989. A change of leadership under such circumstances would slow or stall—and could even reverse—the warming trend in Indo-US relations and cause shifts in India’s regional and domestic policies deleterious to US interests in South Asia. It probably also would introduce new instabilities into India’s political system.

If Gandhi fell to a Sikh or Kashmiri Muslim assassin, widespread communal violence probably would erupt even if strong preventive security measures—including deployment of Army and paramilitary troops across northern India—were taken by the Indian President.

Unless Gandhi had clearly designated a successor—a leading candidate is his third cousin and confidant Arun Nehru—the President probably would appoint an interim prime minister from among elder statesmen, such as Human Resources Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao or Finance Minister Viswanath Pratap Singh, and turn the final selection over to the Congress Party’s Parliamentary Committee. In the absence of either an obvious successor or an undisputed mechanism for selecting one, a protracted struggle for the succession is likely.

Although India’s democratic framework would be likely to survive and the Congress Party likely to serve out its term, dissension in the party could result in a rapid succession of weak leaders who would have difficulty managing foreign and domestic policy issues, including communal unrest and pressures from state governments for a greater share of power. The result could be policy drift in New Delhi. At best, such a trend would result in a gradual devolution of decisionmaking to India’s states that would help restore balance to India’s overcentralized federal system. At worst, such developments could lead to the fragmentation of the Congress Party, a rapid, destabilizing shift of power from New Delhi to ill-prepared state governments, or even a de facto leadership vacuum that would paralyze New Delhi’s ability to respond to domestic or foreign threats.

The perceived vulnerability of the Congress Party probably would spark efforts by the disparate non-Communist opposition parties to unite to challenge the Congress Party at the polls. The new Congress Party leadership could decide to renew its popular mandate by holding elections...
before 1989, or it could be forced to call elections if factional splits deprived it of its parliamentary majority. The opposition might win power, but prospects for a durable coalition government are poor.

A military coup is unlikely. But the progressive erosion of boundaries between civil and military authority—brought on by the military’s steadily growing involvement in internal security—is increasing the likelihood that senior officers would temporarily assume power if they believed civilian leaders were failing to contain civil unrest or were violating the Constitution.

Regardless of the succession process, Rajiv’s death would cause setbacks in India’s efforts to improve relations with other South Asian states. Even a handpicked successor probably would lack the political clout required to counter foot-dragging by Indian bureaucrats attuned to the confrontational approach favored by Indira Gandhi, especially toward Pakistan. Nor can we rule out the possibility that a weak successor would deliberately reverse Rajiv’s policies and provoke confrontations with neighboring states in hopes of uniting the Indian public behind him against a putative external threat. In any case, a series of rapid leadership changes or protracted instability in India would increase Islamabad’s concern over a potential Indian nuclear weapons program and increase the likelihood of a nuclear arms race.

The Soviets currently lack the capability to affect the succession and—except in the unlikely event that New Delhi adopted anti-Soviet policies—most likely would continue their pragmatic policy of supporting the incumbent Prime Minister rather than the small, ineffectual Indian Communist parties. Moscow, however, would reconsider its stance if any Indian leader adopted policies that, in the Soviet view, reflected rising US influence. An example would be an Indian decision to demand publicly a Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Even if there is no change in India’s policies, without Rajiv’s evenhanded stance toward the superpowers and his firm control of the Congress Party’s left wing, the Soviets would certainly increase their efforts to meddle in domestic politics. Protracted instability would provide new opportunities for Moscow to curry influence in the party and possibly to tip the balance toward the left wing in factional struggles for national leadership, to the detriment of Indo-US relations.
Regardless of who succeeded Rajiv, his death would represent a major loss to US interests. Rajiv’s willingness and ability to turn away from his mother’s negative approach to Washington have been critical to the warming and expansion of Indo-US ties. Although a major tilt toward Moscow is unlikely, a relatively weak successor probably would be more demanding of the United States on bilateral economic and political issues, more responsive to pressure from leftwing elements at home, and more susceptible to the influence of Soviet propaganda campaigns targeting Washington’s policies in South Asia.
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India After Rajiv

The Setting: Rajiv's Auspicious Start

Although some of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's policies will continue to encounter serious resistance over the next several years, we believe his dominance of the Indian political scene is secure until at least the end of his party's term of office in December 1989, barring his incapacitation or death. His personal popularity, coupled with the absence of other nationally recognized leaders in the Congress Party and the disarray of the opposition, makes a successful political challenge at the national level unlikely over the next several years. If current trends continue, Rajiv can be expected to continue his party's hold on power after the 1989 election, although perhaps with a reduced parliamentary majority.

