INTRODUCTION

The turbulent and curious history of India-Pakistan relations makes it one of the most intriguing bilateral relationships in the modern history. Having passed seventy years of independence both the countries are locked into a confrontational matrix. This rivalry spans over historical, cultural and socio-political discourse. The contradictory rather belligerent policy postures towards one another have plagued bilateral relations. The strategic and security domain has further cemented this enmity. High scales and low scale escalations between both the states contributed distrust, suspicion and security dilemma in the ever perplexed equation of mutual hostility. This rivalry is ending within no near sight. The foreign policy dispensations had been prone to confrontation always. This pattern of relationship is crystallizing into a volatile and unsettled frame of reference. The reciprocal, regressive and reactionary nature of this relationship makes it more arbitrary and inconsistent. The longstanding conflicts serve as an impetus to this configuration of animosity. The broader contours of South Asian security pivots around the essential nature of India-Pakistan relations. The embroiled pattern of relationship between both the countries is compounding the precarious regional security environment.

Problem Statement

India and Pakistan have divergent ideological orientations, and the formation of Pakistan on communal lines embittered the relations. The contradictory ideals of democracy and secularism in India and Islam and the two nation theory for Pakistan stemmed out of pre-independence struggle. It marked a shaky start since the beginning. The foreign policy of a state is the reflection of its priorities beyond territorial jurisdiction and is guided by national interest. It is a broader framework of the objectives of a state and means to achieve them. States imply different tools to achieve their foreign policy goals. The interplay of structural variables and an impulse of anticipated outcomes define the foreign policy posture of a state. The course of foreign policy action for every state is different based on its capabilities. The determinants of foreign policy are also different for every state. India's foreign policy in recent decades reflects India's status as rising power and its multilateral engagements. India amid its rapid development and economic prosperity has come in the center of the attention in
past two decades. Its foreign policy orientation is trying to be in commensuration with its trajectory of emerging power. Globally India is receiving much attention given its consumerist economy, functional democracy, and rich cultural traits. India has overcome the sluggish and archaic image of a postcolonial state. India envisages itself in the bracket of a major power and intends to compete with the advanced and developed countries. It is also seeking a global and regional influence and wants to have a proactive foreign policy.

The significance of domestic politics in foreign policymaking has been signified in past a few decades in international relations. A country's foreign policy is the reflection of the domestic behavior of a state at the external level. The domestic structure of India, on the other hand, presents a diverse and heterogeneous standpoint. Historically Indian polity exhibited three dominant themes secularism, nationalism, and democracy. Indian National Congress, the forerunner political party in India, remained espoused to these ideals. This secularism strengthens the composite culture which Congress believes is a civilizational trait of Indian polity. On the contrary, Hindu nationalism is an alternative rather fierce rebuttal of secularism and composite culture. It offers Hindu communalist variant of nationalism and counterweighs secularism with the ideals of the Hindu majority. These two dominant discourses shape the broader contours of Indian polity. Along with this India also experience competing views, issues of minorities, central and regional political parties and emerging issues of regionalism. All these factors collectively become domestic undercurrents towards foreign policy decision-making.

Pakistan remains a predicament for India. The equation of India's relationship with Pakistan limits India's foreign policy ambitions. In the meanwhile, the hostile domestic perception of Pakistan in India makes it relevant and inescapable. The deeply grounded rivalry with Pakistan is cultural, religious and historical. Its expressions are a hindrance and persistent consternation for India. India's foreign policy outlook towards Pakistan speaks volume of this mutual antagonism. The event-specific trajectories foster the hostility and subsequent pursuit of foreign policy choices that trigger more confrontation at political and social level. The research undertaken aims to study and explore the theory and the practice of India's foreign policy towards Pakistan. It tries to address the changing themes and patterns in Indian foreign policy vis-à-vis
Pakistan. The research takes a holistic picture of India's policy towards Pakistan and then attempts to dissect the critical narratives on the pursuit of foreign policy choices by Indian nationalists and Hindu nationalists. It presents a detailed anecdote of the etymological origin and underlying theoretical patterns of both the dominant discourses in Indian domestic landscape.

The research undertaken is unique in two ways. It is a theoretical study of Indian foreign policy through the domestic lens. Foreign policy is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of international relations whereas competing discourses fall in the domain of political science. This research attempts to conjoin the academic boundaries of international relations and political science. It endeavors to study the foreign policy construction of India through the pretext of Indian nationalism and Hindu nationalism. It is an interdisciplinary research which addresses the broader outlook of Indian foreign policy, narrows it down to Pakistan and envisions it in the domestic purview and further splits it down to the Indian National Congress and Bharatya Janta Party. It attempts to explore the divergent patterns in the foreign policy ostentation of INC and BJP towards Pakistan.

Significance of Research

This research is significant for the understanding of domestic undercurrent of Indian policy towards Pakistan. It is a rigorous academic endeavor to understand India's Pakistan policy through the party-centric view, ideological disposition and national impetus. It offers a fresh perspective on India-Pakistan relations through their historical and sociological lineage. It tries to understand the cognitive and normative discourse of Indian foreign policy vis-à-vis Pakistan. The anecdotal explanation of India Pakistan relations and prospective scenarios will be hugely beneficial for the learners working in this field. It will be a useful study for the students of Indian foreign policy, India-Pakistan relations, BJP, Indian National Congress and India's domestic milieu.

Research Questions

- What are the major competing discourses in India regarding Pakistan and how are they serving as the domestic sources of foreign policy?
• What is the historical and sociological construct of India-Pakistan relations, and how does it impact India’s approach towards Pakistan?
• How Congress and BJP’s governments differ in their foreign policy dispensation towards Pakistan?
• What are the divergent patterns and responses in the practice of India’s foreign relations vis-à-vis Pakistan and what is the future of India-Pakistan relations?

Hypothesis

The impact of Pakistan on India's foreign relations is very prominent, and Pakistan holds a crucial position in India's foreign policy matrix. There is a significant divergence in the choice of foreign policy actions in Congress led governments and BJP’s ruling dispensations.

Research Methodology

This study is based on qualitative research and followed an open-ended approach to consider how ideational factors influence the decision-making and reflects in India's policy towards Pakistan. The researcher tried to employ how the perceptions of Indian National Congress and Bharatya Janta Party influence their response towards Pakistan. Dealing with the intangible factor and its impact on Indian policy was quite challenging. The researcher built a comprehensive picture of India-Pakistan relations through the available record and published material. The textual analysis of the available policy documents, critical statements and speeches were made to interpret the precarious course of India's policy towards Pakistan. Indian Ministry of External Affairs in 2012 published a massive volume on India Pakistan relations, but that was not enough to suffice the need for primary data. Amid the confrontational nature of India-Pakistan relations, the necessary record was not accessible. It triggered the need for extensive semi-structured open-ended interviews to develop the primary insights. It included interviews with academics, policy experts, think tank researchers and people working on the same thematic areas.

The absence of academic intelligentsia on this topic in Pakistan was a great challenge. Amid visa denial to India, the researcher traveled to the United
Kingdom to carry out the requisite interviews. Emails were sent to the relevant scholars to know their opinion and perspective on the said topic. The in-depth discussions and personal interviews developed insights. Some personal insights fill empirical gaps in the literature. Given the complexity of foreign policy-making process in India and existence of domestic landscape capable of influencing the decisions, the views on the Indian foreign policy decisions towards Pakistan are not homogenous. These views are competing and serve as domestic sources of foreign policy. Nonetheless, the governmental factor is decisively important in foreign policy decision-making process. In fact, it drives the process, but it overwhelmingly relies on domestic context. The decision-makers are constrained to take decisions concordant to domestic impulse. The approach of BJP and Congress towards Pakistan is different. This study tries to dissect the point of divergence in Pakistan policy between both the dominant political parties when they ascend to power.

Working on Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan being in Pakistan was a great challenge. The volatile nature of the relationship between both the states makes this task even more challenging. The unavailability of record and no access to the primary documents, policy memos, and correspondence between both the countries compounded the limitations. The confidentiality of the most of the primary resources made this task pushing a rock uphill. The denial of visa access to India debarred the researcher making useful and crucial interviews. It forced the researcher to rely significantly on scarcely available primary resources, secondary sources and personal insights employed under methodological rigor. The research tried to overcome the daunting challenges and the limitations to present a new narrative on Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan.

At the qualitative level, the primary consulted data includes official and non-official documentation, archives, personal interviews, policymakers' memories, autobiographies, speeches, research service reports, conference proceedings, data released by official think tanks and state subsidiary organizations. This study uses direct quotations from the policymakers, party leaders, and officials to comprehend and understand the convergences and divergences of BJP and Congress to India's Pakistan policy. It will also cover semi-structured interviews of experts, scholars, and academics working on South Asia in general and India-Pakistan in particular. Concerning secondary sources,
extensive literature is available on the foreign policies of India and its concomitant themes and variables. However, the researcher intends to build on the prominent theoretical and empirical narratives relevant to the subject.

**Data Collection**

Data Collection includes the documents released by Ministry of External Affairs of India, Indian Lok Sabha Secretariat, Indian and Election Commission Website. Foreign Service Institute, Indian Council for World Affairs, Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Vivekananda International Foundation, India Foundation, and South Asia Analysis Group were also of great help. Center for Policy Research, Strategic Foresight Group, the Observer Research Foundation, and Brookings India office, Carnegie Endowment, Indian Express, The Times of India, Hindustan Times and *The Diplomat* also contributed towards research findings. The study design has mentioned these primary resources in the end annexures and secondary data in the draft with proper quotations and reference notes.

**Literature Review**

The academic scholarship on Indian foreign policy is vibrant. Different researchers, academics, and scholars have produced a bulk of literature on Indian foreign policy and its contemporary issues. The domain of India's economic growth, its status as a rising power, its relationship with other countries of the world and its approach towards regional conflict resolution offer array of books and articles. The intriguing relationship between India and Pakistan which has many dimensions; security, strategy, economy and nuclear has also contributed opulently to the theoretical body of literature. The domestic politics of India, its constitutional structure, electoral politics, political parties, and issues of ethnicity, identity, and federalism have been extensively researched and have an enormous scholarship available.

The literature on India's relations with Pakistan has three broad categorizations. The first category looks at the general and specific orientation of India-Pakistan relations. It addresses the sources of confrontation which catalyze the rivalry and also jots down the prospective scenarios where India and Pakistan can cooperate with one another and pave the way for sustainable peace in the
region. The second category deals with the Indian foreign policy and its tenets exhaustively and sees Pakistan along as one of the variants in India's broader ambit of foreign policy. The third category of the literature looks at Pakistan through the prism of ideological orientation and state enterprise. It focuses on the political niceties and nuances in the choice of actions and tries to generalize the mutual equation on the understanding of this domestic context.

Three theoretical paradigms mostly explicate the posture of India-Pakistan relations and the enduring rivalry between both the countries. These are Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. Realism envisages the struggle and the maximization of power as a root-cause of the rivalry. On the contrary, liberals identify the prospects of cooperation and trade to develop a link of interdependence, which could reduce and minimize the intensification of rivalry. Constructivists primarily emphasize on the context, perceptions, and ideas and reject the role of material forces and assert ideas and identity as the explanatory sources. The constructivists mainly define India-Pakistan relations within the given context of historical images and the pattern of interaction between both the states. This research uses the tents of constructivism to explain the historical-sociological construct of India-Pakistan relations and relies on neoclassical realism to address the vitality of domestic politics and its impact on Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan. These three theoretical positions contribute to three schools of thought on India-Pakistan relations which are confrontationists, cooperationists, and status quoists. The realists are the advocates of confrontation and precisely focus on the military and strategic casting, installations and development of both the states and predict the relations of both the states on the premise of technological and defense build-up. The literature on nuclear program of both the states, nuclear postures, conventional strength, space weapons and strategic and defense modernization falls in the broader pretext of this realist approach. The cooperationists rely on liberal approach and underpin cooperation, trade, economic relations, regional integration, visa liberalization, most favored nation, trade agreements and dependency as the major themes of literature that underscores India-Pakistan's relational equation. The constructivist approach is a status quoist approach that appraises the role of identity, history, perception and images in setting up a normative discourse which becomes a prism in which both the countries envisage one another. This frame of reference rarely changes
considering the pattern of interaction. This research since primarily and fundamentally is an interplay of India's domestic politics and foreign policy, so it more focuses on the dedicated literature on Indian foreign policy.

In the realm of Indian foreign policy three broader and dominant themes are addressed in the existing literature which include the narratives on India foreign policy and its outlook, India’ relations with other states and issues in India’s course of foreign policy action. The first broader theme addresses India’s foreign policy ideals, determinants, its evolution and successes and failures of India's foreign policy. India's rise as an economic and global power also falls in the broader domain of this stated theme. The second theme has plenty of literature on India's country wise relations. It includes India' relations with the USA, USSR, China and other countries of the world. India's chequered relationship with Pakistan falls in this realm. The third theme assesses India's pursuit of foreign policy choices, constraints on decision-making and the factors which significantly impact India's course of foreign policy action. Domestic politics come into this third category. It offers a critical evaluation of India's foreign policy as well.

Indian Ministry of External Affairs annually publishes a massive volume on India's foreign relations. The Lok Sabha Secretariat also maintains the record of the debates which are very crucial to understanding India's foreign policy. Different authors and researchers offer valuable insights on Indian foreign policy. Appadorai pioneered the study of domestic roots of Indian foreign policy. He covered the era from 1947-1972.\(^1\) Pande underscores national experience of India and the historical contingency as the most crucial variables to understand Indian foreign policy framework.\(^2\) Ganguly tries to address Indian foreign policy through three levels of analysis and takes an exhaustive look at the evolution of Indian foreign policy.\(^3\) Jha looks at the domestic imperatives in Indian foreign policy.\(^4\) Ganguly and Mukerji again evaluate the massive turnaround in Indian foreign policy after the 1980s and take a detailed look at policies adopted by Indian

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4 Nalini Kant Jha, *Domestic Imperatives in India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2002)
governments leading the rise of India as a major global player.\(^5\) Menon looks at the crucial decisions made by India in the realm of foreign policy decision-making and also dissects the choices available at the time of decision-making.\(^6\) Bajpai and Pant highlight the critical issues in Indian foreign policy and traces the change which India has undergone in its foreign policy.\(^7\) Ogden discusses the key dimensions of Indian foreign policy and combines theoretical insights with the case studies to understand the trajectory of Indian foreign policy and its rise as a dominant power and its multilateral interaction with other countries of the world.\(^8\) Mohan looks at the transformation of India from a peripheral nation to a significant player in the global politics and underscores the renewed India's foreign policy after the 90s in the new wave of economic globalization.\(^9\) Pant again discusses the broader outlook of Indian foreign policy and highlights the trends and issues in Indian foreign policy and assesses the transformation in Indian foreign policy.\(^10\) Gujral who served as India's Prime Minister and Minister External Affairs jots down a foreign policy vision for India and asserts that India will never compromise on its national interest. Along with this, he highlights India's strengths to play a significant role in world affairs.\(^11\) Sikri assesses India’s foreign policy options and presents a mechanism enabling India to retain autonomy of action in its foreign policy.\(^12\) Yashwant Sinha. Former Minister for External Affairs of India gives the first-hand account of Indian foreign policy, its choices and the issues which Indian foreign policy confronts and also highlights a future vision for Indian foreign policy.\(^13\)

\(^6\) Shivshankar Menon, *Choices inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016)
\(^7\) Kanti P. Bajpai & Harsh V. Pant, *India's Foreign Policy: A Reader (Critical Issues in Indian Politics)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)
\(^8\) Chris Ogden, *Indian Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Polity Publishers, 2013)
\(^11\) Inder Kumar Gujral, *A Foreign Policy for India* (External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1998)
\(^12\) Rajiv Sikri, *Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy* (London: Sage Publications, 2013)
\(^13\) Yashwant Sinha, *Facets of Indian Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 2003)
This research primarily falls under the second theme of India's country wise relations. As mentioned earlier the scholarship on India's relationship with Pakistan has mainly dealt with the conflictual nature of India Pakistan relations. The bulk of dedicated literature is available on strategic and military competition between both the states. It further discusses the wars and disputes in the context of the bilateral relationship. For instance, Burke examines the nature of India and Pakistan's foreign policies and their performance on the world stage.14 Ganguly focuses on the clear ideological commitments in India and Pakistan as a source of unending rivalry between both the states.15 Hiro discusses the narrative on India Pakistan relations and the evolution of political confrontation between both the countries.16 Raghavan illustrates India’s strange and obsessive relationship with Pakistan and explains the relevance of Pakistan for India’s policy framework.17 Cohen explains how India and Pakistan will continue embarking on the pattern of rivalry that has historical, cultural and strategic specificity and believes that full normalization of relations between India and Pakistan is less likely.18 Wolpert believes that India and Pakistan were born to conflict and explained the nature and origin of the troubled relationship between India and Pakistan.19 Singh looks at India's four decades of Congress rules, India's past and prospects and ever persistent tensions between India and Pakistan. He relies on his experience and insights as India's Minister for External Affairs.20 Bose glimpses at Kashmir issue as a root of the conflict between India and Pakistan and also suggests the path for peace and warns how this conflict can become a grave threat to South Asia and the world.21 T.V. Paul narrates that the rivalry between India and Pakistan is the most enduring and unresolved rivalry and affected every sphere of interstate and

14 S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974)
19 Stanley Wolpert, India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation? (Oakland: University of California Press, 2010)
societal relations between both the states. Pande analyses Pakistan’s foreign policy and argues that it is based in pre-partition divisions between Muslim League and emphasizes on the religious character of identity. Mukherjee presents detailed analysis on India's current predicaments based on his insights and experience, discusses the security of the nation and assesses the aspirations of India to be a major power in global affairs. Abraham takes a uniquely different position and believes that the territorial disputes sanction legitimacy to postcolonial states and through this pretext he tries to understand India's troubled relations with Pakistan. Schofield looks at Kashmir dispute a source of never-ending war with Pakistan and the issues which divide India and Pakistan. Kasuri also gives the first-hand account of India-Pakistan relations and presents a detailed analysis of the conflicts between India and Pakistan and efforts made towards resolution during his stint as Pakistan’s Foreign Minister.

In the third category of India's domestic politics and working of BJP and Congress, there is also a plenty of literature available. Brass discusses the politics of India and its domestic structure and makes an exhaustive assessment of political, cultural and economic changes taken place in India. Muhammad Mujeeb Afzal highlights the working, construction and ideological orientation of BJP and argues that BJP is a communal party that aims to eliminate the secular orientation of the Indian polity. Gurdas Ahuja has taken a brief sketch of BJP’s politics in the national spectrum in his book. Joseph S. Alter explains the construct of militant Hindu nationalism in his article and explains the working and mindset of militant Hinduism. Johari explicates the policies and organization of

24 Pranab Mukherjee, *Thoughts and Reflections* (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2014)
30 Gurdas Ahuja, *BJP and Indian Politics* (New Delhi: Ram Company 1994)
Indian National Congress since independence and also lists the presidential addressed delivered by various personalities of INC.\textsuperscript{32} Parvathy Appaiah in the book explains the notion and construct of Hindutva and its everlasting imprints on the spectrum of Indian politics.\textsuperscript{33} Adeney and Wyatt focus on the politics and society in India and the key issues which India confronted since independence.\textsuperscript{34} India at Risk written by Jaswant Singh, the former foreign minister and abandoned BJP's leader, explains the cognitive mind of Indian foreign policy at work. It highlights and criticized the blunders and miscalculated India's apprehensions in the realm of security issues.\textsuperscript{35} Highlighted by S.D Muni in his book traces and explains the dimension of democracy in the foreign policy of India. Democracy is a defining parameter in India’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{36} Tobias. F Engelmeier in his book explains the relevance of culture, realism, and ideology in Indian foreign policy. He makes a brief assessment of identity- strategy conflict in his work.\textsuperscript{37} Jayanta Kumar Ray exhaustively describes Indian foreign policy in his massive volume of Indian Foreign relation and identifies the dominant themes in Indian foreign policy in all tenures form 1947-2007.\textsuperscript{38} Partha S. Ghosh in the book traces the reasons for the resurgence of BJP from rural peripheries to the centers, from the regions to the national level. It also explains the tactics of BJP for the mass appeal.\textsuperscript{39}

The undertaken research is the culmination of India's domestic politics and its subsequent impact on Indian policy towards Pakistan. It relies on the literature published in all three domains; Indian foreign policy, India Pakistan relations and India's domestic politics to present a fresh perspective on India's policy towards Pakistan guided and pushed by domestic impetus. Using the theoretical framework of constructivism and neoclassical realism the current research

\textsuperscript{32} J.C. Johari, \textit{Indian National Congress Since Independence} (New Delhi: Lotus Press, 2006)
\textsuperscript{34} Katharine Adeney & Andrew Wyatt, \textit{Contemporary India (Contemporary States and Societies)} (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)
\textsuperscript{35} Jaswant Singh, \textit{India at Risk: Mistakes, Misconceptions, and Misadventures of Security Policy} (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2013)
\textsuperscript{36} S.D. Muni, \textit{India’s Foreign Policy The Democracy Dimension} (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2009)
\textsuperscript{37} Tobias F. Engelmeier, \textit{Nation-Building, and Foreign Policy in India An Identity Strategy Conflict} (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2011)
\textsuperscript{39} Partha S. Ghosh, \textit{BJP and Evolution of Hindu Nationalism, From Periphery to Centre} (New Delhi, Manohar Publishers, 1999)
correlates and conjoins the academic boundaries of International Relations with Political Science and through the use of primary documents, personal insights and published material it gives a new explanation of India-Pakistan relations.

The inquiry into an impact of domestic discourses within the realm of foreign policy, the deconstruction of generalized explanations of India's foreign policy towards Pakistan, and the identification of the shift in the foreign policies BJP and Congress-led governments through socio-historical pretext is the original additions to the existing body of knowledge. The study can also inform us on the interaction of certain variables in Indian foreign policy – dealing towards Pakistan, which can help us predict future of India-Pakistan relations.

Division of the Study

The theoretical framework attempts to analyze foreign policy through the lens of internal factors. Foreign policy primarily falls in the domain of international relations with states engaged in a multilateral interaction, but local context is equally important which creates a rubric to understand the choice situation. Internal environment shapes and conditions the context of foreign policy decisions. This chapter attempts to define and theorize foreign policy in the purview of domestic sources and address how the variable of leadership guides and influences the broad trends in particular actions taken by a state.

The chapter one, "Indian Nationalism, Congress and Pakistan Factor," intends to look at the foreign policy patterns and responses of Indian National Congress, while being in government, towards Pakistan through a historical-sociological pretext. The discourse of Indian nationalism cannot be comprehended completely without having understood the historical and contemporary formations of this idea. Indian National Congress had been clinging to this idea of Indian nationalism as a political rhetoric since its constitution, but the existence of this belief as a social and historical undercurrent predates the centuries of India's civilizational evolution and progress.

Chapter two, "Hindu Nationalism, BJP and Policy towards Pakistan," discusses that Hindu nationalism and Indian nationalism are two dominant rather overriding discourses in Indian polity. It meticulously examines Indian nationalism, its historical anecdotes and its rise as a political clout and its subsequent impact on India's dealing towards Pakistan. Hindus are a majority in
India and this idea trumpets for the dominance of the will of the majority. It questions the basic notion of Indian civilization and terms it as Hindu culture and seeks to identify the Indian nation on ethnic and primordial criteria.

Chapter three titled "Mumbai Attacks, UPA, and India Pakistan Relations" deals with the foreign policy response of India with Pakistan after Mumbai attacks. This chapter specifically undertakes the predicament of Congress's decision-making concerning Pakistan in the crisis. The Mumbai standoff led to the deterioration of India Pakistan relations and ended the process of composite dialogue and confidence-building measures aiming at normalizing relations between both the immediate neighbors. This impasse struck Congress towards the end of UPA's first term in office. The Mumbai attacks and the events that followed after redrew the contours of Indian political landscape and marked the electoral victory of Indian National Congress for the second consecutive turn. The UPA led alliance governed India again from 2009-2014. This chapter explicates the foreign policy dispensation of Indian National Congress towards Pakistan in its second tenure of UPA government.

Chapter four, "BJP, Rise of Modi and Indian Foreign Policy," focuses on the ascendency of Bharatya Janta Party to power and rise of Modi as a new idiosyncratic phenomenon in the dispensation of India's security policy. This chapter pivots around India's emerging trajectory of foreign policy under Narendra Modi's premiership and its moves to evolve closer relations with the eastern economic powers, especially Australia and Japan in the pretext of Look East Policy. The other tenets of Modi's foreign policy like Make in India, regional connectivity, conscious neighboring, checkmate on China and discusses minus Pakistan security calculus. This chapter further glimpses on the broader outlook for Indian foreign policy, global and regional contours and their implications for India-Pakistan relations. It evaluates the matrix of Indian foreign policy and critically dissects the initiatives, and foreign policy choices pursued by Modi led government.

Chapter five, "Modi's Foreign Policy towards Pakistan," makes a detailed and theoretical analysis of the patterns, trends, and responses adopted under Modi government. This chapter further narrows down the scope of Hindu's nationalistic discourse and its accentuation through Modi's foreign policy calculus vis-à-vis
Pakistan. It also makes a detailed assessment of the foreign policy options, choices, and actions pursued by Modi government.

The conclusion discusses that Pakistan factor in Indian foreign policy remained viable and continued to impact its policy matrix. A persistent pattern of rivalry locks India and Pakistan. This rivalry is multifaceted. It spans over politics, history, culture, and religion and all these nuances together set up a normative discourse in which both countries envisage one another.
CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter attempts to analyze foreign policy through the lens of domestic factors. Foreign policy primarily falls in the domain of international relations with states engaged in a multilateral interaction, but domestic context is equally important which creates a rubric to understand the choice situation. Internal environment shapes and conditions the context foreign policy choices. This chapter attempts to define and theorize foreign policy in the purview of domestic sources and address how the variable of leadership guides and influences the broad trends in particular actions taken by a state.

1.1 Defining Foreign Policy

It's hard to explain foreign policy in absolute terms given it includes the interplay of multiple actors and causalities which range from the systemic influence of the pressure exerted by the domestic variables. Some scholars have defined it as the sum of foreign relations conducted by an independent actor.\textsuperscript{40} It implies the objectives of a state and the means to achieve them. The foreign policy of a state has inextricable linkage to the domestic politics and subsequently is the reflection of the domestic behavior of that state at the external level. Foreign policy also refers to the goals which a state aims to attain in the international arena which realists claim to be anarchic. The pursuit of national interest and defined agendas are the defining characters of foreign policy. K.J Holsti describes foreign policy as a study of the actions of a state towards and the conditions of those actions.\textsuperscript{41}

There is a fundamental confusion in the study of foreign policy, and that is to demarcate the boundaries of the foreign and domestic arena. Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state, believes that foreign policy starts where domestic policy ends.\textsuperscript{42} The idea of the domestic structure relevant to the foreign conduct of a state was discussed primarily in the work of Immanuel Kant in his democratic peace theory. He propounded that democratic structure within a state makes it less

\textsuperscript{40} Christopher Hill, \textit{The Changing Nature of Foreign Policy} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)
\textsuperscript{42} Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," \textit{Daedalus} 95, no. 2 (1966): 503-529.
prone to wars and to have a perpetual peace. States need to have democratic structure internalized. There also arises vagueness in the definition of foreign policy due to a question whether foreign policy should be taken up as a sum of all the actions employed in the foreign relations of a state or whether it is the interpretation of a specific action of a state in a particular situation? This definitional aspect becomes more complicated when the collective actors such as state and society come into play and affect the process of choice formulation and adoption. This pattern of interaction between state and society makes domestic aspect relevant in the foreign policy decision-making.

This confusion has led to an academic discourse where different theorists of foreign policy have interpreted foreign policy with contending perspectives. C. Hill defines it as a sum of external relations whereas White describes it as a relationship between states and other actors preferably states. Rosenau simply takes it as external behavior of the states whereas Brecher contends and argues that only foreign policy decisions should be studied rather taking foreign policy in its collectivity. Sondermann has tried to explicate a more comprehensive definition of foreign policy by terming it as activities of individuals and groups within a state along with the governmental machinery which is meant to have an impact on the policies of other states. Despite being a slippery concept concerning its definitional problem foreign policy is firmly upheld as an essential parameter for the states to chase their national interest. States make rational and conscious choices in the realm of foreign policy and try to reach onto cost-effective decisions while following the normative impulse.

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43 Perpetual peace was an idea discussed by German Philosopher Immanuel Kant in his essay, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”. It refers to a condition where peace is permanently maintained and is not sabotaged or disrupted by the wars.
44 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
46 The debate on the theoretical positions in the foreign policy studies have been discussed in detail by Derek Beach in his book Analyzing Foreign Policy Derek Beach, Understanding Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 2.
The complexities of the foreign policy decision-making get further compounded with the involvement of various intervening actors. The realist position in international relations hold states as fundamental, unitary and basic actors and negates all other non-state and influential variables. Post-cold war orientation of foreign policies is very different given states structures are combating with many influential non-state actors, NGOs, IGOs, corporate cartels and a multilateral organizational framework at both international and regional level. The security dynamics of the states change and the dimensions of global security turn out to be a decisive factor in foreign policy decision-making. Berry Buzan has introduced a new approach to studying this post-cold war arena that is regionals security complex.\textsuperscript{48} It posits significant challenges for the foreign policymakers who are to incorporate the changing dynamics of the international system along with the impacting domestic structures.

The Foreign policy analysis had a greater role during the cold war when world structure was bipolar, and this concept turned very loosely coherent if not irrelevant in the wake of new world order marked with unipolarity. This change at the global level has brought profound and unprecedented changes given the neoliberal economic policies of the states leaving the dynamics of the nation states in a great change. The rise of corporates and influential actors in foreign policy primarily not falling within the traditional ambit of the players of foreign policy has led the academic discourse of foreign policy to respond to the changed global environment. The studies in foreign policy are responding to these challenges, and international organizations, regional governments, transnational groups, multinational companies and non-state actors of the various types have become relevant in foreign policy and are consistent in applying and deploying foreign policy. According to Walter Carlsnaes, foreign policy has become an amalgamation of the commitments and the directives of a state and is pursued by a state as explicitly stated goals and includes both governmental and non-governmental contexts beyond territorial legitimacy.\textsuperscript{49} For long foreign policy had been revolving around on the abstract notions like national interest, power

\textsuperscript{48} Berry Buzan, \textit{People, states and fear, an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era} (London: Pearson, 2004)

maximization but the major difficulty has been entailed to assess the reasons and the perceptions of the actors making a particular decision.

1.2 What Determines Foreign Policy?

The determinants of foreign policy had been more or less same for all the states given some states prioritize one over other and also some determinants are permanent and some as flexible in the foreign policy formulation and its subsequent execution. They include geography, national interest, history, leadership, economics and public opinion. Ideology used to be a relevant theme during the cold war but the post-cold war epoch does not hold ideology as a substantive variable, and now the world is in a post-ideological age. Every country has its variants in this regard. American foreign policy for instance historically had been following the predominant themes of power, prosperity, prestige, and principles. Most of the countries uphold geography, history, and national interest as permanent determinants of foreign policy whereas leadership, economics and public opinion are non-permanent determinants. It primarily relies on the political system of the country wherein authoritarian rule the role of leadership may be overly assertive and decisive. Allison's account of foreign policy also explains the context of foreign policy preferences, and the influences on personality and perceptions but his work hold bureaucratic variable a deterministic one. Pakistan's tryst with geography has always been a deterministic theme in the foreign policy formulation. In early years of India Nehruvian view of foreign policy dominated for the decades to come. Indira Gandhi's vision of foreign policy also dominated the course of Indian foreign policy.

The Foreign policy decision is a culmination of external and internal environment where psychological factors and international factors are equally relevant where decision environment and domestic factors are the determinants of foreign policy decision-making. It gives credence to the definition that foreign policy is the reflection of the internal behavior of a state at the external level. Domestic milieu sets a prelude for the decision makers to make the choices and external dynamics influence the process of choice making in foreign policy decision-making. The structural dictation over choices have become more relevant


in the pluralistic\textsuperscript{52} Structural realism, the approach introduced by Kenneth N. Waltz has also put an international structure on the front burner for the states and the dictation coming from the international system as the decisive and deterministic factor in the domain of choice making.\textsuperscript{53}

The factor of distribution of proportional power capabilities in international system defines the character of the foreign policy of a particular state. The power equation represents the fundamental notion of foreign policy. The states having a high proportion in power distribution will be prone to aggressive and assertive foreign policies whereas a state having a considerable share in the allocation of power capabilities will be having an anchoring and multilateral foreign policy and the states with the negligible share of power will be more inclined to security and survival. The realist interpretation of statism, self-help, and survival will be more emphatic for the weaker states where the state will be the leading actor and sovereignty will be the defining trait, and together these three S will put together the account of the primacy of the national security.\textsuperscript{54} The middle powers will be more engaged in the issues of multilateral cooperation and active in low politics issues given the high politics issues will be left to the major powers with a larger capacity and say in the international system.

The geopolitical relevance of a state in the international system also defines the necessary and essential character of its foreign policymaking. The theories of Alfred Mahan and Mackinder established the geopolitical significance of a state in international relations. The factor of history can never be nullified in this context since history many of the times define the recurrent themes in foreign policy. For instance, USA and Russia will never be able to dismiss the factor of the cold war in their bilateral relations with one another. Economic prospects for a state most of the times come under national interest which states foresee as their tangible gains. The pursuit of national interest

\textsuperscript{52} Pluralist approach differs the view that only states are relevant to foreign policy decision and contends that variety of state, sub-state, and non-state actors are eroding the traditional primacy of the state in foreign policymaking.


denotes pursuit of economic interests as well; given the components of national interest include power maximization, survivability, and economic pursuits.55

The apparent complex economic interdependence56 among the states has made them largely reliant on one another. It has put forth the factor of mutual beneficially on the top for the states and preference of the relative gains over the absolute gains has led to the trade-offs among states resultantly resulting in a framework of relations where states do persist their animosities but cooperate as well. The trade relations between America and China are a relevant example in this regard. Economics have also become a tool to change the foreign policy behavior of a particular state where sanctions leading to economic crippling may alter the foreign policy conduct of a state. Iran-US nuclear rapprochement is a successful manifestation of this phenomenon. One factor does not decisively determine foreign Policy rather it is interplay of many factors in different circumstances.

1.3 Theorizing Foreign Policy

The liberal approach to foreign policy has been predominantly revolving around the idea of trilateral coexistence. It includes individual ideals like democracy and human rights, the political ideals of democracy and representation and social forces that are capitalism and markets and this trilateral coexistence has a direct impact on the foreign relations of a state.57 Liberalism rejects the idea of realists claiming the deterministic role of the state in international relations. It assumes ideas, interests, and institutions to have a larger role in the definition of foreign policy conduct of a state in a broader framework of international relations. It also does not subscribe to the idea of homogeneity of a state being rational, fundamental and unitary and consequently predicts better predictions of foreign policy by incorporating behavior and modern conceptions of ethical foreign policy.58 The liberal thinking is an idea that all citizens have basic freedom, juridical equality, and civic rights. The representative legislatures draw their

56 Complex interdependence is theory developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, and it argues that interdependence among the states is increasing due to various and complex transnational connections and is making use of military and hard power a less significant phenomenon.
support and legitimacy from the electorates and act to preserve the necessary freedom of the individuals.

The economic model must follow and exercise the right to private property. There should be no monopoly of the state in economic affairs. Decision-making will not be left at the mercy of the bureaucracies but rather will rely on the core idea of supply and demand. In the realm of foreign policy, decision-making liberalism calls for a zone of peace with the majority of state practicing and perpetuating democratic order.\(^{59}\) The idea of peace zone emerges from the work of Immanuel Kant who called for a pacific union or pacific federation, and liberal states do exercise a restraint thus order exists among them and peace is likely to continue among liberal states and expansion of this idea will reinforce global peace. Liberal philosophy in its essentiality has a Universalist manifestation. It believes in a law based society and believes that society should be self-governing, and this objective of self-governance becomes achievable through building democratic institutions. The liberal institutional framework will create a harmony of interest, and this harmonization will obstruct the way of wars. A sustained peace can only be achieved by strengthening the democratic institution and reasserting the belief in the individual.

The liberal view of international relations follows two strands simultaneously. One is liberal nationalism which talks for securing liberal institutional framework at domestic level while maintaining national security. The other view is liberal internationalism which envisages for peaceful resolution of disputes among the states. This idea believes that securing peace at home will pave the way for establishing organizational order at world level resultantly preserving peace at the global scale. Throughout the nineteenth century, American foreign policy had been following the principle of liberal nationalism whose manifestations are traceable in the speech of George Washington and Monroe Doctrine.\(^{60}\) Wilson's fourteen points were the enunciation of liberal internationalism where he advocated principles of democratic order and self-determination which became the basis for the creation of the league of the nations.


\(^{60}\) Earl A. Reitan, *Liberalism: Time Tested Principles for the Twenty-First Century* (Indiana: iUniverse Press, 2003), 44.
Despite this liberal states have particular anathema toward nonliberal states and they have a tendency of aggression in their foreign policies towards nonliberal states.\(^{61}\) The liberal states fear aggression from non-liberal states sometimes due to their authoritarian rulers and sometimes through their intrinsically aggressive foreign policies. This frame of insecurity drives them into a state where they feel locked into an eternal rivalry with the non-liberal states.

Liberalism is concerned with the culmination of individual rights and domestic commercial interests in the foreign policymaking. It runs parallel to institutions and perceptions and thus analyzes their role in policymaking. Liberals agree to the basic postulation of anarchy posited by the realists but disagree about the nature of anarchy which to realists is a continuous state of war as highlighted in the work of Hobbes.\(^{62}\) Unlike realists, liberals contend for a positive and negative sum game within peace zone. The mistrust genuinely undermines cooperation, but stable accommodation can address this instead of balancing. The common threat of non-liberal states can drive them to cooperate with one another with an assumption that existence of one another liberal state is no threat to any means. The trade relations with a liberal state can develop that state as a potential ally against the non-liberal states. The dominant themes of human society, international structure, and human nature are relevant in the liberal philosophy.\(^{63}\) The liberal orientation of foreign policy presumes that states overwhelmingly rely on domestic and international society and this precursor significantly alters their foreign policy behavior. Liberalism predicts a progressive historical change and international institutions are a permanent solution to collective action problems stemming out from interstate relations.\(^{64}\)

The predominant thinking in International relations over the years had been the realist thinking where the state is as an essential, fundamental, unitary and a rational actor capable of making rational choices. Realists argue for a structure dominated and overrun by anarchy and state adherent to the objective

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\(^{63}\) See also Scott Burchill, Andrew Liklater and Richard Devetak, *Theories of International Relations, 5th edition* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)

laws, and the pursuit of power is real law in this regard. This argument was explicitly laid forward in the classical text of Hans J. Morgenthau who dismissed the relevance of moral principles in politics and decision-making.\(^\text{65}\) Kenneth Waltz\(^\text{66}\) argues that states are defensive in their orientation and always attempt to balance the threat whereas John Mearsheimer\(^\text{67}\) postulates that states are offensive and therefore try to expand. To realists, the motivations for a decision are driven by human nature and anarchy, and the pursuit of power remains at the bottom line. Morgenthau argues that states follow three types of foreign policies; either they maximize their power, or they demonstrate their power or they maintain a policy of a status quo.\(^\text{68}\) Interests of a state are concerning power, and no state can afford to ignore the power dynamics of the anarchic international politics. Realists' insistence on rational decision-making had been under the acrimonious academic debates in foreign policy studies since this leads to a presumption that states can never make a wrong or irrational decision. Secondly, security dilemma is at the roots of decision-making where states get threatened by the rise of the power of other states. This insecurity leads state for massive arms buildup and alliance formation. The act of balancing this threat under the guise of national interest and an overarching paradigm of the insecure environment remains at the helm of the affairs for the states. Schweller argues that if states have the surety that none seeks the expansion the security dilemma will fall away.\(^\text{69}\)

National interest remains a central preoccupation in the realist theory. Morgenthau defines national interest synonymous to power and also outlines the various elements of national power which are geography, natural resources, population, technology, national character, industrial capacity, diplomacy, and


\(^{68}\) Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*

leadership. National interest though is a reference point for defining a state's action, yet it remains a disputed term given how it is defined and subsequently implemented are the important questions. States, according to realist theory, make series of selective and self-interested policies that limit the scope of cooperation and reassert their predefined theme of anarchy. In this given context the centrality of power is seen to be a key determinant to sustain a successful and consolidated foreign policy. Some other elements factor in that are geography, demography and material resources and all states adhere to the defining parameters. To understanding the foreign policy of a state, anarchic structure of the international system and the relative power equation are crucial. The national interest can be categorically calculated having considered the material environment of a state and the particular foreign policy dilemma which that state is facing. The relative influence of the different factors on national power is in comparison with other nations that compete with each other in the arena of international politics.

The other strand of realism which has come into prominence after the 1970s is neorealism which represents the position of realists in contemporary international relations. This view of realism is more concerned with the general conduct of international relations in the anarchic structure. As mentioned earlier, the leading neorealist is Kenneth Waltz who emphasizes the characteristics of the international system. Classical realism and neorealism share some common grounds and that are the exclusiveness and distinctiveness of both the theories from the domestic politics with a preponderant focus on international politics. Both have conviction in the ideas like balancing and trade-offs and have a lack of faith in international progress. According to neorealist, the behavior of certain actors in the international system is with reference to the state system. The structure comprises of three elements; one is the ordering principle which is anarchic, secondly the units of the international system i.e. states, and the third is a relative disproportionate division of power capabilities. It determines the stature of a state in the international regime. The states will always try to maximize their

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70 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations
71 See also Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)
power concerning each other, and this generates a balancing tendency in the international system where less power or weaker states always find the avenues where they could challenge the power of most powerful actors. The domestic structure of the state in the eyes of neorealist is not very relevant since it presumes that all the states whether democracy or authoritarian rule follow the same constraints in the decision-making.

The constraints of anarchy put every state in a perpetual security dilemma and propel them to act in a self-interested way. States are operating on the principle of self-help, and this argument is closer to the Hobbesian state of nature. War is an ever-present phenomenon within the international structure without any exception even of liberal democratic states.\(^73\)

Waltz's criticism on political realism was that it cannot offer a scientific explanation beyond the state level and also cannot delineate the theoretical abstraction with the systemic variables. It is not primarily the egoism of the states and individuals but rather this anarchical structure as a whole is a deterministic factor for the state behavior.\(^74\) Relations between states are a zero-sum game, and this is because that every state wants to have a relative advantage over other states. It does not matter how much power a state accumulates and how much difference in the power capability it possesses in comparison with other states it will always try to maximize that power gap. The predominant element is the international system to generate explanations for international politics instead of state or sub-state factors. In this case, neorealism considers economic interdependence and non-state actors irrelevant in the account of international politics. The international structure is resistant to change and antithetical to progress. It does not presume that international politics is static, but rather change comes through the change in power capabilities.

1.4 Constructivising Foreign Policy

Constructivism emerged as a parallel idea to the mainstream theories of international relations which challenged the foundational basis of these ideas. Mainly discussed in the work of Alexander Wendt constructivism postulates that structures of human association are determined primarily by ideas and the identity

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of the purposive actors' shapes their interest. This theory broadly rejects the structuralism position of material environment and nature shaping the interests of the actors involved. This approach puts a lot of emphasis on the context of the actors.

It also rejects the positivist position of knowledge being objective rather constructivists hold a belief that knowledge is stored in the form of images and is the byproduct of an active construction and subsequent invention in line with the actors' idiosyncrasies. Constructivism does not deny the existence of the material environment but rather asserts that the perception of this material existence is by the individuals given their cognition and beliefs. The knowledge of any particular subject filters through the medium of a conceptual structure embedded in the human structuration. The perceived world is different from the real world that's why representation and perception are two separate things hence the definition of the processes is in mere abstraction. The individuals define the outside world grounded and rooted in the cultural variables. Social interaction constructs the reality. The famous phrase of Alexander Wendt that anarchy is what states make out of it is a classic manifestation in this regard. The pattern of interaction which individuals develop as behavior is subjected to change through the change in the interactive mechanism that's why individual's definition of reality is contingent upon the ever-changing construction drawn up and sustained through symbolic interactionist methodology.

The constructivism is at odds with the rationalist theories that are neorealism and neoliberalism. There is a common ground between neorealism and constructivism where both concur to the point that structure defines, dictates and conditions the behavior of a state but the difference is in the normative aspect. Neorealism believes it is the material and the tangible aspect of international

77 See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (Yale: Yale University Press, 1955)
structure which dictates the states to act in a predefined manner in line with the driven impetus emanating from the anarchic structure of international politics. The constructivists differ here by calling this dictative mechanism as ideational and perceptual. It does not mean that constructivists reject the basic notion of material structure and prospective economic gains rather they reassert the importance of the ideational-normative structure based on the shared ideas, values and beliefs have a deterministic tendency and overwhelmingly affects the behavior of the states in the international system. States interpreted tangible material environment and their relationships with other states through the prism of identity and established normative structure, and this subsequently led to the creation of the social identity of the individuals.79

The identity of the actors informs the actors about the interest and drive the actor to a political action. The context, as mentioned earlier, is a sustained pattern of interaction which actors produces and reproduces. This challenges the underlying assumption of the rationalist theories about the interests of the state. It argues that the interaction defines the interests. It determines the identity of the actors which resultantly shapes the interests which states pursue in the socially constructed anarchic world.80 More primarily the essential nature of the international structure is constitutive not merely an ambit of strategic competition and tradeoffs. The interaction does not restrict to interstate relations, but this simultaneously goes on at the international level. The subsequent formation of identity defines the interests which are called national interest. Here comes a difference between the constructivism and neorealism given neorealism believes that structure defines the foreign policy choices for a state whereas constructivism postulates that the identity formation/self-definition of a state will determine the foreign policy choices of a state.

The relationship of the agent and structure holds primary importance in the constructivist approach to the international relations. This perplexing enigma revolves on an agreeable aspect where ideational structure gives meaning to the material structure subsequently shaping the social identity of the actor. This social actor is in the process of continuous interaction with the norms and value

structure, and this leads to the formation of persistent social structures which influence the behavior of the actor. The context of the states is difficult to change because it will change only when material environment and ideational change and evolve through mutual interaction. In the domain of foreign policy, states have limited choices. This limitation of actions is due to the context. The distinct identities of the subjects of the international politics are through extensive interaction with both material and non-material structures.  

The rise of constructivist approach has brought social factors in international relations in the spotlight. The theorists now give more weight and attention to the normative behavior that is beyond quantification and measurability with which the rationalist theories were obsessed with. It also reasserts the significance of the historical, sociological and ideational variables and makes their study relevant in the domain of the foreign policy decision-making. The perceptual image structure develops through the continuous interaction of the material and non-material forces. The context has given more variety to the study of international politics. It has also ended the obsession of scientific, accurate and empirically verified results which have improved the value based qualitative knowledge formation. Constructivism has introduced the meta-theoretical and more nuanced understanding of the social origin of international politics. This approach also came into limelight due to the failure of the rationalist theories and their inability to predict the end of cold war and the subsequent disintegration of USSR. This theory holds a broader belief that actors and structures are the mutual construction whereas meaningful action or behavior is only possible in intersubjective context. The medium of the norms and the practices establishes the relations of actors with the structure and without the medium of norms and practices the structure is meaningless. The anarchy which is the defining aspect of the international system also turns irrelevant without the intersubjective context.

82 Fred Chernoff, Theory and Metatheory in International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008) 68.
In the realm of the foreign policy decision-making cultures, norms, values, and social practice are important since they become the definitional aspects of the context which in return shapes the meanings of the reality.

The role of the decision maker is the main argument and the exploratory variable of this research. The constructivist approach to international politics further signifies it. The decision maker holds a distinct identity and a context which shapes and conditions his cognition which resultantly affects the decision maker is the principal argument. The inductive-interpretative study of the foreign policy decision-making in India with a particular reference to the political discourse the decision maker and its subsequent impact on the foreign policy decision-making in India has been attempted to explore. The actor is a decision maker and interacts with the structure which is subjective and normative. The decision maker is taken as an agent interacting, perceiving and deciphering the material structure through the intrinsic definition of the discourse. This discourse is both social and political. At one place it is conditioned and derived by the ideology and the ideational disposition the decision maker.

On the other hand, it reflects in the decision-making for the political gains. The link of the discourse with foreign policy is perplexing. Discourse simultaneously interacts with the decision maker at two levels. At the individual level, it shapes the cognition and the disposition of the decision maker which makes the decision-making. At the stage of decision-making, it leads to the formulation and the adoption of the policies with particular reference to the discourse of the decision maker. These decisions may be purely time specific or momentous to increase the support base, to create the rhetoric or secure some political mileage. There are the intervening variables presumably the official role of the decision maker, governmental and the bureaucratic variables which can be broadly summed up as the external environment. The central endeavor of this research revolves around tracing the impact of the decision maker on the foreign policy formulation, manifestation, and execution. The study aims to address the query that to what extent the foreign policy of a state gets affected by the change of a decision maker?

### 1.5 Analyzing Foreign Policy

Analyzing foreign policy is a different phenomenon compared to its formulation. Foreign policy analysis is the combination of the approaches. The
theoretical niche of foreign policymaking includes the role of all the variables involved in the foreign policy decision-making. The idea of foreign policy analysis earned significance with the initiation of the behaviorist turn\textsuperscript{84} in the social sciences. This methodological shift in the social sciences pushed the theorists and the researchers of the foreign policy to distinguish it from the international relations. International relations is a broader and a generalized framework of the relations in which states interact with one another whereas foreign policy is a meaningful interaction of the states with specific reference to the policy goals defined by the states. Foreign policy analysis is different from foreign policy formulation. The domain of foreign policy analysis starts when foreign policy is made and operationalized.\textsuperscript{85}

Foreign policy analysis is primarily the study of the conduct and the practice of relations with other states with a central emphasis on decision-making, the process of decision-making, the individual decision makers and finally the outcomes of the decisions. Foreign policy analysis maintains a thin line balance between the boundaries of an external and internal environment. It follows a normative impulse given its exclusive focus on the conduct of the interstate decisions. The traditional centrality of the state in the foreign policy of a state is no longer the decisive factor since now it includes various sub-state and non-state actors who influence the decision-making dynamics in the domain of foreign policy decision-making. Foreign policy analysis also considers the sources of a decision. David Singer developed a very well acclaimed three-level approach in the study of foreign policy where he believes that decision-making dynamics should be studies at individual, state, and system level.\textsuperscript{86}

The significant argument in the theoretical literature of foreign policy is the extent of influence the structural environment and human agency impose on


\textsuperscript{85} See M. Webber and M. Smith, Foreign policy in a Transformed World (Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2000)

the foreign policy decisions and the decision-making environments. The structural factors denote the constraints which international system puts on the choices in the decision-making environment whereas agency refers to the role of an individual in shaping the foreign policy choices. The foreign policy-making process, the decision makers and the nature of foreign policy choices bring the debate of agency and structure\(^{87}\) in limelight.\(^{88}\) In comparison to international relations foreign policy analysis puts more emphasis on agency given international relations take the structural variable as a predominant variable in the decision-making. The constructivist turn in international relations after the 1980s has made the role of personalities, idiosyncrasies and psychological factors which were not very relevant to the classical studies of international relations. As mentioned earlier the rise of foreign policy analysis was an offshoot to the behaviorist turn in social science that's why foreign policy analysis puts more and more emphasis on the scientific study, and it also seeks to employ scientific means to understand the decision-making puzzle. Scholars like Robert Jervis, James N. Rosenau, Harold and Margret Sprout investigated the role of the decision maker and its subsequent influence on the decision-making.\(^{89}\) Jervis arguments that cognitive disposition of a leader and the cognitive limits which are put due to excessive information resultanty making a choice difficult and contributes to the imperfect foreign policy decisions whereas psychological and cognitive factors are the explanatory sources of foreign policy options.

There is a range of theories and approaches related to the decision-making process. These ideas follow two major approaches. One is rationalist approach and second is the cognitive approach. Rationalist approach sees states as unitary actors

\(^{87}\) Agency refers to the structural factors which produce a recurrent pattern of behavior and puts a substantive limit and constraint on the choice making. The agency denotes the capacity of individuals to act in their way restricting the role of structure and making choices freely. The debate in foreign policy study revolves around the argument whether the agency is of primal importance or structure have a decisive role? Further on this study M. Archer, *Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), P.L. Berger and T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor Books, 1966) and Roberto Unger, *Social Theory: Its Situation and its Task* (Cambridge: University Press, 1987)

\(^{88}\) Alexander Wendt, *The Agent-Structure Problem*

capable of making rational decisions following the constraints of the international structure. This approach views the states as organic actors and holds their centrality at the top instead of normative aspects of the decision-making. The cognitive theory on other hands puts a lot of emphasis on the cognition, perception and the personality of the decision maker and also takes into account the normative and ideational challenges/constraints which decision maker is facing to opt for a policy choice. The decision maker is recipient to the massive influx of information, and this may lead to the cognitive dissonance\textsuperscript{90} which may in result affect the decision-making. Since every decision is to be made by a decision maker and certain psychological factors have their impact on the foreign policy decision-making. That's why the role of personality and cognitive and psychological factors associated are taken into detailed account to have a comprehensive understanding of the foreign policy of a state. The Rationalists emphasize the material forces and the tangible context in the decision-making process of foreign policy. Rational actor model\textsuperscript{91} is a better elucidation of this phenomenon that states make cost-benefit analysis based on the ground dynamics and try to opt for the most suitable choice. Decision makers eye on a decision that maximizes gains with an insufficient cost and on the other hand the cognitive-psychological theories relate that how human mind collects and processes information.\textsuperscript{92}

The International system, presumably the defining and decisive variable turns out to be a constraint for the states as well. It rules out the possibilities. The nature of the constraints and its manifestation largely affects the smaller states in comparison with the major powers. Much of the literature on foreign policy studies revolve around the major powers while having brushed aside the weaker states. The system has a compelling degree of influence over weaker states. The domestic environment of a state may also act as a constraint in the context of the foreign policy decision-making. Domestic factors serve as a contextual impetus.

