Analysis of Areas of Convergence and Divergence

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IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE MOST MERCIFUL AND BENEFICENT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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Has been completed under my guidance and supervision. I am satisfied with the quality of student’s research work.

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Registration No. PhD-04-017, a student of Ph.D at the University of Education, do hereby solemnly declare that the thesis entitled Pakistan-US Security Relationship 1947-2006 Analysis of Areas of Convergence and Divergence submitted by me in partial fulfilment of Ph.D degree (in discipline) International Relations, is my original work, except where otherwise acknowledged in the text, and has not been submitted or published earlier and shall not, in future, be submitted by me for obtaining any degree from this or any other University or institution.

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Abstract of the Thesis
ABSTRACT

The US – Pakistan Security Relationship is almost as old as Pakistan itself. Its origin dates back to the initial days of partition, when a nascent, weak nation, born with a major birth defect “The Kashmir Issue”, looked for external help and support against a hegemonic neighbour. Since then, the US-Pakistan security relationship has been a roller – coaster ride of intimate interaction and a pariah state status during Pakistan’s 63 years existence. The world’s major military and economic power has maintained, what has been termed by many as “transactional” relationship, with its much smaller South Asian ally. During the height of the cold war struggle and the heydays of pacts and alliances, as US looked to form an anti - communist ring around the Soviet Union, Pakistan emerged as a staunch ally in the South – Asia region. It was called by many as the “Most Allied Ally” of the United States. In the ardent quest for gaining military and economic benefits from the US, it invited the wrath of the Soviet Union, hoping to use the US support in resolution of the long – standing dispute with India over Kashmir, and bolster its security against Indian military threat. The seismic changes brought about by the Indo – China War of 1962, radically altered this cozy equation for Pakistan. Its rapprochement with China became a major stumbling block in the security relationship and resulted in estrangement with the US. Pakistan’s military gamble in 1965 to settle the Kashmir dispute resulted in disappointment. Not only did the country fail to achieve anything tangible in Kashmir but the war also exposed all the inconsistencies and differences in the strategic perception of US and Pakistan, ultimately ending the security partnership. Though the alliances continued to exist on paper, yet they did not carry any real weight.
President Nixon’s quest for rapprochement with China in 1969-1970 ironically brought Pakistan to the centre stage once again. Now the same issue on China, which had been a source of discord, revitalized the mutual relationship. While General Yahya acted as an intermediary in the US – China dialogues, the country drifted towards anarchy and breakup, owing to years of mismanagement and neglect towards the Eastern Wing. India’s invasion of East Pakistan, resulted in dismemberment of the country and a humiliating defeat, which owed much to the problems of successive regimes in West Pakistan. Yet the US response during crisis once again came under sharp criticism, as it was considered to be Pakistan’s patron and ally, and expected to support the country in the time of need.

The thesis tries to identify and analyze the differing strategic perspectives during the two Indo-Pakistan Wars, as well as perceptions that resulted in disappointment and disenchantment in Pakistan. In the aftermath of the 1971 debacle, Prime Minister Bhutto looked towards nuclear deterrence as a security against Indian hegemony, because of failure of the security relationship with US to deliver at the critical time. This led to a new source of divergence in the security relationship, as the US non-proliferation goals clashed with Pakistan’s security imperatives. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a period of close security relationship, which was terminated abruptly by the US, in the wake of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. This decision reinforced perceptions in Pakistan that US is an unreliable partner. The coming decade was that of Pakistan being put under pressure for its nuclear and missile programs. It also pursued an Afghan policy according to its own national interests that further estranged it from its closest ally, with every passing year. Pakistan’s
support to the obscurantist Taliban regime resulted in gradual estrangement of the US Government. Even more sinister for Pakistan’s interests, was the nexus between Taliban and Al-Qaeeda. This was however glossed over by Pakistan, till the fateful events of September 11, 2001. The September 11 attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, was a defining moment in the security relationship, as President Musharraf was asked to make a tough policy decision. This time Pakistan was threatened with military action, if it decided to continue support for the Taliban. Pakistan’s decision to join the war on terrorism has resulted in a renewed security relationship with added economic and political benefits. Yet the tough decisions have resulted in internal discontent and unrest, which Pakistan is still grappling with. Now, as the Obama Administration looks towards an exit strategy from Afghanistan, Pakistan figures out as an essential component of any successful US disengagement. Will the security relationship last after the present partnership of war on terror, or wither away as the historical precedent indicates? What are the ideal building blocks of a stable, sustainable and mutually rewarding partnership? These are the questions which this thesis attempts to answer, in the light of the analysis of area of convergence and divergence over the last 63 years.
Pakistan was born with a major birth defect, the “Kashmir Issue”. This problem has literally defined the direction of Pakistan’s security initiatives in the last 59 years. On the eve of independence, this young nation, ravaged by communal riots, rudimentary governmental infrastructure, and an impending crisis over Kashmir, felt threatened by its much larger neighbour. At this critical juncture, Pakistan looked for military assistance from any quarter that it could find. USA, being the leader of Western World was a natural choice. However, there was nothing special that would endear Pakistan. The rejection of Pakistan's first request in the late 1947 for $510 million of military aid was predictable. The country plunged into its first war with India, over Kashmir in 1948. President Truman embargoed arms exports to both India and Pakistan immediately. Inspite of the fact that the embargo was lifted in 1949 after the cease-fire took effect, the US was slow to meet Pakistani arms requests. Essentially Pakistan did not figure out in the US priorities.

During 1950-51 the US needed support for the war in Korea and asked Pakistan to contribute troops in the war effort. Pakistan in return, asked for a US security guarantee against India. Washington thought otherwise, believing that acceding to the
Pakistani request would alienate India and Afghanistan and limit U.S. freedom of action in Asia. In the absence of a firm U.S. security guarantee against India, there was broad opposition to committing forces to Korea at a time when the Kashmir problem remained unresolved and tensions with India were high. Although Pakistan, was pro-West it was not willing to align fully with the United States and its allies against the communists unless Washington guaranteed Pakistan's security against India. *(This is an interesting paradox as Pakistan did align itself later, without specific guarantees against India. The bilateral agreement between Pakistan and US in 1959 did not provide specific guarantees against India, only a pledge to support Pakistan against communist threat).*

In the aftermath of Korean war, Washington considered the oil-rich and strategically vital region of the Middle East as a tempting target for the communists. When allied strategists considered ways to bolster the security of the unstable area, some believed Pakistan could become a significant source of troops. British defence planners developed the idea of a Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO), a British-led military group to be headquartered in Egypt with mainly Arab members, which also included Pakistan. When the British raised the possibility with Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in January 1951, he declined for the reasons that unless the Kashmir issue was resolved, Pakistan could not commit troops elsewhere. However this concept faltered once the Egyptians rejected it, considering it another tool of extending British imperialism.¹

Pakistan gained some importance with the U.S. with the concept of a northern-tier defence arrangement against the Soviets. As a first step and with support from Washington, Pakistan and Turkey negotiated a bilateral treaty for military, economic, and cultural cooperation, in February, 1954. This first step toward the broader northern-tier arrangement provided a basis for Pakistan to seek arms from the United States.

On May 19, 1954, Pakistan and the United States signed a mutual defence assistance agreement. This accord provided the legal basis for military aid and was the first formal bilateral security connection between the two countries. There was however no agreement on the scale of the military assistance package. Whereas the United States was thinking in terms of 20 to $30 million, Pakistan's expectations were much higher. In 1955 Pakistan also joined the Baghdad Pact and later its successor, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1958, although in both instances Pakistan did not get any firm assurances against Indian aggression but by becoming a member of these

\[\text{Ibid – pp-63.}\]
organizations Pakistan did become one of the closest U.S. allies in the region and a recipient of U.S. military assistance and support that it had been looking for quite some time.

Despite entering into two alliances with the United States, Pakistan's interests and objectives did not coincide with the United States from the outset. Whereas the United States needed a stable and strong partner in the defence against Communist threat, Pakistan's primary objective was to bolster its defence capability against India. United States on the other hand at no time wanted to antagonize the much larger and important country in the region. These divergent aims would significantly influence the course of relationship between the two countries in the forthcoming years.

In 1959, Pakistan and United States security relationship moved a step further with the signing of bilateral defence agreement. Although it was another formal recognition of the close defence cooperation between the two countries, the 1959 agreement did not commit the United States to come to Pakistan's aid against an attack by India—the commitment that Pakistan really wanted.3

In return for this support by the United States, Pakistan agreed to provide bases at Badaber near Peshawar for the U-2 spy planes. When one of these planes crashed, it brought about a violent reaction from the Soviets. They threatened Pakistan with dire consequences.4 The U-2 episode brought home to Pakistanis that alignment with the

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United States entailed risks and dangers as well as the benefits of military and economic aid.

Following the U-2 incident, Pakistan government started cautiously to increase Pakistan's maneuvering space in the field of foreign policy and to reduce its near total dependence on the United States. This included normalization of relations with its other large neighbor, China. Till this time, Pakistan had been single – mindedly pursuing military and economic links with the US. There had been little effort to enhance or stabilize its regional standing vis-a-vis China, Russia or Afghanistan.

The Sino Indian conflict of 1962 was the first stark reminder to the Pakistani leadership that being an ally of the United States did not mean much, when it came to United States’ global interests. Much to their disappointment and annoyance, the Kennedy administration strongly supported India in this conflict both politically and militarily.\(^5\) President Kennedy saw India as a potential partner in containing China. Pakistan regarded India as the major threat to its own security. Despite Pakistan's protest, the Kennedy administration continued its military support to India even after the war.

After the Sino-India conflict, keeping in line with its redefined regional initiative, Pakistan concluded a boundary agreement and an Aviation accord with China on August 29, 1963. The Kennedy administration responded by postponing indefinitely a $4.3 million loan to build a new airport at Dacca, from which PIA planned to fly to China.\(^6\) U.S. effort, to limit Pakistan's relationship with Beijing as

\(^5\) Ibid - pp-128.
the price for continued large-scale economic aid were not successful. They did however sour relations between the two countries.

The 1965 India Pakistan war was the first time when differences in U.S Pakistan relationship became quite evident. Although Pakistan initiated hostilities in the Indian held Kashmir through “Operation Gibraltar” it was India which attacked across the international boundary and initiated a major conflict. Pakistan considered itself under grave threat and expected the United States to come to its aid. Washington did not see things the same way. The Johnson administration announced on September 8, 1965, that it was suspending military and economic aid to both India and Pakistan. Since the United States had provided almost all of Pakistan's military equipment, the September 1965 arms suspension hit Pakistan far harder. In contrast, India had received relatively little from the United States, had a growing domestic defence industry, and received substantial military help from the Soviet Union.

The Johnson administration was relatively aloof from the predicament of its ally and did not do much actively in terms of resolution of this conflict. They encouraged Pakistan to accept the Soviet offer for mediation at Tashkent.

After the culmination of the war, Pakistan asked the United States for equipment and spares to make up for the major losses suffered during the war. Consideration for renewing the home sales to Pakistan continued till April 1967 when finally the Johnson administration decided that that the United States would sell spare parts for previously supplied U.S. equipment but would not provide financial credits
or grant military assistance. The export of tanks, fighter bomber aircraft, and artillery to Pakistan were not approved. Consequently Pakistan received some spare parts to help maintain U.S.-origin equipment; however this policy meant a far more restrictive and narrower military relationship with the United States.

As the alliance relationship withered, the one substantial quid pro quo that Pakistan had provided the Americans—the Badaber intelligence facility near Peshawar, was discontinued. Despite the fact that the United States remained Pakistan's largest source of economic aid, it no longer provided security assistance. CENTO and SEATO became largely paper alliances. Pakistan deeply resented the treatment received during the 1965 war and firmly believed that it had been betrayed by the Americans. However there wasn’t any real effort to look for alternate options. With President Ayub losing popularity and the political situation in the Eastern wing worsening, things were moving from bad to worse.

The 1971 crisis is significant from two perspectives. With President Nixon at the helm of affairs, the US had a generally positive approach towards Pakistan. His interest in opening ties with China had brought Pakistan to the fore. Ironically the same issue that had soured the relations with the Johnson Administration became an important catalyst for thawing relations. However, Pakistan Army’s crackdown in East Pakistan and rapidly deteriorating situation in that wing was being exploited by the country’s opponents in Washington for limiting relations and cutting off military aid. The aid was once again cut off in 1971. As the Pakistan Army crumbled in East

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Pakistan, US stance towards creation of Bangladesh also shifted. With hardly any support from any quarters, Pakistan reluctantly moved towards recognition of Bangladesh. Following the Simla agreement, the formal U.S. stance on the Kashmir dispute also changed. Although previously the United States had supported the 1948 and 1949 UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite, after Simla, Washington indicated that any settlement that India and Pakistan worked out would be acceptable. Pakistan left the SEATO membership in 1972, bringing an end to an otherwise dead alliance. Pakistan’s decisive political and military failure in East Pakistan crisis reduced its geopolitical standing significantly. The crisis also brought home the stark truth that security was not possible by relying on the US alone. Pakistan under Bhutto moved towards closer ties with China and the Muslim countries.

Subsequent bilateral military relations between the two countries continued on a low key. In 1973 US Government released $24 million worth of military equipment blocked since 1971 and reinstated the 1967 arms-supply policy.\(^8\) This action enabled Pakistan to procure nonlethal equipment and spare parts for weapons that the United States had supplied previously.

In the wake of Indian nuclear tests in 1974, Pakistan Government was compelled to consider ways to meet this new threat. This nuclear quest would develop into a major stumbling block in relationship in the coming years. To start with, the US strategy was a carrot-stick policy. The carrots were in the shape of offer of A-7 Attack Aircraft.\(^9\) When Pakistan did not agree to withdraw nuclear reprocessing plant

\(^9\) (Fardous, 1998, p. 268)
deal with the French, the US government pressurised the French to drop the deal. While they resisted initially, the French finally withdrew their offer. Pakistan however continued with its search for alternate methods for achieving this capability, through uranium enrichment.\textsuperscript{10}

The US government delayed lifting the decade-old embargo on lethal arms transfers until February 1975. When President Ford removed the restrictions, he was unable to renew the intimate pre-1965 security relationship.\textsuperscript{11} Although the US Navy, transferred two destroyers to Pakistan under a long-term loan arrangement, this improvement in relations proved short-lived. The Carter administration withdrew the offer of 110 A-7 attack aircrafts that had remained on the table during the Ford administration. With its emphasis on promoting democracy and human rights, the Carter administration looked on India with favour and on Pakistan with concern. In July 1977, Jimmy Carter welcomed India's new Prime Minister Morarji Desai, to the White House. On January 1, 1978, Carter became the third U.S. President to pay an official visit to India. He did not stopover in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{12} The Carter Administration also renewed efforts to force Pakistan to shelve its nuclear programme. President Zia’s government, which had taken over from Bhutto, refused to tow the line. Resultantly the US Government suspended aid amounting to $ 50 million. The relations reached their lowest ebb, when an inflamed, crowd torched the US Embassy at Islamabad following an incident in Mecca.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid - pp-271.
\textsuperscript{11} (Mahdi, Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981, 1999, p. 161)
Iranian Revolution in 1979 toppled the Shah regime and brought a staunch anti-US revolutionary Government to power. One of its first decisions was to withdraw from CENTO. With Iran’s withdrawal, this alliance also lost its remaining relevance. Pakistan quickly followed suit.\(^{13}\)

Thus ended the first formal period of Pakistan’s alliance with the US. In a period spanning almost 25 years, Pakistan’s security relationship cast a long shadow over the country’s internal and external dynamics. Commencing with the Ayub era, Pakistan saw itself firmly entrenched in the Western Camp as the most allied ally against communism, despite the fact that it did not face any immediate threat from communism. Although the alliance helped bolster Pakistan’s military capability, it did not contribute much once Pakistan went to war with India in 1965 and 1971. This leaves some very interesting questions to be answered. Did Pakistan really benefit from aligning itself with the US, when its key national security concern i.e. security assurance against India was not really met? Was the alliance worth it in terms of the political cost? Did the military assistance actually prompt Ayub to go for “Operation Gibraltor”? Were Pakistan’s failed expectations in the aftermath of 1965 and 1971 justified, or was Pakistani leadership oblivious of the limitations of the security partnership?

In December 1979, the Soviet Army had marched into Afghanistan. The Soviet action shook the globe. The Carter administration's quest for detente abruptly ended. The United States reaffirmed the 1959 bilateral security agreement against communist

\(^{13}\) (Mahdi, Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981, 1999, p. 170)
aggression and offered to bolster Pakistan's security. With Soviet soldiers at the Khyber Pass, the traditional gateway for invasions of South Asia, Pakistan had become a "front line" state. The Carter administration offered $150 million in aid and credits for Pakistan, consideration of debt relief, and a waiver of the legislation barring economic and military aid because of the nuclear program. This offer was rejected by President Zia, who termed it as “Peanuts”. Pakistan felt that it could not enter into a confrontation with the USSR on the terms of assistance offered by the Carter Administration.¹⁴

During the remaining days of Carter presidency, the relations between Pakistan and United States, despite the rejection of aid offer, picked up. President Zia was welcomed at the White House; Pakistan could not be ignored anymore. However the real fillip in the relations came with the election of President Reagan in 1981. The US Government moved earnestly towards wooing Pakistan with an aid offer it could not resist.

As a result of difficult negotiations, $32¹⁵ billion five year package, divided almost equally between economic and security assistance to Pakistan, was announced in June 1981. A measure of the "frontline state's" revived strategic value was the U.S. decision to sell Pakistan forty F -16 fighter-interceptors. In approving the aid, Congress granted Pakistan a six-year exemption from the U.S. non-proliferation law

¹⁴ (Kheli, 1982, p. 104)

known as the "Symington amendment"\textsuperscript{16}, which had brought about the 1979 aid suspension. At the same time, the US Congress tightened its anti-proliferation laws. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on May 13, 1981, approved a six-year waiver for the sanctions that barred assistance to Pakistan. To further highlight congressional concern about nonproliferation, the Congressman Stephen Solarz sponsored an amendment that would cut off aid to any country that exploded a nuclear device. When the Senate approved a similar amendment, this became a legal requirement for U.S. aid.

Support for the Afghan insurgency, was a key part of what came to be known as the "Reagan Doctrine"-- the strategy of confronting and trying to reverse the rising Soviet tide in Afghanistan, Central America, and elsewhere in the Third World. With Pakistan’s assistance, the CIA started a covert programme of supplying arms to the Afghan Resistance. By late 1982, the US Government was providing Islamabad with $600 million a year in military and economic aid. Only Israel, Egypt, and Turkey were in the special group. As a result the United States, with Pakistani cooperation and matching funds from Saudi Arabia fuelled the resistance against the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. The United States also refrained from commenting on Pakistan's domestic political issue. In contrast to the ultimately conflicting motivations of the CENTO-SEATO years, the two countries shared a strong common purpose in opposing the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Pakistan had no illusions about the United States supporting them against India, and U.S. concerns

about the nuclear issue kept simmering just below the surface. In September 1984, President Reagan reiterated in a letter to President Zia that there would be "serious consequences" should Pakistan enrich uranium beyond the 5 percent level. This level of enrichment was considered sufficient to produce nuclear fuel for power reactors but was less than adequate to make a bomb.

A subsequent six-year package for Pakistan worth $4.02 billion, was announced by the Reagan administration in March 1986. To impose a higher barrier on nuclear proliferation, Senator John Glenn proposed an amendment to the foreign assistance act that would require the US President to certify annually that Pakistan neither possessed nor was developing a nuclear weapon, for this aid to continue. But in the face of strong pressure from the Reagan administration it backed off to a milder version requiring an annual certification that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device and that US assistance was advancing nonproliferation goals. This amendment was sponsored by Senator Larry Presseler. At that time, it was viewed by both sides as a way to avert more damaging legislation, and not as a means for cutting off assistance. The fact that this amendment was Pakistan specific, was realized only later. President Ronald Reagan certified in October 1987 that Pakistan did not "possess" a nuclear explosive device. In 1988 also President Reagan gave the necessary certificate.

When Pakistan had initially started supporting the Afghan Mujahideen, the prospect of Soviet withdrawal was far from a foregone conclusion. However as the Mujahideen gained strength, Pakistan started looking at the shape of Afghanistan in the post Soviet withdrawal scenario.
US and Pakistan’s differences arose over the issue of interim government in Kabul. Whereas the prime US objective in Afghanistan remained Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan insisted on a political settlement, before the Soviet withdrawal; as a pre-condition to signing the Geneva Accord. The signing of Geneva accord signaled the beginning of the end for the cozy security partnership. In August 1988, President Zia’s C130 plane crashed mysteriously while returning from Bahawalpur. Elections in Pakistan brought Benazir Bhutto to power.

As George Bush Senior moved into the White House in January 1989, the Cold War was winding down. The Iron Curtain was crumbling. U.S.-Soviet conflicts in the Third World, were moving toward settlements favorable to Washington. The foreign policy focus of the incoming U.S. administration lay on these dramatic events. With respect to military assistance to Pakistan, President George Bush also certified that Pakistan did not "possess a nuclear explosive device." But he coupled it with a warning that it was becoming increasingly difficult to give such a certificate in the future.

In September 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union finally agreed that they would both stop the supply of military equipment to Afghanistan. With this action, Washington effectively washed its hands off Afghanistan, which became a low priority issue. In October 1990 President Bush was to give another certification regarding Pakistan’s nuclear capability.
October passed without the certification and the $564 million economic and military aid program approved for fiscal year 1991 was frozen\textsuperscript{17}. The imposition of Pressler sanctions reflected a major break in U.S-Pakistan relations. The action effectively ended the security partnership.

This period of relationship is significant from the point of view of a marriage of convenience. The US, keen to oppose the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, chose to overlook the problems with Pakistan, for the sake of Pakistan’s cooperation and assistance in defeating the Communists. Immediately after the Soviet withdrawal, the US interest declined and so did the military aid. There are very striking similarities in the way Pakistan’s leadership became “welcome” overnight in 1981 and in 2001.

With the departure of George Bush and the arrival of Bill Clinton, the US administration ruthlessly implemented Pressler amendment sanctions. The US Government insisted on the return of six old frigates leased to Pakistan which had provided the bulk of the Pakistan navy's firepower. Although the U.S. Navy intended to scrap the vessels, American officials ensured that Pakistan return the frigates.

In 1992, the US Government objected to the M-II missile technology transfer to Pakistan from China citing that this transfer was against the Missile Technology Control Regime. Along with sanctions against China, the United States imposed parallel restrictions on high-technology exports to Pakistan, but these restrictions had little economic impact as there was little initial economic activity between the two countries at the time.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid – pp-32.
In March 1994, the Clinton administration launched a new nonproliferation initiative. It offered to deliver the embargoed F-16s if Pakistan agreed to cap its nuclear program and accept "nonintrusive" verification. Although Washington spoke of "nonintrusive" verification, the procedures involved physical inspection of nuclear facilities and monitoring by cameras/technical devices. Pakistan, however, rejected this proposal as it amounted to bartering away its nuclear programme for F-16 Aircraft.

In 1994, Senator Hank Brown sponsored an amendment, designed to neutralize the impact of Pakistan specific Pressler sanctions. Brown initially proposed easing sanctions by lifting the ban on economic assistance and releasing all military equipment frozen in the United States, including the F-16s. But he dropped the F-16s from the package in face of stiff opposition by pro Indian lobby\(^\text{18}\). This action only was a symbiotic gesture, as the ban on military aid remained in place.

In 1998, the BJP Government in India, riding high on a nationalist wave, exploded 5 nuclear devices, signaling India’s forced entry into the nuclear club. US immediately focused its attention on Pakistan, to prevent it from a quid-pro-quo. President Clinton spoke with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif four times on telephone to ask him to resist from following suit. Pakistan was under pressure to respond because of sentiments within the country and also because of the belligerent statements emerging from New Delhi. Without any real condemnation of the Indian tests, and

tangible security guarantees, Pakistan exploded five underground nuclear devices in Balochistan in May 1998. This further slid the relationship a rung lower.

Another source of friction was Pakistan’s support for Taliban, which by now controlled most of Afghanistan. Recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, Taliban had managed to acquire near-pariah status, especially in the United States, by their harsh treatment of women, and their willingness to provide a haven for Islamic extremists and terrorists. The ISI's support for the Taliban had by this time become a significant source of friction with the United States. 19 There was also a growing concern in the US that a Taliban-like movement, presumably supported by pro-Islamic political parties and fundamentalist elements would have much appeal to a Pakistani public weary and frustrated after years of economic mismanagement, political feuding, and chronic lawlessness under the politicians. The US launched missile attacks on A-Qaeda hideouts in 1998, without prior intimation to Pakistan. This signalled the US frustration with its ally of the past.

In 1998, as the momentum for diplomacy was building up between Pakistan and India, another crisis emerged. Kashmiri freedom fighters took over some of the commanding peaks, overlooking the town of Kargil, in Kashmir. India reacted forcefully, employing air power for the first time in Kashmir and launched a massive counterattack, which made slow and costly progress against the insurgents dug in on the heights. Fears that India would broaden the conflict, raised the nightmare scenario of war between two states armed with nuclear weapons. The U.S. urged Islamabad to

persuade the intruders to pull back across the Kashmir line of control. As the Indian counterattack continued to grind slowly ahead on the ground, Pakistan decided to strike a deal for withdrawing the insurgents from the positions captured, after failing to gain support from any quarters.

The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, once again brought Afghanistan into sharp focus. The US Government’s decision to remove the Taliban and destroy Al Qaeda’s network put the Pakistan government in a difficult position. It had to make the tough choice between supporting for Taliban against mounting international opposition or side with the West. Pakistan decided on the latter option. Support to the US Government in shape of bases and logistic, once again warmed the cold relationship. Pakistan’s leadership also became “welcome” at Washington. However this relationship commenced on a much different note than the one in 1981. The US stance in the wake of 9/11 bombings, was quite belligerant and threatening. It was more like “you are with us or against us” Pakistan which had been one of the few countries supporting Taliban was in a very tight spot. Therefore Pakistan could not extract any real deal from the US at the that stage.  

In 2002, India amassed a million troops at the Pakistan border after terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. The ensuing escalation on the borders were a tense period. Two nuclear – armed rivals were on the brink of war. The US, actively engaged in Afghanistan, and in need of Pakistan’s support, conducted a vigorous shuttle diplomacy to cool the tensions.  

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escalation was denouncement of “terrorism” inside Kashmir by Pakistan, thus bringing an end to its covert military support to the insurgency in the past decade.

Relations between US and Pakistan have steadily gained strength in the last eight years. Economic and military cooperation has increased. The US has released military hardware and promised to provide F-16’s which had been off limits since almost two decades. The 5 year military assistance package of 1.5 billion dollars, though not as high as the previous packages, has provided impetus to the bilateral cooperation.

US response to Dr AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation network has been quite strong. American Congress, media and non-proliferation lobbies have raised a storm over the issue. Perhaps the only thing helping Pakistan has been the ongoing war on terror, which has forced the US-Government to take a relatively milder stance. This however cannot be taken for granted in the future. In President Bush’s March 2006 visit the issue again cropped up, with demands by the US administration to provide access to Dr AQ. Khan and two other scientists.

There has been much talk of a sustained and long-lasting partnership between the two countries. With US embroiled in Iraq and at odds with Syria and Iran, Pakistan is being considered as a stable partner in the fight against terrorism. With Musharraf’s departure and the advent of a democratically elected government, there has been progress in the security area. The US calls for “do more” have been replaced by acceptance of the fact that Pakistan’s security forces are capable of handling the insurgency in FATA and the restive Swat Valley. With the Obama administration looking for an exit strategy from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s role has
become paramount in any new strategic development/initiative. Pakistan’s concerns about Indian involvement in Balochistan, through Afghanistan, are likely to affect the policy/stance of the Pakistan Government. The future stage of the security partnership may will be defined by the complex interplay of the contradictory compulsions of the two parties.

Another factor complicating the geo-political situation is Pakistan’s own internal vulnerabilities. It requires sustained US assistance to overcome a myriad of domestic problems. A comprehensive US engagement would be in the interest of both countries.

As this period of partnership continues, there are lingering memories of the last partnership which fell apart unceremoniously after the US interests in Afghanistan were achieved. This partnership has also flourished on a single point agenda i.e. “the fight against terrorism”. What remains to be answered is that “will the partnership last this current phase or is it as fickle as the previous ones”. Keeping in view the near dominant role of US in world politics, its growing strategic partnership with India and recent Indo-China diplomatic and trade overtures, Pakistan will have to adjust to new international alignments. The nuclear issue and proliferation concerns can take an ugly turn in future.

The analysis of Pak – US Security relationship to glean out areas of convergence and divergence and identification of common grounds that can from basis of a sustained and fruitful relationship in the future has never been more important for Pakistan than today.
The Rationale

The chosen subject is important, as it has affected Pakistan during most of its existence, not only in its own right, but by its bearing on Pakistan’s internal and external dynamics. Some of the key areas which will be explored are as under:-

1. The issue has not been discussed as an entity; in relation to expectations on both sides, and their impact on the relationship.

2. The subject has not been discussed in terms of the areas of continuity and change in relationship between the two countries in each phase/period. There is a need to identify recurring patterns, if any. Do they have any commonality? If so what are the prospects of a sustained relationship in the future?

3. Does Pakistan need a security relationship with the US, based on the experience of the past decades? If so, what will be the cost of this relationship? If Pakistan needs this relationship, can Pakistan do something to make it more reliable and predictable?

4. How has the security relationship affected Pakistan’s other areas of foreign policy/ internal dynamics?

Significance of the Study

There is a significant amount of literature available, which tackles the US – Pakistan security relationship in general. There is however, a dearth of information which specifically focuses on the security relationship as a center piece of US –
Pakistan Relations and identifies the role of this relationship in shaping other facets of Pakistan’s internal/external policies/affairs.

Additionally the study will be significant from the point of view of deciphering the transformation of this relationship from the most allied ally “pariah state” not once but twice in the last 63 years, since this relationship has been anything but stable in the past, it has oscillated from one extreme to the other. In the aftermath of 9/11 and Pakistan’s policy shift in relations with Taliban, there has been a significant shift in the US stance towards Pakistan. The country has been designated the closest non-NATO ally. Economic and military cooperation has picked up, along with closer contacts at governmental and military levels. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of the heydays of early 1980’s. In the past alliances and relationships, US focus remained on the fight against communist threat. Pakistan on the other hand sought security against India. The relationships soured as the differing objectives manifested themselves. The current bilateral security cooperation with its center piece as the global war on terrorism despite all its positive rhetoric cannot be taken for granted. Some of the underlying differences which have plagued relations in the past are still there, if only sidelined for the sake of exigency. The study will be significant from the perspective of evaluating the security relationship in its entirety, in order to evaluate whether a sustained and stable partnership is possible between the two countries, based on the elements of convergence and divergence of interests in the past.
Objectives of the Study

1. Determinants of the security relationship – The areas of commonality and differences in this relationship over the last 63 years.

2. The role of Pak - US Security Relationship in protecting Pakistan’s vital security needs.

3. Analysis of the two previous ebbs in the security relationship i.e. post 1971 war and post Afghan war – 1989, in order to ascertain any trends for the future.

Research Methodology

The research has mainly relied on an analysis of the primary as well as secondary sources available on the subject. There has also been an effort to interview some of the key policy makers involved in the decision making process at critical junctures. Important US Government documents that are available with on line libraries have been consulted, in addition to any declassified and documented material within Pakistan. Statements and speeches of the leadership of both countries have been consulted. New and declassified information that has recently become available has been an important source of in contributory factor. Interviews and discussion with military officers involved the FATA and Swat military operations has helped develop a better understanding of these operations.

Delimitations on Research

Owing to the scope of the subject in terms of time period involved and the wide range of bilateral issue, it was not possible to discuss and evaluate each of these in
thread-bare detail. Therefore keeping in line with the primary objectives of the study the focus was mainly limited to identify areas of convergence and divergence in security relationship, through different phases and periods. This has been helpful in drawing relevant conclusion regarding viability and shape of this relationship in the coming years.

**Review of the Literature**

The selected topic covers a period of more than 60 years, encompassing distinct periods in the US – Pakistan relationship. There have been many upheavals downs in the bilateral relations. During all these phases, the security relationship has figured out in some way or the other.