Having affirmed his mandate in December 1984 with an unprecedented parliamentary majority, Rajiv Gandhi has won kudos at home and abroad for a first year's performance that has transcended the unique initial advantages conferred on him by:

- His clear status as heir apparent to his mother, Indira Gandhi.
- The dearth of rival claimants.
- The circumstances of his mother's death, which made stability a prime concern at the time of the election and dynastic continuity an asset.

Indian commentators have noted that voters welcomed his pledges to reduce communal strains widely blamed on his mother's policies, to reinvoke the Indian Government and economy, and to prepare India for the 21st century. With the defeated opposition mute and in disarray and the fractious Congress Party grateful for the unexpected restoration of its crumbling electoral fortunes, Rajiv has enjoyed an extended political honeymoon in which to exercise what he has described as a unique mandate for change.

In his first year, Gandhi, in our view, has largely kept his electoral promises, taking steps to:

- Defuse Sikh unrest in Punjab and anti-immigrant violence in Assam.
- Promote acquisition of selected foreign technology, chiefly from the West, with a view to building India into a major modern power.
- Release what he called the pentup drive for efficiency and productivity in India's overregulated private sector by deregulating and freeing it from political meddling, while retaining the government's overall control of the economy.
- Stem governmental corruption, increase bureaucratic efficiency and accountability, and speed decision-making by placing close associates in key positions to short-circuit cumbersome lines of authority.

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• Mediate a resolution of the conflict between militant Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sinhalese-dominat
ed government in Colombo in hopes of blunting a source of regional instability as well as heading off

• Warm relations with Pakistan, in part by promoting high-level discussions on such contentious bilateral

issues as nuclear tensions and border skirmishes in Kashmir.  

Gandhi also has sought, without deviating from India's longtime nonaligned stance, to add balance to
India's relations with the superpowers by improving ties to Washington while retaining its close relation-

ship with Moscow. His nonideological view of the West, in our view, has raised New Delhi's threshold of

sufferance for differences with the United States on regional and international issues and has opened new,

although limited, opportunities for cooperation in areas ranging from trade and joint aid to Africa to
counterterrorism and narcotics control.  

Unresolved Problems:
India's Fragile Political Institutions

Despite our belief that Gandhi will be able to main-
th his position for the next four years, we believe that his popularity and the success of most of his early

policy initiatives have masked the continuing erosion of institutions that underpin Indian political stabili-

The weakness of the Congress Party's grassroots

organizations, in our view, already has led to the

party's defeat in several states by strong regional

parties representing local interests. These parties are
demanding the return to the states of economic and

political power lost to the national government under

Indira Gandhi through constitutional amendments

and New Delhi's gradual encroachment. State Con-
gress and opposition politicians alike advocate greater

fiscal autonomy for the states. Opposition state gov-

germents, however, are particularly concerned about

New Delhi's power to appoint governors and other

senior officials and the President's prerogative to
dissolve a popularly elected state government by

placing a state under central government control.  

In our view, Gandhi has given no clear indication that

he plans to devolve authority. We believe his perspec-
tive on these issues has changed since he came to

power, perhaps because he has concluded that he
cannot make sufficient headway on his ambitious agenda for India if he loosens his control of the party

and government. He no longer stresses—as he did
when he was general secretary of the party—the need

to strengthen the party's grassroots and to transfer

care of state units, preferring instead to appeal
directly to the electorate. Like his mother, he dele-
gates few decisions to other party leaders—leading

the US Embassy to conclude that his approach to
decisionmaking has made him, in effect, even more an
avtocrat than she was. Far from encouraging new

leadership in the states, he has brought able young

politicians from the state capitals to staff government

ministries.
We believe Gandhi’s actions on two key issues in the next several months will provide an initial measure of his willingness to alter this pattern:

- If he keeps his promise to proceed with party elections in April and desists from trying to manipulate the selection of candidates, this would imply that he is willing to allow the emergence of state leaders with their own base of political support—despite the risk that one of these could eventually challenge him.

- Similarly, a decision to yield the party presidency would nominally disperse authority, albeit only in the national organization.

In our view, Rajiv’s promise at the Congress Party centenary celebrations in December to eradicate corruption and inefficiency in the party and his subsequent appointment of new senior party officials presage further changes at the national level but not necessarily significant decentralization of party decisionmaking. We share the view of some US academics that, while Rajiv might follow through with party elections, he is unlikely to give up his position as party president and probably would be unresponsive to the argument that current arrangements rely too heavily on the survival of a single man.