\textsuperscript{90}Cognitive dissonance theory believes that individuals seek consistency in their opinions, beliefs, and cognition. There is a possibility that the new information or knowledge may contradict the existing knowledge, ideas, beliefs and ideological disposition resultantly leading to a discomfort and alteration in the attitude and behavior of the individual. Further on this one can study Leon Festinger, \textit{A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance} (California: Stanford University Press, 1957)

\textsuperscript{91}Rational actor model was one of the three models discussed by Graham Allison in his book \textit{Essence of Decision} along with organizational process model and bureaucratic process model.

The demography, resource opulence, and economy all generate constraints and prospects. Some of them are constraining enough to be called as determinants.\textsuperscript{93}

The traditional understanding of foreign policy was revolving around the normative grounds of human nature. The advent of the comparative approach was the most striking development of the behaviorist turn of the 1950s. As mentioned earlier the behaviorist approach was concerned with the scientific reasoning, empirical data analysis and logical assumptions about the nature, methodology and the conduct of social sciences. Foreign policy analysis also received its impetus from this attitudinal shift. Previously foreign policy was concerned with the diplomatic history, law and conventional wisdom about the nature and the conduct of the diplomatic practices. Behaviorism was meant to introduce conceptualization based on science and was to develop a general theory of the methods borrowed from natural sciences. The pioneering work in this regard is of R. Synder who tried to conceptualize the human decision and variables that influence the decision-making.\textsuperscript{94} By taking operational environment as a subject under study Synder along with his colleagues tried to study foreign policy through a scientific model. Rosenau also highlighted the absence of scientific studies in foreign policy and postulated that there is lack of scientific generalizations that could explain the foreign policy behavior of the states conclusively; therefore, he suggested a series of explanatory variables. These variables included idiosyncrasy, role, and governmental, societal and systemic variables. The degree of influence of these variables changes from state to state depending upon the nature of foreign policy choice. Certain variables have the better explaining capacity of a foreign policy of any particular state. States differ from one another in three regards. Firstly the size of the state is a distinctive factor. Secondly development and economy of a state differ from other states, and lastly, the nature of political accountability akin to the political system of the state also becomes a distinguishing character of one state from another.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{93} Harvey Starr, \textit{Approaches, Levels and Methods of Analysis in International Politics (ed.)} (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 195.
Foreign policy over the decades relies more on the non-comparable case studies. The comparative study of the decisions and decision-makers is missing rather historical anecdotes dominated the discourse of foreign policy. That's why Rosenau called for a comparative approach that could generate generalizations. In his view, the need for comparative foreign policy analysis gets necessitated by the fact that there had been a remarkable increase in the number of the nation states after 1945 and secondly there is a dire need for an approach that could reconcile the differences of the domestic politics from the arena of foreign policy decision-making.96 The comparison was to be made in scientific and methodological term so that it could test the hypothesis about the foreign policy behavior which applies to more than one state. It was also meant to highlight the differences in the foreign policies of the states to reach onto logical generalizations that are composite to of national and international politics. Two things need to be understood primarily. First is the divergence in the conduct of the states and secondly the variation in their external environment.97

In the pursuit of a scientific method based on empiricism, the scholars of foreign policy analysis give a distinct event data approach. This approach meant to collect the data from the events leading to a generalization instead of relying on the historical anecdotes. This approach was influenced by the positivist thinking that to have empirical analysis one needs scientific data. It was a mainstream reaction to the prevalent traditional approach which used to employ history, law, and diplomacy as a tool to understand the ambit of foreign policy decision-making. This approach began to decline with the rising voices of globalization and subsequently rising of the international political economy which substantially revamped the conduct of foreign policy. The obsession of military and strategic issues in foreign policy went under change by the introduction of new avenues of interaction and cooperation among states. The traditional limits on the foreign policy conduct of the states began to diminish, and new variables like media, nongovernmental sector, society, non-state actors, public opinion, and bureaucracy are an addition in the theory of foreign policy. The growing economic interdependence of the states also altered the traditional mode of

interaction among the states, and this led to a remarkable shift in the state-centric approaches to foreign policy and the traditional theories emphasizing the central role of the state declined considerably.  

1.6 Decision-making in Foreign Policy

Decision-making process in the foreign policy is quite complicated. As mentioned earlier it is the interplay of many variables. Who makes the decision and what are the policy choices are the crucial questions. Usually, a foreign minister is considered the head of the decision-making in foreign policy. For example, John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger are known as powerful and decisive secretaries of the state. But it is not all alone a foreign minister who decides since his office is increasingly invaded by other offices including the head of the state as well who is the ultimate decision maker. Three ministries have their direct input in the foreign policy decision-making, and they are the ministry of trade and commerce, the ministry of finance and ministry of defense. The intelligence agencies also have their input in the decision-making. For instance, the role of CIA in the decision-making in the United States and its subsequent influence on the American president is also among one of the determinants of USA’s foreign policy.  

Graham Allison has substantially discussed the milieu of bureaucratic influence and organizational influence in his book, Essence of Decision. Competing interest and conflicting agendas of different offices and the people who assume those offices have a direct impinging upon the foreign policy decision-making. An intentional attempt of getting closer to the head of the state and subsequent adoption of the self-interested policies affect the discourse of foreign policy.

The decision-making process is conditional on many factors. These include political culture, national will, historical patterns and a collective resolve/decisiveness at large. It is also dependent on the interaction pattern of the institutions. For instance in Pakistan, the rift in civil-military relations has a direct bearing upon the foreign policy decision-making where civilians have a little say. In case of India, it is the political executive and the National Security Council along with the foreign policy executive which makes and implements the foreign policy.

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policy decision-making. The congressional era\textsuperscript{100} in Indian foreign policy witnessed the rise of personality cult in the form of Nehru and Indira and the realm of foreign policy decision-making with the marked absentia of institutional input.

1.7 Sources of Foreign Policy

There are multiple sources of foreign policy decision-making. Foreign policy is influenced, dictated and defined by numerous actors and factors. The sources of foreign policy usually refer to all those factors that directly or indirectly play their role in shaping and defining the foreign policy contours for a state. These factors vary from the systemic influence of structural variables catalyzing the foreign policy decision-making and subsequently defining and redefining the contextual milieu in which decision-making takes place. It also includes the state as a fundamental actor shaping foreign policy in pursuit of its national interest. The role of the society in shaping the public opinion and the role of a decision maker influence and alter the foreign policy conduct of a state.

1.7.1 International System

As mentioned earlier, foreign policy of a state is conditional on many factors. The systemic variable in this regard is highly significant. International structure dictates and shapes the decision-making orbit of the states. The position of the structural realists, primarily neorealist is very explicit. They ascribe a decisive role in the international system and assume that states subdue their preferential choices vis-à-vis their interaction with the international structure. The International structure may constrain the policymakers to take a particular decision. For instance, no state after 9/11 was in the position to support Taliban given the dynamics of the international structure. The systemic influence may affect the foreign policy in multiple ways. International system can be interpreted in abstract terms as non-unit specific factors like anarchy, the arms race, the balance of terror and security dilemma. The existence of international organizations, regimes, and supranational structures also impact the behavior and the selection of choices for a state. Lastly, international structure defines the

\textsuperscript{100} Congressional era refers to the rule of Indian National Congress in the first 3 decades if India's independence. It relates to the rule of Nehru and Indira which defined the foreign policy orientation of India.
evolving conceptualizations of legitimate and illegitimate behavior in the international system.

1.7.2 State

National attributes of a state are important in the realm of foreign policymaking since the nation-state behavior reflects these national attributes. As highlighted by Rosenau that to understand the conduct and behavior of a state the genotype of that state needs to be studied. Every nation and a state are distinctive given some unique trait, and that manifests in the decision-making and subsequently in the overall foreign policy conduct of that state. Size, wealth, and accountability are the variables on which a state's behavior can be gauged. The geographical consideration of being a small state or large state ascribes a different foreign policy role. The accumulation of wealth whether a developed nation or an underdeveloped nation also leads to the marked difference in the foreign policy conduct and nation-state behavior. As discussed earlier the authoritarian societies are more prone to aggression and belligerent foreign policy postures. For example in a large state, the role variable will be more effective and decisive compared to the idiosyncratic variable and vice versa will be there in case of the smaller state. The modern variant of this approach with regard to state structure is democratic peace theory which is an attributional variant. It argues that democracies don't go to a war with one another. The state structure becomes more relevant being an ultimate decision unit. If a leader is powerful then the variables concerning the head of the state, his interaction with his team and advisers and finally his ability to process the information will be of the crucial significance. There can be a group decision-making as well in the given state structure. In that case, the dynamics associated with small groups, their influence, groupthink, coalitional model of decision-making will become more relevant. In autonomous decision-making unit the variables related to conflict resolution, tradeoffs and bargaining will be the salient factors.

1.7.3 Society

The variable of the society is efficient and viable in the given context of the developed world primarily the established democracies. In the less economically developed countries, the variable of society is not very decisive and is considered least relevant. In fact in the developing countries, the public opinion of the society is a tool in the hands of politicians, and they manipulate it for their
real-time interests. As Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of UK once remarked that there is no public opinion, there is only published opinion. In 2003 the UK became the host of biggest ever public demonstrations against the Iraq war yet it did not dissuade Blair's administration to jump into Iraq war. The antiwar sentiments became a worldwide phenomenon and it was impactful enough to resist Canadian government to join the war alliance. The US's reluctance of joining the antiwar alliance in World War II altogether changed after the bombing of Pearl Harbor which changed the society's opinion and rendered the public support which Franklin D. Roosevelt needed to jump into the war.

**1.7.4 Role of Individual**

The role of the individual is highly significant in the foreign policy decision-making. The role compromises the idiosyncrasies and solipsistic behavior of an individual. The instances where the personal idiosyncrasies of a person override the role lead to the drastic reverberations. Usually, personalist rules and foreign policy observe this phenomenon. For example, after Stalin, the foreign policy of Khrushchev had a different orientation. It can also be argued that after 9/11 the foreign policy choices available to Pakistan were limited. Had it been anyone else in the place of president Musharraf, the foreign policy decision might have been the same. The same can be juxtaposed with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan's subsequent joining of hand with the US against Soviets in Afghanistan. It is a common assumption that leaders formulate and implement the foreign policy of their own. This perception can be said to be generated from their election campaigns where they contend to revamp the foreign policy outlook of the country and usually criticize their political opponent. For instance, recently elected American President Donald Trump lambasted Obama's policy towards ISIS and vowed to redefine it and same was reiterated in his first presidential address where he categorically announced the formation of new alliances and reconsidering the existing ones. This media gimmicking is made on the pretext of public unawareness from foreign policy issues. Secondly, foreign policy is a consolidated subject that leaders sometimes can't change the fundamental outlook of a nation's foreign policy. Foreign policy's manifestation

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may slightly change with a head otherwise the stability and the polarity in the international system are the decisive factors in foreign policy formulation and execution. The middle powers usually ascribe their foreign policies to the factors of alliances and economic prospects so the change of leadership does not bring any noticeable change in foreign policy. The major powers have the ability to change and transform their foreign policy posture in the backdrop of a sudden development but in most of the cases, the major powers are concerned with the factors of stability and balance of power in the international system. The hegemon in international system has the ability to redefine the course of foreign policy in global ambit and revamp the landscape of international politics but it is primarily concerned with maintaining its position and expanding its sphere of influence in the international system.\(^{103}\) Irrational decisions on the part of the leaders can also occur therefore a successful foreign policy is the one which recognizes the systemic constraints. Sometimes when a leader doesn't pay heed to the delicacies of his role leads to a foreign policy mishap which may have drastic reverberations. The American expedition in Vietnam and Iraq are good examples in this regard. Foreign policy is not entirely leader specific. In fact, it is the role of the leader which crafts the foreign policy outlook for a state. This is also a fact that all leaders are to formulate their foreign policies in a self-interested way in an increasingly distrustful environment marked with anarchy.

### 1.8 Foreign Policy Decision Making and the Domestic Milieu

As mentioned earlier the domestic ambit and the international arena of foreign policy are nearly inseparable. The domestic constraints, prospects, and opportunities for a state are the defining impetus for a foreign policy of any state. The domestic environment is the push factor for a decision maker in the process of choice making in the realm of foreign policy decision-making. Foreign policy is usually meant to achieve the domestic agenda at the international fora. Therefore foreign policies are often raised by a coalition of domestic and international actors and variables. The political environment and the political system operative in a state are very crucial since it defines the powers vested in the decision maker. This political environment significantly affects the cognition of the decision maker. The relevant factors in the domestic environment are laws and government

\(^{103}\) John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001)
agencies. The normative factors that impact the decision-making discourse are the interest groups, rationality, cognition and personality of a decision maker. The decision maker is engaged in a two-level game, reconciling international pressure and domestic constraints.\textsuperscript{104} The head of a state who is the decision maker is usually motivated by two goals one he wants to retain power and secondly he intends to maintain policy coalitions.\textsuperscript{105} The domestic milieu is very relevant because at times a decision maker is in pursuit of attaining domestic goals through foreign policy and sometimes he wants to keep both the domains separated with a deliberate effort of not letting foreign policy decisions interfering with domestic environment and agendas.

Regardless of the political system, the domestic constraints on foreign policy behavior are compelling. The decision maker is simultaneously coping with the domestic and international imperatives, and in case of a conflict between both, the decision maker usually goes along with the domestic pursuits. If the choice is between the domestic interest and international interest, the decision maker is likely to give emphasis the domestic interest, or he will try to avoid/surpass the situation altogether.\textsuperscript{106} In the foreign policy decision-making, the actors involved intend to maximize their interests. The domestic context becomes very relevant because of the anticipated threats and the decisions already taken. The impact of domestic politics in the case of US foreign policy is very viable and vibrant. The president is to assure the continued support at the domestic level and in case of war, he is to justify the economic and defense spending. For instance to convince the people of United States to join the United Nations the then American President Franklin D. Roosevelt had to initiate a series of efforts convincing American people and molding their opinion on breaking USA's policy of isolationism. The President is to assure the support of the lawmakers as well. If the majority in the American Congress will not favor the President's decision, he will either call it off or change it.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{105} Laura Neack, \textit{The New Foreign Policy- power seeking in a globalized era} (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008)
\textsuperscript{106} Barbara Farnham, “Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making.” \textit{Political Psychology} 25, no. 3 (2004)
\textsuperscript{107} Further, on US foreign policy decision-making Ahmed Ijaz Malik, \textit{US Foreign Policy and the Gulf Wars: Decision Making and International Relations} (London: IB Tauris: 2015)
The head of the state is the individual factor making foreign policy choices is not the case in all conditions. Usually, a decision maker is in a domestic framework with multilateral input from different institutions. His foreign policy decisions are influenced by the institutional input and in some cases through groupthink. Cognitive disposition and psychological variables become the defining factors if the foreign policy decisions are solely at the disposal of the decision maker. For example, the personality and the cognition of John F. Kennedy was a decisive factor in diffusing the tensions of Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Nehru's realization of India's military unpreparedness in the backdrop of 1962's India-China war became a defining character of India's military overtures and subsequent militarization under Indira. The cognitive approach reflects this phenomenon that calls for human reasoning and complex psychology of individuals in decision-making. It does not give much of the emphasis on the objective environment rather it stresses upon the psychological environment as an explanatory variable of foreign policy choices. The cognition of an individual leader is in line with the operative political environment. The political context of the domestic environment is likely to influence the perception of a decision maker. Personality traits of an individual may explain the decisions made by him.108

1.8.1 The Role of the Decision Maker

The foreign policy decision-making as mentioned above takes place in the domestic purview. The decision maker is a rational actor and is making decisions through the rational choice perspective. It assumes

- Policy decisions filter through a carefully well-defined process.
- Defined policy goals are the targets.
- Cost-benefit analysis is a deterministic factor and cost effectivity is crucial.
- Optimal solutions lead to the selection and constitutes a policy

This process includes the recognition the policy dilemma and its appropriate definition. After having identified the particular policy dilemma policy goals are identified. The identification of the alternatives follows the goal selection. It also enables the decision maker to define the choices. The availability of the choices

leads to the decision-making dilemma where all the factors mentioned earlier that include cognition, personality, groupthink and institutional input influence the decision to opt for one of the available choices. This premise of decision-making falls under the broader contours of realist theory which holds states as unitary, rational and fundamental actors and the decision makers act on the behest of the state's defined policies and agendas. There are multiple factors which shape and influence the perception of the decision maker. Under the systemic variables, the factor of polarity is overwhelmingly influential. It denotes to the degree of power concentration among the major powers. It includes the division of power capabilities with reference to the military and economic power. The second important factor in this regard is polarization. It refers to the cluster of smaller states that have a significant role to play. For instance, the alliance formation by major states is in concordance with the smaller states. The third important factor which a decision maker keeps on the front burner in the domestic decision-making milieu is the geopolitics. It holds the element of geographic characteristics crucial in foreign policy. All these factors cumulatively affect the decision-making discourse.

In furtherance to the domestic factors, the military capabilities and economic capabilities of a state are the tangible variables. Their military strength constrains states' actions. The limits to power are a decisive factor determining the foreign policy choices. No state will go for aggression without power projection capability. The aggressive pursuit in foreign policy decision-making is also conditional on the military capabilities of a state. America's role as a hegemon of the world is amid American power and prowess in military strength and economic impetus.109 Sometimes states deliberately exclude a particular choice on this given variable of military strength. Military aggression is a tool and instrument of foreign policy execution but states rarely employ this tool given their limited power and the threats and risks associated with the use of force. India and Pakistan after the nuclear umbrella in South Asia cannot afford to have a direct escalation given the threat of mutually assured destruction. The economic strength

of a state defines its foreign policy conduct. To what an extent the economy of a state can supply and resupply the military spending. For instance, India is a rising economy, and its economic boom has enabled India to surge its defense spending. That's why a marked increase in India's defence budget has been witnessed in the past a few years. Pakistan on the other hand, given a fragile economy and internal security quagmire, is feeling considerable difficulties to compete with the arch-rival India. Iran's oil economy enabled Iran to maintain an offensive foreign policy posture for the years, but the consecutive rounds of sanctions forced it to make a rapprochement with the US on the nuclear standoff.

The type of government also predetermines the foreign policy orientation of that state. The Democratic orientation of a state defines a different foreign policy posture compared to the authoritarian states. For instance, the foreign policies of Russia and Germany under Hitler and Stalin were primarily influenced by the power concentration in their hands due to the authoritarian nature of the respective states. Democratic peace and autocratic aggressiveness are the traditional theoretical notions. There is an explicit link between the type of government and foreign policy. This connection implies the foreign policy posture. But regardless of this fact, the rational political ambitions hold a deterministic role in the foreign policy manifestation of the states. The decision maker/leader wants to expand the influence and maintain its dominant position, and foreign policy decisions sometimes are orientated to keep leaders in power. For instance, the involvement of Britain in Falklands, Clinton in Libya and Bush in Iraq are the explication of this phenomenon. Leaders overindulge themselves in unnecessary disputes in pursuit of power projection or consolidate and reassert their dominant position. Individual leaders matter a lot in foreign policy decision-making. The limitations of an individual and his extraordinary skills determine the foreign policy posture of that state. Sometimes leaders carve out of the box foreign policies. For instance, Nehru along with other leaders in the early years of the intense cold war competition between USA and USSR orchestrated a new framework of the non-aligned movement. It was surprising and out of the box foreign policy orientation where instead of being on Eastern or Western bloc the decision of maintaining a neutral posture was emphasized. India under Indira had successfully managed to

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orientate a foreign policy benefitting India from both the blocs. USA's assistance to India after 1962's India-China border dispute and India's friendship treaty with USSR in 1971 that specified mutual strategic cooperation was the manifestation of this brinkmanship.

1.8.2 Bureaucratic Context

The bureaucratic context in foreign policy decision-making is very well revenant and in some cases very decisive at large. Bureaucracies formalize and accentuate foreign policies. They set operational contextualization of foreign policy decision-making. Bureaucracies script, document and execute foreign policy. Two types of bureaucracies are involved in foreign policy decision-making and its subsequent execution. One is the political executive that includes the foreign minister and his appointees who serve for a term usually conditional with the duration of the sitting government in the office. Second are the cadre employees and the civil servants that constitute the permanent executive. Both have their role and influence in the formalization and operationalization of foreign policy. The idea of bureaucratic influence on foreign policies was first discussed by Graham Allison as mentioned earlier who identified three models of decision-making.

1) Rational actor model
2) Organizational process model
3) Bureaucratic politics model

The competition of various agencies and government's sections for power and influence also affects the decision-making discourse. The politics of like and dislike by the bureaucrats and diplomats also have its imprints on foreign policy. The standard operating procedures of the bureaucracies and their modus operandi and at times their unwillingness to share across the bureaucratic boundaries and the bureaucratic malpractices have their impact on foreign policymaking, conduct or execution. The tendency for inertia and a limited space of innovation given the procedural routines and bureaucratic callousness is a kind of politics within a government. Bureaucracies are influential as far as initiative and rules are concerned. They plan and devise strategies. They process information and can
maneuver to affect the information which resultantly influences the decision-making.\textsuperscript{111}

The influence of bureaucracies on foreign policy was a result of widespread criticism on the individual decision maker. The overreliance on the individual decision maker dismisses the seminal impact of the institutions like foreign affairs, defense, and trade. These organizations contribute to the formation and implementation of foreign policy. For many scholars, the foreign policy analysis starts with understanding foreign policy bureaucracies. It also includes the various factors which tend bureaucracies to play a crucial role.\textsuperscript{112} The bureaucratic approach thus calls for reconciliation between the influence of the leaders, formal state apparatus, the bureaucratic actors and the wider organizational culture. This approach came under criticism due to its preponderant influence of bureaucracy over foreign policy thus demeaning the importance of democratic control. Secondly, the differentiation in organizational process and bureaucratic politics by Allison who is formulator of this approach is also not distinctively made. There is a significant overlapping in both of them. It is tough to ascertain how different autonomous institutions motivated by self-interest are distinctively different from the bureaucratic politics? Nevertheless, bureaucratic politics has been a significant addition. It has turned out to be a stepping stone in advancing the research of institutional influences on the foreign policy-making discourse having analyzed new actors beyond the leaders and individual decision makers. It has also prompted the theorists to develop a more nuanced understanding of the decision maker and the operative political environment while reasserting the role theory.

This approach broadly falls under the domain of the domestic environment since the bureaucratic actors are operating under the domestic political environment. It looks on the influential actors beyond the centrality of the state. It has also led to the introduction of new influential actors like NGOs, IGOs, multinationals, and corporates who are significant influential groups.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{113} S. Smith, A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (ed) \textit{Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases}
1.8.3 Constraints on Policy-making

The debate of rationality in foreign policy is always underway. Rational actor model and rational choice theory both held states and individual decision makers rational and calculated in the pursuit of their foreign policy choices. States are unitary actors, and the decision-making reflects the national interest. This realists' obsession with rationality has also come under substantial criticism by the theorists and scholars of foreign policy analysis. The critics of this approach contend that foreign policy decision makers do not act on rational manner always rather their decision-making is an assessment of the situation and the particular policy dilemma which they are facing. They may misperceive and misjudge the situation.\(^\text{114}\)

Decision makers are supposedly acting as a rational actor in this entire context. This rationality is not achievable since decision-makers continuously are coping with severe constraints on the rational behavior. States cannot ultimately act as unitary actors given a two-level game.\(^\text{115}\) States want to maintain their domestic influence and also intend to maximize their power. States are always in pursuit of promulgating a favorable policy. The desire to achieve a desirable policy and the complexities associated with this process may compel the states to opt for a foreign policy choice that is satisficing. States may not get an optimal foreign policy choice because of their processing ability and may resort to an option which is minimally acceptable. The decision makers risk to a greater extent in the pursuit of their desirable foreign policy choice. The risk factor is comparatively huge when they are trying to avoid a loss instead of pursuing gain in foreign policy discourse and leaders will risk minor losses in chase of substantial gains through foreign policy optimization. Sometimes leaders are preponderantly inclined and focused towards sunk costs.\(^\text{116}\) On the hand, decisions are not only factored in but the foreign policy decisions which are likely to be made are also considered, and their cost is factored in as prospective decision cost.


\(^{115}\) Two level game is an idea developed by Robert Putnam who believes that foreign policy decision-making is the culmination of both domestic and external variables. The negotiations in international politics are simultaneously occurring at both state and international level. The international agreements can only happen when the win sets for a state overlap with one another.

\(^{116}\) The sunk cost in economics and decision making refers to a cost which is irrecoverable. Sometimes it also accounts for a cost that is likely to be incurred in case of a possible course of action.
The rational decisions also signal for future looking cost and benefit. In reality, the rational decisions are hinting at the decisions that dismiss the sunk costs given the sunk costs are gone. The argument of rationality comes under a big question since the policymakers may be attracted to the trap of sunk costs which can be termed as costing something good for unforeseen good which may turn bad and the cost may go in vain.\(^{117}\) The group thinking may also affect the rational decision-making which significantly challenges the assumption of a single decision maker. The issues in international politics are predominantly subjected to the group thinking with the experts from the different walk of life and having expertise in a particular field. Sometimes they are deputed to work on a specific task and are assigned specific responsibilities to tackle a particular foreign policy quandary. The rationality in decision-making may also be compromised in the wake of a ‘newgroup’ syndrome which is the proclivity of group members to tilt significantly or bandwagon with assertive and prominent thinkers in the group.\(^{118}\) There are significant transnational actors which considerably influence the foreign policy decision-making and hence making the argument of rationality more questionable. The presence of more and more actors and sometimes beyond the jurisdiction of a state may turn foreign policy into a loosely oriented concept and a less coherent phenomenon. For instance along with the nation states in apparent times the presence of significantly influential world bodies and organizations and their subsequent regimes have a greater influence on foreign policy narratives. The multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations do significantly alter the perceptions of foreign policy in the mind of a decision maker. States’ economic avant-garde sometimes push them to directly deal with the corporates which traditionally lies beyond the jurisdiction of a state in realist model of decision-making.

The presence of nongovernmental organizations and their underlying agendas also compel states to take a particular course of action. For instance, the NGOs which are working primarily in the domain of human rights and liberal values profoundly influence the foreign policy orientations of the state given states are always under pressure to incorporate these dominant discourses in their decision-making.


primary foreign policy grounds. The presence of minorities, ethnicities and indigenous nationalities define a set of priorities for states. For instance, the Kurdish question in the foreign policy of Turkey remains at the helm of affairs. The issue of Rohingyas in Myanmar and the question of independence of Kosovo from Serbia have a significant impact on the foreign policies of these states. The presence of terrorist syndicates and crime and terror nexuses which is a ubiquitous phenomenon in the modern day world has revamped the traditional posture of foreign policy altogether. The advent of the fourth generation of warfare in the aftermath of this non-state actor paradigm has compelled the states to define and redefine their foreign policies in this ever-changing scenario.

To sum it up foreign policy analysis denotes the roles of bureaucracies along with the decision-making in organizations. The psychological factors and the cognitive variables play a decisive role in interpreting and dissecting the foreign policy of a state. Most of the decision-making in the realm of foreign policy pivots around the executive branch where usually the head of a state is considered as ultimate decision maker along with other influential actors and variables. The states intend to evoke a homogenous narrative on foreign policy decision-making. In this regard states deliberately adopt those policy decisions which have popular legitimacy in the domestic contextualization. The head of a state is concerned with the domestic source of foreign policy theory being an executive head of the government at one time and also a politician thinking in electoral dynamics. States try to act rationally where they make a logical attempt to achieve an identifiable goal. They calculate costs and benefits and also factor in the particular policy goal they think would serve their cause. States always think in terms of profitability and an expected utility. They are concerned primarily with the payoffs.

As mentioned earlier the decision maker may be influenced by the group thinking and this dynamic may be considered pertinent to have a consensus on a certain issue. In the meanwhile, the factors like perception and misperception, the desire to achieve rationality and the factor of motivation and bias may change and influence the foreign policy orientation of a state. For the critics of rationality, the states are not operating in the exact as realism conforms. Decision makers most of the times act on the information available and try to minimize their bias. Many
other abject notions such as beliefs, prejudices and the cognitive limitations affect the decision makers.

The most important factor in foreign policy decision-making is domestic context. The domestic environment serves as the source of the foreign policy definition. The psychological environment comes under the pretext of this domestic environment whereas the operational environment in foreign policy decision-making refers to practical accentuation of foreign policy keeping in view all constraints and impediments. John Steinbruner introduced the cybernetic approach to overcome the limitations of bureaucracy politics model and the problems of decision-making. He hints at three paradigms of decision-making: analytical, cybernetic and cognitive. The combination of cybernetic and cognitive variables gives us the comprehensive understanding of the foreign policy decision-making.\textsuperscript{119}

The gap between the psychological and operational environment leads to distortions in decision-making and has a significant impact. The conflicting patterns of the psychological and operational environment have given rise to the polyheuristic theory of decision-making. This theory bridges the gap between the rational theories of foreign policy decision-making and the psychological theories of decision-making. It postulates that decision-making is a two-stage process. In the first step, the possible options reduce, and alternative options are eliminated having considered their political and critical dimensions.\textsuperscript{120} With the options reduced the decision-making moves to the second stage where out of the available options the policy choices are adopted. It ensures minimum risks and more benefits. This theory applies to interactive, sequential and individual decision settings.

The achievement of pure rational account of foreign policy is not possible given the interplay of multiple and overlapping variables. The decision maker operates in an increasingly complex world, and the decision-making is prone to many risks. The incomplete information at times and the stereotypical behaviors, on the other hand, are playing their role in shaping the foreign policy of a state. Through the process of perception and cognition, the decision makers develop an


image and make the subjective assessment of the situation and try to confront with the policy dilemma they are facing. In the larger ambit, it defines the operational definition of the situation for a decision maker. The distortion of reality subjected to the cognition of a decision maker profoundly impacts the foreign policy discourse. That's why in case of Indian foreign policy the change of the decision maker changes the course of foreign policy on both theoretical and operational tenets. The change of a decision maker changes the political discourse that leader subscribes to and eventually lead to the change of foreign policy narrative.

1.9 Domestic Milieu and Decision-making in India

This research tries to explicate the operationalization of the domestic impetus on the foreign policy decision-making and its subsequent execution in case of India. India is a classic case study of a functional democracy in a postcolonial state. With a tremendously divided social structure and the political basis originating from the differentiation amid diversity, the domestic structure of India exhibits a fragmented public opinion. This diversity at large also splits the existence of homogeneity in India. It is the very reason that India does not have a unanimous, unequivocal and categorical stance on many issues. The central theme of this research pivots around tracing the impact of the domestic structure of India on its foreign policy conduct towards Pakistan. It is also noteworthy to mention that due to cultural and social diversity there are multiple views for Pakistan. The next chapter in detail discusses India's definition of Pakistan with its competing notions and discourses.

The Foreign policy of a state is inseparable from its domestic realm. The domestic ambit conditions the foreign policy choices and also acts as a constraint on foreign policy decision-making. At times the domestic context catalyzes the selection and optimization of a particular foreign policy choice, and in certain circumstances, it impedes the state following a specific foreign policy choice. For instance, at the end of the World War II Stalin feared a robust backlash from Soviet society given the devastation and ruination during World War II. It prompted him to create an external enemy in the form of USA to deviate the attention of its people from real-time domestic issues. On the other hand, Canada's explicit repudiation in joining the alliance against Iraq came in the aftermath of

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compulsively strong antiwar sentiments demonstrated through the protests in Britain.

There is an apparent rapprochement of external and domestic domains whereas a successful foreign policy exhibits the foreign policy choices achieved through the reconciliation of both the environments. A passive domestic structure will lead to incompatible policy goals because the schism in internal structure will overshadow the substantive component of foreign policy. A country can never emphatically accentuate its foreign policy unless it accompanies a homogenous and resilient domestic structure. Rosenau, as mentioned in the previous chapter, makes an explicit avowal that the linkage between domestic and external environment is integral.\textsuperscript{122} States consider foreign policy affairs a serious business and cautiously prioritize their choices. For small states, the issue of primal concern is the factor of survivability whereas the major or powerful countries enjoy the cushion of adding more variety and number of factors in their ‘to do' lists. In some cases, states may take their domestic policies casually and ineffectively, but no state can afford to overrun the dynamics of foreign affairs which are considered the issues of high priority for a state. It is the very reason that foreign policy establishments in all the countries are more or less same. The Foreign policy of a state remains unaffected from the legislative intervention given it is considered to be the prerogative of the high-ups. The institutions concerned with economic, military, cultural and scientific decision-making have their profound influence and impact on setting up the agenda of foreign policy goals and the state heads or decision makers over-rely on the input coming from these quarters. Decision makers are occupied by the domestic considerations generally. In normal circumstances diplomats, military planners and trade experts are primarily concerned with routine activities.

The logical extension of realism has taken a new shape in the form of neoclassical realism which is approach mostly meant for foreign policy analysis. It was primarily reflected in the work of Gideon Rose and is a culmination of neorealist and classical realist tradition.\textsuperscript{123} This theory postulates that leaders always don't perceive the systemic impulse accurately and sometimes they

\textsuperscript{122} James N. Rosenau, “Theories and Pretheories”

\textsuperscript{123} Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” \textit{World Politics} 51 no.1 (1998): 144-172.
misjudge or misperceive the dictation of international system. The International structure does not always convey clear signals, and there may be a misperception on the part of the states. Leaders may not react appropriately even after having perceived the imperative of international system accurately. States may not effectively mobilize their resources. Therefore it was felt necessary to introduce intervening variables that could synthesize structural realism and classical realism. It incorporates both internal and external variables.

The Foreign policy of a state is driven by the position of that state in the international system and specifically by its power capabilities. Here the state is upheld as a central unit which is an essential doctrine of the realist school of thought, but neoclassical realist further argues that the impact of the power capabilities of a state on its foreign policy is indirect not in the concrete terms. For that purpose systemic variables must be translated at the unit level. Foreign policy choices are the result of the perceptions of the leaders. It generates a tricky situation where sometimes the material strength in its tangible form may not matter, but rather the perception associated with the material resources consequently perceived by the leader may define the course of foreign policy. At times the leader may not be able to direct and extract material resources as per their wish, and in this regard, power analysis must examine state structure and the social dynamics that will define resource allocations in the realm of foreign policy. Systemic pressures and dictations define the broad contours of foreign policy without determining the specific details of state behavior. Understanding the link between power and policy will be dependent on the context in which foreign policies are made and executed.

The Foreign policy of India had been an interesting subject of academic inquiry. Nehru set up the normative discourse of Indian foreign policy which even today serves as a prelude of Indian foreign policy decision-making. Emanating from Nehru's cognitive reflections the Indian worldview had been essentially

125 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism”
126 Steven E. Lobbel, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffret W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
internationalist. Nehru's detailed exposure to history and emphasis on civilizational traits which to him were rooted in Indian history, India carved a foreign policy vision of its own where India is an equal player in international affairs. The drive for Indian internationalism had long-lasting imprints on Indian foreign policy. The next chapter presents a detailed account of Indian foreign policy.

The domestic structure of India seemingly had never been overtly decisive in pursuit of foreign policy choices. Since early years in India leadership remained the decisive variable. Foreign policy choices were made, conditioned and executed by a leader during Nehru and Indira’s rule. Afterward, leadership, ideology, domestic politics and bureaucracy were impacting variables in Indian foreign policy.

The domestic context in the foreign policy formulation in India is multifaceted. It includes the influence of domestic impetus at various levels. At the micro level, the domestic milieu sets a prelude for foreign policy choices and their subsequent execution at the macro level. The leadership in India historically held a deterministic role in the foreign formulation and its manifestation. The tryst of Indian foreign policy with leadership started with the first Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who held the reins of power for nearly first 17 years after independence. His cognitive reflections and foreign policy prioritization put up a background that remained valid afterward. The decision-making and its operationalization in the domestic arena have taken a quantum leap forward in the era of Indira Gandhi whose authoritarian way of dealing with the statecraft, and aggressive pursuit of foreign policy choices again put the factor of leadership on the front burner.

The role of domestic environment in shaping the foreign policy contours of India is contingent upon the event specific approach. India is a postcolonial state, and there are no organized institutions which could mobilize and capitalize the public support and domestic capital in a coherent and channelized way. The influence of domestic impetus reflects through certain issues, happenings, and

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130 Sinerpau Singh, *India in South Asia: Domestic Identity Politics and Foreign Policy From Nehru to BJP* (London: Routledge, 2015)
eventualities. The historical experiences, cultural odds, civilizational argumentation and colonial experiences have together set up a normative discourse in which Indians envisage and define the many political developments and processes. For instance, the idea of composite culture which Congress trumpets as a definitional parameter of Indian political culture is India's civilizational attribute. BJP's Hindutva doctrine is also embedded in Indian history and more essentially in the Vedic era. These definitional parameters crystallize into the policy making as well, and India's foreign policy towards Pakistan manifests these historical, cultural and civilizational parameters. The political differentiation that exists at large and the political and regional diversity which the hallmark of Indian political landscape also turn out to be key variables in understanding the context in which decision-making takes place. The study of political processes, electoral politics, regional issues, caste politics and different regions exhibiting various political definitions of the same process are equally compelling interpretations of Indian political landscape.

The significance of the leadership becomes relevant in the context of the domestic concerns and the issues which the leadership is facing at home. Nehru's foreign policy in its early years was more tilted towards internationalism with India taking the lead as an anchoring responsible power but was forced to be drifted into domestic ambit in the pretext of border clashes with China. The Indira's militarism resultantly making India a military giant also came in the years followed after 1965’s war. The war of 1965 and its conclusion through Tashkent declaration lead to the creation of a steady mentality in India's domestic purview seeking India to be in a position where it can give Pakistan a befitting response. The successful military campaign of 1971 resultantly leading to the dismemberment of East Pakistan was the accentuation of this mindset. The Pakistan factor in Indian foreign policy has been continued to be interpreted through these two major events until when some more issues with Pakistan have been added to the existing consolidated rivalry. These problems include Siachen, Sir Creek, Kargil, Water, and Terrorism. The Indian definition of terrorism is also linked up to the patter of its relations with Pakistan. India primarily suspects the

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133 See also Paul R. Brass, *The Politics of India since Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
involvement of Pakistan and presents it as a narrative in its domestic arena widely termed as cross-border terrorism.\textsuperscript{134} The next chapter will present the more nuanced view and a detailed account of Indian foreign policy and its evolution about different phases.

In India, the domestic context of decision-making and its impact on foreign policy are well found and grounded in three areas

1) Domestic Concerns
2) Political institutions
3) Political elite

Different domestic issues coupled with the rhetoric built around them many times serves as a direct source of foreign policy. For instance, India's dealing towards Pakistan conditions through the public sentiment and an insinuated perception. The leadership regardless of the political affiliation has to cater the public sentiment while dealing with Pakistan. The same phenomenon was reflected in Modi's electoral campaign when he was running for the office of the Prime Minister that we want to give Pakistan a jaw-breaking response. Blood and water can't flow together. We shall respond bullet with a bullet. The anti-Pakistan sentiment in India gets capitalized in the electoral campaigns hence a domestic issue comes at the forefront of foreign policy quarters. Pakistan is a domestic issue in India, and this issue significantly alters the course of foreign policy in India. Indian decision making elite disregard the influence of Pakistan on foreign policy. India claims not to look at Pakistan beyond a few disputes. Indian foreign policymakers hold a narrative that India's engagement with Pakistan is contingent upon a few territorial disputes and a few high politics issues.\textsuperscript{135} Having said this, it is the fact that Pakistan remains a quagmire in India's domestic arena and every time in electoral campaigns Pakistan remains an integral part.\textsuperscript{136} Modi's electoral campaign in 2014 mentioned Pakistan repeatedly. He severely lambasted Pakistan for perpetrating the terrorism in India and warned Pakistan of severe

\textsuperscript{134} David Scott, Handbook of India’s Foreign Relations (London: Routledge, 20110, 278.
\textsuperscript{135} In a personal interview with the researcher the former Indian foreign minister Mr. Salman Khurshid maintains a point that Pakistan is not a predominant rather a significant factor in India’s foreign policy. India looks at Pakistan through the prism of a few disputes. Besides that Pakistan holds no significance in India’s foreign policy project.
consequences. Modi emblematizes the hardcore Hindu nationalist perspective and presents a confrontationist view towards Pakistan.

The Nehruvian rhetoric generated a foreign policy discourse in India's history. The grand narratives like nonviolence, India a mature civilizational power, non-alignment and Nehru's firm resolve on Afro-Asian cooperation had been predominantly influential discourses in all stages of foreign policy making and execution. These discourses even today impact the overall grandeur of Indian foreign policy. The World continues to see India through this historical lineage. India's ancient past has led to the definition of sociopolitical processes in India. Indian foreign policy also receives a great impetus from the historical notions. India always defined itself a mature civilization and the same reflected through the cognition of Nehru. The Nehruvian rhetoric of anti-colonialism, anti-racism and decolonization were the demonstrations of the same historical construct.

The domestic arena of India has been equally compelling concerning the democratic continuity within India polity. The exception of India as a rarely functional postcolonial democracy has made Indian domestic and democratic political structure appealing and intriguing to the rest of the world. Having the status of the largest democracy of the world, India continues to attract the rest of the world through the prism of democratic progression. India's regional politics, caste-based political structure and the strong factor of regional politics continue to affect the structures involved in foreign policy formulation. For instance, the opposition towards Pakistan is more in the areas and regions which have been affected by the event of partition. For instance, in the cow belt which has a prevalent hate sentiment towards Pakistan, the electoral campaigns have Pakistan as an integral factor. The elections in UP and Punjab in 2017 witnessed the same phenomenon when premier Modi spewed anti-Pakistan rhetoric to garner more votes and massive electoral appeal. It delineates how the impetus of domestic politics interacts and influences the structures involved in foreign policy decision-making.

137 R.C. Hingorani, Nehru’s Foreign Policy (Columbia: South Asia Books, 1989)
138 Cow Belt is a term used by Indian academic Dr. Suba Chandaran in a personal interview with the researcher, dated on November 23, 2014. It refers to all those areas where anti-Pakistan sentiment prevails and these are the areas which have been primarily affected at the time of partition and includes UP and Punjab.
India does not present a homogenous voice and perspective on all issues about foreign policy. The competing discourses exist in India. These competing notions are political and ideological. The Congress’s rhetoric has always depicted India as a home for composite cultures and the basis of Indian civilizations mostly secular. The foreign policy of India under Congress rule entangles with multiple alliances with different religious parties and vote blocs. It has affected the discourse of Indian foreign policy. Congress with its tilt towards socialist ideology and inclination towards centralized economic planning had pro-soviet policy during the cold war. Indian leader, particularly Indira Gandhi, had a socialist leaning and her decision-making cohort was also having a bent of mind more prone towards leftist thinking. Chapter three and detail discusses the accounts of Congress’s discourse and its foreign policy manifestation. The section will also give a detailed analysis of the adoption of certain policies under the Congress rule.

Both Congress and Hindu nationalists plead for a strong India and a self-reliant India. The ideology of Hindu nationalists mainly termed as Hindutva lies in the mythology of Vedic era. The religious interpretation of the socio-cultural and socio-political processes lies at the helm of Hindu nationalist ideology. This discourse rejects the rhetoric of a composite culture and believes that India primarily and essentially had been a Hindu state throughout its history of existence. The historical anecdotes of India are along with the evolution of Hindu religion. In its nutshell, this discourse holds a belief that majoritarian Hindu culture and religion should prevail. This discourse had been so compelling and emphatic that the founder of Indian nation Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu extremist Nathu Ram Godse on his alleged role in the partition of Indian motherland. Throughout its postcolonial history, Hindu nationalism remained counter-rhetoric to Congressional discourse. The Hindu nationalist discourse presents an alternative view and perspective of foreign policy which is completely at odds with the policies of Indian National Congress. Chapter four shall take a brief review of the Hindu nationalist discourse and its subsequent impact on Indian domestic polity. It shall also review its concomitant reverberations on the process of foreign policy formulation and execution in India. This ideology yearns

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139 See also Romila Thapar, *Readings in Early Indian History: A Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)
for a patriotic India. The rhetoric like Make in India, Look East policy and Shining India is the manifestation of this thought process.140

The nuanced and subtle implication of these domestic discourses can be found primarily in India's schematization of external affairs. Different leaders and their part policies substantially and significantly impact the foreign policy pursuits amid these domestic constraints and preconditions. This phenomenon can be witnessed primarily after the decade 80s when the conundrum of coalitional politics started impinging India's domestic state of affairs. The successive governments in the 90s with people coming at the top from certain coalitions, internal bifurcation and disharmony of interests at large between the coalition partners significantly increased the friction and necessitated the need for consensus and issues. These shared ground and issues are overlapping in both the ambits of domestic and foreign policy and the trajectory of India's domestic arena in comparison with its external affairs has also blurred.141

In case of India, four significant factors historically have marked their influence on signifying domestic contextualization pertinent and foreign policy decision-making.

1) Democratization
2) Decentralization
3) Economic Development
4) Political Tradition

India's democratic avant-garde since its provenance had shaped the contours of decision-making more towards institutionalism. Nehru, being an idealist was more prone towards making institutions.142 Though India lacks any formal institution catering public opinion but the logic of democratic polity is tantamount to institutional vibrancy. It also revamped the pattern of state and society. A strengthened society within a state is potent when it comes to its exertion. The way democracy has held its roots in Indian society gradually has made processes more relevant and significant. This impetus had led to the mainstream acceptance of domestic arena in the statecraft. In keeping the principle of the democracy, the emphasis was laid upon strengthening the bond between the voters and the

142 Guha, *Makers of Modern India*
representatives.\textsuperscript{143} Democracy has been embraced and consolidated in Indian polity and had become a defining aspect of the pattern of state and society relations in India. Indian democracy is a puzzle and a kind of an exception since rarest of the democracies in postcolonial societies has turned up with such a massive participation and dynamism. In the wake of neoliberalized world order post-Cold War, the expansion of Middle Class in India had taken place which has resultantly made Indian democracy a Center of attention for the rest of the world.

The other contributory factor is the economic prosperity and a substantial economic growth which India managed to achieve in past two decades. Indian economy's inspiration since the beginning was the Soviet model of centralized planning. The socialist-leaning of India became more existent and viable during the rule of Indira Gandhi. Nehru's anathema towards West and in the meanwhile avoidance to be the part/ally of Soviet campaign impelled him to carve out a new spectrum of non-aligned movement. It was rather an idealistic position which Nehru tried to maintain in the then global affairs dominated by East and West competition and rivalry. This idealistic construct of Nehru came under criticism in the aftermath of 1962's India-China border clash. Nehru sought assistance from both Soviet and USA in pursuit of India's sovereign existence. This domestic impetus became the hallmark of foreign/external affairs. Having overcome the turbulence which followed after the death of Pandit Nehru, Indira Gandhi followed a hawkish pursuit of foreign policy. Next chapter will present a detailed account of India's practice in the realm of foreign policy concerning the specific course of actions that spans over the decades of Indian foreign policy. Indira Gandhi had an explicit socialist leaning which was evident from her cohort of decision makers. Indira also inspired by the Soviet model of economy ensured the matrix of centralized planning. The Permit-Raj system was a hallmark of Indira rule. The sluggishness in Indian economy persisted until the end of the Cold war. There was no serious mechanism to restructure/revamp India's financial affairs. The adoption of Glasnost and Perestroika in the Soviet Union marked an end towards the demise of communism and subsequently led to the diminishing of the influence of the Soviet Union in global and regional affairs. India was also the recipient of the change which followed after Soviet demise.

The liberalization of economy and abolition of state's overt intrusion in economic affairs pushed India's economic growth which became rampant over the years to come. It is evident from the fact that when the world was confronting the global financial crisis that started in 2008, India was celebrating its annual growth of 9%. The economy as already discussed in the first chapter holds a defining position in the pursuit of foreign policy choices of the states. The post-cold war era has witnessed a marked shift from security centric foreign policies to polynomic foreign policies. A new trajectory of foreign policies more prone to economic pursuit is viable.

The strengthening of democracy at the level of the center has trickled down to the state level as well. It has led to the perpetuation of democracy as a political tradition. The unstinted democratic journey of India, with a minor exception of one constitutional emergency, has made Indian democracy mainly consolidative. Democracy has become a consensual discourse where all competing notions, perspectives, and narratives agree upon the democratic fate of India. The fortification of this political tradition has impinged Indian polity with far-reaching implications. Democracy in India tantamount to a political culture is a prominent factor in Indian domestic ambit and became a defining element in a revamped and redefined India. The prism of democratic development has contributed to one of the explicit definitions of India in global affairs.

The escalating voices of regionalism and a strong demand for decentralization have marked new avenues of representation and assertion. The political assertion at the state level and in dealing with the center impacts domestic discourses and lead to heterogeneity. As mentioned earlier various regions in India depict different discourses. These discourses are mostly different and at times contrary to one another. The absence of homogeneity over several issues led to the adoption of policies at central level that could serve these voices of dissent. For instance, Indian Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda hailed from Karnataka and was first low-caste PM. He was an influential figure in state politics in Karnataka and

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144 Meghnad Desai, *The Rediscovery of India*

145 Democratic Peace Theory put forth by Immanuel Kant argues that the foreign policies of countries largely depend upon being democratic and non-democratic. Democratic countries have a different foreign policy orientation and manifestation towards non-democracies. The democratic character of a state reflects in its foreign policy accentuation.

146 See Kataharine Adeney and Lawrence Saez, ed. *Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2005)
had served as Chief Minister of Karnataka. When he became the Prime Minister of India in 1996, his foreign policy orientation was more peripheral rather than pivoting around the limelight issues. He was an ardent crusader of socioeconomic development and was more prone to the appreciation of the cultural heritage of India. Chennai, Karnataka, UP, Assam, and Gujrat all have different politico-cultural traditions which at times don’t correspond to the policies flowing from New Delhi. This political differentiation guides the emergence of competing views and narratives on a single issue. It leads to the dire need of some national issues which could result in a homogenous opinion. These issues or discourses are embraced in India regardless of political and cultural variations.

Though the level and intensity of perception and reaction towards these issues may vary, they serve as a unifying force in India. These political and historical issues are normative and cognitive at large. These issues have a structural dimension in Indian foreign policy discourse. They not only affect and influence the decision-making but hold a definitional aspect in some areas of foreign policy decision-making. These issues though traditionally lie in the jurisdiction of domestic politics but have a direct impinging upon the external affairs of India. They have a substantial impact on the course of Indian foreign policymaking and its subsequent execution. Some of these issues that hold a significant rather decisive position in India’s domestic contours and resultantly impact the foreign policy of India are:

1) Pakistan  
2) China  
3) Nuclear  
4) Kashmir  
5) Terrorism  
6) Indian diaspora  
7) Muslim factor

8) Indian image abroad

These issues constitute a uniform public opinion. They generate an impulse that leads to consistency. The factors listed above are of perpetual orientation. They strike India either in positive or negative nuance and hold concrete imprints on Indian policymaking. There are the issue areas which combines Indian regardless of their regional differences and contradiction of priorities. Pakistan is a national cause in India and rivalry with Pakistan is a defining posture of Indian polity. Some areas depict more stringent perception about Pakistan, and in some regions, the intensity and sensitivity towards Pakistan are not that harsh. Overall Pakistan holds a significant position in Indian domestic political landscape. This Pakistan factor is two-pronged. Indian governments use Pakistan card to harmonize the public opinion and harness it towards a particular policy orientation. Secondly, the government in the Center is always under pressure to convey a harsh and stern tone towards Pakistan. The public sentiment at large presumes anti-Pakistan rhetoric. It is the very same reason that in the backdrop of an event of bilateral significance the Indian government operationalizes a narrative against Pakistan and postures aggressively. This two level contingency of domestic factor in India's policy towards Pakistan predominantly shapes India's strategic priorities vis-à-vis Pakistan. Hostility towards Pakistan remains a persistent theme in Indian foreign policy. The reflection of this hostility at the state level through policy actions is in concordance with the social enmity and hatred for Pakistan that exists in India polity. Any such action is thus legitimimized in the pretext of public opinion which is against Pakistan at large.

Pakistan remains a vibrant and contentious phenomenon in India's election campaigns. The hate speeches against Pakistan are a ubiquitous phenomenon in Indian elections. It can be substantiated through the fact that Modi’s electoral campaign mentioned Pakistan numerous times while having maintained a hardline approach. Indian public sentiment believes that terrorism in India is exported from Pakistan and Indian soldiers at borders are getting slaughtered due to Pakistan. It convolutes the relational trajectory and triggers anti-Pakistan sentiment. Pakistan also purports the unrest in Kashmir. India portrays Pakistan as an impending threat or impediment towards India’s rampant progress, which hinders India’s developmental agenda in the region. The four wars in this regard are citation and
ostentation of this frame of mind. Pakistan nurtures terrorism to backstab India. India strategic and political calculus is of the opinion that since Pakistan cannot fight and compete with India in conventional war given a huge disparity between both the countries that is why it resorts to sub-conventional warfare. It includes hitting India through terrorism, and Pakistan harbors terrorist, peddles them and export them to India to incur immense damage. Pakistan does not want to engage seriously with India and does not want to mend ties with India either. The perpetuation of rivalry suits Pakistan since it feels eternally locked into hostility and rivalry with India. Indians also think that no amount of goodwill from Indian side can change Pakistan’s intransigence.

China defines India’s larger threat spectrum. China’s growing military and political prowess in global affairs equally perturbs India. India's inability to reconcile differences with China has portrayed it India's competitor and rival. This rivalry has historical orientation. India envisages itself in a larger strategic and economic competition with India and also shares the discontent of the border demarcation and the disputed territories. The poignant past of 1962’s border clash, Dokhlam issue and subsequent China's strategic angling in South Asia considering Pakistan as a close and concerning ally perturbs India to a greater extent. This insinuation is intensely consolidated in India's domestic context as well. China is a rival and competitor. China, on the other hand, is also anxious about India's development and rising status. The upward trajectory of India may drive India-China relations towards a Thucydides trap. China is also a consistent domestic undercurrent which significantly and profoundly impacts the Indian course of foreign policy action.