The literature available on security cooperation is mainly to specific phases/issues in the bilateral relations. The study will in fact endeavour to glean elements of convergence and divergence in the relationship from these sources in order to present a complete and full picture. In this regard the most comprehensive book, covering the subject at some length is “Disenchanted Allies – USA & Pakistan 1947-2001, by Dennis Kux.

In this book, the author who has good insight into the Pakistani and US decision making process has presented the relationship in an objective and concise manner. His conclusions regarding the nature of relationship are quite interesting and thought provoking. “Over the years U.S. and Pakistani interests and related security policies have been at odds almost as often as they have been in phase. The United States and Pakistan were, broadly speaking, on the same wavelength during the Eisenhower,
Nixon, and Reagan presidencies. During the Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, Bush, and Clinton administrations, however, policy differences have been significant. . . . . Given these realities, the volatility of the relationship should not be surprising. Absent a greater and more continuous congruence of security goals, U.S. – Pakistan ties have lacked a solid underpinning of shared national interests. Major differences and consequent disputes were probably inevitable. The partnership was likely to prove a fragile structure. The tendency of Americans and Pakistan to gloss over this basic problem has only served to sharpen the sense of frustration and disappointment about the actions of the other.”

This book however does not cover the relationship in the aftermath of 9/11 attack. The Pakistani perspective on the range of bilateral issue, though covered in some detail, needs to be analysed, further in light of other sources.

Another great publication is the book by Robert J McMohan, titled ”Cold War on the Periphery is an excellent book, covering the entire range of US relatins with Pakistan in the formative years of the alliances leading upto 1965 War. It uses may primarily source and records from original meetings and conferences in the US policy making circles. Other books which provide a useful insight into the dynamics of the relationship are Abdul Sattar’s “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947 – 2005, A Concise History” and Burkes “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, “An Historical Analysis”. The aspect which stands out is that although individual perspectives of the two countries are well covered, there is room for analysing these in a wholesome manner, taking

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into account each others limitations and compulsions. An attempt has been made to bridge this gap, in the thesis.

“America – Pakistan Relations, Vol – I & II, edited by K. Arif, are essentially a collection of official documents, speeches and other extracts related to Pak- US Relations, between 1947-1974. The books provide an authentic resource base for research, whereby contentions and thoughts of different authors can be compared with official extracts to arrive at meaningful conclusions.

“Eagle Over Pakistan” by Zubair Ahmed Firdousi is an overview of Pakistan US Relationship form independence in 1947 to the fall of Bhutto in 1979. The book has a strong nationalist /anti imperialist bent and argues over the dangers and pitfalls of alliance with the United States. Though the veracity and content is a bit questionable, it does provide an alternate view of the relationship, which is shared and espoused by a large segment of the population, especially those who come out to burn western embassies and business at the smallest provocation.

“The American Role in Pakistan” by M.S. Venkataramani deals with Pakistan – US Relations from 1947 – 1958. The book is significant, being authorized by an Indian, with strong credentials (fellow at Wooden Wilson Institute). The author has highlighted impact of “donor” relationship on the well-being of the recipient country, as opposed to the well-being of a select group of people i.e. the leadership of the recipient country. He argues that the US supported a military/non-democratic regime in Pakistan to ensure that their interest were safeguarded in the country. This in his opinion was disadvantageous for Pakistan and its people. He opines that the US support to President Ayub was primarily meant to ensure that US interests in the
region were protected. “The political instability which was characteristic of previous governments and seriously impeded the effectiveness of U.S efforts in Pakistan has been replaced by a relatively stable martial law regime. For the short term, and given the intentions and capabilities of present leaders to implement much-needed reforms, the present political situation should be conducive to the furtherance of U.S. objectives”. 23

The author’s other conclusion, drawn from an official US document alleges that US was fully aware of the perils of supporting an unrepresentative regime in the country, but continued to do so in order to maintain its influence. “Only under a democratic system would East Pakistan, with its greater population, appear to be able to match the greater military and bureaucratic weight of West Pakistan. . . However, the prospect of prolonged suppression of political freedom under military domination would intensify the risk of such an increase in tension and discontent in East Pakistan as perhaps to jeopardize the unity of the two wings of the country”. 24

The arguments put forth in this book are interesting from the perspective of analysing a relationship that seems to have recurring patterns. Many similar observations resonate in relation to the current phase of relationship, which can be better understood by looking at earlier precedents. G.W Choudhry’s “Last Days of United Pakistan” and Rao Farman Ali’s “How Pakistan Got Divided” give an interesting and balanced perspective on the 1971 Debacle.

23 Pp 421
24 pp 422
There is a wealth of material on the Pak – US Security Relations during the Afghan War Period. Two important publications by Dr Shirin R. Tahir Kheli are significant in this regards. These are “India, Pakistan and “The United States – Breaking With the Past” and the United States and Pakistan – The Evolution of an Influence Relationship” The author has captured the dynamics of relationship quite well. The influence that Pakistan enjoyed due to war against the Soviets and intricacies of Pak – US relations vis-a-vis India, including future prospects have been covered in detail. Robert G. Wirsings book “Pakistan’s Security Under Zia 1977 – 1988” give a balanced view of the various facets and dynamics of security partnership during the critical period of Afghan War.

In her book “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1971 – 1981 the Search for Security”, Niloufer Mahdi has described the nature of alliance with the US in somewhat similar terms. “Pakistan needed the US alliance to counter what the former perceived as a threat to its security from India and Afghanistan. Washington’s global interests, on the other hand, dictated a policy that did not meet Pakistan’s need in the alliance. From time to time, Pakistan expressed its dissatisfaction with the US stance and took a position contrary to Washington’s interests. However, Pakistan did not repudiate the alliance with the US, nor did it cease in its efforts to elicit a response from the US more commensurate with its perceived security needs. Pakistan was not prepared to jettison the US alliance, because Pakistan believed that it met some of its security needs, without it, the country’s vulnerability to Indian designs would have been more pronounced. Pakistan found other friends to act as a balancing force to India, but none that Pakistan regarded as an alternative to enable it to terminate the American
alliance”. The dilemma for Pakistan still exists, though certain dynamics of the relationship have evolved. The book will be a valuable source for analyzing Pakistan’s foreign policy compulsions, which are still largely influenced by the same regional imperatives that influenced them in the period between 1971 – 1981.

In “United States – Pakistan Forum: Relations with the Major Power”, Edited by Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Hussain, Stephen Cohen has identified few salient features of the Pakistan – U.S. relationship during the cold war era. These are its partial nature, its asymmetry, and its perceptual distortion.

In his opinion, U.S. – Pakistan security relations are partial because for each state, there are other interests more important than their overlapping interests. In the case of the United States, the Soviet Union remained more important than Pakistan itself. For Pakistan, India remained the chief security threat, and this threat overshadowed relations with both the United States and USSR.

He terms the relations as asymmetrical because in his opinion, the relationship has been, and may remain, more important to Pakistan than to the United States. The latter’s involvement in South Asia has been intermittent, and it can withdraw from the region with little loss. Pakistan cannot withdraw: its very survival is continuously at stake.

The security relationship in his opinion, remains burdened by an extreme degree of distortion, misperception, misrepresentation, and stereotypes on both sides. Expectations on both sides about the degree of commitment are quite divergent. These observations by the author are quite penetrating and thought – provoking. They
provide one explanation of the nature of the rocky relationship that has oscillated from extreme cordiality to the very chilly.

In the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, emergence of US as the predominant power and subsequent rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, the dynamics of Pak – US relations were quite different. In the period after the Afghan war, Pakistan relations with US – were at the lowest ebb. While the nuclear issue remained at the forefront, the authors have focused on the dilemma for Pakistan; in the absence of any worth while counter balance / bargaining chip. As described by Dr Hina Qambar “One must realize that International Politics is not very different from ordinary life where individuals and entities join forces only when there is some commonality in goals and objectives”.

In “Pakistan – American Relations: The Recent Past” edited by Raziullah Azmi, Dr Maleeha Lodhi has analysed the regional and global imperatives of the Pak – US Relationship, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Pakistan and US haggled over the nuclear issue, changing geopolitical landscape following the end of cold war, made things very difficult for Pakistan. In her opinion, Pakistan’s foreign policy options were further circumscribed due to rapprochement between India and China on one hand and India and US on the other.

Taliban and nuclear issue dominated and soured the bilateral agenda, particularly the security relationship in the 1990’s. Some publications which help understand these dynamics are discussed in the subsequent paras.

25 “USA in South Asia after Cold War, A Case Study for Pakistan”, South Asian Studies, 1996, pp 14
“The Age of Sacred Terror” - Radical Islam’s War Against America by Daniel Benjamin Steven Simon, provides a perspective on the efforts of US administration to elicit Pakistan’s support against Al-Qaeda. Describing the meeting between President Musharaff and the US President “Clinton met twice with Musharraf. In the meeting, flanked by a dozen or so aides, the two men discussed a range of issues on the bilateral agenda. He pressed Musharraf very hard and told him to use Pakistan’s influence with the Taliban to get Bin Laden. He was very tough on that.” The book helps understand the different perspectives and the environment prior to 9/11 attack.

Ghost War The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 by Steve Coll highlights some of the difficulties that Pakistan found itself, due to continued support to Taliban. “Mullah Omar refused to do the Pakistan army’s bidding and refused to acquiesce even on the smallest issues, yet the United States and other world powers all adamantly believed that Pakistan pulled the Taliban’s strings. Pakistan had achieved the “worst of both worlds,” as one official recalled arguing”²⁶.

In the author’s view, the dissidents in Pakistan’s government supported a break with the Taliban because they thought it was in Pakistan’s national interest. Mullah Omar and his Jihadist allies had spooked former Soviet governments in Central Asia and alienated them from Pakistan, chilling trade. The economy sagged under debts, sanctions, and a poor investment climate. Some strains of the Taliban’s violent

²⁶ Pp - 333
radicalism had blown onto Pakistan soil. Al Qaeda harbored and trained anti-Shiite fanatics who mounted assassinations and touched off riots in Pakistan cities.

*The 9/11 Commission Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, aptly highlights the dilemma posed for Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. The commission report indicates that “The pre-9/11 draft presidential directive on Al Qaeda evolved into a new directive, National Security Presidential Directive 9, now titled “Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States.” The directive would now extend to a global war on terror, not just on Al Qaeda. It also incorporated the President’s determination not to distinguish between terrorists and those who harbor them. It included a determination to use military force if, necessary to end al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan.” 27 As indicated by this directive, the US Government exerted strong pressure on Pakistan to change its policy vis-à-vis Taliban. The pressure that had been building up over the Taliban’s rule, now came to fore in the wake of 9/11 bombings.

Owing to the strong international outpouring of support and the willingness of US Government to use force against any nation resisting their initiative, Pakistan took a major U turn in its policy on Afghanistan.

*“America’s Secret War” - Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between the United States and its Enemies*” by George Friedman, illuminates Pakistan problems with the United States in the aftermath of September 11, especially the US determination to prevent nuclear, weapons falling into Al-Qaeda’s hands.

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27 Pp - 333
Pakistan and US Security relations are currently centered on the war against terrorism. As aptly highlighted by the US President’s visit to Pakistan in March 2006, this issue dominates the bilateral agenda. Another significant issue which haunts Pakistan is that of nuclear proliferation. A National Seminar on “Emerging World Order and the Pak – US Relations’ was held under the auspices of FRIENDS in collaboration with Hanns Seidel Foundation Germany in Islamabad on 23 February, 2005. Views of eminent scholars on the subject are quite illuminating. Dr Rifaat Hussain presented in his paper the impact of American War in Afghanistan and polarization of society in Pakistan. He said that in the wake of 9/11 events, US is looking at South Asia from the global perspective. He asserted that India is a complicating factor in Pak-US relations. Prof Marvin G Weinbaum, Scholar-in-residence, the Middle East Institute, Washington D.C. presented his paper on “Anatomy of the Pak-US relations and future policy option”. He termed Pak-US relations as a partnership of necessity. He said that the relationship will sustain as the past 9/11 world gave back the importance to Pakistan, which it had lost in the post Cold War era. He, however, admitted that there are tensions and ambiguities in this relationship.

A lot has been written on the shape and contours of the security relationship in the coming years. In her article “Pak – US Relations; no room for illusions” 28, Dr Shireen Mazari contends that Indo-US Nuclear deal and the US stance on Kashmir, coupled with focus on war on terror highlight the fact the strategic partnership between India and US will have serious repercussion for Pakistan in the future. This is

28 The News, 8 Mar 2006
especially significant when seen in the broader context of US India Pact, with missile defence component. Similar views have been expressed by Hussain Haqqani in his article “The Morning After”\(^\text{29}\) He describes the US tilt towards India as expected and something Pakistan’s rulers should realistically expect. Opposition by a range of political parties to the government policies during US President’s visits adds yet another angle to the situation. There is a whole range of articles from Congressional Research Committee, Special Reports and other publications on the shape and contours of the Afghan situation and its interplay with Pakistan’s border areas. These have been a useful source of information regarding the analyses of war on terror and the likely contours of future security relationship.

As indicated by this review of literature, there is evidently a wealth of information about Pak – US Security Relationship, in different publications and books. Most of these books focus on a particular phases of relations or particular issues i.e. nuclear, economic terrorism, etc. An effort has been made to connect these strands to and make a uniform whole with these strands need to be connected to gain a better picture of the areas of convergence and divergence of relationship.

With regards to the nature of relationship, the authors generally agree upon the fact that given the lopsided alliance/friendship, there were bound to be frictions and disappointment for Pakistan. However with regards to Pakistan’s need and effort to enhance this alliance, there is a distinct school of thought, which feels that Pakistan suffered by aligning itself so strongly. The leadership set the country up for disappointment by relying heavily on the US Security cooperation.

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\(^\text{29}\) The Nation, 8 Mar 2006
The other school of thought, which is more predominant, recognizes the inherent drawbacks of this relationship and takes a more pragmatic view, whereby strains are bound to occur, in relationship where Pakistan’s importance for the US has changed significantly in different phases of the relationship. The issue of perpetual distortions, misperceptions and stereotypes on both sides is quite evident in each phase of the relationship which needs to be understood. As demonstrated in the latest March 2006 President Bush visit to Pakistan there was broad opposition/disagreement in a large segment the of political parties about the nature of the Pak – US Relationship.

The change at the helm of affairs both in US and Pakistan after the departure of President Bush and President Musharraf happened after 2006 and is out of the scope of the paper. However in the context of war on terror, the situation in Afghanistan and FATA as well as the internal security situation in Pakistan has seen many important developments. Without covering these developments and their impact, this discussion would have been inconclusive. An attempt has therefore been made to bring the study up to the present day situation by including significant events up to present day, in order to make the study wholesome.

Evidently, this relationship is very important for Pakistan, after perhaps its relations with India. It also heavily influences that other relationship, as well as Pakistan’s internal dynamics. With US establishing itself as the pre-dominant world power, and forging a new “Strategic Partnership” with India, the significance of Pak – US Security relationship has enhanced even further. The need to study and evaluate this relationship is greater than ever before.
Organization of the Study - Outline

The research has been organized in 5 chapters. Each chapter has been designed to cover a significant period of security relationship between the two countries, which can be analysed for conclusions and distinctive patterns; these can provide a lead for the likely shape of future security relationship.

Chapter one deals with the origins of security partnership in the early 1950’s. It analyses Pakistan’s security predicament at the time of independence and its quest for an external patron in the fight for survival against India. It looks into the alliance formation and the heydays of “most allied ally” status. It also analyses the underlying differences in perception, that existed at the time, but were overlooked by both sides, especially Pakistan, due to domestic compulsions.

Chapter two tackles the seismic change in the regional security situation, following the Sino-Indian War of 1962. It tackles the growing differences in the security partnership, owing to differences in the core strategic concerns of the two countries. It analyses the effects of Pakistan’s quest for a more balanced foreign policy, on the mutual security partnership. This chapter studies two very significant events, the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak Wars. It analyses at length the differing strategic perspectives of US and Pakistan, that led to the stoppage of military aid and US support at this crucial time. It also analyses the value of the security partnerships for Pakistan. The chapter also tackles the withering of the partnership, as the US strategic imperative for the region changed, due to changing global/regional sceneries.

The third chapter analyses the renewal of security partnership in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The joint struggle against communist and the dynamics of
covert CIA-ISI operations, along with the Mujahideen operations in Afghanistan are discussed at length. The chapter analyses the impact of security partnership on Pakistan’s internal and external threat spectrum. It also looks at the flaws in the joint strategy that led to chaos and instability in Afghanistan and the subsequent rise of Taliban and Al-Qaeeeda. The abrupt stoppage of aid and its effects are also disused here.

The fourth chapter covers the interesting phase of Pakistan turning into a “pariah state” from a close strategic partner recently. It analyses Pakistan’s Afghan policy and its support to the Kashmir insurgency at length. In also analyses the effects of US abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan, on the worsening security situation in that country, that led to the rise of Taliban and al-Qaeeeda. It also analyses Pakistan’s security considerations, that led to support to the Taliban regime, which eventually landed Pakistan in a security predicament on the eve of September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre.

The fifth and final chapter initially tackles the Post 9/11 scenario and Pakistan’s decision to change its Afghan policy and side with the US. President Musharraf’s decision of supporting US is analysed in detail here. The subsequent large scale military and economic cooperation and fight against terrorists in FATA and border regions is covered at length, along with the nuclear issue and impact of security relationship on Indo-Pakistan relations. The final part of the chapter looks at the future outlook in light of historical precedent, and the current determinants of the security partnership. Though the mandate of the thesis was to cover Pak-US security relationship till 2006, yet owing to important developments in the last three years, this
has been extended to include significant events and their there implication on the nature and shape of the future Pakistan-US security relationship upto the present day (2010). This chapter concludes the research and attempts to answer:-

1. The value of security relationship in Pakistan’s overall relations with US.

2. Is this security relationship vital for Pakistan or not? Has it helped protect Pakistan’s security concerns in the past?

3. Areas of convergence - meeting of national interests.

4. Areas of divergence – Can they be removed/ mitigated?

5. If the security relationship is vital for Pakistan, the “Way Forward”
   a. Building Blocks of a stable partnership.
   b. Contours of a sustained security partnership in the future.
CHAPTER 1

THE ALLIANCE HEYDEYS

1947 - 1962

Introduction

This chapter investigates the origins of the US – Pakistan security partnership and its development into an intimate security alliance, whereby Pakistan become America’s “Most Allied Ally” in the South Asian region. The chapter tries to identify Pakistan’s strategic imperatives and compulsions, which necessitated the quest for an external patron. It also analyses the real mysteries behind both countries forging an alliance, looking at the anatomies and distortions, which were brushed aside by the leaderships, in the quest for forging an alliance. Though Pakistan became US’s favoured partner in the South Asia, yet US Security imperatives vis-a-vis India, and her impact on the US- Pakistan security relationship were pronounced. The most significant aspect was Kashmir dispute, which simmered along, despite this intimate association. The impact of the Security relationship on Pakistan’s internal political dynamics, its foreign policy options and specifically its relations with the USSR are analyzed in some detail. The problems associated with antagonizing a superpower, came to sharp focus in the after math of the U-2 episode when the Soviet Union expressed its indignation and anger over Pakistan allowing its territory to be used for US spy plane missions. This was the first reality check for the Ayub regime in Pakistan, which now looked to diversify its military and political linkages. As
Pakistan committed itself to being US’s most vocal supporter at international fora, there was a growing realization that the security relationship was not delivering on Pakistan’s core security concern i.e resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Yet the alliance had brought an era of prosperity and economic growth, along with a substantial enhancement of military capability. As Pakistan continued its support for the US against the communist aggression, the regional security dynamics necessitated a rethink of US policy towards the region. The growing Sino-Indian rift alarmed the US strategists, while opening up the exciting possibility of weaning away India from the Soviet. In those circumstances Pakistan is seriously concerned to its core security concerns vis-a-vis India, at adds with US strategic objectives in the region. By 1962, while Pakistan remained a staunch US ally, its security objectives were at the crossroads with those of the US.

**US-INDIA RELATIONS IN THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD**

During the pre-partition period, there was little direct contact between the US and the Indian Sub Continent. From a security perspective, the Indian Sub-Continent was an area with negligible interests for the US Government. In the early decades of the 20th Century, as the US emerged from its isolationist policy, its attention was on power struggle in Europe and the rise of Japanese influence in Pacific. These developments challenged the traditional balance of power and threatened America’s vital political and economic interests in these regions. India was an industrially backward British colony that did not offer much to the US. This low priority was reflected by token diplomatic, political and economic contacts between the two
countries. The American official presence in India was through consular offices in the port cities of the Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Karachi. There was no diplomatic presence in Delhi and all official correspondence was routed through the British government.

During the Second World War, India figured out in relation to the war against the Japanese, as a logistics base, for the Burmese and the Chinese theaters. It also furnished troops to fight along with the British and Americans. The political developments within India during this period were closely followed by the US Government as they were keen to see the Indians participating in the Allied struggle against the Axis Powers. The Japanese advance in South Asia took the Allies by surprise. The British stronghold in Singapore and their Malayan and Burmese colonies fell in quick succession. The Indian Sub Continent by the fall of 1941 was within striking distance of the Japanese forces in Burma. The US at this juncture was heavily involved in China, and India was being used as a major logistic and air support base. The American Government grew concerned that the political movement in India may adversely affect this ongoing war effort. In October 1941, President Roosevelt appointed Thomas Wilson as the first US Commissioner in India, signaling a more proactive role in the region. He was to look into the prospects of assisting in the road construction and other infrastructure development projects in India. Simultaneously Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai was appointed as the first Indian Counsel General in the US. In 1942, the US further enhanced its presence in India by appointing Colonel Lewis Johnson as the first US ambassador in India. On arrival, he participated actively in unofficial discussions with Indian political leaders on the
future political dispensation in India. President Roosevelt also wrote to Prime Minister Churchill, suggesting that the Indians be granted some dominion status, with representation of all religious and ethnic entities. However he did not pursue this idea too vigorously, as the British Government still remained a major partner in the war effort. The American Government closely monitored and to this end they added their voice towards granting the Indians some political concessions and supported different political initiatives by the British Government. They came in contact with key Congress leaders during this period, Gandhi and Nehru were quite well known in US Government and political circles. Both of them exchanged letters with President Roosevelt on the issue of Indian independence.

With regards to the Muslims of the Sub-Continent, the American public, media and Government were not very familiar. In fact the Muslim cause in the Sub Continent received scant attention till late 1940s, when the movement became too strong to ignore.

In the context of evolution of Pakistan Movement, when the two nation’s theory was propounded by Allama Iqbal for the Muslims of Sub-Continent in 1930, the Americans were quite oblivious of the plight of the 100 million Muslims in this vast country. Unlike the Congress leaders, the Muslim League leadership had little direct contact with the US Government. One of the first mentions of the Pakistan Movement in American media coverage on India, focused on the Congress leaders Like Ghandi and Jawhar Lal Nehru. The American official presence in India was

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30 (Tewari, 1977, pp. 15-16)
31 (Brown W. N., 1972, p. 262)
through consular offices in the port cities of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Karachi. There was no diplomatic presence in Dehli and all official correspondence was routed through the British Government. April 1940 when the US, Consulate in Calcutta sent a detailed report on the landmark Lahore Resolution, saying “Pakistan may be postponed or put aside, it would be a great mistake to dismiss Pakistan Resolution as something of decreasing or no importance.” During the Second World War, as the political movement in India gained momentum, a series of articles appeared in the US press, on Jinnah and the rise of Muslim League. In October 1942, an article in the New York Times described Jinnah as “The man who in his hands hold more power for good or evil, then any single Indian politician”.

The US leadership was not very favourably inclined towards the idea of Pakistan. In August 1942, President Roosevelt, expressed his opposition to any idea of partitioning India, in a meeting with British Chargede Affairs, Sir Ronald Campbell in New York “The partition of India sounded terrible, after the US experience of Civil War”. As the Pakistan movement gained momentum, the American press took note. In April 1946, the cover of Time Magazine showed Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and the caption, “His Moslem Tiger Wants to eat the Hindu Cow”. The coverage was openly critical of the idea of the partition. American government also forcefully supported British plans for a United India. A State Department memo, initiated by Loy Henderson, Head of Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, blamed the Muslim League for the political crisis and suggested that the British Government should proceed with

32 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 5)
33 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 6)
34 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 6)
constitutional reforms regardless of Muslim League’s opposition. Cabinet Mission Plan, a last ditch effort to retain Indian Unity, therefore assumed added importance for the US State Department. Quaid-e-Azam accepted the proposals, but Nehru who had agreed initially, later back pedaled on some of the key clauses, which would ensure the Muslim rights would be protected in a United India.

Failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which Muslim League had agreed to retain the unity of the country, was a watershed event. Quaid-e-Azam called for open demonstration in favour of Pakistan, on 16th August 1946 and declared it the “Day of Deliverance”. This led to widespread clashes and anti-Muslim riots throughout India. At this stage, the US government alarmed at the prospect of strife in India, took a more proactive role for an early agreement between Muslim League and Congress. In December 1946, the British government called Nehru and Jinnah for talks at London. These talks failed but the State Department continued its own efforts. The US officials in India met with Liaquat and Quaid separately to ask them to accept the Cabinet Mission proposals for a United India. In one of these meeting between the Quaid and Sparks, the US Vice Council, the American representative insisted that Muslim League should agree to cooperate with Congress. The Quaid remarked “Tell your government that we work for the same ends, but for God’s sake do not be chloroformed by meaningless Congress gesture made for propaganda effect”. Quite clearly the Muslim League and the State Department did not share similar views on the future of India.

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The British elections in 1946 brought the Labor Party in power. They were more favorably inclined towards granting Indian independence as compared to the losing Conservative Party. The Atlee Government appointed Lord Louis Mountbatten as the new Governor General of India to work out the modalities of an orderly withdrawal from India. Mountbatten’s plan was to grant independence to the Sub-Continent by June 1948. In May 1947, he advanced the date for granting independence by one year to August 1947, because he realized that this was the only viable option to avoid further chaos and communal violence. Unfortunately, this did not augur well for the future of the Sub-Continent, especially Pakistan. With three months available for partitioning a country as vast and diverse as India, it was an almost impossible task to resolve all sticking points. The division of assets, demarcation of borders and future of the 562 princely states were amongst the major issues that needed to be resolved37. Naturally, the disadvantage lay with the smaller seceding state. Uncertainty fuelled the flames of communal violence and led to mass migration of Muslims from India. Pakistan, accepted only grudgingly by the Congress, was short shrifted in every respect. In words of Quaid-e-Azam, it was a “moth eaten” Pakistan.38

The US interests in these critical days were an orderly transfer of power, maintenance of peace and security, and their preference for United India39. The US government did not share the Muslim League views about partition of India. They in fact expressed grave doubts, fearing a balkanization of the Sub-Continent. However, once the formation of Pakistan became a certainty, the US government accepted the new

37 (Chaturshreni, 1980, pp. 134,135)
39 (Brown W. N., 1972, pp. 398,399)
country and moved speedily to accord formal recognition. As can be ascertained from President Truman’s message to Quaid on the eve of independence:-

“This extend on behalf of the American people sincere best wishes to you, to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and the people of Pakistan……..I wish to assure you that the new dominion embarks on its course with firm friendship and good will of the United States of America.”

Despite this positive gesture, the US had far more important issues to consider than the emerging states in the Sub-Continent. For several years after the second World War, the US expected Britain to take care of West’s interests in the region and followed its advice. At the international stage, the erstwhile white partners of the struggle against Nazi Germany; The West led by the US and the victorious Communists under Stalin, were now moving towards another confrontation, the Cold War. The US and Soviet Union had emerged as the two most powerful entities in the post World War period, with diametrically opposed ideologies. This was the beginning of a new politico military standoff. As the Soviet Union started enhancing its influence in Europe, the US concerned about losing ground, decided to prop up the faltering economies of Greece and Turkey. Britain, financially drained by the war effort, had informed the US that it could no longer support these two countries. On March 12, 1947, President Truman announced a major policy decision, “The Truman Doctrine”, which stipulated aiding the two fledgling countries to prevent them falling to the communists influence. President Truman said “I believe that it must be the

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40 (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Vol One, 1984, p. 15)
41 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise Histsory, 2007, p. 41)
policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation"\footnote{Acheson, 1969, p. 222}.

In June 1947, another major policy initiative to support the European economic recovery was announced by Secretary of State George C Marshall, which came to be known as the Marshall Plan. In China, the US supported nationalist regime of Chaing Ki Shek, despite massive military and financial assistance, was steadily losing ground to the Chinese Communists.

In this foregoing global context, the sub-continent was an area outside this struggle with the communists. It had no significant economic or military value to be of immediate concern to the US. So in words of Proffesor McMohan it was a region of “peripheral importance” to the US leadership\footnote{McMahon, 1994}.

**US Security Interests in the Region after 1947**

The independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 came at the time when the British Empire, weakened by the devastating effects of two global conflicts in less than four decades, was breathing its last. It actually signaled a beginning of the end to the centuries of European Colonial rule in Africa and Asia. The mantle of western leadership decisively shifted to the US in the aftermath of the Second World War\footnote{Ahmad M., Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1968, pp. 29,30}.

With the European influence and prestige on the decline in Asia and Middle East, the new threat to western interests emerged in the shape of communism. Principally, concerned about the danger of communists gaining a foothold in the politically and

\footnote{Acheson, 1969, p. 222}
\footnote{McMahon, 1994}
\footnote{Ahmad M., Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1968, pp. 29,30}
economically unstable European states, the US planners also feared that the newly 
independent nations in Middle East and Asia might fall into the Soviet Orbit\textsuperscript{45}.

From the US perspective, Pakistan and India, though out of the immediate area of 
concern, were significant enough because of the size, resources and location of the 
two countries, which together constituted one fifth of the world’s population. While 
the US strategists grappled to bring Japan and Germany back on the feet economically 
through the Marshall Plan and other incentives, the value of India and Pakistan was 
not lost on them. They feared that declining British influence in this region, might be 
an opening for the communists, which could be exploited. Uncertain about the future 
orientation of the countries and concerned about the possible impact of these countries 
falling into the Soviet Orbit, the US strategic planners tried to discern the possible 
courses of action with regards to these new nations.

The basis of relationship with the two countries, during these formative years was 
essentially the power struggle with communism. Both the countries were viewed in 
terms of their potential benefits in the ongoing cold war struggle, by the Truman 
Administration.\textsuperscript{46} 

A CIA report in late 1948 concluded that the sub-continent would be “a potentially 
important base for either side in the event of a global war between the US and 
USSR”\textsuperscript{47}. US Joint Chief of Staff noted the strategic location and importance of

\textsuperscript{45} (Ahmad M., Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1968, pp. 29,30) 
\textsuperscript{46} (McMahon, 1994) 
\textsuperscript{47} (McMahon, 1994, p. 13)
Karachi and Lahore as potential bases against communism and defence of Middle East\textsuperscript{48}.

NSC 48/1, a position paper on US policy towards Asia reported that India and Pakistan were the only major Asian countries, other than Japan, that remained outside the Soviet Orbit. “Should India and Pakistan fall to communism, the US and its allies would be denied any foothold on the Asian mainland”\textsuperscript{49}. The chief objective for the US planners therefore, in the early years of independence was to orientate these nations towards the US and western democracies and away from the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{50}. However, even within the Sub-Continent, the US intelligence estimates considered Pakistan more important for the US security interests. Two factors made this new country very lucrative in the cold war struggle. Firstly, its close proximity to the Soviet Central Asia, which made it an ideal base for intelligence gathering and for provision of air fields for strategic bombing of Russian industrial complexes in the Urals. “Pakistan becomes of immense strategic importance for long range bombing of the USSR”\textsuperscript{51}. Secondly, proximity of Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, making it potentially important in any defence arrangement for the Middle East\textsuperscript{52}. Pakistan could be used as a staging area for forces engaged in the defence or recapture of Middle East oil fields. All these factors combined to give Pakistan a greater strategic and military importance than India, in the eyes of US strategic planners\textsuperscript{53}.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{48} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 41) \\
\textsuperscript{49} (McMahon, 1994, p. 13) \\
\textsuperscript{50} (McMahon, 1994, p. 14) \\
\textsuperscript{51} (McMahon, 1994, p. 147) \\
\textsuperscript{52} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 41), \\
\textsuperscript{53} (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 15)
\end{flushleft}
Secretary of State George. C. Marshall, in his memo to President Truman, highlighted this strategic importance of Pakistan in July 1947:-

"I believe it would be in our national interest to accord recognition to the new Dominion of Pakistan at the earliest possible date by responding favourably to the anticipated request for an exchange of ambassadors. Pakistan with a population of seventy million persons will be the largest Muslim country in the world and will occupy one of the most strategic areas in the world".  