The Threat of Assassination: Stability in Jeopardy

In our view, there is at least an even chance in the next several years of an assassination, most likely by extremist Sikhs or disgruntled Kashmiri Muslims who have targeted Rajiv. We believe the dogged determination and fanaticism of these groups, together with weaknesses in Indian security capabilities, make Gandhi one of the world’s most vulnerable leaders:

- Beginning in June 1984, when Indira ordered an Army assault against the sacred Golden Temple where Sikh extremists were headquartered, militant Sikhs repeatedly—and in some cases, publicly—vowed to kill Indira and Rajiv, their relatives and associates, and moderate Sikhs who cooperated with them. Six months later, Indira died at the hands of her Sikh bodyguards. The government’s alleged mishandling of and complicity in anti-Sikh riots that followed outraged even moderate Sikhs and fueled the extremists’ case against Rajiv. Since then, they have assassinated leading members of his party—including two close friends—as well as moderate Sikh leaders despite special measures taken to protect them.

- We believe the threat by Kashmiri nationalists, who in 1984 assassinated an Indian diplomat in the United Kingdom, to kill Rajiv in retaliation for the alleged repression of their people by the Gandhi family also should be taken seriously.

- A fanatical Hindu convinced that Gandhi’s concessions to militant minorities have come at the expense of his coreligionists might also make such an attempt.1

Although we expect India’s parliamentary democracy to survive Gandhi’s assassination and the Congress Party to retain power for the rest of its term, several factors make us doubt that the country would weather the shock with as much ease as it did Indira’s assassination. These factors include:

- The likely impact of a second assassination on public confidence in the capabilities of the country’s security forces.

- The absence of both an obvious successor and an established procedure for selecting one—a situation likely to encourage a scramble for the succession in

1 Such concerns led a Hindu fanatic in 1948 to assassinate Mohandas Gandhi—revered by most Indians for his efforts to ease Hindu-Muslim tensions as well as for his role in securing India’s independence.
the Congress Party, foster future challenges to the legitimacy of any successor, and reduce public confidence in and respect for New Delhi’s authority.

- The weakness of Congress-led state governments, which lack the autonomy and credibility either to bolster a national leader or to arbitrate a succession dispute. Even so, Congress as well as opposition state leaders probably would see protracted jockeying for national leadership as an opportunity to force the issue of states’ rights under circumstances in which a rational reallocation of authority would be unlikely.

- Gandhi’s personalistic style of leadership, which, in our view, greatly increases the potential for disruption of government and party alike if he should depart the political scene abruptly. Moreover, his strong personal role in formulating policy has contributed to the widespread public perception—noted by Indian commentators—that New Delhi’s policies derive almost exclusively from his initiative. Were Gandhi to die suddenly, this perception could spark a crisis of public confidence in the government and also could encourage his opponents to challenge its policies.

- The volatility of communal, ethnic, and caste tensions, particularly in Punjab, Assam, and Gujarat. We believe Rajiv’s death—and the perception that his successor was preoccupied and susceptible to pressure—would spark further demands for concessions from militant minority groups. A successor who lacked Rajiv’s popular mandate and his confidence would have difficulty deflecting such challenges without heavy use of security measures.

Aftermath of an Assassination: Most Likely Outcome

Immediate Reaction
We believe that public reaction to the ethnic or religious identity of the assassin would initially overshadow the succession issue. US diplomats in New Delhi and US academic experts believe that Rajiv’s death at the hands of a Sikh or a Muslim would trigger reprisals by conservative Hindus throughout the north, where members of these minority groups are concentrated, as Indira’s murder by her Sikh bodyguards did against their coreligionists in November 1984. It also could—in the case of a Sikh assassin—cause Sikh refugees once more to flood into their home state of Punjab. Although we believe that this is the most likely outcome, particularly in light of Rajiv’s popularity, there is a slim possibility that public memory of the bitterness engendered by the violence in 1984 might mute such reactions among Hindus to a second assassination. In the case of a Hindu assassin, public attention probably would turn quickly to the choice of a new national leader.

Whatever the circumstances of an assassination, the developments after Indira’s death probably would prompt President Singh or his successor to set in motion preventive security measures—at a minimum, placing the armed forces on alert and deploying Army and paramilitary troops to likely trouble spots. He might decide to impose a state of emergency until after Gandhi’s funeral and delay the installation of an interim prime minister.