Nuclear weapons demonstrate India's offensive and aggressive muscles. They project India's offensive posture to India's enemies and rest of the world. India's elite holds a cognitive perception that the discrimination with India needs to end at

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150 Sanjay Singh, “Pakistan’s state-sponsored policy of exporting terror is isolating Islamabad globally”, FirstPost, October 11, 2016.
151 “Sushma Swaraj's UNGA speech: Here is the full text,” The Indian Express, September 27, 2016.
152 “Shiv Sena questions Centre's will to act against Pakistan,” The Indian Express, January 03, 2017.
153 Thucydides trap is a term coined by Graham T. Allison. It refers to fear and insecurity in an established power amid a rising power and escalates towards war. This term analogizes with the Thucydides’ landmark book, “The History of Peloponnesian War.” Thucydides writes in the book, “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”
the global level. For this matter, India considers Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a discriminatory treaty. India's nuclear program accentuates its strength and juxtaposes it with other major powers of the world. India's drive for NSG membership and all the provisions which permanent five enjoy is the reflection of anti-discriminatory mindset. India's earnest endeavor for the acquisition of civil nuclear technology is the manifestation of domestic push at the external level. The quest for nuclear energy to satiate India's domestic needs is serving as a useful impetus for India's foreign policy to bolster its relations with the countries who potentially can indulge into a closer relationship with India. Muslim factor, terrorism and Kashmir issue are the variables that penetratingly affect and impact India's foreign policy dealing towards Pakistan. All three factors traditionally lie in the domestic jurisdiction of India but have their implications on larger foreign policy dispensation. India's foreign policy towards these issues is the reflection of domestic perception. India's projection of soft power by cultivating an image of rising and booming India evinces domestic impulse towards a foreign policy spectrum. Though India does not have a formal institution and mechanism channelizing public opinion and crystallizing it in a foreign framework for action, nevertheless there are significant domestic undercurrents which impact and affect the decision-making and the course of foreign policy action significantly reflect the cognitive and normative impulse. The domestic milieu in India is an impactful domain which has concrete imprints on fundamentals of foreign policymaking.
CHAPTER 2
INDIAN NATIONALISM, CONGRESS, AND PAKISTAN FACTOR

This chapter intends to look at the foreign policy patterns and responses of Indian National Congress towards Pakistan through a historical-sociological pretext. The discourse of Indian nationalism cannot be comprehended completely without having understood the historical and contemporary formations of this idea. Indian National Congress had been clinging to this idea of Indian nationalism as a political rhetoric since its formation, but the existence of this concept as a social and historical undercurrent predates the centuries of India's civilizational evolution and progress. This research aims to trace and explore the impact of ideational structures on foreign policy formulation and execution. It wants to delineate the broader definitional parameters which define the broader contours of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. Given the fact that Indian National Congress and Bharatya Janta Party have strikingly different definitions of Pakistan and the same reflects from their different rather divergent foreign policy positions. As mentioned in the previous chapter foreign policy is not exclusively an external process but rather a reflection of the internal political and social structures manifested through policy formulations and responses in a particular decision-making dilemma.

The theory of neoclassical realism which broadly an approach to foreign policy analysis has made the significance of domestic discourses more relevant and important. It holds that particular actions of a state or regime cannot be only delimited to the systemic variables only because the cognitive variables and domestic variables have a larger role in understanding and explicating the actions and decisions of a state.\(^{154}\) The perceptions, intentions, state institutions, elite and societal actors are equally important and emphatic in setting up a decision-making discourse in foreign policy. This normative discourse affects the power and freedom of the decision makers and either provides or limits their foreign policy choices. In case of India and Pakistan relations, the domestic variable attains more significant position since it plays its role in creating a grand narrative about bilateral ties which more or less remains intact and dictates the foreign policy choices.

choices. This grand narrative is contingent and embedded in the domestic political discourse. Congress and BJP are the representatives of the alternative discourses, and both have a different domestic outreach, and both manipulate domestic variable differently. It is the very reason that foreign policy conduct of Congress and BJP towards Pakistan are completely poles apart.

Indian nationalism is the idea or a concept that corresponds to a consciousness that Indians exhibit a consistent identity regardless of their religious, cultural or historical differences. India is a civilizational construct, and all religious minorities and ethnic backgrounds are the part of this grand composite culture. This definition of nationalism is not limited to the territorial nationalism but spans over all other areas of social and cultural life. India is a cradle of Indus valley and Vedic civilizations and host to four major religions, i.e., Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. Akhand Bharat is an idea that flows from this conception.\footnote{Jim Masselos, Indian Nationalism: A History (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 2010), further on this topic Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-building, Implantation and Mobilisation with Special Reference to Central India (New Delhi, Penguin Books, 1999) and Hanna Lerner, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)}

The definition of Indian nationalism has both modern and archaic undercurrents. This idea was nurtured and became a political lexicon during the British Raj's rule over India. The sociocultural existence of this consciousness is in the historical lineage which presents an inclusive picture throughout medieval and modern ages. The early conquests and a subsequent blending of Indo-Aryan culture led to the rule of powerful dynasties spread over the most parts of the Indian subcontinent.\footnote{Romila Thapar, Early Indian History: A Reader (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013)} The modern accentuation of this idea was manifested in the formation of Indian National Congress in 1885, a political party, to represent all the Indians of the subcontinent. This idea of Indian nationalism ferociously opposes the strands of communalism whose strands are in the form of Hindu and Muslim nationalism.

It is important to understand the basic structure of the polity of India to understand the ideational construct of Indian nationalism. In pre-British India, there was a marked absentaia of legal and political authority. The formal administrative and institutional unity remained absent though they established an
effective administration.\textsuperscript{157} The British Raj led the centralization of the power by overcoming the chief defects of the system.\textsuperscript{158} It established an institutional mechanism and currency system which guided India towards legal and administrative unification.

The rule of Raj in India led to the formation of new social classes in India. India traditionally was a caste-based society. The intervention of Raj resulted in the fundamental transformation of the social structure and started stratification on the class lines.\textsuperscript{159} The rapid socioeconomic change led to the formation of Middle Class in India. This middle class was politically conscious and cognizant of the rapid changes that were taking place in the traditional Indian society. The advent of Raj also guided the process of modernity which thrived in as the aftermath of the rapid communicational and technological changes. The initiation of the transportation system, railways, newspapers, and telegrams revamped the traditional societal structure and introduced new ideas of social and political engagements. The conscious middle class was primarily catalyzing the process of change.\textsuperscript{160} The Charter Act of 1833 banned politics in India. The economically incentivized middle class was seeking the avenues of political representation. It triggered the upheaval in 1857 in the form of an organized rebellion which eventually proved to be counterproductive in subverting the Company rule. A well-thought plan was made to return politics to India in the aftermath of the 1857's mutiny and subsequently achieved in 1862 with first Indian Councils Act. The introduction of political competition in Indian political landscape increased the communal competition. The language controversy of 1866 was the manifestation of this very same fact.\textsuperscript{161}

The communal nationalism was making its headway in India since there was no organized political entity in the social and political landscape of Indian politics. The process of identity construction through myths and symbols coupled

\textsuperscript{157} Katharine Adeney & Andrew Wyatt, \textit{Contemporary India (Contemporary States and Societies)} (London: Palgrave, 2010)
\textsuperscript{158} A.R. Desai, \textit{Social Background of Indian Nationalism} (London: Sage Publications (5\textsuperscript{th} ed), 2016), 117.
\textsuperscript{159} Ian Talbot, \textit{India and Pakistan: Inventing the Nation} (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2000)
\textsuperscript{160} On this Sanjay Joshi, \textit{The Middle Class in Colonial India (Themes in Indian History) ed} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Yash Pal Chibbar, \textit{From caste to class:: A study of the Indian middle classes} (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1968) and Surinder Johdka & Aseem Prakash, \textit{The Indian Middle Class (Oxford India Short Introductions)} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)
\textsuperscript{161} Ian Talbot, \textit{India and Pakistan}
with communal competition became the defining aspect of India's political fortune. The formation of Indian National Congress in 1885 by Lord A. O Hume was the first political party that spearheaded the claim of national representation. The political rhetoric of Indian National Congress always centered on inclusive nationalism. The historical lineage of this idea was right ingrained in India's civilizational attribute. Congress politically tried to present itself a sole representative for all Indians, but as mentioned earlier the communal strands in Indian polity had sustained their positions. The Muslims of India decided to stay away from Indian National Congress given the fact a very marginal proportion of Muslims joined Congress. Congress held rhetoric that all Indian have a shared destiny since they share a common history, common traditions, shared political association and common ideals of political unity. Congress presented a comprehensive view of nationalism where communal differences remain at the social level. No amount of religious and cultural differences should tear apart the core fabric of holistic Indian nationalism.

2.1 Congress and Foreign Policy in Colonial India

The rise of political movements as an expression of Indian nationalism was a significant development at the start of 20th century. Its first sprouting was in 1857 as an outright rejection of foreign domination. The militant leadership emerged in the social and political landscape of India. Movements like Swadeshi and Boycott emerged on the national scene. The idea of nationalism as a political narrative took a new turn in the decade of 1920s with the advent of Gandhi as a central and key leader of Indian National Congress. Gandhi clung to Indian nationalistic narrative while having rejected the violent means. He espoused to the ideals of democracy, religious harmony, ethnic equality and an outright rejection of untouchability and caste-based discrimination. It established Congress as a powerful political voice in Indian polity and led to its acceptance and recognition as a vibrant political entity as well. Communal sentiments and differences which were brewing after the mutiny of 1857 were more solidified. Muslim factor became a distinctive trait of Indian politics with new leadership and Muslim elite following a political trajectory not in lines with Congress but

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Swadeshi movement started in the aftermath of Bengal partition in 1905. Its prime architects were Aurobindo, Lala Lajipat Rai, and BG Tilak. Swadesh was as a self-rule. This movement instigated radical nationalist sentiments which became a force for Indian revolutionaries.
strategized a policy of its own given the narrow political interests and the exclusive identity matrix defined along the religious lines.

Indian National Congress had been a strident voice in the domain of foreign policy even before independence. It started taking independent foreign policy standpoints. The leadership of Congress had been adamant on four major themes.

1) Overt despise towards colonialism and imperial rule
2) Opposition to war and militarism, though it supported the cause of Britain in WW1.
3) Sympathy and moral support for independence movements
4) Outright rejection of India’s foreign entanglements

Congress bitterly opposed the annexation of upper Burma in 1885 by the British Raj. Congress also expressed its severest reservations over using India as a defence line for military motives of British Raj against Afghanistan, Tibet and Burma. Congress opposed the British involvement in Tibet.\textsuperscript{163} The World War I triggered Indian National Congress to take more explicit and articulated stand on foreign issues. The expression of overt support for Irish independence was the reflection of this shift. In 1921 Indian National Congress adopted a dedicated resolution on foreign policy with a firm expression of resolve in establishing good and friendly ties with India’s neighbors and furiously lambasted Indian government over prioritizing colonial interest over the national interest of Indian people. This resolution had served as guiding document in the post-independence foreign policymaking as well.\textsuperscript{164} In 1927 Indian National Congress opposed the use of Indian troops against China and Persia. In 1928 Congress took a quantum leap forward and established a foreign relations department in the party whose aim was to establish and develop contacts in organizing and strengthening anti-imperialist struggle.\textsuperscript{165} Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru came to head of this department and became the director of this wing. Nehru's role as the director of foreign relations of Congress imparted him the skills, acumen, precision, and accuracy which eventually made him the chief architect of India's foreign policy after its independence. Under Nehru Congress opposed the Nazi and fascist policies and

\textsuperscript{163} N.V Rajkumar, \textit{The Background of India's Foreign Policy} (New Delhi: Indian National Congress, 1952)
\textsuperscript{164} Rammanohar Lohia, \textit{Indian foreign policy (Congress political and economic studies)} (J.B. Kriplani, 1938)
\textsuperscript{165} A. Appadorai, “India’s Foreign Policy”, \textit{International Affairs} 25, no. 1 (1949): 37-46.
issued an explicit condemnation and warned a war and declared that India wouldn't be party to this war. In 1939 a session was held at Tripuri where Congress demanded that India should be allowed to govern foreign policy of its own. Congress again condemned imperialist voices and highly criticized British decision of going into World War II. Congress demanded the recognition of India as a full state in the pretext of Atlantic Charter. Congress welcomed the formation of United Nations but also expressed its apprehensions of big powers domination. Congress demanded freedom of all countries and complete elimination of imperialist control and an end to the foreign domination of Asian and African countries. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru drafted most of these resolutions, and he zealously advocated democracy and shunned imperialism and colonialism. The role of Nehru in this capacity sharpened his understanding in the domain of foreign policy and equipped him with the necessary skills which became a prelude of Indian foreign policy at the onset of its independence.

2.2 Nehruvian Internationalism in Postcolonial India

The assassination of Gandhi brought Nehru into the spotlight. He became the key leader of Indian National Congress. Nehru conducted India's foreign policy, and for the same reason, India did not have a Foreign Minister. Nehru continued to be India's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister from 1947-1964. The Nehruvian foreign policy had more internationalist dimension given his background as the director of foreign policy of Indian National Congress. The international developments that followed after World War II influenced and shaped his foreign policy vision. This period witnessed the weakening and subsequent collapsing of imperialist powers and rise of democracy and development as substantive alternatives. Two power blocs divided the World. Many countries of Europe and Asia departed from the capitalist system and joined hands with socialist model led by USSR. Nehru had a rich background of dealing with the foreign policy related issues given that he had been a crusader of anti-

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imperialism throughout the 1930s and 40s. In the pretext of the resolution of 1920 that India aims to establish friendly relations with its neighbors, Nehru held an Asian Relations Conference in 1947 which was attended by 29 countries. The primary purpose of the Conference was to strengthen the solidarity of Asian countries.

Nehru was an idealist and was eying at India's international engagements more than its regional commitments. The rivalry between USA and USSR dominated the chessboard of global politics and developing countries had little existence and margin in foreign policy formulation. Nehru took a uniquely different position and declared to remain neutral in the cold war rivalry. Nehru went on to make the nonaligned movement. He received support from Nasser of Egypt, Sukarno of Indonesia and Tito of Yugoslavia. Nehru participated in Bandung conference in 1955 and popularized nonaligned movement. India denounced any foreign policy that can lead to war and conflict and steered away from any alliance. India proclaimed for an independent foreign policy controlled and conditioned by India. Nehru espoused again to the ideals of democracy, racial equality, and anti-imperialism. Nehru envisioned a bigger stature for India where it could mediate the disputes and conflicts rather than being a party to the conflicts. India effectively dubbed rhetoric of a peacemaker in the Korean War and Indo-China conflict.

Nehru wished a course of foreign policy for India which does not take it to isolation but integration and cooperation with all states but at the same time following an independent course.

The dominant themes in Nehruvian foreign policy were

1) Panchsheel
2) Nonalignment
3) Anti-colonialism
4) Institutionalism

Panchsheel refers to the five principles of peaceful coexistence enunciated in the treaty between India and China in 1954. These five principles are mutual respect for one another's territorial sovereignty, non-aggression, equality and
mutually beneficial relationship, noninterference and peaceful coexistence.\textsuperscript{168} The other factor which pushed Nehru to move towards nonalignment was India's economic backwardness and overreliance on foreign aid. In the purview of this constraint, he wished help to come from all the quarters.\textsuperscript{169} India was both eying on East and West for its economic development. Secondly, Nehru envisaged a more significant role for international institutions to maintain peace and stability in global politics that was getting polarized in the backdrop of military blocs and the cold war. Nehru was the staunch supporter of pacifism and United Nations. Nehru earned much praise for his role in denouncing British invasion in Egypt over Suez Canal Crises. Notwithstanding all liberal ideals Nehru espoused to, he was a realist in a great deal. Andrew B. Kennedy remarked that in Nehru's worldview idealism and realism were joined at the hip.\textsuperscript{170} Nehru authorized India's Atomic Energy Commission which later on made India a nuclear power. Nehru also played smart on Kashmir issue where he pledged a plebiscite in the United Nations but later on consolidated India's hold and authority over Kashmir. He granted asylum to Dalai Lama 14\textsuperscript{th} of Tibet which led to the souring of India’s relations with China. China’s deteriorating relations with India was also amid Sino-Soviet rivalry in the third world and the delimitation of their shared border. Nehru also moved ahead to accept the arbitration of the World Bank over water distribution mechanism between India and Pakistan in the shape of Indus Water Treaty.

Nehru’s over engagement in internationalist campaigns made him overlooked the regional scenario. His rhetoric of Indian pacifism suffered a major blow in the aftermath of India-China border conflict. India's unsuccessful military campaign against China brought a demolition to the Nehruvian idealistic edifice. India's weak defense and insubstantial military strength impinged India with a significant blow. Nehru had to seek assistance from both USA and USSR, and he had to bow down before the realities of power politics. Nehru though successfully built

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{168} This treaty went into force on 3\textsuperscript{rd} of June 1954. See United Nations Treaty Series 299 (1954): 57-81. \\
\textsuperscript{169} Amrital B. Shah, India’s Defence & Foreign Policies (Bombay: Mankatalas Publishers, 1966), 16. \\
\textsuperscript{170} Andrew B. Kennedy, Nehru’s Foreign Policy: Idealism and Realism Conjoined? in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan’s The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)
rhetoric about India's preeminence in global affairs at the regional level his pursuit of foreign policy choices did not come that effective.  

2.3 Nehru’s Pakistan’s Policy

Pakistan was a seceding state from the Federation of India, and this was contrary to the very logic and nature of inclusive banner of Indian nationalism led and promulgated by Indian National Congress. The creation of Pakistan was a big blow to the Congressional elite, and this partition syndrome had long been a striking factor in defining the contours of Congress's foreign policy towards Pakistan. The leadership of India born before partition resonates this sentiment profoundly. The anti-Congress elite in the form of BJP also insinuates the very same sentiment. The leaders like Vajpayee and L.K Advani who were born before partition had a very stringent view of Pakistan considering the ideological nuance. The leaders born after partition like Modi also hold a strict view but this view is more embedded in statecraft and niceties of nation state paradigm where India and Pakistan are considered arch rivals. The cognitive disposition of ‘One India' came under question in the aftermath of partition. Congress always upheld and promoted it as political rhetoric. The other conceptions like composite culture and Akhand Bharat lost their substantive capital. Congress was a powerful political institution in India.

The creation of Pakistan was amid obstinate and non-accommodative behavior of Indian National Congress which impelled Muslims to cogitate over having a country of their own. Congress never actually tried to measure up the differences between Hindus and Muslims and this gulf widened resultantly creating a new country Pakistan. Muslim elite led by All India Muslim League felt significantly marginalized in the aftermath of Nehru report of 1928, and Congressional ministries followed after the elections of 1937. It mounted great

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172 Ayesha Jalal in her book The State of Martial Rule, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) claims that Pakistan was a result of a secession from Indian federation.


mistrust and suspiciousness in the intercommunal relations whose backdrop was the creation of Pakistan.

India and Pakistan commenced bilateral relations with bitterness and animosity. Congress’s attitude towards Pakistan was more confrontational and was an accentuation of non-acceptance at large. The early statements and speeches of Indian leaders reflect this confrontational and demeaning behavior. It seriously debilitated any option of evoking normal and peaceful ties between both the countries.\textsuperscript{175} India and Pakistan did not start the journey as two equal sovereign states pursuing foreign policy matters on same grounds but with a crisis of legitimacy, suspiciousness and a huge volume of disgust and mistrust. The partition of India was a big blow for Congress.\textsuperscript{176} This non-acceptance was also due to a factor that Jamiat Ulema e Hind, one of the leading Islamic organizations was in India was on the side of Congress and didn't favor the idea of Pakistan. Jinnah wanted to have normal ties with India on the model of USA and Canada. He believed that the early dust of partition would settle and Indian and Pakistan would be able to reconcile their differences and would establish normalized relations.\textsuperscript{177}

Nehru maintained a political rhetoric that India and Pakistan could play a larger role in shaping the common destiny of Asia and their mutual antagonism will hamper and obstruct their way in playing a constructive role. He also remarked that India and Pakistan have much in common and that is their history, culture, and traditions so they should cooperate with one another on the fullest level. India and Pakistan should develop a common approach to foreign policy and defense and on many other issues. Nehru said that India and Pakistan could be either more than friends or more than enemies. India and Pakistan should try their best to promote friendly relations and should not against the course of the history that has a lot of commonalities between both the countries. There should not come

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{175} India only wishes to be left alone. I would tell Pakistan, “You have now got Pakistan. I wish you joy of it. It is only when your teeth are soured that you need come back to us. You want to make Pakistan a heaven on earth. We ourselves welcome it, for after all, we shall also benefit from it.” It is an excerpt from the speech of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the first home minister and deputy Prime Minister of India. For a United India: Speeches of Sardar Patel, 1947- 1950 compiled by Publications Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India. \\
\textsuperscript{176} The mind-set of congressional elite is assessable through the book of Rafiq Zakaria, The Man who Divided India: An Insight into Jinnah’s Leadership and its Aftermath (New Delhi: Sangam Books, 2002) \\
\textsuperscript{177} Hussain Haqqani, India vs. Pakistan- Why Can’t we just be Friends? (New Delhi: Juggernaut Books, 2016)
\end{footnotesize}
anything in India and Pakistan's way helping one another.⁷⁷ In reality his actions did not support this rhetoric. In his policy dealings with Pakistan Nehru appeared to be a sheer pragmatist. He publically narrated many times that war is not the solution for the issues between India and Pakistan. He also explicitly mentioned that India offered Pakistan a no war declaration which Pakistan declined. The war between India and Pakistan will bring disastrous and catastrophic consequences for the public of both the countries. So a brinkmanship and statesmanship are required in dealing towards Pakistan. India should try to come on to some friendly settlement with Pakistan because pacifism is in the best interest of India.⁷⁸

The real-time political issues which unzipped rivalry between India and Pakistan which took the shape of disputes between India and Pakistan are all congressional legacy. Congress continued to rule India in the first two decades of its independence, so all the policy measures and their subsequent application in bilateral relations of India and Pakistan are important to understand the construct of India Pakistan relations. In the early years, the issues which had the striking significance and long-reaching implications for India-Pakistan relations are Kashmir dispute, distribution of water resources and division of financial assets from the reserve bank of central India. There had been many conflicts that stemmed out from these issues that primarily made the environment of India-Pakistan relations hostile and volatile. India and Pakistan had a war in 1948 over Kashmir issue, and a war was also impending over the distribution of water resources. Kashmir's annexation with India had been a source of consternation for coming all decades between India and Pakistan.

During the Nehruvian age, India and Pakistan relations remained volatile. Nehru’s pragmatism was a combination of realpolitik and diplomatic reconciliation. During Nehru’s tenure there had not been a major row between India and Pakistan after 1948 except over the Kashmir issue. In 1954 the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was ratified by the state’s constituent assembly, and this drew a significant criticism by Pakistan. In 1957 the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was approved, and Jammu and Kashmir was

⁷⁷ Nehru’s Speeches on India Pakistan Relations from the address at the joint session of the Pakistan and India Newspaper Editors' Conference, New Delhi, May 4, 1950, see the annexures for complete text.
⁷⁸ From speech during the debate on Foreign Affairs in Parliament, New Delhi, March 28, 1951, see the annexures for complete text.
declared an integral part of the Indian Union. The nature of the Kashmir dispute remained international, but India successfully blocked any prospect of resolution or plebiscite pledged in the United Nations. Another major diplomatic triumph was the conclusion of the Indus Basin Water Treaty which was a workable plan of water distribution between India and Pakistan. It was a lingering issue between India and Pakistan since independence. Both the countries agreed to the mediation of the World Bank and hence in September 1960 Indus Water Treaty was concluded. BJP and opposition parties till date criticize Indian National Congress over this treaty.

Nehru orchestrated an effective roadmap and chalked out a policy landscape best to India's interests. His vision remained a beacon for Indian governments to come. Nehru continues to impact Indian foreign policy even today. It remains the fact that his over assertion on India's cognitive and psychological determinants of foreign policy downplayed the power and security-centric calculus of foreign policymaking. It proved to be impinging for India since India had to face a watershed in 1962 in the war against China and a substantial challenge in 1965's war against Pakistan. His rhetoric of pacifism confronted grim realities of power politics. Nehru who discredited power as a currency in global politics and was rather critical of USA and USSR's role having dubbed their policies as imperialistic and militaristic had to seek assistance from both the countries amid Sino Indian standoff. Apart from this, the grand narratives of India as a mature civilization and idealistic principles like Panchsheel still serve as a prelude for Indian foreign policy. He rekindled and consolidated the philosophical foundation of Indian foreign policy and his deliberate steering away from politics of alliances attained an esteem and prestige for India which became more impactful in the post-cold war politics. His ideals of democracy, human rights and anti-colonialism and anti-racism embarked India on a trajectory which has become India's strength and made India a buzzword in global politics in the neoliberal world. Nehru's emphasis on history, culture, and civilization has now become the determinants of India's soft power in the contemporary geometry of international politics.

2.4 India's Post Nehruvian Policy

India adopted a hawkish foreign policy after the demise of Pandit Nehru in 1964. Lal Bahadur Shastri became the Prime Minister after Nehru. The major
standoff which he had to confront was the war against Pakistan. The Nehruvian pacifism shattered completely. The war of 1965 preceded series of military ambushes in Rann of Kutch. It was another disputant territory in the state of Gujarat over which India and Pakistan both had the claims. Lal Bahadur Shastri made a speech to Lok Sabha and said:

In the utilization of our limited resources, we have always given primacy to plans and projects for economic development. It would, therefore, be obvious for anyone who is prepared to look at things objectively that India can have no possible interest in provoking border incidents or in building up an atmosphere of strife... In these circumstances, the duty of Government is quite clear and this duty will be discharged fully and effectively... We would prefer to live in poverty for as long as necessary but we shall not allow our freedom to be subverted.  

The events developed in the backdrop of Rann of Kutch triggered a major upheaval and led a major war between India and Pakistan. This war military didn't prove to be of great success to India. It was also because India didn't pay much heed to the accumulation of military resources and strong defense buildup during the Nehru's times. This ill preparedness reverberated a great deal in Sino Indian border conflict and military aggression against Pakistan as well. However, India exhibited tremendous diplomatic capital, and Tashkent declaration achieved the truce. On the same day Lal Bahadur Shastri passed away, and Indira Gandhi, the daughter of Pandit Nehru, succeeded Shastri as Prime Minister. Indira Gandhi had a better exposure to foreign affairs as compared to Shastri. She had served as an assistant to her father from 1947-64 and had the tremendous exposure of outside world. Indira had been receiving and hosting foreign delegations. Her extended stint in the West along with the intellectual lineage which she inherited from her father and grandfather exposed her to a wide array of ideas and developed her thorough understanding of the global affairs. She was well

181 Tashkent Declaration was the result of continued diplomatic efforts. It was a peace agreement which brought an end to the war. The Soviet Union mediated between India and Pakistan. The Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin moderated between India and Pakistan, and hence this peace treaty was signed on 10 January 1966. More on this read, Farooq Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 (London: Hurst Publishers, 2013) and Rachna Bisht, 1965: Stories from the Second Indo-Pakistan War (London: Penguin Books, 2015)
equipped with the theoretical ideas of international politics and was also very well aware of the grim realities of power politics.

Unlike Nehru, Indira was more focused on the developments of the region, and she envisioned a larger role for India in the region. Indira was more pragmatic in her approach and more oriented towards a realistic pursuit of foreign policy choices. She wanted India to have an extended say in South Asian affairs. Indira embarked India onto massive military modernization with a power-centric approach. She deviated from the idealistic principle of nonalignment and developed more close strategic ties with the Soviet Union. Cognitively she had a pro-socialist bent of mind, and her close cabinet comprised of left-wing intellectuals like Romesh Thapar, Pitambar Pant, and I.K Gujral.  

Indira was more prone to establishing India's hegemonic position in the region. India's record in the region was quite abysmal given a thumping defeat against China and a military standoff with Pakistan. The countries like Sri Lanka and Nepal were also drifting away from India. Indira had a significant opposition from inside the party and was more focused on centralizing her political power. She was more dogged into the domestic mess and was facing a serious challenge from fellow leaders of Congress. Foreign policy under Indira Gandhi was arbitrary. She did not develop any institutional framework but rather exerted herself emphatically and implemented her structured vision of global politics and regional scenario. She more depicted her character and personality in diplomatic actions. She subsumed political authority in an outright authoritarian way having marginalized her political rivals. Her course of foreign policy action reflected the same phenomenon. She pivoted foreign policy of India around her personality and through some close advisers. There were no basic or fundamental principles underpinning her diplomatic actions, and there was no centralized framework to carry out the course of foreign policy. Though India’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union started during Nehru’s times but in the context of great powers rivalry, Indira overly tilted towards the Soviet Union. 1969 turned out to be a year that reshaped the landscape of India’s domestic politics. The great split in

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Congress completely overhauled the political scenario. Indira managed to combat this political challenge and emerged successful with more power and authority in her hands. It gave her autonomy of action in the realm of foreign policy as well. Having overcome the gruesome challenge of domestic politics, she was now more confident and assertive in the course of foreign policy actions. She was more inclined to the Soviet Union. The treaty of friendship and cooperation inked in 1971 where India and the Soviet Union both agreed on mutual strategic cooperation was the reflection of this tilt. This had its impact on the conflict leading to war between India and Pakistan in 1971 where India successfully quashed Pakistan militarily resultantly Bangladesh was formed. Indira Gandhi made ‘Demographic Aggression’ of Pakistan as raison d'être to justify military operation against Pakistan. It came under the pretext of massive displacement of Refugees from East Pakistan to Bengal and Assam.

The major themes of the foreign policy of Indira Gandhi were:

1) Regional Domination
2) Hawkish Militarism
3) Soviet Inclination
4) Personality cult and focalized decisional framework

Indira foreign policy towards Pakistan was the culmination of realism and pragmatism. She intervened in the conflict in East Pakistan resultantly leading to the independence of Bangladesh in December 1971. India emerged victorious in its campaign. The military preparedness and strategic modernization in which Indira heavily invested resulted in a huge success. In the aftermath of this war, India emerged as a great power of South Asia. The relationship with Pakistan remained continuously strained. The Shimla accord further boosted her confidence and consolidated India's domination in South Asia. Shimla also released pressure from India in a great deal over Kashmir issue. It marked a shift from internationalism to bilateralism in Kashmir dispute. In the pursuit of India's

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185 Great Split refers to the division of Congress in two factions. Indira was expelled from the party by the Syndicate over indiscipline. It led to the formation of two rival groups in Congress, Congress ‘R’ and Congress ‘O.’ Congress ‘R’ was led by Indira and Congress ‘O’ was led by Kamaraj and Morarji Desai.


187 Shimla agreement was signed between India and Pakistan in July 1972 to put an end to confrontation and conflict that followed after the India Pakistan war of 1971.
hegemonic designs in the region, India under Indira went nuclear in 1974. She authorized the test of the nuclear device in Pokhran. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, remarked that nuclear test was conducted to intimidate Pakistan and to accept India's hegemony. The relations between India and Pakistan went dormant post-Shimla. India was subject to political instability and domestic chaos. Indira was facing daunting political challenges from her political rivals at home. Widespread opposition to her authoritarian way of rule led to significant internal disturbance. Indira Gandhi had to impose a constitutional emergency in India which was as a black day in the democratic history of India.

India's domestic political chaos and Pakistan's entry into the US-led war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1979 put India Pakistan relations at the backburner. Still both the countries remained at loggerheads. The two significant issues that continued to be a source of discontent were Pakistan's alleged support to the Sikh Separatists in Khalistan movement and second was Siachen Conflict. Pakistan was a front state ally of US in the military campaign against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and India faced growing isolation globally. The internal political bifurcation, uplift of emergency and subsequent defeat of Indira Gandhi in the Indian elections led to a weak officialdom in India. The Indian government and statecraft essentially and primarily were sloughed into the domestic political quagmire. The year 1980 witnessed the return of Indira to power after tumultuous years. Indira in her third term was even more authoritarian. India successfully quashed Sikh insurgency through Operation Blue Star. India also through Operation Meghdoot established the control over Siachen glacier.

The assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984 led to the diminishing of personality cult on Indian foreign policy, and it went under a bureaucratic transformation. Rajeev Gandhi, the son of Indira Gandhi, succeeded her as Indian Prime Minister who was not very charismatic and influential leader. He lacked all those personality attributes which were governing India since independence given India was ruled by a strong leadership except Shastri years and the occasion when Congress lost elections in the aftermath of the constitutional emergency of 1975.

188 Verinder Grover, Events and Documents of Indo-Pak Relations: Includes Chronology of All Important Events & Documents from 1947 to 1998 (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications. 1999) 189 Operation Blue Star was a military operation ordered by Indira Gandhi to quell militant insurgency led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale in Amritsar Punjab.
India's relations with Pakistan were on a steady decline. Pakistan's nuclear program was progressing at a brisk pace, and Pakistan's overt involvement in Afghanistan had led to a substantial military buildup and India under Rajiv was feeling international isolation at large. The USSR was also on the verge of the collapse hence India's strategic partnership with USSR was of no avail.

India clamored for the ethical principles in global politics. Rajiv vociferously denounced nuclear weapons and urged for world free of nuclear weapons. Rajiv propagated the Gandhian principles of peaceful coexistence and significance of norms and ethics in international politics. The rhetoric of moral principles pleaded by Rajiv was in contradiction with his earnest actions of securing power and influence. India made rigorous efforts to be part of Nuclear Suppliers Group. In the meanwhile India's bid to have excessive influence in the region persisted. India and Pakistan continued to amount high tensions. Brasstacks crises of 1987 further strained the relations between India and Pakistan. Rajiv was a weak leader and decision maker as compared to his predecessors. Due to lack of personal charisma and blasé diplomatic capital of Rajiv Gandhi the foreign policy of India underwent a major transformation. The bureaucratization of Indian foreign policy took place. He tried to guide India's foreign relations where he kept the portfolio of India's external minister for nearly two years, and in rest of three years, he had five external ministers. He tried to keep India alive in global affairs by taking some unique moral positions like his grandfather Pandit Nehru. He was a passionate crusader of the anti-apartheid movement. He was more prone to institutional mechanisms in holding and sustaining peace. It was the very reason he enacted a vibrant role in SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) and Nonaligned Movement. He was also the leader of the six nations' initiative on peace and disarmament.

India's foreign policy under Rajiv was an amalgamation of Nehruvian moralism and Indira's pragmatism. He served India at the dramatic turnaround of global politics which witnessed the collapse of USSR, end of communism, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, a new and unprecedented era of

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190 Brasstacks was a major military exercise by Indian army in the state of Rajasthan in 1986. It was a major troops' mobilization.
economic reforms and the eruption of a wide range of regional conflicts. The dominant themes in his foreign policy were:

1) Ethical Moralism
2) Institutional Enthusiasm
3) Bureaucratization of Foreign Policy
4) Multilateral Interactionism

The return of power to the Indian National Congress took place in 1991 after a thumping defeat in 1989's elections. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and dissolution of National Front's government marked a slim margin victory of Congress in 10th Lok Sabha elections. Narasimha Rao ascended to the office of the Prime minister of India with a coalition government. The leadership phase for the Congress was over. Congress now developed pragmatic framework of foreign policy decision making. This Congress government embarked India on a trajectory of economic reforms. India started working on its missile program and increased military spending. India developed India's relations with Israel, Iran, and Far East countries. India dealt with the threat of internal terrorism and started internationalizing foreign policy. Congress in this tenure led the economic liberalization of India's economy. This economic strength of India, later on, paved a matrix of India's foreign policy resultantly making India a center of attention for the rest of the world. Rao's government tried to diffuse tension with China and Pakistan. Amid the growing unrest in the state of Jammu & Kashmir in the wake of militant insurgency and the Mumbai attacks of 1993, the Congress-led government effectively developed rhetoric of cross-border infiltration and Pakistan's involvement in attempt destabilization of India.

This rhetoric still serves a prelude to India's foreign policy globally. India on all international forums projected Pakistan responsible for internal disturbance and separatist movements in India. India's foreign policy received lots of impetus from domestic drivers. It effectively cultivated Pakistan rhetoric in the domestic arena. The political landscape of India responded to this rhetoric, and hence Pakistan became a national concern in India.
India faced a great domestic tumult in this era given Babri Masjid fiasco, the insurgency in Kashmir and internal turbulence at large. The factor of strong leadership which India espoused to since its independence was no more viable. The assassination of Rajiv led to the constellation of political power into non-Nehruvian hands, only second time in the history of Indian politics. Foreign policy in these given circumstances was a secondary area of concern. The domestic dynamics were unfolding in rather a quizzical way for India yet India led by Congress tried not to brush aside the relevance of foreign policy related issues. India abandoned the idealistic rhetoric of non-alignment and morality and ethics rather India chalked out a foreign policy schema best serving the national interest. India established full-fledged diplomatic relations with Israel. It has to do with relation one can entertain with a Muslim neighbourhood apart from the expertise provided on counter-terrorism. India started expanding its diplomatic and economic clout to South East Asia. Indian foreign policy was guided and dictated by ruthless pragmatism and rational pursuit of policy choices. The traditional Gandhian pacifism or Nehruvian moralism was no more relevant in orchestrating India's foreign policy choices. India became pragmatic in her foreign policy and let the course of events define foreign policy.

India's successful economic marching in this era paved a new course of foreign policy for India. The domestic contextualization became relevant, and the world politics which observed a marked shift from security to the economy and the notions of 'Soft Power' became the defining lexicon of global politics. India under Congress capitalized on the changing dynamics of international politics. The Rao's government took series of actions that signified India on global chessboard of international politics. On the other hand the government led by Congress also faced constraints on decision-making due to the coalitional framework of Indian politics, the weakness of foreign policy institutions and the federal structure of India. India also lacked strategic culture which impacted

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192 Babri Masjid demolition occurred in 1992 when a large crowd of Hindu nationalists demolished the 16th-century mosque in Ayodhya, and this resulted in an intercommunal rioting claiming over the lives of 2000 people in several months.

India’s foreign policy in Post-Cold war period. The dominant highlights of this era were

1) India’s Look East Policy
2) India’s Cultivate Iran Policy
3) Defence Buildup and Military Modernization
4) Economic Growth and Neoliberal Reforms

The successful interplay of economy and democracy in India post-cold war reshaped its global perception. India's cultural heritage, civilizational traits and all other elements of attraction became the center of attraction. India turned out to be an unexplored destination for the world. India became lucrative with one of the largest markets and propensity of an enormous consumerist economy. The rising middle class and the indicators of purchasing power parity and unprecedented economic growth brought India into the global limelight. India started opening up with rest of the world. The efforts which were made to evoke cordial ties with the USA in Rao's regime crystallized afterward and put India and USA on a harmonious trajectory in the coming two governments of Indian National Congress.

Indian National Congress suffered a major electoral blowback in three consecutive Lok Sabha elections in 1996, 1998 and 1999 respectively. Congress returned to power in 2004 and served for two consecutive tenures under the premiership of Manmohan Singh under the aegis of Sonia Gandhi, the wife of Rajiv Gandhi. India's foreign policy globally and regionally achieved many triumphs. India managed to normalize relations with Pakistan where the series of confidence-building measures ensured peace from 2004-2008.

**Congress and Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy**

Congress's foreign policy primarily remained influenced by Nehru and Indira. The personality cult had been a decisive variable in Congress's foreign policy. It inherited patterns of foreign policy from Nehruvian and Indira's age that remained concurrently relevant and emphatic in the coming decades.

After Nehru and Indira the context which essentially impacted the decisional framework of foreign policy was bureaucratic operationalization. The norms and

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organizational codes of bureaucracy significantly impact the decisional modus operandi. The coalitional politics, the grand narratives of Indian nationalism and composite culture, left-leaning politics and economic transformation of India conjoined with neoliberal trade reforms are the areas which significantly influence the course of foreign policy actions for Indian National Congress. The impact of coalitional politics over the course of foreign policy actions was witnessed in 2005 when the United States and India were paving the way for more close strategic and diplomatic relations in the form of civil nuclear deal. In this bid, India condemned Iran's nuclear program and voted against Iran in UN in 2005 and 2006. It invited a backlash from its allies. Communist Party saw this step in the direction of curbing India's foreign policy autonomy.\(^{196}\) The tensions mounted and in 2008 Communist Party withdrew its support from Congress's led government. The government though sustained yet a foreign policy action stirred a major wrath in the domestic politics and correspondingly corroborated the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy.\(^{197}\) Congress could not sign a water sharing agreement with Bangladesh given the opposition of Mamta Banerjee's Trinamool Congress and subsequent withdrawal from the alliance, thus serving as a domestic constraint on foreign policy actions.\(^{198}\) Congress traditionally had a robust and unflinching alliance with Muslims and in reciprocation Muslims never formed a political party of their own. Congress while making its decisions has to keep this fact under consideration as well.

Congress domestically remained locked on the horns of a dilemma in its last two tenures. It is also noteworthy that significance of domestic framework in foreign policy had been emboldened more after the end of Cold War. The end of Cold War ushered the era of multilateral foreign policies and prioritized issues beyond security and strategy. Hence economy, environment, political structure and domestic context turned very relevant. Congress had been facing a dual policy dilemma. The head of Congress Sonia Gandhi had a vision that prioritized domestic issues with welfare and economic wellbeing trickled down to the local level. On the contrary, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh urged Indian economy to


\(^{198}\) Anaya Dutta, “Mamta withdraws support to UPA government,” *The Hindu*, September 18, 2012
be abreast with liberal international order and the nexus of democracy and development to be stronger. India should be a liberal democracy but with a robust economy. A workable power-sharing arrangement between both could not bring any breakthrough in India's foreign relations except Indo-US nuclear deal. The relations with Pakistan after some considerable confidence-building measures regressed with no real success in this regard. There are four areas in which domestic context impinged foreign policy of Indian National Congress

1) Coalitional Politics
2) Ideals and Rhetoric
3) Bureaucratic Process
4) Economic Development

India under Singh orchestrated a strategy that combined India's rampant economic growth and development with foreign policy goals and objectives. India pinpointed the countries with a prescient target on energy security and foreign investments. India gradually developed a policy of assertiveness towards its fractious neighbors.\(^{199}\) India attempt to increase the amount of strategic influence it exercises in regional and global issues. India's renewed relationship with USA and bid of the strategic relationship with countries like Australia, France, and Japan were the manifestation of this policy. The Look East Policy which was developed during the era of Narasimha Rao and is now vigorously pushed by Narendra Modi.

India made a significant economic progress in the first tenure of UPA government. The second tenure experienced sluggishness amid global financial crises. In the first tenure, India managed to achieve an annual growth rate of 10 percent which was a landmark achievement but dropped down to 3.2 percent in 2012.\(^{200}\) Congress transformed the economic realities of India, but its foreign relations remained undercapitalized. It enthusiastically pursued relations with many states, but that did not consolidate and crystallize into some major breakthrough in India's foreign relations. India's significance of domestic context in diplomatic relations followed top to bottom approach where officialdom and statecraft defined the nuances and niches of foreign policy and its subsequent


\(^{200}\) Ankit Panda, “India’s UPA Government and Foreign Policy”, *The Diplomat*, January 18, 2014
trickling down to state and domestic level. Apart from a few rarest occasions as mentioned Congress did not pay much heed to the domestic variables, political discourses and on ground rhetoric. India's pursuit of policy choices followed a narrow prism of political interest defined by the political elite rather decision-making elite of Indian National Congress. The decision-making elite refer to a troika which included Sonia Gandhi as the head of the party, Manmohan Singh as the head of the state and Rahul Gandhi, the leader or head in the offing. India's decision-making had been oscillating in between this troika.\textsuperscript{201}

Like previous Congress's governments, the UPA led government in both the tenures followed traditional approach. Public opinion, domestic acceptance and contending narratives in political pretext did not impact much, and the foreign policy followed a conventional approach. The bureaucracies were in charge for most of the decision-making. The significant input of think tanks or policy networks did not get acknowledgment to greater deal. The domestic politics though is an area where Congress confronts opposition parties which resultantly hampers some of its policy decisions. BJP factor is a great domestic constraint in foreign policy decisions for Indian National Congress. Apart from this no formal institutional mechanism working on the premise of channeling domestic input or variables was made or executed at the center or the state level. Even in the previous governments, Congress's policy has been insignificantly impacted by domestic contextualization.

Indian foreign policy had received tremendous rather definitional impetus from the individual/decision maker at the helm of the affairs. Both took decisions keeping in view their cognitions, dispositions and worldview. In the coming tenures, the variable of leadership slightly subsided given a fact; there was no strong and impactful leader. It led to the significant influence of bureaucracies in formulation and execution of Indian foreign policy. This bureaucracy refers to Indian civil service and military hierarchy and is trained to think and act in predefined and predetermined parameters. Indian foreign policy bureaucracy is wedded to status quo and is a great hurdle in the integration of India into the

\textsuperscript{201} Soutik Biswas, “Was India's PM Manmohan Singh undermined by own party?”, \textit{BBC Asia}, April 14, 2014.
global order. Even in the current regime Modi repeatedly termed Indian bureaucracy as an impediment towards India’s multilateral engagements.

The institutions in India are sluggish given the fact that they are a colonial enterprise and India did not undergo any serious institutional reforms that could make it at par with the modern globalized world. This severe lacking is one of the predominant variables that serve as an obstruction towards domestic context becoming overly significant in the course of foreign policy actions. The foreign policy of India notwithstanding its economic boom could not capitalize effectively on it domestic strength including economy and polity, making it a diplomatic currency and guiding India's sources of foreign policy formulation. Congress despite its economic vision and a visionary agenda of transformation could not essentially reform the very nature of Indian internal politics that has a profound impact on foreign policy making both in theory and practice. Domestic sources of foreign policy in India under Congress remained underutilized and undercapitalized except its relations with Bharatya Janta Party which effectively serves as a domestic constraint on Congress's foreign policy decisions.

**Foreign Policy of Congress and Pakistan Factor**

Indian National Congress follows an apologetic frame of dealing towards Pakistan, and this is due to a fact that it opposition parties primarily Hindu nationalist solely holds Congress responsible for the division of India. Congress is always under tremendous pressure from the parties like BJP, Janata Dal, Shiv Sena and other parties that espouse to Hindu majoritarian rhetoric of politics. It is the very same fact that Congress's dealing towards Pakistan is always obscure, reluctant and under confident. Congress envisages Pakistan through the prism of outstanding conflicts India has with Pakistan. Besides the conflictual view, India is eying more on its relationship with China in the region, and it does not to irk its relations with Pakistan and also does not intend to take them to a great deal. Congress could not make any breakthrough in ties with Pakistan due to BJP's pressure.

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Due to this very fact of oppositional nature of Indian polity that confronts Congress, it always pursues its foreign policy options at the systemic and external level rather than dealing them at domestic level. Congress externalizes its strategic options with Pakistan. Congress more relies on the structural and systemic variables. Even in the times of crises it more eyes on the role of intermediaries and seek great powers assistance in setting the course of action right. The next chapter presents the case study of this argument when after Mumbai attacks of 2008 Congress-led government more focused on increasing international pressure on Pakistan. The next chapter empirically will substantiate this argument that how UPA government led by Indian National Congress stringently pursued structurally focused variables of foreign policy choices.

In the pretext of domestic politics of India, some confounding variables significantly influence the posture of Indian polity. The issues of caste, inter-communal relations, and coalitional dynamics are compelling in defining the contours of India's domestic politics. Congress's rhetoric of composite culture comes under furious criticism and opposition in domestic purview. BJP over the years had become a strident oppositional force and restricted Congress's autonomy of actions. Congress came under furious criticism by BJP over its foreign policy pursuit vis-à-vis Pakistan. Congress was slammed by BJP and other Hindu nationalist organizations when it started normalizing its relations with Pakistan through a series of confidence-building measures and initiation of composite dialogue in 2004. The peace process got jeopardized in 2008 in the wake of Mumbai attacks. Congress formulates its foreign policy choices keeping in view the level of opposition it anticipates from BJP, and at times it has to restrict its options, and it can't go for any out of the box policy choice due to BJP's pressure.

Congress had an ambitious policy agenda when it returned to power in 2004. It took series of actions mitigating the rivalry between India and Pakistan. Congress attempted to pursue a policy of constructive engagement with Pakistan that could lead to establishing friendly, rational and cooperative relations between both the countries. It also embarked on to enhancing people to people relations. Bus services were commenced on the Amritsar- Nankana Sahib, Amritsar-Lahore,

204 N. Jayapalan, Foreign Policy of India (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 2001), 150.
205 Interview with Salman Khurshid
Srinagar-Muzaffarabad, and Poonch-Rawalakot routes. India and Pakistan discussed all the issues of conflict including Kashmir and Siachen. It could not have paved a way towards sustainable and positive peace in the region. Mumbai attacks brought an end to the euphoria in India and Pakistan relations.

Congress in its dealing towards Pakistan confronts multifaceted variables. Muslim vote and coalition with JUH are also the intervening variables in selecting and optimizing a certain foreign policy choice. Muslims in India face a dual pressure one from BJP which aims to eliminate the secular nature of Indian state and second an exclusion from the mainstream. The fear of Islamic radicalism and a reactionary fanaticism is always there. Congress is to take into consideration this Muslim conjoining discourse. Congress fears the infiltration of radical Islamic sentiments from Pakistan to Indian Muslims and it also tries to keep its Muslim support intact.

In its nutshell, Pakistan holds a significant position in Congress's foreign policy calculus. Pakistan factor resonates in Congress's foreign policy formulation and accentuation. It holds a profound position in foreign policy discourse. The posture of relations between India and Pakistan defines the larger ambit of South Asian geopolitics, and issues of high politics like nuclear deterrence, missile race, deterrence stability and crisis management determine the context. Congress in its both tenures could not come up with nay out of the box achievement in India and Pakistan relations though it made some reasonable efforts for normalization of relations. Congress though rhetorically it claims that it has only confrontational engagement with Pakistan, but this remains the fact that India and Pakistan share profound and intricate social, cultural and historical relations. India and Pakistan share unavoidable relational posture that by and large impacts and impinges decisional framework. Congress cautiously devises its foreign policy and domestic politics vis-à-vis BJP significantly influences it foreign policy posture towards Pakistan.

207 Mumbai attacks of 2008 were the series of dastardly attacks that took place in November 2008 resultantly killing 164 people. India held Lashkar e Taiba, a Pakistani militant organization, responsible for this attack and alleged that it received significant support from Pakistan's security and intelligence establishment.
CHAPTER 3
HINDU NATIONALISM, BJP, AND POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN

Hindu nationalism and Indian nationalism are two dominant rather overriding discourses in Indian polity. This research undertakes the essential tenets of these dominant discourses and tries to explicate their impact on foreign relations of India towards Pakistan. The previous chapter substantively explained the development of Indian nationalism, its dominant political narrative along with its sociocultural legacy. This chapter meticulously discusses Hindu nationalism, its historical anecdotes and its rise as a political clout and its subsequent impact on India's dealing towards Pakistan. Hindus are a majority in India and this idea trumpets for the dominance of the will of the majority. It questions the basic notion of Indian civilization and terms it as Hindu civilization and seeks to identify the Indian nation on ethnic and primordial criteria. It disregards the definition of Indian nationalism along the lines of civic and territorial connotations.

Hindu nationalism emerged as a powerful counter-narrative to Indian nationalism. It questioned and critiqued the basis of composite culture and termed it contradictory to the historical antecedents. Hindu nationalism is a cultural, social and political expression embedded in Hindu's spiritual and cultural traditions. In its simplest definition, it can be termed as Hindu polity. It holds that the unifying character of Hindu identity will predominate resultantly overcoming all the regional and cultural diversities and the espousal to Hindu ethos will define the fundamental character of identity between Indians and non-Indians. It emphasizes a shared cultural heritage but precisely on religio-cultural lines. It cognitively holds and transcends a perception that India throughout its history existed as Hindu majority polity, and all other identities, ethnicities, and religions are a challenge and threat to India's unifying attribute. By bracketing all other identities in an oppositional matrix, Hindu nationalism seeks to overcome the cultural diversity.

This idea is not a throwback to ancient times but a reflection of modern and contemporary social and political formation defined in the pretext of the will

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of the majority. Its current manifestation revolves around the core notion of Hinduutva. This dominant narrative holds its historical roots in the Vedic era. It refers to the age in 1500 to 500 BCE in which the composition of the Vedas, the oldest scriptures of Hindu religion, took place. Hindu nationalism rejects the evolution of Indian civilization as homogenous and inclusive where all religions and culturally different identities peacefully coexisted, but rather it projected a view that Hinduism persisted as a dominant theme and undercurrent throughout the evolution of Indian civilization. Three defining characteristics of a Hindu are Rashtra, Jati, and Sanskriti. Rashtra refers to a collective nation. Jati refers to common race and Sanskriti views and outlines common civilizational culture. This primordial construct of Hindu identity constructs an oppositional view of other identities and hence projects them as absolute identities. This absolute character of identities serves as a prelude for the relations of enmity and animosity with the other religious entities.

Hindu nationalism always confronted a challenge of the Muslim majority in many areas of India henceforth contradicting the claims of Hindu's uniformity and monolithic identity construct. The confrontational pattern of relation gives an opportunity to Hindus to create an otherness hence inviting unity among Hindus by projecting enmity with Muslims and others. Theologically Hindu religion faces a lot of fragmentation since there is no central text and not a unanimous agreement upon the traditions and rituals. The customs and value structure are also strikingly divergent in different regions. Social hierarchy and caste system are the defining characteristics of Hindu ethos.