India and Pakistan were considered valuable to the U.S for different reasons. India's importance stemmed from the facts that it was the natural successor to the British Raj, and the dominant state in South Asia. Pakistan was important, being the largest Muslim country at the time. It could help bridge the widening gulf between West and the Middle East through its religious affinity and historical ties with these countries. Its western wing had geopolitical significance for the American planners in the anticipated struggle against the Soviets. At this stage the U.S wanted to foster good relations with both countries.  However as mentioned earlier, the focus of the developing cold war was far away from the Sub-Continent.

Pakistan’s Security Dilemma on the Eve of Partition

The environment surrounding Pakistan’s independence was extremely unstable. The two wings of the newly formed country were separated by more than a

54 (Venkataramani, 1984, pp. 7,8)  
55 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 44)  
56 (McMahon, 1994, p. 54)
thousand miles of hostile Indian Territory. The bitterness and hatred surrounding the Independence movement reflected itself in the displacement and brutal massacres of thousands of Muslims by Hindus and Sikhs. There were also instances of Hindus being forced to migrate and being killed in the areas now comprising of Pakistan. There was wholesale rioting and looting in Punjab. Lahore was flooded with refugees, with their appalling stories, murder and atrocities. The partition, already an emotionally difficult experience was compounded by hatred and mistrust. As Dennis Kux points out, "Pakistan's traumatic birth would have made India -Pakistan relationship difficult and tough under the best of circumstances". But unfortunately the circumstances were far from ideal. Much had to do with the haste in which Mountbatten divided India and the extreme bias shown towards the new country.

"Mountbatten's partition agreement treated Pakistan as a stepchild. India, as the successor state to the British colonial regime, received the lion's share of the trained administrative personnel, armed forces and financial reserves of British India; Pakistan, as the seceding state, inherited little more than table scraps". As is evident from the table not only Pakistan share was too less rather the actual received share was even lesser.

58 (McMahon, 1994, p. 145)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Pakistan share</th>
<th>Actually Received by Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance Store</td>
<td>160000 tons</td>
<td>23225 tons only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured fighting vehicles including Sherman and Stuart Tanks</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition all kinds</td>
<td>40000 tons</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering stores and machinery</td>
<td>173667 tons</td>
<td>1428 tons only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

From a security point of view the problems at the inception were mainly due to aspects related to the way division of the country was done by the Mountbatten Administration. Insecure and unrealistic borders, leading to differences right from the outset. These differences translated into war within three months of the partition. It clearly reflected the lack of foresight and logic in the decisions of the boundary commission. Totally inadequate security apparatus, especially the army, which made the country vulnerable and in need of military assistance right at the outset. The fragile economic situation, lack of any suitable government apparatus and infrastructure, refugee problems all weighed heavily on the new Pakistan government. With just 17.5% share of the assets of British India, the new country was straddled with the task of establishing and running the entire governmental infrastructure from the scratch. As Mc Mohan points out,

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59 (Pasha, 1991, p. 46)
60 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise Histsory, 2007, p. 31)
“Pakistan's economic plight compounded its security dilemma, making it nearly impossible to supply a military force adequate for internal security purposes, no less capable of protecting Pakistan from external threats”\(^{61}\).

Two very ominous security issues cropped up almost immediately after independence. The first one arose from the negative attitude of Pakistan's western neighbour Afghanistan. The Kabul government opposed Pakistan's entry into the UN. Afghanistan was the only country who casted a vote against Pakistan in United Nations General Assembly on 30 September 1947 \(^{62}\). It supported the call for “Pushtoonistan”, an independent state of Pathans, in the area comprising NWFP (Khyber Pakhtun Khwa). Afghanistan tried to create trouble through Fakir of Ipi who was known as crusader against the British \(^{63}\). It refused to accept the result of the plebiscite in NWFP, which resulted in the province joining Pakistan. It also questioned the validity of the Durand Line, between Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawn by the British in 1893 \(^{64}\). Pakistan Government feared that these claims were clandestinely supported by the Russians.

The second, far more threatening problem arose out of the issue of accession of the Princely States. The two large princely states, Hyderabad and Kashmir, were ruled by minority rulers. According to the rules of partition, formulated by Lord Mountbatten in 1947, these states could regain full independence after termination of the Raj. They

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\(^{61}\) (McMahon, 1994, p. 46)
\(^{62}\) (Pasha, 1991, p. 99), (Hyder, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 1987, p. 95)
\(^{63}\) (Pasha, 1991, p. 94)
\(^{64}\) (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 20) (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 11)
were however strongly urged to join either India or Pakistan after taking into account their geographical location and composition of population\textsuperscript{65}.

The Muslim Nizam of Hyderabad wanted to retain his independent status, but his desires ran against the popular will of Hindu majority. Located in the heart of the Indian Sub-Continent, he clung on to his state, under increasing pressure by India to accede.

Kashmir, the other major princely state, spread over 85,000 square miles in the northwestern part of India, was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja but consisted of more than 85% of Muslim population. The state had entire transportation and economic links with Pakistan. The only road link with Jammu, the winter capital, was through Pakistan’s city of Sialkot. In addition, Kashmir controlled the head waters of all major rivers flowing in West Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh, who had ruled the helpless Muslim population like a true despot, could not bear to lose his prized possession. He entered into a "Standstill Agreement" with Pakistan, pending final decision for the status of the state\textsuperscript{66}. However, events thereafter provided sufficient proof that it was a delaying tactics, the minimum purpose of which was to avoid joining Pakistan. The most important indicator was boundary commission’s decision to give Muslim majority district of Gurdaspur to India, providing them a land access to the mountainous state, otherwise surrounded by Pakistan. This was followed by a planned massacre and forced migration of the Muslims of Jammu, radically altering the state’s ethnic composition. Simultaneously the Indian government was fast trying to construct an

\textsuperscript{65} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ‘Disenchanted Allies’, 2001, p. 21)
\textsuperscript{66} (Chaturshreni, 1980, pp. 139-140) , (Wolpert, 1993, p. 115)
alternate road link to the Kashmir valley from Pathankot to Jammu. Sensing the inevitable, the Muslims of Kashmir rose up against Maharaja in October 1947. They were also aided by around 2000 tribesmen from NWFP. As they liberated the hilly region of Kashmir bordering Pakistan and advanced towards Srinagar, the capital, Maharaja signed an instrument of accession with India on 24 October 1947. Within two days, the Indian Army landed at Srinagar Airport. They were airlifted from Palam, India on Dakota Aircrafts. The swiftness of such an elaborate airmobile operation further confirmed Pakistan's fears that plans for accession were ready much before the actual date.

In accepting Kashmir's accession, Lord Mountbatten who was now the Governor General of India stated clearly “As soon as law and order have been resorted and the soil cleared of invaders, the question of state’s accession should be settled by reference to the people.” With the Indian Army advancing in Kashmir against rag tag fighters and looking set to wrest control of the state forcibly, the Government and people of Pakistan felt powerless. Pakistan Army was in no shape to respond to any military threat. Created out of existing Indian Army units, the distribution of stores and equipment was very lopsided. With bulk of the ordnance factories and stores located in India, much of the promised equipment and material never arrived Pakistan. Major General Fazl-e-Muqim Khan writes “Much of the mechanical transport was deficient and there were neither reserves to replace vehicles nor were tools and spares

67 (Brown W. N., 1972, pp. 179-182)
68 (Sinha, 1977, pp. 14-18), (Major General Fazal Muqeeem Khan, 1963, p. 92)
69 (Sinha, 1977, p. 14)
70 (Wolpert, 1993, p. 117)
71 (Brown W. N., 1972, pp. 9,10), (al, 1993)
72 (Major General Fazal Muqeeem Khan, 1963, p. 92)
to repair them”, “There was complete absence of procurement machinery for good, lubricants and oil”\(^\text{73}\). Not only was Pakistan grievously deficient in stores but the most of the units also lacked any cohesion\(^\text{74}\). Field Marshal Ayub Khan describes the state of these units:-

"When partition came, our men from units in India began to trickle back in small groups. In some cases they were unarmed and in others they had to fight their way out. So we had to start our army with bits and pieces like gigantic jig saw puzzle with some of the bits missing"\(^\text{75}\).

Matters were further complicated by presence of a British chief of Pakistan Army\(^\text{76}\). General Gracey was not inclined to pitch the Pakistan Army in Kashmir. As the Indian Army consolidated, many officers and soldiers of Pakistan Army, especially those belonging to Kashmir, left their units and joined the local fighters. The tribals went back, but the few regulars stayed on to fight the Indian Army as it consolidated its gains.

From a security perspective, by the fall of 1947, the fledgling country had an undeclared war with India, a developing border dispute with Afghanistan\(^\text{77}\), an unenviable internal security/administrative situation and a military that lacked almost everything\(^\text{78}\). The fear of domination by Hindu India emerged as the single most dominant factor influencing the formulation of Pakistan's foreign policy in this crucial

\(^{73}\) (Khan M. G., 1963, p. 40)
\(^{74}\) (Riza M. G., 1989, pp. 145-146)
\(^{75}\) (Khan M. A., 1967)
\(^{76}\) (Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan, 1963, p. 91)
\(^{77}\) (Wolpert, 1993, p. 221)
\(^{78}\) (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, pp. 18,20)
period. Threatening statements by Indian leaders further added to the sense of insecurity. Acharya Kripalani (Congress Party President) stated that "Neither Congress nor the nation has given up claim for a United India, and Sardar V. B Patel (Indian Home Minister) said "Sooner than later, we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country."

The new US consulate, in Pakistan, summed up this baffling collection of problems in an October 1947 dispatch as "The difficulties with which the new Dominion Government of Pakistan was confronted in August 1947, were increased manifold in September and assumed such proportions as to threaten the very existence of the new state. In these extremely trying circumstances, Pakistan’s leadership looked for immediate financial and military support from other countries.

**Pakistan's Decision to Turn to U.S. for Security and Financial Assistance**

Faced with daunting challenges to its security and viability as a state, the Pakistani leadership decided to look to the U.S for assistance. This decision had far reaching implications on the nation's future alignment. Two important factors contributed to this decision. First was a matter of options available to the country at this stage and second was the orientation of Pakistan's leaders.

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79 (Hasan K. S., 1951)
80 (Khan M. A., 1967, pp. 115,116)
82 (Hyder, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 1987, p. 149)
83 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 41)
With regards to the choices available to the country, this was the period immediately after the Second World War. Amongst the victorious nations, three countries stood out; America, Russia and Britain. Pakistan could not expect much from Britain as it had won the war but lost an empire. It had sustained the war effort because of the massive economic and military assistance by the U.S. After the war it was cutting its losses and had already declined to support Greece and Turkey against the developing communist threat. Furthermore the role of Lord Mountbatten in the partition agreement, division of assets and the Kashmir Dispute reflected a definite bias towards India. He was now the Governor General of India and wielded considerable influence in the ruling circles in London.\textsuperscript{84}

Russia had emerged victorious in Eastern Europe and was now busy consolidating its military gains through ideological and political maneuvers. The Communist ideology held little appeal to Pakistan's leadership. Quaid-e-Azam spelled out Pakistan’s orientation in a cabinet meeting on September 7, 1947:-

“Pakistan is a democracy and communism does not flourish in the soil of Islam. It is clear therefore that our interest lie more with the two great democratic countries, namely the UK and USA, rather than with Russia”.

In another cabinet meeting, the Quaid highlighted the threat to Pakistan from Russia “The safety of NWFP is of world concern and not Pakistan alone”. The Quaid was concerned that the Russians were encouraging the Afghan government in calls for Pushtoonistan.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{84} (Venkataramani, 1984)
\textsuperscript{85} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ’ Disenchanted Allies’, 2001, p. 20)
In this bleak environment, United States emerged as the only country with the financial and political prowess to address Pakistan's myriad of problems. Pakistan’s leadership was inclined towards the west from the very beginning. Some of the key appointments in the new government were taken up by former civil servants of the British Raj. The portfolio of finance went to Ghulam Muhammad, former finance minister of Hyderabad. The limited depth of administrative and political talent in the Muslim League hierarchy, meant that former bureaucrats gained greater access to power in the formative years of the country. As one author describes it “Leaders of Pakistan who belonged to westernized upper class, formulated pro-western policies.”

In September 1947, Laik Ali, a close associate of Ghulam Muhammad, the finance minister, was sent to Washington as the personal emissary of Quaid-e-Azam. The purpose of this visit was to request for security assistance from the USA. He requested for a US $2 billion loan over a period of five years to include the following defence items:-

1. Army (- $170,000,00) - One armoured and five infantry divisions
2. Air Force - ($75,000,000) - Twelve fighter squadrons, trainer aircraft and ground facilities
3. Navy - ($60,000,00) - Four light cruise, gunboats and Miscellaneous facilities

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86 Venkataramani, 1984, pp. 13,14) (Rao, 1985, p. 56)
87 (Bindra, Determinants of Pakistan Foreign Policy, 1988, p. 249)
The enormous request for assistance in the absence of any real and urgent U.S. interest in Pakistan was almost completely turned down. The office of Near Eastern Affairs, headed by Ray L Thurston processed the request and the response was communicated by the State Department officials, on 30 October 1947. "The United State does not have funds to loan of the magnitude contemplated for essentially developmental project”.

At this stage Pakistan’s request did not even merit consideration at the highest level. Pakistan received a token sum of 10 million from the war assets administration, 5% of its actual request. This episode demonstrated that there was nothing significant about the new country that would merit assistance of such magnitude from the U.S. However Pakistan continued its efforts to align itself with the U.S. In July 1948, the ailing US Ambassador to Pakistan, Paul Alling, returned to the US. His replacement did not arrive for another year and a half. This illustrates the low priority Pakistan occupied in this early period.

Kashmir Imbroglio

Kashmir dispute plunged Pakistan into an undeclared war with India, only three months after independence. The desperate search for security assistance was directly linked to the developments in the Kashmir dispute, following the arrival of Indian Army in Kashmir in October 1947. Pakistan refused to accept the legality of instrument of accession whereas India decried the illegal presence of tribesmen and blamed Pakistan for aiding and abetting them.

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90 (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 6)
91 (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 7)
92 (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 54)
Kashmir was no ordinary dispute from the outset. It was actually much more than a territorial issue. Pakistan, created on the basis of Muslim majority areas, considered it rightfully to be a natural part of the newly formed country. Its geographical contiguity and historical links to West Pakistan only strengthened this belief.

The boundary commission’s decision to give the Muslim majority district to India, which provided land access to India, only strengthened the belief that a sinister plot to snatch this prize was hatched by Nehru with the connivance of Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy of India. On the other side, Nehru had an equally strong affinity with Kashmir. This being the ancestral land of the Kashmiri Brahmin, as US Assistant
Secretary of State George Mcgee commented “Nehru was the stumbling block, if he had cooperated, the Kashmir problem could easily have been solved” 93

The Kashmir issue was initially referred to the UN by India, hoping to get a swift condemnation of the “invasion” by tribals from Pakistan. However, after Pakistan’s successful representation of the unfairness surrounding the Maharaja’s accession to India by Sir Zafar Ullah Khan, The UN Security Council decided to hold a plebiscite, to determine the ultimate disposition of Kashmir. The UN Security Council resolution of 21 April 1948 called for a plebiscite to decide the future of Kashmir. It set up United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). According to this resolution Pakistan was to ensure the withdrawal of all the freedom fighters from the disputed territory. Thereafter, India was to begin reducing its troops in Kashmir, in consultation with the commission. Finally, the commission was directed to arrange for an impartial plebiscite to be held in the disputed territory 94. Quite clearly, this was not the result that India had expected. Plebiscite if held under free and fair conditions could most likely result in Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.

The Security Council resolution actually became the start point of a desperate struggle by Pakistan to get its implementation in face of an intransigent attitude and delaying tactics by the Indians. Having little military or political clout to force the issue with its much larger neighbour, Pakistani leadership opted to look towards the US for help. In a way the Kashmir problem became the single most important factor in propelling Pakistan towards US for Security assistance.

93 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ’ Disencharited Allies’, 2001, p. 31)
94 (UN Resolution 5/726, 1948)
The US initial response to the Kashmir crisis was lukewarm. US policy makers, engaged in Europe, Middle East and China, did not want to stretch themselves by involving in new issues. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Lovett, was quite unmoved when approached by the British representative at the UN, Sir Alexander Cadogen to take a leading role in the UN efforts, as the British involvement could be construed as a re imposition of the Raj. Lovett responded that “The US is spread very thinly in its commitments” and expressed concern that US involvement may invite Soviet interest, making it even harder to find a solution. The US reluctantly agreed to be a part of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, (UNCIP), set up to work out the modalities of a plebiscite. They appointed a middle ranking official, Ambassador to Burma, Karl Huddle as their representative.

The first high level meeting between US and Pakistan leadership was held in October 1948 in Paris. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan met Secretary of State George C. Marshall on the sidelines of UN General Assembly meeting. He outlined Pakistan’s need for financial assistance, its desire to stand up against the communism and asked the US to assist on the Kashmir issue. Marshall also met Indian Prime Minister Nehru. The Indian leader’s unrelenting stance was described by General Marshall as “He found it difficult, when his turn came, to talk about Kashmir in a moderate way”. General Marshall opted to keep the US stance strictly neutral. He also advised Prime Minister Liaquat to look for private capital for economic assistance.

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95 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 23)
96 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 28)
At this juncture, Pakistani leadership was unable to gain any tangible support on either Kashmir or security assistance. US rejection had to do with two factors. Firstly, Pakistan did not rate significantly yet, in the policy of “containment” of Soviet Union. Secondly, the US still harboured the desire to maintain friendly regimes in both India and Pakistan. They were keen to pursue South Asia policy in consultation with the British. However, the US government planners had identified the latent value of Pakistan in case of need against communism. As Secretary of State Marshall indicated to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, “The administration was at work on “Projects” that were “presently in the planning stage”98, an aspect highlighted in Pakistan’s strategic importance due to its geographic locations that allowed its cities to be used as military bases for operations against the Soviet Union. “From military point of view, the countries of South Asia except Pakistan have under present and prospective conditions little value to the US”99.

A State Department policy paper also highlighted the need for providing Pakistan with military assistance:-

“We recognize that the final orientation of the Pakistani leaders will be influenced by the response they receive to their requests. Our response to Pakistani request for military assistance, should increase its willingness to make bases available to us”100.
In the fall of 1948, Pakistan’s security fears were further exacerbated by two significant events. On 11 September, the Quaid-e-Azam passed away. It was a big blow for Pakistan. His towering personality had kept the Muslim League intact and given hope to the infant nation. Two days after his death; the Indian army invaded the State of Hyderabad and annexed it. In Kashmir, the Indian Army was already pushing the freedom fighters back from their positions. The Pakistan leadership feared an invasion of the country.\textsuperscript{101}

In December 1949, the UNCIP floated another draft resolution.\textsuperscript{102} The resolution was accepted by both India and Pakistan. This resolution asked for a demilitarization of the state to be followed by a plebiscite under the UN auspices.\textsuperscript{103} This time, one of Pakistan’s key concerns, that a personality of high international standing be nominated, as plebiscite administrator, was also incorporated. US grudgingly accepted to take a lead role in the negotiations for the first time. It was due to reluctance of both parties to accept British mediation. The US concerns about the region drifting towards war, forced them to take a more proactive role in the Kashmir dispute.\textsuperscript{104}

In March 1949, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the celebrated commander of UN Pacific Fleet, was named as the Plebiscite Administrator, accepting Pakistan’s request. This was a major contribution by the US, reflecting a renewed interest in resolving the dispute. The Pakistan Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan specially thanked the US

\textsuperscript{101} (Riza M. G., The Pakistan Army 1947-1949, 1989, p. 303)

\textsuperscript{102} (Jalalzai, A New Hope for Peace in South Asia, 2005, p. 264)

\textsuperscript{103} (Choudhury G. W., Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947-1966, 1968, p. 112)

\textsuperscript{104} (Cohen S. P., 1984, p. 24)
President in a letter, complementing the selection of a man of international repute for the sensitive task. However despite Admiral Nimitz’s appointment, there was not much progress on Kashmir issue. This was essentially linked to India’s intransigence in accepting any reasonable proposal for settlement, which involved plebiscite.

In December 1949, the Pakistan Army, lost two senior General Officers namely General Iftikhar Khan and Major General Sher in an air crash. This cleared the way for Major General Ayub Khan, who was appointed the Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army in January 1951, replacing General Gracey. From a security relationship perspective, “the identity of new Commander in Chief of Pakistan Army assumed added significance for the military planners in Washington.” General Ayub soon became the key supporter of enhanced US-Pakistan security co-operation.

The South Asia experts in the US government still pressed for limited military aid for Pakistan. Assistant Secretary of State George Mc Ghee pressed hard for limited military support to keep the Pakistan government aligned to the west and keep the country’s internal dissentions in check. Mc Ghee’s visit to Pakistan in December 1949 was quite a success as he found the Oxford educated Liaquat Ali Khan quite affable and likeminded on issues of US interest. In a memo addressed to James Bruce, Director of Military Assistance Program, he assessed that in case of a conflict with USSR, Pakistan was expected to make its bases available for the war effort.

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105 (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations -Vol Two, 1984, pp. 37,38)
106 (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 144)
107 (McMahon, 1994, p. 150)
108 (McMahon, 1994, p. 151),
Pakistan’s leadership continued its efforts throughout 1949 to woo US security assistance. All the key players including Finance Minister Ghulam Muhammad, Foreign Secretary Ikramullah, and Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza visited the US to seek financial and military assistance. During their meetings, they “informally and repeatedly declared their desire to associate themselves closely with the US in long-range defence planning. The Department of State Policy statement on Pakistan dated 3 April 1950 recognized Pakistan’s importance in the long-term security arrangements in the Middle East as well as South Asia. It also recognized Pakistan’s need for a stronger military in its current turbulent security environment, in the backdrop of the simmering Kashmir dispute, recommending both military assistance and economic assistance to the country”\(^\text{110}\).

**Indian Factor in Pakistan - US Security Relationship**

The development of Pakistan-US security relationship is intricately linked to the developments in Asia, particularly with regards to the developing struggle against the communists and US need for a reliable partner in the region. Initially it was India that was looked upon by the US strategists as the logical choice. However Nehru’s strong socialist leanings and his response to various developments in the region convinced the US administration that they would have to look to other countries to fit their grand designs. The US efforts to woo India and the Indian response are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

\(^{110}\) (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, pp. 27-31)
The Truman administration considered India as the true successor to British Raj\textsuperscript{111}. Pakistan on the other hand, was regarded in the early days with certain amount of scepticism, despite its obvious strategic location at the cross roads of South and Central Asia. As discussed earlier, the primary motive of US policy makers was to align the new nations of the sub-continent towards western democracies. Two events radically unsettled the Americans policy makers in 1949, suddenly enhancing India’s value in the strategic calculus. First the Russian detonated their atomic device in August, wiping away America’s nuclear monopoly. This was almost immediately followed by the second event, the victory of Chinese communist over Americans protégé Chiang Ki Shek’s Nationalist forces in October 1949. The US planners now considered India as a potential bulwark against the emerging communist threat in Asia\textsuperscript{112}.

Nehru’s first visit to the US, in October 1949 dispelled the impression that India was going to replace the Chiang Ki Shek regime as the new US supporter in Asia\textsuperscript{113}. His insistence on non alignment, his perception about communist threat, which was at odds with the American concept of "evil empire", and his willingness to recognize Communist China at the earliest, dampened any hopes of India taking up the anti-communist crusade. Most importantly, he insisted that colonialism and not communism was the biggest threat to world peace\textsuperscript{114}. They neither endorsed US

\textsuperscript{111} (Hyder, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 1987, p. 8)
\textsuperscript{112} (McMahon, 1994, p. 37)
\textsuperscript{113} (Wolpert, 1993, p. 142)
\textsuperscript{114} (McMahon, 1994, p. 142)
policy towards its communist adversaries nor indicated any willingness to play a co-operative role. The US officials:-

“convinced of the righteousness of their policy in face of what seemed a dangerously implacable Soviet adversary, denigrated Nehru's resistance on a policy of non alignment as short-sighted at best, at worst immoral”\textsuperscript{115}.

The result of Nehru’s visit was felt in all spheres of US-India relations. The US government rejected a proposed 500 million dollar economic loan to India. Congress delayed the approval of one million ton of wheat requested by the Indian Government\textsuperscript{116}. Most importantly, on the Kashmir issue, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, urged Nehru to accept Mc Naughton’s proposal for demilitarizing the Kashmir valley. “If Naughton proposal failed, it would be the third time India had failed to accept the findings of an impartial agent. Under these circumstances the US would have no choice but to support whatever Security Council action would be necessary to overcome the stalemate”\textsuperscript{117}. Nehru was livid at this message and said:-

“The US appears to us to be seeking to bring pressure on our government under threat of consequences. Government of India cannot accept this form of intervention nor do they think it can lead to any beneficial result”\textsuperscript{118}.

This was the first occasion that the U.S Government had openly chided Nehru on his intransigence. Nehru and Indian diplomats on the other hand believed that US was

\textsuperscript{115} (McMahon, 1994, p. 142)
\textsuperscript{116} (McMahon, 1994, p. 143)
\textsuperscript{117} (McMahon, 1994, p. 143)
\textsuperscript{118} (McMahon, 1994, pp. 143,148)
giving importance to Pakistan on Kashmir, because of its desire to obtain air bases in Pakistan\textsuperscript{119}.

Korean War took the U.S. India relations a notch further down. Immediately, after the North Korean invasion, the US sought support for the UN Resolution on 25 June 1950, condemning this invasion. Both India and Pakistan supported this\textsuperscript{120}. However the second resolution of 27 June 1950 which asked for assistance to South Korea to repel the military attack was not supported by India. This irked the US government. Nehru instead embarked upon his own peace initiative, floating counter proposal for accommodating the Chinese and Russian standpoint. The American considered his proposals unacceptable and tantamount to rewarding the Chinese for their aggression. Nehru's contacts were however useful for the U.S, as an intermediary to communicate with the Chinese government.

The India-US rapport suffered another serious setback when the Indian government cast a negative vote on 7 October 1950 on the UN resolution calling for unification of Korea. Following this vote, the US government and press openly decried Nehru\textsuperscript{121}. This episode was followed by another acrimonious matter. The Indian government requested for 1.5 million tons of wheat in 1951. The US Congress, stung by Nehru’s role in Korea, took a long time to approve this aid. It only added to the mutual bitterness\textsuperscript{122}.

\textsuperscript{119} (McMahon, 1994, p. 144)
\textsuperscript{120} (al, 1993, p. 250)
\textsuperscript{121} (McMahon, 1994, p. 144)
\textsuperscript{122} (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, pp. 59,135)
In September 1951, US-India cleavage again came to fore, on the issue of Japanese Peace Treaty. The US, in the wake of the Korean War, dropped the idea of keeping Japan weak and dependent. In view of the developing communist threat, the US wanted Japan to be strong. John Foster Dulles was tasked with formulating a treaty acceptable to Japan and majority of the UN member nations. India, objected on many of the clauses. It expressed reservations on stationing of US troops in Japan. It also wanted that Formosa (Taiwan) should be returned to China and the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin to Russia. None of the proposals were acceptable to the US. The US invited 54 countries to sign the Peace Treaty in San Francisco. India was not amongst the signatories. These policy differences substantially reduced India's value in American strategic calculus. “As India’s strategic stock declined, Pakistan’s rose.” The New York Times termed Pakistan as ‘One Sure Friend in South Asia’.

Liaquat Ali Khan is Invited to Moscow – Impact on Pakistan US Relations

This has been an important event in the developing relations with the US. Pakistan had been eagerly pursuing a closer relationship with the US but these overtures had not received any substantial encouragement. The Soviet invitation to the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan resulted in a quick counter offer by the

123 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, pp. 59,135)
124 (Tewari, 1977, p. 98)
125 (New York Times, 28 August 1951)
126 (McMahon, 1994, p. 142)
127 (New York Times Businessman Convicted in Pakistani Nuclear Plot, 1951)
128 (Azam I., 1983, p. 50)
US administration. Pakistani Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow never materialized, leading to a long period of estrangement in the relations between the two countries and an almost uni-focused foreign policy and security relationship, which banked on the US.

Liaquat Ali Khan was invited to visit Moscow, by Joseph Stalin, through Soviet Charge de Affairs on 2 June 1949\(^{129}\). At the time he was on a visit to Tehran\(^ {130}\). The invitation was conveyed through Pakistan’s ambassador Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan. Till this time Pakistan had no formal ties with the Soviet Union. There had even been no exchange of ambassadors. Stalin’s invitation thus stirred a lot of interest in Pakistan, especially at a time when they had not been receiving favorable response from the US in the ongoing tussle with the Indians\(^ {131}\).

Apparently, the invitation was a counterbalance to the US’s invitation to Nehru. Pakistan’s leadership, already smarting from the US rebuff on repeated requests for military and economic assistance and on courting India despite its non-aligned rhetoric, readily accepted the invitation. The Assistant Secretary of State George McGee wrote in a memo dated 12 November to Secretary Dean Achenson that Pakistani establishment and people were dissatisfied with the US response to their concerns and there was a danger of Pakistan turning towards the Russians. It appears that this

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\(^ {129}\) (Hyder, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 1987, p. 11)
\(^ {130}\) (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 35)
\(^ {131}\) (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, pp. 23,24), (Ahmad M., Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1968, p. 49)
observation was registered and soon thereafter, in December 1949, President Truman extended an invitation to Liaquat Ali Khan to visit the US\textsuperscript{132}.

Within Pakistan's ruling elite there was a strong lobby for developing relations with the U.S. The pro-western lobby, including Foreign Minister Sir Zafarullah, Foreign Secretary Ikramullah and Pakistani ambassador in UK, Habib Rahim Tullah, were some of the prominent individuals who opposed any liaisons with the Russians\textsuperscript{133}. However, difference over the dates of the visit and the issue of exchange of ambassadors before the visit delayed the visit to Moscow till November 1949. Later it never materialized.

Many theories have been put forth regarding reasons for this change and Liaquat’s inability to take this opportunity to cultivate better relations with the Russians. The tussle within the Pakistan government circles over the proposed visit was a contributory factor. The outcome of Nehru’s visit to the US may also have allayed Russians fears about India siding with the west. So having felt relieved at the failure of US government to enlist Nehru in their anti-communist crusade, the Soviet planners may have cooled off the proposed Liaquat visit\textsuperscript{134}.

The acceptance of US invitation by the Liaquat Government, without pursuing the Moscow visit, laid the foundations of a skewed foreign policy and military alliance\textsuperscript{135}.

The actual estrangement with USSR occurred 1954 onwards, when the USSR, after Pakistan’s joining the US sponsored anti-communist alliance, openly sided with India.

\textsuperscript{132} (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, pp. 23,24)
\textsuperscript{133} (Popatia, 1988, p. 32)
\textsuperscript{134} (Aziz F. , Pakistan’s National Security Problems, 1984, pp. 43,44)
\textsuperscript{135} (Hyder, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 1987, p. 11)
on Kashmir\textsuperscript{136}. This imbalance was partially corrected almost two decades later by Ayub Khan, when he commenced friendly overtures with the Russians in the wake of the U2 episode\textsuperscript{137}, and finally visited USSR in 1965\textsuperscript{138}.

**Korean War 1951-52, A Watershed in US-Pak Relations**

Korean War was a significant landmark in the US-South Asia Relationship in general and US-Pakistan security relations in particular\textsuperscript{139}. The Korean War signaled a new level of confrontation between the communist and the western world, led by the US. In the absence of Indian help and the communist victory in China, the US was increasingly receptive to Pakistan’s requests for enhanced security cooperation, though it should be noted that the core objectives of both the countries did not coincide in any way. Pakistan was looking to bolster its military and economic potential, primarily against India while the US was looking for reliable partners in the fight against communism. Pakistan did not face any immediate threat from the communist expansion.