Interim Successor
Unless Rajiv had explicitly named a successor—as we doubt he will, in light of the Indian cultural distaste for spelling out the implications of death—the President probably would appoint an interim prime minister in the hope of postponing the likely struggle for power within the party until domestic tranquility was restored. The President probably would choose a man who he judges—for whatever reason—would not aspire to be permanent prime minister. Human Resources Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao or Finance Minister V. P. Singh, both respected politicians with unblemished reputations, would be likely candidates. The caretaker government probably would focus almost exclusively on restoring public order and confidence.

If faced with severe communal violence, the President could decide to postpone appointment of even an interim prime minister and turn instead to the military for help in restoring civil order. The President
Other Potential Causes of a Sudden Leadership Change

Although we believe assassination is the major near-term threat to Rajiv’s tenure, any of several other events could cause his abrupt departure from the political scene before 1989:

- His death from natural causes or by accident.

- A decision by Rajiv to resign out of frustration with the difficulty of achieving the goals he has set for himself. We see no signs of this and believe it would be out of character.

- A decision by Rajiv to leave public life on the grounds that it imposed unacceptable risks and strains on his family.

We suspect, however, that Rajiv would calculate—as we do—that he and his kin would be targets for extremist violence even if he left public office.

- A disastrous series of political missteps in the next several years could discredit Gandhi and cause him to step down or be forced out by party rivals who have yet to emerge. We believe the long-term consequences of such a scenario would resemble those of an assassination, but we would expect to have advance indications if Rajiv were in political trouble—for example, evidence of growing factional divisions, widespread and violent public protests against his policies, and a major resurgence of opposition activity.

alone has the power to declare a military state of emergency—as distinct from the civilian state of emergency declared by the President at Indira Gandhi’s insistence in 1977—and to call out the armed forces in times of crisis. If this were to occur, we believe Rajiv’s first civilian successor would face an uphill struggle to establish his credibility as a peacekeeper.

Nehru, a Leading Candidate

No matter how Rajiv departed the political scene, once the succession issue came to the fore, we would expect Rajiv’s third cousin and confidant, Arun Nehru, to press his claim to represent the Nehru-Gandhi legacy in what otherwise is virtually an open field. US diplomats point to Rajiv’s elevation of Nehru to a key position in the Home Affairs Ministry as a possible signal that Nehru is being positioned to replace Gandhi, should the need arise. Unless Nehru had Gandhi’s indisputable endorsement, we would expect him to encounter resistance from other close associates of Rajiv, including Arun Singh and V. P. Singh.

Even with Rajiv’s blessing, Nehru’s reputation as a powerful but controversial power broker and his efforts to exploit his family ties probably would revive the protests that both opposition and Congress politicians frequently advanced with reference to Rajiv before Indira’s death against dynastic rule in a democracy. We believe Nehru would be more vulnerable than Rajiv to such objections.

We concur with the view of at least one US academic expert on South Asia that, without Rajiv to push him forward, Nehru would have difficulty winning cooperation from many Congress Party officials and gaining power. Although Embassy reporting indicates that Nehru has a growing base of support within the party, its durability is untested. US diplomats report that many Congress politicians believe they have lost status and prerogatives since Rajiv came to power as a result of his disdain for party politics. We would expect some of these politicians to view the transition to a new leadership as an opportunity to recoup their losses, which some doubtless attribute in part to Arun Nehru’s influence. We cannot exclude the possibility, suggested by US observers, that Nehru might react to resistance from within the party by trying to persuade paramilitary or military leaders to help him gain or retain the prime ministership—a move unlikely to succeed, in our view.
Rival Claimants
Although Nehru is the only obvious potential successor of national stature, any of the party’s many experienced functionaries and politicians—including, for example, the recently appointed vice president of the party, Arjun Singh—could make a bid for national leadership. Sonia Gandhi’s Italian heritage probably would disqualify her from serious consideration as a successor, but some Congress politicians might propose her as a candidate. The long tradition of drawing India’s top leadership from the northern Hindi-speaking states probably would tip the odds in favor of contenders from that region. In any case, street violence could erupt between followers of rival claimants.

The President might judge it prudent, given his weak political position, to sidestep the factional quarrels and delegate the choice of a prime minister to the Congress Party’s Parliamentary Committee. The committee, in turn, might decide to foreclose the issue and ensure continuity by retaining the interim prime minister or another ranking member of the Cabinet in the position.