Hindu nationalism was a crystallization of anticolonial idea which questioned the legitimacy of colonial rule and its concomitant belief of superiority. Hindu nationalism countercharged the view of white men superiority by propounding its scriptural and spiritual advancement and hence serving as an impetus to many reformist movements in the nineteenth century. The modern

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211 Hindutva is a predominant expression of Hindu nationalism. It seeks the hegemony of Hindu identity and Hindu way of life. It clamors to define Indian culture in the purview of Hindu values. V D Savarkar coined this term. More on this read V D Savarkar, Hinduutva (New Delhi: Hindi Sahitya Sadan, 2005)


A manifestation of Hindu nationalism emerged as an antidote to Indian nationalism pushed vigorously by Indian National Congress. The promotion of patriotism along the religious and cultural lines and instrumental use of the notions like ‘Motherland Bharatya’ became the breeding ground of militant nationalist struggle. It also founded the ideological and cultural basis for Indian independence movement. This process of cultural and religious reformism started in the aftermath of Brahmo Samaj. This idea received a widespread appreciation from westernized Indians, and this movement made grounds for many other movements intellectually striving for logical and rational interpretation of Hindu spirituality. This movement discredited caste discrimination and called for the reinterpretation of Indian scriptures. Arya Samaj was again a reformist movement that started at the end of the nineteenth century and had an overarching impact on Hindu reformism. This movement called for an end to Brahmanic values and denounced caste discrimination and hierarchy of Indian social structure. Swami Vivekananda and Aurobindo reshaped the contours of Hindu spiritualism and Hindu polity. Vivekananda presented Hindu spirituality as a cure to Western materialism. His impact on Hindu nationalism is far-reaching and everlasting. He revitalized and rejuvenated the Hindu notion and questioned the legitimacy of the notions of Western superiority. The strand of spirituality and Hindu values induced the spirit of national unity and distinct identity in the independence movement and differentiated Hindu nationalism from European nationalism.

The acceptance of Pan Hindu Indian nation was more primarily ubiquitous in the elite segments of the society. The Brahmanism and upward mobile castes were more prone towards this idea, therefore, its principal support was therefore coming from the largest Hindu speaking region along the Gangetic lines. It was not a traditional drive given a fact that Hindu nationalists envisaged conserving

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214 Brahmo Samaj was a religious reformist movement started by Ram Mohan Roy in 1828 and wanted to create a monotheistic construct of Hindu religion based on the ancient texts which could lead to the formation of modern India with social reforms. More on this read David Kopf, *The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind* (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979)

215 Arya Samaj movement was a Hindu reformist movement started by Swami Dayananda in the late 19th century and had a profound impact on Indian polity. This movement inspired many leaders of Indian freedom movement including Bhagat Singh, Bismil and Lala Laljipat Rai.


Hinduism but also the constellation of the political power of Hindus as a community. On the contrary side, Hindu traditionalism was more inclined to the preservation of Hinduism in its scriptural forms and sustaining the social practices and religious beliefs. The Hindu nationalist parties in India like Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Shiv Sena derive their expression of Hindu assertion from this period. Sir Aurobindo insinuated the idea of militant nationalism in Hindu polity and urged for complete independence of India from foreign occupation. He considered armed struggle as a real-time solution and revolutionary course of action for the attainment of India's glory. The instrumental use of religious symbols like Durga and Kali Mata sparked the sentiments of militant nationalism in Hindus and urged them to play their role in liberating their motherland. The various undercurrents of Hindu nationalism that even exist today in Indian polity are locked in between Hindu traditionalism and Hindu nationalism developed under British Raj.

Hindu nationalism received a different response in the various regions. The amalgamation of the religious niche of Hindu revivalism, economic nationalistic philosophy and a militant response to India's foreign occupation defined the larger ambit and narrow contours of Hindu nationalism at the start of 20th century. The development of Indian nationalism was taking place simultaneously which was quite secular. There are some common grounds which Indian nationalists and Hindu nationalists share. They include economic opportunities for Hindus, the end to foreign rule and reforming the social structure for advancement. At the same time, both differed on cognitive grounds. Indian nationalism is largely secular and considers diversity and plurality a solution for India's nationalistic ambitions. On the other hand, Hindu nationalists reject the secular nature of Indian nationalism and discredit the notion of plurality and diversity and emphasize on unity, uniformity, and dominance of Hindu ethos. Hindu nationalism developed as counter-rhetoric to Indian nationalism upheld by Indian National Congress. It was also a response to the process of modernity initiated by British Raj in India.

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The confluence of Hindu cultural dominance with Indian nationalism synergized the philosophical basis for India's independence movement. The interpretation of Indian nationalism of Hindus was different from what was interpreted by Indian National Congress. Hindus' syncretic tradition of religion and culture essentially embossed this idea of nationalism. It also had incorporated the tendencies of communalism and Hindu majoritarianism. This manifestation of nationalism did not intersect with the notion of nationalism upheld by Indian National Congress rather Hindu nationalists remained critical of the leadership of Indian National Congress. In the first turn of the twentieth century, this culturally inspired phenomenon served as an impetus to many revolutionary movements like Samiti and Jugnatar. All these movements had anti-Muslim orientation. The communal rivalry instigated over the adoption of language to either Hindi or Urdu. It was further intensified and fortified till the end of 19th century. The cow protection societies aiming at abolishing cow slaughter among Muslim also fumed the communal relations and put them in the matrix of persistent yet unending rivalry. It is a matter of the fact that cow protection societies of the 1880s and 1890s provoked 45 riots resultantly claiming 107 lives. Hindu traditionalism was also facing a grave challenge from Hindu reformism. The traditionalist Hindu nationalists attempted to ensure the orthodoxy and started extending their networks across the countryside. They used religious festivals as a tool to funnel them and not only targeted Muslims for cow slaughter but also low caste Hindus.

Religious, cultural and militant expressions of nationalism were a departure from the mainstream Indian National Congress which was exhibiting secular, liberal and democratic ideals. The Swadeshi movement was opposition to British colonial rule but distinctly in comparison to Indian National Congress. The split from the mainstream led this strand of Hindu nationalism, which was mainly extremist, to form Hindu councils. In 1915 Hindu Mahasabha was constituted as the umbrella organization of all Hindu nationalist groups. By then the early

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219 Samiti and Jugnatar were the revolutionary movements against the British colonial rule. Anushilan Samiti was started by Aurobindo in 1902 to overthrow British rule in India whereas Jugnatar was a movement started by Jatindra Das Mukherjee in 1910 and continued the armed struggle against British.


221 The formation of Indian Muslim League in 1906 and accession of separate electorates to Muslims by British led Hindu nationalists to gather under one forum. Madan Mohan Malviya, Manindra Chandra Nanady and Swami Shraddhanand were notable early leaders. The Mahasabha changed its name to Akhil Bharatya Mahasabha in 1921.
spirit of Hindu reformism was also eroded, and witnessed an outright dominance of Hindu extremists and led to the formation of a common Hindu communal front. Mahasabha went into an alliance with Arya Samajers. This alliance called for Hindu defense squads. The narratives of equality, textual reinterpretation and reformation declined. The Mahasabha was explicitly anti-Muslim, and it presented itself as an independent political force.222

The decade of the 1920s led to the culmination of all strands of Hindu nationalism into one homogenized political discourse. It was a response to Muslim communalism which was becoming politically substantive and also a countercharge on Indian National Congress accused of going soft on Muslims. The Mahasabha came under the political influence of Damodar Savarkar, and Shivram Moonje and both were highly critical of Congress's secularism. Savarkar lambasted Congress for being sympathetic to Muslims. Mahasabha suffered a major setback in 1925 when one of its strong leaders Keshaw Hedgewar departed from Sabha and formed a part of its own Rashtriya Swayemsevak Singh. Hedgewar denounced active politics and called this organization a volunteer organization working for religious communion. This organization trumpeted for India’s glorious past and was intrinsically anti-Muslim and it vowed to end Muslim resistance over the observance of Hindu festivals near mosques.223 The RSS remained effervescent afterward in post-independence period and continued to impact India's landscape of domestic politics as of today. It diminished the influence of Mahasabha and created a hierarchical chain of local units. RSS inculcated martial values in its followers and was a paramilitary origination. In 1927 the pursuance of religious festival Laxmi Puja near a mosque sparked violence which led to organized riots which continued for three days. RSS organized this violence and protected Hindu households.224

The strands of Hindu nationalism one led by Hindu Mahasabha and other by RSS took uniquely different political positions and stance. Towards the late 1930s after the resignation of Congressional ministries Mahasabha joined hands with Indian Muslim League to form governments in particular provinces including

222 Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, 235.
NWFP, Bengal, and Sindh. It is interesting to note that Mahasabha smoothly functioned with Muslim League notwithstanding that Sindh assembly in 1943 adopted a resolution for creation of Pakistan. Mahasabha though opposing the idea of India's division did not quit the government and only protested. Mahasabha built an entirely smooth working relationship with the League governments in Sindh led by Ghulam Hidayatullah, in Bengal led by Fazalul Haq and in NWFP led by Sardar Aurangzeb Khan. It explicitly opposed Quit India movement of Congress given the fact that in 1930 it opposed the Civil Disobedience Movement led by Gandhi as well. Hindu Mahasabha under Savarkar did not actively support the Indian freedom movement. Hindu Mahasabha diverted from an extremely anti-Muslim cognitive position and underwent a change and became a political party. On the other hand, RSS continued to represent a ferocious anti-Muslim and dominant Hindu mindset. RSS identified and described itself as a cultural organization and decided not to contest elections.

M.S. Golwalkar succeeded Hedgewar after his death in 1940. Syama Prasad Mukherjee replaced Savarkar in Mahasabha. Golwalkar’s interpretation of Hindu nationalism took lots of inspiration from European fascism. He reinterpreted state and nationhood in purely ethnic terms. He applied primordial racial construct on Indian nationalism. He believed that Hindus remained subjugated to Muslims and Europeans amid their mildness and docility. To overcome this docility he imparted and promoted Hindu chauvinism. To broaden the appeal and support, he also included low-caste Hindus in the organizational framework of RSS. Golwalkar did not criticize British Raj for its imperialistic policies since he did not want to give British Raj an excuse to ban RSS. It persisted with its anti-Muslim rhetoric and when All Indian Muslim adopted Lahore resolution for the creation of a homeland for Muslims Golwalkar demanded a state for Hindus, yet RSS under him steered completely away from independence movement. The center of its policies pivoted around Muslims and the communal relations between Hindus and Muslims. There were some Hindu traditionalists in the ranks of Indian National Congress like Vallabhbhai Patel who were eying on a potential merger between Congress and Mahasabha or Congress

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The assassination of Gandhi at the hands of RSS activist brought an end to this possibility and also helped Nehru in establishing and effectuating his vision of a secular state which was likely to confront a significant amount of opposition from the traditionalists in his party. The assassination of Gandhi put the traditionalists on the back foot and gave a carte blanche to Nehru. The partition of India and the formation of Pakistan outraged Hindu nationalists. RSS put the onus of the partition on Congress and blamed it for appeasing Muslims and helping them out in making a country of their own and thus undermining the centrality of Indian homeland. Mahasabha and Savarkar were also highly critical of Gandhi’s role, and they alleged Gandhi was abetting Muslim League in getting a country of their own through appeasement.\(^\text{227}\) The assassination of Gandhi brought a lot of distress for Hindu nationalists. Nathuram Godse, the assassin, was the member of Hind Mahasabha and was deeply linked with RSS as an activist given RSS never claimed to be a political party. RSS and Mahasabha were both suspected of the killing of Gandhi. It inflicted a ban on RSS and arrest of Savarkar. He was acquitted later on, and ban remained for one year. In the aftermath of this eventuality, Hindu Mahasabha lost its wider popularity and mainstream acceptance among the masses. It triggered a change in the cognitive disposition of Hindu nationalists to come out of the communal image, broaden the support base and contest for political power.\(^\text{228}\)

### 3.1 Hindu Nationalism after Independence

Hindu nationalists viewed Pakistan through a communal lens, and this embittered context ingrained into history and culture continued to plague the India Pakistan relations. Hindu nationalists remained highly critical of Indian National Congress and labelled it soothsayer and appeaser to Pakistan. Hindu traditionalists in the ranks of Indian National Congress also urged the pursuit of hawkish and chauvinist policies towards Pakistan. Sardar Patel's approach and statements towards Pakistan were the manifestations of this mindset.\(^\text{229}\) This frame of mind wanted to discard Pakistan and nullify its significance. RSS, Mahasabha and other Hindu nationalist sections of the society were increasingly perturbed over

Congress's docile policy towards Pakistan. On the one hand, the Hindu nationalist considered Congress responsible for the division of Indian homeland and readily conceding to the demands of the Muslims and other hand were upset over Congress's congenial policy towards Pakistan and hatred towards secular policies of Gandhi. The assassin of Gandhi Nathuram Godse also admitted killing Gandhi on his palpable pro-Pakistan sentiments and his fast unto death to make sure the division of financial assets between India and Pakistan in just manner.\textsuperscript{230}

Followed the backlash on Hindu nationalists in the aftermath of the prosecutions on Gandhi's assassination, the Hindu nationalists were forced to change their cognitive approach. It was also coming in the backdrop of the first elections in 1951. Hindu Mahasabha remained stick to the restriction of membership to Hindus. It led to a significant political difference between Mukherjee and other party leaders. He resigned from the organization and formed a new party Bharatya Jana Sangh. This party was open for Muslims and other members of RSS. It was a nationalistic alternative to Indian National Congress. Mukherjee also struck close association with RSS and became a politically cogent force and later on became the face organization of Sangh Parivar.\textsuperscript{231} It managed to win only three seats in the elections. It also attracted the disenchanted members of Congress and became a vibrant right-wing conservative political party in Indian political landscape. It was also critical of India's China and Pakistan policies. It gave a new face to Indian nationalism and emphasized more on Sanskriti culture than Rashtra nation. It did not go for the exclusion of minorities but voiced for cultural heritage.\textsuperscript{232} This new blend of Hindu nationalism was more inclusive towards domestic landscape but remained anti-Pakistan to large and urged more stringent policies towards Pakistan. BJP was the successor organization of Jana Sangh.

Congress continued to rule India till 1977, and it faced its toughest challenge from Hindu nationalists. This problem was coming in the form of opposition whereas electorally these parties performed poor and Congress's influence remained unabated. Jana Sangh electorally played well in the elections

\textsuperscript{230} On 8\textsuperscript{th} November 1948 Nathu Ram Godse, the assassin of Gandhi made his statement in the court explaining why he killed Gandhi? It got published as a book later on. See Nathuram Vinayak Godse, \textit{Why I Assassinated Mahatma Gandhi} (New Delhi: Surya Bharti Parakshan, 1993)

\textsuperscript{231} Kingshuk Nag, \textit{The Saffron Tide: The Rise of BJP} (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2014)

\textsuperscript{232} Donald Eugene Smith, \textit{India as a Secular State} (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 471.
of 1957 when it grabbed 35 seats in Lok Sabha. Hindu nationalist moved to a broader identity of Sangh Parivar. A major development in this regard was the formation of Vishwa Hindu Parishad. VHP was formed by Golwalkar in 1964 aiming at unifying Hindus to serve and protect Hindu Dharma.\textsuperscript{233} It is essentially a militant organization where Bajrang Dal is its youth wing founded in 1984. It attracted the funding from Hindus across the world to do construction and renovation of Hindu temples, banish cow slaughter and preserve Hindu religious distinct identity.\textsuperscript{234} RSS continued to serve as a mother organization for all other Hindu nationalist organizations and outfits. All these outfits collated to make an umbrella organization Sangh Parivar. VHP tried to gather Hindus under one flag of religion but failed given the tremendous diversity of Hindu religion and its texts. It also could not attract major Hindu religious leaders to be the part of this organization. Failing to do so it started issue based unification campaign like Ayodhya temple movement.

The Kashmir factor further tinted the perception of Hindu nationalist about Pakistan. Mukherjee also died in police custody in Jammu & Kashmir where he went for a campaigning for Hindu minorities. Hindu nationalists including BJP as of today seek to end the special status of Kashmir granted under the article 370 of Indian constitution. Mukherjee was not the member of RSS, and his death established control and influence of RSS over Jana Sangh. Deen Dayal Upadhyay remained a central figure in the ranks of Jana Sangh after Mukherjee but his murder in 1968 Jana Sangh went to the hands of RSS. The then stalwart leaders of Jana Sangha and later on BJP Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and Lal Krishan Advani were both the members of RSS.\textsuperscript{235} The Jana Sangh lost its influence gradually. Different parties which were opposing the state of emergency in India imposed by Indira Gandhi gathered under one forum and formed a new party Janata Party in 1977 which subsequently defeated Congress in the elections of 1977 and formed the first Non-Congress government in India. Before the formation of Janata Party, the significant development was the formation of Janata Morcha by Jayaprakash Narayan and Morarji Desai. It was an alliance against Indira's authoritarianism, and it paved the way towards the formation of Janata Party in the aftermath of

\textsuperscript{233} The Objectives of Vishwa Hindu Parishad, available at www.vhp.org
\textsuperscript{234} Manjari Katju, Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Indian Politics (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 2013)
\textsuperscript{235} Graham, Hindu Nationalism, Chapter 02.
uplift of constitutional emergency in 1977. Janata Party remained associated with RSS, and in the late 1980s, it joined hands with Shiv Sena as well. Shiv Sena was a non-RSS militant Hindu nationalist party formed in the mid-60s by Bal Thackeray. It was against the infiltration of South Indians in Maharashtra. It took a strong anti-Muslim position afterward along with its violent militancy.\footnote{Subhas Palshikar, “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?”}, Economic and Political Weekly 39, no. 14/15 (2004): 1497-1507. Shiv Sena continues to play an active role on issues of Indian foreign policy related to Pakistan and retorts with the violent and militant course of action. For instance, during 1999's tour of Pakistan's cricket team to India, the zealots of Shiv Sena dug the pitch. Shiv Sena at the number of occasions disrupted cross-border cultural or literary activities and thwarted attempt of cultural cooperation with Pakistan.\footnote{Nishnat Shekhar, “Tracking Shiv Sena’s anti-Pakistan stance over the years”, The Indian Express, October 7, 2015}

The Janata Party fragmented and disintegrated in 1980 following a mismanaged rule of three years. Janata Party in its tenure tried to achieve normalcy in relations with China and USA. Vajpayee as minister of external affairs made first official visit to Beijing whereas Jimmy Carter also made first American president's visit to India. Hindu nationalists traditionally remained critical of USSR and its socialist policies, so the course of relations with the USA naturally went on the rise. Relations with Pakistan followed a reverse rather stagnant path. The dissolution of government also led the demise of the party and the leaders of Janata Party reconvened and reorganized it as a new party named Bharatya Janata Party led by Vajpayee and Advani as notable leaders. Initially, BJP tried to keep itself away from the clout of RSS and declared that it would follow the principle of Gandhian Socialism. This narrative counterfeited given BJP only won two seats in the elections of 1984. Afterward, a close association of BJP, VHP and Shiv Sena was witnessed as all of them gathered around Ayodhya campaign to garner larger public support. Ram Janambhoomi movement led to the strengthening of BJP and its allied parties.\footnote{Rama Janambhoomi movement was a major political campaign of Hindu nationalists for the demolition of Babri mosque and formation of Ram Mandar at the same place in Ayodhya. This place is the birthplace of Rama God in Hindu mythology.} The aggressive and offensive strategy towards the communal issues and an impulsive course of action made BJP a plausible alternative for the people. It used religious symbolism instrumentally. Lal Krishan Advani made a country-wide travel ‘Rath Yatra’
dressing up as *Rama* inviting people to be the part of this campaign and donate for Ram temple. The campaign of Advani benefitted itself from the highly popular televising of *Mahabharata* on Door Darshan, the state television channel.239 This campaign led to the resurgence of Hindutva and increased its acceptance manifold whose manifestation was the elections of 1991 where BJP claimed 120 seats in Lok Sabha. It also led a gradual rise of BJP in Indian political landscape. BJP which could achieve only two seats in the elections of 1984 performed better and better with every successive election.

The popular politics at the name of religion and cultural consciousness boosted BJP's position, and it finally ascended to power to make government in the Center. It was a massive upsurge and turnaround given the dissolution of Janata party's government in 1980 had led to a complete downturn for BJP and subsequently poor electoral performance in general elections to come. BJP's emphasis on Hindu majoritarian values sharpened the lines in Indian polity and led an intercommunal polarization. Muslims were feeling increasingly insecure. BJP's projection of absolute identities was brewing resentment. This insecurity got further fuelled in the aftermath of M. Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum Case where a Muslim divorcee filed a maintenance lawsuit against her husband and Indian Supreme Court ruled in favor of her. Congress government under the pressure of All India Muslim Personal Law board overruled the decision. This decision aggrieved Hindu nationalists who since the independence had been demanding amendments to the personal family law of Muslims. It triggered a major upheaval where Congress came under furious criticism by BJP and other parties of Sang Parivar. It also furthered the insecurity of Muslims and seethed intercommunal sentiments with mutual hatred, enmity, and rivalry. This contextual background served as breeding ground for the violent fracas between Hindu and Muslims and finally bracketed both the communities in a direct row. The conclusive backdrop of all these eventualities was the demolition of Babri Mosque followed by intercommunal riots.

The prevalent communal sentiment led to the intercommunal rioting. These riots claimed many lives. Indian polity turned increasingly volatile. Both

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Hindus and Muslims had many violent upsurges which triggered major upheavals. BJP and Hindu nationalism grew wider support in the backdrop of this turmoil. It earned BJP and anti-Congress parties a massive electoral appeal and the pursuance of ethno-nationalist policies made BJP a plausible alternative for voters. All these factors culminated and resulted in a landslide victory of BJP in 1996's elections. This government could only last for thirteen days but it made BJP a robust electoral force and a largest political party concerning membership. The power again went to the hands of Janata Dal with Gowda as Prime Minister and Inder Kumar Gujral as Minister of External Affairs. This government received supported by Congress. Later on, Congress withdrew its support from Gowda, and it brought Gujral in power as Prime Minister. BJP with other like-minded parties developed an electoral alliance after the elections of 1998 called National Democratic Alliance.

The dynamics of coalitional politics impinged BJP to a great extent as second time it lost the majority in the Lok Sabha. The government headed by Vajpayee in this tenure could only serve for one year and led to the fresh elections in 1999. These elections again marked a thumping victory of BJP and a full term in government again headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The same alliance is currently ruling India led by Narendra Modi as Indian Prime Minister. The electoral strategy of Hindu nationalists since 1950s revolved around preventing concessions to Pakistan and preventing reforms in personal Hindu law. BJP’s ascendancy was

Apart from the Ayodhya campaign, BJP was the real-time beneficiary of its alliance with Janata Dal. Janata Dal was the amalgamation of the split away factions of Janata party and Congress. It rose to power in 1989 with 143 seats in Lok Sabha. BJP secured 86 seats in this election. It was a huge upsurge for BJP since it could only win two seats in 1984's elections. Something that helped BJP's rise was the unpopular stance of Janata Dal on Other Backward Castes (OBCs) which excluded a larger section of the peasantry. It invited a lot of resentment against Janata Dal. BJP also championed the cause of neglected regions.

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240 Inder Kumar Gujral being foreign minister announced Gujral Doctrine. This doctrine was about the relations of India with its immediate neighbors notably Pakistan.
241 Smith, *India as a Secular State*, 471.
242 In 1979 under Janta Party a commission named Mandal Commission was set up. The premise of this commission was to identify the economically and socially underprivileged castes and
decision of Janata Dal to apply Mandal Commission report aggrieved prosperous peasants and resultant broadened the space and acceptance for BJP. BJP withdrew its support from the alliance amid the government's crackdown on the march for Ayodhya campaign led by BJP, and this resulted in the split of Janata Dal and formation of a coalitional government of splitting away *Samajwadi Janata Party* with the support of Congress. The elections were held in 1991 and witnessed the return of Congress to power with the stable government of Narsimha Rao. The dynamics of coalitional governments and instrumentally using the popular sentimental issues BJP became a resilient and robust electoral force with an increased number of vote percentage.\(^{243}\)

The presence of BJP in state politics also witnessed ascendancy. In the elections of 1989, it single handily held the reins of powers only in Madhya Pradesh. In Rajasthan and Gujrat it was evenly poised with Janata Dal where it formed a government in Rajasthan. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar were taken away by Janata Dal, and in Maharashtra, it emerged as an opposition force in collusion with Shiv Sena. BJP marked its significant vote presence. The collapse of Janata Dal led the burgeoning of BJP, and it became a sole contender for power in Gujrat, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.\(^{244}\)

### 3.2 BJP’s Policy and Pakistan Factor

The BJP's return to power in 1999 resulted in a stable government for next five years. Before this, the one-year stint of BJP in government from 1998 to 1999 had produced landmark foreign policy decisions of the test of nuclear weapons in May 1998 and visit to Pakistan and subsequent conclusion of Lahore declaration. This tenure also witnessed a major military standoff in the form of Kargil crises where both India and Pakistan embroiled in a high scale intense rivalry with a looming threat of a full-scale military escalation.

BJP's view of Pakistan is contingent on the communal pretext. The espousal to hardcore Hindu nationalistic ideology puts it in the oppositional matrix vis-à-vis Pakistan. Politically it had always leveled strident criticism on communities in India so that through affirmative action and a defined quota for their empowerment.


Congress for making concessions to Pakistan. It holds confrontation as viable recourse in dealing towards Pakistan. The India's foreign policy towards Pakistan has always been met up with furious criticism by Hindu nationalists. The parental party of BJP Bharatya Jana Sangh had played a crucial role in the determination of Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan. The short-term of Janata Party in government in the late 70s is also crucial in redefining the course of foreign policy action towards Pakistan. Bharatya Jana Sangh since the early years criticized Congress for not prioritizing India Pakistan relations. It held a narrative that the government in the center is not paying due heed to issues emanating from border tensions, issues of minorities, infiltration and the Kashmir issue. It considered both China and Pakistan enemies and threat to India’s sovereign territorial existence.

The creation of Pakistan was purely on communal lines and this insinuated hostility since the provenance. Muslims of the Indian subcontinent projected the hostility of Hindus as prima facie for the creation of Pakistan. This argument and rhetoric were compelling enough to convince Muslims to banner under the flag of Muslim league and eventually carved out a new country for them. This division was cognitively unacceptable for Hindus. It invited a natural wrath and counter hatred from the Hindus' side. The non-acceptance and non-accommodative behavior of Hindus were the real-time reverberations of the partition which was a huge setback for both Hindu and Indian nationalists. The misappropriation of the joint assets, i.e., military and financial further augmented and fuelled the rivalry and defined a context of enmity, confrontation, and animosity in the bilateral relations. Jana Sangh believed that the permanent solution this issue is reintegration and the unification of India. The issues of confrontation in India Pakistan relations such as Kashmir displacement of refugees, defense expenditure, and economic instability can be all solved by the establishment of Akhand Bharat and for that matter annulment of partition is essential.

Jana Sangh maintained a view that India extends appeasement and Pakistan reciprocates it with belligerence. That's why the policy of appeasement towards Pakistan should be completely called off, and the pursuance of a rigorous

course of action towards Pakistan which could counter Pakistan's hostile policy towards India. No concession to Pakistan in any situation on water canal resources, financial assets, and evacuee property. The statements and arguments like annulment and undoing partition made Pakistan insecure and vulnerable and boosted defense economy in the nascent state. Jan Sangh in its equivocation made the bilateral construct of relations more volatile. Sangh was impulsive, reactionary, strictly communal, ultra-rightist and militantly nationalist in its ideological disposition, orientation, and organizational behavior.²⁴⁷

Bharatya Janata Party since its inception holds relations with neighbor countries extremely important. It believes that India's nationalist interest is safe only when it has peaceful and harmonious relations with its neighbor countries and the countries which have more neighbors should evolve a more rationalist foreign policy and that's why BJP believes in interaction with all neighbor countries.²⁴⁸ Economic protectionism and aggressive Hindu nationalism lie at the helm of the affairs of BJP's foreign policy. BJP criticizes the USA for giving Pakistan military assistance throughout the cold war in pursuit of its geostrategic objectives given it bolstered Pakistan's security and fuelled the arms race in the region. South Asia can only remain peaceful when there is peace between India and Pakistan and amid this defense build-up both the countries have to divert their funds from development to defense. It also makes the regional security more precarious with an ever looming threat of aggression. Pakistan needs more political and economic stability than arms and offensive technology.²⁴⁹ Kashmir continues to sour relations between Indian and Pakistan, and India labels violence in Kashmir as terrorism and BJP directly hold Pakistan responsible for disturbance and turmoil in Kashmir and laments it as ‘Cross-Border Terrorism.' BJP very harshly criticized the policies of previous government over Kashmir as hollow and insubstantial. BJP lambasted policy of Congress over Kashmir lacking farsightedness and redressing internal problems. According to BJP Kashmir is an integral part of India and Pakistan should not perpetrate terrorism and disturbance in Kashmir. BJP has an unflinching stance of abolishing of article 370 of the

²⁴⁹ Resolution of BJP National executive meeting held at Kochin on 23rd April 1981.
Indian constitution which grants special status to Jammu & Kashmir. It had always been categorically opposing this constitutional clause.

BJP banks on the radical options in dealing with Pakistan and does not castigate the possibility of military aggression against Pakistan. The blend of Hindu nationalism along with the ruling pragmatism has invited forays of policy options for India. Vajpayee's uncalled visit to Pakistan was the manifestation of this phenomenon. Lahore declaration was a monumental achievement since it came from a hardliner Hindu nationalist rightist party and it rejuvenated the hopes of sustainable peace in the region. The euphoria which developed after the Lahore declaration dashed down in the aftermath of Kargil standoff. NDA government confronted a lot of criticism from the opposition parties attempting to build peaceful and friendly relations with Pakistan at the expense of India's security and was considered tantamount to violating Line of Control and jeopardizing India's defense. Soon after Kargil face off the democratic government in Pakistan was toppled by the military and General Pervez Musharraf took over as the Chief Executive of Pakistan. This coup invited a lot of criticism from USA and India's relations with Pakistan also declined. Pakistan further dogged into the domestic mess and there was no further progress in bilateral dialogues.

The other significant development in this NDA's tenure was Agra Summit. It was a summit that took place in July 2001 and aimed at discussing all issues including Kashmir, terrorism, and restraint on nuclear weapons. It could not achieve substitutive results amid lack of confidence hence Agra treaty was not signed. Vajpayee led government was susceptible of Musharraf since his aggressive overture in Kargil resulted in the sabotaging of the peace process initiated between Vajpayee and Nawaz. The relations further intensified volatilye in the wake of the attack on Indian parliament in 2001 which resulted in seven deaths. It put both the countries on the brink of war and led to massive border mobilizations on both the sides. This attack was allegedly carried out by

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250 Lahore declaration was a bilateral agreement signed on 21 February 1999 between Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif, the premiers of India and Pakistan. It aimed at improving relations and friendly cooperation between India and Pakistan.
251 George Iype, “Government's handling of Kargil dismays defense forces”, Rediff News, June 1, 1999.
Lashkar e Taiba and Jaish e Mohammed. India claimed that ISI, the premier intelligence agency of Pakistan, perpetrated the attacks which Pakistan categorically denied. It led to a major military standoff between India and Pakistan which continued for several months. It darted a threatening picture since both the countries were nuclear powers and any misunderstanding could trigger a major escalation proving catastrophic for the entire region. Following incessant diplomatic causation both the countries withdrew their troops from international border leading to the de-escalation. Kargil war and this military standoff disparaged Vajpayee government to reconfigure ties with Pakistan. It also invited a furious backlash from the opposition parties.

India’s foreign policy towards Pakistan largely remained dormant and status quoist until the end of NDA government. BJP faced a major imbroglio in 2002 when intercommunal riots broke out between Hindus and Muslims. It anti-Muslim rhetoric was further corroborated in the aftermath of these riots. These riots sparked out after a train was torched out causing the deaths of 58 Hindu Pilgrims. This upheaval spanned over months to come caused nearly 1000 deaths, many kidnappings, rapes and arsons resultant bringing a huge loss. The then Chief Minister Narendra Modi was alleged to have condoned this massacre albeit exonerated in 2011 by the special instigation team set up by the supreme court of India. Many of the observers argue that it was a state-backed and organized violence against Muslims and was tantamount to an organized pogrom. India’s embroilment in this trepidation garnered an enormous amount of criticism for NDA particularly BJP from the opposition parties. Critics argued that BJP tried to impose its communalist agenda. BJP’s militant nationalism got exhibited at the fullest. Opposition parties lambasted BJP for attempting to

256 Special Investigation Closure Report on Gujrat Riots and Mr. Justice G.T. Nanavati & Mr. Justice Akshay H. Mehta’s Commission Report on Sabarmati Express Train Incident at Godhra available at home.gujrat.gov.in
eliminate the secular nature of Indian politics and promoting aggressive and chauvinist Hinduism. The intercommunal rioting did not remain confined to Gujrat only but expanded to Ahmedabad as well and consumed many lives.\textsuperscript{258} The absolute character of identities and the otherness which BJP upheld and promoted impinged Indian polity with unintended consequences.

The BJP's communalism was facing the grave challenge in the backdrop of post-cold war globalization. Gradual liberalization and economic growth were emerging as a threat for BJP's traditional emphasis on Hindu exclusive identity construct. Congress pitted the notion of equality, diversity, secularity, and plurality and this was discordant with BJP's cultural nationalism rooted in the Hindu tradition. It was the very reason that when BJP came into power in NDA alliance, it overemphasized the notions of Hindu dominance and cultural nationalism. The Hindutva textbooks and attempt to rewrite history were symptomatic of this thinking process.\textsuperscript{259} BJP attempted to rewrite the history considering a fact that it wanted to annihilate the perception that it was ruled by the foreign invaders. The completion of the term in office also ended criticism on instability and legitimacy since earlier two governments could not sustain for a longer period. BJP reinforced Hindutva as a viable and potent force in Indian polity as Advani claimed that BJP had added the lexicon of ‘Dharma’ to Indian democracy.\textsuperscript{260} BJP emphasized communalism and communal politics to address the ideational challenges in the wake of rampant globalization and India's unprecedented economic growth.

The second factor which contributed towards the mainstream acceptance of BJP and its concomitant ideology in Indian middle class was its capitalistic orientation. Congress historically had a tilt towards pro-socialist policies whereas BJP and its predecessor Jana Sangh were critical of economic policy and centralized planning framework of Indian National Congress. These parties had remained critical of India's Soviet tilt as well. The rise of neoliberal capitalism after the cold war led to the acceptance of BJP in Indian middle class was due to

\textsuperscript{259} Bharatya Janta party claims that Aryans were Indians and Muslims were invaders. BJP in its first tenure tried to rewrite the history through popular myth building and use of media outlets but it counterfeited.
its espousal to capitalistic economic policy orientation. India's relations with the USA also flourished in BJP led NDA tenures due to the very same ideological nuance and pro-capitalist niche.\textsuperscript{261}

The volatile regional security environment turned further capricious amid USA's invasion of Afghanistan followed after 9/11 attacks. It necessitated Pakistan again for the USA. Pakistan came back into the limelight given it was facing international isolation in the backdrop of the military takeover. India also offered intelligence and other forms of support to coalition forces. The invasion of NATO forces in Afghanistan and global strategic chessboard overshadowed the oppositional contours of regional politics and mutual enmity between India and Pakistan. BJP government in this tenure attempted to castigate its impression of aggressively nationalist and tried to include ruling pragmatism and brinkmanship in its dealing and course of action towards Pakistan. It was a significant shift and a diversion from the headstrong rhetoric of rendering concessions to Pakistan with which BJP and its predecessor party have clung to since independence. Vajpayee paid a visit to Pakistan again in 2004 to attend SAARC summit and reaffirmed that India and Pakistan must keep talking.\textsuperscript{262} No landmark foreign policy success or breakthrough during this tenure was visible. India and Pakistan relations followed the same trajectory of event-specific orientation. BJP intentionally and skilfully ensured that its ties with Pakistan should not flourish to a point where it is considered a digression from its anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim disposition, and it should not also fall to the point that India becomes a victim of the cross-border terrorism. Historically the most of the invasions in India have taken place through the route of Khyber Pass, which lies in North West of Pakistan. India's frame of insecurity from Pakistan has a historical lineage. Whenever Khyber got breached, India was at the receiving end. The foreign invasions and infiltration in India have largely shaped the paranoia of Hindu nationalists. BJP always tried to normalize relations with Pakistan amid this frame of mind that India can remain safe and stable only when its neighborhood is peaceful. Any disturbance or consternation in its neighborhood will go a long way and impinge India's national interest. BJP wants to keep relations with Pakistan at a bare minimum threshold where it can

\textsuperscript{261} Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, \textit{The Making of India's Foreign Policy} (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2003), 285

maintain poise between its ideological contextualization and the dynamics of national interest. BJP's policy towards Pakistan exhibits national interest and is guided by Hindutva ideology.

The foreign policy schematization led by NDA government faced certain oscillations towards Pakistan. The dominant themes of BJP’s foreign policy towards Pakistan were:

1) Confrontation
2) Normalization
3) Aggression
4) Pragmatism

BJP had always been critical of Congress's docility in its dealing with Pakistan, therefore, it develops a reciprocal and befitting policy framework vis-à-vis Pakistan. It utilizes all tools of foreign policy. BJP in its tenure from 1998 to 2004 successfully led the interplay of diplomacy and coercion in its foreign policy decision-making. At one hand it initiated a conciliatory frame of action in 1999 by taking a bold initiative, and in 2002 it was all ready and geared up for an aggressive hot pursuit against Pakistan. BJP intends to normalize relations with Pakistan but from the point of strength. In its decision-making, it skillfully reconciles its theoretical positions and cognitive dispositions with the real-time political challenges and geopolitical realities.

The combination of theory and practice define the ambit of BJP's pragmatism. Diplomacy and use of force are two powerful tools to attain foreign policy goals. BJP efficiently utilizes diplomatic negotiations and threat to use force towards the attainment of its foreign policy objectives. For instance, in the aftermath of the border mobilization of 2001-2002 Pakistan had to ban religious Jihadi outfits. This action turned out to be a revocation from the support of the insurgency in Kashmir. India was successful in achieving its objective since continued diplomatic pressure from international community assured that India and Pakistan don't enter into a direct war with one another.

4.3 BJP and Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of Bharatya Janata Party is largely contingent on domestic contextualization. BJP's mobilization strategies on both electoral and

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political level lie in the domestic political scenario. BJP efficiently utilizes its domestic capital through popular rhetoric. The polemic against Pakistan, Muslims, cultural relativism and composite culture extend support base and assist BJP in ascendancy to power. The fall of Janata party and a colossal loss in popularity and acceptance of Bharatya Janata Party in the decade of 80s got rescued through popular narrative, tirade against Congressional rhetoric and stricture against Muslims. The active manipulation of the domestic pulse through the instrumental use of popular sentiments and demagogy on Ram Janambhoomi movement made BJP a strong and decisive force in Indian political landscape. BJP in its electoral camping and state elections rely on popular issues and through counter-rhetoric garner public support in its favor. The theoretical models of the relevance of domestic sources of foreign policy don't fit appropriately on BJP's modus operandi. It capitalizes on domestic political context to ascend to power, but BJP's overreliance on domestic political arena underscores only electoral politics and a popular sentimental narrative in a crisis. For instance, the way BJP cultivated its anti-Pakistan narrative in the backdrop of Indian parliament attack is a striking example.

BJP insinuated warmongering and war-mania in Indian polity and projected Pakistan an existential threat to India's sovereignty and territoriality. Through this, BJP established and consolidated its political position and further fortified its ideological grounds on which it battles with Pakistan. BJP through the use of these crisis situations secures its ranks and convinces its supporters that it does not deviate away from its stated position and deflects criticism from its competitor parties. BJP communicates to its followers that the secularity of Indian National Congress had devalued their cultural consciousness and BJP has gone a long way to achieving a communal, Hindu based and Hindu oriented polity. This Hindu Rashtra traditionally had been jeopardized by invaders primarily Muslims. The domestic cultivation of this Hindutva ideology demanded a confrontationist group to secure and consolidate its ideological grounds therefore, BJP uses the anti-Muslim card. Pakistan is a manifestation of BJP's communalist vision of Indian polity and formation of Pakistan justifies BJP's communalist definition of

Indian civilization. The promotion of his Hindu worldview further directs BJP and its supporters to rewrite and reinterpret history. Through this, it compounds its discrimination and hatred against these communities and forms a normative orientation of Indian state-guided and ruled by Hindutva and Hindu majoritarianism.

Bureaucracy is the core engine of foreign policy formulation and its subsequent execution in the domestic framework. Unlike Congress who draws more help and assistance from the bureaucratic framework, BJP is critical of bureaucracy and considers it a colonial inheritance and hold bureaucratic slippage a major impediment in India's headway in global affairs. No serious institutional reforms are made in India after independence. The coalitional dynamics of Indian polity also hinder any agenda of reformation. Congress also strengthened the colonial enterprise through the use of bureaucracy in the purely focalized decisional framework. BJP though remained stringently critical of slow bureaucratic decisions also could not transform the essential nature of bureaucratic functioning. The centralized administrative structure and a lot of paperwork with passive standard operating procedures pale the dynamic role of bureaucracy in statecraft. Indian bureaucracy got criticized by US Secretary of State John Kerry who termed Indian bureaucracy expert in setting up roadblocks. In foreign policy decision-making bureaucracy also slows down the decision-making hence a proactive foreign policy at times is not visible. In the given context of the statecraft BJP's foreign policy is the culmination of ideological undercurrents, realistic geostrategic and geopolitical pursuits, and rationalist tools of foreign policy accentuation. The ideology and the incumbent norms set up a normative discourse which is poles apart from Indian National Congress. Indian polity witnesses diametrically opposite secularism and communalism. They exist concurrently and are into a constant competition with one another. In this regard, Indian National Congress is also a normative force which holds influential competing norms. Indian nationalism and Hindu nationalism are two dominant yet competing discourses in Indian polity.

The BJP's pattern of confrontation receives its impetus from the ideological and cognitive disposition of Hindu nationalism. It defines the larger

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266 Prakash Nanda, “Babudom barricade: John Kerry's criticism of Indian bureaucracy is spot on,” *FirstPost*, Sep 06, 2016
ambit of the oppositional and absolute character of identities based on communal lines. It is also noteworthy that division of Pakistan on communal lines gives the very reason of existence to Hindu nationalism and justifies it on socio-political tenets. BJP always had been comfortable interacting with Pakistan given both share the same ideological basis though in divergent political orchestration. BJP and dominant Hindu nationalist ideology have long championed the anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistani rhetoric, so any effort of normalizing relations is unfathomable. That's why when BJP comes up with an effort of normalizing relations it is greeted with surprise. BJP's foreign policy decision-making in general and towards Pakistan, in particular, does not come under any grounded institutional framework. Here the tenets of BJP's foreign policy share ground with Congress. It also makes and executes personalized decisional framework and largely focalizes around the decision maker in the center. BJP also doctors and dictates the public opinion in its favor and follows top to bottom approach when it is in power.267

BJP shapes the domestic contours according to its ideological dogmas and hold up the narratives and builds prescient rhetoric to consolidate its ideological position and political support in the domestic frame of reference. BJP's electoral and political strategies of mobilization help it a great deal and strengthen it's on ground presence and builds further cohesion in its supporters. The cognitive-normative reconciliation of ideology and politics drive this cohesive mechanism. The narrative of Hindu's cultural dominance, anathema of foreign invaders and an oppositional context of Muslim presence in the polity define the broader contours of BJP's politics in the domestic landscape of Indian politics.

BJP cultivates Pakistan hatred in its support base and also explicitly spells it out in the election campaign and relevant forums. BJP more effectively utilizes the arena of domestic politics and builds an oppositional rhetoric against Pakistan, and it garners vote and support for BJP. The relevance of domestic contextualization in the foreign policy formulation for BJP is more effective than Congress. Congress faces opposition from domestic scenario hence domestic arena serves as a constraint on decision-making. On the other hand, BJP relies on domestic context to create and consolidate a discourse and a narrative which eventually serves and strengthens its political position. BJP uses domestic context

267 Interview with Suba Chandaran, Director Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
to climb to power but once it attains political prowess it also tries to keep its support intact, and it reiterates its aggressive position on certain issues to keep its acceptance intact. BJP claims Kargil and withdrawal of Pakistani troops as a major success. Very recently in 2017 BJP government led by Modi claimed surgical strikes on Azad Kashmir and demonstrated it as a huge success to enhance public support. He used this rhetoric in the electoral campaigns of UP and Punjab's elections. The next chapter "The Current Matrix of Indian Foreign Policy under Modi" presents the detailed account of the foreign policy of BJP under Modi in NDA led alliance which is quite divergent from the last tenure of NDA in office from 1998-2004.

BJP, unlike Congress, does not confront the variable of domestic politics as an impediment in its dealing towards Pakistan. Congress since had been apologetic about its stance towards Pakistan does not oppose BJP's efforts substantially to legitimize its foreign policy course of action. It is also a striking fact that relations of India towards Pakistan improved significantly during BJP tenures. Congress maintains a stalemate in its relations with Pakistan or maximum goes to the level of icebreaking. It does not crystallize these initiatives to a consolidated foreign policy mechanism overcoming all impasses and hitches in India-Pakistan relations amid BJP's pressure and the connotation of domestic politics. BJP on the other hands breaks inertia and at times take bold initiatives. The Lahore declaration substantiates this fact. The coalitional dynamics of Indian polity are always very significant, and BJP's anti-Muslim position earns it a lot of criticism and opposition from inside. Through its Pakistan policy, it also wanes criticism and opposition coming from inside.

BJP is held up as staunchly anti-Muslim, and its policies also corroborate this orientation. Every time BJP ascends to power the pursuit of aggressive and hawkish policies are quite evident. BJP in its electoral campaigns also capitalizes on anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim rhetoric and hints out at aggressive and reprehensive foreign policy towards Pakistan. In government and statecraft when ruling pragmatism overrides the cognitive disposition and leads to a diplomatic course of action casting aside offensive posture it receives a considerably acceptable feedback. Any friendly foreign policy action/gesture towards Pakistan aiming at normalizing the relations or even as a symbolic gesticulation is greeted with surprise. Some examples can be adduced to establish this argument. For
instance in 2015 BJP's Premier Narendra Modi paid an unexpected and serendipitous visit to Pakistan on his return from Kabul and was met up with a pleasant surprise for everyone.\textsuperscript{268} The domestic politics impacts BJP's decisional framework meagrely in comparison with Indian National Congress. Congress cannot criticize BJP to a great deal over two striking factors. One BJP holds Congress responsible for the creation of Pakistan and also rendering concession to Pakistan, and secondly, BJP itself leads and champions anti-Pakistan case in Indian polity. It gives BJP a leverage to form a Pakistan policy deviant from Congressional principles and even contradictory to its stated position.\textsuperscript{269}

\textsuperscript{268} “India PM Modi in surprise Pakistan visit”, \textit{BBC News}, 25 December, 2015

\textsuperscript{269} Mujeeb Afzal, \textit{Bharatya Janta Party and Indian Muslims}
CHAPTER 4
MUMBAI ATTACKS, UPA AND INDIA PAKISTAN RELATIONS

This chapter deals with the foreign policy patterns and responses of Indian National Congress vis-à-vis Pakistan post-Mumbai attacks. The previous chapter explained the dispensation of the foreign policy of Indian National Congress in a historical and genealogical lineage. This chapter specifically undertakes the predicament of Congress's decision-making concerning Pakistan in the crisis. The Mumbai standoff led to the deterioration of India Pakistan relations and ended the process of composite dialogue and confidence-building measures aiming at normalizing relations between both the immediate neighbors. This impasse struck Congress towards the end of UPA's first term in office. The Mumbai attacks and the events that followed after redrew the contours of Indian political landscape and marked the electoral victory of Indian National Congress for the second consecutive turn. The UPA led alliance governed India again from 2009-2014.

Mumbai attacks were the series of attacks that took place on November 26, 2008, and this impasse continued for sixty hours. It claimed the lives of 164 people. Indian government alleged the involvement of Pakistani militant organization Lashkar e Taiba with the complicity of its premier intelligence agency. This event proved to be a major hitch in India-Pakistan relations for years to come. It also downplayed the level of cooperation and confidence which both the countries had developed since 2004. Mumbai is the commercial hub of India and attack on this city could have produced a ripple effect and much more attention. The destinations selected for attack were also significant. Taj Hotel and Hotel Oberoi also host a large number of foreign residents so an attack on these targets would have fetched worldwide attention. The attacks got properly planned, and according to reports terrorists came by sea, and terrorists were found well organized, equipped and orchestrated attacks with precision. The onslaught lasted for four days and across Mumbai.

Indian National Congress through United progressive Alliance was ruling India with the government in the center and Manmohan Singh as the Premier. The first and instantaneous reaction to Mumbai attacks was the resignation of the Home Minister Shivraj Patil. Mumbai attacks paved a new trajectory of relations with Pakistan which to date affects the course of bilateral relations. Congress demanded an immediate inquiry into Mumbai attacks and perpetrators to be handed over to India. India also blamed Pakistan for harboring terrorists which resultantely jeopardizes the internal security of India. Amid this eventuality, the UPA led government was shaken by the jolt and confronted enormous criticism from position parties particularly BJP which demanded on an outright ban on all travels between India and Pakistan. It also demanded Indian High Commissioner to be called back from Pakistan.

Congress opened all forays of diplomatic options in the backdrop of Mumbai attacks. As mentioned in previous chapter Indian National Congress in its foreign policy manifestation presciently relies more on systemic and structural variables. It externalized this issue and invited and skillfully presented this issue as a matter of global terrorism and demanded role of USA and UN in this quagmire. The American president George W. Bush assured PM Manmohan that American agencies would throw their weight behind the investigation of Mumbai attacks and demonstrated a shared resolve on the war on terrorism. The USA also sent a team from Federal Bureau of Investigation to unearth the plot behind these attacks. India further reiterated its position that it looks to international community's cooperation in this ever prolonged war against terrorism and government of India is determined to make sure the territorial integrity of and sovereignty of India intact. The US also said that the attacks on Mumbai were managed and controlled in Pakistan.

The vigorous persuasion of this imbroglio at international front produced a major diplomatic victory for India. United Nations through a Security Council resolution declared Hafiz Saeed a terrorist and Jamat-ud-Dawa as a terrorist organization. This declaration came as a part of UN Resolution 1267. The Security Council listed JUD as an alias of Lashkar e Taiba and put four of its leaders under the organizations and entities known to support  

Al-Qaeda and Taliban. This success got further compounded when in 2012 US announced a bounty of $10m on Hafiz Saeed equal to Mullah Omer, the most wanted terrorist. It is the manifestation of the argument listed earlier that Congress in its foreign policy dispensation more relies on structural variables and open diplomatic fora inviting systemic pressure and pursue a legalistic frame of action. On the contrary BJP resorts to impulsive, domestic and intrinsic policy mechanism and ensures a populist and sensational stance vis-à-vis Pakistan. This frame of action is also under significant transformation under the Premiership of Modi and BJP is also trying to evoke a coercive-pragmatic response in crisis situations. The next chapter will make a detailed account of the trends and transformations in India's foreign policy under Modi.

The Indian diaspora in the United States helped Indian foreign policy stance to a great extent. The diaspora as mentioned in the second chapter is a significant tenet of India's domestic milieu and effectively influences the foreign policy operationalization. This domestic phenomenon plays a crucial role in the international sphere. The large presence of Indians in different walks of life in the USA, i.e., lobby groups, academia, officials and diplomatic forums shape and alter a foreign policy perception in the United States. This diaspora has boosted the ties of India with the USA. Different organizations like US-India Political action committee, Indian caucus in the US Congress and the lobbying firms hired by the Indian government to facilitate US foreign policy towards India. These lobbying groups have played a larger role in smoothing opinion for India after 1998’s nuclear tests which resulted in the imposition of many sanctions on India. American foreign policy largely gets impacted by the lobbying group and the public opinion. John Mearsheimer's book "The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy" offers valuable insight on this topic. Indian diaspora in general and lobbying groups, in particular, has played their effective role in shaping America's favorable perception of India. The rise of the economy and substantive democracy at home further complements this perception. It also reflects the impact of the domestic push on foreign policy decision-making. Notwithstanding diaspora and

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the cordiality of the first term, the second tenure of Congress could not witness any tremendous development in the larger context of US-India relationship.

Congress-led Indian government though did not completely sever its diplomatic ties with Pakistan. Shivshankar Menon, the former Indian foreign secretary, believes that a different government in 2008 would have a different foreign policy decision or an event like Mumbai again will witness a different course of action.\textsuperscript{278} India did not terminate bus service from Delhi to Lahore. The communication channels between both the countries remained open. Indian government led by Congress turned up with a pragmatic response coupled with brinkmanship that it wants Pakistan to investigate and act against the terrorists instead of creating unnecessary media hype and warmongering.\textsuperscript{279} Pakistan's reaction was noticeably positive. It admitted the planning of attacks on Pakistani soil but explicitly denied any complicity and condoning into these attacks.\textsuperscript{280} There is a steady mindset in India which opines that Pakistan cannot compete and battle India in conventional warfare given a huge and substantial disparity between both the countries. It has triggered a sub-conventional strategy where Pakistan resorts to using terrorism and non-state actors against India. Mumbai killings of 1993, Parliament attacks of 2001, Mumbai attacks, Pathankot and Uri attacks are the orchestration of this sub conventional warfare against India. The speech of Indian PM to the Lok Sabha after Mumbai attacks also reiterated the same position that Pakistan is using terrorism as a weapon against India but is not privy to a fact that terrorism is a double-edged sword and it has brought the huge cost for Pakistan.\textsuperscript{281}

This rhetoric yields a political mileage in the domestic politics and also adds electoral appeal but has not helped much in settling the deadlocks between India and Pakistan. BJP's criticism of Congress puts it in a defensive position, and it tries to establish that it does not render concessions to Pakistan, and its policy towards Pakistan is not docile. Calling off dialogues amid Mumbai stacks signaled

\textsuperscript{278} Shivshankar Menon, \textit{Choices inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy} (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016)


\textsuperscript{281} Inaugural speech of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at the Conference of Chief Ministers of Indian States on Internal Security. New Delhi, January 6, 2009. For complete text see the annexures.
the same message. Congress did not opt for an offensive course of action like BJP did border mobilizations in the aftermath of 2001's parliament attacks.