North Korean attack on South Korea, aided by the Chinese was seen as a clear manifestation of the aggressive designs by the communists, aimed at enhancing their area of influence. US responded with force and geared up diplomatic efforts to line

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} (Amin, 2000, p. 42)
\item \textsuperscript{137} (Azam I., 1983, p. 54)
\item \textsuperscript{138} (Aziz F., Pakistan's National Security Problems, 1984, pp. 43,44), (Ahmad M., Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1968, p. 50), (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973), (Hyder, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 1987, pp. 14-15)
\item \textsuperscript{139} (Popatia M. A., 1988, p. 37)
\end{itemize}
up allies in this new ideological confrontation. Till this time Pakistan’s repeated requests for security assistance had met with little success. Pakistani leadership was quite frustrated at the US for not aiding in any meaningful way.

The communist victory in China, and acquisition of nuclear capability by the Soviets in 1949, came as a twin blow to the US strategists. Not only the US lost its nuclear monopoly but now there was a communist foe in Asia's most populous country. The long, expensive association with the Chiang Ki Shek regime, throughout the Second World War came to naught, as now the country was controlled by Mao’s communists, with the Nationalists thrown out of the mainland China. Considering India to be a more valuable partner in the fight against communism, and a counterbalance to Mao's China, the US government extended an official invitation to Indian Prime Minister Nehru to visit the US. The visit however did not bring the desired results to the U.S strategists, as discussed earlier. Nehru's rhetoric on non-alignment and his differences with the US leaders on China and Russia removed any hopes of cooperation against communism. This provided an opening to Pakistan, which had been so desperately trying to forge a security relationship with US.

In June 1950, at the outbreak of Korean War, Liaquat Ali Khan, was on his inaugural visit to the US. Having spurned the Russian offer to visit earlier, Pakistani leadership had already thrown its lot behind the Americans. Korean War provided the first real opportunity to prove Pakistani usefulness to the US. In Liaquat Ali Khan’s address to

140 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 38)
the nation on radio, 19 July 1950\textsuperscript{141}, strongly condemned the North Korean invasion and remarked that Pakistan would back UN to the “fullest” for steps that it had taken to counter aggression in Korea\textsuperscript{142}.

US looking for support from Asian countries, immediately asked Pakistan to provide ground forces for the Korean War. The American Government was quite keen to utilize Pakistan’s well trained troops, as well as the political advantage of having an Asian member in the anti-communist coalition.

There was however an inherent dilemma in this arrangement for Pakistan. With the Kashmir issue unresolved, Pakistan was in a quandary sending its troops to support a foreign war. This concern was expressed by Liaquat Ali Khan in a meeting with US Ambassador Avra. M. Warren in July 1950. He asked the Ambassador to obtain some sort of security assurance from the US, against any military threat from India\textsuperscript{143}. This was not acceptable to the US. As can be noted from the reply by Secretary Dean Acheson to Ambassador Warren "If Liaquat Ali’s offer of troops was predicated on complete and unqualified support on Kashmir and Pashtun issues by the United States, it was unacceptable”\textsuperscript{144}. The US offered instead to equip and maintain one Pakistani Division. Pakistan’s demand to provide security guarantee was unacceptable to the US as despite differences with India, they were not prepared to alienate the

\textsuperscript{141} (Arif K., America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 35)
\textsuperscript{142} (Khan L. A., 1951, p. 28)
\textsuperscript{143} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 38)
\textsuperscript{144} (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, pp. 54,55)
Indians by openly siding the Pakistan\textsuperscript{145}. With an imminent offensive in Korea, US still hoped to court the Indian support for its war effort\textsuperscript{146}.

The US Government signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with Pakistan in December 1950, however this agreement did not result into any meaningful transfer of arms/equipment. Incidentally the Indians also signed a similar agreement with the US in March 1951. The Pakistani request for any assistance was carefully weighed by the US administration against its likely impact on the Indians\textsuperscript{147}. This attitude of US continues even to date.

There was an opening at the start of the Korean War to strengthen the relationship with the US by sending Pakistani troops to Korea. Why Pakistan did not opt to cement an alliance that it had been so eagerly pursuing, is best answered by the development of the Kashmir impasse. The Nehru-Liaquat meetings in London and subsequent Kashmir talks by Sir Owen Dixon were unproductive. By August 1950, India's unwillingness to compromises rendered further talks meaningless. Collapse of these talks and Pakistani belief that US had not done enough were decisive factors in Pakistani decision not to send troops to Korea\textsuperscript{148}.

Apparently there was not enough common ground between the two countries for a meaningful security relationship. So what led to a reassessment of the US policy?

Pakistan’s persistent requests for assistance and its political support for the Korean War were not enough. It was in fact a convergence of US strategic interests, following

\textsuperscript{145} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 38)
\textsuperscript{146} (Arif K., America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, pp. 54-55)
\textsuperscript{147} (Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan , 2002, p. 119)
\textsuperscript{148} (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 54)
the Korean War, coupled with its frustration with India, which slowly led to a shift towards Pakistan.

Korean War heightened the US concerns about communism and a possible shift in global balance of power. The US leaders embarked on a policy of containment. It sought to confine the communist contagion by establishing a "cordon sanitare"\(^{149}\) around the periphery of USSR, China and Eastern Europe.

In this backdrop, a Staff Study (98/1), prepared by NSC in January 1951 and approved by the US President in March 1951, assumed added significance after the Korean War. It became a very significant document in shaping the US policy in South Asia. It emphasized the need to court Pakistan, for the air bases that could be useful in a confrontation with USSR.

"Air bases at such places as Karachi, Rawalpindi and Lahore in Pakistan would be nearer a larger portion of Soviet territory including the industrialized area east of the Urals, than bases in any other available location in Asia or the Near East\(^{150}\).

Another conference of US and British diplomats at London and Nuwara Eliya in Ceylon (Now Sri Lanka) in February 1951, chaired by Assistant Secretary of State George McGee, concluded that Pakistan must be given a major role in the planned US security arrangements in the region\(^{151}\). The key recommendations of the conference were:

\(^{149}\) (Aziz F., Pakistan's National Security Problems, 1984, p. 46)
\(^{150}\) (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 44)
\(^{151}\) (Popatia M. A., 1988, p. 36)
“The most effective military defence of South Asia would require strong flanks. Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan are of primary importance in the west and Indochina in the East. Pakistan can provide important ground forces now, either directly in Southern Asia or to the Middle Eastern flank, provided the Kashmir question is settled or an agreement is reached that will ease Pakistan’s tension with India.”

Pakistan's Significance in Middle East Defence

The U.S. concerns about the turbulent and volatile Middle East region increased significantly after the Korean War. The American strategists believed that this region was very vulnerable in case of an all out confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Middle East oil accounted for almost 70% of the West's needs and was crucial for the Western economic recovery.

Britain had shown dominant presence in the Middle East before the Second World War. In the aftermath of the war, they no longer enjoyed the same political or military clout and consequently the US had started engaging the area more actively, starting with a small naval presence in the Middle East, called the Middle East Task Force. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nationalist movements in Egypt, Iran and Iraq all contributed towards a general resentment towards the West. In this scenario the U.S looked to step in and prevent the communists from gaining a foothold in the region. Pakistan and Turkey, with pro west governments gained importance in the US.

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152 (McMahon, 1994, p. 70) (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, pp. 47,48)
153 (Popatia, 1988, p. 39)
strategic planning\textsuperscript{154}. In the broader spectrum, a secure South Asia was also seen as an extended defence of Middle East. Therefore Pakistan, Iran and Turkey were important countries on the eastern flanks\textsuperscript{155}.

In a meeting at Istanbul in February 1951, Ambassador Warren argued that Pakistan would take a lead in any Middle East Defence organization. In another meeting at Colombo, Sri Lanka, Captain E.M Miller of the US Middle East Task Force said that U.S. security "would be reinforced by moving at once in this critical period to develop Pakistan's capacity to support US in war", despite likely "unfavorable political repercussions in adjoining countries\textsuperscript{156}.

Assistant Sectary of State, George McGee remarked on 2 May 1951 during a meeting at the Pentagon, "With Pakistan, the Middle East could be defended". The Assistant Secretary stated flatly; "without Pakistan, I don't see any way to defend the Middle East"\textsuperscript{157}. Despite these positive attributes, the problem with Pakistan was its continuing conflict with India. The daunting problem for western planners remained balancing relations with India, while trying to enlist Pakistan\textsuperscript{158}.

While the plans for including Pakistan in the Middle East Defence were still in process, the security situation in the sub-continent deteriorated rapidly. The Kashmir situation took another downturn. Although Admiral Nimitz had been appointed as the Plebiscite Administrator, yet his role could only come into effect once the process of demilitarization of the disputed territory was complete. The two negotiators appointed

\textsuperscript{154} (McMahon, 1994, p. 103)  
\textsuperscript{155} (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 148)  
\textsuperscript{156} (McMahon, 1994, p. 103), (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 43)  
\textsuperscript{157} (McMahon, 1994, p. 104)  
\textsuperscript{158} (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, pp. 60-65)
by the Security Council, Mc Naughton and later Sir Owen Dixon could not work out these differences. With the major and more suitable chunk of Kashmir under Indian control, an early plebiscite was quite clearly not in the Indian interest.

Pakistan desperately appealed to Britain and US to mediate. The US and British co-sponsored another Security Council resolution on 30 March 1951, in order to restart the negotiation process. This resolution appointed a former US Senator, Frank Graham as the new UN representative for India and Pakistan. This time the significant clause of the Security Council resolution was that in case of failure of the negotiations, the dispute would be referred to the International Court of Justice for arbitration\textsuperscript{159}.

India had no more desire for implementing this resolution as it had for the previous ones. US Ambassador to Pakistan, Henderson observed, that India would eventually lose parts of Kashmir it currently held if it entrusted arbitration of the dispute to the UN. "It therefore hopes the SC will drop the dispute and [the] present temporary partition will gradually be accepted as permanent"\textsuperscript{160}.

This attitude was further confirmed by another Indian ploy of establishing the puppet regime of Sheikh Abdullah in Indian Held Kashmir. On April 30, he called for a state constituent assembly to determine the future shape and affiliation of the disputed territory. This was quite clearly a way of circumventing the UN resolution. Situation rapidly deteriorated, and by June 1951, more than 90,000 Indians and 46,000

\textsuperscript{159} (Arif K., America-Pakistan Relations -Vol Two, 1984, pp. 56-57)

\textsuperscript{160} (McMahon, 1994, p. 106)
Pakistani troops were amassed in a tense military standoff across the Kashmir and Punjab border.

Pakistan was severely hampered by this standoff. Its fledgling and starved economy could scarcely bear the brunt of the military buildup. It was already spending about 60-70% of its national budget on the military and despite all its pleas, had not obtained any worthwhile assistance from either US or Britain. So by mid 1951, the situation was precariously balanced. U.S and Britain wanted to enlist Pakistan’s support in a Middle East grouping. Pakistan wanted to get military assistance in face of mounting military buildup on the Kashmir border. In case of a war in the sub-continent, US interest in the region would have been severely hampered, as indicated by a CIA report which stated:

"War would increase the risk that US policy might alienate one or both of the parties and adversely affect their positions in the East-West conflict. War would temporarily cripple Pakistan's strategic value to the United States. "Militarily", the estimate noted, "war would almost certainly remove any early prospect of Pakistan's joining in plans for defence of the Middle East against a Communist attack."\(^\text{161}\)

Here was a convergence of interests albeit for different reasons. The U.S now had a greater stake in the security and viability of Pakistan. This was also reflected in the U.S policy statement for Pakistan in 1951.

In Pakistan, the domestic situation worsened in October 1951. Liaquat Ali Khan was shot by an assailant at Rawalpindi on 16 October 1951, while addressing a public

\(^{161}\) (McMahon, 1994, p. 107)
meeting at the Company Bagh (Grounds). He was by far the most popular and respected political figure in the country. His death was at a critical time when the Kashmir situation was unresolved and the security situation quite precarious. His death brought in a new team in Pakistan. Khawaja Nazim ud Din took over as the new Prime Minister. The Governor General Ghulam Muhammad was the main power broker, his team Consented of Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza and the Army Chief General Ayub Khan. From a security relations perspective was welcomed by the US administration.

Pakistan’s Foreign Sectary Ikram Ullah, visited the US in October 1951, once again looking for military assistance. In his conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson he remarked “You must make up your mind about Pakistan. Pakistan was also ready “to hear what the US wanted of Pakistan” The US team eventually brought up the issue of Middle East Defence to which he replied:-

“Pakistan was interested in the defence of the Middle East, and in fact the interest was so natural that the concept would not require “Selling” to the Pakistanis”.

Pakistan’s position was indeed insecure. It needed assistance not only for military purposes, but also to shore up the credibility of its pro-western regime which had stacked everything on its alignment with the US. In an internal memo, Assistant Secretary of State George McGee:

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162 (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 176)
164 (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 72)
165 (McMahon, 1994, p. 109)
“With the new Ghulam Mohammad regime pleading earnestly for authorization to buy arms and given clear indications of a “co-operative” attitude, the time is opportune for the United States to respond promptly within the framework of the concept of “token assistance”\(^{166}\).

Till now, Pakistan Government had gone out of the way to show their allegiance. The Pakistani stance at the San-Francisco, Japanese Peace Treaty, in September 1951 was very positive as compared to India, which had refused to participate in the conference. The New York Times singled out Pakistan as one of the sure friends in South Asia\(^ {167}\).

So a combination of factors, i.e. emerging US security interests in South Asia and Middle East, stonewalling from the more valuable prize, India, and need to show positive response to a regime demonstrating pro-west policies led to a modest shift towards Pakistan in late 1951. Pakistan’s support to the US in the Korean crisis became a valuable and timely contributory factor for enhancing Pakistan’s value in the US strategic planning\(^ {168}\).

**Pakistan Included in the Point Four Technical Assistance Program**

In November 1951, the Truman Government approved limited sale of military equipment to Pakistan. The Assistance was in the form of The Point Four Technical Assistance Program, formally signed by the Pakistan and US representatives on February 2, 1952. It was an extension of the doctrine providing similar assistance to

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\(^{166}\) (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 189)
\(^{167}\) (Rao, 1985, p. 44)
\(^{168}\) (Cheema P. I., Pakistan's Defence Policy, 1947-58, 1990, p. 112)
Greece and Turkey\textsuperscript{169}. It amounted to ten million dollars. Pakistan government was far from satisfied but from the US viewpoint, this was about all it could get, till it joined some formal alliance relationship with the West.

Planning for such a Middle Eastern Alliance had been in process for some time. The real stumbling block remained likely Indian opposition, for which the planners did not have a suitable answer yet. While the Americans were very keen to get Pakistan on-board quickly for shoring up the defence of the Middle East and willing to pay the price in the form of a limited financial and military assistance, the British view, expressed by Ambassador Franks in a meeting with Donald Kennedy of the State Department, was quite illuminating:-

“Any proposals for increasing Pakistan's military potential would lead to severe reactions from India; Indo-Pakistani relations would in turn deteriorate immediately, thus foreclosing prospects for a Kashmir settlement; Pakistan's contribution to collective defence efforts, furthermore, would remain negligible until a Kashmir accord was reached”\textsuperscript{170}.

It was a very balanced assessment, and one with far reaching consequences. Events in the coming decades validated this assumption, and led to disappointment for both Pakistan and US with regards to their respective objectives in forming a military alliance.

\textsuperscript{169} (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 72)

\textsuperscript{170} (McMahon, 1994, p. 111)
The US planners at this time were quite concerned with the British inability to defend Middle East against Soviet aggression\textsuperscript{171}. NSC 68 concluded that "capabilities available to the British are wholly inadequate to defend the Middle East against Soviet aggression". The Policy Planning Staff paper recommended direct U.S involvement in the area. This could be “influence with Pakistan, coupled with supply assistance as practicable to increase Pakistan's capability of contributing to the defence of the Middle East"\textsuperscript{172}.

America considered Pakistan a vital component in its plans for Middle East security. A joint statement, of Defence Department and Department of Mutual Security’s study in April 1952, titled “Re-examination of United States Military Programs for Mutual Assistance” concluded that Pakistan could contribute significantly to the military and political strength of the organization. It recommended substantial military aid to Pakistan, provided it could be done in a manner that it did not create further problems with India\textsuperscript{173}. While these deliberations were underway, Pakistan’s security situation, already precarious due to the Kashmir conflict, was further aggravated by internal political strife; especially in Bengal province. 1952 also witnessed a poor harvest. Pakistan was forced to import $15 Million worth of wheat from the US on loan. On the Kashmir front, the Graham negotiations looked far away from any break through. The multitude of political and economic woes put real pressure on the Nazimuddin government. The leadership looked outwards for answers and once again Mr. Laik Ali was sent to the US, with a fresh request list. He asked for $200 million in military

\textsuperscript{171} (Popatia M. A., 1988, p. 38)
\textsuperscript{172} (McMahon, 1994, p. 111)
\textsuperscript{173} (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 201)
supplies for Pakistan Armed forces, along with request for credits for further purchases. In order to get the US interested, he said that Pakistan was facing strong public alarm with regards to Soviet intentions. He also promised active and positive alliance against the Soviet.

It is quite evident that Pakistani leadership looked to elicit US security cooperation on a false premise. Looking to solve their immediate security and economic dilemma, they seemed oblivious of the ramification of such a partnership on the internal politics and external policy options. Pakistan and U.S were moving in the same direction for different reasons. The US was guided by its global policy of containing international communism and Pakistan was motivated by problems of national security and defence.

The “MEDO” Concept

By June 1952, there were strong anti west sentiments in Egypt. King Faruoq was toppled and the regime of Colonel Nugieb and Jamal Abdul Nasser took over power in Egypt. They were strongly Anti-West and looked towards the British as imperialists. Serious differences arose between the Egypt Government and the British over control of Suez Canal, the British Military complex and other military facilities in Egypt. In this situation, Middle East Organization did not look practicable. The US and British planners came up with another option, called Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO). It was designed to be an arrangement in which the
participating countries would plan joint exercises and defence consultations\textsuperscript{174}. As Anti-West sentiments also ran high in Iran, Pakistan was thus considered a valuable partner\textsuperscript{175}. Its Islamic roots and traditional relationships with the Middle East was an additional asset. The Egyptian crisis further raised the stock of Pro-West regimes like Pakistan.

Nehru expressed deep disaffection on the proposed arrangements, claiming that any US military aid would be used against India, to force a military solution of Kashmir. Similar views were expressed by Chester W Bowles, the US Ambassador to India. He predicted that any prospect for settlement of Kashmir and other regional disputes would be dealt as a blow and the Soviet Union would be granted a golden opportunity to enhance its influence in the region.

The MEDO concept was still under consideration, when the Truman administration lost to the Republicans in elections of November 1952. The concept failed to take off as the new Egyptian government was strongly opposed to colonialism and looking at ways to reduce the Western presence rather than increasing it. With MEDO an unlikely prospect, the efforts of US strategic planners now turned to strengthening the remaining countries of the region against the perceived Soviet threat. These countries including Iran, Turkey and Pakistan were considered the Northern tier of defence against the communists\textsuperscript{176}.

\textsuperscript{174} (McMahon, 1994, p. 113)
\textsuperscript{175} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 43)
\textsuperscript{176} (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 207), (McMahon, 1994, p. 113)
The Northern Tier Defence Arrangement and Impact on Pakistan

The change in US Administration in 1953, augured well for the Pakistani establishment’s continuing efforts to secure security assistance. President Eisenhower and his running mate Richard Nixon came to the Oval Office with a promise to fight the communist threat with greater vigor. The new US administration considered USSR as a formidable adversary that had to be contained both politically and militarily. This struggle was viewed in very moralistic terms as a life and death struggle against evil. One of the key assumptions was that the “Free World” could not accept any further loss of territory. Since the American military capabilities were finite when it came to protecting all the threatened regions, it was considered imperative that the US must have alliances with regional partners in order to curtail the Soviet menace. This would allow the US to reduce its commitment in Korea type operations by building up the fighting capabilities of regional allies such as Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.

The new Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was an eager proponent of military alliances. The Pakistani government, in this new environment, looked much more friendly and useful. The military potential of Pakistan was considered to be a valuable asset in the likely confrontation against the Soviets in the Middle East.

In May 1953, Dulles visited the Middle East and South Asia to assess the prospects of such defence arrangements. He was deeply disappointed by the Arab regimes, and felt that they were quite incapable of facing up to the Soviet menace. In a call to

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177 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, pp. 51,52)
178 (Kheli, 1982, p. 1)
President Eisenhower he remarked “Bitterness toward the West, including the United States,” he said, is "such that while Arab good will may still be restored, time is short before loss becomes irretrievable"\textsuperscript{179}.

In sharp contrast, his meetings with the Pakistani leadership were all that he had expected. During Dulles’s visit, Prime Minister Bogra in a statement to the press said:-

“Pakistan is both a Middle Eastern and South Asian country. We have an abiding interest in the security of countries in the Middle East. Likewise we should be interested in any measures likely to promote political and social stability in South and South East Asia”\textsuperscript{180}.

Pakistan’s response was very different from the Arab States. Here Dulles found a complete agreement on issue of concern. He praised the “Spiritual Spirit” of Pakistan and expected that they could be counted to serve as a dependable bulwark against communism\textsuperscript{181}.

On his return to the US, the Secretary of State presented his report to the National Security Council. He stated that the Arab countries were not dependable allies against the communist threat. Egypt, the main partner in the Middle East, for MEDO, could not be trusted to tow this line. He therefore, proposed an alternative concept, the “Northern Tier-Defence” He proposed that Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq may be included in a new regional alliance, something far stronger than the one based on

\textsuperscript{179} (McMahon, 1994, p. 125)

\textsuperscript{180} (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 77)

\textsuperscript{181} (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 204)
Egyptian cooperation. This time the only Arab country in this proposed arrangement was Nuri Said's Iraq as the other Arab states were embroiled with the Israeli-Palestinian issue and Egyptian-British dispute over the future of British Military complex in the Suez.

Deeply impressed by his visit to Pakistan, he emphasized Pakistan’s importance in a Senate hearing on 3 June 1953 “What I do think is possible to develop strength along this northern area (indicating), where there is more fear of the Soviet Union. You have got a motivating force there…..you find a different spirit and a recognition of the danger from Soviet Russia and you have something on which to build…… We feel that if you have two strong points, here and here [Turkey and Pakistan] it is very difficult, even if Iran itself cannot be made strong, to go through those mountain passes. The trouble with Pakistan at the moment is that we do not have any program of military aid for Pakistan, because we don’t dare to do it because of the repercussions on India.

Just a month before Dulles’s visit, 17 April 1953, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad had dismissed Khawaja Nazim ud Din, the last remaining real political leader of the independence movement, and appointed in his place, Muhammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan’s ambassador to the US, as the new Prime Minister. With this change, the transition from political to bureaucratic military elite was complete. In the context of security relationship it meant that now the government was even more willing to court the US, for military hardware and financial assistance. “American officials

182 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 44)
183 Naveed Ahmed, "US interests in Pakistan and South Asia" p-65
184 (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, pp. 78,79)
recognized immediately that the bloodless coup in Karachi created a much more positive atmosphere for the Dulles mission"\(^{185}\).

General Ayub Khan candidly remarked to one of the US diplomats that he had worked hard to get Nazim Ud Din replaced\(^{186}\). It is important to note that all this debate between Pakistani leadership and USA, was West-Pakistan centric. The eastern wing did not have any say in the matter, neither did this whole arrangement, being pursued by the predominantly West Pakistani leadership have any support from the populous and troubled East Pakistan. As the Pakistani leadership moved forward eagerly to embrace US against external threat, the fragile union between the two wings became more tenuous. It is also important to note that the leadership at that time considered alliance relationship and military aid as a panacea for all the ills; political and economic\(^{187}\).

The Eisenhower Government approved a policy paper on the Middle East, in October 1953, titled “Basic National Security Policy”\(^{188}\). It recommended that Pakistan and Turkey should be encouraged to join a regional security alliance. This could than form the nucleus of a broader security grouping, involving Iran and Iraq. With the departure of Iran’s nationalist Prime Minister Mosaddeq, in a US sponsored coup, the prospect of this security arrangement increased even further\(^{189}\).

An immediate effect of this convergence of interests and closer cooperation between US and Pakistan was the American response to Pakistan’s urgent request for 1.5

\(^{185}\) (McMahon, 1994, p. 127)  
\(^{186}\) (McMahon, 1994, p. 127)  
\(^{188}\) (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, pp. 82,83)  
\(^{189}\) (Venkataramani, 1984, pp. 217-218)
million tons of wheat. The ship “Anhorage Victory” was dispatched with 9860 tons of wheat as a first installment from the US port of Baltimore. This was a swift response by the US government, in sharp contrast to the acrimonious and lengthy procedure adopted for a similar request by India, two years earlier.

By the late 1953, the US planners had moved closer to actualizing the concept of Pakistan playing a major role in the defence of the Middle East. They expected that in case of a Soviet threat towards oil fields in the Persian Gulf, Pakistan military, along with Turkish and Iranian forces would delay the Soviet advance. This would allow US and Britain to mount a suitable response. While the US planners continued to work on this concept, Pakistan leadership felt increasingly frustrated with lack of any concrete steps.

General Ayub Khan, the commander of Pakistan Army, visited the US in September 1953. The Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad joined him in November, ostensibly for a medical checkup. Later Sir Zafrullah the foreign Minister also reached the US capital. Although there were official denials from both sides, the meetings focused on formalizing US Pakistan Security Cooperation package. The team had fruitful discussions with Gen Walter Badel Smith, the US Under Secretary of State and Henry Boyardee, the Assistant Secretary of State, who later became an avid supporter of military aid to Pakistan.

These meetings cemented prospects of an agreement and also enhanced General Ayub’s personal image in the US decision making circles. The Pakistani leadership

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190 (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1973, p. 162)
191 (McMahon, 1994, p. 124)
pushing for this arms deal was almost entirely on unrepresentative group, consisting of General Ayub, The Army Chief, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad and Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza (Later President 1954 to 1955). Prime Minister Bogra and Foreign Minister Sir Zafar Ullah also participated but the parliament and the cabinet was not initially involved. There were rumors in the leading publications that Pakistan was negotiating a sizable military package. However no formal announcement was made\(^{192}\). The British government, once being informed of these developments expressed their reservations. They believed that any chances of Kashmir settlement would be scuttled by US military aid to Pakistan at this stage\(^{193}\).

Indian response to rumors about aid to Pakistan was sharp and vociferous. Nehru decried the prospect of any military alliance as an effort to bring cold war to the Sub-Continent\(^{194}\). Many experts including US Ambassador in India, Allan also objected to military aid to Pakistan\(^{195}\). The key US policy makers dismissed these objections as being too narrowly focused. They believed that Pakistan was needed for broader global security interests of the US. These views were reinforced by Vice President Nixon, after his visit to Pakistan in December 1953. He remarked “Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for. The people have fewer complexes than the Indians. The Pakistanis are completely frank, even when it hurts. It will be disastrous if the Pakistan aid does not go through”\(^{196}\). Nixon's biographer Ralph Tolendano

\(^{192}\)(Nawaz, 2008, pp. 104,105)
\(^{193}\)(McMahon, 1994, p. 221)
\(^{195}\)(Gupta, pp. 227,228)
contends that Nixon supported Pakistan not only to defend against USSR but also to strengthen Pakistan as a counter force to the confirmed neutralism of Nehru’s India\textsuperscript{197}. As a prelude to formal security agreement with U.S, Pakistan signed a bilateral treaty for military, economic and cultural cooperation with Turkey on 19 February; 1954. This step ostensibly, brought Pakistan closer to the visualized Northern Tier Defence Arrangement and provided the rationale for enhanced military assistance from the U.S. The US aim for the alliance was clearly identified as strengthening the countries that could form an anti-communists ring around the Soviet Union. These included Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Indo-China, Taiwan (Formosa) and Japan. It was in this broader context that Pakistan was involved\textsuperscript{198}.

President Eisenhower on 25 February 1954 approved the security assistance plan, but with clear directions that India must be reassured that “US was not trying to help Pakistan against India”\textsuperscript{199}. Clearly the US government was very careful to avoid alienating India. This was conveyed by Ambassador Allen to Nehru, in a letter from US President. It stated that aid to Pakistan was directed primarily against communist aggression and not against India.

The Turko-Pakistan communiqué was followed by a formal agreement on 19 May 1954, between the US and Pakistan, at Karachi. The US government undertook to give military training and equipment to the Pakistan Armed Forces\textsuperscript{200}.

\textsuperscript{197} (Tewari, 1977, p. 163)
\textsuperscript{198} (Tewari, 1977, p. 163), (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 45)
\textsuperscript{199} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 45)
\textsuperscript{200} (Tewari, 1977, pp. 164,165)
Nehru responded by sharp criticism of the US initiative. In March he asked for removal of all US military personnel from UN observer teams in Kashmir. He stated in an address to the Indian parliament, that US intervention in affairs of South Asia was bound to be unfortunate\textsuperscript{201}.

**Analysis – Areas of Convergence and Divergence**

At the commencement of formal Pakistan-US security relations in 1954, an analysis of the areas of convergence and divergence of interests reveals certain important trends that had profound implications on the future of this relationship. The US interests in Pakistan stemmed from perceived strategic importance, vis-a-vis, its perspective in protecting the Middle East, and a pro-western leadership, that expressed solidarity with the US in major international situations, especially the Japanese Peace Conference in 1951 and the Korean Crises in 1951-52. Considering that defence of the Middle East against communist aggression was the raison-de-etre for the military alliance, it is understandable from the US point of view, as their military planners and strategists arrived at this conclusion, after exhaustive deliberations and running out of any better alternative. Dr Shirin Tahir Kheli points out, “Being a country in the right location at the right time, Pakistan thus emerged to have utility for US policy. It was a marriage of convenience but one that both partners sought quite eagerly, at first\textsuperscript{202}.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{201} (McMahon, 1994, p. 136)
\item \textsuperscript{202} (Tahir Kheli, 1982)
\end{itemize}
From Pakistan’s perspective, it is hard to imagine how the Soviet menace affected the country. Quite clearly Pakistan wanted security assistance to boost its standing with India and to overcome its financial difficulties\textsuperscript{203}. Far from supporting the US against communists, Pakistan’s goals remained strengthening itself against India and gaining US support in the Kashmir conflict. Pakistan and US were moving in the same direction for different reasons. The US was guided by its global policy of containing international communism, and Pakistan was motivated by problems of national security and defence\textsuperscript{204}. Former Pakistan Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi points out that Pakistan’s alignment with the US flowed from its threat of an armed attack by India\textsuperscript{205}. This closeness was brought about by “need for one another for diverse purposes rather than a shared security concern\textsuperscript{206}. Another interesting reason for the alliance relationship, that had little to do with strategic imperatives, has been floated by some researchers. It has been identified as a very keen interest in the relationship by the Pakistani bureaucratic- military elite, who after the death of Liaquat Ali Khan had actively courted this alliance in order to maintain their grip on power\textsuperscript{207}. “Pakistan's current rulers--largely British-educated, secular, and Western-oriented--were an unrepresentative elite in a nation where the masses tended to be devout Muslims who harboured deep suspicions about the West\textsuperscript{208}. From the outset the advocates and makers of foreign and defence policy in Pakistan were principally administrators and military officers, individuals whom one

\textsuperscript{203} (Collard, p. 17), (Amin, 2000, p. 44)
\textsuperscript{204} (Choudhury G. W., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers, 1975, p. 81)
\textsuperscript{205} (Shahi, Pakistan Security and Foreign Policy, 1988, p. 211)
\textsuperscript{206} (Ali M., 2006, p. 183)
\textsuperscript{207} (Nawaz, 2008, p. 99)
\textsuperscript{208} (Venkataramani, 1984) (McMahon, 1994)
author describes uncharitably as “men who had grown grey in the service of the British and they favoured “very close” relations with the West, especially the United States”\textsuperscript{209}. The Western orientation of these leaders was recognized by various US intelligence/diplomatic estimates and the need identified to shore them up against reactionary forces\textsuperscript{210}. As Muhammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan’s Prime Minister remarked to Ambassador Hildrich

“For Gods sakes, if you once make an affirmative decision (regarding military aid), stick to it, because we will have burned our bridges behind us”\textsuperscript{211}.