Domestic Policy Implications
Although we would expect few major shifts in India’s policies following an assassination, several of Gandhi’s domestic programs and achievements would be vulnerable were he to pass from the scene before 1989. Crucial details of the accords Gandhi has negotiated with Sikh and Assamese dissidents remain to be worked out, and serious tensions could revive. If Arun Nehru succeeded Gandhi, his experience as junior Home Affairs Minister with responsibility for internal security would help him to contain, if not avoid, heightened conflict in Punjab and Assam.

Without Gandhi’s personal authority and commitment, his fledgling economic liberalization program could easily succumb to controversy over its alleged bias in favor of India’s small middle and upper-middle classes and private sector and the priority it places on importing high-technology items even at the cost of deferring Indira’s goal of national self-sufficiency. Some Indian commentators note unease with the scope and speed of Rajiv’s intended changes even among middle-class individuals and successful corporations that stand to gain most from many aspects of deregulation. As a result of these factors, even Rajiv’s close associates—who, in our view, would be disposed
to push his liberalization policies forward if they had a free hand—would have to yield some ground to opposition politicians and Congress traditionalists who oppose it.

Alternative Outcomes

Although the Congress Party probably could retain power under a new leader until the end of its term in 1989, any of several plausible developments in the wake of an assassination could adversely affect the party’s prospects, resulting ultimately in a change of government or even a power vacuum. Precursors of such major changes might include:

- An extended succession struggle or rapid sequence of leadership changes in the Congress Party and/or in the senior ranks of government.
- Fractional splits in the Congress Party.
- A growing perception that the government was failing to address immediate problems—for example, to check severe communal, regional, or ethnic strife or to maintain adequate external defense.
- Increasingly widespread and unpunished abuses of civilians by police, paramilitary, or military personnel engaged in domestic security duties.
- A serious economic blunder that caused rapid increases in the price of food or other basic commodities.

An Opposition Government?

We believe a sharp decline in the fortunes and public standing of the Congress Party would stimulate the fractious leaders of India’s disparate opposition parties to unite to pose a credible electoral challenge to the Congress Party, and this might bring a coalition government to power. The opportunity would arise if the new Congress leadership decided to test its popularity by calling a national election before 1989. Alternatively, if factional splits deprived Congress of its parliamentary majority, the President would be constitutionally required to dissolve parliament and call an election. The opposition probably could even capitalize on adverse economic developments beyond the government’s control—such as a significant decline in the standard of living sparked by drought. Although such problems could emerge during Rajiv’s stewardship, we judge that virtually any other Congress leader would be more vulnerable to perceived missteps in key policy areas, a distinction that would be clear to watchful opposition figures.

In our view, the events of 1977, when public reaction against the excesses of Indira Gandhi’s emergency rule galvanized the opposition to unite in the Janata Front, demonstrate how such a scenario could evolve. Despite the well-known incompatibilities of its leaders and the lack of a coherent platform, the pooling of protest votes against Indira delivered an overwhelming electoral victory to the Janata. A united opposition would be most likely to succeed in a bid to regain power if the Congress Party splintered. A splintering would decisively alter the electoral arithmetic that has repeatedly permitted it to carry national as well as state elections with only a plurality of the popular vote.

In our judgment, an opposition win would not necessarily ensure a smooth transition to a new government. Opposition unity probably would be more difficult to achieve than it was in 1977, in large part because, in the last several years, powerful regional opposition parties representing local interests in a single state have eclipsed the stagnant national opposition groups. The new regional opposition leaders generally lack political experience at the national level and have even less common ground than do their counterparts in the national parties. We believe rivalries among opposition leaders could slow or even prevent formation of a Cabinet. Were an extended deadlock to occur, the opposition might be compelled to concede failure and call a new election, perhaps returning the Congress Party to power by default.

Even if a victorious opposition coalition formed a government, disagreement over key issues—the management of the economy and of conflicting regional and communal demands, for example—could stalemate decisionmaking in New Delhi, resulting in a policy drift such as occurred under the 1977-79 Janata government. Such a drift could have beneficial
results if it allowed a gradual shift of decisionmaking from national to state governments, according to Indian political scientists.

A Political Leadership Vacuum
Although we believe that another leadership assassination is unlikely to cause a rapid breakdown in the resilient Indian political system, we cannot discount the possibility of a more catastrophic outcome—notably, the emergence of a leadership vacuum that no party or individual politician is well positioned to fill. Any combination of the following developments would greatly increase our concern that such a scenario was in store:

- Prolonged government inaction in the face of sharply increasing challenges by regional, ethnic, or communal groups. Faced with evidence of governmental incapacity to respond to civil strife or even to external security threats, the military, in our view, would at least consider stepping into meet the threat without authorization by the civilian government.