The foreign policy choice of Congress particularly in this crisis followed a nearly wise and realistic course of action, yet it remained anguished that Pakistan has not shown enough earnestness in prosecuting the handlers and perpetrators of Mumbai attacks. Pakistan did not demonstrate the seriousness of purpose in scuttling the network run by Hafiz Saeed who India believed was the ringleader behind this tragedy. Pakistan had been insistent on more and more evidence, and this gave Pakistani courts an excuse to absolve him over insufficient evidence. S. M. Krishna, the then external minister, voiced stance of the government that Pakistan could have made more serious efforts in pursuing the case.\(^{282}\) Congress played communal politics in the backdrop of Mumbai attacks. Congress did not opt for any hard or offensive course of action pertaining Pakistan amid Muslim votes. The general elections of 2009 were also drawing near. Secondly, any unrest on borders could have triggered upheaval domestically impinging Congress politically.

The domestic frame of reference significantly shaped and influenced the choice of foreign policy actions. The elections of 2009 marked the victory of Indian National Congress notwithstanding the incumbency factor. It remained espoused a rhetoric that Pakistan fails to realize that terrorism is a double-edged sword and Pakistan cultivate this terror policy to punish India, and now it's striking Pakistan back. And Congress took Mumbai as a litmus test to gauge Pakistan's commitment to fighting against terrorist instrumentalities, but it did not help India long way since Pakistan does not show any zeal in prosecuting the culprits of Mumbai and bringing them to book.\(^{283}\)

The domestic flux and the niceties of India's electoral politics thrived in a surprising victory for Congress. Congress did not make Mumbai a hoax and rather dealt it in a technocratic manner. The Congress-led government avoided emotional sensationalism, media ‘mongering and over projection in the domestic context in the pretext of coming elections. Congress pursued Mumbai attacks on the diplomatic front instead of the domestic front. The domestic wrath was there given Indian media's overhyped projection to the issue. UPA contested elections

\(^{282}\) Interview of S. M. Krishna with Karan Thapar on June 14, 2009.
\(^{283}\) “Relations with Pakistan, India’s Foreign Relations, Ministry of External Affairs (2009): XLV
on its first tenure's success where it claimed to have clinched a tremendous economic upsurge for India and credited itself for rural growth. BJP, on the other hand, campaigned around the security, good governance and development. BJP in its manifesto criticized Congress for its failure on the foreign policy front and declared to make a robust and muscular foreign policy.\footnote{“BJP’s Manifesto of Lok Sabha Elections 2009”, Bharatya Janta Party, 2009 available at https://www.bjp.org/images/pdf/election_manifesto_english.pdf} The electoral trends of this elections registered that the dynamics of economy overruled foreign policy and people largely voted for the party which offered them a policy of moderation. Congress remained successful in avoiding Mumbai becoming a cliché of terrorism.

In its second tenure, the UPA led alliance could not make any effective Pakistan policy since it did not build much in the aftermath of Mumbai attacks given the electoral context. Manmohan Singh continued his second term as India's Premier. Speaking to Lok Sabha on Pakistan issue he stated that it is in our vital interest to have normal relations with Pakistan, but it can't be done and achieved at the cost of the lives of our countrymen and a widespread insecurity which stems out from our neighborhood. He further stated Congress' foreign policy position vis-à-vis Pakistan and avowed that India won't be able to have normal and peaceful relations with Pakistan unless it assures India that it will not allow the use of its territory and soil against India. India has followed a policy using all effective bilateral and multilateral instruments to make sure that Pakistan acts with sincerity and India would never delink terrorism while dealing with Pakistan.\footnote{Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Address to Lok Sabha on July 29, 2009.} It reflects and bodes the foreign policy position and its articulation of Indian National Congress which is quite repetitive and did not have anything substantial except rhetoric. India revoked all kinds of composite dialogue though PM Manmohan met President Asif Ali Zardari on the sidelines of SCO Summit in 2009 and PM Gilani and PM Manmohan met on the sidelines of NAM summit in Sharm El Sheikh in July 2009.\footnote{“Joint statement of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Prime Minster Yusaf Raza Gilani”, Sharam El Sheikh, July 16, 2009. See the Annexures.}

Dialogues between India Pakistan continued to face downward spiral, and the overall trajectory of India-Pakistan relations stagnated. The geopolitical scenario confronted a tremendous flux given the presidential elections of USA led...
to the unprecedented and unanticipated victory of Barack Obama who later on announced his famous Af-Pak policy and gradual drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{287} India emerged as a new potential partner for the USA in its pivot to Asia policy. Under the Af-Pak policy, America bracketed Pakistan with Afghanistan and India with China in the larger preview of global and regional politics. Under this policy, US decided to deal with Pakistan and India separately.\textsuperscript{288} It paved a new trajectory of India's foreign relations with USA albeit this relationship has not produced any considerable foreign policy landmark except civil nuclear deal between USA and India which still is awaiting implementation in its letter and spirits. As highlighted earlier that Indian National Congress in its foreign policy dispensation more focuses the systemic and structural undercurrents, BJP, on the other hand, is more inclined to domestic and political impulse in its foreign policy matrix.

Manmohan normatively remained clung to civilizational rhetoric which is essentially Congressional rhetoric instrumentalized by Nehru. He emphasized on new values in Indian foreign policy based on India's civilizational character. He repeatedly trumpeted the buzzwords like India as the symbol of the confluence of civilizations and the coexistence of civilizations. He termed the world as \textit{Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam}, whole world is one family and there he sought to link up the world with India's ancient cultural heritage. Manmohan doctrine of Indian foreign policy believes that India should not only have government to government relations with other states but business to business and people to people relations. India is destined to play a major role in global affairs that's why it needs to stabilize its neighborhood, create a frame of relationship based on interdependence and secure its borders. The stable South Asian neighborhood is a prerequisite for India's development. India should resolve outstanding issues with its neighbors, and this serves India's national interest to its best.\textsuperscript{289} This India's civilizational rhetoric is very much akin to the American idea of manifest destiny and American exceptionalism which is again a normative construct. Americans had a widely held belief in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century that they hold unique geographical

\textsuperscript{287} The Af-Pak policy was Obama's policy towards South Asia in general and Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular and announced in 2009. It was to dismantle and eliminate the terrorist networks and their affiliates in the region.

\textsuperscript{288} Cleo Paskal, “The Importance of De-Hyphenating India”, \textit{Huffington Post}, September 30, 2017

position and set of values which distinguish them from others. Americans used this ideational construct to legitimize their westward expansion. It referred to the special virtues of American people and to revamp and redraw the American continent in lines with American value structures and a divine sense of accomplishing this duty. Following the similar pattern, India believes that it possesses the unique civilizational traits which no one else possesses and this antiquity of civilization distinguishes India. India envisages its position in South Asia in the very similar preview and emphasizes on the common destiny of the region. Indira doctrine and Gujral doctrine (Gujral hailed from Congress and remained a close aide of Indira) are the manifestations of this thinking process. Indira believed that India should have an extended influence along the Himalayan borders rest assures India's dominant and hegemonic position in the region. Gujral doctrine also stated that India does want the relations of reciprocity with its weaker neighbors and none of the countries in Indian neighborhood should allow its territory for use against India. All the countries of the region should respect one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and no interference into the internal affairs of one another. Above all countries of South Asia must settle their disputes peacefully through bilateral negotiations. Indira's doctrine and Gujral doctrine are the classic depictions of how India views itself and its neighbors in the regional geopolitical scenario and how it strives to maintain an upper hand on the issues of regional significance.

Congress confronted another blow in its second tenure, and this was global economic meltdown which impacted by and large economy of all the countries across the globe. Though Indian economy remained steadfast in the beginning and it marked the historic double-figure annual growth in 2010 percent this boom in Indian economy could not last for long and dropped to 3.2 percent in 2012. This regression in the economy coupled with high inflation rates and rupee's decline against the dollar made things hard for India. It marked an end to Manmohan charisma who was considered to be an architect of India's economic aggrandizement. India was confronting dire domestic challenges in the realm of economics and the escalating voices of opposition in the political landscape. The

290 Harish Kapur, *Foreign Policies of India’s Prime Ministers*
292 Ankit Panda, “India's UPA Government, and Foreign Policy”
domestic challenges grew harder and harder for Congress, and Congress seemed incapable of dealing with these grave challenges of the economy. The UPA led government tried to initiate a working mechanism of water distribution between India and Bangladesh but due to the domestic opposition could not materialize it. Mumbai was a great setback for India Pakistan relations. Amid domestic pressure and media hype, Congress called off composite dialogues.

All development in bilateral context declined, and relations deteriorated to a large extent. Terrorism has become a buzz word in India, and the normative impulse of country's foreign policy predetermines role of Pakistan in it. India uses this rhetoric of cross-border terrorism to put Pakistan under pressure. It also helps India in diverting the attention from the turbulence and instability in Jammu and Kashmir. The factor of foreign infringement warrants India to resort to violent means to curb the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir is again a domestic conundrum significantly impacting India's foreign policy. Putting the onus of terrorism on Pakistan India absolves itself for using force in Kashmir which to Indian definition becomes necessary to confront cross-border terrorism. Kashmir remains host to an ever prolonged disquiet, and strides as a determinant in the foreign policies of both India and Pakistan. There is no end in sight to this imbroglio. Had India under Congress decided to engage Pakistan despite Mumbai and used dialogue as only recourse the trajectory of India-Pakistan relations would have been different. This foreign policy choice might have invited a furious backlash from the opposition parties especially BJP, but this could be a wise overture. The failure to do so led to different consequences and the top of them was the frailty of civilian regime in Pakistan. Engaging with civilian leadership could empower democratic regime and in a better position to negotiate with India to set the things straight.

UPA's Pakistan's policy in its totality proved to be a failure since all the confidence-building measures and normalization of relations proved to be a zero-sum game. UPA also failed to seize the initiative when the government in Pakistan led by President Musharraf was willing to make a considerable shift on its traditional foreign policy posture vis-à-vis outstanding disputes with India. Musharraf's four-point formula towards the resolution of Kashmir dispute was groundbreaking for many reasons. One, it was a deviation from traditional intransigence over Kashmir issue. Secondly, it came from a military leadership in
Pakistan which is presumed to have a larger rather defining say in India-Pakistan relations. Thirdly, this was a serious and daring initiative to resolve the ever-prolonged Kashmir issue. Any serious development in this regard could have paved a sustainable roadmap to peace and stability in South Asia. The reluctance and delay in capitalizing this initiative led to Mumbai, and everything turned zeroed. The change of leadership in Pakistan with the return of democracy and ousting of Musharraf India missed a potentially historic moment. The coming years witnessed the same anachronous foreign policy patterns. The civilian leadership in Pakistan was frail enough to take a daring and bold initiative. It gets substantiated through the fact that President Asif Ali Zardari made a statement on Pakistan's nuclear policy that Pakistan is considering to revise its first use policy came under a derogatory criticism by conservative and hyper-nationalist sections in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{293} India failed to strike any noticeable development afterward, and Mumbai tragedy proved to be the last nail in the coffin and marked an end to the euphoria of India and Pakistan reaching to some concrete solution of the protracted disputes. Indian foreign policy is often criticized waiting for some miracle to solve India and Pakistan's outstanding disputes instead of resorting to the processes, methods and available mechanisms rife in international politics towards resolution of the conflicts. Indian foreign policy follows a delayed mechanism and a hollow symbolic structure waiting for some ideal solution.\textsuperscript{294}

The rhetoric which Congress built during the period 2004-2008 where India and Pakistan considerably eased out their rivalry was not transformed into a consolidated policy guiding the comprehensive makeover of the relational context between India and Pakistan. The initiatives taken in the time span of four years were unprecedented, and it was the harmonious era in the bilateral context of India-Pakistan relations. The agenda of regional integration through SAARC also failed without any substantial outcome and India failed to generate cooperation. India amid its heterogeneity has commonalities and shared grounds with every regional neighbor where this is not the case for the rest of the countries in the region. India could have been the driver of cooperation in South Asia but of failed to do so.

\textsuperscript{293} "Zardari's 'no first use of nukes' remark takes Pak by surprise", \textit{The Indian Express}, November 23, 2008.

The stagnation in relations with Pakistan persisted, and there was no breakthrough moment. India and Pakistan gradually started resuming relations first starting with the talks at foreign secretary level and then further development got noticed in 2010 with the minister level dialogues. The uncalled meeting between Singh and Gilani and Singh and Zardari melted some ice. The significant development was Manmohan Singh's cricket diplomacy in 2011 when he invited Prime Minister and President of Pakistan to watch a cricket match between India and Pakistan. It was icebreaking since this was a major foreign policy overture after Mumbai attacks. In 2012 the president of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari retorted through Sufi diplomacy when he visited the shrine of Chishti at Ajmer. It was symbolic because in the epoch of violence and extremism he conveyed a message of peace enshrined in Sufi tradition. Towards the late 2012 India and Pakistan achieved a significant success when both the countries agreed to liberalize the visa regime. This agreement was unprecedented given the volatile relationship and skewed security centric policies both the countries agreed upon enhancing people to people contact. Under this agreement both the countries introduced group visa, business visa, pilgrim visa and visa on arrival for those 65 years of age. 

The second tenure of UPA witnessed an incomprehensive, fractious and scattered foreign policy not towards Pakistan but the neighborhood at large. This era experienced some land sliding transformations in the region. India failed to engage Nepal in the aftermath of fall of the monarchy in and the rise of Maoists in power. Sri Lanka's fight against Tamil guerrillas that spanned over three decades came to a conclusive end with the victory of the state over belligerents. India remained sluggish towards responding to this momentous development. India remained oblivious to the events in Myanmar where the movement of democracy ran by Aung San Suu Kyi was at its full throttle. The rising status of India demanded proactive policies in the region and at the global level where India failed to have developed a course of action corresponding to its regional and global ambitions of a dominant power. India could not have successfully engaged with China despite the fact that international community envisions India as a counterweight to China in the region. India's response to terrorism was also unsatisfactory. India could not have devised a strong counterterrorism policy

296 “India and Pak sign new liberalized visa agreement”, Times of India, September 08, 2012
though it claims herself to be the victim of terrorism. India's foreign policy in this
tenure was not congruent to its emergent power status and hence remained
counterproductive at large.

India did not significantly engage with the civilian regime in Pakistan. India being a stable democracy did not put its weight behind the nascent democracy in Pakistan which emerged after a dictatorial military rule of nearly a decade. The warmth of relations which was there during Musharraf era fizzled out and subsequently zeroed in the backdrop of Mumbai attacks. India's support to the democratically elected government could have furthered the trust and cooperation between both the states, but India preferred to opt for a reluctant course of action. In Pakistan, the India policy is primarily guided by the security-centric mindset and military has a larger say in the decision-making for the obvious reasons. Civil-military relations in Pakistan remained consternated historically with the upper hand of the military over civilians. India did not make any serious effort in empowering civilian democratic regime in Pakistan. Peaceful neighborhood better serves India's regional security calculus. India does not have many alternatives in the region and can't change its neighbors. It is in India's interest to live with these geopolitical realities.²⁹⁷ India steered itself away from Pakistan and created a binary in which it views its relationship with Pakistan and does not play its role in mitigating the quagmires of Pakistan. It remains the fact that Pakistan itself is the big victim of terrorism and the prevalent insecurity had resulted in a poor and sluggish economy which hinders Pakistan in playing a constructive role in the overall ambit of regional politics. Echoing old mantra of cross-border terrorism, state-sponsored insurgency, and border infiltration in this given context further worsen the state of affairs. India's failure in engaging Pakistan is a big failure of Indian foreign policy. The blame game and rhetoric yield no productive foreign policy outcomes for India. Pakistan still stands as undeniable reality, and the subtleties of nation-state system presume acceptance and acknowledgment of this tectonic shift where no state can undo another state. Americans despite their technological sophistication and hegemonic control over the global affairs could not overhaul and restructure Afghanistan. India's normative unacceptance of Pakistan since the beginning has set up a roadmap of a reluctant and disinclined

posture of foreign policy towards Pakistan. The cognitive structure of Indian political elite does not consider Pakistan even a tenable reality as highlighted in the interview of Salman Khurshid. He said, "Pakistan is not even a substantive issue in India's foreign policy. Pakistan is only relevant to India vis-à-vis outstanding disputes India has with Pakistan rest India does not even consider Pakistan as its competitor. India is poised to play a global role and India is competing with China and other major powers of the world. Pakistan holds no significance and eminence for India in this given pretext."298

Mumbai attacks and the foreign policy choices pursued by the government led by Congress demonstrated some decisive themes of India-Pakistan relations which are:

1) Lack of strategic trust between India and Pakistan
2) Endemic inability of crisis stability
3) Regressive nature of India-Pakistan relations
4) Event-specific foreign policy dispensation

The essential nature of India-Pakistan relations since their inception elicit on distrust and skepticism. The non-resolution of the longstanding disputes has contributed to the ill will which both the countries share. The coercive pursuit of foreign policy through arms and defense buildup added more quandaries to the already volatile relationship. Congress which governed India for long could not evoke a sustainable and peaceful foreign policy matrix vis-à-vis Pakistan. Apart from the outstanding disputes, the crisis situations exposed the lack of brinksmanship and inability of leadership to stabilize the situation. The pattern of India-Pakistan relations is so quizzical and regressive that unless a sustainable policy without having aimed at concrete gains is adopted the ill will and bad blood is enough to zero the efficacy of ad hoc and arbitrary measures. Unfortunately, the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan started under Manmohan government was an interim initiative which collapsed with Mumbai attacks. The Congress-led government failed to evoke a workable mechanism after having called off the dialogues. It started the journey from the beginning again, and all the goodwill accumulated in between 2004-2008 got trashed. This intermittent foreign policy posture had remained counterproductive in the past as well.

298 ‘Personal Interview with Salman Khurshid,’ Former External Minister, November 12, 2015
Water Treat, Simla Accord, and Cricket Diplomacy were all punctuated initiatives and could not have paved a sustainable frame of relations between the arch-rivals. No détente struck the bilateral equation of India Pakistan relations. There is not a single decade of protracted peace in the turbulent trajectory of India-Pakistan relations. Congress-led governments could not think out of the box solution for the shared predicament. Status quo ruled and animosity between both the states grew bitter and bitter. India always resorted to the buzzwords of cross-border terrorism and Pakistan's collusion in destabilizing India. This blame game though succeeds in putting Pakistan under pressure but does not yield any tangible foreign policy outcome. Moreover, this has not reduced the vulnerability of India. The attacks in 1993 ensued India's rhetorical blame game against Pakistan. It persisted till Parliament attacks took place and overshadowed 1993. India kept on harping on Parliament attacks till the tragedy of Mumbai struck it while casting parliament attacks aside.

Mumbai became a new lexicon in India's dealing towards Pakistan and now under Modi India is hammering Pakistan on Pathankot and Uri. It reflects a foreign policy pattern in India's security matrix and bilateral relational construct. Discussing with Pakistan is a plausible alternative than not talking to Pakistan. Congress adopted myopic and event specific policy after Mumbai. It deteriorated the fabric of engagement and embarked India and Pakistan on more hostile and belligerent trajectory.

CHAPTER 5
BJP, THE RISE OF MODI AND INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY
This chapter focuses on the ascendancy of Bharatya Janata Party to power and rise of Modi as a new idiosyncratic phenomenon in the dispensation of India's security policy. This chapter pivots around India's emerging trajectory of foreign policy under Narendra Modi's premiership and its moves to evolve closer relations with the eastern economic powers, notably Australia and Japan in the pretext of Look East Policy. The chapter further discusses other tenets of Modi's foreign policy like Make in India, regional connectivity, conscious neighboring, and checkmate on China and minus Pakistan security calculus. This chapter further glimpses on the broader spectrum of Indian foreign policy, global and regional contours and their implications for India-Pakistan relations. It evaluates the matrix of Indian foreign policy and critically dissect the initiatives, and foreign policy choices pursued by Modi led government.

As explicated in previous chapters, Bharatya Janata Party (BJP) operates purely on communal grounds and seeks to eliminate the secular characterization of the Indian polity in which state and society coexist. BJP projects Hindus and Muslims as absolute identities contradictory to one another. BJP is the proponent of Hindutva and seeks to dominate the value systems and traditions based on majoritarianism. Modi's populistic rise became a worldwide phenomenon in 2014 when he started running for India's PM. With a tainted past of being alleged involvement in Gujrat massacre, things were not very convenient for Modi, yet he crafted an image of messiah for Indians. Congress's abysmal term in office abetted the rise of Modi. After an unimpressive tenure of UPA in office from 2009-2014, the general elections of 2014 produced surprising and unexpected results. Though there were escalating voices against nepotism, inefficiency, and incompetence in the statecraft and governance yet two factors largely contributed towards Congress's massive defeat. One was incumbency factor and second corruption scandals which dented party's repute. It aggrieved Indian Middle Class and inflicted heavy loss upon Indian National Congress. The elections marked a landslide victory of BJP and a decisive majority in Lok Sabha. BJP led National Democratic Alliance NDA registered momentous victory with 336 seats. Congress amid its insipid policy faced a big blow and was restricted to only 44 seats in the

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299 Mujeeb Afzal, Bharatya Janta Party and Indian Muslims, 225.
general elections. The Congress-led UPA alliance secured only 60 out of 543 seats.

Nehruvian model of Indian democracy pivots on democracy and secularism. BJP counter charged this narrative and presented Hindu communalism and majoritarianism as an alternative to Indian secularism where the will of Hindu majority should precede and dominate in the polity. Indian secularism is dual faced in the pretext of criminal prosecutions. It is evident with the exoneration of Modi in the case of Gujrat massacre. Hindu nationalism of BJP with extreme centrist-right ideology, in its first tenure with NDA alliance, could not produce any monumental foreign policy outlook. The ideological and idiosyncratic disposition of BJP confronted certain impediments in its stint in office. Earlier the unstable government and coalitional dynamics impinged BJP great deal. The precariousness in Indian political landscape made it difficult for BJP to craft and effectuate its cognitive roadmap on foreign policy and associated issues. Earlier two attempts of forming a stable government in 1996 and 1998 bungled. In 1999 BJP succeeded in forming a stable government which dwelled for a complete term, but the issues of polity, electoral dynamics and the subtleties of alliance politics obstructed BJP in framing a formidable foreign policy framework. A deliberate attempt to alter and modify the character of national identity through Hindutva, religious projectionism, religious symbolism and rewriting history counterfeited.

While elucidating the cognitive structure of Indian Elite in the formulation of foreign policy, it appears that ideology no longer plays an important role. India has become rational and pragmatist in pursuing its national goals, the core of them is to preserve the country's pluralistic democracy, protect its territorial unity and integrity and sustain and expand its economic and industrial growth by fully utilizing the opportunities of economic reforms and globalization. The BJP's foreign policy right now is the amalgamation of ferocious Hindu nationalism coupled with the rationalist pursuit of policy choices. India is a committed status quoist country and aspires to play a larger role at the global level after having assured regional dominance. Indian elite takes into account its unique geographical position, ancient history, natural resources, democracy and culture and is yearning for a conducive and supportive global environment which could pacify India's global aspirations. India longs for a stable neighborhood. A
prosperous and stable India needs to be at peace with itself and its neighbors. A troubled neighborhood not only limits India's global ambitions but also jeopardizes its internal security. India could only play an anchoring role in the global affairs its dominant position in the region is assured. In the region, India counters two credible threats China and Pakistan, and it constrains India's global ambitions. Modi's doctrine is the elucidation of India's dominant role in the region and proactive role in the global affairs.  

With all these stated rhetorical positions the fact remains that BJP became an undeniable electoral strength and hinges as a substantive alternative for both traditional and middle-class Indian voter. BJP has successfully preserved its ideological core and evolved itself to incorporate the issues concomitant to modernity and neoliberal economic growth in India. BJP's policy outlook is the culmination of ideology, security, and governance. The same reflects in the electoral manifesto of BJP in 2009 and subsequent elections. These evolutional tendencies in BJP had not restricted it to a hardcore Hindu party but have exacerbated its presence and appeal. It is vindicated through the electoral triumph of BJP in 2014 and the percentage of votes it secured. It was surprising by all means.

Congress which governed India for one decade and takes credit for India's economic transformation got restricted to an insignificant presence in Lok Sabha. BJP benefited itself with the hazy and obscure conclusion of the second tenure of UPA. Towards the end of UPA’s tenure, many corruption scandals and embezzlements stirred the wrath. The 3G scam where Supreme Court of India annulled the agreement and quashed 122 licenses granted. Many other reported scams tarnished the repute of Congress and also demonstrated the inability of Manmohan government in curbing the corruption resultanty discoloring the Mr. Clean image of Manmohan Singh. The movement of Anna Hazare against corruption and the rise of Aam Admi Party in India were the orchestration of this

301 “BJP's 31% lowest vote share of any party to win majority”, Times of India, May 19, 2014.
302 “SC quashes 122 licenses”, Times of India, February 02, 2012.
phenomenon of middle-class activism. This activism could not crystallize into a meaningful political action and created a huge vacuum of choice and alternative in Indian polity. BJP filled the gap with its cautious and prudent strategy. This middle-class phenomenon still strikes India with its full vigor. BJP's overwhelming defeat in Delhi’s state elections in 2015 at the hands of Aam Admi Party vindicates this changing trend of Indian politics. BJP's popularity and the rise of Modi came in the aftermath of the worst display of governance by Congress towards the last years of its rule. Modi except for one odd instance of Gujrat massacre transformed the outlook of Gujrat with his commanding governance. Gujrat was presented as a model to govern India. The defenders of Modi argue that the success of Modi was in the fact he did not let any watershed like Gujrat massacre happen again. His inspiring governance and his self-made persona helped him against Indian National Congress's projection of a dynastic party, and Rahul Gandhi as heir from the fourth generation.

5.1 BJP’s Electoral Strategy in 2014’s Elections

Bharatya Janata Party's electoral strategy in 2014's general elections was a big success. It was a successful combination of foreign policy and domestic politics enshrouded in Hindu syncretic values. Towards foreign policy, a strong and befitting policy line indicated BJP’s priorities. On the domestic front, the issues of corruption, governance and sagging economy were aimed to be resurrected through better governance, accountability, and responsibility. Modi had the repute of business-friendly Chief Minister of Gujrat state, and through his nomination ahead of polls BJP signaled the economic revivalism of India. Nominating Modi ahead of elections was also a big and wise move. In the coming months, the persona of Modi was glorified and presented as messiah to India's ongoing and persistent problems. Congress remained reluctant in announcing its candidate for Prime Minister ahead of elections. It did not want to cast an image of the dynastic party by declaring Rahul Gandhi as the candidate albeit he was the obvious choice. Secondly, Congress considered it against the norms of the

parliamentary system and considered announcing beforehand tantamount to the Presidential system.\textsuperscript{305}

Modi became an icon of development and economic prosperity for India. His humbled background from a tea seller to the Chief Minister of Gujrat and now to the candidate for Prime Minister became his strength. His attributes were glorified. BJP took a stringent decision and made some surprising decisions which affected its ranks and file. The senior leadership of BJP like Advani and Jaswant Singh got sidelined. They were not given the constituencies of their own choice. Jaswant Singh parted ways with BJP and slammed its decisions pushing senior leadership to the wall.\textsuperscript{306} The leaders like Sushma Swaraj, Arun Jaitley, and Modi came on the front burner, and the veteran leadership of BJP went unnoticed. BJP combined traditional Hinduism with issues of modernity. RSS considerably mobilized for the nomination of Modi and declared to give 2000 volunteers to BJP for the electoral campaign to keep the Hindu ideology intact.\textsuperscript{307} BJP tried to tone down Hindutva in this election campaign, and more emphasized on slogans like Rising India and Shining India albeit the commitment to build Ram Temple was there in the electoral manifesto.\textsuperscript{308} The incumbency factor of Congress and India's deteriorating economic helped BJP and Modi and catchy phrases like Brand India earned acceptance and garnered massive electoral support for BJP. Modi emphasized on 5Ts in his campaign and, i.e., Trade, tradition, talent, tourism, and technology. He vowed to build 100 cities and restructure connectivity parameters and to start bullet trains as well. Modi successfully campaigned to engage the business community, youth and Indian middle class to strike a paradigm shift in India.\textsuperscript{309}

The tremendous support of BJP and its vote share was not all an acceptance for Hindu nationalism but for a fact that BJP made successful inroads into Indian Middle Class, youth, Dalits and other backward castes except Muslims. Gujrat's success story helped Modi and BJP securing votes of educated

\textsuperscript{305} “Sonia Gandhi to head election panel; Rahul is Vice Chairman”, \textit{The Indian Express}, New Delhi, 12 February 2014.
\textsuperscript{306} Anando Bhakto, “BJP not fit to govern India: J. Singh”, \textit{The Economic Times}, New Delhi, April 2, 2014.
\textsuperscript{307} “2000 RSS men to run BJP after the polls”, \textit{The Economic Times}, April 02, 2014.
Indians which were indifferent to communal issues. BJP exhibits an intrinsic capitalism that is business friendly and at odds with Congress's economic policies which historically have a leaning towards socialistic blend. The failure of Congress in trickling down the boom of Indian economy brewed a disgruntlement at large. Modi’s mandate was primarily an economic mandate. BJP notwithstanding its capitalistic disposition made an electoral manifesto which was a successful combination of corporatist and socialistic tenets. It vowed for pro-poor economic policies and continuation of welfare agenda. BJP promised the rationalization of taxation while having labeled Congress's tax regime as ‘Tax Terrorism. BJP's electoral manifesto and electoral strategy pivoted against Congress's failures in one-decade long tenure. That's why

BJP evoked electoral manifesto more centered on improving governance and resurrecting India's economy. Along with this BJP also nimbly addressed the issues to placate its traditional voters and religious support base by making an explicit announcement to abrogate the Article 370 of Indian constitution and building Ram Temple. It was a major departure from Congress's cultural and political domain. Foreign policy and domestic politics were visible in BJP and Modi's campaign. BJP promised for a pragmatic framework of foreign policy and doctrines ensuring mutually beneficial relationships. Foreign direct investment received the highest priority and through improved governance and use of technology the fruits of the economy will be trickled down to the masses. BJP did not overtone Hindutva in its electoral manifesto rather highlighted the real-time concerns of masses and vowed to address them. It further strengthens this argument that ideology is becoming less relevant in electoral politics. People vote on genuine issues. It is evident from the fact that the construction of Ram Temple got mentioned under a benign title of cultural heritage. The further noticeable clause was that all the ways of this construction would be under the constitutional framework. It was a significant shift since in 2009's electoral campaign BJP made a forceful call for construction of Ram temple and called that an attempt to preserve Indian civilization. It is also worth mentioning that BJP in its electoral manifesto did not make any call or announcement for Madrassa modernization or amendment in Muslim personal law which it has been demanding since the days

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310 “BJP’s Electoral Manifesto”
of Jana Sangh. More focus in the electoral manifesto was on issues pertaining economy, governance, and corruption. It also aimed to digitalize the state record and pave a step forward towards e-governance. Hoarding, black money, and corruption will be dealt iron handed. Price stabilization was also a priority reflected in the manifesto. BJP announced that it would pursue harmonization between state and center through national development where CMs and PM will be equal players.

BJP evoked a terrific electoral manifesto in the given circumstances. It addressed all issues of apparent consternation in India and presented a way forward to them. At the documental level, it was a poised and impressive manifesto. It was an open document with many explicit promises and commitments. The culmination of ideology, strategy and timely response helped BJP in securing a landmark victory. Modi’s persona served as an added factor and lured larger vote appeal. It turned out to be a big triumph and BJP made an emphatic entry into power. The coalitional dynamics of Indian polity have made mandate so scattered that BJP despite its huge and monumental victory could only grab 31% of the total votes which was the lowest share in Indian elections for any party to win a majority.\(^{312}\) It also reflected some developing trends in Indian polity. The nexus of democracy and development is only viable if the effective framework of governance supports it. One view is that it was not BJP’s victory but Congress’s complete and quashing defeat on all counts.

The traditional sources of legitimacy are also undergoing great change. Rahul Gandhi was despised more on dynastic politics, and his political lineage served him bitterly rather than turning out to be a political mileage. It also reflects voters’ awareness that they vote on real issues. Top of the all it demonstrated BJP’s evolitional ability and its shrewd decisional framework which embraced the changing dynamics and the realities of the polity and responded effectively to them. BJP's stance on issues in 2009 and 2014 was totally at odds with one another. In 2014 BJP diluted its Hindu communal outlook to a great extent and built an effective rhetoric which catered its political objectives in the general elections and marked a thumping victory despite being shrugged off in 2009’s elections. The forceful entry into power raised the level of expectation from BJP

\(^{312}\) “BJP’s 31% lowest vote share of any party to win majority”, *Times of India*, May 19, 2014
on all fronts. On domestic and foreign policy level a complete makeover was expected and anticipated at both doctrinal and executional level.

5.2 Modi’s Foreign Policy Matrix

In the domain of foreign policy, Modi was known for his idiosyncrasy and a muscular foreign policy outlook. Modi's aspiration of strong India relies on a pursuit of indigenous defense production for India. The regional connectivity by integrating North Eastern region of India into the mainstream was amongst his priorities. Modi's foreign policy priorities were quite clear that he wants a certain level of convergence in India's relationship with the United States to persist it and make it a suitable partnership beyond the ambit of security. He intends checkmating China's overtures, befitting response to Pakistan while curtailing policy options for Pakistan and ensuring transit cooperation with other neighbors by overcoming contentious issues like water distribution and constructing a mutually beneficial relationship.313

Modi in this term has great autonomy of action in comparison to previous governments. It enabled Modi to execute his central and unitary form of government. His decisions are not under hindrance by the smaller parties of the coalition like it was the case with UPA and NDA in earlier tenures. In the realm of foreign policy Modi aimed to build self-reliant, confident and strong India.314 BJP's decision of going nuclear in 1998 was the ostentation of India's strength and prestige which India yearns for in the comity of nations. On the contrary side, Modi's view of strong India vis-à-vis foreign policy is economically resurgent India attracting more and more foreign direct investment and sustaining the economic growth which increasingly slowed after 2012. Modi's view of strong India is a derivation from BJP's view of strong India and which is Strong at Home, Engage Abroad.315 Modi's foreign policy primarily revolved around internal security, border disputes, and defense reforms. India's definition of internal security corresponds disturbed Pakistani neighborhood and subsequent infiltration of terrorists in India primarily Kashmir, border intrusions from China and illegal immigrants coming from Bangladesh. The first conundrum of infiltration is akin

314 More on this Sreereem Chaulia, Modi Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of India’s Prime Minister (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016)
to terrorism in India which India believes Pakistan exports. India also alleges the insurgency in Kashmir being abetted and orchestrated by Pakistan. With China, India has a long history of border dispute along the McMahon line, Western Himalayas, Doklam, Aksai Chin and Sikkim.\(^{316}\) BJP highlights attacks from Pakistan's based terror groups, Maoist attacks, Chinese border intrusions and illegal immigrants from Bangladesh jeopardizing India's internal security. In its nutshell Modi government is simultaneously facing three quagmires as it proclaims; terrorism, border dispute and border management.

### 5.3 Defence Procurement

BJP remained a critic of Congress's counter-terrorism response. Over Mumbai attacks, it also ferociously criticized Congress for having no concrete policy on counter-terrorism. BJP always demanded a legal preventive mechanism to curb terrorism like Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). Modi's resolve on this issue was clear by his move of appointing Ajit Doval as National Security Advisor who is the former director of Intelligence Bureau.\(^{317}\) Through his appointment, Modi signaled that he is taking terrorism and counter-terrorism policy very seriously. Modi attempted to confront the menace of internal security through empowering National Investigation Agency (NIA), intelligence capacity and coercive diplomacy. In the aftermath of this coercive diplomacy, the border tensions escalated with Pakistan significantly.\(^{318}\) BJP clings to its rhetoric of Zero Terrorism Policy. At home, Indian polity faced a grave challenge of powerful Hindu demonstration, RSS activism, and growing cow vigilantism. The minorities in India are becoming more and more insecure, and furious display of Hindutva and violence inflicted on minorities claimed many lives. Congress has raised many questions over anti-terrorism measures taken by Modi government and called them stringent towards Muslims. Congress demanded the parity between both the communities to keep the integrity of the nation intact.\(^{319}\)

Towards the second challenge of Chinese incursion, Modi's responded cautiously. Modi is investing in North Eastern Region. Modi tried to incorporate

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\(^{318}\) India and Pakistan since 2014 are having regular instances of unprovoked border firings resulting an increased tensions at the working boundary between India and Pakistan.

\(^{319}\) “Congress accuses Centre of 'encouraging' cow vigilantism”, *The Times of India*, July 31, 2017.
this region in the mainstream through development and connectivity. Modi is attempting to build massive infrastructure in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim to evoke a comprehensive strategy against Chinese threat. Modi is cautiously moving ahead given he does not want to soar or take the bitterness of relations to the extent where India and China lock their horns in a war as it happened in 1962. It also remains a fact that ever since Modi got elected there have many ambushes between India and China on the North Eastern border. In the 2014-15 budgets, Modi government allocated 10 billion rupees for defense railroad network.\(^{320}\)

From 2014-2016 India under Modi embarked on a brisk pace of military modernization and huge defense spending. Modi wants 250 billion dollars to push India's defense modernization to counter the potential threats of Pakistan and China.\(^{321}\) India under Modi consecutively increased defense budget in 2016-17 and 2017-18 by 10 &. In 2014 Indian defense budget was 2.6% of the total GDP. In 2015 it was 2.4%, and in 2015 it was 2.5 pc of the total GDP.\(^{322}\) India is also set to finalize 660 million dollars deal for boosting military firepower. It will include mobile heavy artillery weapons.\(^{323}\)

Modi is also investing hugely in indigenous equipment making under Make in India. The defense modernization is delayed due to bureaucratic hiccups. India under Modi's ambitious plan of spending 250 billion dollars on strategic modernization is also eyeing to buy 185,000 deadly assault rifles.\(^{324}\) In its nutshell, Modi is all geared up to transform India defense posture and wants to anchor a huge defense build-up to guide and orchestrate India's offensive posture in the region and also counter the threats emanating from the region jeopardizing India's internal security. Most of these initiatives have not been materialized and are still underway amid bureaucratic delays. India's defense management had been poor in

\(^{320}\)"Union Budget 2014-15", available at indiabudget.gov.in
\(^{323}\)“Govt to finalize $660 mn deal for heavy artillery in major defense modernization push”, FirstPost, Jan 04, 2017.
\(^{324}\)Nc Bipindra & Ian Marlow, “Modi's Looking to Buy the Indian Army 185,000 Deadly Assault Rifles”, Bloomberg, October 28, 2016.
the three years of Modi government. Modi slammed bureaucracy for unnecessary delays in decision-making.\textsuperscript{325}

\textbf{5.4 Maritime Policy}

India has always been weak on the maritime front, and the phrase "Maritime Blindness" actually depicts this perpetual weakness. India under Modi attempted to prioritize maritime matters and to shun India's laziness towards maritime matters. India remained vulnerable on maritime front. The attackers of Mumbai also came through the sea route. Secondly, India envisages itself as a potential partner of the USA in the new geopolitical equation of Asia Pacific and as a credible partner in the South China Sea. Towards the end of 2015 Indian navy released its redefined maritime strategy titled, "Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy." The previous policy released in 2007 was, "Freedom to Use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy."\textsuperscript{326} The phrase of this new policy is the indicative of the change in India's maritime posture. India is trying to craft a proactive role in the Indian Ocean Region. India's quest for blue water navy demonstrates this desire. Bluewater navy is a force which is capable of operating in the depths of open seas. India since considers itself as a potential competitor to China where China's presence and performance in Indian Ocean Region in the past one decade had been impressive. India is attempting to modernize its navy to compete China in IOR. China's Belt and Road also aims at creating maritime Silk Road investing and fostering connectivity and cooperation with South East Asia, North Africa, and Oceania. It aims to build connectivity through the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and South Pacific Ocean.\textsuperscript{327}

India under Modi has prioritized three primary areas pertaining maritime matters. They include maritime security, economic interaction, and connectivity through oceans which again boost the economic interaction at large. The impetus to this maritime involvement is economic and geostrategic. About maritime security, India envisions sea-based terrorism and piracy as two major threats. In the geostrategic equation, India envisages itself in the confrontational matrix vis-à-vis China. India is crafting a role of a formidable maritime partner for the

\textsuperscript{325} Ajay Singh, “Narendra Modi puts bureaucratic old guard on notice: Forget retirement, focus on governance”, \textit{FirstPost}, June 15, 2017.

\textsuperscript{326} Darshana M. Baruah, “India's Evolving Maritime Strategy”, \textit{The Diplomat}, December 03, 2015

\textsuperscript{327} Shannon Tiezzi, “China Pushes ‘Maritime Silk Road’ in South, Southeast Asia”, \textit{The Diplomat}, September 17, 2014.
smaller coastal states who lack military wherewithal. India wants an extended and friendly cooperation with these states. They include Sri Lanka, Kenya, Tanzania, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles. Due to lack of military power, these states remain vulnerable, and India is proactively trying to engage them in a maritime partnership to extend its role as an oceanic power in the region. India, USA, and Japan carried a trilateral Malabar naval exercise in 2017 in the Bay of Bengal. India's aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya participated in this exercise. This was to reassure India as a natural and credible partner against China. Overall India under Modi is investing huge diplomatic, economic and political capital to demonstrate and showcase India's maritime prowess.

### 5.5 Nuclear Policy

BJP credits itself for India's nuclearization. It authorized the nuclear tests in 1998 to demonstrate offensive and hawkish face of India. BJP always remained critical of sublime foreign policy posture of India. India's nuclear doctrine of ‘no first use’ was also developed in 1999 during the Vajpayee's regime and accepted and implemented in 2003 under the NDA government led by Vajpayee again. Currently, there are two dimensions of India's nuclear policy. One is related to nuclear weapons, and other is nuclear power generation. This is the realm where Congress and BJP both agree and share grounds. The landmark civil nuclear deal with the USA signed during UPA's first tenure is of extreme importance to India. All political parties of India concur to India's nuclear posture. It is evident from the fact that two consecutive governments of UPA did not significantly alter the nuclear policy of India which got developed and articulated under BJP. The No First Use doctrine was to tame down the criticism of initiating nuclearization in the region.

Through NFU India communicates the world that its nuclear device is to deter its opponents primarily China to use a nuclear weapon against India otherwise India does not have any offensive military designs. Under Modi, India is more presciently focusing on the second dimension of nuclear power generation. The breakthrough India achieved was Indo-US nuclear deal

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subsequently giving India NSG waiver. It boosted India's confidence to pursue the deals of similar nature with other developed countries of the world. The pursuance of agreements with Australia, Japan and other countries of the world is the accentuation of this drive. Modi announced a paradigm shift in India’s nuclear policy about nuclear power generation. India is alleged of exposing its huge population to the risks of radiation. In the nuclear security summit in 2016, Modi unveiled his policy. Modi underscored the steps India had taken to ensure the safety security and accountability. It includes updating export controls, establishing inter-ministerial counter smuggling team and shifting onto low-enriched uranium instead of highly enriched uranium. Modi government has also set up 23 emergency response centers to respond to any catastrophe. Nuclear liability remains a big issue. The nuclear liability act of 2010 is a big issue. It inflicts liability on the operator in any mishap, and this liability has been raised after Fukushima power plant disaster. With this risk, the manufacturers and suppliers are reluctant in doing nuclear business in India. Still, no significant development is there, but under Modi, India has announced that supplier’s liability is not the mandatory part for the contracts to be signed. India is also aiming to produce 7000 MW nuclear energy and trying to foster it domestic industry of manufacturing reactors to make India a hub for nuclear reactor technology.

5.6 Make in India

In September 2014 Modi started his ambitious flagship program Make in India which was part of his electoral campaign. Modi’s "Make in India" can well be complemented with "Spend in India." It targeted the making of national and multinational goods within India. Modi set up an Investor Facilitation cell to help and guide the people investing in India throughout the time of their business. From building toilets to smart cities he invites investment from the potential investors. Demand, development, and demographics are the key drivers for investing in India. 800 million people are below the age of 35 which presents a rosy scenario for cheap and skilled labor-an attractive message to the investors.

330 “Modi announces key nuclear security measures”, The Hindu, April 02, 2016.
332 Prakash Nanda, “How the Narendra Modi govt is systematically paving the way for a nuclear-powered India”, FirstPost, May 18, 2017.
Though power development index is still a major problem and poverty still haunts India to a large extent. Modi said opportunities existed for investors in different sectors including energy, agriculture, infrastructure, food, finance, manufacturing processing, technology, and mining. He urged providing finances, resources, technology, and expertise to working partners and investors. Modi claimed that overall trade would be grounded in a familiar democratic framework.

India significantly improved and showed substantial figurative development under this program in certain areas, but on certain counts its efficacy was questionable. India's ranking in the World Bank's list of Ease of Business doing improved to 130 from 134 in one year from 2015-2016. Foreign Direct investment has increased to 60.08 billion dollars from 36 .05 billion dollars in three years. Industrial project setups also rose by 28 percent. On the other hand, India's growth rate had fallen to 0.7% in 2016 from 1.1 percent in 2012. The manufacturing sector also did not show any stark development. The downturn in this sector has also impacted the job market. Modi failed to create 10 million jobs which he promised during his campaign. Programs like Make in India and Skill India mission also did not help significantly in creating new jobs. Unemployment has risen from 4.9% in 2013-14 to 5% in 2015-16. Modi launched his 'Digital India' project in July 2015 bore some results but also remained abysmal on many counts.

After the announcement of his demonetization drive on November 08, 2016 the e-payments declined as soon as cash replenished. This drive slowed the GDP and also shrank the cash supply. On the positive side, it added 91 lac people in the tax net post demonetization drive. Indian banking sector also experienced a deteriorating trend. Nonperforming assets increased to a great level and banks' assets quality drastically reduced. India though has announced a uniform tax system to reduce complexities and lowered the tax rate. The key to tax expansion will be the effective implementation of this policy which had not been ideal in many other cases. It remains a fact that through the series of initiatives Modi government has been able to revive the economy from the slump where it was during the last years of UPA government. It has outlined procedures and rules to

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set forth economic reforms in the country. However, it is far away from meeting its commitments, expectations, and promises of and has failed to address the problems of the Indian economy in domestic landscape structurally. A country's foreign policy is the reflection of the domestic state of affairs and is an extension of domestic interests and economic undercurrents.

5.7 US-China Calculus

India and USA are on a harmonious trajectory since the turn of the new century. It also remains the fact that this relationship could not consolidate into a longstanding enduring strategic partnership. The remarkable landmark is the conclusion of the civil nuclear deal which still awaits implementation. The USA envisions India as a potential counterweight to China in the region. India’s significance was further underscored under Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia' policy. The USA sees a larger role for India in South Asia and the Asia Pacific. It also wants India to be the competitor of China in the South China Sea. The recent South Asia policy of the USA announced by President Trump mandated a larger role for India in South Asia in general and Afghan quagmire in particular. Modi was received with a cold gesture when he was running for Prime Minister, but after having won the election, President Obama invited him to visit the USA which he accepted. This visit was a success when it comes to the overall posturing of Indo-US diplomatic cordiality. The joint statement was the ostentatious display of this warm reception which had a phrase, ‘Aao Chalain Sath Sath, ’Let's Walk Together. India and USA both intend to take the trade volume to 500 billion dollars and want to collaborate in joint research, co-development, and co-production of Defence. Modi invited Obama to Republic Day celebration of India. USA and India released Delhi Declaration of Friendship and Joint Vision for Asia Pacific. Trump during all his electoral campaign had been friendly and welcomed towards India notwithstanding harsh towards China and Pakistan. USA renewed policy towards South Asia announced by President Trump will have profound implications for regional security calculus. India's extended role in Afghanistan inevitably invites opposition and reaction from Pakistan and China. The geopolitical matrix of South Asia is likely to remain in flux amid USA's persistent presence in Afghanistan.

336 “3 Years of the Modi Government”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 36.
India seems locked on the horns of dilemma towards crafting a viable China Policy. It wants to counter China's flexing in the region and its global push through initiatives like Belt and Road. At the same time, it does not want to enter into a confrontation with China. The bitter past is also a striking factor in this regard. It also intends to cooperate with China for economic prosperity. Modi's China policy is quite vague and does not carry any clear directions. It is the amalgamation of confrontation and competition. Investments from China increased significantly. India and China are cooperating in many areas like education, e-commerce, health, software, and medicine. At the same time, India's opposition to China Pakistan Economic Corridor has embittered the relations. India expressed its strong reservations about this program. 2017 also witnessed border clashes between China and India and intermittent skirmishes guided the pattern of relationship towards a downward spiral. Indian Ocean Region and the South China Sea also invite rivalry between both the countries. China's rejection of India's NSG candidature also soured the relation to a great extent. India believes that BRI significant undermines India's interests in the region. India boycotted the BRI summit in 2017. India is cautiously looking at the foreign policy maneuvers of China. It has not escalated tensions with China on border dispute despite India and China border forces engaged violently multiple times. India's evolving relationship with the USA has also impacted the course of relations between both the countries which are on a confrontational matrix albeit both the countries are the member of BRICS. In June 2017 India became a full member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), yet the adversarial spirit prevails in the bilateral relationship of both the countries and Modi could not devise any solution to this predicament and could not evoke a visionary China policy.

5.8 Look East Policy

India's Look East Policy is a not a new policy. It developed during the tenure of Prime Minister Narsima Rao and successor governments of Vajpayee and Manmohan also pursued this policy. Under this policy, India intends to build cumulative security, economic and strategic ties with Southeast Asian

337 Srikanth Kondapalli, “Why India is not part of the Belt and Road Initiative summit”, *The Indian Express*, May 15, 2017.
Nations to bolster its status as a regional power. Modi's East mantra is not a new phenomenon, but he has reasserted and redefined it by focusing on Australia, Japan, and Korea as potential allies. Modi aimed to develop relations with Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the Far East. Additionally, the overtone of Modi's eastward push is strategic; it is meant to prove India's relevance in any anti-China coalition with the United States to balance off China in the South China Sea and invite American capital investment and sophisticated technology to provide India with a semblance of power equal to China. In this regard, there are apprehensions about the growing Indian naval strength around its seas because it will be an opportunity for Pakistan to counterbalance the Indian naval superiority.

Some key bilateral and multilateral engagements are the apparent manifestations of India's diplomatic push for economic cooperation towards the east. Narendra Modi has moved one step ahead by developing "Act East Policy" to illustrate the recent diplomatic expeditions into the South East Asia and Australia.\(^{339}\) By shifting the India's Asia policy from "Look East" to "Act East," Prime Minister Narendra Modi indicated that he would be more focused and proactive in the region than his predecessors. From the very beginning of its tenure, he has been actively involved in this region while deliberately excluding Pakistan from his priority list. Not only in the diplomatic sense but also from the economic and strategic point of view, India is intentionally undermining the cooperative postures towards Pakistan. "Act East policy" is the new name for India's Look East Policy. Given India's Look East Policy Modi is fundamentally targeting on Australia, Japan, and Korea where trade, investment, maritime cooperation, security ties and creating linkages at the societal level are his focus areas. PM Modi visited Australia after the hiatus of 28 years when PM Rajiv Gandhi went there in 1986. He became the first Indian PM who addressed the Australian parliament.\(^{340}\) India, Australia, and Japan had their high-level trilateral moot in June 2015. Indian foreign secretary represented India in these talks whereas vice foreign minister of Japan and secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs Australia attended the meeting. The trilateral moot discussed a wide range of issues with maritime security as the top agenda. The discussion included

\(^{339}\) Prashanth Parameswaran, “Modi Unveils India’s ‘Act East Policy’ to ASEAN in Myanmar”, *The Diplomat*, November 17, 2014.

\(^{340}\) PM Narendra Modi’s address to the Australian Parliament”, *The Indian Express*, November 18, 2014.
cooperation vis-à-vis free navigation in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and the greater prospects for economic cooperation. A joint three nations' naval exercise is also on the cards.\textsuperscript{341} Australia and India were sharing a history of active Defence relationship after 2006 when India and Australia signed MOU on Defence cooperation and in 2009 signed a joint declaration on security cooperation.

The Defence relationship between Australia and India has grown and includes new forums for strategic dialogue, and a frequent interaction through visits of senior officials. Training exchange programs and staff talks are also boosting the bilateral relations. In his visit to Australia while making a speech to the parliament of Australia Modi touched on all important aspects of bilateral ties between India and Australia with the spin of regional and global political and strategic setting. He stated that Australia is not in the periphery of our vision; it is in the center of our thought. With Australia Modi signed five agreements on social security, arts, and culture, combating narcotics trade, tourism and transfer of sentenced prisoners.\textsuperscript{342} The current trade between India and Australia stands at 15 billion dollar which is much below the potential agreed by both the leaders. In 2012 in a meeting between the then Indian PM Manmohan Singh and Australian PM Julia Gillard it was committed to enhancing bilateral trade to 100 billion dollars by 2015. Both countries are working to finalize a free trade deal by the end of the next year. Modi and Jinping signed a comprehensive trade agreement during the visit whereby 95 percent of Australian exports would go to the Chinese market with zero tariffs. India and Australia earlier concluded a strategic pact in 2009 but considering the lukewarm follow up this time they decided to upgrade the strategic ties.\textsuperscript{343} Two leaders signed a Framework for Security Cooperation and agreed upon the action plan to lend weight to the framework. As per the plan the annual summit and foreign policy exchanges and coordination, defense policy planning and coordination, counter-terrorism and other transnational crimes, border protection, coast guard, and customs, disarmament, non-proliferation, civil nuclear energy and maritime security, disaster management and peacekeeping and

\textsuperscript{341} Prashanth Parameswaran, “India, Australia, Japan Hold First Ever Trilateral Dialogue”, \textit{The Diplomat}, June 09, 2015.
\textsuperscript{342} “India, Australia agree on new security cooperation framework”, \textit{India Tribune}, November 18, 2014
\textsuperscript{343} Rajiv Nayam, “Strategic Significance of the India-Australia Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement”, \textit{Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses}, September 15, 2014.
cooperation in regional and multilateral fora are outlined. Counter-terrorism figured prominently in Modi's engagement with the Australian leadership. He underlined the need and importance to work at a regional and global level to form a regional and global strategy to counter the global threat of violence. Modi intends to build a close naval partnership with Australia. Knowing the reach and significance of Australia regarding its maritime potential he is seeking cooperation in this regard.