It is important to note that while the major reason for military alliance was ostensibly the joint struggle against communism; the whole concept was far from clear and well defined. Many analysts have pointed out the US strategic planners glossed over one of the fundamental inconsistencies in the concept, i.e. how Pakistan could contribute meaningfully to a Middle East Defence given its own internal and external vulnerabilities. As McMohan points out:-

“The idea that Pakistan, a nation beset with monumental political and economic difficulties, in addition to unresolved disputes with hostile neighbours, could provide sufficient forces to deter or slow down significantly a Red Army thrust into the Middle East strains logic”\textsuperscript{212}.

\textsuperscript{209} (Venkataramani, 1984, pp. 119,192) \\
\textsuperscript{210} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disencharmed Allies', 2001, p. 54) \\
\textsuperscript{211} (McMahon, 1994, p. 139) \\
\textsuperscript{212} (McMahon, 1994, p. 105)
This issue had the potential to dash expectations on both sides as the partnership developed.

A key issue of divergence which did not surface openly between two countries at this time, but one which had profound implications in the coming years was the relationship of military alliance to India. From the US perspective, India remained an important country in the region which could not be ignored. The Indian reaction and how to mollify it, was at the forefront for the US strategists, during the formative stages of this partnership. Despite the dislike for Nehru and India’s non-aligned posture, US still considered India as an important regional country with strategic importance. The shift towards Pakistan had much to do with India’s rebuff of the Japanese Peace Treaty and unwillingness to side with the US in the Korean Crisis, as well as Pakistan’s willingness to participate in the Northern Tier Defence Concept. Nehru’s virulent anti-west tirades and his inflexible attitude also played an important role in the US getting disenchanted from India. Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, clearly highlighted American’s position with respect to supporting Pakistan against India, when Liaquat Ali Khan asked for such a guarantee in 1951, in return for providing troops for the Korean Conflict “Liaquat’s proposal is unacceptable, as it would completely alienate the Government of India and America, and limit US freedom of action in Asia”. As can be ascertained from President Eisenhower’s letter to Nehru on 24 February 1954. It assured that the action is not directed in

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213 (Tewari, 1977)
214 (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 55)
215 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 45)
any way against India and that he was recommending to Congress the continuation of American economic and technical aid to India.  

The Pakistan government at this stage did not openly ask for any US commitment against India. Actually, leaving aside the Kashmir dispute, where Pakistan sought US and British support in implementation of the resolutions, nowhere in the negotiations of the security assistance did Pakistan factor in the Indian threat. All policy statements openly decried the communist threat and Pakistan’s desire to combat it. General Ayub, in his discussions at Washington in 1954, carefully avoided discussing India with the US officials.

The Pakistan government in its eagerness to obtain military assistance seemed to speak what the US planners wanted to hear. This closeness was brought about by “need for one another for diverse purposes rather than a shared security concern”.

Pakistan’s advocacy was at a minimum congruent with US perceptions of the world, with advocacy extended in a manner to make Pakistan fit the categories that US policy makers at the time judged essential to warrant unusual attention and largesse. However, this underlying divergence of interest would later become a major factor in souring this relationship.

The prospect of involving US to help force the Indians into a more meaningful dialogue over Kashmir was also an important consideration. The Turman


217 (Nawaz, 2008, p. 101)
218 (Ali M., 2006, p. 183)
219 (Hussain L. E., 1987, p. 114)
220 (Tewari, 1977, p. 141)
221 (Chaturshreni, 1980, pp. 207,208)
administration had sponsored two UN resolutions and appointed two eminent personalities Admiral Nimitz and Senator Frank Graham in succession. In those early years of the Kashmir dispute, these were important incentives to resolve the dispute in order to maintain peace and stability in South Asia, which could be conducive for the western strategic objective in the region. However, after almost five years of involvement, the US and British were unable to exert any meaningful pressure on India that could lead to a free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir. The military alliance was never meant to support Pakistan against India on the Kashmir dispute. This could be something Pakistan may have come to expect after lining up squarely with the west, but given India’s relative importance to the US and their past effort on the Kashmir dispute, any major expectations by Pakistani leadership and public was bound to be dashed. Venkatramani gives an interesting perspective on this issue:—

"If Pakistan leaders could have perceived the possible advantage to their country of the “time table” they should have deferred the issue of joining a US-sponsored military alliance at least till after April 1954- till the Plebiscite Administrator had worked out modalities for the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir. Had Pakistan’s leaders been men of shrewd realism, they would have chosen the course of projecting an image of “sweat reasonableness” till the plebiscite itself\textsuperscript{222}. However, given Nehru’s past record on the issue, it is questionable that India would have agreed to a plebiscite regardless of US- Pakistan alliance.

\textsuperscript{222} (Venkataramani, 1984)
Another issue was the scale of military and economic assistance. Pakistani leadership, since 1947, had been trying to count the US as its major military supplier and aid donor. The first mission led by Laik Ali in 1947, had requested for a substantial military package. His second mission in 1952 was also aimed at getting large US arms supply. The US government on the other hand, had not come up yet with the exact amount of aid that would make Pakistan a viable member of their proposed alliance\textsuperscript{223}. Although Pakistan’s economic and political fragility had been pointed out by many opponents of Pak-US security relationship, the planners did not visualize the gap between Pakistan’s expectations in siding with them and their own estimates for the cost of this relationship. This was the grey area in the formative stages of the relationship. Assistant Secretary of State Henry Boyardee spoke of a mere $20 million as the contemplated figure, to shore up Pakistan's defensive capability in the proposed Northern Tier Defence Arrangement. This amount in his opinion was quite small and would not likely to stir up major issues between the U.S and India\textsuperscript{224}. Coming to this issue of protection against the Indians, it is again questionable from Pakistan’s perspective as to what was more important for the country at this stage. Was military aid the only answer to Pakistan’s myriad problems i.e. political instability, dissention in the Eastern Wing, constitutional vacuum and lack of stable institutions. The fabric of this young nation was already being torn apart at the seams. Geographic, linguistic and cultural barriers between the two wings were already surfacing. Kashmir, undoubtedly, still stood out as the biggest issue, but how it could

\textsuperscript{223} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 42)  
\textsuperscript{224} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ‘Disenchanted Allies’, 2001, p. 57)
be solved by entering into a military alliance? Did Pakistani leadership expect that the country would become strong enough through this aid to wrest Kashmir forcibly from the Indians, or did they expect the US to force India into a favourable settlement on behalf of its military partners. Both these possibilities, viewed in the context of evolution of the military relationship, do not seem very plausible. Winning Kashmir by enhancing military potential was an unlikely prospect to Pakistan, given India’s much larger economic and military potential and its ability to match any military buildup with a suitable response. With regard to the US openly exerting pressure on India for a Kashmir solution, it is again not very pertinent, as whatever advantage Pakistan gained from US would quite easily be neutralized by USSR, in the UN Security Council, owing to Pakistan’s open alignment with the anti-communists alliance. Pakistan’s leadership overestimated US capabilities to influence the Kashmir conflict and were still “it was a disastrous presumption to equate Washington’s priorities with their own”. The timing of the pact was also very interesting. India had so far never openly denounced the call for a plebiscite. In these formative years of the military alliance, Pakistan was already facing serious threats to internal cohesion. West Pakistani dominated government's initiative to forge an alliance with the US, against a perceived Russian threat, did not appeal to masses and leaders in East Pakistan. Despite Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra’s Bengali roots, the East Bengal provincial elections of March 1954 resulted in a resounding victory for United Front, which trounced the ruling Muslim League by

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225 (Choudhury G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan, 1974, p. 25)
226 (Tahir Kheli, 1982, p. 13)
227 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 54)
winning 223 seats in 309 members assembly, against only 10 seats by the ruling Muslim League. On assuming political control, the United Front leaders severely criticized the military pact and demanded its repudiation.\textsuperscript{228} This event is important in the hindsight, as the Bengali leaders did not share the same threat perception as their West Pakistani counterparts. The 21 point manifesto of the United Front asked for a status that was autonomous, with only defence, foreign affairs and currency being shared between the two wings. It was with the full backing of two charismatic politicians Fuzlullah and Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy, both former Chief Ministers of undivided Indian province of Bengal. 162 members of the newly elected Bengal assembly asked for reviewing the military part with United States\textsuperscript{229}.

Despite the positive geostrategic attributes, the US interest in Pakistan, was mainly restricted to intelligence and military planners. At the policy makers level, there was only a vague knowledge of this new country. Even as late as 1950, where Liaquat Ali Khan visited the US and educated the politicians on Pakistan’s strategic significance, he was embarrassed by one of the California businessman during a lunch, who asked him “Whether the blank space between the two parts of Pakistan, as shown on the menu card, was Africa”\textsuperscript{230}. Pakistan only started gaining importance with the US decision makers, as the Cold War intensified in the aftermaths of North Korea invasion in 1951. However it still did not generate the same kind of interest and understanding as India.

\textsuperscript{228} (McMahon, 1994, pp. 135-140)
\textsuperscript{229} (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1973, p. 245)
\textsuperscript{230} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 36)
The period of mid 1950's was the most aligned period in Pakistan's history. It assumed the title of "Most Allied Ally" in Asia. What is quite illuminating from a security relation perspective that even in these so called "heydays", there were serious divergence in the interests of the two countries. As Pakistan entwined itself in closer security relationship, there were many issues that had not been clarified and understood in their true perspective. These had all the potential to sour the relationship in the coming years. In such an unequal and unidirectional relationship, the loser is always the smaller partner.

An important aspect influencing this relationship is the state of internal cohesion and stability of Pakistan. The political fortunes of Pakistan’s ruling elite, closely linked to the shape and direction of the security relationship helped shape the contours of this relationship. These vested interests were also partially responsible for creating and sustaining unrealistic expectations from the alliance with regards to U.S support against India.

The section looks at the period between 1954 and 1962; a period that may be termed as the closest in the Pak -U.S. Security Alliance relationship. It commenced with U.S and Pakistan coming together, ostensibly for defence of the Middle East against the communist threat. The two countries signed a Mutual Defence Agreement in 1954, closely followed by Pakistan joining the SEATO and the BAGHDAD Pacts. By the middle of 1955, Pakistan became the only country that was part of an anti communist alliance both in the Middle East and South Asia. Pakistan received substantial amount of military and financial aid from the U.S. In return Pakistan supported the U.S
policies on international issues. In 1959, it allowed the US to secretly fly spy planes over Russia from its air base at Badaber near the Northern city of Peshawar.

However the apparently close relationship saw serious differences when Pakistan objected to the U.S support to India during the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962. Whereas the U.S. insisted that it was only supporting India against communism, the Pakistani side saw this as a serious breach of trust and against the spirit of the Security Relationship. So a very interesting aspect of this relationship manifested itself at this early stage i.e. the divergence in the core strategic interests of the two countries. As McMahon points out, it was a patron-client relationship between Washington and Karachi, fraught with misunderstandings, tensions, and unfulfilled from both sides its inception:

"The excessively vague strategic vision that had given shape to the Pakistani-American alliance grew ever more clouded during this period, even as the Eisenhower administration tied Pakistan formally into two anticommunist alliance systems"\(^{231}\).

**Pakistan - U.S Security Agreement, 1954**

US-Pakistan Mutual Defence Agreement was signed on 19 May 1954\(^{232}\). Extracts from the agreement highlight some important issues which would influence the development of the security relationship in the coming years:

\(^{231}\) (McMahon, 1994), (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 53)
\(^{232}\) (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 46)
1. The Article I of agreement stipulated that "The Government of Pakistan will use this assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defence, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation. The Government of Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished. This clause clearly pointed to the fact that use of U.S military assistance would be strictly in accordance with what the U.S Government perceived appropriate.

2. In return for the security assistance, Article IV stipulated that Pakistan would be obliged to host U.S military personnel and accord them all the privileges of diplomatic staff. This would effectively render them immune to the local laws.

3. In accordance with Article V, Pakistan was also obliged to render political, diplomatic and material assistance to the U.S. It effectively tied Pakistan to the global and regional diplomatic and security objectives of the United States. However same could not be said for the U.S as it contained absolutely no reference to Pakistan's security concerns regarding India".

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233 (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 96)
The agreement clearly placed specific obligations on the Pakistan Government and contained checks to ensure that the U.S assistance could not be used for purposes other than those approved by the U.S Government. Pakistan therefore could not expect the U.S. to concur use of this aid against India if the U.S perception of the threat differed from Pakistan. Considering that Indian threat was the foremost reason for seeking the American support, there seems to be little deliberation by the Pakistani leadership on few very relevant issues. "How much arms would Pakistan need in order to attain military superiority over India or even parity? How much money would the US Congress have to appropriate to provide such a quantum of arms to Pakistan? Were there any indications whatsoever to the effect that the United States would assume such a burden or even to be an accessory to a Pakistani effort to confront India militarily?" This issue seems to have been glossed over by the Pakistani leadership in the deliberations with the U.S counterparts. The core question should have been the role of this new partnership in helping Pakistan achieve its desired end state in Kashmir dispute with India. The Pakistani leadership assumed that this arrangement would somehow tilt the balance of power in the Sub-Continent and simultaneously address Pakistan's financial woes. The Mutual Defence Agreement formalized the Pak-U.S. Security Relationship. Although US gave us commitment that she would come for help in case any third country attacks Pakistan. As discussed earlier, both countries came to the partnership with divergent objectives. "The United States and Pakistan brought widely divergent hopes, expectations, and needs to their newly

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234 (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 303)  
235 (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 301)
established partnership. In the months following the signing of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, those differences burst into the open, sparking charges of bad faith on both sides.”

Pakistan, straddled under immense economic, political and security pressures looked for U.S. assistance in bringing the country out of this quagmire. Pakistan's ruling elite was convinced that substantial U.S support would not only guarantee the nation's security vis-à-vis India; of equal importance, it would provide the financial and military wherewithal essential to the construction of a viable state”. The U.S objectives at this stage were far more circumscribed. Pakistan, for them, was one more prospective ally in the South Asian region that possessed enough significance in the old war calculus to warrant token military and financial assistance.

The first issue of discord in the immediate follow up of the security agreement was the scale of military assistance. Pakistan's obvious reasons for joining this partnership were to gain substantial military and economic assistance. However the U.S Government had only contemplated a modest token assistance for this new ally. Following the agreement, in July 1954, the U.S Government sent Brigadier General Harry F. Meyers to Pakistan to assess its military requirements. In his discussions with Pakistani leadership he indicated an approximate amount of U.S $29.5 million for Pakistan's military needs. This meager amount was so far below Pakistan's expectations that Governor General Ghulam Muhammad commented in despair that the new relationship was likely to bring Pakistan "many troubles and little
help”\textsuperscript{239}. After the initial appraisal by Meyers, which was unanimously approved by both the State Department and the Pentagon, Brigadier General William T. Sexton was sent to Karachi in August 1954 as in charge head of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). This group was set up in Pakistan to oversee the implementation of the military aid program as recommended by Meyers. He confirmed to the Pakistani leadership that military aid for the first year would be $30 million, dedicated to purchase of military equipment and enhancing training of the Pakistan Army. This official confirmation of the scale of the aid program was very disappointing for the Pakistan leadership\textsuperscript{240}. General Ayub who had been the strongest exponent of the Military alliance complained bitterly that he was "dejected" and "broken hearted"\textsuperscript{241}. Ayub Khan had expected $200-$300 million in aid and no strings attached as to its utilization\textsuperscript{242}.

This conditionality had another serious implication for Pakistan. It actually meant that Pakistan would have to allocate further resources from its own budget to meet other defence related expenditures which would invariably incur as a result of a bigger military establishment. This was almost impossible for the country, already suffering from a steep decline in its export earnings that mainly relied on cotton and jute crops. This dire situation was confirmed by a special study mission led by business

\textsuperscript{239} (McMahon, 1994).
\textsuperscript{240} (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 306)
\textsuperscript{241} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 'Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 67)
\textsuperscript{242} (McMahon, 1994)
executive H. J. Heinz II, sent to Pakistan by President Eisenhower to assess the country's economic health\textsuperscript{243}.

As the situation stood, Pakistani leadership was desperate for a large scale U.S Military assistance, which seemed as aloof as before signing the defence agreement. At this juncture another interesting development occurred. The U.S called a regional conference in Manila to look for ways to enhance the anti communist defence in South East Asia. This would lead to another security pact, the SEATO alliance\textsuperscript{244}.

**SEATO- 1954**

Pakistan had been actively pursuing a Middle East alliance with the U.S. The idea of joining a South East Asian regional grouping had not been considered or discussed earlier; therefore Pakistan's entry in this alliance was quite surprising even to influential individuals within the ruling elite. Before analyzing Pakistan's decision to join, a brief background of the events leading to the treaty would be useful for analysis.

The United States, concerned with the emergence of Communist China looked to reduce its influence by shoring up the countries of the region through bilateral and multilateral treaties. It signed a bilateral treaty with the Philippines on 30 August 1951. On 1 September 1951, the United States signed the ANZUS Pact-with Australia and New Zealand. This treaty affirmed that an armed attack in the Pacific

\textsuperscript{243} (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 102)
\textsuperscript{244} (Cheema P. I., Pakistan's Defence Policy 1947-1958, 1990, p. 138), (Keesings Contemporary Archives, 4-11 September 1954, p.13761)
Area on any of the member countries would be dealt with collectively. In the Far East, the United States signed the Japanese Peace Treaty. Under this treaty it was allowed to maintain its armed forces in Japan, in order to maintain the strategic balance in the region. On 1 October 1953, it signed a treaty of common defence with the South Korea. All these treaties had one thing in common; these agreements were signed with regional partners based on a shared threat perception\textsuperscript{245}.

French defeat at Dien Bien Phu (Vietnam) in 1954, led to a rapid erosion of colonial rule in the region. Ho Chi Minh's communists were rewarded for this success by gaining control of North Vietnam, while South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia became independent. This success led to fears of further communist ingress in South Asia\textsuperscript{246}.

NSC 5405, an important policy document in Feb 1954, emphasized on this communist threat to South Asia. It claimed that the inter-relation among the countries of the region was such that the loss of one country, Vietnam, would “lead to submission or alignment with communism” by the remaining countries. President Eisenhower declared that if disintegration were to be avoided in Southeast Asia, the United States should make a determined effort to “defeat the domino result\textsuperscript{247}.

Pakistan being a country geographically detached from the region did not figure out in any analysis.

The initiative of involving Pakistan into the South Asian collective security was not a natural outcome of these analyses. It may be linked to British interest in the proposition, as they correctly assessed the need for non-white members in this region.

\textsuperscript{245} (Tewari, 1977, p. 77)
\textsuperscript{246} (Horowitz, 1967, pp. 145-147)
\textsuperscript{247} (Venkataramani, 1984, pp. 246,247)
alliance to lend it credibility. Amongst all the newly independent countries of the South Asian region, Pakistan's leadership stood out for anti-communist rhetoric and its financial woes, requiring immediate assistance. This was a country that could be persuaded. The Americans let the British take the lead in inviting Pakistan to the Manila Conference. In this way Pakistan could be convinced to join without the U.S having to promise more help for this gesture\textsuperscript{248}.

Another important U.S policy document, NSC 5409 released in Feb 1954 identified Pakistan's latent value in this regard, as a country that could be incorporated into any security arrangement due to its strong pro-west alignment. Some relevant extracts are:

"Support the present government of Pakistan so long as it remains friendly to the United States, and seek to insure that any successor government is not communist controlled and is friendly to the United States. Seek greater participation of Pakistan in common front against communism. Encourage Pakistan’s participation in any defence association which is judged to serve the interests of the United States. Priority should be given to the establishment of such an arrangement between Pakistan and Turkey"\textsuperscript{249}.

The Manila Conference in September 1954 culminated in Pakistan becoming a signatory of the treaty along with Britain, France, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines\textsuperscript{250}.

\textsuperscript{248} (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 251)
\textsuperscript{249} (Venkataramani, 1984, pp. 236,237)
\textsuperscript{250} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 46)
The U.S objectives in the treaty have been elucidated earlier. They obviously appreciated Pakistan's entry. However Pakistan being geographically detached from South East Asia, seemed to be an odd addition to this grouping. A cursory look on the map is enough to appreciate that it is nowhere close to the region. The only other non-white countries were Philippines and Thailand, both part of South East Asia. So what led to Pakistan signing up to this pact when it was neither part of the region, nor threatened by the communist aggression in any way. One obvious reason is the desperation to join the Western Camp in order to get that elusive military and economic support from the U.S. But then again Pakistan was already well on the way to joining a Middle Eastern Defence Alliance. That could equally help Pakistan's claim on these resources.

The reason offered by scholars for Pakistan's unexpected entry into this South Asian Grouping is not only bizarre but also is a pertinent example of lack of institutionalized approach in the policy making process of the country.

The meeting at Manila was attended by Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's foreign Minister. At the time he was under immense personal pressure owing to violent demonstrations against the Ahmadi community in Pakistan, to which he also belonged. It is conjectured that he signed up Pakistan in the alliance without even consulting the government back home. The reward was his acceptance to the International Court of Justice immediately thereafter where he had the support of U.S, UK and France for whom he had supposedly done this good gesture. "Painfully aware that his Ahmeddiya in Pakistan, Zafrullah Khan was eager to retire to The Hague and savor

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the leisurely and well-paid life of a judge of the World Court. When the voting took place in the UN General Assembly, India’s Radha Binod Pal polled 32 votes as against Zafarullah Khan’s 30. But the issue was clinched in the Security Council which voted six to five in favor of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, who had lately rendered a signal service to the West

Quite different from his own explanation, there is an uncharitable interpretation of Zafarullah's actions: with his position as Foreign Minister ended as a result of religious agitation against his community the Ahmadis, Zafarullah put self before country; Dulles secured for him a judge’s post at the International Court of Justice soon after the Manila Conference. In fact, Zafarullah did not return to Karachi, but flew straight to the United States from Manila.

Credibility is also lent to this assertion by General Ayub Khan's account, who being the military chief and the defence minister should have been the most involved and well informed on the issue. He claimed that he only came to know of the pact after the Foreign Minister had already signed it. As per his account it was a fait-accompli presented to the Pakistan Government which they had to sign in order to save face. Regardless of the circumstances, the real issue remained relevance of this alliance to Pakistan's national objectives.

The main discussion point from Pakistan’s perspective in the meeting was the definition of threat. For Pakistan, the real threat was aggression from India. During

252 (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 256)
253 (Choudhury G. W., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers, 1975, p. 89)
254 (Khan M. A., 1967)
the conference Sir Zafarullah tried hard that the scope of the threat be widened to include any aggression against a member country as opposed to communist aggression only. The Americans whose sole purpose of the treaty was to build an anti-communist alliance did not share this perception. They ensured that the treaty remains focused on the communist threat.255

On Pakistan's insistence, the terms of the treaty mentioned aggression in general as opposed to "communist aggression". Pakistan tried in vain through SEATO meeting to induce the U.S to commit itself to the defence of member states against all types of aggression “irrespective of the label”. The United State gave the highest importance to the label and stipulated that its commitments would “apply only to communist aggression”. U.S Secretary of State, Dulles ensured that such a commitment was not given to Pakistan and "even added an explicit reservation to the treaty to make clear that SEATO would deal only with communist aggression". US-Pakistan relations by Khurshid Hasan Foreign Policy of Pakistani an Analysis Latif Ahmed Sherwardi Kasahi the Allies back corporation 1964 257. The secretary later commented that he had no interest in embroiling the new alliance in India-Pakistan disputes.258 Article IV of the treaty addressed some of the vital issues related to security of the member states.

Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty Area against any of the parties or against any state or territory, which the parties by

256 (Rao, 1985, p. 69) (Chaudhri, 1993, pp. 190,191)
257 (Ahmad D. S., 1996, p. 56)
258 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, pp. 72,73)
unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety and agrees that if will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

If, in the opinion of any of the parties the inviolability or integrity of the territory or sovereignty or political independence of any part of the Treaty Area or any other state or territory, to which the provisions of paragraph one of this article from time to time apply, is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for common defence.

It is understood that no action on the territory of any state designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph one of this article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned\textsuperscript{259}. Unlike the NATO alliance, SEATO did not visualize joint commands, with standing forces. Also unlike NATO, an attack on one member was not automatically considered an attack on all. "SEATO signaled the intent of the signatories to oppose with force further communist incursions in the region, but did not commit them to do so"\textsuperscript{260}. It did not provide for automatic military commitment in case of aggression against a member country. According to the terms, each signatory of SEATO pledged,

\textsuperscript{259} Venkataramani, 1984, p. 348

\textsuperscript{260} Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 'Disenchanted Allies', 2001, pp. 72,73
in case of attack against any of them, to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes”\textsuperscript{261}.

The treaty while providing symbolic political support, did not commit the U.S. to come to the assistance of any of the members automatically\textsuperscript{262}. This was perhaps the most telling feature, considering Pakistan's security predicament. The treaty did not significantly enhance Pakistan's security vis-a-vis India. It did not commit the U.S Government in any meaningful way towards safeguarding Pakistan's security. At best, it improved Pakistan's bargaining position with the U.S and provided Pakistan another claim on the US military and financial support.

Without any assurance against Indian aggression, the treaty did not provide any tangible benefit to Pakistan. US tried to remove Indian apprehension of Pakistan being member of SEATO even an assurances were given to India that if Pakistan attacked India US sympathies will be for India\textsuperscript{263}. As one author describes "It will be hard to find many military alliances with so little prior consideration of its own interests and the sentiments of its people. Pakistani leaders hardly appear to have evaluated with any real seriousness the implications of membership in such an alliance system. They had neither asked serious questions of the principal sponsors nor had they obtained clear assurances on the concrete benefits that Pakistan could expect to receive by undertaking additional commitments and risks"\textsuperscript{264}. "The proposed Southeast Asia Collective Defence treaty would have very little to offer in
terms of Pakistan’s own problems. On the other hand, membership in the Treaty would have reduced Pakistan to the position of providing moral justification and political support for actions that the United States might take in Indochina.”

J.A Rahim, Pakistan's foreign Secretary commented that the treaty committed Pakistan politically and militarily in an area quite remote from its frontiers, while other members of the pact did not have any obligation to defend Pakistan except in the event of a communist attack. Even Prime Minister Muhammad Ali questioned Zafrullah's decision to sign the treaty. The Pakistan Government was in a difficult position after Zafrullah's acceptance of the draft treaty. Backing out of it would convey a wrong impression at a time when Pakistan was very keen to be a part of the Western Camp.

The cabinet despite its reservations went ahead and ratified the treaty in Jan 1955. Thus Pakistan entered into its first alliance with the U.S, an alliance that did not grow out of any shared threat perception or common objective. Owing to this divergence of interests, Pakistan neither had the capability nor the will to contribute meaningfully to the defence of South East Asia. Similarly it could not expect any of the alliance members to come to its assistance in case of a serious threat from its principal adversary, India. Hans Morgenthau points out “SEATO was inteneded to be an act of defiance; an act which would show the appearance of initiative or strength when actual initiative or strength were lacking.”

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265 (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 342)
266 (Choudhury G. W., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers, 1975, p. 89)
267 (Chaudhri, 1993, p. 184)
The one clear advantage to Pakistan, for joining this alliance was a revision of the earlier aid allocation by the U.S. Government. In October 1954, Pakistan's top leadership including Prime Minister Bogra, Army Chief General Ayub, and Finance Minister Chaudhri Mohammed Ali traveled to Washington to plead for more aid. The U.S. Administration now put forth an enhanced aid package. It included economic assistance of $105.9 million ($75.6 million in commodity assistance, $5.3 million in technical assistance and $25 million in defence support that could be used for economic development purposes).

More significant from the defence aid perspective, the U.S. officials also presented the Pakistani leaders with a secret aid-de-memoir on 21 October, that increased the level of military aid to $50 million. It also established specific program goals. "The aide-de-memoire on 21 October committed the United States to equip 4 army infantry and 1.5 armored divisions, to provide modern aircraft for 6 air force squadrons, and to supply 12 vessels for the navy. The estimated cost of this program was $171 million". The aid-de-memoir however, did not clarify one important issue i.e., if the cost of the program goals exceeded the $171 million ceiling, then what would take precedence: the program goals or the dollar figure approved? This issue would lead to further confusion later.

Finally the beleaguered Pakistani leadership had something to show for their support to the U.S. A Joint Communiquè issued at the end of Prime Minister Mohammad Ali

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270 (McMahon, 1994, p. 137)
Bogra's visit affirmed these commitments in a vague and cautious manner "The United States shall endeavour to accelerate the substantial military aid programs for Pakistan, which are beginning this year. In this connection, The United States cannot make commitments beyond existing and current appropriations". "As Bogra was busy in the U.S, trying to woo the Americans, political intrigues threatened his premiership back home.

**Political Jockeying and Constitutional Crisis-1954**

Prime Minister Bogra owed his current position to the powerful bureaucratic clique headed by the crafty Governor General Ghulam Muhammad. Obviously the Governor General had looked at Bogra's American connection to appoint him at the slot. This was aimed at securing the U.S. goodwill and much needed aid. What he had not contemplated was that Bogra would try to assert himself beyond acceptable limits. Much to Ghulam Muhammad's chagrin, this is exactly what happened.

The Prime Minister initiated certain constitutional amendments on September 20, 1954, in Pakistan's Constituent Assembly. These amendments to the Government of India Act of 1935 (The law which still serves as the nation's constitution, in absence of a new Pakistani constitution) were designed to chip away at the power of the governor-general and to strengthen the powers of the Prime Minister and the cabinet. The protégé no longer wanted to play to the Governor General's tune. "Bogra, at odds with a governor-general who increasingly held him in contempt, engineered what

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amounted to a constitutional coup d'état in order to preempt any effort by Ghulam Mohammed to dismiss him, the fate that had earlier befallen Nazimuddin. In this effort he had the support of politicians from East Bengal and other non-Punjabi provinces who shared a common resentment towards what some authors described as "Punjabi bureaucratic-military axis that controlled most of the levers of state power." The Governor General and his supporters reacted sharply to this move. On October 21, while still on his U.S. tour, Bogra was asked to return home. Defence Minister Mirza, a key member of the Ghulam Muhammad coterie met Bogra at the London airport. He was whisked away on a special chartered jet to Karachi. Ghulam Muhammad offered him two choices. He could dismiss the constitutional assembly or risk Martial Law. Bogra accepted the inevitable, and on October 24 he dismissed the Constituent Assembly. He was allowed to continue as the Prime Minister in the new cabinet, to keep pretence of continuity. The power players further strengthened their positions. General Ayub, who as an Army Chief should have been contemplating retirement in his third year in office, assumed the position of Defence Minister. Iskander Mirza was appointed as the Interior Minister. In retrospect, it was a defining moment in the history of the nation as well as the future of its security relations with the U.S. Ayub had taken the first fateful step of bringing the Army into the political arena. (Luck, circumstances and shrewd manipulation would see this machination to its logical and unfortunate end; the first military dictatorship in

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273 (Venkataramani, 1984, pp. 272-277)
274 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 'Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 75)
Pakistan). Ayub also confirmed his position as the real power behind the ruling clique, something that was becoming more apparent in the Army as well as to the foreign observers.\(^\text{275}\).

**Pakistan's Participation in Middle East Defence - A Question Mark within one year of the Security Relationship**

Pakistan's importance for the American planners primarily stemmed from its perceived role in the Middle East Defence Arrangement. The assumption that Pakistan could contribute meaningfully in any such arrangement was seriously challenged in the period following the Mutual Defence Arrangement, due to two major factors. The first as mentioned above was Pakistan's volatile and unpredictable political situation. The second was its economic fragility. The country was lurching from one financial crisis to another. Under these circumstances, the prospect of Pakistan deploying troops beyond its borders seemed quite unlikely. Assistant Secretary of Defence H. Struve Hensel, who visited Pakistan in February 1955, concluded that American officials stationed in Pakistan did not have a clear idea as to what role Pakistan could play in the Middle East Defence or "whether that role would be developed into an important one. "He recommended that "some plan be developed which will outline the military role expected of Pakistan and permit us all to move in that direction".\(^\text{276}\).