- A rapid shift of decisionmaking by default to unprepared state governments. Efforts by a weak national government to retrieve its authority from state and regional leaders are likely to be ill timed and clumsy, further complicating federal-state relations.

- Evidence that the Constitution was being violated—particularly by a leader who lacks widespread support.

- Flagrant manipulation of elections—national or state—by the national government.

- A prolonged national strike, whether instigated by the opposition or by labor unions.

- Unbridled dissension in the Congress Party government, leading to splits that would divide the party’s parliamentary majority and cause the government to fall from power, coupled with unsuccessful efforts by the opposition to unite.

Even if they did not result in a leadership vacuum, such developments could seriously erode national government authority and cause the breakdown of political norms that have prevailed since independence, to the detriment of India’s security. As the rules of politics changed, rival politicians might be tempted to turn to outside powers for financial and political support, thereby increasing the scope for meddling by foreign powers—particularly the Soviet Union—in India. A weak leader probably would try to deflect blame for domestic problems onto longtime foreign scapegoats, such as Pakistan or the United States, even at the cost of greater tensions between India and these countries.

The Changing Role of the Military: Prospects for a Coup
We believe that, short of a complete breakdown in civilian authority, there is little likelihood that the military—even a disgruntled coterie of military officers—will try to seize and retain power in the next several years. The Indian military remains wedded to its apolitical British legacy and generally has respected civilian authority. The Army’s self-image has been bolstered by its negative perception of military rule in neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh, where soldiers with the same British legacy are viewed as having violated their constitutional trust. Senior Army officials clearly voiced their discomfort with their unprecedented responsibilities for civil administration in Punjab following New Delhi’s crackdown against Sikh extremism in June 1984. The decentralized structure of the Indian military—whose three services lack joint regional commands—also militates against a military takeover, although progress toward Gandhi’s goal of overcoming command and control problems by creating a unified command will reduce this impediment.

Even so, we believe New Delhi’s growing reliance on the Army to perform domestic security duties, however unwillingly, already has weakened the boundary between civilian and military domains. This trend is increasing the odds of a military bid for greater influence in government decision making or even a provisional military takeover without civilian authorization. US academic experts surmise that the political
Why a Civilian Coup in India Is Unlikely

The very factors that make India difficult to govern also make it unlikely that one or more civilian leaders could seize and retain power in disregard of the existing political system, far less reshape the Indian political and social system as Khomeini did in Iran. To govern India, any prospective leader would need at a minimum to secure the support of the Army, the civil service, industrial and commercial leaders, and the growing middle class. He or she would also have to overcome the consensus among Indians that only their democratic political institutions are capable of mediating their national diversity:

- US experts on India note that the Army and civil service pride themselves on being upholders of the Constitution.

- Indian voters, particularly the growing middle class, are deeply committed to the Constitution, parliament, the apolitical court system, the multiparty system, and the free press—which limit the authority available to any national leader—and were quick to penalize Indira Gandhi at the polls in 1977 for transgressing acceptable bounds during the two-year-long state of emergency she imposed in 1975.

Other potential sources of authority and legitimacy are widely dispersed in the Indian setting. India has no unified national political, social, or religious hierarchy:

- Its political parties are loosely organized—with the exception of the cadre-based Communist parties—and are active almost exclusively at election time.

- Indians have conflicting loyalties to the diverse caste, class, religious, ethnic, regional, and occupational groups to which they simultaneously belong.

- The ethnic arithmetic by which rank-and-file government jobs as well as senior appointments are allocated to ensure equity and representativeness means that all India’s national institutions, including the civil service and the military, reflect these overlapping affiliations.

- Religious authority in the majority Hindu religion is dispersed among thousands of local priests, who—like their counterparts in the minority Sikh and Muslim religions—represent different sects and subsects.

- India has no central city. Its industrial and commercial base and elite are dispersed among several major urban centers.