“The oceans are our lifelines. But, we worry about its access and security in our part of the world more than ever before,”

The security dimension is again at the core of maritime cooperation with an aim to counter piracy, securing sea-lanes and harnessing the economic potential of the marine resources. Maritime security cooperation marks its importance to advance the bilateral ties as well as regional security complex. India wants Australia to expedite the civil nuclear deal so that India can import Uranium. Building a case for uranium import from Australia after the agreement Modi confidently stated that the deal would give Australia an opportunity to be the part of one of the safest and secure nuclear energy program. The assertion aimed at Abbott who earlier minced no words that the nuclear deal will be if all goes well and with suitable safeguards in place. Australians want to ensure that any deal with India would be in line with their commitment to cleaner energy. Nuclear commerce and trade is an important issue in Indian foreign policy ever since the Civil Nuclear Pact with the US in 2008. India received a treatment of a nuclear pariah due to its status as the non-NPT member having incurred restrictions by the NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group. India could not engage by any means in nuclear trade be it a military or civilian purpose. However, India got NSG waiver along with an additional IAEA protocol and the amendment of the US domestic laws relating to regulation of nuclear commerce. India earned an exception to the rules and regimes of global non-proliferation and all that was made possible to facilitate the Indo-US nuclear deal (2008) which otherwise was not in coming.

345 “Modi’s Speech at Australian Parliament”, Express-News Services, November 18, 2014.
Following the Indo-US nuclear deal, India became eligible to engage in nuclear commerce not only with the US but with all other countries possessing nuclear technology and signatories of NPT at the same time. Following this breakthrough, India has signed nuclear deals with Russia, Kazakhstan, France, UK, Argentina, Namibia, South Korea, Canada, and Mongolia. The Indo-US nuclear deal which in effect is the deal between India and NSG members allowed India to expand its nuclear complex for civilian purposes whereas sparing its military facilities from IAEA scrutiny. Australia is interested in selling civilian nuclear technology to India. Initially, even the US gave a rationale while agreeing with India that it will benefit the former economically creating 27 thousand jobs annually and bringing 1 billion dollars to the national kitty. India is aware of the untapped potential to expand commercial nuclear links with countries which are willing to trade with it. In this connection, PM Modi made it a point during his visit to Japan to accelerate the stalled talks on the issue. The visit of Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot to India in September 2014 brought dividends to India as both have agreed to cement the ties with nuclear trade topping the agenda.

India and Australia started negotiating on uranium sales in 2012 right after Australia lifted a long-time ban on exporting the uranium ore to Delhi to meet its ambitious and high capability nuclear energy program. Australia, the third-largest uranium producer, had previously declined such exports to India amid India's nonsignatory status of the non-proliferation treaty. And this is where the nuclear deal with the US came handy for India paving the path for vetting the appetite to augment its civilian nuclear program. Australia aims to sell 10 thousand tons of yellow cake/uranium by 2017. The ambition fits well with the Indian efforts to import nuclear energy for civilian purposes what they term as peaceful and for power generation. India argues that as a fast-rising economy it needs nuclear energy to keep pace with its emerging profile. According to the World Bank still, 400 million people in India are without electricity. India insists on accumulating nuclear energy to meet its electricity demands to lighting-up villages in its nooks and crannies. India hence successfully puts a humanitarian spin on its desire to optimize its civilian nuclear capability. The agreement will

allow India to add to 20 small plants in operation at present. Moreover, it will lessen India's reliance on coal and make a shift to more environment-friendly nuclear energy for power generation.

The second country with which Modi is pursuing vigorously under the pretext of Look East policy is Japan. Given the priority of nations, civil nuclear cooperation is an important aspect of Japan-India bilateral relations and is expected to be on the top of agenda list for the prosperity of two countries as defined by their policymakers. Both the nations intend to continue with the use of civil nuclear power, having recognized its risks. Japan's nuclear policy had been a hurdle while negotiating with India, Turkey, South Africa and other nations on civil nuclear agreements, so most of the deliberations went inconclusive. With the rollover of the new century, the peaceful persuasion of nuclear power got recognized as one of the workable and effective measures to combat global warming and to surging economic growth. The Great East Japan Earthquake in May 2011 and the unfortunate occurrence of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant triggered new rounds of discussions and deliberations on the risks and threats of civil nuclear energy, not primarily in Japan but also in many countries.

Arrangements continued, and basic assentation got achieved with Turkey in March 2012. India-Japan bilateral ties extended in areas of vital concerns including security and economics. India-Japan collaboration in the trading of nuclear technology has a high potential for development. India is searching for different avenues to measure up the expanding demand to support its economic development. Japan has developed into a country with high nuclear sophistication, and the conjunction of these two variables is taking the India-Japan relationship forward. Both nations have over and over-focused on the requirement for controlling the proliferation of WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction). In the joint statement of December 2001, for instance, the heads of both governments had consented to work as partners against non-proliferation and to take some serious measures in the export of dual used, sensitive and cautious technology.

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The nuclear issue has two angles, to be specific, the interest for abandoning nuclear weapons and crafting a mechanism for the peaceful use of nuclear technology.\footnote{Rajaram Panda & Ch. Viyyanna Sastry, “India and Japan: Prospects for Civil Nuclear Cooperation”, \textit{Indian Foreign Affairs Journal} 6, no. 2 (2011): 202-216.}

Japan is very precise to the issues of nuclear proliferation, and public opinion is intensely against the proliferation of any form. India-Japan ties went under severe turmoil after India's 1998 atomic tests at Pokhran. Japan deferred all its monetary help to the then on-going ventures. India perceived this move as Japan's hyper response and absence of comprehension of India's impulses. Political relations, be that as it may, consistently enhanced from 2001 onwards. In the field of conceivable participation in the areas of mutual interest between India and Japan, divergences do exist. Amid his visit to India in December 2009, Hatoyama had insinuated the likelihood of Japan beginning to export nuclear supplies and other high-tech technology in his discussion with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The Japanese government and also the general population appear befuddled on what stance Japan ought to bring concerning nuclear cooperation with India. While there is no sharp rift in the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) or the decision DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) that would debilitate a part in either party on the issue, the DPJ ends up amidst characterizing a course that would not forsake Japan's expressed strategy on nuclear disarmament. In spite of the fact that still wary, Japan recognizes India's strategic significance. There is more appreciation in Japan that peaceful use of nuclear technology would help India battle with global warming.

The two nations had their first round of discussions on 28 June 2010 went for fixing a respective civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. Under this agreement, Japan would export nuclear innovation and related gear to India while barring India from utilizing them for military and strategic purposes or proliferation them to any other nation. In particular, Japan needs to cooperate with India for the political orientation of this cooperation, India's drive to deal with energy scarcity, the increasing threat of global warming, the promotion, and enhancement of cooperation in science and technology and the contribution of Japanese exporters involved in nuclear power. Japan is one of the few well-equipped advanced producers of nuclear power reactors. If Japan relaxes its
policy and consents to cooperate with India, the nuclear market itself will unleash growth potential in a decade around $100–150 billion.\footnote{Rajaram Panda, “India and Japan”} It is a huge attraction for Japan to reconsider its position soon. A consortium of 13 Japanese companies joined hands on 22 October 2010 to establish International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co. Ltd. (JINED), headquartered in Tokyo, to commence and engage in activities that may lead to the proposals supporting nuclear power projects in the emerging countries.

Pakistan and Japan share a history of great relations. Japan is the second major donor to Pakistan after the United States. Realizing this fact India under Modi is trying to craft a sustainable roadmap of ties with Japan. It is a fact that no visible change in the bilateral ties has occurred yet. The nuclear agreement awaits implementation, and the cooperation on the US-2 is a dream for the distant future.

In Japan nowadays not much attention is paid on the negotiations between the two countries. The Japanese business circle might have expected a miracle at the initial stage of Modi government, but no substantial development has occurred.

To bring more dynamism in Indian foreign policy India under Modi was ambitious to make a consolidated relationship with South Korea. It was intent to build more close and cordial relations with South East Asian Nations. Apart from economic and political partnerships, India will inculcate cultural connections with these countries. India intended to add more substance to its foreign policy vis-à-vis these countries. India and South Korea have a history of growing cordial relationship since the 1990s. It is visible through the indicators that the bilateral trade with was less than a billion dollar reached to 20 billion dollars on 2011-12. India had two monumental agreements with South Korea. One was Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and second was Strategic partnership agreement in 2009 and 2010 respectively. This momentum was slowed down under the last sluggish years of UPA government. The win of NDA government generated optimism in the relation between India and South Korea and will prosper and overcome all the hindrances which have slowed down the momentum of bilateral ties. Modi visited Seoul in May 2015 and reiterated the significance of the bilateral relations and marked it a new beginning. India and Korea signed numerous agreements and MOUs and agreed on a formwork of
annual meeting of their defense and foreign ministers. Defence, defence production, cultural and educational exchange were the potential areas of cooperation.\footnote{PM Modi visits South Korea, signs 7 agreements including DTAA revision”, The Indian Express, May 18, 2015.}

India also vowed to play its role in the resolution of the North Korean standoff. Both the countries will embark onto a trajectory of forming an exclusive strategic partnership and will welcome the formation of peace regime in the region. India and Korea will review CEPA and will revise it accordingly. South Korea was also invited to participate in Modi's Make in India and Digital India. India and Korea could not move ahead with substantive results in their bilateral relations. The only achievement in this regard is the commencement of daily flight between New Delhi and Seoul and export of Indian mangoes to South Korea. All other decisions await implementation. Indian government under Modi could not bring reciprocity in the bilateral relations and addressing the concerns of South Korean government and has left it to bureaucracies to implement them. Bureaucracies work with their narrow vision and in the pretext of their organization codes and standard operating procedures. CEPA still needs revision. In June 2017 it was observed that India is implementing the highest number of trade regulations against South Korea.\footnote{Jung Suk-yee , “India Implementing Largest Number of Trade Regulations against Korea”, BusinessKorea, June 07, 2017.} It does not bode a good omen for the bilateral relationship of both the countries.

5.9 Critical Analysis

Under Modi nothing much has changed at the ground level. A paradigm shift was expected when Modi got elected as the Prime Minister in the realm of Indian policy notwithstanding the fact that foreign policy matrix has a little scope for a significant change. Modi presented himself as a messiah. His attributes and his charisma were the most debated topics in the national and international press. The reality after three years in the government presents a very different picture. Modi’s policy revolves around more rhetoric than substance. He is aggressively pursuing the options, but no substance is visible. Admittedly Asia’s new geopolitics revolves around India, Japan, and Australia but Modi though is pushing for the strategic framework in the indo-pacific with considerable currency, but the only success in this regard is the trilateral dialogue. It is a fact
that no visible change in the bilateral ties between India and Japan has occurred yet. Modi at home is facing some serious challenges in meeting up to the promises which he made during his election campaign. There had been a drastic decline in his popularity at home. Corruption remains India's biggest predicament. BJP lost elections in Kashmir, and Bihar. It was defeated at the hands of Aam Admi Party in the state elections of Delhi and faced hard challenge in Gujarat. It recovered substantially in the state elections of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Himachel Pradesh in 2017's state elections, albeit it lost in Punjab.355

In the realm of foreign policy though Modi has demonstrated some innovation the outlook of the policy caveats which he promised and were expected out of him has not been manifested. Modi took the series of initiatives in almost all the domains of foreign policy. There had been a high rhetoric and euphoria attached to these initiatives, but on the realistic ground, Indian foreign policy under Modi had not achieved anticipated substance and expected results. Modi orientated Indian foreign policy through his persona and flare, but in diplomacy, only ostentation is not enough. Foreign policy is a realm where the margin for complete makeover and paradigm shift is marginally less. The geopolitical realities and the deterministic factors rarely change, and complete overhauling in foreign policy is a less witnessed phenomenon. Modi achieved certain successes as well, and that is both in the domestic and foreign policy arena, but the hopes and expectations which he built around him have not been orchestrated. Pakistan remains a credible threat to India. Next chapter presents a detailed sketch of Modi's Pakistan policy and underscores the trends and transformation in India's dealing towards Pakistan. This argument holds credence that Modi's charisma, persona, and overtures have not proved to be a turnaround.

CHAPTER 6
MODI’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN

This entire research aimed to present a detailed analysis of the dominant competing views in India vis-à-vis Pakistan and their subsequent impact on Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan. The study tried to explore its impact both at the theoretical/doctrinal level and also at executional front. Through the use of certain events and developments, this research sought to empirically substantiate India's contending yet diverging foreign policy postures towards Pakistan. The change of political discourse at regime level brings profound relational implications in the bilateral context of India and Pakistan. This last chapter makes a detailed and theoretical analysis of the patterns, trends, and responses adopted under Modi government. In the previous chapter, a thumbnail sketch of the overall matrix of Modi's foreign policy was presented. This chapter further narrows down the scope of Hindu's nationalistic discourse and its accentuation through Modi's foreign policy calculus vis-à-vis Pakistan. It also makes a detailed assessment of the foreign policy options, choices, and actions pursued by Modi government.

Narendra Modi is a headstrong adherent of Hindu nationalism. The picture which emerges of him is a hardcore Hindu with communalist disposition and an enthusiast of Hindutva. He did not shed this image during his stint as the Chief Minister of Gujrat, electoral campaign for Prime Minister and his role as Premier in the central government. He eulogizes and glorifies Hindu attributes and Vedic era in discussions, symposiums and seminars. Modi government is pushing the superiority of Hindu values and mythology and is again trying to rewrite history which had been an old priority of Hindu nationalists. Through this BJP wants to present Muslims as oppressors and inculcates dominant Hindu values. As described in chapter three BJP envisages Pakistan through a communal prism and is eternally locked into a rivalry and animosity with Muslims on religious and cultural pretexts. The hostility towards Pakistan was evident from the very first speech Modi made in his electoral campaign where he stringently slammed UPA government for having rendered protocol to Pakistani Prime Minister. He lashed out on Pakistan for beheading Indian soldiers in the backdrop of Indian killings on

Line of Control (LOC). Modi time and again promised in his electoral campaign that his party will maintain a tough stance against Pakistan and will resort to befitting response if it gets elected. Modi garnered public support through the use of anti-Pakistan rhetoric which essentially remains BJP's electoral strategy. Modi also capitalized on emotional sentimentalism and hyper-nationalism, having projected Pakistan as an exporter of terrorism in India and also decapitating Indian soldiers on the borders. He also lambasted UPA government incapable of dealing with Pakistan and discussing terrorism which Pakistan has unleashed in India.

Pakistan factor in BJP’s electoral campaign for 2014’s elections was comparatively stringent amid three contributory factors. First was concerning the docility and obscurity of UPA's government which failed to take any concrete and emphatic stance on issues pertaining internal security, terrorism, and India Pakistan relations. The second was Modi factor whose idiosyncratic and cognitive disposition coupled with his staunchly anti-Muslim past projected him as perseverant communalist determined to teach a lesson to Pakistan. The third was the mass electoral appeal couched in ideological tinge which BJP often resorts to vis-à-vis its Pakistan stance. A strong Pakistan policy was in the offing in anticipation of BJP's win. BJP won the elections with a decisive majority. The realities of the domestic political landscape for BJP were quite different from its previous tenures. This time its presence in the central government was not contingent on alliance and coalitional politics. Secondly, Congress due to its failures in UPA's second tenure was on back foot and unable to be an active opposition. Congress also had an insubstantial majority in Lok Sabha. Third Muslim vote this time was not a pressure on BJP this time due to its strong position.

This factor gets substantiated through a fact that in the state elections of Uttar Pradesh in 0217 BJP did not field a single Muslim candidate despite a fact that BJP's minority cell over the years was trying to establish close contacts with Muslim voters. Usually, the BJP's rise to power significantly normalizes relations with Pakistan. The legacy of Vajpayee government for taking a bold and

357 S.R. Kashyap, “Yes we can! Yes, we'll do it! Modi launches BJP's 2014 campaign with massive rally at Hyderabad”, Daily Mail, August 12, 2013.
359 “No tickets for Muslims in UP polls: rethink in BJP now?”, The Times of India, March 01, 2017.
daring initiative of visiting Pakistan in 1999 and historical Lahore declaration evince this fact. The themes in BJP’s foreign policy are the amalgamation of normalization and aggression.

Modi after getting elected followed the continuity of BJP’s unexpected and event specific foreign policy posture towards Pakistan. Modi invited Pakistani Premier Nawaz Sharif to attend his swearing-in ceremony. It was greatly surprising move given the acrid speeches Modi made against Pakistan in his electoral campaigns. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accepted the invitation. It rejuvenated the hopes that BJP's legacy of normalizing relations with Pakistan with breakthrough initiatives may pave a way towards the resumption of dialogues and subsequently pave a way towards durable peace in the region. Though these hopes dashed down and India-Pakistan relations returned to the same conventional matrix of enmity and animosity soon. India missed the initiative which PM Nawaz extended despite great opposition from military and domestic forces.

Had India capitalized on that initiative probably the trajectory of India and Pakistan relations have been different today. Right after that Nawaz Sharif dogged into political crises at home on the alleged rivalry in the general elections of 2013 which questioned his legitimacy at large. It also weakened his propensity towards taking any daring or bold initiative towards India. Likewise, Modi led government failed to engage civilian government in Pakistan which arguably has shifted the tilt of power towards the armed forces of Pakistan and significantly lessened the say of civilian government in matters of India-Pakistan relations.

6.1 Modi’s Pakistan Policy

Modi's Pakistan policy accompanied an enormous amount of rhetoric, demagogy, and oratory. Practically speaking the realm of foreign affairs offers a very little space for a radical shift in policy orientation. Foreign policy can observe a doctrinal or attitudinal change given the change in leadership. Modi promised a strong Pakistan policy, but the construct of India's foreign policy towards Pakistan remains more or less same except India's aversion from dialogue and serious talks with Pakistan. Spewing of hatred against Pakistan in the domestic arena through media hype and vigorous push to isolate Pakistan at the global level through active diplomacy primarily with the United States persisted.

India failed to evoke a coherent policy on Pakistan. Modi’s policy of dealing with Pakistan is arbitrary and reactionary at large. Modi appointed Ajit Doval, former DG Intelligence Bureau, as National Security Advisor and it was a clear manifestation of a mindset that Modi wants to deal hard with Pakistan instead of being soft and candid. Modi tried to circumscribe Pakistan’s foreign policy options. He tried to averse all course of actions benefitting Pakistan and tried to make inroads into all those countries Pakistan traditionally had good relations with. He tried to isolate Pakistan on the diplomatic front and continue to lobby against Pakistan globally. On the other hands, Ajit Doval targeted at Pakistan’s destabilization through espionage and supporting belligerent groups within Pakistan. It got proven when in 2014 Doval in speech publically avowed that, “You can do one Mumbai and you may lose Baluchistan.”\(^{361}\) India's defense minister Manohar Parrikar also remarked that best way to deal with the terrorism of Pakistan is through terrorism.\(^{362}\) Modi lashed out at Pakistan in Dhaka as a promoter of terrorism and creating nuisance in 2015. He mentioned Pakistan on four occasions in his speech.\(^{363}\) This indicates Modi’s hawkish overtures and the approach towards India-Pakistan relations.

In the bilateral context, the first step Modi taken was to cancel the secretary level talks on the pretext of Pakistani High Commissioner in Delhi meeting the Hurriyat leadership. It came as a disappointment given Prime Minister Nawaz gesticulated positively towards India and did not meet Hurriyat leadership on his visit to India to attend Modi's inauguration ceremony. Modi raised the public expectations of aggressive posture towards Pakistan, and it has quashed the hopes of engagement with Pakistan for any constructive dialogue. Modi relies on his anti-Pakistan rhetoric to consolidate his support base. His speeches in the state elections of 2017 in UP, Punjab, and Uttarakhand reflected the same position. Modi instead of focusing on the successes of his rule slammed Pakistan. The border tensions also escalated as soon as Modi ascended to power and the firing incidents at working boundary have become a ubiquitous phenomenon. Modi changed the standard operating procedure for the forces

deputed on borders. Modi has given border forces a mandate to open the fire and initiate retaliation without approval from the higher command. That's why the border provocations and border firing incidents have become a much frequent phenomenon. It has contributed towards India's aggressive posturing concerning its immediate neighbors.

India Pakistan relations remained mired in a stalemate albeit Modi's unexpected visit to Pakistan on his return from Kabul. It was an uncalled visit and surprising for everyone given Modi's penchant against Pakistan and his idiosyncratic disposition. This visit generated the euphoria like Vajpayee's visit to Lahore in 1999. But this was only a diplomatic thunder and more quizzical rather than a serious initiative aiming at improving India-Pakistan relations. No substantive policy development followed this serendipitous move. Modi turned to every country with which Pakistan had amicable relations and tried to circumvent Pakistan's diplomatic and foreign policy alternatives. Modi visited Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey, China, Qatar Japan and many other countries under his proactive diplomacy and foreign policy maneuvers. Sushma Swaraj though attended Heart of Asia Conference in December 2015 held in Pakistan. It was a regional conference aiming at finding a sustainable solution for Afghan imbroglio. It also underscored cooperation among the Asian countries to counter security threats and fostering connectivity in the region. Foreign ministers from ten countries attended the meeting. Swaraj remarked that she had come with the message to move forward.

Swaraj did not attend the same conference in the following year on the ground of illness, and hence the possibility bilateral meeting between India and Pakistan on the sidelines was quashed. The status quo prevailed, and no noticeable development in India Pakistan relation was evident. India equally remained clung to anti-Pakistan foreign policy at the domestic, regional and international level and adopted noticeably harder line against Pakistan compared to previous regimes. The series of actions since the start of Modi's tenure till today have convoluted the bilateral relational context of India and Pakistan. India tried various hardline postures under Modi, and they have not yielded great results for India.

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364 Interview with Dr. Suba Chandaran, Director Institute Peace & Conflict Studies.
attempted isolation of Pakistan does not seemingly have worked out in the backdrop of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It brought Pakistan back in the limelight with a massive infrastructural investment of China under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Modi’s Pakistan policy did not produce any noticeable results. Modi government failed to realize the fact that geopolitical realities don't change the countries and foreign policy breakthroughs are seldom phenomenon.

Foreign policy is a status quoist construct which usually follows the recurrent path. You cannot change your neighbors, so you’re to live with them. Engaging with Pakistan without the expectation of outcomes may have proved to be effective instead of a complete cul de sac. In the geometry of international politics disengagement is not a wise option and negotiations remain underway. USA and USSR during the intense rivalry of Cold War continued interacting with one another and it resulted to Détente, the softening of relations which paved the way for many treaties like SALT and START between both the countries. Modi’s penchant for going hard towards Pakistan and resolve on befitting tit for tat response seemingly proved counterproductive. The dispensation of Indian foreign policy under Modi may have some successes, but his Pakistan policy depicts an impasse at large.

6.2 Minus Pakistan Calculus

Modi’s foreign policy orientation practically remained minusing Pakistan from India's security matrix. No cooperation, no deliberation, no talks, no dialogue and no terms of engagement with Pakistan at any level. This foreign policy has not been announced formally through any doctrine or document, but the prevalent practice in Indian foreign policy under Modi bespeaks the same practice. It was a new dispensation that doesn't talk to Pakistan at all, not at the back channel even. The strategy was very simple, and that was to defy Pakistan. And the talks if happen will be on terrorism. Through this, he preconditioned the dialogues and that too on a specific one point agenda provided Pakistan shuts down all anti-India terror networks. He redrew the terms of bilateral re-engagement. The regional lexicon reflected the same. Through this India tried to isolate Pakistan at regional and global level. He assumed that his bent on terrorism would push the world to pressurize Pakistan to shun all anti-India terrorist outfits. The demand of this was not significantly plausible since Pakistan was busy battling anti-Pakistan terror networks and a crackdown on anti-India networks was
not a foreseeable priority. He further attempted the significant circumventing of Pakistan by enhancing ties with Afghanistan and Iran so that Pakistan remains stuck with an uneasy neighborhood. It will restrict Pakistan's sphere of influence. Modi cautiously added Pakistan factor while dealing with Pakistan's neighbors and traditional allies. He added Pakistan dimension on his visit to UAE. Traditionally India’s relationship with these countries remained a zero-sum game given India-Pakistan equation.\textsuperscript{366} This foreign policy push was to de-hyphenate Pakistan from India's relations with these states. India under Modi tried to embark onto an autonomous pattern of foreign policy decision-making having made Pakistan irrelevant.

This frame of policy did not help India to a great extent. In foreign policy tools, countries either negotiate or resort to coercion. India cannot coerce Pakistan amid credible deterrent, and Pakistan is not a weaker neighbor of India like the other countries of South Asia. Disentanglement with Pakistan further surges India's vulnerability. The strategic options for the countries in the realm of foreign policy are quite limited. India can't teach Pakistan a lesson. The escalation or a war with Pakistan can trigger a nuclear catastrophe eventually putting entire region on tenterhooks. Zero talks with Pakistan or conditional talks with Pakistan will not yield any significant foreign policy results for India. The image of a strongman cannot go a long way in the dynamics of the nation-state system. The better foreign policy is the one which secures national interest. The Too much hardline approach creates problems and will have to impinge upon India's strategic calculus. According to a survey conducted towards the end of 2016 50\% of Indian disapproved Modi's policy towards Pakistan.\textsuperscript{367}

The very significant trepidation in the context of India Pakistan relations amidst their historical rivalry was the Ufa declaration in 2015. Pakistani premier Nawaz Sharif attended the 7\textsuperscript{th} BRICS summit held in Ufa Russia on 8-9 July, 2015. Prime Minister Modi and Nawaz met on the sidelines of the summit and discussed issues of bilateral and regional interest. Both India and Pakistan agreed to confront the menace of terrorism. A meeting of National Security advisors from both the states was decided upon in New Delhi to discuss issues related to

\textsuperscript{366} Dr. Nitin Prasad, \textit{Changes in Indian Foreign Policy towards Pakistan} (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2017)

\textsuperscript{367} “50 per cent Indians disagree with Modi’s Pakistan policy: Pew Survey”, \textit{The Indian Express}, September 19, 2016.
terrorism. The meeting of DG Rangers and DG BSF followed by the meeting of DGMOs was also consented. Both sides also agreed to release the fishermen along with their boats within 15 days. Both the states expressed their resolve in facilitating religious tourism. India and Pakistan decided to expedite Mumbai and sharing additional information. Modi was invited by Pakistani premier to visit Pakistan which he accepted.\textsuperscript{368} This declaration was a landmark for India and came under furious criticism in Pakistan. It was pictured as India's great diplomatic victory. It was the first time when Kashmir was absent in the joint statement of India-Pakistan Prime Ministers and terrorism was solely mentioned. This declaration was very significant in a larger picture. On the agenda of dialogue table, Pakistan always pitches Kashmir as the topmost priority whereas India's first and foremost resolve is terrorism. These two contradictory agendas are reciprocal for both the sides largely contingent on one another. India counter balances demands of talks over Kashmir by Pakistan through the rhetoric of addressing terrorism first. This Ufa declaration came as a surprise for everyone since it only carried India's priority of terrorism and both states expressed their resolve in dealing with this menace through joint efforts. It portrayed Pakistan's reversal on Kashmir first policy. It was met up with high denigration in Pakistan and invited furious wrath for Nawaz led government.\textsuperscript{369} It came as a blunder of Pakistan's foreign office and India greeted it as a huge success.

The magnitude of the impact of this joint statement in Pakistan is evident through a fact that in August 2017 a letter was surfaced in media allegedly written by Mr. Abdul Basit who served as Pakistani High Commissioner to India. The letter addressed Mr. Aizaz Chaudhry, Pakistan's ambassador to the United States and the former foreign secretary. The letter carried harsh language and remarked Mr. Chaudhry as worst Foreign Secretary ever. The former blamed the later for the blunder of Ufa joint statement and commented that people like Aizaz should refrain from the delicate profession of diplomacy\textsuperscript{370} It reflects how Ufa joint statement was perceived in Pakistan tilted in favor of India yet this could not bring

\textsuperscript{368} “Summary of Modi-Sharif talks in Ufa, Russia”, \textit{The Indian Express}, July 10, 2015. The original text of the joint statement of this meeting is available on the website of Ministry of External Affairs India, www.mea.in

\textsuperscript{369} Nasim Zehra, “Ufa statement has put Nawaz Sharif on the mat in Pakistan”, \textit{Hindustan Times}, July 16, 2015.

\textsuperscript{370} “You have been the worst foreign secretary ever,' Basit wrote in the scathing letter to Aizaz”, \textit{Dawn}, August 29, 2017.
any drastic change or noticeable impact on the bilateral construct of India-Pakistan relations.

India's slump into growing domestic intolerance further embroiled the scenario. The anti-Muslim policies and right-wing extremism increased manifolds. The public lynching over cow slaughter virulently polarized the societal divisions. It also proved the ire of the moderates and more than 40 writers returned their awards against this climate of intolerance. The pursuance of communal policies further darted the bleak prospects for India and Pakistan relations. Modi was also perhaps eying at the state elections in India which witnessed a significant upsurge for BJP in 2017 despite early jolts in Delhi and Bihar. It guided a nuanced stigma against Pakistan followed by a full-throttled impasse. There have not come any instance of serious escalation like of 2001-2, but the relational trajectory remained submerged in the oppositional matrix. The one foreign policy pattern which Modi inherited from Congress was to push Pakistan vigorously on internal front and channeling the systemic variable. Modi's pushed his resolve on isolating Pakistan on all forums. This argument gets further credence through the fact that India pursued the rhetoric of Pakistan's sponsored terrorism at BRICS summit in 2017 China ruled out discussions on this considering it not falling in the premise of BRICS summit. The joint statement which came at the end of the summit was encouraging for India since it denounced terrorism and expressed concerns on the security situation in the region and the violence caused by terrorist outfits with the mentioning of Jaish e Mohammad and Lashkar e Taiba. It again came as a big success since China in the previous summit, and earlier discussions of this summit cautioned India not to target Pakistan. India repeatedly took the issue of Masood Azhar, the leader of Jaish e Mohammad to the United Nations' Security Council but every time China blocked and vetoed any such move. India under Modi had been persistently trying to internationalize the issue of terrorism which it allegedly faces at the hands of Pakistan.

Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj lashed out at Pakistan in United Nations in 2016 and warned Pakistan about Kashmir. This speech came in the

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373 “BRICS Summit 2017: Full text of BRICS leaders’ declaration signed at Xiamen, China”, The Indian Express, September 04, 2017.
backdrop of Pakistani Premier Nawaz Sharif's speech in which he highlighted the plight of Kashmiris in the fresh round of insurgency in Indian held Kashmir and also glorified the guerilla fighter Burhan Wani and condemned his killing at the hands of Indian forces. Sushma Swaraj labeled Pakistan as nurturer, peddler, and exporter of terrorism. She also demanded the global isolation of Pakistan. It indicates how India is zealously trying to brand Pakistan as host of terrorist activities and circumvent its diplomatic options. India is attempting to evoke a narrative that entire world is unsafe due to terrorism and is fighting against terrorism and Pakistan is supporting terrorism so it must be isolated. Countries of this kind should have no place in the comity of the nations.

6.3 Anti-Pakistan Symbolism

The ostentatious display of anti-Pakistan symbols compounded the diplomatic reluctance and minus Pakistan calculus of foreign policy. It included the projection of anti-Pakistan symbols and cultivation of hyper-nationalism in the domestic polity. India in 2015 planned a month-long celebration of self-proclaimed victory in 1965's war. This carnival was also to denounce a perception that Pakistan inflicted massive damages on India in the battleground albeit India managed to turn it around in Tashkent Declaration through the use of active diplomacy. The celebrations like this reflected the determination of Modi government to adopt a hawkish approach towards Pakistan. It was also a depiction of India's confrontational stance towards Pakistan. The India's paranoia towards Pakistan was further manifested when Indian authorities in Punjab captured a pigeon in the border village of Pathankot and suspected it a Pakistan's spy pigeon. Media reported it as Pakistani bird carrying some secret message and has the phone number written on it which was of Narowal District of Pakistan. The pigeon got jailed over spying charges and espionage concerns. Indian media's hysteria and this event earned a lot of embarrassment for India. This event was the illustration of India's mood towards Pakistan and depicted Pakistan as the forerunner of India's all internal problems. The similar like incident was the terror

374 “Full text of Nawaz Sharif's speech at UN general assembly”, Hindustan Times, September 21, 2016.
375 “Sushma Swaraj names and shames Pakistan at UN”, The Times of India, September 26, 2016.
376 Sushant Singh & Nirupama Subramanian, “Pakistan bristles at India's 1965 war 'commemorative carnival', The Indian Express, June 29, 2016.
boat incident in January 2015 where Indian coastal guards claimed intercepting a Pakistani boat carrying terrorists and after an hour-long hot pursuit killed and destroyed the boat leaving behind no trace of the boat and people onboard. India portrayed it another attempt like Mumbai and Indian media again went hysteric. Later on, it revealed that it was a smuggling boat carrying drugs. It triggered a huge controversy. Government's version spelled out by Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar was that the boat blew up internally and the boat crew was responsible for the explosion after chased by Indian Coast Guards for one hour. Later on, Coast Guard DIG B K Loshali got sacked since he contradicted government's stance and claimed that he ordered the boat to be blown up. It ended in the termination of DIG Coast Guard from his service for having contradicted Government's stance. A three-member team found enough substance to believe that he had contradicted the official position and ordered his termination from the service. It sufficiently demonstrates the level of impulsiveness in Indian policy towards Pakistan and a customary practice of beholding Pakistan as the culprit in any sporadic incident without any due inquiry or investigation. This also accentuates a significant gulf and a trust deficit at large which both countries share otherwise any such incident can be reported and thwarted with early cautioning and share of information.

India and Pakistan have drastically failed to evoke any joint response to any abrupt eventuality or unforeseen incident. The lack of will and resolve in this regard further solidifies the patterns of animosity, rivalry, and enmity and also raised the possibilities of confusion and miscalculation. It is the very reason that both the countries are at daggers drawn after having passed seven decades and failed to deconstruct the basis from where the enmity and confrontation stem out. The contentious approach towards certain erratic happening well reflects the seriousness of purpose in the bilateral relations of both the states.

In July 2015 the Gurdaspur district of Indian Punjab which borders with Indian held Kashmir was struck with a terrorist attack. India alleged Pakistani

379 “Coast Guard DIG Loshali sacked for Pakistan boat remarks, may go for review”, The Indian Express, December 15, 2015.
based Lashkar e Taiba responsible for this attack. Three terrorists dressed in military uniform attacked a police station in Dina Nagar. It left three civilians, and four police officers killed and fifteen injured. Five planted bombs were also found, and a major catastrophe was avoided. All three attackers were killed. This event added the further bad blood in the already deteriorated trajectory of India-Pakistan relations. India has knitted the terrorism equation with Pakistan and presupposes Pakistan's role in any terror activity held in India. It has made the posture of relations so fragile that ultimately demeans the scope of a joint investigation or mutual quelling of threat. India does not even conduct an inquiry and indicts Pakistan straightaway as it happened in terror boat incident. India also has failed to realize a fact that to deal with the threat emanating from non-state actors it will have to talk and negotiate to state. No talk option has added further quandaries in India's threat spectrum. Nonstate actors have become a ubiquitous reality in global politics, and no state has completely overrun this phenomenon. India believes that Pakistan hatches and peddles this kind of attacks on Indian soils where nonstate actors like Lashkar e Taiba and Jaish e Mohammad are administered and patronized by the state agencies of Pakistan.

6.4 Confrontational Posturing

The escalation on borders leading to a volatile scenario continued unabated. It almost made it a limited war theatre under Modi government. The tensions on borders mounted after India announced to build a war along the Line of Control which was a blatant violation of the LOC agreement. Pakistan wrote a letter to UN over this expressing its deepest reservations on this move. Kashmir dispute is an internationally recognized dispute where the resolutions of Security Council are awaiting implementation. Any change in border scheme will be akin to making it a quasi-international border. The tensions kept on escalating with provoked and unprovoked firing incidents along the working boundary and the LOC. It resulted in a loss of many lives of civilians and soldiers deployed on borders. Both countries present a different account and narrative on the death toll and also hold responsible one another for the provocation. It remains the fact that firing incidents on India Pakistan working boundary and LOC have become a

381 “Pakistan writes to U.N. about India’s plan to build wall along LoC”, The Hindu, September 25, 2015.
norm. The issue remains protracted and unstinted. In 2014 it took a quantum leap forward when the then Indian Defence Minister Arun Jaitley warned Pakistan to stop unprovoked firing at the borders and threatened Pakistan of the unaffordable response from India. Pakistani counterpart Khawaja Asif responded with the warning of the nuclear deterrent and a befitting response given any aggression. UN despite a letter sent to the mediation in the dispute did not intervene amid the bilateral nature of the conflict and urged India and Pakistan to resolve it mutually.

India and Pakistan agreed to stop border violations in September 2015 when a delegation headed by DG Rangers Pakistan and DG Border Security Force (BSF) met and agreed on setting up a mechanism to mitigate border tensions. Indian officials hold a stringent narrative on border tensions that India will not fire the first bullet but will not spare short of a befitting response if a shot gets launched from the other side. Rajnath Singh, Indian Home Minister, uttered the same. Despite this, the coming years witnessed the persistent border war. Indian officials like Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, Home Minister Rajnath Singh including Modi reiterated the mantra of befitting response on many occasions and warned Pakistan that time has now changed in India. This conformational posturing may prove disastrous given the volatility and vulnerability both the countries share amid their nuclear status. The statement of Indian Army Chief about the cold start doctrine and India’s proactive military strategy furthered the confrontation and made the volatile scenario more hostile.

The killing of Burhan Wani as mentioned previously gave a fresh impetus to the insurgency in Indian held Kashmir. Pakistan took up this issue proactively and reiterated its stance that it supports the Kashmiris’ struggle for the right to self-determination and Pakistan strongly condemns the human rights violations in

383 “Islamabad’s dark warning to India as defense minister hints at nuclear response”, Daily Mail, October 10, 2014.
385 “India won’t fire the first bullet along the border, Rajnath Singh tells Pak Rangers”, Times of India, September 11, 2015.
386 “Jaitley warns Pakistan, Modi praises troops as ceasefire violations continue”, The Indian Express, October 10, 2014.
387 Rajat Pandit, “Army keeps surgical strike option open, while also honing Cold Start strategy for Pakistan”, The Times of India, January 14, 2017.
Indian held Kashmir. Indian Army chief cautioned Pakistan that India wouldn't hesitate in using power over ceasefire violations, cross-border terrorism, and Kashmir. He further remarked that India's desire for peace should not be considered India's weakness. The war of statements on both the sides persistently continued. The governmental officials on both the sides have continued media tirade and heretic statements against each other. The symmetry of bilateral relations remained couched in mistrust, rivalry, and confrontation.

The dawn of 2016 brought an acrid start for India Pakistan relations. On 2\textsuperscript{nd} of January 2016, heavily armed terrorists attacked the Pathankot air base which is a part of India's Western command of Air Force. The operation against the terrorists lasted for 17 hours resultantly killing all four attackers and three security forces personnel. Indian security forces commenced a combing operation, and next day fresh gunshots were exchanged, and one more security personnel got killed in IED explosion. The fifth terrorist was killed, and final sixth terrorist got neutralized on January 5\textsuperscript{th}, and combing operation was declared over. It invited a high voltage rivalry and concomitant blame game between India and Pakistan again. India without any procedural inquiry claimed that they were Pakistani terrorists belonging to Jaish e Mohammad. It led to a breakdown to already crumbled edifice of India Pakistan relations. The statement of the home minister Rajnath Singh reflected the same and remarked that we wanted good ties with Pakistan and with all other neighbors, but if India is attacked, we will give a befitting reply.

Pakistan condemned the attack and reiterated that it wants normalized relations and stabilized peace with India. Pakistan also expressed the willingness to continue the goodwill which was developed after high-level contacts including PM Modi's visit to Pakistan and expressed resolve to partner with India and other countries to completely eradicate the menace of terrorism.

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{388} “Pakistan's Ambassador to UN speaks at General Assembly debate; reminds world body of an urgent need to address Kashmir issue”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release, October 06, 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{389} “Army Chief Bipin Rawat tells Pakistan that India ‘will not hesitate in using our power”, FirstPost, January 02, 2017.
\item \textsuperscript{390} Navjeevan Gopal & Kamaldeep Singh Brar, “Terror attacks Pathankot air force base, India-Pakistan thaw”, The Indian Express, January 03, 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{391} “Pathankot attack: Sixth terrorist neutralized, combing operations to end tomorrow”, The Indian Express, January 05, 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{392} “Will give befitting reply to terror attack: Rajnath”, The Hindu, January 02, 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{393} “Pakistan condemns the terrorist incident in Pathankot, India”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release, January 02, 2016. available at mofa.gov.pk
\end{itemize}}
Later on, Pakistan agreed to send a special investigation team to probe Pathankot incident. It was agreed in the meetings of the national security advisors of both the states.\(^{394}\) The same team when visited Pathankot was denied entry into the air base when visited Pathankot. Manohar Parrikar, the Indian Defence Minister, remarked that Pakistani JIT wouldn't be allowed to go into the airbase since that area is cordoned off. They can only visit the crime scene. \(^{395}\) It speaks volume of the mistrust both the states have accumulated for one another. This event thwarted the secretary-level talks with were scheduled to be held on 15\(^{th}\) January. The secretary-level talks were immediately put off and rescheduled for March. This JIT was to investigate ahead of the secretary-level talks, but this gesture and initiative remained counterproductive at large. It is very noteworthy to mention that on 2\(^{nd}\) June 2016 during an interview to News 18.com the chief of National Investigation Agency (NIA) Sharad Kumar admitted that no complicity of Pakistan and its state agencies was found in Pathankot attack and nothing could have been established against Pakistan's alleged role in facilitating Pathankot attack. Ministry of External Affairs, India issued a statement that speculations should be avoided given investigation is underway, and involvement of Pakistani nationals in Pathankot attack is an accepted fact, and Kumar's statement is misinterpreted. Home office also told reports that no clean chit could be given at this time when the investigation is going on. The NIA chief also said that he was misquoted.\(^{396}\) Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson Nafees Zakaria on twitter remarked that the statement of Chief NIA vindicated Pakistan’s longstanding position.

The confrontation between India and Pakistan further compounded in the backdrop of Kulbhushan Jadhav's episode. He was allegedly Indian spy involved in subversive activities in Baluchistan and Karachi. India refused to accept him a spy in the first place yet acknowledged him Indian Navy officer who took premature retirement. India also alleged that Jadhav got abducted from Iran. Pakistan claims that Jadhav was arrested in a counterintelligence operation in

\(^{394}\) “Pakistan sets up Joint Investigation Team to probe Pathankot terror attack”, *The Indian Express*, February 26, 2016.

\(^{395}\) “Pathankot attack: Pakistan probe team denied permission to go near air base”, *The Indian Express*, March 29, 2016.

\(^{396}\) “NIA DG remark on Pathankot incident: MEA clarifies, Cong launches attack”, *The Indian Express*, June 04, 2016.
Baluchistan in March 2016.\textsuperscript{397} Pakistan used this incident to establish its point that India is involved in sponsoring terrorist activities within Pakistan. India denied any role and affiliation of Jadhav with RAW, the premier intelligence wing of India. According to Pakistani authorities Jadhav formerly was a Navy officer who joined Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 2003 and was stationed in Chabahar, the port in Iran, and from there he made many undetected visits to Pakistan and was involved in subversive activities in Karachi and Baluchistan. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) of Pakistan Army issued a confessional video of Jadhav in which he accepted his role in fomenting terrorism in Karachi and Baluchistan and told that he was arrested while entering to Pakistan from Saravan border area of Baluchistan with Iran in a counterintelligence raid.\textsuperscript{398} Pakistan proactively took up this issue and also developed a dossier to present it to the United Nations and other countries that how India is trying to destabilize Pakistan internally through espionage and subversion. India, on the other hand, remained steadfast defending Jadhav and demanded counselor access to Jadhav repeatedly which was denied by Pakistani authorities.\textsuperscript{399} Pakistan prosecuted the case of Jadhav in the military court and sentenced him to death. India warns Pakistan that it would be considered a murder since the spirit of the law, in this case, is not followed and the decision is in contradiction to the prevailing norms of justice and fair trial and asked Pakistan to refrain hanging Jadhav.\textsuperscript{400} Jadhav bided the plea for pardon from Army Chief in Pakistan which got rejected. India took the issue to the International Court of Justice. Pakistan made a plea that the case is of bilateral nature and does not fall in the premise of ICJ and hence should be rejected. India claimed that Pakistan did not follow the prerequisites of fair trial and equity. ICJ stayed on Jadhav death sentence on May 18, 2017. India celebrated it as a huge victory. Indian External Minister Sushma Swaraj said that India will go to any extent to save Jadhav and will leave no stone unturned to save him.\textsuperscript{401} The second confessional video of


\textsuperscript{399} “Pakistan turns down India’s request for consular access to Kulbhushan Jadhav”, \textit{The Indian Express}, June 04, 2016.

\textsuperscript{400} Shubhajit Roy, “Pakistan court sentences Jadhav to death; if executed, it is murder, warns India”, \textit{The Indian Express}, April 12, 2017.

\textsuperscript{401} “Kulbhushan Jadhav's execution stayed: Sushma Swaraj thanks Harish Salve”, \textit{The Indian Express}, May 18, 2017.
Jadhav was released on June 22, 2017, and said that he along with Anil Kumar, another spy of RAW was involved in destabilizing Pakistan through funding and administering Baloch sub-national miscreants.\textsuperscript{402} This issue is yet unresolved and continues to sour India Pakistan relations.

In a very reciprocal manner, Indian National Investigation Agency released the confessional video of alleged Pakistani terrorist named Bahadur Ali alias Saifulla. He confessed that he hails from Lahore and is the member of Lashkar e Taiba. In the very likely manner, India also tried to establish that Pakistan precipitates the current unrest in Indian held Kashmir. He further confessed that he was sent to Kashmir to mix violence with agitation by throwing grenades at security forces. NIA IG Sanjeev Kumar Singh further added that Bahadur Ali infiltrated in Kashmir with the active support of Pakistani military and border forces. India further alleged that Pakistan is trying to orchestrate violence amid the recent disturbance in the valley developed in the aftermath of the killing of Burhan Wani and Pakistan is continuously infiltrating heavily trained terrorists to create a nuisance and attack police and security forces.\textsuperscript{403} The issue of Bahadur Ali was picked up by Sushma Swaraj as well in her speech to the UN general assembly on September 27, 2016. She said that we attempted an unprecedented paradigm of friendship with Pakistan in two years. We extended Eid greetings to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, wished success to cricket team and sent good wishes for his health and wellbeing and what we got in return Pathankot, Bahadur Ali, and Uri. Bahadur Ali is in our custody and is a living example of Pakistan's complicity in hatching cross-border terror against India. Pakistan is always in a state of denial when this kind of evidence are presented, and Pakistan still thinks that through such kind of activities it will be able to regain the territory it covets.\textsuperscript{404}

\textbf{6.5 Uri and Surgical Strike}

India and Pakistan relations further went into a great turmoil in the aftermath of Uri attack. It was the deadliest attack on Indians security forces stationed near the town Uri in Indian administered Kashmir. It led to the killing of

\textsuperscript{402} “Kulbhushan Jadhav’s second confessional video: Full text”, \textit{The Indian Express}, June 22, 2017.
\textsuperscript{403} “Confession of Pak terrorist: Lashkar fuelling unrest in Kashmir, says NIA”, \textit{The Indian Express}, August 11, 2016.
\textsuperscript{404} “English rendition of External Affairs Minister’s address at the 71\textsuperscript{st} UNGA, New York”, \textit{Ministry of External Affairs}, Government of India, September 26, 2016.
17 soldiers along with the four attackers. India alleged the involvement of Jaish e Mohammad in this attack. This attack came at a time when Kashmir was hostage to unrest and turbulence amid the fresh wave of insurgency. PM Modi condemned the attack. Home Minister Rajnath Singh convened an emergency meeting with the defense officials. Modi also said that the Defence minister Manohar Parrikar would visit Jammu & Kashmir to monitor the situation. The attackers and the security forces exchanged massive gunfire.

It was not the first attack but the year 2016 witnessed series of attacks on Indian security forces. Earlier this year Pathankot airbase attack rattled Indian security forces. In February two CRPF officials were killed, and 11 were injured. The attackers took a refuge in a nearby institute and an encounter started which lasted for three days. It was finally concluded killing the attackers and two captains and soldiers from Special Forces. On June 03 BSF convoy was attacked killing three personnel. On June 04 a police check post was attacked killing two police officials in Anang Town. On June 08, 2017 Indian the convoy of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) was attacked near Pampore and killed eight security personnel and left 20 injured. In July Indian security forces claimed to foil a bid of border infiltration in Kupwara district near LOC. In exchange of gunfire, a soldier was killed. On 15th of August on the day of Independence Day celebrations, Army convoy near Srinagar-Baramulla highway was attacked killing eight people and injuring 22. The day before a grenade was thrown at Kakapora police station injuring five policemen. On September 09 CRPF camp in Pulwama was attacked. No killing or injury was reported.

On September 14 in Poonch security forces and police officials engaged in a battle with four militants which lasted for three days. It was the longest gun battle since Pathankot. Two police official, two army men and a civilian were killed by militants in Poonch before they took a refuge in a mini secretariat opposite to police building. All four militants were neutralized in three days long battle. Uri attack came in the backdrop of these series of attacks on Indians security forces which India believes were orchestrated by either Lashkar e Taiba

405 “Uri terror attack: A look at past attacks in Jammu-Kashmir this year”, The Indian Express, September 18, 2016.
or Jaish e Mohammad. India alleged the involvement of Jaish e Mohammad behind Uri attack.\textsuperscript{408} Indian DG Military Operations made a statement that there is enough evidence to believe that the attackers belonged to Jaish e Mohammad. Indian External Ministry also said that with the GPS found the bodies of the attackers we had confirmed the point and time of infiltration near the line of control. Grenades and communication equipment was made in Pakistan. Officials from National Investigation Agency (NIA) claimed that they had found substantial evidence that confirms the links of the attackers with a specific Jihadi group in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{409}

It invited a major impasse in the already perished trajectory of India Pakistan relations. The Uri attack ushered a customary battle of rhetoric, blame game and confrontational posturing towards one another. India immediately canceled participation in the SAARC summit in Pakistan. India conveyed to the SAARC chair that the prevailing situation is not favorable and conducive for the successful holding of 19\textsuperscript{th} SAARC summit. Cross-border attacks and the growing interference of a member into the internal affairs of the member states have made the security situation precarious therefor India is unable to participate in the proposed summit.\textsuperscript{410} Pakistan retorted with the reciprocal stance and called postponement of the summit unfortunate and criticized India for using an excuse of terrorism. It further said that India is perpetrating and financing terrorism in Pakistan and mentioned Kulbhushan Jadhav as a living example of this phenomenon. It further accused India of violating norms of International law by infringing inside Pakistan.\textsuperscript{411}

Domestically it also created a major uproar. Indian Motion Pictures Producer Association boycotted all Pakistani actors and artists working in India. Indian channels also stopped airing Pakistani content. Pakistan responded with the same action by blocking Indian content in Pakistan. Indian Cricket Board also ruled out the possibility of reviving cricketing ties between India and Pakistan. All these gesticulations gave the government go-ahead to continue with a diplomatic

\textsuperscript{408} “Jaish terrorists behind Uri attack, had items with Pakistani markings: Army”, \textit{Times of India}, September 18, 2016.

\textsuperscript{409} “Uri attack probe: Terrorists locked soldiers in cook house, store”, \textit{The Indian Express}, September 21, 2016.

\textsuperscript{410} “SAARC summit uncertain as tensions rise between India Pakistan”, \textit{The Indian Express}, September 29, 2016.

\textsuperscript{411} “India pulls out of SAARC summit in Islamabad”, \textit{The Express Tribune}, September 27, 2016.
offensive against Pakistan. It is where the domestic landscape sanctioned the legitimacy for a particular foreign policy action. Modi and other governmental officials adopted a hardline and an offensive posture towards Pakistan in their statements. It triggered a major upheaval and overhyped media tone which added further mistrust and enmity to India-Pakistan relations. The narrative that Pakistan is killing our soldiers insinuated in the domestic landscape of Indian politics and gave hostility towards Pakistan a further push. This domestic impetus demanded a stringent conclusive action against terrorists from Modi led government aiming at teaching Pakistan a lesson. On the very same grounds and pretext, Modi government claimed on September 29 that it has successfully conducted surgical strikes within Pakistan.

On September 29, 2016, India claimed that it successfully conducted surgical strikes against the militant launch pads within Azad Kashmir, Pakistani administered region of Jammu & Kashmir. India media contended that it led to the killing of 35-50 militants. This claim came as a response to Uri attack. Indian media created a hype and Modi led government conveyed a message to the nation that they have taught Pakistan a befitting lesson and took the revenge of Uri.\textsuperscript{412} Pakistan categorically denied the Indian claim of surgical strikes and said that there was a usual exchange of fires on the border which claimed lives of two Pakistani soldiers. Rest the story and claim of the surgical strike is a fabrication and completely untrue.\textsuperscript{413} ISPR admitted that two soldiers got killed in the exchange of firing between India and Pakistan and claim of surgical strikes is imaginary and fabricated. Pakistan further maintained a point that it was a better coherent firing on borders and Indian government and media are overhyping it to divert attention from the ongoing Kashmir crisis and to calm down its people and media by Resorting to such aggressive action.\textsuperscript{414} A surgical strike is a bigger term in the literature of security studies. It refers to a coordinated and targeted plan of action and subsequent attack aiming at the minimal collateral damage and counter value targets. It is usually airborne where troops land down from helicopters, conduct their operation and go back. Given the terrain of the line of control, the

\textsuperscript{412}“India's surgical strike: Let us answer all your questions”, \textit{The Indian Express}, September 30, 2016.