\(^{275}\) (Venkataramani, 1984, pp. 273,274) (Cloughley, 2001-2002, p. 44)  
\(^{276}\) (McMahon, 1994, p. 138)
This ambiguity was also highlighted in a report submitted to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff by Joint Strategic Plans Committee, in March 1955. The committee opined that the immediate effect of the regional pact between Pakistan and Turkey was "primarily political and psychological rather than military:"

"It did not visualize Pakistan contributing significantly to Middle East defence efforts in peacetime or wartime. In the committee's view, the broader northern-tier strategic concept that had given birth to the Pakistani-American alliance could not be expected to "result in any significant reduction of the area's military vulnerability". This assessment vitiated the very rationale of providing aid to Pakistan. If Pakistan could not assist against a Soviet attack through Iran or provide even a limited support in convoy protection or minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf then the only other advantage of providing military aid was to shore up a friendly regime and to avoid a major embarrassment at the political level. As Mc Mohan points out:

"Increasingly, defence officials justified aid to the Pakistani military not in terms of Middle Eastern defence, but in terms of the need to provide internal security and to maintain in power a pro-Western government."

So within one year of the commencement of the alliance there were widely divergent perspectives in the two camps regarding the purpose and value of this partnership. The Americans still hoped to get a value for their investment but had substantially scaled down their initial estimates of Pakistan providing forces for the defence of the

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277 (McMahon, 1994, pp. 200,201),
278 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 'Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 79)
279 (McMahon, 1994, pp. 159-162)
Middle East. Under these circumstances the size of the aid package obviously matched the U.S expectations from Pakistan. It was much lesser than what the Pakistan Government contemplated. Against an approved aid package of $34 million dollars for the year 1954, only $7.9 million dollars were delivered up to 31 March 1955\textsuperscript{280}.


The northern-tier defence arrangement, one of the main reasons for providing military aid to Pakistan, became more likely on February 24, 1955, after Iraq and Turkey initialed a defence pact in Baghdad\textsuperscript{281}. This move was sponsored by the British, through the pro-Western Iraqi regime of Nuri Said. Britain's prime motive in joining this treaty was to maintain a degree of influence in the region that had been adversely affected by emergence of Nasser's regime in Egypt. This was highlighted by Foreign Secretary Eden in his memoirs as "Our purpose [in joining the pact] was very simple. I think by so doing we have strengthened our influence and our voice throughout the Middle East"\textsuperscript{282}.

Britain managed to gain an agreement to retain its air bases in Iraq through this treaty by negotiating more acceptable terms with the Iraqis than the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930, which was deeply resented by the latter.

The prevalent feeling in the rest of the Arab World was far from favorable towards the West. The Western support to the emerging Israeli menace in the midst of the

\textsuperscript{280}(Nawaz, 2008, p. 134)
\textsuperscript{281}(Chaudhri M. A.)
Arab world, coupled with thinly veiled efforts by the British and French to maintain a semblance of their former glory days of colonial imperialism did not go well with the resurgent nationalists in these countries\textsuperscript{283}. Egypt's Nasser was the most vocal opponent of any Western meddling in the Middle East. His disagreement with the British and French over the Suez Canal and future of the British Military Complex was already reaching crisis proportions.

In this backdrop, the Americans, though keen on the concept which came close to the one put forth by Secretary Dulles in 1953, were not so enthusiastic to become a part of this pact, themselves. They opted instead for an observer status. This decision was based on two influencing factors:-

"The first was the worry that becoming a full pact member would worsen U.S relations with nationalist and neutralist Egypt which vociferously opposed the Baghdad Pact as a new form of imperialism. The second concern was that the alliance might jeopardize US relations with Israel\textsuperscript{284}."

With the U.S decision to stay out of the pact, Pakistan's leadership, especially Ayub Khan, were not very enthusiastic about this proposal. Ayub Khan, by now the Defence Minister, contended that Pakistan had demonstrated its solidarity with Iraq and Turkey by initiating the Turko-Pakistani Pact in 1954. He was convinced that without the American participation, the new pact would be meaningless\textsuperscript{285}. In June 1955, General Ayub Khan visited Turkey. He held discussions with the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and despite assurances that the pact would not entail any

\textsuperscript{283} (Choudhury G. W., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers, 1975, pp. 89,90).
\textsuperscript{284} (Sattar, 2007, p. 49) (Tewari, 1977, p. 171)
\textsuperscript{285} (Choudhury G. W., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers, 1975, p. 90)
additional responsibilities for Pakistan reluctantly agreed support accession to the pact. The new Prime Minister in Pakistan Chaudhri Muhamad Ali did not want to join the pact. However the American pressure to join the pact increased a few months later when USSR supplied arms to Egypt through Czechoslovakia. Under pressure and still looking for the elusive large scale aid package, Pakistan formally joined the pact on 23 September 1955\(^2\). Chaudhri Muhammad Ali was overruled by President Iskander Mirza\(^2\).

The quest for U.S military and economic assistance had now dragged Pakistan into two security alliances, none of which in fact co-related to Pakistan's immediate security concerns. The circumstances surrounding Pakistan's accession to both the pacts were far from ideal. Whereas the government seemed to have stumbled into the SEATO Pact without any conviction or prior consideration, in case of the Baghdad Pact it was the price to be paid for the economic and military assistance that Pakistan was looking for. While the SEATO Pact had limited impact on Pakistan's foreign relations, the Baghdad Pact put the country squarely against the Nationalist Arab countries especially Egypt. It sealed any chances of Pakistan assuming a leading role in the Muslim World and in fact strengthened neutralist India's position in the region\(^2\). It also increased Soviet animosity towards Pakistan.

For the first time Pakistan Government had chosen a foreign policy course that did not have the support of the masses. This basic dilemma would plague coming regimes as they tried to defend U.S policies that went against the popular sentiments of the

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\(^2\) (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise Histsory, 2007, p. 49)
\(^2\) (Sattar, 2007, p. 49)
\(^2\) (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 263)
country’s vast majority of devout Muslims. The pact brought Pakistan into confrontation with the resurgent Arab nationalists in Egypt, who regarded this alliance as a new way to impose western imperialism in the region.

So despite its reservations Pakistan was now America's "Most Allied Ally in Asia"\textsuperscript{289}. Its military commitments, in theory stretched from Turkey in the West to Philippines in the East\textsuperscript{290}.

On the American side, the State Department declared that the U.S had always favoured the aspiration of Middle Eastern nations to promote their defence through an effective collective security arrangement\textsuperscript{291}. The United States only committed to establish close political and military liaison with the pact, without joining as a full member\textsuperscript{292}. It became a member of the various committees without being an actual signatory of the pact\textsuperscript{293}.

A JCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defence, elucidated the course of action for US Military observers to the Baghdad Pact "The US position, with respect to the Baghdad Pact, is that, under the existing circumstances, the United States should not adhere or otherwise formally associate itself with the pact, particularly because this would adversely affect U.S influence in bringing about a reduction in Arab-Israeli tensions. The United States does not, however, exclude the possibility of eventual

\textsuperscript{289} (Khan M. A., 1967, p. 130)
\textsuperscript{290} (Choudhury G. W., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers, 1975, p. 90)
\textsuperscript{291} (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 266) Dawn, 24 September 1955
\textsuperscript{292} (Bajwa F. N., 1996, p. 168)
\textsuperscript{293} (Gallman, 1966, p. 58), (New York Times, 31 January 1958)
adherence, and shall keep this question under constant review in the light of development\textsuperscript{294}.

Another JSC Memorandum, dated 16 June 1955, gave out the outlines of U.S contribution to the Pact: "It is envisaged that our adherence would be on a broader possible basis, carrying no obligation for earmarking U.S. forces for the area, nor any implied commitment as to the order of financial or material support we might extend."

In line with this concept, the alliance did not have a unified command or specific forces designated for the defence of the member countries.

Quite clearly, it was another regional grouping for the U.S. at a carefully calibrated level, to enhance deterrence against the Russians. However what was the cost-benefit ratio for Pakistan? This remained to be seen. Iran joined the pact in October 1955.

This completed the arrangement of the Northern Tier. The alliance was now a rough arc of countries surrounding the Soviet Union, from Turkey to Pakistan.

The first meeting of the alliance took place in Baghdad on November 20, 1955. The level of participation was a clear indication of the importance each country attached to this alliance. The regional members sent their prime ministers and Britain its foreign secretary, Harold MacMillan. The United States, participating as an observer, was represented by its Ambassador to Iraq Waldeman J Gallman. This pattern was a precursor of the future trends. Without America's full participation, this pact and its revised version CENTO (Iraq left the alliances when Nuri Said was overthrown in 1958), never mattered much militarily\textsuperscript{295}. Specific pact forces never were designated

\textsuperscript{294} (Venkataramani, 1984, p. 267)  
\textsuperscript{295} (Singh S., Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1970, p. 90)
nor command structures created\textsuperscript{296}. While considering the American response, it is important to consider the relative value Pakistan offered to the U.S through these alliances. Pakistan due to its chronic political instability and domestic opposition was never able to furnish any troops for these alliance either in the Middle East or in South Asia. Its only utility was to support the U.S diplomatically and its provision of base facilities at Peshawar. This, though an important contribution was a transitory advantage to the U.S. It lost its value once the U.S achieved superior satellite technology that made manned flights un-necessary.

SEATO and CENTO never were militarily compatible to NATO. Their conception; terms of involvement and force structure were no way compatible to a vibrant and purposeful military alliance. They committed the nations to mutual cooperation and protection, as well as non-intervention in each other's affairs. The main objective was to contain the Soviet Union by having a line of strong states along the USSR's periphery. Unlike NATO, they did not have a unified military command structure, nor were many U.S. or UK military bases established in member countries, The U.S. only had communications and electronic intelligence facilities in Iran, and operated U-2 intelligence flights over the U.S.S.R. from bases in Pakistan. The United Kingdom had access to facilities in Pakistan and Iraq at various times while the treaty was in effect. Turkey agreed to permit American access to Turkish bases, but this was done under the auspices of NATO and not CENTO.

CENTO did little to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence to states in the Middle East. The first blow to the pact came on July 14, 1958, when the Nuri Said

\textsuperscript{296} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 74)
Government was overthrown in a military coup. The new government led by General Abdul Karim Qasim withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, opened diplomatic relations with Russia and adopted a non-aligned stance. It also failed to coalesce Arab states under the Western banner or even contain the Soviet influence in the region. The Soviets conveniently 'leap-frogged' the member states, establishing close military and political relationships with governments in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. By 1970, the U.S.S.R. had deployed over 20,000 troops to Egypt, and had established naval bases in Syria, Somalia, and P.D.R. Yemen.

With the Middle East seething at the Israeli aggression against the Arabs, loss of Jerusalem and Western acquiescence to all these actions, Pakistan Government was left standing on the wrong side\textsuperscript{297}. Its own public sentiment was so critical of its pro-West stance that it circumscribed any potential value of Pakistan to the U.S. Pakistan's contribution to the alliance was limited. Except for the period 1957-62, when they needed Pakistani territory for the U2 flights, it could be easily foregone by the Americans, with just a little inconvenience. With such utility it is difficult to understand why in a world of Realpolitik, Pakistani leadership expected anything beyond what they got. And it was not much that Pakistan got in relation to its core security concerns. There was hardly anything to show for the alliances except military and financial aid that fell well short of giving it a military parity with India,

\textsuperscript{297} (Dawn, 5 July 1955)
let alone any significant advantage. With respect to India and Kashmir issue these alliances did more damage than help\textsuperscript{298}.

Lulled into a false sense of security, with unrealistic hopes and expectations, the Pakistani Government embarked on these alliance relationships. The hidden political cost of aligning with the interests of a global power, at the cost of alienating regional and extra regional powers would only be felt a few years down the road.

Pakistan tried vainly, in the succeeding years to make this pact more potent. However this was unsuccessful. In January 1958, Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon asked for rules similar to NATO, that required that aggression against one country is aggression against all. Later in October 1959, President Ayub repeated the desire for untied command under an American Commander. Both the proposals were turned down because of lukewarm response by USA and Turkey. In 1961, at the 9\textsuperscript{th} Council Meeting, a commander was finally appointed, but without any ground troops. So this also remained a symbolic gesture to placate Pakistan and Iran. Thus the pact did not manage to achieve any meaningful military deterrence value. It was more symbolic with the added benefits of closer military ties, training and physical contacts between the member countries\textsuperscript{299}. But on a more substantive level the pact clearly did not provide Pakistan any meaningful guarantee against aggression from India, which remained Pakistan’s quest for enhanced security assistance\textsuperscript{300}.

\textsuperscript{298} (Amin, 2000, pp. 44-47)
\textsuperscript{299} (Tewari, 1977, p. 172)
\textsuperscript{300} (Mahdi, Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981, 1999, pp. 154,155)
The Differences on the Agreed Scale of the Military Aid Program

In September 1955 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that meeting deficiencies in five and a half Pakistani divisions, as the United States had promised, would require $301.1 million, rather than the initial estimate of $171 million. The US Government did not contemplate the provision of these additional funds. This was intimated to the Pakistani Defence Minister Chaudry Muhammad Ali in a letter by the US Chief of Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Pakistan, Rothwell H. Brown. “I have been notified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they have approved a joint time-phased military defence assistance program for the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force within an overall combined fund ceiling of US$171,000,000. It should be noted that this is an MDAP end item material and training program only and does not include either dollars or rupees which will be expended in improvement of military forces of Pakistan under the Direct Forces Support Program. Of the 171 million dollars, 75.7 million dollars have tentatively been allocated to the support of the army, 30.35 million dollars to the support of the Pakistan Navy, and 64.95 million dollars to the support of the Pakistan Air Force. Under the monetary ceilings noted in paragraph 3, above, the agreed upon force goals for the Navy and the Air Force will be achieved. However, the force goals for the Army of four infantry divisions, one and a half armored divisions and corps supporting troops cannot be achieved with the funds made available for the support of the Pakistan Army”. This was not what the Pakistani government was prepared to accept. There was an angry response from the Pakistani leaders. Ayub Khan was especially vocal in

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301 (McMahon, 1994, p. 157)
expressing his disaffection\textsuperscript{302}. The US Government reviewed the situation and decided to equip five and a half divisions as originally agreed upon, regardless of the total cost involved\textsuperscript{303}. This was a major concession gleaned from the US administration, primarily due to the tough stance by Ayub Khan. However it did not hide the fact that the underlying divergence in the relationship was of a nature that could not be easily brushed aside. The coming years apparently were considered to be very fruitful for the Pakistan military and the economic progress, primarily due to association with the US, yet undercurrents of dissonance because of divergence in core strategic objectives led to estrangement in the relations.

\textbf{Seeds of Disillusionment 1957-1962}

Having signed three major agreements for defence, Pakistan should have been smoothly transitioning into a comfortable security relationship with the US after 1956. To the contrary, the relationship mired into more controversy and mistrust with the passing years. Elements of divergence identified earlier, coupled with the international developments related to the cold war struggle, strained the relationship, setting the stage for the 1965 War where Pakistan felt left out and abandoned by its erstwhile ally. Issues that affected the nature and shape of the relationship in this crucial period are as under:

The changing nature of the cold war struggle between USSR, and US necessitated a rethink of the US Policy of relying on alliances alone to contain communism.

\textsuperscript{303} (McMahon, 1994, p. 158)
Neutralist India was a beneficiary of this policy. This in turn strained relations with Pakistan.

Costs-benefit assessments on both sides, reflecting a growing sense of dissatisfaction by the two parties on the shape and future direction of the relationship. Pakistan’s endemic political and economic instability, made its value to the US in the anti-communist struggle somewhat questionable. This led to lowered levels of security cooperation, reflected through haggling over the total aid package and inordinate delays in delivery of promised equipment. The US inability to break the Indo-Pak impasse on the crucial issue of Kashmir, triggered disillusionment and rethink of policy options within Pakistan.

The relationship was tested in the wake of Soviet threats to Pakistan following the U2 episode. Pakistan realized the limitations of relying solely on a distant superpower and decided to hedge its bets by developing a more balanced foreign policy. This inevitably involved mending fences with its giant communist neighbour in the North-China. This did not go well with the US administration.

The specter of India emerging as a counterbalance to Communist China raised its importance for the US strategic planners, leading to efforts to draw India into the Western orbit.\textsuperscript{304}

US economic aid to India initially stemmed from the desire to prevent it from going down the socialist road. Subsequently the US desire to prop up India against China

\textsuperscript{304} (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 247)
further accelerated the aid process by the US. This led to tensions and misunderstanding with Pakistan\textsuperscript{305}.

Economic assistance to Pakistan during the period remained a major cementing factor in the US- Pakistan relationship. It helped bring about one of the most fruitful periods of economic and industrial development in the country. Despite many dissenting voices against the relationship, and fallouts due to an almost satellite like relationship, Pakistani leadership could not afford to disassociate itself from the alliance.

The US policies in the Middle East especially with regards to Israel did not resonate with the Pakistani public. Thus the Pakistani government and the public did not share a common vision for the alliance. \textit{This factor has been a constant source of divergence with the US and West, increasing in intensity with the passage of time.}

\textbf{The changing nature of Cold War Struggle}

One obvious downside of alignment with a global power is the fact that the interests of the smaller party are a minor overlapping in the overall interests of the larger party. From the US perspective, Pakistan was an eager regional partner in the global war against communism and quite obviously, the struggle against the communist threat came at the forefront of all policy initiatives. While both the global power had been busy seeking out allies and strengthening relationships in different regions of the globe, there was a host of impoverished nations, many of them having gained their independence from the West after centuries of colonial rule. Some like Pakistan opted for outright alliance relationship; others like India, Yugoslavia and Egypt resisted the

\textsuperscript{305} (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 247)
temptation to fall into a particular orbit for a variety of reasons. These nations presented a lucrative prize if the US could win them over or even prevent from joining the other side. The crux of this new strategy seemed to be that Moscow planned to weaken the Western alliance by weaning away neutralist countries who could not be supported by the West economically and militarily. This issue was highlighted in a CIA intelligence estimate of November 1955. "Western failure to meet the demands of these (third world) countries for aid, may make them susceptible to bloc aid"\(^{306}\). The added advantage of the Russian aid was that it came with lesser strings than that offered by the West and it was from a source much more acceptable to the impoverished masses for whom Britain, France and to some extent US represented a continuation of centuries of oppression.

The US planners, who had been wary of the impact of Pak-US security relations on relations with India, saw their fears come true as they witnessed the new strategy being applied by the USSR during the first visit by their leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Bulganin to India in 1955. The two leaders did everything possible to woo the Indians. They offered soft loans, construction of a steel mill and other incentives in addition to an open and unequivocal support on the Indian stance on Kashmir\(^{307}\). The Indian public received them boisterously and a mammoth crowd turned up at Calcutta to give them a rousing reception. All this confirmed the assessments that USSR was out to exploit the opportunity created by the US-Pak security relationship, with offers of economic, military and political support. The US strategists felt that India could

\(^{306}\) (McMahon, 1994, p. 183)

\(^{307}\) (Chaudhri, 1993, p. 70)
not be allowed to fall into the Soviet sphere of influence as it was too large and important a country to be lost to the other side. Thus the US administration looked at ways to bolster economic and trade links with India, in order to ensure that the Soviet Union does not gain an edge in relations with this country.

The economic aid to India which initially started as an initiative to prevent the Soviets from gaining a foothold in India in 1955 was subsequently continued for another equally important reason, i.e keeping pace with China\textsuperscript{308}. Over the coming years the US economic and military aid to India grew steadily, primarily due to the concern that the country must not fall behind China, another communist giant and a competitor. The US administration had concluded that if India fell behind in the race for development against China, the communist forces inside the country could be emboldened and would increase their influence in the country. Indians, with the largest democracy in the world, were thus taken as an example of developing country in the free world that should be taken as a success story by all the newly liberated and developing nations.

From a US-Pakistan security relations perspective, both these aspects gave India a strategic significance in the US policy making and a virtual impunity to any pressure with regards to Kashmir issue. Thus, India could afford to scuttle all serious US initiatives for Kashmir dispute resolution, without any real danger of being cornered politically or economically.

\textsuperscript{308} (Chaudhri M. A., 1993, p. 15)
The US could not afford to lose India to Soviet overtures, as it was considered to be too valuable a country to be lost to the communists\(^{309}\). This global policy imperative thus emerged as a major source of divergence in the Pak–US security relationship.

**Economic Aid to India**

US economic aid to India, necessitated by the global imperatives to prevent Russian influence in that country and to develop it as a counter-balance to communist China, soured the US-Pak security relationship. \(^{310}\) It was difficult for the Pakistani leadership to digest that they were getting almost similar levels of aid as India, which neither had any alliance with the US nor really supported them at international forma, and more importantly an antagonist of their ally in the region, Pakistan. The issue of India’s leaning towards Moscow was very closely being monitored by the US Government in the aftermath of the Khrushev-Bulganin visit. By 1957, India seemed to be in the midst of an economic crisis, owing to a huge budget deficit and need for sizable foreign exchange injection to meet the ambitious goals for its second five year plan. This issue was raised by America’s ex Ambassador to India, Chester W Bowels after visiting India in Jan 1957. He wrote to President Eisenhower:-

“Without substantial U.S assistance over the next several months its (India’s) five-year plan would almost certainly fail, a failure likely to bring devastating consequences to India and to U.S. interests in Asia”\(^{311}\). India was considered as an example for the rest of the developing world. If it could be assisted in economic

\(^{309}\) (Chaudhri, 1993, p. 151)
\(^{310}\) (Chaudhri M. A., 1993, p. 15)
\(^{311}\) (McMahon, 1994, pp. 141,142)
growth and presented as an alternate and viable development model to China, this would encourage other nations to follow the free market economy."  

He tried to play up the dangers of not providing aid to India by hyping up the risks to the future of democracy in India. The incumbent Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker also shared these views, estimating Indian needs to be around $800 million to $1 billion. On these requests and on the recommendations of the State Department, President Eisenhower ordered a study by an interagency committee to look into the prospects of additional US assistance to India. The committee presented its report in May 1957, with the recommendation that the US must help India to close its budget deficit which was around $700 million to $1 billion.

The election victory of communist party in the Indian state of Kerala in March 1957, heightened the US concerns about a communist wave in the wake of an economic crisis in India. The State Department was quick to point out that "once a country, like China, comes under communist control it is lost to the free world; no amount of dollars can buy it back." India therefore was too important a prize to be lost to the Soviets. The Indians formally requested for aid in Sep 1957, through their Finance Minister T. T. Krishnamachari. There were deliberations within the US Government circles on the appropriate mode of funding and finally after a lot of interdepartmental haggling, the US Government announced an aid package in March 1958, comprising

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312 (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 240)
313 (McMahon, 1994, p. 184).
314 (McMahon, 1994, p. 186)
of $225 million and large quantities of wheat and other food grain under the PL 480 program.\textsuperscript{315} 

Pakistan’s leadership was predictably disappointed. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Malik Feroze Khan Noon strongly objected to the aid and requested an American pledge to defend Pakistan in case of an Indian attack in a letter to Secretary Dulles in September 1957. He also asked that the US should use the leverage of economic package to help resolve the Kashmir and other outstanding disputes between the two countries.\textsuperscript{316} 

Pakistan was also concerned that the Indians were getting more aid from the US i.e. $364.8 million compared to $170.7 million for Pakistan in 1957, despite Pakistan’s total involvement in alliance relationship. The US logic that India was receiving only economic aid, while Pakistan was receiving military aid, did not carry weight in Pakistan. Even some US officials themselves recognized this fact. Under secretary of state for economic affairs, Douglas Dillon conceded that India was a cleric example of country using economic aid to buy military equipment.\textsuperscript{317} 

The enormous aid to India compelled Pakistan to evaluate the option of leaving the alliance. Yet this step was not practicable at the time as Pakistan itself was too dependant on the US aid. There were debates in the National Assembly on the viability of an alliance relationship vis-a-vis non alignment, but the consensus was that Pakistan could not afford to be neutral, once the Indians were in a much better financial position to support their military expenditures.\textsuperscript{318} 

Additionally by 1958, with Field Marshal Ayub Khan over

\textsuperscript{315} (McMahon, 1994, pp. 183-187)  
\textsuperscript{316} (McMahon, 1994, p. 187)  
\textsuperscript{317} (Phillips Talbot and S.L./ Popalis, India and America, A Study of Their Relation, pp 92)  
\textsuperscript{318} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ‘Disenchanted Allies’, 2001, p. 89)
the reins of power, there was an increased orientation to cement the military alliance, as the General had been one of the prime mover and architect of this alliance\textsuperscript{319}.

In August 1958 the US Government arranged $350 million for India through the World Bank. It was a significant aid package involving the contributions from Britain, Germany, Canada, and Japan as part of an international consortium\textsuperscript{320}. The US government explained the aid to India as a necessary measure against communist ingress and tried to placate Pakistan by explaining that the aid did not mean that India was getting any higher priority. The argument did not do much to hide the obvious that the interests of the two countries stood widely divergent over this issue\textsuperscript{321}. This issue had become a sour point in the relationship and future developments only deepened the gulf between the two countries. President Eisenhower, at the end of his presidency visited India in December 1959. It cemented the growing cooperation between the two countries in both the economic and military fields. These included a multi-year PL 480 agreement between the two countries, the sale of U.S. C-119 aircraft to India, and increased US aid to India’s developmental projects. It was as the US Ambassador Bunker described “A brilliant success”\textsuperscript{322}.

The US government also placated the Pakistani government by accepting the request for advanced F 104 Fighter AC and Sidewinder Missiles, but this was largely due to the fact that now Pakistan was providing the US with base facilitates for the U2

\textsuperscript{319} S. M. Burke, \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy}, Oxford University Press London, 1973, p 241
\textsuperscript{320} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 63)
\textsuperscript{321} (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, pp. 253-255)
\textsuperscript{322} (McMahon, 1994, p. 205)
surveillance planes\textsuperscript{323}. The dissent in Pakistan owing to the US overtures to India, grew in the period\textsuperscript{324}.

The change of guard at White House in 1960 brought in the Democratic President John F Kennedy. He was an ardent supporter of Indian democracy. His administration attached even more significance to relations with India than its predecessor\textsuperscript{325}. Kennedy felt that the neutral countries could not be allowed to tilt towards the Soviets, as it would adversely affect the balance of power against the US\textsuperscript{326}.

The Kennedy administration believed that the thrust on formal alliances and military aid relationships with countries like Pakistan had resulted in weakening of US position with nonaligned countries like India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Ghana. Kennedy hoped to reverse that trend by demonstrating a more tolerant attitude toward neutralism and offering a more generous financial commitment to the economic development plans of neutralist nations. In one of his speeches before taking over as president, he remarked that India with the total population of South America and Africa combined, represented a very sizable chunk of the neutral countries on the globe / another feature adding to the allure of wooing India remained its competition with China, which the US Administration considered essential for its containment policy in Asia. Kennedy wanted to get other Western nations involved to provide

\textsuperscript{323} (McMahon, 1994, p. 204)
\textsuperscript{324} (Ahmad M., Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1968, p. 39)
\textsuperscript{325} (Stebbins, 1962, p. 209)
\textsuperscript{326} (McMahon, 1994, p. 215)
India with long-term loans, backed up by technical and agricultural assistance--designed to enable India to overtake the challenge of Communist China".327

In November 1959, before assuming the presidency, he remarked in a speech in California “No struggle in the world deserves more attention and time from this administration and next-than that which now grips the attention of all Asia, the battle between India and China”.328

This line of thinking elevated India’s position for the Kennedy administration. With Chester Bowels, a known Indian supporter and one of the earliest proponents of increased aid to India, as the Under Secretary of State, these views were given greater importance. A very significant shift was now taking place in the US-Pakistan Security relationship. The Kennedy advisors were so obsessed with the prospects of India alignment that they were prepared to risk of closing relations with Pakistan in order to gain Indian support. These views were expressed by National Security aide Robert W. Komer "If we must choose between Pakistan and India, the latter is far more important".329

The first reflection of this pro-Indian policy came through the ‘Aid India Consortium’ in Washington in April 1961 in which the United States pledged to provide India with $1 billion in economic assistance over the next two years.330 Pakistan was only promised a paltry $125 million for the next two years in a separate aid consortium in May 1961. In view of the growing concerns in Pakistan with regards to the pro-Indian

327 (McMahon, 1994, p. 214)
328 (Sherwani, 1967, p. 63)
329 (McMahon, 1994, p. 215)
330 (Sherwani, 1967, p. 65)
bias of the Kennedy administration, President Kennedy dispatched Ambassador at large Harmison to Karachi in March 1961 to reassure the Pakistani leadership, about American support in the collective security arrangement. However the discussions only highlighted growing differences over China and aid to India. The issue again cropped up during the visit of Vice President Lyndon B-Johnson, in May 1961. President Ayub was very forthright in his demand for an increased US role in mediation over the Kashmir issue, given their economic leverage over India. However Johnson declined to commit to any increased involvement by the US, and downplayed the US's ability to influence India over Kashmir. In fact the Johnson statement in India that “He urged Mr Nehru to extend his leadership to other countries of South Asia, on the behest of President Johnson”, was viewed very unfavourably in Pakistan.

These concerns were voiced even more openly by President Ayub, as he planned to visit the US in July 1961. He remarked "Can it be that the U.S is abandoning its good friends for the people who may not prove such good friends?"

In his meetings with President Kennedy, Ayub once again stressed the need for US to use its economic assistance as a bargaining chip for settlement of Kashmir dispute. He also stressed upon him to make a distinction between allies like Pakistan and non-allies like India.

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331 (Singh S., Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1970, p. 93), (Sherwani, 1967, p. 65)
333 (Singh S., Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1970, p. 94), (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 63)
President Kennedy opined that the economic aid could not be used as leverage for settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Instead he offered to discuss the issue with Indian Prime Minister Nehru in his forthcoming visit. Kennedy also promised to consult Pakistan first in case of an eventuality where the US contemplated providing military assistance to India. In view of the growing tensions between India and China, this was a very important commitment, which would figure out significantly in the bilateral relations later. President Kennedy visited India in November 1961.

After so much hype and expectations about India in the preceding years he expected Nehru to be sympathetic towards US global policies. However the two leaders were unable to find common grounds on most global issues including Vietnam. The key discussion from Pakistan’s perspective, centred on Kashmir. In this, Nehru once again rejected any major concession, except minor boundary adjustment and maintenance of the status quo.

This visit clearly reflected the limited leverage US had and was willing to exercise on Pakistan’s behalf. Another episode which further confirmed the US soft approach on India, was the US reaction to Indian invasion of Goa. The forcible annexation of this Portuguese enclave on December 17th by India received worldwide condemnation. The US Government was especially peeved, as it had, through diplomatic channels tried to stop India form military action. However the US Government resisted from

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334 (McMahon, 1994, p. 218)
335 (McMahon, 1994, p. 219)
any change in its policies, as the fundamental objective of building India as a bulwark against China remained firmly on track\textsuperscript{336}.

Pakistan Government was deeply disappointed by the US inability to achieve any breakthrough on the Kashmir impasse and considered raising the Kashmir issue at the UN once again. Spurred by the worsening situation, the Kennedy administration embarked on yet another initiative. This time it was a personal letter by President Kennedy to Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub, offering mediation on Kashmir. He offered the services of Eugene Black, President of the World Bank. Nehru once again rejected this offer, as brusquely as he had done to the earlier Eisenhower Administration offer of 1958\textsuperscript{337}.

There was a growing concern amongst US policy makers that the policy to support India could lead to intractable difficulties with Pakistan. One of Kennedy’s key advisors Robert Kromer, underlined this issue and the US stance in a memo in the beginning of 1962 as "If we must choose between Pakistan and India, [the] Later is far more important. Obviously, we want both. But is this feasible until we dispel Ayub's illusions that we will back him against India?"\textsuperscript{338}. His views had a broad acceptability in the policy making circles of the US administration. It was therefore inevitable that the Pak-US security relationship was on a downward curve.