Acumen and administrative experience gained by army officers have reduced their patience with the failure of the civilian leadership to head off communal, regional, and ethnic tensions before they reach crisis proportions—a judgment with which we agree. Senior military officers could well demand and secure a role in domestic crisis management on the basis of their experience. Such officers, however, probably would consider preempting the civilian national leadership, even temporarily, only as a last resort. We believe they would seize power only if convinced that the national government was illegitimate and incompetent—as evidenced, for example, by indisputable breaches of the Constitution or a failure to quell civil strife. Even then, the officers probably would act only if they felt certain of support from key economic and political groups, including the bureaucracy and industrial leaders, as well as from the public and their peers. Although we cannot rule out the possibility of a coup by junior or middle-level military personnel—spurred
perhaps by discontent with tolerance by senior officials of inept civilian leadership—we doubt that the perpetrators could retain power for long.

Despite these considerations, any of the following developments in conjunction with an unstable civilian leadership would lead us to revise our view that there is only a slight chance of a military coup in the near term:

- A marked increase in involvement by senior military officers in making foreign and domestic policy decisions.

- The emergence in the military of specific political allegiances—perhaps including pledges of loyalty by senior officers to individual political leaders or parties.

- Widespread and long-term ethnic tensions in the Army, especially if officers blamed them on civilian policies. Such tensions were evident following New Delhi’s crackdown on Sikh extremism in Punjab in summer 1984, when concern about the Army’s treatment of their coreligionists led some 2,000 Sikh soldiers to desert in northern India, who comprise about 10 percent of enlisted troops and over 20 percent of the officer corps.

We believe Army involvement in running the national government—whether short or long term—would significantly worsen prospects for India’s political stability. Although such involvement may be reversible, the further blurring of distinctions between civil and military authority would almost certainly increase the likelihood of future challenges by the military. We judge that anxiety about these prospects would prompt subsequent civilian governments to skew their priorities toward the military in an effort to appease it. Opposition parties might bid against each other and the government for the support of the military, further undermining the legitimacy of the electoral process.

In our view, military rule also would inflict serious damage on the integrity and perhaps the combat readiness of the Army. Army leaders could find their own attention and that of key officers divided between civil and military duties. Expanded civil responsibilities probably would result in the frequent interruption of training routines—a problem that has already arisen whenever Army troops have been deployed for domestic security duties. The onus of mediating ethnic, religious, and regional tensions across the country would deepen such divisions within the armed forces, strain discipline, and perhaps impair external defense capabilities.

Gandhi’s Assassination

Implications for Regional Issues

Although we doubt that the most likely successors to Rajiv would make major changes in India’s foreign policy, we would expect at least some setbacks—if only by default—in his efforts to change direction in important aspects of Indian foreign policy, including relations with neighboring states. In our view, Rajiv’s personal diplomacy has been critical to overcoming foot-dragging by bureaucrats accustomed to his mother’s confrontational approach to India’s relations with Pakistan and Sri Lanka. We judge that even a designated heir would lack the political leverage necessary to build on the progress achieved by Gandhi.

It is even possible that a weak national leader seeking to unite the Indian public behind him might welcome—or promote—a deterioration in India’s relations with other regional states as evidence of an immediate external threat. Such a leader might consider, for example, provoking border skirmishes with Pakistan to divert attention at home from unresolved problems.

A series of rapid leadership changes or protracted instability in India probably would increase Islamabad’s concerns about the prospect of an Indian nuclear weapon. In our view, such developments would aggravate existing tensions between the two sides, undercut the limited nuclear dialogue begun by Rajiv and Pakistani President Zia, and heighten the risk of a nuclear weapons race between India and Pakistan.
Implications for Relations With the USSR
We believe the Soviets lack the ability as well as the inclination to meddle with the succession in the next several years.

In our view, Moscow would be predisposed to continue its pragmatic policy of supporting the ruling party in New Delhi—which for all but two years since independence has been the Congress Party—rather than the two relatively ineffectual Indian Communist parties. Apparently satisfied with the benefits of good relations with a leading nonaligned state, Moscow has continued to show a high degree of tolerance for India's mixed economy and for its consistent rejection of Soviet requests for closer security ties under both Congress and Janata governments. Since Indira's return to power in 1980, Soviet support has persisted despite both the eclipse of the pro-Moscow left wing of the Congress Party and Rajiv's moves to bolster the private sector of the Indian economy, acquire Western technology, and open India to Western imports. The Soviets probably expect the bilateral relationship to endure in light of India's long-term reliance on Soviet weapons—sold on uniquely concessional terms—and its need to retain close relations with the Soviets to counter ties among the United States, China, and Pakistan.