\textsuperscript{413}“Pakistan denies surgical strikes, says only cross-border firing happened”, \textit{The Indian Express}, October 03, 2016.

\textsuperscript{414}Syed Ammar Abbas, “Army rubbishes Indian ‘surgical strikes' claim as two Pakistani soldiers killed at LoC”, \textit{Dawn}, September 29, 2016.
possibility of using a helicopter to drop the troops down at ground level to conduct a strike does not seem plausible. BBC tried to verify the claim of the surgical strikes over Azad Kashmir but came up with a different conclusion. BBC report suggests that India didn’t carry out the strikes in the way it claims yet Indian forces made the infringement and LOC violation in some areas. India did not airdrop commandos. The reality lies somewhere in the middle of Indian and Pakistani stances. Modi government through this claim placated and satiated the demand of Indian masses who were seeking a determining, befitting and conclusive action against Pakistan. Modi on his visit to the USA while speaking at a community reception in Virginia praised the military prowess of India and boasted surgical strikes and said that with the conclusion of successful surgical strikes within Pakistan. He added that we have proven that we can defend our country and convinced the world that the menace of terrorism needs to end.

India pursued this issue vigorously on the diplomatic front. It successfully branded the role of Jihadi militant organizations in Kashmir impinging great loss on Indian security forces. India specifically targeted Syed Salahudeen, the militant commander of Hizbul Mujahideen. This organization is the forerunner of the armed insurgency against Indian troops in Jammu & Kashmir. Salahudeen whose original name is Yusuf Shah heads the anti-India militant alliance. He participated in the J&K assembly elections of 1987 and got defeated over alleged rigging. It led his transformation to an armed militant fighting against Indian security forces deployed in Jammu & Kashmir. This organization and alliance hit India with serious reverberations. India pushed the issue of Syed Salahudeen, and on Modi’s visit to the USA, he was declared as a global terrorist. On June 26, 2017, the US Department of State designated him a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). India declared it a thumping diplomatic victory. India marched on to clinch a major victory in August 2017 when Hizbul Mujahideen was designated as a terrorist organization by US and freezes all assets. The Hizb got declared as the foreign terrorist organization (FTO). Formed in 1989 Hizb was the largest and most coherent group operative against Indian security forces in J&K. This quotes

416 “Surgical strikes proved that India can defend itself, ensure security: PM Narendra Modi”, The Indian Express, June 26, 2017.
as India's big diplomatic triumph since India over long was bidding with UN Security Council to declare Hizb, a terrorist organization and every time China blocked India's effort by vetoing it.\(^{418}\)

### 6.6 Regional Integration & Corridor Politics

India under Modi does not do any trade or cooperation with Pakistan. In the regional geometry, the India Pakistan rivalry hijacks the prospects of regional cooperation. India is trying to extricate Pakistan from SAARC. India boycotted SAARC summit in Pakistan in September 2016. India under Modi is attempting to evoke a sub-regional framework of cooperation with could pacify India's developmental agenda and also keeps Pakistan out of the equation. India is thinking to create BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal).\(^{419}\) India believes that Pakistan is a hurdle in regional connectivity and its presence in South Asian regional framework jeopardizes the prospects of cooperation and propensity towards regional integration. SAARC without Pakistan is also the manifestation of minus Pakistan calculus. It is to defy Pakistan's significance in the region and as a viable regional player. SAARC essentially was Indian brainchild under Rajeev Gandhi. India had been passionate about this framework since it closely corresponds to India's territorial ambitions and the developmental agenda. It is also a stepping stone towards India's globalist aspirations.

India first intends to hold a substantial anchoring role in the region and then orchestrate a multilateral foreign policy at the internal stage. It also remains the fact that SAARC did not accumulate any remarkable success or breakthrough since its existence. India Pakistan pattern of rivalry remained the decisional rather decisive posture of SAARC's functioning and restrained its scope. There is no alternative framework of regional trade and connectivity in South Asia except SAARC. The fractionalization between India and Pakistan is dwindling India's clout and influence in the region which is perturbing India. As mentioned in the previous chapters India envisages a bigger and dominant role in the region.

India does not seek the relation of reciprocity with its weaker neighbors but wants an extended role, dominance and larger sphere of influence. Trade relations in South Asia stagnated due to India-Pakistan rivalry and India is unable

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\(^{419}\) Rajeev Sharma, “Forget SAARC, if Pakistan does not cooperate, India will come up with 'BBIN'”, *FirstPost*, Feb 26, 2015.
to reap the fruits of its economic boom. It is prompting India to carve some out of the box solution. SAARC without Pakistan will effectuate India's economic vision for the region. It will keep Pakistan out of the equation as desired by Modi under his current policy matrix. It becomes evident through a fact that when India boycotted SAARC summit in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Bangladesh joined India in this boycott and refused to participate in SAARC summit.420

It shows the convergence of interests these countries are developing with India. Modi already had conceived Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal Motor Vehicle Agreement (BBIN MVA). The idea was to build a road between these four countries aiming at increasing the mobility and easing the transit. The idea was first pitched in the SAARC summit of 2014 at Katmandu and was opposed by Pakistan. India instead pursued it as a sub-regional architecture and managed to achieve an agreement between the said countries in Thimpu Bhutan in 2015. Bhutan, later on, pulled out of the agreement and did not ratify it amid the looming elections. India is determined to operationalize this agreement with three members.421 It demonstrates India's resolve in evoking a minus Pakistan regional or sub-regional framework. It will augment India's influence in the region and will also pacify its regional economic agenda. It will also keep Pakistan out of the calculus which Modi government is persistently trying after having ascended to power.

China Pakistan Economic Corridor is a flagship project of China's Belt and Road initiative. China announced it formally in April 2015. It is a collection of infrastructural projects, transit route, energy projects and special economic zones and targets at modernizing Pakistan's sluggish economy.422 It is China's proposed vision of Silk Road Initiative for the 21st century and Pakistan partners with China in this geopolitical and geo-economic pursuit. It came at a high time when Pakistan was getting isolated in the global mainstream and Modi's foreign policy matrix was working out efficiently. CPEC changed the scenario. Pakistan came back in the limelight. India expressed its deepest reservation over this project and

420 “SAARC Summit: Now, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Afghanistan say they won't be going to Islamabad”, The Indian Express, September 28, 2016.
raised certain legal and judicial objections on this project which have been
downturned by China.

India claims that CPEC passes through Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Kashmir
which is a part of India albeit disputed yet it violates India's sovereignty. Soon
after the announcement of CPEC the External Minister of India Sushma Swaraj
told the media reporters that India has deepest concerns and reservation over this
project and Prime Minister Modi will take up the issue of 46 billion dollars
corridor running from Gwadar to China's Xinjiang region with the Chinese
government and termed it unacceptable.\(^{423}\) China time and again dismissed India’
concerns over CPEC and communicated India that the nature of the project is
purely economic and commercial and India should not worry about it. China
respects India’s sovereignty.\(^{424}\) Pakistan considered it the continuation of Modi’s
anti-Pakistan track record and India’s detest towards Pakistan’s prosperity. India
boycotted the BRI summit. Ministry of External Affairs issued a detailed
statement and highlighted India's reservations over this initiative. India has three
major concerns over CPEC.

1) Corridor passes through the land belonging to India
2) It will push smaller countries in a crushing debt cycle.
3) It will destroy ecology and disrupt local communities

India believes that under cover of building physical infrastructure China is
building its political influence and clout.\(^{425}\) India has a particular developmental
agenda for the region and the massive investment like CPEC undermines India's
presence and clout in the region. Except for Bhutan all of India's neighbors have
entered the B&RI AND India feel vulnerable by China's extended presence in
Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Maldives. It constrains India's larger role in the
region and serves as an impediment to India's hegemonic designs for the region.
Along with this Pakistan's development through this major infrastructure,
rehabilitation of existing transit routes and new energy projects is not acceptable
for India. The closer partnership of China with Pakistan limits foreign policy
options of India.

\(^{423}\) "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 'unacceptable,' Modi tells China", *Express Tribune*, June
01, 2015.
\(^{424}\) "China dismisses India's concerns over OBOR, cites international support", *The Indian
Modi’s foreign policy matrix towards Pakistan has not succeeded greatly. Modi could not change the ground realities in which India-Pakistan relations exist. Modi tried to make things tough and hard for Pakistan and also postured offensively towards Pakistan. He tried to isolate Pakistan from the mainstream and in the region. His some efforts produced results for India with some major diplomatic victories at the global level yet at the regional scale Pakistan remains an undeniable reality for India. Modi’s efforts towards annulling CPEC have not succeeded. The major victory which Modi claimed was the trust and acknowledgment of his voters and the claim of surgical strike changed his perception in the domestic landscape. He presents himself as a leader who can make Pakistan lick the dust. The state elections of India in 2017 reflect thus support. This election came after surgical strikes. In previous state elections BJP was faltering, but this time it marched on to clinch a thumping victory. On the domestic front, he has established his credentials as a hard nut to crack. He reiterated many times in his speeches that India will again do surgical strikes when it feels vulnerable. Realistically speaking Modi’s foreign policy is a mixed bag of successes and failures. His Pakistan policy did not yield him any productive or striking success yet he tried to orientate his foreign policy vis-à-vis Pakistan in a divergent way from his predecessors.
CONCLUSION

Pakistan factor in Indian foreign policy remained viable and continued to impact its policy matrix. India and Pakistan share an unbroken pattern of rivalry. This rivalry is multifaceted. It spans over politics, history, culture, and religion and all these nuances together set up a normative discourse in which both countries envisage one another. India has not been able to come over the partition syndrome. India's unacceptance towards Pakistan owes itself to the secession it made from Indian dominion. History compounds India's grievances. Foreign invasions and colonial past have left significant imprints on Indian polity and its thinking patterns. Pakistan had made a successful departure from the colonial past. It accounts this colonial history as a legacy of India. The acclaimed and official narrative in Pakistan is not getting independence from British but Hindus. India is left alone to carry the colonial baggage. Indian history profoundly shapes the images which significantly reflect in the policymaking.

India inherited unique civilizational traits with a marked absentia of the political organization throughout its ancient history. The geographical orientation of India and the tremendous diversity which it hosts has led to competing narratives and discourses. The discourses serve as an alternative perspective on a contextual niche of Indian history, culture, and politics. The historical-sociological landscape of Indian polity reveals that Hindus and Muslims are the primary identity constructs in India which existed as incompatible and reconcilable identity parameters for centuries. These both discourses coexisted till the advent of British rule in India. The British Raj through the adoption of discriminatory and de-hyphenated policies augmented the differences between Hindus and Muslims. British used their imperial power to escalate the differences, and one identity of India was eroded and decomposed into Hindus and Muslims with the oppositional character of identity embedded in the social setting of the Indian subcontinent. This peculiar situation pioneered the division of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan.

The formation of Pakistan was inevitable in the purview of formidable hostility which both the communities had accumulated for one another. The British rule introduced the expression of central rule in India. Had Pakistan was not formed probably it would have led to the Balkanization of India. The level of hatred and hostility had made the rapprochement next to impossible proposition.
The regional diversity and linguistic differences of India were unable to be managed without a central governing rule. British's exigency in leaving India amid economic bankruptcy diminished the law and order and security apparatus which was developed to ensure peace and stability. It instigated communal violence which claimed innumerable lives. The dust of hatred, animosity, and mistrust settled down with the creation of two states and thwarted a looming instability amid infused vengeance which could have been very perilous given the demographic undercurrents. Even the formation of two states followed a tragic and horrendous communal violence which constitutes a tragedy of modern history. It was in the backdrop of seeth and anger that was brewing amid the polarization of contradictory political ideals.

The creation of Pakistan saved the impendence of civil war in Indian subcontinent which could have been the most likely scenario. It also had created many new countries in India. The absence of law and order and fermenting regional and cultural differences would have led Bellum omnium contra omnes. Different regions on various diverging traits would have strived for their states. Historically India existed in the bifurcated units. There always existed a central authority. Darbar used to be the centralizing authority before Raj. The absentia of central authority in the contextual background of British departure might have worsened the scenario. The emphasis on the religious character of identity during the freedom struggle overshadowed the other differential aspects of intercommunal relations and finally ended with the formation of two states in the Indian subcontinent. The other differences and divergences got subsumed under the monolithic character of the religious banner. It generically categorized communities as Hindus and Muslims only while having deemphasized regional and linguistic characterization. In this purview, the creation of Pakistan was not only inevitable, but it impeded a new trajectory of violence and rampage in the offing. Jinnah made the same inkling in a candid talk with journalists in April 1942. He said, "Whether you are Hindus, Muslims, Parsis or Christians, all I can say to you is that, however much I am criticized, however much I am attacked, and today I am charged with hate in some quarters, I honestly believe that the day
will come when not only Muslims but this great community of Hindus will also bless, if not during my lifetime, after I am dead, the memory of my name.  

The creation of India and Pakistan amid this circumstantial backdrop shaped the matrix of bilateral relations with hate, rivalry, hostility, animosity, and bellicosity. The series of nuisances after the independence largely fretted both the states. The persistent display of soreness reflected in all spheres where India and Pakistan potentially could have cooperated. Pakistan was confronting existential challenges interpolated in the economy, security, and stability. India's raucous condescending display and hawkish statements surged vulnerability manifolds. India was unable to concede to the reality of Pakistan coming into existence, and it furthered insecurity and vulnerability of Pakistan. The annexation of Junagadh and Hyderabad through force shaped the threat spectrum and continued to be a recurrent and dominant theme in India Pakistan relations. Hindus continued to envisage Muslims' politics in the subcontinent through a larger prism of religion and culture. The dominant theme of India nationalism had a flavor of Hindu majority. Majority of Hindu nationalists remained the member of Indian National Congress which was politically a flagbearer of Indian nationalism. The boundaries of both the narratives were overlapping rather intermixed. Traditional Hindu differed on cultural and religious lines, and they continued with their different interpretation under the larger banner of Congress. The identity matrix of the Indian subcontinent was reactionary, reciprocal and mutually contingent. The subdivisions and religious reformations remained vibrant but did not depart to form a separate Hinduist discourse. The formation of Pakistan was a huge setback for all Hindus either nationalist or traditionalists. It guided the formation of Hindu nationalistic discourse which was ferociously anti-Congress and held it responsible for the division of India having rendered concessions to Muslims. It is also strikingly significant that majority of staunch Hindu nationalists like Golwalkar and Mukherjee did not actively participate in the freedom movement and remained aloof from the mainstream struggle for Indian independence. Hindu nationalists did not significantly participate in the anti-colonial struggle. Indian National Congress led the cause of Indian freedom and was in the crucible of change and tumult and ended up with the division of India.

Hindu nationalism as a political discourse receives its larger impetus from the division of India.

The aftermath of the division was further infuriating for the Hindu nationalists, and they became a diverging, dissenting and disparaging voice against Congress. They demanded adoption of bottleneck policies towards Pakistan. Congress which also had some hardliner Hindus in its ranks came under pressure to posture offensively and outrageously against Pakistan. The aftermath of partition triggered many circumstances which invited option of either accommodating Pakistan or opposing it. Congress handpicked the course of opposition. The appropriation of movable and immovable assets between India and Pakistan compounded the ill will and rancorous trajectory of India-Pakistan relations. The heretic statements and media tirade fumed the relational matrix.

The creation of Pakistan legitimized Hindutva and also counter charged the Congress's rhetoric of composite culture. It asserted the communal claims of Hindu nationalists. The ‘Two Nation’ construct promulgated by Muslims and Hindutva clamored by Hindu nationalists are reciprocal and correlative ideologies. They justify one another's existence. They substantiate the claims of both the communities that Hindus and Muslims form a different mosaic and can't coexist with one another. The contradictory symbolism of both the communities placed them in incompatible and opposing precepts. Through this Hindu nationalists also dismiss Congress's claim of composite culture. Hindus believe that only the variants of Hinduism should be allowed in India and it should be a Hindu polity. The Muslims who did not migrate to Pakistan in the backdrop of the partition of Indian subcontinent give Hindus a plausible and enduring pattern of anti-Muslim rivalry which it holds politically and crystallizes as a dominant discourse in India. Hindu nationalists seek dominance of Hindus and outright elimination of secular and conciliatory policies towards Muslims in particular.

The turn of the events after the partition and deplorable communal violence at large fortified this discourse. Initially, it existed as a social discourse only with no concrete political support and electoral backing. Gradually it ascended to be a dominant political discourse and claimed the political power as well. This acrid start at the beginning genuinely quashed the hopes for normalization of relations between both the states. The expectation that with the time the dust of the enmity may get settled down and India and Pakistan can
evoke a workable if not a harmonious pattern of relations also trashed. The chauvinistic display of power, military prowess, initial war and subsequent defense build-up dashed down the hopes of normalcy in India Pakistan relations. Kashmir issue became the contentious issue and continued to define the bilateral context. Water distribution mechanism also surged the qualms. The paranoia of insecurity which Pakistan faced at the hands of India impelled it to join the anti-communist alliance led by the United States. Pakistan's entry into SEATO and CENTO embarked country onto a drive for defense procurement and arms race which is seemingly ending within no near sight.

The ingression of the military in politics in Pakistan and India's reluctance in engaging Pakistan added quandaries to the anecdotes of India and Pakistan's relational trajectory. The patterns and themes of relations which were initiated in the beginning are now consolidated. Mutual distrust and confrontational matrix are still the hallmarks of the relational posture between both the states. Congress with its narrative of composite culture and BJP with its narrative of Hindu majoritarianism continue to dominate Indian polity, and the same reflects in their policy-making which is strikingly different from one another.

Domestic politics of any state is an influential variable in the foreign policy formulation and execution of a state. The Foreign policy of a state is akin to its domestic policies, and the foreign policy framework for a state is a larger reflection of its domestic context. This domestic impetus is very well relevant in the dispensation of Indian foreign policy. It has led the permeation of the dominant discourses of Indian nationalism and Hindu nationalism into societal and internal basis. Anti-Muslim rhetoric and anti-Pakistan narrative are grounded in India's public sphere, and both are used as an electoral tactic to garner votes. India's ambit of domestic politics is influential in setting up the foreign policy priorities. India's Pakistan policy receives its impulse from Indian domestic political landscape. The Indian government in the center is always under pressure to pacify anti-Pakistan undercurrent of Indian polity. It leads to the adoption of policies which further volatiles the scenario. This confrontational portraiture demeans and mitigates the propensity towards serious engagement aiming at reconciliation. The domestic politics catalyzes the anti-Pakistan dispensation. It is the very rationale that having passed the seven decades, both the countries are still at daggers drawn. The pursuance of policies with the narrow political agenda and
skewed interests has resulted in an everlasting impasse in India Pakistan relations which continues to haunt the equation of relations between both the states.

Indian National Congress always upheld the rhetoric of composite culture and Indian nationalism and attributed it to India's civilizational tradition which remains host to cultural, regional and religious diversity. This narrative and discourse looks at the inclusive glimpse of history and focuses on the dominant theme of Indian national identity. It envisages a shared cultural consciousness and considers all the diversity as a variant of this cultural consciousness. Congress which had been the sole representative as on organized political for Indians for long envisions itself in a larger role. The formation of Pakistan was a setback for Congress as well. The pursuance and persistence of obstinacy at the part of Indian National Congress paved a way towards stringent demand for a new state. This recalcitrant attitude remained visible in the aftermath of the partition as well. But the onslaught which Hindu nationalists leveled against Congress and its ranks put into a defensive rather an apologetic position. This pattern of apologia and defensiveness became a dominant and defining theme in Congress's dealing towards Pakistan. Nehru remained focused on the internationalist dispensation of Indian foreign policy, and Pakistan was not falling in his definitional pretext of Indian destiny albeit he reiterated through speeches and oratory that Pakistan and India together could pave a way towards a collective future of the region. His inveterate yet devious dealing towards Kashmir issue made the trajectory of India and Pakistan labyrinthine. His idealism remained confined to his speeches, aura and the political clout which he demonstrated. In practice, he endured realistic pursuit of policy choices both in domestic and foreign policy realms. His stature, erudition, and sagaciousness did not help India-Pakistan relations significantly. Pakistan in its early years of independence faced a leadership vacuum especially after the demise of Jinnah Nehru did not substantially engage with the leadership of Pakistan.

India's foreign policy especially over Kashmir is brewing consternation where the resolutions of the UN Security Councils are still awaiting implementation. This nimble play of waiting game helped India changing the essential nature of Kashmir dispute from an international issue to a bilateral, regional issue. The seeds of discontent were not alleviated, and no seriousness of purpose was demonstrated in settling outstanding issues with Pakistan. It has
contributed towards a precarious regional security posture where India and Pakistan share enormous enmity. This dogmatic course of foreign policy fueled Pakistan's psychological makeup of defense and the paranoia of insecurity. National security in both the states has become concrete, hard and inflexible cognitive construct instead of fluid and dynamic cognizance. It has triggered a confrontational drive supplemented by the arms race and huge defense expenditures. Human development and human security are the most neglected areas of concerns in both India and Pakistan. The hysteria of defense spending is rising. Congress in its all tenures of Nehru family and afterward demonstrated a murky, hazy, uncertain and inconclusive policy towards Pakistan. It was amid domestic opposition which it faced at competing yet contradictory discourse of Hindu nationalism. The partition syndrome still haunts Congress, and it's under the arrearage of that watershed. The concussion of opposition places it in a defensive matrix where it can't take out of the box situation. All the tenures of Congress in power witnessed a pertinacious impasse and a status quo at large. The hawkish display of Indira's hardliner policies and concomitant fall of East Pakistan could not metamorphose a new geography of the region.

The Nation-state system is an undeniable reality, and no state can undo or nullify the existence of another state no matter how inconsonant they are to one another. Pakistan's attempt to impinge India with climacteric reverberations through Jihadi and militant outfits also counterfeited. The equation of nuclear deterrence has made the posture of regional security more slippery and perilous. Both the countries can't castigate one another unconditionally. Congress, though having a socialist leaning, was the pioneer of India's economic reforms. India under Manmohan as finance minister in Narsima Rao's cabinet shed the conspicuously old-fashioned centralized policies and initiated liberalization in Indian economy. It accrued a massive turnaround with India's impregnable economic strength. The region of South Asia still is war away from the fruits of India's economic boom. India under Congress failed to orchestrate a mutually beneficial policy or the region which could lead to interdependence. This is the age of borderless trade, and every country is seeking entry into the global mainstream while having fortified the regional integration and connectivity. South Asia remains the most loosely integrated region, and Congress-led successive governments failed to make any substantial policy in this regard. The peace
process which it initiated with Pakistan in the first tenure of UPA led alliance also proved counterproductive.

The event-specific trajectory of Indian foreign policy attenuated the entire development and India-Pakistan relations reached back to square one. The regressive ability of bilateral relations exhibits the lack of strategic trust in India Pakistan relations. India's decision of calling off dialogues and a stalemate in the backdrop of Mumbai attacks was lacking prudence. It led to the undermining of newly elected civilian government in Pakistan. The Congress-led government made significant progress with the military regime in Pakistan from 2004-8 but withdrew talking to a civilian government. Had India decided to engage Pakistan post-Mumbai attacks, the trajectory of India-Pakistan relations would have been different. This argument gets credence since the abandonment of dialogues did not yield any considerable results for India except a cul-de-sac in India Pakistan relations. It also profoundly tilted the power equation in favor of military and concurrently stagnation became the hallmark of bilateral ties. Congress held the reins of power in India for almost 50 years of its total 70 years of independence. The policy towards Pakistan remained obfuscating. It owes to the reluctant and obscure policy pursuit that the matrix of India Pakistan relations after seven decades is scathingly antithetical.

Hindu nationalism is an intricate and variegated discourse. Its resounding presence in the social landscape and political landscape make it a counter-rhetoric and confutation of Indian nationalism. This idea has its genealogical roots in the formation of Hindu societies under the banner of Indian National Congress. The formation of Hindu councils and Mahasabha augmented and reinforced the distinct existence of this discourse. The creation of RSS and its affiliates broadly represent the Hindu nationalistic discourse in Indian polity. The communalist pretext of Indian history and dominant Hindu sphere of Indian polity are the striking features that characterize this discourse. It gainsays the secular orientation and character of polity which Indian National Congress presents and considers all Muslim rulers as foreign invaders and refuses to recognize them as Indians. This discourse registered its explicit existence right after the partition. The assassination of Gandhi and subsequent crackdown on Hindu nationalist organizations earned them an irrefutable existence. It accuses Congress of creating Pakistan through the adoption of submissive and docile policies. The formation of
Jana Sangh as a political party was a counter charge on Congress' actions and stance, particularly towards Muslims and Pakistan. It lambasts Congress for rendering concessions to Muslims and Pakistan and demands anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan policies. This political expression of Hindu nationalism had been transfusing into multiple political identities. The formation of Sangh Parivar in the 60s created a border spectrum of Hindu nationalism. Jana Sangh got replaced by Janata party in the 70s, and finally, BJP succeeded Janata Party in 1980. The first ascendancy to power was manifested in 1977. India was plunged into a political mess amid emergency and domestic upheaval. It could not make any effective foreign policy in that term given the turbulence of domestic context. It tried to alter history and impose a ban on some history books that depict secular disposition of Indian history.

Pakistan being the US ally in the war against Soviet was more in international conformance rather than the regional undercurrent. This constrained Indian foreign policy choices towards Pakistan. It reinforced and reasserted its strength through anti-Muslim and Ram Janambhoomi marches. The decision of going nuclear was to demonstrate India's killing jaws to both Pakistan and China. It exhibits the aggressive instincts and overtures of BJP. The decision of going nuclear was insane. It gave Pakistan a reason to do the same under the pretext of self-dense and reciprocity. Pakistan since its beginning was insecure and vulnerable of India's military strength. This disparity was compounded through the wars which it fought with India. The resort to nuclear weapons balanced the equation of terror and ended the old arms race. Pakistan could not have taken a unilateral decision of going nuclear amid international pressure and looming threat of sanctions. India's decision of going nuclear provided Pakistan a legitimate excuse and reason to do the same and effectively terror balanced. It rendered a tremendous relief to Pakistan, and the acquisition of nuclear capability further constrained India's foreign policy actions. Realistically the BJP's decision of nuclear tests was to earn the prestige for India but ended with a more potent and credibly deterring enemy. This decisional miscalculation impinged India and its foreign policy ambitions to a great deal.

BJP tries to surprise everyone with its maverick decisions and consciously attempt to follow a different course of action from Congress. It does not try to stabilize and normalize relations with Pakistan but relies on momentous decision
creating uproar. It instrumentally wants to drive the matrix of bilateral relations. It wants negotiations and talks on its terms. BJP always sets an elusive goalpost and keeps on hammering Pakistan for not doing optimum and lacking seriousness in the peace initiatives. The two terms of NDA led by BJP experienced the same phenomenon. BJP led government wants a step ahead of Pakistan. It will take sudden and impulsive foreign policy action and will leave it in the middle. This resolve is to demonstrate the fact that it is Pakistan which every time sabotages the peace initiatives and overtures extended by India. These kind of overtures towards Pakistan are mostly out of the blue and lack brinksmanship, and that's why end in limbo. It waits for a suitable time to withdraw from its initiatives, and the symmetry of relations returns to the perpetual stagnancy. Indian resolve on terrorism is a calculated attempt to pushover Pakistan and rescinding talk and dialogues. None of the country in the apparent geometry of international politics is saved from the menace of terrorism. The non-state actor paradigm is a pressing reality, and nation-states are confronting grave challenges of security and stability. India is not an exception, but the entire world is withstanding this phenomenon.

Dialoguing without any concrete achievement is a better alternative than no parlance. The portrayal of confrontation and clinging to pugnacious rhetoric wanes the hopes of normalization. BJP plays on Pakistan card in electoral and political pretext. It is an observable fact that the elections in Pakistan seldom reflect anti-India sentiment, resolve or policy statement considering India's campaign where Pakistan bashing is reverberant. It can be said that India reflects in Pakistan's foreign policy summations whereas Pakistan pictures in India's domestic rundowns. Mere rhetoric and blame game adds no substance to the anachronous construct of India Pakistan foreign policy dispensations. BJP feels comfortable while interacting with Pakistan since it doesn't confront any ferocious domestic voice as it does in case of Congress. Congress though spells hardly on BJP's decisions, but this can't be equated with the BJP's onslaught. BJP led governments also did not initiate any serious and durable endeavor which could keep India and Pakistan at normal terms if not friendly. The event-specific responses completely obliterate the goodwill accumulated gradually. The equation of India and Pakistan relations is a house of cards which collapses with one gentle push. BJP also follows the inverted trajectory towards Pakistan without any
concrete and substantial policy outlook. This matrix of Indian foreign policy continues to define the impervious journey of India-Pakistan relations.

The emerging scenarios of India-Pakistan relations in foreseeable future demand merited attention. The first scenario is the extended economic cooperation leading to a frame of interdependence and resultantly mitigating the rivalry. The European context of interstate rivalries and their fizzling is an explicit example and model in this regard. Christopher Clary has done a landmark work on this thematic area of politics of peace that led to the end of interstate rivalries.\(^{427}\) The European concert set up a viable political arrangement of conflict management which ensured peace and stability in Europe through a European conference notwithstanding a terrifying past. Post-World War II the same experience was precipitated through institutionalized diplomacy and resulted in the formation of European community for Steal and finally ascended to its optimum level of European Union where supra nationalism overshadowed the sharpened boundaries of the nation-state paradigm. The same anecdote is used as the frame of reference for South Asia where the economy can catalyze the process of deconstructing mutual enmity and pave a way towards sustainable peace in the region at general and India and Pakistan in particular. It is a widely believed and circulated narrative and holds academic credence as well and is grounded in liberal tradition furthered by functionalist and neo-functionalist theoretical dispensations. David Mitrany in 1933 accorded international integration, economic interdependence and collective governance as three tenets which can foster cooperation and common interests.\(^{428}\) Nonfunctional theoretical assertion narrowed down cooperation to the regional level and postulated that the growing material interdependence would lead to the organizational capacity of resolving disputes through legal regimes having assured that supranational markets replace the national regulatory regimes.\(^{429}\) The neoliberal theory reasserted this predominantly optimistic view. Robert Keohane's and Joseph Nye's groundbreaking work on complex interdependence at the end of the Cold War and

\(^{427}\) Christopher Clary, “The politics of peace: the end of interstate rivalries”, (Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2015), 514-540.

\(^{428}\) David Mitrany, The Progress of International Government (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1933)

\(^{429}\) Earnest B. Hass, The uniting of Europe: political, social, and economic forces, 1950–1957 (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1958)
the subsequent ushering of multilateral cooperation at the global and regional level set a prelude for this dominant perspective.430

Two counterarguments strikingly reduce the optimism enshrined in this perspective in the case of India-Pakistan relations. Europe had a considerably large trade volume at the end of the 19th century. German steel giants were heavily investing in French iron ores sites located in Normandy. 3.4 million migrant workers were laboring in Germany’s coalfields and agricultural sector. Rail networks were expanding across Europe and bringing the people closer. Exports were reaching to record levels year by year and trade was accounting higher GDP than ever before. Until 1913 worldwide trade grew by more than 3% annually.431 The technological advances triggered a marked increase in international trade yet all these factors combined cannot stop World War I. Notwithstanding the trade dependency and growing economic relations still World War could not have been thwarted. It led to a sizeable reduction in trade afterward. It corroborates the fact that economy cannot change the essential notion of rivalry and hostility. It can not revamp the confrontational matrix of relations. It is ‘a’ significant variable in the foreign policy calculus of the states but not ‘the’ significant variable considering high politics and issues of security and survival.

Secondly, the global financial crises and economic meltdown started after 2007-8 has profoundly permutated the realities of global politics. It has shattered the economic idealism. The rise of conservative voices and populistic leadership is becoming a widespread phenomenon. It has resurged the economic nationalism and internal protectionism in the global sphere. The rise of Modi and Trump explicate this drive. The British exit from the European Union in 2016 is a vindication of the rise of the nationalistic economic policies. It has struck the liberal paradigm with a huge setback. Security matrix is overshadowing the economic primacy. The organizational frameworks which are meant for economic synergism are also jeopardized by international political security. The economic summits like SCO and BRICS are primarily centering on economic coadjuvancy and are falling under the larger pretext of security. The security-centric mindset is

prevailing. The joint statement of BRICS summit in 2017 reflects the same phenomenon. The pursuance of conservative policies globally has faded the economic buoyancy. Security issues, high politics and hardware myopia is ruling the global political chessboard. America’s Afghan policy bodes the same trajectory. The dropping of the mother of all bombs in Nangarhar Afghanistan in 2017 indicates the same shift. The ferocious display of power by North Korea is further substantiating the primacy of this disposition. The future of global politics is more interplay between security and economy rather economic determinacy only. In the newly emerging contours of world politics expecting the economy to play a decisive role towards the normalization of India Pakistan relations does not seem plausible unless it is done at the policy level. The extension of economic relations and their bolstering to a considerable level may not be able to deconstruct the edifice of India-Pakistan longstanding hostility unless backed by a conscious foreign policy choice of dismantling conflictual demeanor.

Ayesha Jalal, the distinguished historian on the Indo-Pak history, commentates on the essential future of India-Pakistan relations,

“So while India and Pakistan are not on course to become friends, now or in the near future, there are weighty reasons for them to establish good neighborly relations in the larger interests of the common shared destiny of the South Asian region. Unfortunately, ingrained suspicions and unprecedented levels of distrust, made worse by endless bickering and successive wars, have contributed to a deficit of political will on both sides of the historic divide. This has confounded the dilemmas stemming from the unresolved conflict over Kashmir and, with the rise of religious majoritarianism in both countries, raised the frightening spectre of future water wars between two nuclear-armed states.”

India and Pakistan are living up with the last generation that experienced a United India and the partition and its consequences. The partition of India affected this generation in one or other way. The massive displacement and the communal violence impinged it to a great extent. This generation cognitively is less violent and craves peace on both sides to avoid any such watershed again. This generation had a common lineage and cross-border contacts. The people divided on the two sides of borders are a common link between both the countries. This impetus was fostering people to people contact. It was one conjoining factor in the broader ambit of India Pakistan relations. This generation and its concomitant experiences
were a first-hand account offering a shared perspective and a proneness to the common character of India and Pakistan. With one or two more decades this generation will be replaced entirely by a new generation that will recognize one another through the history books and syllabus taught in schools and colleges. The written anecdotes of India and Pakistan relations are unsympathetic towards one another. They project India and Pakistan rivals and enemies. This generation will be more hostile and belligerent towards one another.

The unsociable character will overpower the concertedly nonviolent perspective. The media mongering and state instilled narratives will place them on a trajectory of a vitriolic relational matrix. Given the fact that foreign policy is the reflection of domestic policy at large, it will pave a way towards more stringent and acrimonious foreign policies towards one another. The rise of the right wing on both the sides and a dominant view of incompatible identity construct will direct and guide a hostile outlook at the state and society level. The pursuance of the antagonistic policies will have public legitimacy. The aggressive course of foreign policy action remains the most likely scenario. This proximate scenario gets compounded by the rise of populism which is increasingly becoming a global phenomenon. It is empathizing with the public through unrealistic rhetoric and broader appeal in the political spectrum. It is leading to the resurgence of conservative and far-right political parties, groups, and leadership. India is experiencing this transition with the ascendancy of Modi at the top level. The rise of populism curtails the dissent in the society. The creeping fascism in Indian polity amid Modi's win is an observable phenomenon.

The rise of Hindu jingoism and cow vigilantism are the incontrovertible paradoxes which are reshaping the societal contours. The persistence of rightist policies on the state and the social level will leave India with climacteric implications. The liberal and secular voices are dwindling, and this will be further injunctive to a parochial societal outlook. The state elections of India in UP and the choice of BJP for CM Yogi Adityanath, a hardliner Hindu ritualist, speaks volume of the slump of India in extremism and Hindu ethnocentrism. When the entire world was denouncing the blatant human rights violations by the Myanmar government against Rohingya Muslims and was condemning the Aung Sun Suu Kyi and her government to stop the barbaric violence against the Muslims, Modi visited Myanmar. He extended his best of cooperation and support to Myanmar's
government notwithstanding India's surgical strike along the border of Myanmar under Modi in 2015. It reflects the Modi’s idiosyncratic mindset and his cognition in decision-making which is staunchly anti-Muslim.

The changing regional dynamics bode that Pakistan in coming future will be a transit economy. The successful completion of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will make Pakistan an anchor to this transit mode of economy. The frequent cross-border movements from various countries and unabated trafficking and lodging will expose Pakistan to different cultural nuances and diversity. It will drastically reduce Pakistan's xenophobia and will make it more open polity. Pakistan had long remained host to conspiracy theories that other countries are conspiring against Pakistan to undermine its territoriality. The trade corridor will change this mindset as well and will eventually reshape the conventional conception of national security.

The BRICS statement of 2017 affirms this phenomenon. China has signaled that Pakistan will have to abandon its proxies and those banded outfits who traditionally served the equation of national interest in Pakistan. Economy and instability cannot go hand in hand. For robust economic and transit route Pakistan will have to ensure the peace and stability. Reluctantly or by choice but this will push Pakistan to eliminate all anti-state and non-state terror networks. These resort to proxies and sub-conventional method of hitting enemy was an effective strategy during the Cold War, but all the countries benefitting from this approach raised their proxies in the external land. Pakistan doctored its proxies within its boundaries and paid a hefty price for that. The present internal security predicament owes itself to the persuasion of the short-sighted policies made and effectuated in the 1980s. India and Operation Zarf e Azam and Red Ul Farad are the manifestations of this thinking. Pakistan will have to end and eliminate all these banned and terrorist outfits.

In this likely emerging scenario if India gives Pakistan space and confidence the future of India Pakistan relations can be very different. India should realize that confronting Pakistan limits its foreign policy options. India's determined opposition to CPEC is building a new narrative of 'Enemies of CPEC' in Pakistan. Pakistan became strategically autonomous after the acquisition of nuclear capability, but its economy remained a major irritant and kept it dependent on foreign aid. CPEC is likely to bolster Pakistan's sluggish economy and take it
on a course where it can become economically autonomous as well. India's outright opposition to this corridor is further worsening the perception about India in Pakistan. India should realize that economically stable Pakistan is less lethal to India and a peaceful neighborhood will be commensurate with India's global aspirations of a rising power.

India should welcome this corridor and let Pakistan overcome its shortcomings. Destabilizing Pakistan through covert espionage and sponsoring instability in Baluchistan and FATA will not be a wise course of action for India's broader strategic interests. The Doval doctrine is a myopic and narrow pursuit of short-term foreign policy gains but will counterfeit in the far future. Events like Kulbhushan Jadhav will invite more bad blood. Combating terrorism through terrorism is playing with fire and will further surge India's vulnerability and embroil India and Pakistan in a tight security competition which is a zero-sum game. The overreliance on diplomatic capital in deciding the choice of foreign policy action towards Pakistan embitters the relational construct, and this short-term political goal impinges the trajectory of India-Pakistan relation with enormous consequences. The pursuance of policies and rhetoric to serve the domestic impulse is leading to hawkish policies and offensive course of action which is unyielding and unproductive at large.

India and Pakistan should reconcile differences through dialogues. That will be only possible if there will be a will for durable peace on both the sides. One-sided and half-hearted initiatives will not be able to deconstruct the confrontational context of India Pakistan relations. Event-specific trajectory needs abandonment, and a normalized course of action is required. India and Pakistan should discuss all the issues of conflict without any hope of a paradigm shift or groundbreaking outcomes. The realization of sustainable peace and a joint vision towards a shared destiny of South Asia will catalyze and foster the willingness of both the sides to enter into a serious dialogue without any impending threat of sabotage. India and Pakistan will have to adopt conscious policies to de-escalate the hostility. The approaches towards conflict resolution between both the states are inconsistent. Addressing issues like Kashmir, water security, other territorial disputes, and terrorism will be crucial. India and Pakistan can also adopt the stage-wise conflict resolution in which both the states can first address and solve the
disputes which are of secondary importance and then can move forward to address the issues which are longstanding and protracted.

The persistence of status quo in a nuclear neighborhood is very jeopardous. It can trigger any catastrophe which can have terrible consequences. Regardless of the prospective future of bilateral relations, one thing remains a fact that the rivalry between India and Pakistan is historical, cultural and sociological and is grounded in the civilizational pretext. The foreign policy matrix of India overwhelmingly reflects this undercurrent of hostility.
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The natural conclusion is that we should try our utmost to develop friendliness and not do anything which is contrary to the whole course of our history and to the modern currents in the world.

Ultimately, we cannot go against the currents of history. I am quite sure of the desire of our people and so I have arrived at this conclusion. It is clear that, though we may have been partitioned and divorced from each other, our own historical, cultural and other contacts—geographical, economic and other—are so fundamental that, despite everything that happened and despite passion and prejudice and even gross inhumanity, ultimately the basic ties will survive. These are the things that will keep us together, unless India and Pakistan prove to be backward even culturally. Then, of course, all this will have only been talk and nothing else. If India and Pakistan do not ultimately come together, they will only prove that they have no cultural standards to maintain...

Well, I have ventured to place before you my ideas frankly and I hope that you, who wield such a great deal of influence through your newspapers, will use your influence in solving our problems and removing the sense of insecurity in the minority communities. Big things are happening in the world and big things will happen. A month ago, there was mounting tension between India and Pakistan and there was a possibility of conflict. People became afraid that the trouble might spread to other parts of the world; and then India and Pakistan ceased to be of much value in world affairs as they were wrapped up in their own problems. When this Agreement was concluded, it raised high hopes and the world saw that we would not be swept off our feet and that we were capable of steering ourselves away from disaster.

In this context, we immediately became more important than we were when we were tied up with our own difficulties. So, we must work the Agreement to the advantage of both India and Pakistan. There are things in which Pakistan can, in some ways, help India and India can help Pakistan similarly. There is nothing that should come in the way of India and Pakistan helping each other.

From speech during debate on Foreign Affairs in Parliament, New Delhi, March 28, 1951
My friend, Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee, appealed for statesmanship in his speech and I entirely agree with him. But it is very difficult to say what statesmanship really is. I do wish to say, however, that to think largely in military terms is not statesmanship. When I see that military objectives have become the goal of statesmanship, frankly, I am nervous and afraid. Our voice does not go very far in the inter-national assemblies but, anyhow, it gives us the satisfaction that we have said what we feel is right.

This approach has governed our actions in foreign policy and we have tried to apply it even to our relations with Pakistan. Of course, very special considerations apply to our relations with Pakistan because of our past history and because of the conflicts we have had. Nevertheless, the fact remains that a major conflict between India and Pakistan would be a disaster of the first magnitude for both the countries. I say that and I shall repeat it because some hon. Members do not wholly appreciate that. If a problem is difficult it will not be solved through war. All war does is to kill a large number of human beings and destroy their property. It is a solution only in the sense that it can exterminate the entire population of a country. War, nevertheless, is possible for various reasons, one among them being foolishness. If a country is foolish enough to have a war you cannot run away from it; you have to face it with all your strength and put an end to it. Therefore, we envisage war, if at all, as a purely defensive measure. That is why we wanted to reduce our army.

Our approach is not, if I may say so, one of piety or pacifism. It is an approach based on hard facts and on a cold-blooded realisation of facts. Since we want to avoid war, we offered Pakistan a no-war declaration which Pakistan did not wholly accept or agree to. And even a few days ago, this offer was repeated but they declined to accept it unless Kashmir was left out of it...

An hon. Member talked of statesmanship and I must say I do not quite know how to define statesmanship. There are probably many definitions. If I may suggest one, statesmanship is the ability to think not only of your immediate urge, not only of the action before you but also of the consequences of that action, to think not only of today but of what tomorrow and the day after might bring. In other words, perspective and vision are essential attributes of statesmanship. That test should be applied to some of the things that have been said here since yesterday. Proposals have been made in regard to East Bengal or Pakistan or Kashmir. It is futile, just because you are angry with Pakistan, to say, ‘To hell with Pakistan. Let us go ahead ourselves.’ That you have lost your patience with something that is happening, is no justification for you to do the same thing. You have to think of the morrow’s consequences. I am, at the moment, not talking about moral standards. I am merely applying the pragmatic test of action.

The actions you indulge in must have consequences and these consequences flow from action as inevitably as any law of physics or chemistry...

I hope this crisis in our relations with Pakistan will pass. I am convinced that the only thing that will ultimately settle our various problems is friendship. I am also convinced that friendship is bound to come, in spite of bitterness in the intervening period. If so, why should we not try to arrive at a friendly settlement soon rather than pass through all kinds of disasters and troubles? Regardless of the provocation Pakistan has given us and in spite of the daily talk of jehad and so on, we shall always be ready to solve every problem peacefully and to develop friendly relations with Pakistan. At the same time, we have to take every precaution against the war with which we are being continually threatened.

The Lahore Declaration

February, 1999, February 02, 1999

The Lahore Declaration

Joint Statement ||| Memorandum of Understanding

The following is the text of the Lahore Declaration:

The Prime Ministers of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress and prosperity for their peoples;

Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future;

Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries;

Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit;

Committed to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for improving the security environment;

Recalling their agreement of 23rd September, 1998, that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Have agreed that their respective Governments:

- shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
- shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs.
- shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.
shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.

reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realisation of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development.

reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace.

shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Signed at Lahore on the 21st day of February 1999. Atal Behari Vajpayee - Prime Minister of the Republic of India and Muhammad Nawaz Sharif - Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Joint statement

The following is the text of the Joint Statement issued at the end of the Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee's visit to Lahore:

1. In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Pakistan from 20-21 February, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service.

2. The Prime Minister of Pakistan received the Indian Prime Minister at the Wagah border on 20th February 1999. A banquet in honour of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort, on the same evening. Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Minar-e- Pakistan, Mausoleum of Allama Iqbal, Gurudawara Dera Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. On 21st February, a civic reception was held in honour of the visiting Prime Minister at the Governor's House.

3. The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. They decided that:
   o The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues.
   o The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions.
   o The two sides shall determine areas of cooperation in Information Technology, in particular for tackling the problems of Y2K.
   o The two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalising the visa and travel regime.
   o The two sides shall appoint a two member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to Civilian detainees and missing POWs.

4. They expressed satisfaction on the commencement of a Bus Service between Lahore and New Delhi, the release of fishermen and civilian detainees and the renewal of contacts in the field of sports.

5. Pursuant to the directive given by the two Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21st February 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries.

6. The two Prime Ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples.

7. Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee extended an invitation to Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, to visit India on mutually convenient dates.

8. Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, thanked Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of his delegation and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit.

Lahore,
February 21, 1999.
Memorandum of Understanding

The following is the text of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Raghunath, and the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, in Lahore on Sunday:

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan:-

Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter;

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit; Guided by the agreement between their Prime Ministers of 23rd September 1998 that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Pursuant to the directive given by their respective Prime Ministers in Lahore, to adopt measures for promoting a stable environment of peace, and security between the two countries;

Have on this day, agreed to the following:-

1. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.
2. The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.

3. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides further undertake to notify each, other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorised or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two side shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.

4. The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.

5. The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.

6. The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.

7. The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Directors- General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications.

8. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora. Where required, the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, before mid 1999, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements.

Done at Lahore on 21st February 1999 in the presence of Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.

(K. Raghunath)
Foreign Secretary of the Republic of India

(Shamshad Ahmad)
Foreign Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Statement on July 2001 Indo-Pak summit, July 24, 2001

"Hon’ble Members would recall my invitation to President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan to visit India. In the days and weeks before his visit, I had occasion to exchange views and perspectives – individually and collectively – with leaders of political parties, eminent personalities, media representatives and intellectuals, on the future prospects for India-Pakistan relations. They endorsed, almost unanimously, our view that the visit should be used to seek avenues for durable peace and cooperative friendship with Pakistan. Building on the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, we sought, through the invitation and the consequent visit, to strengthen the broad-based framework of dialogue, so that progress could be made on all outstanding bilateral issues, including Jammu & Kashmir. We also identified the continuing cross-border terrorism as an important subject to be addressed.

To promote a congenial environment and confidence-building in advance of the visit, the Government announced some significant decisions relating to peace and security, nuclear and non-nuclear CBM’s, people-to-people contacts, humanitarian issues, education, youth exchanges and trade. We believe these decisions have been well received by the people of India and Pakistan. The Government remains committed to implementing them.

President Musharraf, accompanied by Begum Musharraf, was in New Delhi on July 14. He was accorded full ceremonial honours. He called on the President, who hosted a State banquet. The Vice-President, Home Minister, the External Affairs & Defence Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha called on him. I hosted a lunch in his honour. At the retreat in Agra on July 15 and 16, President Musharraf and I had extensive one-to-one talks for over 5 hours. We also had talks at the delegation level.

During these discussions, I emphasised the importance of creating an atmosphere of trust for progress on all outstanding issues including J&K. I took up other specific issues which would help the processes of peace. These included the issue of 54 POWs believed to be in Pakistani jails; the extradition of known terrorists and criminals who have been given sanctuary in Pakistan; the upkeep of Sikh Gurudwaras and Hindu temples in Pakistan, the treatment of Indian pilgrims visiting shrines in Pakistan, and the enhancement of mutually beneficial trade.

I focused on the terrorism being promoted in the state of J&amp;K. I conveyed in clear terms that India has the resolve, strength and stamina to counter terrorism and violence until it is decisively crushed. I want to reiterate this determination today on the floor of this House.

In his presentations, President Musharraf focussed almost exclusively on Jammu & Kashmir. Honourable Members would be familiar with all his views, since they were widely disseminated in both our electronic and print media.

Despite the obvious differences in our perspectives, we made progress towards bridging the two approaches in a draft joint document. We sought to incorporate in the document the structure of a future dialogue process on all issues, including meetings at official, Ministerial and Summit levels. We made proposals for addressing the issues of Peace & Security – including nuclear and conventional CBMs, Jammu & Kashmir, and terrorism; and all other issues from the composite dialogue. Eventually, however, we had to abandon the
quest for a joint document mainly because of Pakistan’s insistence on the settlement of the Jammu & Kashmir issue, as a precondition for the normalization of relations. Pakistan was also reluctant to acknowledge and address cross-border terrorism. My Cabinet colleagues and I were unanimously of the view that our basic principles cannot be sacrificed for the sake of a joint document.

There are strong views both in India and in Pakistan about Jammu & Kashmir. But it is our conviction that an all-round development in the relationship between India and Pakistan will have beneficial impact on our dialogue on J&K.

No worthwhile purpose would be served by a debate on whether or not J&K is a “core issue”. But we cannot ignore the fact of terrorism and violence in the state, which is exported from across the borders. We cannot accept that the insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir today, with its foreign mercenaries and generous assistance from abroad, is anything but terrorism. The daily killing of innocent men, women and children can simply not be glorified as “Jehad” or as any kind of political movement. Please reflect that, soon after the Agra Summit had concluded, our pilgrims on their way to the holy shrine of Amarnath were killed. And just two days ago another massacre of members of one community occurred at the hands of the terrorists. That is why Pakistan’s refusal to end cross-border terrorism is the main hurdle in the creation of a conducive atmosphere.

Pakistan has been seeking a solution to J&K in accordance with the wishes of the “Kashmiri people”. I am certain that the primary wish of every single Kashmiri, whether from the Kashmir valley or Jammu, Ladakh, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, the Northern areas or the Shaksgam Valley, is to live in peace, security and freedom, so that he can make economic progress. We should constantly strive to provide him with this fundamental right. Most of the Kashmiris have their elected representatives, through whom they express their legitimate aspirations. We are also willing to listen to all other streams of Kashmiri opinion, however small the minority they represent, as long as they abjure violence. It is in this spirit that we had offered to talk to the representatives of the All Parties’ Hurriyat Conference.

President Musharraf has extended an invitation to me to visit Pakistan. I have accepted this invitation. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan has similarly invited the External Affairs Minister. This, too, has been accepted. Thus, our bilateral engagement with Pakistan will continue. We will continue to seek dialogue and reconciliation. We will persist with our efforts to convince Pakistan that our bilateral cooperation should not be held hostage to the resolution of any one issue. Though we could not conclude a joint document in Agra, we did achieve a degree of understanding. We will build on this to further increase the areas of agreement. Obviously, India’s concerns in vital areas – such as cross-border terrorism – will have to find place in any document that future negotiations endeavour to conclude.

Let me add – we are not looking for propaganda advantage or seeking to score debating point. We will engage in quiet, serious diplomacy. Our endeavour for a relationship of peace, friendship and cooperation will be pursued vigorously.

**India-Pakistan Joint Press Statement, Islamabad, January 6, 2004**

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India met during the SAARC summit in Islamabad. The Indian Prime Minister while expressing satisfaction over the successful conclusion of the SAARC summit appreciated the excellent arrangements made by the host country. Both leaders welcomed the recent steps towards normalisation of relations between the two countries and expressed the hope that the positive trends set by the CBMs would be consolidated.

Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented. President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner. President Musharraf emphasised that a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results.

To carry the process of normalisation forward, the president of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India agreed to commence the process of the composite dialogue in February 2004. The two leaders are confident that the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides. The two leaders agreed that constructive dialogue would promote progress towards the common objective of peace, security and economic development for our peoples and for future generations.

**Joint Statement, India-Pakistan, April 18, 2005**

1. The President of Pakistan, His Excellency General Pervez Musharraf and Begum Sehba Musharraf visited New Delhi as guests of the Prime Minister of India and Shrimt Gursharan Kaur on 16 to 18 April 2005.

2. While in New Delhi, the President of Pakistan called on the President of India. He also had a meeting with the Prime Minister of India, who hosted a dinner in his honour. The President also watched the last one-day international cricket match between India and Pakistan.

3. The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India used the opportunity provided by the visit to review progress in Pakistan-India relations. They assessed positively the progress that had been made so far through confidence building, people-to-people contacts and enhancing areas of interactions and determined to build on the momentum already achieved.