\textsuperscript{336} (McMahon, 1994, p. 219)
\textsuperscript{337} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 126)
\textsuperscript{338} (McMahon, 1994, p. 220)
Divergence of Interest-US Slows Down Military Supplies

It is an interesting fact that the alliance despite involving millions of dollars of US military and economic assistance remained subject to criticism both in Pakistan and in the US. This was primarily due to the reason that the US Government realized that the money was not going into building of Pakistan against communist aggression but actually in preparing the country against India, which in a way kicked off an arms race in the sub-continent, detrimental to the US goals in the region. Thus they adopted a “go slow” approach on the supply of arms and equipment as promised initially. From Pakistan’s perspective, the country having aligned itself with the global agenda of a superpower, there was nothing to show for the satellite-ship to the public, who did not see any tangible progress on the core issue of Kashmir, and could not comprehend the need for an anti communist stance by the country. Thus the unpopular and unrepresentative leadership in the country came under increasing flak from the public over the alliance obligations which involved supporting US/Western stance in the Middle East. This in turn compelled the Pakistani leadership to ask for more assistance to justify their allegiance to the security relationship. General Ayub’s ascendance to the power added another dimension to this relationship. He being a military ruler was inherently biased towards the increase in the military assistance program. As a dictator, he also needed the visible support of the superpower to shore up his credibility. The coup in Iraq, which toppled the pro American regime also made Ayub more valuable for the US administration, as they feared a dynamo effect of the coup in other Baghdad Pact member countries. Continuation of military assistance and signing of another mutual security agreement with Pakistan in 1959
was in essence an effort to sustain a supportive regime in the country. In the absence of a shared vision and clearly defined objectives for the security assistance, the size of the military program and its perceived value to the both the countries thus remained under constant debate and criticism. The criticism and doubt about the security alliance was at the highest level of the US Government. President Eisenhower remarked that “Our tendency to rush out and seek allies is not very sensible." The military commitment to Pakistan was perhaps the worst kind of a plan and decision that we could have made, it was a terrible error, but now we seem to be hopelessly involved in it.”339 Some of the influencing factors and their impact on the security assistance program are discussed below.

**Pakistan’s Internal Political Instability and Subsequent Military Takeover In 1958**

In the aftermath of Liaquat Ali Khan’s death, Pakistan saw a rapid succession of leaders ascending to the Prime Minister’s office, one weak leader replaced by another in short spells. The political machination that led to the removal of Khawaja Nazimuddin and Muhammad Ali Bogra have already been discussed. As a result of the 1955 elections, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali became the Prime Minister in August 1955. Ghulam Muhammad was replaced by Iskander Mirza as the Governor General and Bogra returned to his previous post as the ambassador to the US. More importantly Ayub Khan retained his position as the army chief, relinquishing his post

339 (McMahon, 1994, p. 159)
as the defence Minster but still remaining as the key power broker behind the scene 340. Pakistan’s new constitution was signed in 1956, declaring the country as a republic. The office of the President retained most of the key powers. Ayub was granted an extension in tenure. The power of the civil military elite further increased 341. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali lost his job in the wake of violence following the strong protests in the country against the West’s biased attitude towards Israel in the 1956 Arab Israel War. He was replaced by Hussein Shaheed Suharvardy in November 1956. He lasted barely a year and differences with the President Iskander Mirza led to his resignation on October 10, 1957. His replacement was I. I. Chundrigar, another weak politician who himself lasted two months and was followed by Feroze Khan Noon.

In total, Pakistan experienced six prime ministers between the death of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 and General Ayub Khan’s military coup in 1958. As opposed to this, India had “one Prime Minister and Several Army Chief during the same time” 342. This political turmoil in the country did not help in building confidence of the US government in the stability of the country. In the period following the SEATO agreement, Pakistan’s fractured and squabbling political leadership, growing economic instability and inability to take stock of vital national concerns like food and grain security, weakened the country considerably. This seriously impacted the security relationship in the initial and formative stages.

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340 (Nawaz, 2008, p. 128)
341 (Nawaz, 2008, p. 129)
Additionally the Pakistani leadership in absence of tangible results on Kashmir found it ever more difficult to justify this alliance relationship to the public. Feroze Khan Noon declared in a speech to the National Assembly that the relations with the US would have to be reviewed in case there is no tangible progress on Kashmir, in March 1958. The public in the country did not share the vision of fighting the communists. Most people considered Pakistan as a Muslim country that should support the cause of other Muslim countries such as Egypt and Palestinians against the Israeli aggression. The pro-western bias prevented the government from taking a more public stance on the issues. This in turn estranged the population and resulted in large-scale resentment.

Interestingly the brunt of this public anger was taken by the political leadership, while the real power wielders i.e President Iskander Mirza and the strong military commander General Ayub Khan remained relatively immune to the criticism.

The net effect of this political crisis was that the US Government found it increasingly difficult to gain the kind of return on its substantial military and economic assistance as it had anticipated.

**Military Coups in Iraq and Pakistan.** The year 1958 was significant for the US alliances in the Middle East. On July 13, 1958, a military coup in Iraq against the unpopular regime supporting the US resulted in the abrupt withdrawal of the country’s military forces.

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from the Baghdad Pact. Fearful of the consequences of Middle East falling into the Soviet orbit, the US Administration renewed efforts to maintain the pro-West orientation of the remaining pact members, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran. So despite all the assessments against continued large scale military aid to Pakistan, it was decided not to reduce the level of support for the country in the present turbulent and charged political environment\textsuperscript{346}.

Within three months of the Iraqi coup, Pakistan also witnessed a coup, but not by the populist forces. It was a takeover by the pro west bureaucratic-military elite led by President Iskander Mirza and assisted by General Ayub Khan. In October 1958, the President removed the political government, and proclaimed martial law, appointing Army Chief General Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. He must have realized ruefully weeks later that the real power behind the putsch wanted nothing less than complete power himself. On 27 October, just a few weeks later, Iskander Mirza was sent packing in the same way as he himself had done to a succession of politicians in the preceding years. Ayub took over as the president of the country, promising a new era of stability and cooperation with the US\textsuperscript{347}. With his ascent to power the US Government felt considerably relieved about the state of flux in the national hierarchy. It must also have assured them that this coup had forestalled any chances of a national upheaval against an unpopular and discredited leadership.

General Ayub’s accession to the presidency signaled an end to one major concern for the US administration, the instability that had plagued the country. The military

\textsuperscript{346} (McMahon, 1994, p. 196)
program was now again reviewed in the light of the developments and the need to shore up a friendly regime. Thus it remained subject to conflicting requirements, most of which had nothing to do with the original rationale for the military assistance\textsuperscript{348}.

The military takeover, though appreciated by the US administration as conducive for further strengthening the military relations, was not without its obvious downsides. A prophetic report titled “Pakistan’s Military Regime Faces Great Problems”, by the Department of State in December 1958, concluded:-

“The prospect of prolonged suppression of freedom under military domination would intensify the risk of such an increase in tension and discontent in East Pakistan as perhaps to jeopardize the unity of the two wings of the country”\textsuperscript{349}.

**Differences over the Size of the Military program**

The size and progress on the approved equipment of the military program became controversial quite early in the relationship. The US Government realized that the Soviet threat that had been made as the raison-de-etre for the alliance was a “hoax”\textsuperscript{350}. The US government also increasingly became aware that their military support to Pakistan was prompting a matching response by India, resulting in an

\textsuperscript{348} (McMahon, 1994, p. 197)
\textsuperscript{349} (Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Vol One, 1984, p. 152)
\textsuperscript{350} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 93)
escalating arms race between the two impoverished nations\textsuperscript{351}. Thus the military aid to the country was more of an inducement to remain committed to the US global policies. In this backdrop, some of the commitments made in the initial aid-de-memoir of 1954 were also put on hold. This included a light bomber squadron. The US Government took its time in deliberating the issue and delayed any commitment despite repeated requests\textsuperscript{352}. In 1957 Pakistan requested for planning further military expansion in order to counter the Indian military buildup. This urgency for additional and expanded military assistance was not shared by the US Administration, primarily for the following reasons:-

1. Pakistan’s military program was not directed against Communist threat but was India specific.

2. The Pakistan military’s ability to provide a worthwhile capability for regional defence was quite limited. As per the US assessment, Pakistani military despite the beefing up by US aid was no match for a communist or even Indian threat and could hardly sustain for upto 30 days in West Pakistan and likely to collapse even more quickly in East Pakistan. The singular focus on a military buildup, that could not be supported by the country economically, was making Pakistan even more fractured and weak. At the time Pakistan was spending almost 56%
of its total revenue on defence\textsuperscript{353}. This would make the country less useful to the US and more dependent on them in the long term.

4. The cost of relationship both in political and financial terms was increasing beyond the expectations for the US Government. These thoughts reverberated in the US policy reviews and analyses for Pakistan. US Pakistan country team for Pakistan noted at the start of 1958 ‘Despite the fact that there has been an American aid program in Pakistan for seven years with total aid amounting to almost $700 million, Pakistan offers little or no hope for viability in the foreseeable future’\textsuperscript{354}.

Ambassador Langley was even more forthright in his assessment on the lopsided development in Pakistan, primarily focused on the armed forces "Military strength, without a sound economic and political base, does not constitute real strength in South Asia or elsewhere. It is time to rethink our approach to the Pakistan problem"\textsuperscript{355}. Key figures in the State Department shared the skepticism on the need for large armed forces for Pakistan. Under Secretary Dillon’s comments to Ambassador Langley encapsulated the opinion at the state department:-

“The military role and value of the Pakistan Army is dubious. In retrospect, it now appears clear that the military program in Pakistan was launched as a political measure designed to induce Pakistan to join regional security

\textsuperscript{353} (Nawaz, 2008, p. 136) \\
\textsuperscript{354} (Nawaz, 2008, p. 186) \\
\textsuperscript{355} (Jalal, 1991, p. 254)
pacts. From a purely military standpoint, maintaining large armed forces in Pakistan cannot be justified.\textsuperscript{356}

With the original rationale for military assistance to Pakistan as good as dead, the continuation of the aid package in relatively restrained form was due to two major factors:-

1. The first being the need to maintain a political setup that was providing valuable support to the US on international forums.

2. Second reason was due to specific need for the provision of base facilities for electronic surveillance through U2 planes. Pakistan had been identified as a suitable base owing to its geographical contiguity to the USSR. Pakistan remained sufficiently useful for the US to maintain financial aid and security cooperation.

The US President ordered an interagency review of the military commitments to Pakistan, keeping in view all these conflicting requirements. It was a long drawn process involving the Defence and the State Departments.\textsuperscript{357} In the meanwhile other developments kept adding new dimensions to the problem.

The period remained tumultuous and troubled from the point of view of expectations from both sides, especially Pakistan. Pakistani leadership, perhaps not very clear about these strategic perspectives of the US Administration and obviously more concerned with their own political fortunes which they had linked with the free flow of aid and military assistance, became increasingly frustrated with the slow progress.

\textsuperscript{356} (McMahon, 1994, p. 195)
\textsuperscript{357} (McMahon, 1994, p. 195)
on the promised delivery of military hardware. Especially frustrating for the Pakistani leadership was the delay in the delivery of equipment already agreed to in the original aide de memoire of 1954. A key component of this delivery program was a light bomber squadron for Pakistan Air Force. The US Administration delayed decision on the issue for much of 1957 and after a lot of deliberation it was finally approved in May 1958, with a delivery schedule that stretched well into 1960.\(^\text{358}\)

In the aftermath of the military coup in Pakistan, the Ayub Government intensified efforts to obtain the promised military hardware. The review being undertaken by an interagency task force resulted in inexplicable delays in the supply of arms to Pakistan, adding to the frustration of the Pakistani leadership. The US Defence Department was in favour of immediate resumption of aid, while the State Department insisted on the curtailment of defence expenditures. These two diverging perspectives within the US Government owed a lot to the assessments made by the respective departments, based on their areas of expertise and their set of priorities. The defence Department was still looking for ways to bolster the defence capability against the communists and the provision of base facilities for the surveillance flights over the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, the State Department looked at the issue in a much broader perspective. They had been receiving disturbing reports from the US Embassy staff in Pakistan that the country was spending far too much on the defence establishment. Despite the substantial US military aid, the cost of maintaining a large military machine was far beyond Pakistan’s capability. This expenditure was putting a strain

\(^{358}\) (McMahon, 1994, p. 195)
on Pakistan’s meager resources and was detrimental to the development of other state institutions vital for the long term viability of the country, as highlighted earlier\textsuperscript{359}.

Another concern that complicated the process was the fact that Ayub Government now looked towards the aid package as a test of the US friendship. With no political roots, the Ayub regime was very keen to court the US Government both for economic and military support as well as lending it an air of legitimacy. This was a time when the global powers were much more tolerant to military dictators in the third world countries as long as they towed their line. Across the globe there was a whole range of military rulers like Soikarno of Indonesia, Mobuto of Congo, Pinochet of Chile and many others. By Aug 1959, the US administration reached to a consensus with regards to military assistance program to Pakistan. NSC 5909 concluded that military assistance should continue for Pakistan, without any significant increases, chiefly for the reasons that reduction in aid may result in the following:-

1. Pakistan may retreat from its present anti-communist pro-Western policy.

2. It may jeopardize the U.S political position in the area.

3. It may weaken planned defences designed to protect U.S. interests in the Middle East

4. It could alienate the Pakistan military leaders who constitute the controlling element in Pakistan\textsuperscript{360}.

\textsuperscript{359} (McMahon, 1994, p. 195)
\textsuperscript{360} (McMahon, 1994, p. 203)
The report however clearly suggested that there should be no further increase in the military program, and all efforts by Pakistan to modernize its armed forces should be resisted.

From Pakistan’s perspective the military buildup viewed with pride, did have its hidden costs, as a non sustainable military machine, maintained solely with US assistance could only increase Pakistan’s dependence on a superpower patron whose strategic interests remained the driving force behind this aid\textsuperscript{361}.

This military aid if viewed rationally, could really not be expected to offset the strategic and military imbalance that existed between the India and Pakistan. This sole reliance on military buildup was counterproductive for the long term economic stability of the country as well as not good enough to achieve any tangible political objectives through the use of military instrument, keeping in view the comparable arms buildup by India. It was indeed a self defeating strategy with grave consequences for national viability and integration. But under a military regime this was the most likely course of action for Pakistan.

**Mutual Security Agreement -1959**

The Mutual Security Agreement between US and Pakistan was signed in the backdrop of Iraqi Coup, as a sort of reassurance that the US would assist Pakistan in the times of crises.

It did not bring anything new in the security relationship, though it did give rise to the confusion later on whether the US Government was bound by agreement to support

\textsuperscript{361} (Mahdi, Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981, 1999, p. 155)
Pakistan in a conflict with India, as it happened in the 1965 War. A closer look at the Article 1 indicates that the vague assurance gave rise to speculations about possible US assistance to Pakistan in case of a conflict with India:

“In case of aggression against Pakistan, the government of USA, in accordance with the constitution of USA will take such appropriate action, including the use of Armed Forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to promote peace and security in the Middle East, in order to assist the government of Pakistan at its request”\(^{362}\).

The key phrase in to declaration was “Joint resolution to promote peace and security in the Middle East” which specified that it was meant for armed aggression by any country controlled by communism. In this article there is agreement to support Pakistan to promote peace and security in the Middle East, and not in the Indian Sub Continent against India. It is amazing that the government of Pakistan was content with an assurance that did not even take into account the real threat to the national security. When Pakistan tried to invoke the agreement in 1965 War, the US Government pointed out that “Joint resolution on Middle East limited the US assistance to aggression against communist threat”\(^{363}\). The discredit for not clarifying the issue and informing the public should go to Pakistani leadership and not the US government.

\(^{362}\) (Sattar, 2007, p. 57)
\(^{363}\) (Sattar, 2007, p. 57)
The Surveillance Facilities and the U2 Episode

The most significant reason for continuation of security relationship turned out to be Pakistani’s geographic location, which was well suited for the US intelligence gathering facilities and surveillance flights over the Soviet Union. This had been one of the key priorities of the Defence Department since the beginning of the security relationship. Though the exact dates for establishment of these facilities are not clear, apparently these facilities were agreed to by the Pakistan Government during the visit to US by the Prime Minister Suhrvardy in 1957. These facilities were established in a ring around the USSR, in Iran, Norway and Pakistan in order to collect data and monitor the USSR's military capabilities. These facilities were spread over the country though the one that attained international fame was the Badaber airfield near Peshawar. US President Eisenhower gave approval for flights of U-2 Spy planes over Soviet Union from Pakistan.

The Ayub Government was able to extract major concessions from the US Administration on the plea that this provision made Pakistan vulnerable. During a visit to Pakistan in December 1959, the Pakistani leadership once again impressed upon President Eisenhower the dangers incurred by allowing its airfields to be used as bases for the U2 flights against another superpower and thus the need for enhanced air defence capability. The US President promised to consider the request for a squadron of F-104s as well as Sidewinder missiles. Subsequently this request was approved. The US Government’s decision to give these sophisticated weapons to

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364 (Nawaz, 2008, p. 130)
365 (Weiner, May 2008, p. 184)
Pakistan reflected Ayub’s shrewd negotiation tactics as this decision was in contravention to earlier assessments that Pakistan should not be given any new weapons systems\textsuperscript{366}. This was military aid for all the wrong reasons. It did not in essence reflect common goals and objectives rather a compromise at both ends to continue with the relationship for purposes other than those stated. Inherently flawed, such a relationship was bound to hit the rocks as soon as larger strategic objectives overruled US compulsion to support Pakistan. It would also be a changed scenario when the need for the intelligence facilities diminished due to some other technological advancement that did not require bases all over the world.

**The U2 Episode-May 1960.** An American U-2 plane, flown by Major Gary Powers was shot down while flying high over Russia on May 1, 1960. The plane was part of the US surveillance program, and was operated from military bases in Pakistan and Norway. It had taken off from the Pakistani city of Peshawar and was heading towards Bode in Norway\textsuperscript{367}. The pilot managed to bail out and was captured alive\textsuperscript{368}. Pakistan denied any knowledge of the U2 flight and only conceded that it had given permission for a communication facility\textsuperscript{369}. However the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was livid. He warned that “They (Pakistan) ought to know for their own good because they might be sufferers of Americans’ playing with fire”. He also

\textsuperscript{366} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 102)
\textsuperscript{367} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise Hisstory, 2007, p. 50)
\textsuperscript{368} (Weiner, May 2008, p. 184)
\textsuperscript{369} (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 196)
warned of rocket attacks on Peshawar. This episode though militarily not very significant for Pakistan, carried grave political consequences. It, for the first time brought home the downside of allying with a superpower against another superpower that actually did not have any direct confrontation with Pakistan.

The Ayub government stood publicly with the United States however, their confidence was badly shaken in the American support as well as the limitations of a very narrow foreign policy that only relied on one patron for diplomatic and military assistance. As highlighted by an American commentator Paul Grimes “Pakistan suddenly seemed to be aware of three factors: that such incidents as the U2 could touch off a war, that Pakistan could be a prime target and that the Soviet Union nearly touches Pakistan’s northern border, while US, her ally is nearly 9000 miles away”.

An analysis by the US Embassy in Pakistan also pointed to this growing concern:

"Because of the U-2 episode and its aftermath, President Ayub and Foreign Minister Qadir, while not weakening their adherence to the alliance with the United States, expressed a diminution in confidence in America's ability to act quickly, decisively, and competently in a crisis.”

In the follow up to the U-2 incident, Ayub Khan embarked upon a policy of decreasing the country’s dependence on the United States. This new policy relied on developing better relations with USSR and China, the two giants in Pakistan’s

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370 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 195)
371 (Sherwani, 1967, p. 92)
372 (McMahon, 1994, p. 204)
neighborhood, both of whom were earlier ignored due to one-track policy of looking towards the US.

In June 1960, Pakistan chastened by the U-2 episode decided to improve relations with Soviet Union. President Ayub remarked that he saw no reason why Pakistan could not do business with the Soviet Union. As a tentative start Pakistan concluded an agreement for $30 million Soviet loan to Pakistan for oil and gas exploration in Mar 1961. Simultaneously Pakistan entered into negotiations with China on the demarcation of borders in Kashmir between the two countries. Till this time, Pakistan had been ardently and consistently supporting the US stance on international fora. During the 1959 Tibet crises, Pakistan supported the UN resolution calling for respect of fundamental rights of the Tibetan people. Pakistan also during these early alliance years voted against China Inclusion in the UN seven times and abstained from voting twice, i.e 1952 and 1957. However, now Pakistan was much more receptive to closer contacts with China.

**Kashmir Initiatives by the US Government**

During the alliance heydays, the issue of Kashmir was brought up repeatedly by Pakistan, hoping to elicit US support in resolving the dispute. The period after joining two security alliances leading upto the 1962 Indo-China War was perhaps the most significant from the point of view of Pakistan’s closeness to the US. Two

373 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 213)
374 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 266)
375 (Sattar, 2007, pp. 70-72)
376 (Tewari, 1977, p. 198)
377 (Tewari, 1977, p. 194)
separate initiatives, one each by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administration launched with great care and deliberation were practically stonewalled by the Indian Government. This led to frustration and deep indignation in Pakistan and was crucial in disenchancing the leadership and the public in the value of US support.

The prospect of an arms race between the two countries in the sub-continent, coupled with the pressure from Pakistan to use their influence prompted the Eisenhower administration to initiate a dialogue process to resolve the Kashmir dispute in 1958. The additional incentive was to protect vital US interests in both the countries, for it was important to bring these two countries into some sort of peaceful co-existence so that they could then be encouraged to participate in the larger US plans for halting the communist expansion. The US Government proposed an integrated "package plan" for the subcontinent aimed at defusing tensions between the two countries by addressing the three major bilateral problems, i.e Kashmir, the arms race, and the dispute over the waters of the Indus River and its tributaries. This initiative reflected a wholesome approach to resolving the differences between the two antagonists. The US Government also took the British onboard. In a meeting between the working – level groups of the two countries, the details were hammered out in April 1958. Later the Secretary of State presented this plan to President Eisenhower, who fully endorsed it and even offered to visit the Sub-Continent personally if that helped. It was decided that the offer of a comprehensive dialogue will be delivered to the leaders of both nations simultaneously on behalf of the US President. The offer was delivered to the respective leaders by the US Ambassadors personally on May 16, 1958. The letters formally offered the "friendly assistance" of the United States government in helping
to explore possible solutions to the problems dividing India and Pakistan and proposed the dispatch of a special U.S representative to aid in the opening of formal, detailed negotiations whenever the two parties were ready.

This initiative, worked out with great deliberation and about eight months of consultation was brushed aside in one day by Nehru. In a letter of May 17, Nehru promised careful consideration but rejected any possibility of serious negotiations, citing political instability within Pakistan as being non conducive for serious dialogue\textsuperscript{378}. The US officials abandoned this attempt after the lackluster response by Nehru\textsuperscript{379}. However, this episode did reflect some disturbing signs for Pakistan.

Firstly it clearly showed that the US Government would not go beyond a point in supporting the Kashmir cause. This at a time when they had a lot of leverage over India.

Secondly, that alliance relationship was not a ticket for outright support to Pakistan. The US would like to help Pakistan but not at the cost of its own core interests, which at this time lay in wooing India into the Western orbit.

Thirdly that in absence of any real problem/pressure, India would not give up Kashmir through negotiations alone. As one US diplomat commented, "How could [the Indians] reject the President's offer so bluntly," "when they are seeking further aid from us?" "the Indians feel they are in the driver's seat and don't really want a settlement"\textsuperscript{380}.

\textsuperscript{378} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 97)
\textsuperscript{379} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise Histsory, 2007, p. 65)
\textsuperscript{380} (McMahon, 1994, p. 193)
This is the real reason for the Kashmir impasse, which our leaders do not impress upon the public. Pakistan has minimal chances to wrest Kashmir from India through UN resolutions or moral high ground or even a bit of pressure from a global power. In the wake of this initiative, two things should have been clear to the Pakistani leadership, first the limitation of the US to meaningfully influence India over Kashmir, and secondly the futility of the defence relationship that could not possibly achieve the desired goal i.e security against India and solution of the Kashmir dispute through US arms and influence. As early as 1957, The US Ambassador in Pakistan, Langley observed that:-

"U.S handling of its relations with India has convinced most Pakistanis that the U.S rewards those who snub it, takes its sworn friends for granted, and is hesitant in forceful direct action in the cause of international justice”\textsuperscript{381}.

However the alliance relationship was not really about the stated objectives or even these objectives that the public was made to believe but also about political survival of the leaders, about the economic instability of a country that was being kept afloat by the aid. Herein lay the real issue i.e divergence in the core interests between the benefactor and the recipient of security aid\textsuperscript{382}.

The third initiative by the US administration aimed at resolution of Indus Water Dispute was more successful. The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in September 1960, through the auspices of the World Bank and the active political and financial

\textsuperscript{381} (McMahon, 1994, p. 194)
\textsuperscript{382} (Ali M., 2006, p. 22)
assistance of the US Government\textsuperscript{383}. Though it was an extremely significant agreement, resolving a potentially damaging discord between the two countries, however it did not give any positive impetus to the Indo-Pakistan security situation especially Kashmir.

Thus the alliances which had started with much enthusiasm in 1954, seemed to be tottering under the pressure of changed US strategic priorities in the region. In the absence of shared core security interests, it would not be long before the alliance relationship would be put under severe strain.
CHAPTER 2
FADING ALLIANCES – DISILLUSIONMENT AND ESTRANGEMENT 1962 – 1979

Introduction

This chapter tackles a very unique period of US-Pakistan Relationship. The vague perception and faulty premise, which had led to the commencement of the security partnership, were fully exposed in the wake of Indo-China War of 1962. As the US went ahead with the policy of containing China and propping up India as a bulwark against the communist expansion, Pakistan found that its core security concerns was not only threatened but also heightened by the Indo-US military and economic cooperation. This basic divergence in the strategic objectives of the two countries was obviously detrimental to the security concerns of Pakistan. The Birch Grove Communique, between the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and US President John F. Kennedy set the tone of new US policy towards the sub-continent, where the primary focus was to bolster India’s defence capability against China and possibly wean it further away from the Soviet influence. In this backdrop Pakistan’s core security issue, the defence capability against India and the resolution of Kashmir dispute, both took a backseat in the US strategic priorities.

Pakistan, disillusioned by the security relationship, looked to achieve a balance in its foreign policy by engaging China, which by now had emerged as a natural ally against India, and by tentative contacts with USSR. This initiative by the
junior partner, however, angered the Johnson administration, which saw this as a breach of solidarity against communism. It also struck at the very basis of the US-Pakistan security partnership, which was ostensibly to wage a common struggle against spread of communism.

Thus by 1962, the US strategic perspective vis-à-vis the sub-continent had changed considerably and Pakistan found itself to be at cross-purposes to the US objectives. In the year leading up to 1965, this acrimony over Pak-China relations grew steadily, leading to a major setback in relationship in 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson cancelled Pakistan President Ayub’s visit to the US.

In this environment, when Pakistan was not even at cordial talking terms with the US, the country’s leadership embarked upon a dangerous military adventure in Kashmir that not only backfired, but led to a full scale war with India. The war did not go in Pakistan’s favour, and US-Pakistan relations suffered a major setback when the Johnson Administration suspended all military aid to Pakistan. This was a major blow, as Pakistan was almost entirely dependent on the US military aid. The chapter analyses the differing perspectives of the US and Pakistan sides, on the stoppage of aid and the US role in the Indo-Pak War. The 1965 war effectively ended the most fruitful period of US-Pak Security Partnership both in the military and economic fields.

Later in 1969-1971, President Yahya and Nixon rekindled the relationship, primarily due to US interest in using Pakistan’s rapport with China, for a US-China backdoor diplomacy.
The 1971 East-Pakistan Crisis and the eventual dismemberment of Pakistan was a very traumatic experience for the country. Since it was still a nominal ally of the US, there was much heartburn and resentment on the US role in the crisis. This aspect has been analysed in some detail, to understand differing perspectives and perceptions, which led to the wide chasm between Pakistan’s expectations and the US response.

The final part of the chapter tackles the post 1971 US-Pak security relationship. In this period, Pakistan, now reduced in size and importance, looked towards the Muslim countries and nuclear deterrence for safeguarding its security and foreign policy objectives. In this period, as Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions became more clear to the US, the security relationship that had already moved from a positive, vibrant relationship in late 1950’s to dormant one in late 1960’s, now entered a negative phase. Pakistan was now subjected to coercive diplomacy and sanctions for the first time. This situation remained relatively unchanged till 1979, when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan once again brought the country to the center-stage of US policy objectives in the region.

**Indo-China War 1962-Beginning of a diminished security calculus between the US and Pakistan**

The Indo-Chinese conflict, a short border conflict with limited military implications, had far reaching political fallout internationally and especially with regards to Pak-US security relationship. It brought to fore the inherent discrepancies
and inconsistencies in the security relationship. It in fact signalled an end to the apparently cozy relationship that Pakistan had tried to cultivate with the US\textsuperscript{384}. The conflict also had far-reaching effects on the nature and shape of future relations as the interests of the smaller partner now squarely stood at tangent from its superpower patron. Some of the issues raised by the conflict are as under:-

1. The conflict provided the US strategists much sought after opportunity of developing closer relations with India and weaning it away from its non-aligned leanings.

2. Pakistan’s efforts to normalize relations with China, which had started since 1960, now became unacceptable to the US. This strained the mutual security relationship that was essentially one sided in nature, with US providing much needed financial and military assistance.

3. India, despite a military debacle, stood to gain enormous goodwill and support from the West, thus undermining Pakistan’s ability to leverage its association with the US for any meaningful support on Kashmir.

4. The military aid to India, in the aftermath of the Sino-India conflict meant that the distinction between an ally (Pakistan) and neutral (India) disappeared\textsuperscript{385}.

5. The war further strengthened Pakistan’s desire to seek common ground with China, now that both countries shared a common enemy. Thus,

\textsuperscript{384} (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 241)
\textsuperscript{385} (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 242)
the conflict defined a new regional landscape where Pakistan’s natural position lay closer to China.

6. Interestingly, the conflict, in a way, allowed Pakistan with an excellent opportunity to put pressure on India for settlement of Kashmir issue, both militarily and politically. This could not be fully exploited due to the pressure by the US Administration which did not want to weaken India at this stage. Ironically, the alliance hampered Pakistan’s pursuance of the very objective that it had initially joined it for. Ayub Khan writes that the US, instead of putting pressure on India to settle Kashmir, adopted the course of “Asking Pakistan to assure Nehru that she would take no action on the frontier to alarm India”\(^\text{386}\).

**The Conflict**

The break in Sino-Indian relations occurred in the aftermath of Beijing’s crackdown in Tibet in 1959 and Indian decision to offer political asylum to the Dalai Lama and his followers. The other aspect of friction was the Himalayan border between the two countries where both countries claimed portions of the territory. Though the immediate reason for the conflict was the border dispute, there were indications that China wanted to ensure that there was no subversive activity in Tibet from the Indian side.

\(^{386}\) (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1990, p. 288)
The border clashes erupted on October 20, 1962, with Chinese forces launching attacks against Indian positions in Ladakh, Indian-occupied Kashmir, and the Northeast Frontier Agency. They lasted till November 20, 1962 when the Chinese after thoroughly routing the Indians on the battlefield, declared a unilateral ceasefire. The one month long clashes though restricted to the remote Himalayan region had profound impact on the geopolitical landscape of the Sub-Continent.

The Indian Government was caught by surprise from the sudden and ferocious Chinese offensive. Despite the fact that mountains are considered more defensible, providing lot of strength to a defender, the Indian troops in the disputed areas seemed to be helpless against the Chinese. This military incompetence added a sense of urgency to the situation. By 28 October the Indians had conveyed their desire for US assistance and President Kennedy, replied promptly in a personal letter to Nehru "I want to give you support as well as sympathy". The Indian Prime Minister who had long touted neutrality and self-reliance, and castigated Pakistan for reaching out to the US for support against a regional threat (India) now did exactly the same, when confronted with Chinese threat. He accepted the offer of US military assistance. In fact, when the Indian counter attack launched on November 14, failed and the Chinese further consolidated their gains, he panicked completely and asked for immediate US assistance, inviting direct US military involvement. In a letter to the US president on November 19, 1962, he requested for 12 fighter squadrons, to be flown by the US pilots, along with sophisticated radars and surveillance equipment. The US Government was still analyzing this request when

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387 (Sattar, 2007, p. 77)
the Chinese, having routed the Indians militarily, declared a unilateral cease fire and withdrew their forces to the areas originally claimed by them. This final diplomatic masterstroke completed a resounding victory for the Chinese, who in one swoop secured their border claims, exposed Indian weakness and prevented the conflict from extending further.