Moscow would undoubtedly reconsider its stance toward India's leadership—including Rajiv or his successor—if it had indications of drastic changes in the relationship, such as Indian plans to abrogate the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty or to terminate abruptly purchases of Soviet arms. It would also view with concern changes in India's foreign policy that, in the Soviet view, clearly reflected rising US influence—for example, a sudden shift in India's vote on Afghanistan in the UN General Assembly from its customary abstention to a condemnation of the Soviet invasion.

Even so, we would expect the Soviets to proceed cautiously. Moscow probably would not attempt to arrange the ouster—far less the assassination—of an uncooperative leader. Rather, Soviet leaders would first attempt to dissuade New Delhi from its new course; then reduce support for the incumbent party, stepping up both its cultivation of ties to the opposition and its propaganda campaigns against the West in India; and finally perhaps threaten to slow or halt the flow of arms. A hostile Soviet stance against the incumbent leadership in New Delhi most likely would require, or perhaps would reflect, shifts in Moscow's policy toward other regional powers, including Pakistan and China.

Even if New Delhi did not alter its foreign policy, prolonged instability following a leadership assassination probably would offer Moscow new opportunities for involvement in and influence on Indian domestic politics. Moscow's options in India are currently limited. Rajiv's insistence that Congress Party officials hew to his own policy line has spurred the decline in influence of the party's left wing. Among non-Communist opposition leaders, only H. N. Bahuguna of the Lok Dal Party is both nationally known and pro-Soviet, but his support—confined to the Hindi-speaking states of the northern tier—has diminished sharply over the past three years. Without Rajiv's firm control and insistence on evenhandedness, Moscow would step up its efforts among both Congress Party and opposition politicians to secure favorable treatment and might even gain sufficient leverage to tip factional rivalries to pro-Soviet individuals.

Implications for the United States
We believe Gandhi's death would represent a significant blow to US interests, regardless of the circumstances of the succession. Rajiv's personal affinity for Western culture, his willingness to risk bold departures from his mother's policies, and his unprecedented political strength at home, in our view, have been key elements in the improvement of the tone and expansion of the scope of Indo-US ties. We doubt that any successor will combine these attributes with the commitment Rajiv has demonstrated to a range of domestic and regional policies congenial—or at least

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less inimical—to the United States, including moves toward economic liberalization and efforts at reducing tensions with Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

In our view, Rajiv’s death would herald at least a slight increase in anti-Americanism—though not necessarily in support for Moscow—in India. A US academic expert has pointed out that Rajiv’s personal popularity and large parliamentary majority have enabled him to counter without political penalty the widely noted predisposition of India’s middle and upper-middle classes to distrust Washington and to project a far less negative image of US intentions toward India than did his mother. Rajiv’s stance has been a key factor in reducing public criticism of the United States by press commentators and by Congress Party officials, according to US diplomats. Indian public opinion polls last spring registered the first significant improvement in the popular image of the United States in several years. In our view, no likely successor to Rajiv—including such favorably disposed individuals as V. P. Singh and Arun Singh—would be both as able and as willing to sustain such a trend.

We believe Indo-US relations could also suffer as a result of domestic political changes following Rajiv’s assassination under even the most optimistic assumptions about Indian stability. Under either a Congress or an opposition government, India might well experience a series of rapid leadership changes that could lead to:

- Uncertainty about who speaks for India.
- Dealings with leaders who represent overwhelmingly parochial regional interests, have little or no international experience, give little weight to foreign policy, or are anti-American or more broadly xenophobic.
- Fluctuations in New Delhi’s good will toward Washington and perhaps in its willingness to honor specific agreements made by Rajiv.
- Heightened tensions between India and its neighbors—specifically Pakistan and Sri Lanka—to the detriment of stability in South Asia.
- Increased uncertainty about the likelihood of India’s launching a nuclear weapons program in the next several years.

Although we do not expect a major tilt toward Moscow under any of the scenarios we have examined, a relatively weak successor to Gandhi probably would be more critical of Washington’s handling of bilateral relations, more responsive to criticism by leftist elements of perceived efforts by the United States to influence India’s policies, and more vulnerable to the effects of Soviet propaganda campaigns targeted at Washington’s role in South Asia. If pressed to choose between New Delhi’s longtime relationship with Moscow and the potential benefits of closer ties to Washington, such a leader probably would react by inching away from the United States and perhaps moving closer to the Soviet Union.

Beyond the obvious implications of the demise of the world’s largest democracy, the impact of a military coup on US interests is unclear. A military government, in our view, would be less inclined to seek through diplomatic channels to reduce tensions with Pakistan and Sri Lanka than would most likely civilian administrations in India.
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