4. They reaffirmed the commitments made in the Joint Press Statement of January 6, 2004 and the Joint Statement issued after their meeting in New York on September 24, 2004 and expressed satisfaction on the progress in the peace process and the improvement of relations between the two countries that has since been realized.
5. Conscious of the historic opportunity created by the improved environment in relations and the overwhelming desire of the peoples of the two countries for durable peace and recognizing their responsibility to continue to move forward towards that objective, the two leaders had substantive talks on all issues. They determined that the peace process was now irreversible.
6. In this spirit the two leaders addressed the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and agreed to continue these discussions in a sincere and purposeful and forward looking manner for a final settlement. They were satisfied with the discussions and expressed their determination to work together to carry forward the process and to bring the benefit of peace to their people.
7. They also agreed to pursue further measures to enhance interaction and cooperation across the LoC including agreed meeting points for divided families, trade, pilgrimages and cultural interaction.
8. They decided to increase the frequency of the bus service and also decided that trucks would be allowed to use this route to promote trade. They also agreed to operationalise additional routes including that between Poonch and Rawalakot. They also look forward to early start of the bus service between Amritsar and Lahore and to religious places such as Nankana Sahib.
9. The two Ministers: a. welcomed the agreement to operationalize the Lahore-Amritsar bus service in November, 2005; b. agreed that a meeting of experts would be held in Islamabad on 25-26 October, 2005 to start the Nankana Sahib-Amritsar bus service at an early date; c. agreed that a meeting at the technical level would take place before the end of the year to discuss arrangements for operationalizing the Rawalakot-Poonch bus service as early as possible;
d. agreed that a technical level meeting would take place before December 2005 to discuss modalities for starting truck service on Muzaffarabad-Srinagar route for trade in permitted goods; and

e. welcomed the release of prisoners and fishermen by Pakistan and India. They agreed that the understanding reached between the Interior Secretaries on exchange of prisoners and fishermen would be implemented in letter and spirit including immediate notification of arrests by either side, consular access to all persons within three months of arrest, release of prisoners on completion of sentence and verification of national status, and early release of inadvertent crossers across the LoC. The Indian side handed over a draft of an agreement on consular access.

6. The two sides exchanged ideas on the Siachen issue and agreed to continue their discussions so as to arrive at a common understanding before commencement of the next round of the Composite Dialogue in January next year.

7. The two sides also exchanged ideas on the Sir Creek issue, taking into account the joint survey of the horizontal section of the boundary in the area. Without prejudice to each other's position, they agreed to undertake a similar joint survey of the Sir Creek itself, and to consider options for the delimitation of their maritime boundary. They agreed that the joint survey should commence before the end of the year and its report will be considered in the next round of the Composite Dialogue. Ideas relating to the delimitation of the maritime boundary would also be addressed in the Composite Dialogue with a view to its early resolution.

8. The two Ministers reiterated their commitment to the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project and agreed that this would contribute significantly to the prosperity and development of their countries.

9. The two Ministers also welcomed the signing of the following:

a) Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles.

b) Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Establishment of a Communication Link between the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and the Indian Coast Guards.

c) Agreement on Visa, visits to religious shrines and new proposals for a Cultural Exchange Programme. The two sides agreed to pursue these matters under the Composite Dialogue framework.

10. The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to maintain the integrity of the Composite Dialogue.

11. The two Ministers expressed satisfaction at the revival of the Joint Commission and hoped that the Joint Commission would contribute significantly in strengthening the mutually beneficial relations and cooperation between the two countries. The two sides decided to restructure and streamline the work of the Joint Commission in the light of developments that have taken place since its last meeting in 1989.

12. In this context, the two sides had a meaningful and constructive exchange of ideas on restructuring the Joint Commission and subjects to be considered under its purview. The understandings reached would form the guidelines for the future work plan for the Joint Commission. The next meeting of the Joint Commission will be preceded by technical level working groups on Agriculture, Health, Science & Technology, Information, Education, I.T. & Telecommunication, Environment and Tourism.

13. The External Affairs Minister of India also paid courtesy calls on President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz.

14. The External Affairs Minister of India invited the Foreign Minister of Pakistan to visit India. The invitation was accepted and dates would be finalized through diplomatic channels.

15. The External Affairs Minister of India also paid courtesy calls on President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz.

Prime Minister Manmohan’s Address to the Nation, November 27, 2008

PM's address to the Nation Hindi Version Dear Citizens, The dastardly terror attacks that took place in Mumbai last night and today leading to the loss of many precious lives and injuries to many others have deeply shocked the nation. I strongly condemn these acts of senseless violence against innocent people, including guests from foreign countries. I offer my deepest condolences to the bereaved families and sympathies to those injured. The Government will take all necessary measures to look after the wellbeing of the affected families, including medical treatment of injured. The well-planned and well-orchestrated attacks, probably with external linkages, were intended to create a sense of panic, by choosing high profile targets and indiscriminately killing foreigners. I salute the courage and patriotism of the police officers, including the Chief of the Anti-Terror Squad, Shri Hemant Karkare and men who have laid down their lives in fighting these terrorists. I assure the country that we will attend in an urgent and serious manner to police reform so that the law and order authorities can work unitedly, effectively and in a determined manner to tackle such threats to national integrity. We are not prepared to countenance a situation in which the safety and security of our citizens can be violated with impunity by terrorists. It is evident that the group which carried out these attacks, based outside the country, had come with single-minded determination to create havoc in the commercial capital of the country. We will take the strongest possible measures to ensure that there is no repetition of such terrorist acts. We are determined to take whatever measures are necessary to ensure the safety and security of our citizens. Instruments like the National Security Act will be employed to deal with situations of this kind. Existing laws will be tightened to ensure that there are no loopholes available to terrorists to escape the clutches of the law. Most importantly, it is essential to immediately set up a Federal Investigation Agency to go into terrorist crimes of this kind and ensure that the guilty are brought to book. We will take up strongly with our neighbours that the use of their territory for launching attacks on us will not be tolerated, and that there would be a cost if suitable measures are not taken by them. We will take a number of measures to strengthen the hands of our police and intelligence authorities. We will curb the flow of funds to suspect organizations. We will restrict the entry of suspects into the country. We will go after these individuals and organizations and make sure that every perpetrator, organizer and supporter of terror,
whatever his affiliation or religion may be, pays a heavy price for these cowardly and horrific acts against our people. In this hour of tragedy, I appeal to the people to maintain peace and harmony so that the enemies of our country do not succeed in their nefarious designs. All concerned authorities are on alert and will deal sternly with any attempts to disturb public order. I am confident that the people of India will rise unitedly to face this grave challenge to the nation's security and integrity. Jai Hind!

Inaugural speech of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at the Conference of Chief Ministers of Indian States on Internal Security, New Delhi, January 6, 2009.

We last met to discuss internal security issues in December 2007, a little over a year ago. The twelve months that have passed since then have been a difficult period for us. The security situation has, if anything, become even more complex. Many predictions made a year ago have unfortunately turned out to be true. In some cases the scale and magnitude of terrorist attacks appear to have been stepped up exponentially. In the prevailing circumstances we cannot afford to take a partial or segmented view. A holistic approach to our security concerns is definitely called for. During the past year, we faced a severe challenge from terrorist groups operating from outside our country. Many of them act in association with hostile Intelligence Agencies in these countries. The attempt has been to exploit our vulnerabilities, and at times they do succeed as is evident from the terrorist attack in Mumbai. Our problems are compounded by the fact that we have a highly unpredictable and uncertain security environment in our immediate neighbourhood. The Governments in some of our neighbouring countries are very fragile in nature. The more fragile a Government, the more it tends to act in an irresponsible fashion. Pakistan's responses to our various demarches on terrorist attacks is an obvious example*. We face multi-dimensional challenges of different kinds, but the most serious threats are those posed by Terrorism, Left Wing Extremism and insurgency in the North East. Left Wing Extremism is primarily indigenous and homegrown. Terrorism, on the other hand, is largely sponsored from outside our country, mainly Pakistan, which has utilized terrorism as an instrument of ** Reacting to the evidence provided to Pakistan on the Mumbai attack, Pakistan responded by saying that the information given to it by India did not constitute "proof" and, responding to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's speech, warned that allegations against the Pakistani state could end "all prospects of serious and objective investigations" into the incident. In the National Assembly, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Malik Adam Khan and Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir told the Committee on Foreign Relations that the material handed over by India was "not sufficient" and could not be regarded as "evidence." "India did not give any proof; it has given some documents containing their investigations [into the attacks]. Pakistan wants credible, and according to the law, evidence from the Indian government," Mr. Bashir told the House. On New Delhi's demand for extradition of fugitives, Mr. Bashir said Pakistan did not have an extradition treaty with India. He told the committee that India had escalated the military tensions in the entire region.

Joint Statement of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani Sharm-e-Sheikh, July 16, 2009

The Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani met in Sharm-e-Sheikh on July 16, 2009. The two Prime Ministers had a cordial and constructive meeting. They considered the entire gamut of bilateral relations with a view to charting the way forward in India - Pakistan relations. Both leaders agreed that terrorism is the main threat to both countries. Both leaders affirmed their resolve to fight terrorism and to cooperate with each other to this end. Prime Minister Singh reiterated the need to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice. Prime Minister Gilani assured that Pakistan will do everything in its power in this regard. He said that Pakistan has provided an updated status dossier on the investigations of the Mumbai attacks and had sought additional information/evidence. Prime Minister Singh said that the dossier is being reviewed. Both leaders agreed that the two countries will share real time, credible and actionable information on any future terrorist threats. Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas. Both Prime Ministers recognized that dialogue is the only way forward. Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed. Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues. Prime Minister Singh reiterated India's interest in a stable, democratic, Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Both leaders agreed that the real challenge is development and the elimination of poverty. Both leaders are resolved to eliminate those factors which prevent our countries from realizing their full potential. Both agreed to work to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. Both leaders reaffirmed their intention to promote regional cooperation. Both Foreign Secretaries should meet as often as necessary and report to the two Foreign Ministers who will be meeting on the sidelines of the forthcoming UN General Assembly.

Joint Statement following India-Pakistan Home/Interior Secretary level talks March 29, 2011

The India-Pakistan Home/Interior Secretary level talks were held in New Delhi on March 28-29, 2011. The Indian delegation was led by Shri Gopal K. Pillai, Home Secretary of India, while the Pakistan delegation was headed by Mr. Qamar Zaman Chaudhary, Interior Secretary of Pakistan. The meeting was held in pursuance of the decision taken in Thimphu (Bhutan) in February 2011 by the Governments of Pakistan and India, to resume the dialogue process and in the backdrop of Bilateral meeting between the Home Minister of India and the Interior Minister of Pakistan held in Islamabad on June 25-26, 2010. The meeting was held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. Both sides exchanged views on the decisions taken in the last round of Talks held in Islamabad in 2008. It was agreed that it was important for both sides to remain engaged on
outstanding issues and henceforth the Home/Interior Secretary level Talks would be held bi-annually. Both sides agreed to set up a Hotline between Home Secretary of India and Interior Secretary of Pakistan to facilitate real-time information sharing with respect to terrorist threats. Both sides reiterated their commitment to fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and reaffirmed the need to bring those responsible for such crimes to justice. Pakistani side provided updates on the ongoing trial and investigation in Pakistan on the Mumbai Terror Attacks. Pakistan conveyed its readiness, in principle, based upon the principle of comity and reciprocity, to entertain a Commission from India with respect to Mumbai Terror Attack investigations. Modalities and composition in this connection will be worked out through diplomatic channels. Dates for the visit of the Judicial Commission from Pakistan in connection with Mumbai attack trial will be conveyed by India within four-six weeks. NIA and FIA will continue to cooperate in the Mumbai Terror Attack investigations. India provided information on the on-going Samjhauta Express blast case investigation. It was also agreed that after filing of report in the court, updated information will be shared with the concerned Pakistan authorities. Both sides noted and welcomed the release of prisoners and fishermen by each other since the last round of Talks. It was agreed that both sides would release by April 15, 2011 those civilian prisoners/fishermen who have completed their sentence, whose nationality status has been confirmed by the respective Governments and whose travel documents have been received. Complete list of prisoners in each others’ custody will be exchanged by both sides on July 1, 2011. Both sides agreed that the problem and issues of the inadvertent crosses should be viewed sympathetically, and in a focused and sensitive manner. Accordingly, both sides also agreed to task the Coast Guard of India and Pakistan Maritime Security Agency to work on setting up a mechanism for release of inadvertent crosses (fishermen) and their boats on the same lines as the inadvertent crosses on land. The Group will submit its report to the Home/Interior Secretaries before the next round of Talks. Both sides commended the work done by the Judicial Committee on Prisoners for the release, repatriation and humane treatment of prisoners and agreed on the need for its continuation. The next meeting of the Judicial Committee would be held from April 19-23, 2011 in Pakistan. Both sides shared the concern of the growing menace of Narcotics/Drugs and agreed that cooperation between NCB of India and ANF of Pakistan should be enhanced to ensure an effective control on drug trafficking. It was further agreed that Talks between DG, NCB and DG ANF would be held annually. Indian side accepted the invitation for DG NCB to visit Pakistan in May 2011 for talks with DG ANF. The ‘MoU on Drug Demand Reduction and Prevention of Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics Drugs/PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND PRECURSOR CHEMICALS AND RELATED MATTERS’ as finalized will be formally signed at the next DG level meeting of NCB-ANF in May 2011. It was decided that CBI and FIA will schedule a meeting to work out the technical details of moving forward on issues of; human trafficking, counterfeit currency, cyber crimes and Red Corner Notices (RCNs). Both sides agreed to set up a Joint Working Group to examine the modalities for streamlining the visa procedure/modalities and for giving a final shape to revision of the Bilateral Visa Agreement. The Interior Secretary of Pakistan invited the Home Secretary of India for the next Home/Interior Secretary level Talks in Pakistan. The invitation was accepted. Both sides agreed that the visit of the Interior Minister of Pakistan to India will take place on mutually convenient dates, to be decided through diplomatic channels.

India-Pakistan joint statement on PM Narendra Modi-Nawaz Sharif talks in Russia, July 10, 2015

The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India met today on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Ufa. The meeting was held in a cordial atmosphere. The two leaders exchanged views on issues of bilateral and regional interest. They agreed that India and Pakistan have a collective responsibility to ensure peace and promote development. To do so, they are prepared to discuss all outstanding issues. Both leaders condemned terrorism in all its forms and agreed to cooperate with each other to eliminate this menace from South Asia. They also agreed on the following steps to be taken by the two sides: 1. A meeting in New Delhi between the two NSAs to discuss all issues connected to terrorism. 2. Early meetings of DG BSF and DG Pakistan Rangers followed by that of DGMOs. 3. Decision for release of fishermen in each other’s custody, along with their boats, within a period of 15 days. 4. Mechanism for facilitating religious tourism. 5. Both sides agreed to discuss ways and means to expedite the Mumbai case trial, including additional information like providing voice samples. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reiterated his invitation to Prime Minister Modi to visit Pakistan for the SAARC Summit in 2016. Prime Minister Modi accepted the invitation.

Joint Statement on Discussion between External Affairs Minister and Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs in Islamabad (December 09, 2015)

The External Affairs Minister of India, Smt. Sushma Swaraj led the Indian delegation to the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process in Islamabad on December 8-9, 2015. She called on the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and held discussions with Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sartaj Aziz. The EAM and the Adviser condemned terrorism and resolved to cooperate to eliminate it. They noted the successful talks on terrorism and security related issues in Bangkok by the two NSAs and decided that the NSAs will continue to address all issues connected to terrorism. The Indian side was assured of the steps being taken to expedite the early conclusion of the Mumbai trial. Both sides, accordingly, agreed to a Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue and directed the Foreign Secretaries to work out the modalities and schedule of the meetings under the Dialogue including Peace and Security, CBMs, Jammu & Kashmir, Sichuan, Sir Creek, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, Economic and Commercial Cooperation, Counter-Terrorism, Narcotics Control, Humanitarian Issues, People to People exchanges and religious tourism.
Brothers and sister, we talk about foreign policy. I don’t want to go into details. We had invited the leaders of SAARC Countries on the day we took oath at the Center. Our message was clear that we all, neighbouring countries, have a common problem, and that common challenge is poverty. Let us fight this poverty together, by fighting one-another, we are left shattered but if we fight this poverty, we will walk towards prosperity. So, I exhort all neighbouring countries to join us in this fight against poverty. No freedom can be much bigger than the freedom of our citizens from poverty; freedom of our country’s citizen from poverty. No liberation is more liberating than the freedom from poverty. Whenever a citizen from the neighbouring countries would get freedom from poverty, we will feel elated regardless of the fact whether the poor belongs to us or our neighbouring country. Brothers and Sisters, what kind of people are those who got drive from humanity and, what is the kind of those who reward terrorism? I want to place two pictures before this world, and I say to the world, I say to those who believe in humanity that just weigh out the attack, when terrorists brutally killed innocent children in a school at Peshawar. The attack take place in Peshawar, and was a terrorist incident. The innocent children became victim of the bloodbath; the temple of learning had blood stream all around; innocent children were slaughtered. Hindustan, the Parliament had tears in it’s eyes; Every Indian school was in tears; every child of India felt the trauma of the deaths of children in Peshawar. His tears had become unstoppable. Every child, who was killed in Peshawar in the terrorist attack, ached our heart too. This is the drive of our nurtured culture of humanity; this is our humanity, but if you look around, you will find a more to glorify terrorists. Where innocent people are killed in terrorist attack, and they celebrate, what type of terrorism inspired life it is, what type of these creations of the terrorism inspired governments are? The world will understand these two differences properly, this is sufficient for me. Today I want to specially honour and thank to some people from the ramparts of Red Fort. For the past few days the people of Baluchistan, the people of Gilgit, the people of Pakistan occupied Kashmir, the way their citizens have heartily thanked me, the way they have acknowledged me, the goodwill they have shown towards me, the people settled far across, the land which I have not seen, the people I have not met ever, but people settled at far across acknowledge the Prime Minister of India, they honour him, so it is an honour of my 125 crores countrymen, it is respect of my 125 crores countrymen and that is why owing to the feeling of this honour, I want to heartily thank the people of Baluchistan, the people of Gilgit, the people of Pakistan occupied Kashmir for having an expression of thankfulness. Brothers and Sisters, today when we are celebrating the seventy years of Independence, then there is a big contribution of freedom soldiers for the country. When there is a contribution of these freedom soldiers, then the Government is deciding to increase 20 percent in the honouring amount being received, pension being received by the all these honourable freedom soldiers family members. The freedom fighters, who earlier used to get 25000 rupees, will now get 30000 rupees. It is my small effort to pay my respects to the sacrifice and oblation of our freedom fighters. Brothers and Sisters, when we talk about the history of freedom struggle of our country, some persons are talked about a lot, some are excessively mentioned but the contribution made by the people living in jungles, the tribals, in the freedom struggle was unmatched. They used to live in jungles. We hear the name of Birsa Munda but perhaps there would be no tribal dominated district where the tribals would not have fought and given sacrifice since 1857 to the time we got freedom. They proved through their sacrifice what is freedom, what is struggle against servitude. But our forthcoming generations are not much aware of this history. The government desires and plans that in the coming days, in the states where these freedom fighters, who were tribals, who lived in jungles, fought against britishers, who were not ready to succumb. The Government would work towards building permanent museums in various states dedicated to tribal brave freedom fighters, wherever land would be available for the purpose, where their contributions and memoirs would be displayed, so that coming generations could be able to know about their sacrifices for the country. Brothers and Sisters, in the midst of the debate on inflation, we are realising one fact that the entire economy of a poor household is affected if somebody falls ill. The wedding of their daughters gets stalled, the education of children gets stalled and sometimes even food is not available in the evening. Healthcare is getting costlier and that is why, I am announcing an important scheme from the ramparts of the Red Fort for the healthcare of BPL families. Government are faking an important for such families. Under this scheme, in the coming days, if such poor families have to take medical facilities, the government will bear expenditure upto Rs.1 lakh per year, so that my poor brothers are not deprived of healthcare facilities and their dreams are not shattered. My dear Brothers and Sisters, let us proceed forward with a new determination, new energy, new enthusiasm by getting inspiration from those great persons who sacrificed their lives for our freedom. We did not get an opportunity to die for the country but we have the opportunity to live for the country. We should dedicate our life to the nation. We should achieve something of substance for the nation. We should fulfill our responsibilities and also inspire others to accomplish their responsibilities. We should stride forward for building of one society, one dream, one resolution, one direction and one destination. With this very pious feeling, I once again bow my head before the great personalities of the country, the soldiers who risk their lives for our security on water, land and air fields and also those 33 thousands martyrs who sacrificed their lives for us. So, I hereby, dedicate myself to dream about the future of the country and call on all of you from the rampart of the Red Fort to speak with your full might: Bharat Mata Ki Jay! Let the voice reach to every corner of the world. Bharat Mata Ki Jay! Bharat Mata Ki Jay! Bharat Mata Ki Jay! Vandematram! Vandematram! Vandematram! Jay Hind! Jay Hind! Jay Hind! Thanks you.
“India’s Look East Policy: Challenges and Options for Pakistan”, NDU Journal, 2015
Raja Qaiser Ahmed

Abstract
The article focuses on India’s emerging trajectory of foreign policy under Narendra Modi’s premiership and its moves to evolve closer relations with the eastern economic powers, especially Australia and Japan and its implications for Pakistan. India and Pakistan, the immediate neighbours, are locked into an incessant rivalry since their inception. The change of political rule or a policy schema in either country brings profound implications for the regional competitive environment. This paper seeks to identify the patterns and processes which are likely to be altered in Indian Foreign Policy under Modi and possible responses from Pakistan. The theoretical conception of cognitive interconnectedness of ideas and actions has been used to explain this new trend in the Indian foreign policy.

Introduction
The India-Pakistan relations are a haunting tale since their inceptive years more ostensibly in the realm of mutual antagonism and the character of animosity which in which they are embedded. The construct of the relations and the mutual suspicion which takes over the discourse these bilateral relations can be exhaustively interpreted in the framework of contained instrumentalism which kept the communitarian differentiation intact based on the character of identity.

The interconnectedness in the mutual relations of India and Pakistan has made these polities largely proportional to one another. The eventuality in a respective one brings profound implications for the other. India’s threat spectrum and its immediate neighbour one’s are contradictory to one another. India envisages cross border terrorism and external manoeuvring as a major threat than the frame of internal security is concerned whereas on contrary Pakistan largely identifies internal security threat as the existential one and more fundamentally suspects India’s involvement in it.

Pakistan apparent ruling elites’ preferences in concordance to India are quite evident
1) Pakistan government led by Nawaz Sharif intends to boost economic relations and trade ties with India
2) Pakistan aspires to move ahead with the regional integration as the beneficiary of India’s rampant economic growth
3) Pakistan wants a process of political normalization with India to avoid tragedies like Mumbai and Samjhota.

On the contrary, Narendra Modi, the recent elected prime minister of India also represents a mind-set of a Hindu nationalist and a non-accommodative behaviour towards Pakistan at large. His anti-Pakistan which he repeatedly reiterated in his election campaigns speaks volume of the animosity in the relations and dealing towards Pakistan.

Ways are not convenient for Pakistan. An oppositional and ferocious response awaits Pakistan in its bilateral relations with India. India’s intransigency and furious reactionism is likely to remain prevalent. The foreign policy relations in South Asia particularly India-Pakistan, largely termed as sub-contintental security, is by far the least complex and most accessible. In an anarchic setting with struggle of power and maximization of material capabilities, especially the military kind is of utmost concern. The asymmetry in military capabilities has been leading to a security dilemma, resulting in an outgrowth of military build-ups.

India’s Electoralization: Rise of Bharatya Janata Party in Power
It is quite appurtenant to narrate that Hindu nationalism of BJP with extreme centrist right ideology, in its first tenure could not crank out the anticipated outcomes rather proved to be a disaster. A deliberate attempt to alter and modify the character of national identity through forced Hindutva, religious projectionism, Babri Masjid fiasco and amendments in syllabi counterfeited. Since 1991 the Janata culture in India was on demise. The public acceptance at large and the Janata narrative were on verge of decline. This two decades’ surge is something worth intriguing and raises to more up to the minute question that why Congress got defeated and orthodoxo and conventionalism triumphed?
Nehruvan’s model of Indian democracy is fundamentally based on democracy but Indian secularism is based on majoritarianism. The will of majority precedes and dominates. Indian secularism is dual faced when it comes to the case of criminal prosecutions. It has been substantiated with the exoneration of Modi in the case of Gujrat massacre. At Center secularism operates superficially but at the state level the Hindutization takes the lead. How Modi moves ahead with the culmination of Hindu identity and the Indian secularism will be having far lasting imprints on Indian polity in coming years.

While elucidating the cognitive structure of Indian Elite in the formulation of foreign policy it appears that

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433 Contained instrumentalism is a theory that explains the manipulation of identity variable and its instrumental usage to solidify the identity differences.
436 Nehruvan State is a phrase used by the researchers and academics to describe the early years of Indian polity when Nehru was Indian Prime Minister from 1947-64.
437 Mujeeb Afzal, Ibid
ideology no longer plays an important role. India has become rational and pragmatist in pursuing its national goals, the core of them being to preserve the country’s pluralistic democracy, protect its territorial unity and integrity and sustain and expand its economic and industrial growth by fully utilizing the opportunities of economic reforms and globalization.436 The BJP’s foreign policy right now is the amalgamation of ferocious Hindu nationalism coupled with the rationalist pursuit of policy choices. India a committed status quoist country aspires to play its role at global level. Indian elite takes into account its unique geographical position, ancient history, natural resources, democracy and culture and is yearning for a conducive and supportive global environment which could pacify India’s global aspirations. India longs for a stable neighbourhood. That a prosperous and stable India needs to be at peace with itself and its neighbours need not to be emphasized, for a troubled neighbourhood not only limits India’s global ambitions but also jeopardizes its internal security.

BJP’s Foreign Policy and Divergences from Congressional Rhetoric

_Bharatya Janata Party_ (BJP) is perceived as a party on communal basis seeking to eliminate the secular characterization of the Indian polity in which state and society coexist. Political Hinduism and Indian Muslims’ Ritualism are often projected as absolute identities contradictory to one another. Multiple identities communitarian and caste based and some with regional outlook exist in India and compete to preserve their identities and traditions. The BJP as furious proponent of Hindutva seeks to dominate the value systems and traditions based on majoritarianism.439 Political Hinduism is extremely impactful on the contours of national politics in India. An attempt based on majoritarian culture and to remove the secularism from the equation of liberal democracy with Hindu nationalism having replaced Indian nationalism. The notion and construct of Hindutva and its everlasting imprints on the spectrum of Indian politics can be shrugged aside.441 Congressional rhetoric since the inception of India is Liberal democracy+ Composite Culture +Indian secularism. _Bharatya Jana Sangh_ and Janata Culture are counter rhetoric to the Congressional composite culture and their rhetoric is Liberal Democracy+ Hindutva+ Majoritarianism442 BJP is the extension of Janata culture and is primarily obsessed with Hindutva doctrine. Democracy is a defining parameter in India’s foreign policy.443

When it comes to the foreign policy doctrines of both the mainstream parties Congress believes in the externalization of the relations with systemic variables more in focus and takes a global manifestation of the foreign policy processes. BJP on the other hand internalizes the foreign policy variables and believes more in the channelization of domestic variables. That’s why warmongering, war hysteria, and war mania at the home are very likely to happen when a crises situation occurs in BJPs’s tenure. The fervent border escalations with the immediate neighbour can also be explained in the given framework.444

 Modi’s Redefined Foreign Policy

India’s Look East Policy is a not a new policy. It was developed during the tenure of Prime Minister Narsima Rao and successor governments of Vajpayee and Manmohan also pursued this policy.445 Under this policy India intends to build cumulative security, economic and strategic ties with Southeast Asian Nations to bolster its status as a regional power. Modi’s East mantra is not a new phenomenon but he has reasserted and redefined it by focusing on Australia and Japan as potential allies. At the domestic level, Modi is focused on the Delhi-Bombay corridor; and at the regional level, Modi wishes to develop relations with Bangladesh, Myanmar and the Far East. Additionally, the overtone of Modi’s eastward push is strategic; it is meant to prove India’s relevance in any anti-China collusion with the United States to balance off China in South China Sea and invite American capital investment and sophisticated technology to provide India with a semblance of a power equal to China. In this regard, the Australian apprehensions about the growing Indian naval strength around its seas should also be noted because it will be an opportunity for Pakistan to counterbalance the Indian naval superiority.

 Modi’s East Mantra: From Look East to Act East

A number of key bilateral and multilateral engagements are the clear manifestations of India’s diplomatic push for economic cooperation towards the east. Narendra Modi has moved one step ahead by developing “Act East Policy” in order to illustrate the recent diplomatic expeditions into the South East Asia and Australia.446

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436 Mujeeb Afzal, Ibid
437 Ibid, Mujeeb Afzal, 225.
438 Political Hinduism is a philosophy that believes in the manifestation and accentuation of Hindutva doctrine and believes that the superiority of Hinduism lies in the vedic era.
440 Majoritarianism is usually associated with the Hindutva philosophy of Hindu nationalists that presumes the definition of Indian political processes to be based on the definition of majority i.e Hindu.
441 S.D. Muni, India’s Foreign Policy The Democracy Dimension, Cambridge University Press Limited India, 2009.
442 See Also Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (Routledge: Contemporary South Asia Series, 2011)
By shifting the India’s Asia policy from “Look East” to “Act East”, Prime Minister Narendra Modi indicated that he would be more focused and proactive in the region than his predecessors. From the very beginning of its tenure, he has been actively involved into this region while deliberately excluding Pakistan from its priority list. Not only in the diplomatic sense but also from the economic and strategic point of view, India is intentionally undermining the cooperative postures towards Pakistan. In a situation where Pakistan has been kept at the back burner, Pakistan has to design a pragmatic roadmap in order to come up with its own version of look East vision. Pakistan has also embarked upon the policy of Look East yet little is heard about how successful it has been for the state.

**India’s Look East Policy: Between the Rhetoric and Substance**

India’s look East policy can be primarily dubbed as “act East policy”. Given India’s look East Policy Modi is fundamentally targeting on Australia and Japan where trade, investment, maritime cooperation, security ties and creating linkages at societal level are his focus areas. PM Modi visited Australia after the hiatus of 28 years when PM Rajiv Gandhi went there in 1986. He became the first Indian PM who addressed the Australian parliament. 447 India, Australia and Japan had their high level trilateral moot in June 2015. Indian foreign secretary represented India in these talks whereas vice foreign minister of Japan and secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs Australia attended the meeting. The trilateral moot discussed a wide range of issues with maritime security as the top agenda. Cooperation vis-à-vis free navigation in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean was also discussed. The greater prospects for economic cooperation were deliberated. A joint three nations’ naval exercise is also on the cards.448

**India-Australia Relations**

Australia and India are sharing a history of positive Defence relationship after 2006 when India and Australia signed MOU on Defence cooperation and in 2009 signed a joint declaration on security cooperation. The Defence relationship between Australia and India has grown and includes new forums for strategic dialogue, and a frequent interaction through visits of senior officials. Training exchange programs and staff talks are also boosting the bilateral relations. In his visit to Australia while making speech to the parliament of Australia Modi touched on all important aspects of bilateral relations between India and Australia with the spin of regional and global political and strategic setting. He stated that Australia is not in the periphery of our vision, it is in the center of our thought. With Australia Modi signed five agreements on social security, arts and culture, combating narcotics trade, tourism and transfer of sentenced prisoners. 449 The current trade between India and Australia stands at 15 billion dollar which is much below the potential, agreed both leaders. In 2012 in a meeting between the then Indian PM Manmohan Singh and Australian PM Julia Gillard it was committed to enhance bilateral trade to 100 billion dollar by 2015. Both countries are working to finalise a free trade deal by the end of the next year. The aspiration and decision was also prompted by a comprehensive trade deal signed between Modi and Jinping during the visit whereby 95 percent of Australian exports would go to Chinese market with zero tariff.

**Modi’s Make in India**

Modi’s mantra “Make in India” can well be complemented with “Spend in India.” From building toilets to smart cities he invites investment from the potential investors. Demand, development and demographics are the key drivers for investing in India. 800 million people are below the age of 35 which presents a rosy scenario for cheap and skilled labour-an attractive message to the investors. Though power development index is still a major problem and poverty still haunts India to the large extent. Modi said opportunities existed for Australians in different sectors including energy, agriculture, infrastructure, food, finance, manufacturing processing, technology and mining. He urged providing finances, resources, technology and expertise to working partners and investors. Modi claimed that overall trade ties between the two countries would be grounded in familiar democratic framework.

**Security and Strategic Aspects**

India and Australia earlier concluded a strategic pact in 2009 but considering the lukewarm follow up this time they decided to upgrade the strategic ties. 450 A Framework for Security Cooperation was signed between the two leaders. Action plan to lend weight to the Framework has also been established. As per the plan:

1. Annual summit and foreign policy exchanges and coordination
2. Defence policy planning and coordination
3. Counter-terrorism and other transnational crimes
4. Border protection, coast guard, and customs
5. Disarmament, non-proliferation, civil nuclear energy and maritime security

6. Disaster management and peacekeeping
7. Cooperation in regional and multilateral fora

Counter-terrorism figured prominently in Modi’s engagement with the Australian leadership. He underlined the need and importance to work at regional and global level to form a regional and global strategy to counter the global threat of violence.

Maritime Cooperation

Modi intends to build close naval partnership with Australia. Knowing the reach and significance of Australia in terms of its maritime potential he is seeking cooperation in this regard.

"The oceans are our lifelines. But, we worry about its access and security in our part of the world more than ever before," he said.

The security dimension is again at the core of maritime cooperation with an aim to counter piracy, securing sea-lanes and harnessing the economic potential of the marine resources. Maritime security has also been included in the framework for security cooperation marking its importance to advance the bilateral ties as well as regional security complex.

Civil Nuclear Deal

India wants Australia to expedite the civil nuclear deal so that uranium can be imported by India. Building a case for uranium import from Australia after the agreement Modi confidently stated that the deal would give Australia an opportunity to be the part of one of the safest and secure nuclear energy programme.

The assertion was aimed at Abbott who earlier minced no words that the nuclear deal would be finalized if all goes well and with suitable safeguards in place. Australians want to ensure what any deal with India would be in line with their commitment for cleaner energy.

Nuclear commerce and trade is an important issue in Indian foreign policy ever since the Civil Nuclear Pact was concluded with the US in 2008. India was treated as nuclear pariah due to its status as non-NPT member having incurred restrictions by the NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group. India could not engage by any means in nuclear trade be it a military or civilian purpose. However India got NSG waiver along with an additional IAEA protocol and the amendment of the US domestic laws relating to regulation of nuclear commerce. India started being treated as an exception to the rules and regimes of global non-proliferation and all that was made possible to facilitate the Indo-US nuclear deal (2008) which otherwise was not in coming.

Following the Indo-US nuclear deal India became eligible to engage in nuclear commerce not only with the US, but with all other countries possessing nuclear technology and signatories of NPT at the same time. Following this breakthrough India has signed nuclear deals with Russia, Kazakhstan, France, UK, Argentina, Namibia, South Korea, Canada and Mongolia. The Indo-US nuclear deal which in effect is the deal between India and NSG members allowed India to expand its nuclear complex for civilian purposes whereas sparing its military facilities from IAEA scrutiny.

Australia is interested in selling civilian nuclear technology to India. Originally even the US gave a rationale while concluding the agreement with India that it will benefit the former economically creating 27 thousand jobs annually and bringing 1 billion dollars to the national kitty. India is aware of untapped potential to expand nuclear commercial links with countries which are willing to trade with it. In this connection PM Modi made it a point during his visit to Japan to accelerate the stalled talks on the issue. The visit of Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot to India in September 2014 brought dividends to India as both have agreed to cement the ties with nuclear trade topping the agenda.

India and Australia started negotiating on uranium sales in 2012 right after Australia lifted a long-time ban on exporting the uranium ore to Delhi to meet its ambitious and high capability nuclear programme. Australia, the third largest uranium producer, had previously declined such exports to India amid India’s non-signatory status of the non-proliferation treaty. And this is where the nuclear deal with the US came handy for India paving the path for vetting the appetite to augment its civilian nuclear programme. Australia aims to sell 10 thousand tons of yellow cake/uranium by 2017. The ambition fits well with the Indian efforts to import nuclear energy for civilian purposes what they term as peaceful and for power generation.

India argues that as a fast-rising economy it needs nuclear energy to keep pace with its emerging profile. According to the World Bank still 400 million people in India are without electricity. India insists to accumulate nuclear energy to meet its electricity demands with a view to lighting-up villages in its nooks and crannies. India hence successfully puts a humanitarian spin on its desire to optimize its civilian nuclear capability. The agreement will allow India to add to 20 small plants in operation at present. Moreover, it will

453 Modi’s Speech, Ibid
455 Smriti Chand, ‘Agreements on Nuclear Energy that India has Signed with Different Countries’ http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/nuclear/agreements-on-nuclear-energy-that-india-has-signed-with-different-countries/762
lessen India’s reliance on coal and make a shift to more environment-friendly nuclear energy for power generation.

India-Japan Relations: From Economics to Nuclear Cooperation

Given the priority of nations civil nuclear cooperation is an important aspect of Japan-India bilateral relations and is expected to be on the top of agenda list for the prosperity of two nations as defined by their policy makers. Both the nations intend to continue with the use of civil nuclear power, having recognized its risks. Japan’s nuclear policy had been a hurdle while negotiating with India, Turkey, South Africa and other nations on civil nuclear agreements so most of the deliberations went inconclusive.

With the rollover of new century, the peaceful persuasion of nuclear power got recognized as one of the workable and effective measures to combat global warming and to surge economic growth. The Great East Japan Earthquake in May 2011 and the unfortunate occurrence of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant triggered new rounds of discussions and deliberations on the risks and threats of civil nuclear power, not primarily in Japan but also in many countries.

As indicated by the media reports, arrangements are being continued and basic asserntion was arrived at with Turkey in March 2012. India-Japan mutual ties have extended in areas of vital concerns including security and economic ties. India-Japan collaboration in the trading of nuclear technology has high potential for development. India is searching for different avenues to measure up the expanding demand to support its economic development. Japan has developed into a country with high nuclear sophistication and the conjunction of these two variables is taking the India-Japan relationship forward. Both nations have over and over focused on the requirement for controlling the proliferation of WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction). In the joint statement of December 2001, for instance, the heads of both governments had consented to work as partners against non-proliferation and to take some serious measures to the export of dual used, sensitive and cautious technology. The nuclear issue has two angles, to be specific, the interest for abandoning nuclear weapons and crafting a mechanism for the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

Japan is very precise to the issues of nuclear proliferation and public opinion at large is intensely against the proliferation of any form. Despite the fact that Japan now at understandable level of India's position and history of use of nuclear energy for non-military and civilian purposes. India-Japan ties went under severe turmoil after India's 1998 atomic tests at Pokhran. Japan deferred all its monetary help to the then on-going ventures. The move was perceived in India as Japan's hyper response and absence of comprehension of India's impulses. Political relations, be that as it may, consistently enhanced from 2001 onwards. In the field of conceivable participation in the areas of common interest between India and Japan, divergences do exist. Amid his visit to India in December 2009, Hatoyama had insinuated the likelihood of Japan beginning to export nuclear supplies and other high tech technology in his discussion with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The Japanese government and in addition the general population appears befuddled on what stance Japan ought to bring with respect to nuclear cooperation with India. While there is no sharp rift in the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) or the decision DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) that would debilitating a part in either party on the issue, the DPJ ends up amidst characterizing a course that would not forsake Japan's expressed strategy on nuclear disarmament. Meantime encouraging nuclear exports with India. In spite of the fact that still wary, Japan recognizes India's strategic significance. There is more appreciation in Japan that peaceful use of nuclear technology would help India battle with global warming.

The two nations had their first round of discussions on 28 June 2010 went for fixing a respective civilian cooperation agreement. Under this agreement, Japan would export nuclear innovation and related gear and is expected to be on the top of agenda list for the prosperity of two nations as defined by their policy makers. The nuclear issue has two angles, to be specific, the interest for abandoning nuclear weapons and crafting a mechanism for the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

(i) The political orientation of this cooperation
(ii) The India’s drive to deal with energy scarcity
(iii) The increasing threat of global warming:
(iv) The promotion and enhancement of cooperation in science and technology
(v) The contribution of Japanese exporters involved in nuclear power.

Japan is one of the few well equipped advanced producers of nuclear power reactors. If Japan relaxes its policy and consents to cooperate with India, the nuclear market itself will unleash growth potential in a decade around $100-150 billion. This is a huge attraction for Japan to reconsider its position soon. Consortium of 13 Japanese companies joined hands on 22 October 2010 to establish International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co. Ltd. (JINED), headquartered in Tokyo, to commence and engage in activities that may lead to the proposals supporting nuclear power projects in the emerging countries.

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Pakistan and Japan share a history of long relations. Japan is the second major donor to Pakistan after United States. Realising this fact India under Modi is trying to craft a sustainable roadmap of relations with Japan. This is a fact that no visible change in the bilateral ties has occurred yet. The nuclear agreement is yet to be reached, and the cooperation on the US-2 is only a dream for the distant future. In Japan nowadays not much attention is paid on the negotiations between the two counties. The Japanese business circle might have expected a “miracle” at the initial stage of Modi government, but no substantial development has occurred.

**Modi’s Policy: Between the Myth and Reality**

Since Modi got elected as the Prime Minster there had been much hue and cry across the globe. Modi was presented as a messiah. His personal attributes and his charisma were the most debated topics in national and international press. The reality after one and a half year in the government presents a very different picture. Modi’s policy revolvs around more rhetoric than substance. He is aggressively pursuing the options but nothing substantive has been achieved or reached out yet. Admittedly Asia’s new geopolitics revolves around India, Japan and Australia but Modi though is pushing for the strategic framework in the indo-pacific with considerable currency but the only success in this regard is the trilateral dialogue.

On the other hand Pakistan and Japan share a history of long relations. Japan is the second major donor to Pakistan after United States. Realising this fact India under Modi is trying to craft a sustainable roadmap of relations with Japan. This is a fact that no visible change in the bilateral ties has occurred yet. The nuclear agreement is yet to be reached, and the cooperation on the US-2 is only a dream for the distant future. In Japan nowadays not much attention is paid on the negotiations between the two counties. The Japanese business circle might have expected a “miracle” at the initial stage of Modi government, but no substantial development has occurred.

Modi at home is facing some serious challenges in meeting up to the promises which he made during his election campaign. There had been a drastic decline in his popularity at home. Corruption still remains India’s biggest predicament. BJP lost elections in Kashmir and was defeated at the hands of Aam Admi Party in the state elections of Delhi. Modi phenomenon in India is slightly fizzling out.

**Pakistan in the Matrix: Lessons and Recommendations**

The policy by Narendra Modi towards the East marked by a number of key bilateral and multilateral engagements is the manifestation of diplomatic push towards the unexplored continent. The strategic and security considerations are also weighed in to the extent desired. Engagement with NRIs and the domestic audience of the host countries are also on the front burner. The cosmetics of the diplomatic niceties however should not cause the onlookers to overlay the downside of the broad engagement by Modi.

Pakistan has to confront and respond to the challenges posed by Indian designs and manoeuvres. The policy dissemination options would have direct implications for Pakistan. Keeping a checkmate on India’s moves is vital. Strategic countering is necessary but economic restructuring of the country is direly needed. Modi is inviting foreign companies and corporations to invest in the sectors of energy and human development. Pakistan should also conceive and chalk out a comprehensive plan to rehab economy, foreign investment and regional trade.

**China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Possible Antidote**

It is important to note that trade is always linked with security. It can reduce antagonism and aggravate rivalry at the same time. CPEC can prove to be both. However, India’s look East policy clearly depicts that India will not only have access to capital investments and technology from the developed world but also acquire a strategic backyard to assert its hegemony in South Asia. CPEC will increase China’s stakes in the region. The economy-led security apparatus will lure China into saving its interests in Pakistan, thus reducing the power imbalance created by Modi’sLook East policy.

Pakistan can facilitate and contribute to the regional trade. Pakistan’s relations with the Islamic world can prove pivotal in revitalizing the importance of its strategic location. It can also become the central point in any kind of future free-trade agreement among the Muslim countries. Pakistan-China Economic Corridor provides Pakistan with an opportunity to assert the importance of its strategic location, especially vis-à-vis Persian Gulf.

In addition to providing China with a short route, Pakistan can also facilitate other countries for transit trade with Central Asia. Pakistan’s growing relations with SCO countries will benefit the member states to use Gwadar for their trade. Once the member states start trading through Pakistan, strategic importance of the latter is likely to increase.

Economic Corridor is not only aiming at building massive road infrastructure but also wants to develop telecommunications and energy infrastructure. A comprehensive analysis needs to be made of the economic prospects regarding this economic route. This massive investment plan of China in Pakistan will make Pakistan a regional economic hub and would further boost the bilateral ties between China and Pakistan. CPEC can be termed as game changer and the fate changer in the region. Chinese are not just only offering Pakistan a massive infrastructure but are making Pakistan a ley partner in this grand economic ambitions that relate to the proposed 21st century Silk Route initiative. The corridor would enable China’s access to the Indian Ocean and would lead to the massive investments and would help easing out power shortages that are obstructing economic growth of Pakistan. Corridor will connect significant economic agents along predefined geography. It will connect economic hubs and certain landscapes where substantial economic resources and actors are concentrated.

**Conclusion**

If the Indian moves succeed, it will be the first time after independence that India would become relevant geo-strategically to the international politics of the super powers and their competition for dominance. In that
case, India will not only have access to direct capital investments and technology from the developed world but also acquire a strategic backyard to assert its hegemony in a more aggressive manner in South Asia. Pakistan has to craft a realistic roadmap to follow its own version of “Look East vision.” In reaction to Indian moves countries located in East can be engaged. Pakistan needs to counter India by emphasizing its own strategic position especially in the Indian Ocean, its Islamic linkages and the economic opportunities that could result by contacts with Central Asia, South West Asia and beyond. Instead of being reactive in approach, Pakistan should be proactive in policies.

A foreign policy white paper in the wake of current regional dynamics focusing on look East vision can be the first step in this direction. The white paper can identify key interest areas, viable measures to secure these interests and find Pakistan’s relevance in the political, commercial and strategic configuration of the region.

Matching India move to move is definitely not viable, but Pakistan can make its presence felt in countries where India is making big inroads.

China Pakistan Economic Corridor is a game changer. It will connect Pakistan with the emerging Central Asian economies and would give Pakistan an inroad to the new silk route and would increase the significance of Pakistan as a key regional player. Pakistan can make a multilateral foreign policy that could reassert its position. Pakistan can further improve its relations with Russia though in this regard both the countries recently have signed a landmark defence deal for the purchase of Mi-35 helicopters. Optimization of pragmatic foreign policy choices and decisions in the wake of changing regional scenario is much needed to counter the proactive Modi mantra.

Indo-Pak Summits: A Profile

Dr. Suhra Chandaran

Ever since the Simla Agreement, there only have been two bilateral summits at the Prime Ministerial level between India and Pakistan. The first was between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad in December 1988, when Rajiv visited Pakistan. The second summit took place a decade later, between Nawaz Sharif and Atal Behari Vajpayee in Lahore in February 1999.

However, there have been a number of meetings between the Prime Minister/President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, which took place at various multi-lateral forums, both at the regional and global levels. Most of these meetings were unproductive with both the leaders reiterating the same positions taken by their respective governments; some of these meetings were very productive.

A short history of the various meetings between the leaders of India and Pakistan during the post-Simla period is as follows:

Zia-Desai Meeting, Nairobi, 31 August 1978

The Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq and Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai met in Nairobi, when both were attending the funeral of President Jomo Kenyatta. Though it was expected that the Zia-Desai meeting would lead to a normalization of relations between the two countries, there were no significant change in the relations.

Zia-Indira Gandhi Meeting, New Delhi, 01 November 1982

Zia met Indira Gandhi in New Delhi when he was returning back from his trip to South East Asia. Both leaders met each other at a crucial time. The Afghan war was at its peak and both the superpowers were involved. Besides, the meeting took place in the aftermath of both countries submitting their own proposals for normalizing their relations.

Pakistan, with the conflict in Afghanistan intensifying, came out with a suggestion in April 1981, emphasizing “Mutual guarantees of non-aggression and non-use of force, in the spirit of the Simla Agreement.” These non-aggression proposals were formally presented to the Indian Government during in 1981. After incorporating some suggestions from the Indian side (Indiaproposed a “seven point aide-memoire, detailing additional elements) Pakistan made the revised proposal on non-aggression in June 1982.

India, at this juncture proposed a “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation” in August 1982, instead of a non-aggression pact between the two countries. Zia and Indira Gandhi, met each other against this backdrop.

Outcome of the Meeting: The meeting resulted in both leaders taking two decisions. First, to form a Joint Commission to discuss bilateral issues and the second to continue the discussions on the two peace proposals.

Follow Up: The Foreign Secretaries of both countries met on 22-24 December 1982, to discuss these two issues. However, no agreements were reached due to the following reasons. Firstly, Pakistan was not willing to extend the provisions of these proposals to Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly, there were differences of opinion between the two on what constitute “territorial integrity” of India. Thirdly, Pakistan disagreed with India on the question of foreign military bases in its soil.

Zia-Indira Gandhi Meeting, New Delhi, 10 March 1983

Zia met Indira Gandhi, when he came to attend the NAM Conference.

Outcome of the Meeting: A Joint Commission was established, to discuss the various issues between India and Pakistan.

Follow Up: The first meeting of the Joint Commission took place in Pakistan on 04 June 1983, which was co-chaired by Narasimha Rao, the then External Affairs Minister of India. The proposals made by India and Pakistan were discussed in the meeting. It was decided to form Sub-Commissions under the Joint Commission on Economic Relations, Information, Education, Travel, and Tourism.

Meetings between Rajiv Gandhi and Zia-ul-Haq

Zia and Rajiv Gandhi met each other at various locations on various occasions. The first was in New Delhi during the funeral of Indira Gandhi on 01 November 1981. Besides they met each other on 13 March
1985 during the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko (luckily there were no major discussions during these meetings, otherwise this would have been termed “Funeral Diplomacy”); New York in October 1985, when both were attending the 40th session of the UN General Assembly; Dhaka on 07 December 1985, when they were attending the First SAARC summit; and New Delhi on 17 December 1985, when Zia was returning back to Pakistan after his visit to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
There were no major decisions reached, nor were there any significant follow ups of these meetings

**Rajiv Gandhi-Benazir Bhutto Meeting, Islamabad , December 1988**
The first meeting between the two leaders took place in December 1988, when Rajiv Gandhi went to Islamabad to attend the SAARC summit.
Outcome of the Meeting: The summit resulted in three bilateral agreements.

a. Prohibition of attack on each other’s nuclear installations and facilities
b. Cultural Co-operation; and
c. Avoidance of double taxation on incomes derived from international civil aviation transactions.

**Rajiv Gandhi-Benazir Bhutto, The First Bilateral Summit since the Simla Agreement, 16-17, July 1989**
The 1989 July summit was the first ever summit between the leaders of Pakistan and India, after the Simla agreement. However, this summit did not result in any major breakthrough. Rajiv Gandhi was facing serious problems internally in the aftermath of the Bofors scandal and Benazir Bhutto was under pressure from the Pakistani Army and the hardliners.
Outcome of the Meeting: In the Joint communiqué both the leaders expressed their desire to work toward a comprehensive settlement to reduce the chances of conflict and avoidance of the use of force.

**Chandrashekar-Nawaz Sharif Meeting, Male, 21-23 November 1990**
Chandrashekar and Nawaz Sharif met during the SAARC summit in Male, in which it was decided to set up an additional hotline between the two leaders.
Outcome of the Meeting: Nawaz Sharif later on 29 November 1990, used the hotline, and it was decided to resume the Foreign Secretary level talks between the two countries.
Follow Up: The third level of Foreign Secretary level talks took place on 18-20 December 1990, as a result of the discussions between the two leaders. It was agreed to evolve a “bilateral code of conduct on treatment of diplomats.”

**Narasimha Rao-Nawaz Sharif Meetings**
Nawaz Sharif and Narasimha Rao met each other in Harare on 17 October 1991; during November 1991 at a SAARC summit; in Rio de Janeiro on 14 June 1992; and the NAM summit in Jakarta on 03 September 1992. However, these meetings did not result in any major breakthrough, the main reason being the increase of insurgency and terrorist activities in Kashmir and Pakistan ’s role in its support.

**Gujral-Nawaz Sharif Meeting, Male, 12 May 1997**
A Gujral-Sharif meeting occurred during the SAARC summit in Male, which was the most significant meeting between the leaders of the two countries after the 1988 meeting between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto.
Outcome of the meeting: Both leaders decided to reactivate the hotline. They also decided to constitute working groups on various issues between India and Pakistan. Thirdly and most importantly, Nawaz Sharif agreed for an “intergrated approach”, instead of focusing merely on Kashmir.
Follow Up: Two rounds of talks at the Foreign Secretary level were held, which resulted in the formation of Joint Working Groups to discuss issues like Kashmir, Peace and Security, Siachen, Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, Economic Cooperation, and Promotion of friendly exchanges. However, this momentum was lost during the talks held in September 1997, when Pakistan insisted on making Kashmir the “core issue.”

**Gujral-Nawaz Sharif Meetings, September 1997, October 1997 and January 1998**
Both leaders met again at various multilateral meetings in New York, Edinburgh and at Dhaka. There were no significant developments during these meetings.

**Atal Behari Vajpayee – Nawaz Sharif Summit , February 1999**
The Lahore summit was the second bilateral meeting after Simla agreement.
Outcome of the Meeting – Lahore Declaration: It was decided at the end of the meeting that “an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir is essential for the purpose.” Both sides also decided to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.” Besides, both governments agreed to “refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs”; to “intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the bilateral agenda”; to “take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons”; and to condemn terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations.”