The Soviet Government during this conflict was left in an awkward situation, with two of its close friends at opposing ends. They did not play a proactive role, preferring to maintain neutrality. This gave the US planners an opportunity to exploit the situation to their advantage.

The Kennedy administration though aware of the problems likely to be raised by any emergency aid to India did not want to let up on a perceived opportunity. The war "can give us a major breakthrough in Asia," noted the NSC Subcommittee on South Asia, "provided we can find ways to help India stand firm against the Chinese without disrupting our relationships with Pakistan". Thus the initiative to give military aid to India was forged. In order to get Pakistan on board, the US President, John F Kennedy dispatched a personal letter to Ayub Khan on October 28, explaining that U.S aid to India was designed solely to counter communist aggression. "These are interests which we all share," he wrote. "Certainly the United States as a leader of the free world must take alarm at any aggressive expansion of Communist power, and you as the leader of the other great nation in the subcontinent will share this alarm." Kennedy called upon Ayub to play the role of statesman by offering a unilateral no-
war pledge to India, thus allowing India to shift all its forces to the border fight in the Himalayas.\textsuperscript{389}

President Ayub felt personally let down as Kennedy had promised him twice, first at Washington and then at Newport, that the United States would consult Pakistan before offering military aid to India. In actual fact he had only been informed of the decision and not consulted. Ayub had commented on this aspect in the Joint session of the US House of Representation on 12 July 1961, alluding to this possibility:

\begin{quote}
“The only people who will stand by you are people of Pakistan, provided your one prepared to stand by them”. So whatever may be the dictates of your commitments you will not take any steps that might aggravate our problems or in any fashion jeopardize our security”.\textsuperscript{390}
\end{quote}

This did not materialize as he had hoped for. The US decided to give aid to the Indians regardless of Pakistan’s security concerns. He, in response to the American President’s letter did not agree with the assessment and considered the Chinese incursion a border clash and not a new level of aggression by the communists. He also correctly assessed that arms supplied to India for defence against China would eventually be used against Pakistan.\textsuperscript{391} Bhutto termed it as a “phony war, intended to whip up war hysteria and gain western aid”.\textsuperscript{392} State Department analysts also

\textsuperscript{389} (Sattar, 2007, p. 77) (Barnds W. J., 1972, p. 179)
\textsuperscript{390} (Gauhar, 1996, p. 114)
\textsuperscript{391} (Khan M. A., 1967, pp. 141-143)
\textsuperscript{392} (Syed, 1974, p. 103)
believed that Chinese purpose for the conflict did not include significant territorial expansion\(^{393}\). However, it proved to be a strategic windfall for the Indians.

The episode had a very negative effect on the leadership and public in Pakistan. There were angry demonstrations and editorials across the country. The US aid to India signified a very important new development. Any real hope of using the American influence in settling the Kashmir dispute was now an forlorn hope for Pakistan. As Komer, Kennedy’s key security advisor and an ardent supporter of closer ties with India told Kennedy on November 12, the Pakistanis were "going through a genuine emotional crisis as they see their cherished ambitions of using the US as a lever against India going up in the smoke of the Chinese border war"\(^{394}\).

The US pressure prevented Ayub Khan from taking advantage of the military situation and pressing India on Kashmir either diplomatically or militarily

> “Thus Pakistan lost its best chance to settle Kashmir through force of arms, and most ironically, whether Pakistan gained anything substantial from its friendship with the United States or not, it was India that became the greatest beneficiary of this relationship\(^{395}\)."

Bhutto was very skeptical of the handling of the war by the Pakistani establishment. He was of the opinion that the Pakistan Government did not take any real advantage from the conflict:

> “If the significance of that conflict had been properly understood, and if President Ayub Khan had acted decisively, Pakistan might have avoided

\(^{393}\) (Sherwani, 1967, p. 109)  
\(^{394}\) (McMahon, 1994, p. 225)  
\(^{395}\) Pakistan drift into extremism, 39, 40
many subsequent catastrophes and, perhaps even vindicated its legitimate interests. The Government stopped into the void haltingly and with fear, primarily to bargain with the United States”\textsuperscript{396}.

Though this harsh assessment may not be entirely correct yet undoubtedly the security relationship severely circumscribed Pakistan’s options at this strategic moment. The linking of Pakistan’s foreign policy with the global agenda of a superpower was an obvious disadvantage, made painfully clear by this episode. This prompted Pakistan to look for alternatives to sole dependence on the US support.

It also brought home painfully for Ayub the bitter lesson that nations have interests first and friendships later. It also reflected the real value of Pakistan’s relations with the US. The administration planners felt confident that they could ride the storm of Pakistani protest since Pakistan was still too much dependent on the US aid to do without it\textsuperscript{397}. It was evident that Pakistan’s heavy dependence on the US aid and limited tangible contribution in the security alliance did not give the country significant influence with the US administration\textsuperscript{398}. The only valuable contribution from Pakistan, apart from political statements, was the bases and surveillance facilities for which the US was already paying a hefty price in terms of military and economic assistance.

\textsuperscript{396} (Bhutto Z. A., Pakistan and the Alliances, p. 58)
\textsuperscript{397} (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 289)
\textsuperscript{398} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ’Disenchanted Allies’, 2001, p. 133)
The US- India Military Cooperation-1962 Onwards

The US India cooperation in the military field in the aftermath of the 1962 War removed the last distinction between Pakistan and India as far as alliance relationship with the US was concerned. This actually spelt the end of the security relationship as far as Pakistan was concerned, now that its principal backer was arming its adversary.

“The Sino Indian conflict provided a golden opportunity for the United States to persuade India to make a common cause with it against China. In return India was to receive substantial economic and military aid and the leadership role in South Asia”.

The US Government stance that it was arming India against the common foe, Communist China, did not carry weight in Pakistan, as it did not take into account the physical situation on ground, where Pakistani and Indian forces sat eye ball to eye ball across almost 600 miles of Line of Control in the disputed region of Kashmir. This point was raised by President Aytub, in an interview with a western component “If she (India) is not likely to use this aid against China, where is she going to use it? Obviously, against Pakistan, because they say Pakistan is enemy number one”. The developments related to the US military aid to India thus became a major source of divergence in the period following the war. There are three events of significance in this regard.

399 (Gauhar, 1996, p. 105)
400 (Khan R. A., Forty Years of Pakistan - United States Relations, 1990, p. 45)
401 (Sattar, 2007, p. 77)
402 (Gauhar, 1996, p. 122)
The Duncan Sandys – Averall Harriman Mission. The US Government, now presented with the opportunity they had been long waiting for, decided to take full advantage of the situation. President Kennedy decided to dispatch Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Averall Harriman to the subcontinent, in a bid to explore ways of closer US-Indian military cooperation. He was accompanied by British Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys. This they hoped would then be helpful in drawing India away from the Soviet influence. Harriman, a very senior negotiator, was also assigned the additional sensitive task of convincing the Pakistan Government that the US initiative was also in their broader national interest as their cooperation at this stage might eventually lead to a mellowed Indian stance towards the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

The crisis placed the Soviets in a difficult position, with two friendly countries fighting it out. They adopted a neutral posture in the conflict. This presented an ideal opportunity to the US to step in and make a move to wean away India which now had requested for outright military support.

Averall Harriman and Duncan Sandys arrived in New Delhi on November 25, 1962. They promised Nehru short term and long term military support. They convinced Nehru to restart negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir as it would make it easier for the administration to win over Congressional support for military aid to India.

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403 (Gauhar, 1996, p. 122)
404 (McMahon, 1994, p. 223)
Nehru sensing the inevitability of the situation at the moment agreed to the proposal reluctantly\textsuperscript{405}.

After the meetings with the Indian leaders, the Harriman mission moved to Karachi for talks with Ayub Khan. The meetings between Harriman and President Ayub focused on the issue of military aid to India. Harriman highlighted the need for US to support a neutral country in face of communist aggression. Ayub accepted the logic of limited military aid but made it clear that Pakistan needed tangible progress on Kashmir and the current situation allowed the US to use its leverage to bring India to the negotiation table. Harriman on his return strongly recommended that the US should use its influence to restart the stalled Kashmir negotiations. Harriman very aptly described the situation to Secretary Dean Rusk "if the present opportunity toward encouraging a settlement in Kashmir is not seized, it is hard to see how any other occasion more favorable will arise"\textsuperscript{406}. However, the US Government was at this stage quite quick to assure the Indians that the aid proposed for India was not dependent on the resolution of Kashmir dispute\textsuperscript{407}. Thus even before the start of negotiations, there was no real pressure on the Indians for any compromise\textsuperscript{408}.

This took the sail out of Pakistan’s key argument that the US should use its influence to settle Kashmir, especially now that it had extra leverage over India due to the military aid. With this US stance it was evident that the negotiations on Kashmir now initiated by the Indians on US request did not stand much chance of success right

\textsuperscript{405} (McMahon, 1994, p. 226)
\textsuperscript{406} (McMahon, 1994, p. 227)
\textsuperscript{407} (Brines, 1968, p. 268)
\textsuperscript{408} (Sherwani, 1967, pp. 113-114)
from the outset. Indians did not stand to lose anything by being intransigent in the negotiations.

The Pak-India negotiations commenced in December 1962. Ayub correctly identified this as an opportunity for India to cash on the western support, and gain military aid, which could then be equally advantageous against Pakistan\textsuperscript{409}. During this period Pakistan also concluded a border agreement with the Chinese. It was signed in Feb 1963, much to the discomfort of the Indians and the American Government. The Nehru Government, forced to the negotiation table due to political expediency, remained as rigid and intractable as before. In the ensuing months, there was no tangible progress on Kashmir\textsuperscript{410}. By May, the US Ambassador in India, Galbraith observed. “What had originally looked like a vigorous initiative "became a disastrous bungle. When it was all over, we were about back where we started”\textsuperscript{411}

Having gone through with the exercise on Pakistani insistence, President Kennedy in a crucial White House meeting on April 25, expressed his strong desire to go forward with a program of substantial military assistance for India--regardless of the state of Indo-Pakistani relations\textsuperscript{412}. The US President valued the containment of China much more than the risk of alienating Pakistan further. Thus Nehru once again rode out the threat to Indian interests in Kashmir, while simultaneously managing to keep the Americans interested.

\textsuperscript{409} (Gauhar, 1996, p. 140)

\textsuperscript{410} (Bindra, Indo- Pak Relations, Tashekent to Simla Agreement, 1981, pp. 26-27)

\textsuperscript{411} (McMahon, 1994, p. 229)

\textsuperscript{412} (McMahon, 1994, p. 229)
Birch Grove Communiqué- May 1963

After the apparent dead end in the Indo-Pak talks, President Kennedy signaled his approval to continue with the program of military aid to India, regardless of the progress on Kashmir. This in fact meant that at the strategic level Pakistan’s contention that America should use its leverage to influence the India government was turned down by the Kennedy administration. This decision was reinforced by the US Government in a formal communiqué issued at the conclusion of talks between President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in May 1963. The communiqué pledged to continue the aid to India regardless of the state of discussions on Kashmir. This was in fact the carte blanche to India, a repudiation of the very basic assumption of Pakistan’s alliance relationship with the US. It served to highlight the fundamental difference in the strategic objectives of the two countries. The Kennedy-Macmillan pledge of continued military aid to India, in conjunction with the failure of the Kashmir negotiations, strained American relations with Pakistan almost to a breaking point.

The arming of India by the US and its allies had a serious impact on the military balance in the Sub-Continent. The Indian military strength increased substantially (by the eve of 1965 War, they had twenty-two divisions, against Pakistan’s six and one-half). Dr Rais Ahmed Khan contends that:-

“Had the US made military aid to India become made contingent on a settlement of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the United Nations

413 (Sattar, 2007, p. 80), (Sherwani, 1967, p. 74)
resolutions, the war between India and Pakistan in September 1965 could have been avoided”\textsuperscript{414}.

Similar views are expressed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was at the time Foreign Minister of Pakistan. He commented on the Birch Grove communiqué “The shadow of war, that has been looming large on the horizon of the sub-continent over the last decade, will grow darker”\textsuperscript{415}. At this stage Pakistan was confronted with the difficult choice whether to keep its fruitful economic and military relations with the US regardless of the Kashmir situation or go for a radical shift in its policy towards its alliance. The US Government waited to see whether this development would derail the relationship, jeopardizing its use of intelligence facilities or whether Pakistan Government would come around to the realities of an adjusted relationship. Thus the events set in motion by the Indo-China War now brought a perceptible divergence in the basic objectives of the two countries. The combined stance adopted by the two key western nations reflected a growing importance of India for the West in the wake of the Chinese conflict. This further reinforced Pakistan’s growing desire to strengthen its relations with China, fast emerging as a logical geopolitical ally. In a National Assembly Debate on 26 November 1962, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto commented that Pakistan’s friendship with China was “unconditional” and that China had been more understanding of Pakistan’s compulsions regarding Kashmir\textsuperscript{416}.

\textsuperscript{414} (Khan R. A., Forty Years of Pakistan - United States Relations, 1990, p. 41)
\textsuperscript{415} (Government of Pakistan, Handout E, No 2708, 11 July 1963)
\textsuperscript{416} (26 November 1962, p. 63)
US Military Aid to India

Having identified the new direction for US security assistance in the Sub-Continent, the US Government worked out the contours of military aid to India. By May 1964, India was promised $50 million in military aid for fiscal year 1965 and a $10 million credit for the purchase of U.S. military equipment, during a visit by Y. B. Chavan, the Indian Defence Minister. Indian Prime Minister Nehru died on May 24, and was replaced by Lal Bahadur Shastri. Chavan rushed back to India in the wake of Nehru’s death. The US Government announced the details of this new military agreement on June 6, 1964. The reaction in Pakistan was of disgust, anger and betrayal. Ayub Khan commented during a press interview that U.S. policy is "based on opportunism and is devoid of moral quality". Now Americans do not hesitate to let down their friends." The same sentiments were also conveyed to the American President in a formal letter on July 7, 1964. He noted that Pakistan might review its obligations to SEATO and CENTO Pacts due to this new development. The letter was formally delivered to President Johnson by Pakistani Ambassador Ghulam Ahmed. The US President, in response, reiterated the US stance that the American aid to India was not against Pakistan but to shore up a threatened country against communism. He refused to accept that the US had abandoned a friend. He on the other hand, charged that Pakistan was guilty of breach of commitments by getting closer to China, a common enemy. He told the ambassador that “If Pakistan chose to

\[417\] (Sherwani, 1967, pp. 77,78)
\[418\] (Chaudhri, 1993, p. 156)
\[419\] (Sattar, 2007, p. 83)
reexamine its relationship with the United States, regrettable as it might be, the United States would have no choice but to re-examine its relationship with Pakistan\textsuperscript{420}.

**Pak- China Rapprochement - A Key Source of Divergence with US Security Agenda**

By 1963, the Pakistani initiative to forge closer ties with China became much more than a minor irritant in the relationship and in fact assumed the role of a major diverging factor\textsuperscript{421}. This singular factor more than any other, set the tone for the relationship in the following two years leading to the 1965 War. It was as if two issues complimented each other in souring the relationship\textsuperscript{422}. These issues were the US economic and military aid to India, and Pakistan’s developing relations with China, a country that was now the major US antagonist in Asia. In essence both the countries were supporting each other’s enemy, albeit for their own specific strategic interest. However, Pakistan with little to offer in the mutual security relationship except the use of its intelligence gathering facilities, stood to lose more, if this downward spiral continued.

Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1962 War and the US response to the Indian security assistance requests, now started looking more eagerly to expand ties with China. There was an active effort to reduce the sole dependence on the US. Foreign Minister Bogra during National Assembly Debates remarked that there could be “no eternal

\textsuperscript{420} (Sattar, 2007, p. 83)

\textsuperscript{421} (Sherwani, 1967, p. 118)

\textsuperscript{422} (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 290)
friends and no eternal enemies” The only thing eternal was national interest. There was a general consensus in Pakistan that China offered a good hedge to Pakistan’s overdependence on the US. Pakistan’s developing etente with the Chinese has been aptly described as “Born of small-power insecurity, combined with a deepening skepticism about the reliability of its principal ally, Pakistan's opening toward China serves as a classic case of geopolitical expediency overcoming ideological dissonance.”

The new phase in relations with the Chinese started with the Border Agreement signed between the two countries in Feb 1963, whereby Pakistan and China adjusted their borders in Kashmir and Northern Areas of Pakistan with mutual agreement. The agreement involved demarcation of territory between Xinjiang Province and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. The two countries decided to mutually adjust borders with some territorial adjustments.

In July 1963, Pakistan announced opening up an air link with China. This announcement was received with dismay by the US administration. US State Department Representative Richard Phillip termed it as a breach of free world solidarity. The agreement made Pakistan International Airlines the first international airline operating from Canton and Shanghai. Pakistan also decided to halt any further development of the US’s intelligence gathering facilities. This decision caused consternation in the US Senate. One

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423 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 288)
424 (McMahon, 1994, p. 242)
425 (Bhutto Z. A., Reshaping Foreign Policy, p. 185), (S.M Burke, “Sino-Pakistani Relations”, Orbis Summer, 1964)
426 (Sherwani, 1967, p. 118)
427 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 299)
outspoken Senator Wayne Morse bluntly declared that "all foundation for so-called strategic assistance to Pakistan has disappeared, and (Pakistan) ought to be eliminated from the foreign aid bill for fiscal 1964". Looking at it from the American perspective this indeed was an apt observation, as the original rationale for the alliance was in fact fighting the Communists. The Chinese had threatened a neutral country India and were also seen as a major hidden threat in the rapidly escalating conflict in Vietnam. Now unfortunately for Pakistan, the communist shared common interests against India and happened to be a neighbor.

From Pakistan standpoint the US military assistance to India was a direct threat to national security. As Bhutto remarked:

> “American military support for India had revealed the irreconcilable contradictions between the different assumptions on which Pakistan and the United States had built their special relations.”

So the inherent flaws and contradictions in the original rationale for the security alliance, which had been brushed aside in the earlier years, now plagued the relationship. A series of developments, mainly related to the differences over China, over the next two years complicated the relationship further, bringing it to its lowest ebb at the eve of the 1965 War. Some important events that indicated the worsening ties between the two allies are discussed below.

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428 (McMahon, 1994, p. 231).
George Ball Visit- August 1963. The Kennedy administration decided to dispatch Under Secretary of State George Ball to visit Pakistan for a comprehensive dialogue with the Pakistani leadership in Aug 1963. He tasked George Ball to look into ways

"To arrest the deterioration in U.S Pakistan relations so that our major interests in the security and stability of the subcontinent and in the Peshawar facilities can be protected without at the same time endangering the development of our new relationship with India"\textsuperscript{430}. However, the basic contradiction in the perceptions of the two countries defied easy solution. The discussions between Ball and President Ayub were held at Rawalpindi for a period of three days. Both parties discussed their specific compulsions. The US stance was once again reiterated that aid to India was part of the global strategy to contain communism. President Ayub contended that this did not alter the fact that the US aid to India had seriously jeopardized Pakistan’s security. On his part George Ball stated the US position that further steps towards improving ties with the Chinese may jeopardize Pakistan’s relations with the US. As Mcmohan remarks “The Ball mission ---revealed with disturbing clarity that the United States and Pakistan were embarked on a collision course”\textsuperscript{431}. Altaf Gauhar a close confidant and Information Secretary with President Ayub writes:

\textsuperscript{430} (Sherwani, 1967, p. 118), (McMahon, 1994, p. 231)
\textsuperscript{431} (McMahon, 1994, p. 232)
“George Ball visit marked a historic turning point, if not a break in Pakistan’s relations with USA. Pakistan had not changed sides in the Cold War, but its presence in SEATO and CENTO had become purely symbolic.”

The only aspect agreed upon in the visit was expansion of the Badaber airbase being used by the US.

The Kennedy administration set the tone for the strategic equation with Pakistan in which China emerged as a major stumbling block in the security partnership. By relegating Pakistan’s genuine security concerns to vague global objectives of building up India against perceived Chinese threat, the US pushed Pakistan towards an untenable position. Professor McMahan concludes that:

“The administration's decisions were rooted not in regional realities, but in a series of global illusions: the illusion that China posed an immediate threat to the security of Southeast Asia; the illusion that India could--and would--contain Chinese expansion; the illusion that a Sino-Pakistani entente posed a major threat to U.S. interests.”

Yet these were the basis of the US policies towards the region and Pakistan found itself at the wrong side of the US global policy objectives. The grand designs of a superpower did not allow any divergence of thought or actions from a dependent regional ally. This does not sink in well with President Ayub who perhaps believed too much in friendship and personal commitments.

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432 (Gauhar, 1996, p. 144)
433 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 'Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 146)
434 (McMahon, 1994, p. 233)
The Johnson Presidency- Further Bad News for Pakistan US Security Cooperation

On November 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated and Lyndon Johnson took over the US Presidency. During his tenure as the US Vice President; he had developed a favorable opinion of the Pakistani leadership and especially of President Ayub whom he considered a strong and reliable leader. However, right at the outset of his tenure the signs of divergence in the security partnership were unmistakably clear. The first meeting between President Johnson and Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took place at the sidelines of President Kennedy’s funeral. Bhutto had stayed back in Washington to deliver personally a message by President Ayub. The meeting took place four days after the funeral, at the White House. It was the first instance that the issue of Pakistan’s developing relations with China were discussed by the US President with the Pakistani Foreign Minister. The US Government considered the Chinese as a pariah state. Their policy dictated isolating the Chinese at all levels and preventing them from gaining respectability and legitimacy at the international level. In this backdrop the Pakistani overtures towards China were viewed as a serious breach of the US anti communist agenda. The American President warned Bhutto that the Chinese President Zhou Enlai’s visit to Pakistan, planned in February 1964, could result in serious "public relations" problems for the United States. More importantly, it could seriously jeopardize congressional support for future U.S economic and military aid to Pakistan. Bhutto tried to explain

435 (Gauhar, 1996, p. 145)
Pakistan’s compulsion, which was primarily necessitated by the enhanced US military and economic support to India. The argument did not sink in with the new President who was quite blunt and responded that “he was a friend of Pakistan and would continue to be one--"if Pakistan would let him”\(^{436}\). The meeting highlighted few very disturbing trends for Pakistan with regards to the future of the security relationship:-

Firstly, China stood out as a major diverging factor in the security relationship. With vital security interests of the two countries dictating opposing directions on the issue, there was little scope of common ground unless one of the parties radically modified its broader policy goals.

Secondly, President Johnson displayed little patience and understanding of Pakistan’s legitimate security imperatives. This attitude at the highest level of the US administration indicated a rocky road ahead if Pakistan continued with its policy of forging closer ties with China. The US President’s blunt discussion with the Pakistani foreign minister did not leave any doubt that he would not tolerate divergence from US worldviews from an impoverished third world partner. Bhutto emerged visibly shaken from the rough treatment meted out by the US President\(^{437}\).

Thirdly, Pakistan, more of a client than a partner in the security relationship, stood out to lose the most in case of a downturn in the security relationship. Tying its fate to the global agenda of a superpower initially in the alliance, now had started to produce its fallout for Pakistan.

\(^{436}\) (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 148)
Fourthly, the new US President showed little tolerance and understanding of the third world problems. He believed in a straight forward approach whereby any assistance by the US should be repaid in some way by the recipient.

**China factor in the American strategic calculus.** Since China emerged as the major disconnect in the US-Pak security relationship at the turn of the 60’s, it is important to look at the US stance and policy imperatives for China. The US viewed China as a belligerent country. It, in some ways replaced Soviet Union as the major threat to world stability in the US reckoning. The US government was working on the policy of isolating and containing the Chinese influence. This automatically elevated the status of any country which could be used to further this US goal. Development of cordial bilateral relations with China, by any country, especially one like Pakistan which had forged a relationship with the US based on the containment of communism, was thus totally unacceptable to the US Government. On December 9, 1963, these concerns were formally conveyed to the Pakistani leadership in a letter from the US President. President Johnson once again reiterated his objection to the Chinese overtures by Pakistan:

"Regardless of Pakistan's motivations, which I understand but frankly cannot agree with, these actions undermine our efforts to uphold our common security interests in the face of an aggressive nation which has clearly and most explicitly announced its unswerving hostility to the Free
World. Pakistan's interests are best served by doing everything possible to strengthen, not weaken, its ties with the Free World.\textsuperscript{438}

**The Taylor Mission-December 1963.** In view of the growing discord between Pakistan and the US, President Johnson dispatched US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor to India and Pakistan in December 1963. The visit was yet another reflection of steadily diverging trends in the security relationship between Pakistan and US. His objectives for Pakistan were to persuade the Pakistani leadership that China and not India posed the real danger to the security of the Sub Continent. He also wanted to convey to the Pakistani leadership that the US would continue to provide military aid to India in view of the Chinese threat. He also intended to convey American desire that Pakistan must fulfill its obligations to SEATO and CENTO if it expected continued American aid.\textsuperscript{439}

The logic that China and not India was the main threat to the security of the subcontinent may have seemed rational to the American planners, but for Pakistan living under the shadow of a belligerent neighbor, it just did not cut ice. China figured out once more as the real diverging issue. General Taylor met Ayub on 20 December 1963. He again cautioned President Ayub about the dangers of flirting with the enemy.\textsuperscript{440} Ayub’s explanation that the forthcoming visit by Chinese Premier reflected little more than an effort to normalize relations with a hostile neighbor, did not satisfy

\textsuperscript{438} (McMahon, 1994, p. 243)
\textsuperscript{439} (McMahon, 1994, p. 244)
\textsuperscript{440} (Gauhar, 1996, pp. 144-145)
the American general who remarked that "Ayub will be seen in close company with [Zhou] on every TV in the world, to the detriment of US/ Pak relations."\(^{441}\)

General Taylor’s visit served to highlight the growing gulf between US and Pakistan goals in the region. Upon return he recommended a five year military assistance package for India, despite Pakistan’s reservations. With regards to Pakistan he recommended continued military assistance contingent upon fulfillment of alliance obligations\(^{442}\).

An important part of the discussion seems to be the unofficial assurances that Pakistan could rely on the US assistance in case of an attack from India or any other country. General Taylor also proposed joint exercises and deployment of a naval task force to allay Pakistan’s security concerns. The suggestion of Naval Task force was rejected by President Ayub as he contended that the real threat to Pakistan’s security emanated from the Indians and not from the sea\(^{443}\). However, the assurances did prove to be a diverging factor when Pakistan asked for US to intervene in the 1965 War. It is therefore understandable that during the 1965 war there was a general sense of betrayal amongst the Pakistani leadership and public. What is not understandable that the leadership took these assurances on the face value, a somewhat wishful approach given the significant stakes for the US policy makers in a friendly and aligned India. China, of course stood as a major stumbling block in the security relationship. Pakistan was now confronted with a very difficult choice. If it continued to normalize


\(^{442}\) ibid

\(^{443}\) (Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 ' Disenchanted Allies', 2001, p. 151)
relations with China, it stood to widen the existing chasm in the relations with the US. On the other hand, growing US military and economic assistance to India strengthened its enemy and made its security dilemma even worse with every passing year. In this situation, China rather than America stood closer to Pakistan with regards to its legitimate security concerns. Thus Pakistani leadership was presented with a “catch twenty two” situation. It stood to lose big, regardless of which option it chose.

The Taylor recommendations were agreed to by the US administration. It was also agreed that "the principle of parallelism between India and Pakistan would be a guide to all future U.S. military aid decisions in the subcontinent" 444. This principle of course was not sacrosanct and would change if the strategic balance between India and Pakistan changed, as was the case eight years later in the aftermath of the dismemberment of Pakistan.

So both the countries were to be offered five year military assistance programs. Pakistan would also be offered new supersonic aircraft, however, the aid was made conditional to fulfillment of its alliance obligations. President Johnson also desired that future discussions on military assistance to Pakistan should be delayed till after the planned visit of Chinese Premier Chu-en-Lai to Pakistan in order to assess the true extent of Pak-China relations. It was also principally decided that aid to Pakistan would be conditional to fulfillment of alliance obligations 445.

444 (McMahon, 1994, p. 245)
445 (McMahon, 1994, p. 245)
Despite a mellowed and somewhat circumscribed reception to the Chinese Premier by Pakistan, the American Government dispatched another high-ranking diplomat to Pakistan to reinforce their concerns about Pakistan’s China policy. Assistant Secretary of State, Talbott Pakistan visited Pakistan in March 1964, to convey another personal message from President Johnson to President Ayub. This visit also harped on the same theme that future military aid would be contingent upon Pakistan’s developing ties with China. However, it is important to note that even Talbott realized that it would be very difficult for Pakistan to accept pressure on the issue "In view of [the] centrality of India" to Pakistani national security planning, Pakistan would likely continue to welcome such "alternative options to full dependence on [the] US" as a strengthened entente with China.

The Johnson administration was getting increasingly embroiled in Vietnam during this period. The American military presence in the country was growing rapidly, along with mounting casualties and corresponding domestic pressure at home. In this situation China stood out as the most dangerous adversary, being the principal backer of the Vietcong guerrillas. Chinese detonation of an atomic device in 1964, further alarmed the US analysts. In this situation the Pakistan-China developing friendship was viewed extremely negatively by the Johnson administration.

With the alliance badly tilted in US favor, Pakistan enjoyed limited leverage in defining the direction of the future relations. By the end of 1964, the alliance was dragging along because of specific interests rather than any shared objectives. The US was not willing to lose the intelligence facilities and Pakistan was not in a position to

446 (McMahon, 1994, p. 246)
break away owing to its heavy dependence on US military and economic assistance. As Mc Mohan points out:-

“Pakistan still required U.S. aid for critical development and defence priorities; and the United States still valued the intelligence-collection facilities that Pakistan permitted it to operate447.

New US Policy Direction for Pakistan - 1965

At the start of 1965, the US State Department crystallized the direction for US–Pak relationship. It recommended that Pakistan should be clearly told that its relations with China could not "exceed the speed limits" imposed by the United States if it desired continued ties with Washington448. Hence China now stood out as a major diverging issue in the relationship. Pakistan being the junior partner stood to lose the most due to any fallout from the differences. And the fallout came much earlier than expected. President Ayub was extended an invitation to visit the US in Jan 1965. In March of the same year, Ayub won the presidential elections in Pakistan. He later embarked on a trip to Beijing and Moscow where he was warmly received. Ayub’s visit to Moscow in April 1965 did not result in any spectacular new developments, but opened up relations with a superpower, long ignored due to Pakistan’s reliance on the Western Alliances449.

His standing at home also improved owing to this new, more independent foreign policy initiative. This trip did not go well with President Johnson. He reacted by

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447 (McMahon, 1994, pp. 245-250)  
448 (McMahon, 1994, p. 250)  
449 (Dawn, 21 April 1965)
withdrawing the visit invitation to President Ayub just nine days before the scheduled date.

The main contributor to the decision was the eight day’s Ayub visit to China, where, he was warmly received. In a mass rally in Beijing, he announced that “Pakistan and China were united in their common determination to eradicate the vestiges of imperialism and colonialism” 450. He pledged "lasting friendship and fruitful cooperation" between Pakistan and China. A joint communiqué issued at the end of meeting “reaffirmed the view of both countries that Kashmir dispute should be resolved in accordance with the wishes of people of Kashmir”451. More importantly, Pakistan joined China for the first time in condemning the US policy of “Two China’s” a mention to US support to Taiwan452.

President Johnson now more embroiled in Vietnam could not take this cozying up of an ally with a perceived enemy and citing Ayub’s China visit as an excuse wrote to the Pakistani leader that it would be better to postpone the visit “I cannot overstate the full depth of American feeling about Communist China”, Johnson wrote:-

"The mounting number of American casualties in South Vietnam is having a profound effect upon American opinion. This is being felt in Congress just at the time when our foreign aid legislation is at the most sensitive point in the legislative cycle".

450 (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 296)
451 (Pakistan Horizon, 2 October 1965)
452 (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 296)
Under the circumstances, President Johnson felt that, a postponement of the visit until September, when it would likely generate less heat, appeared the wisest course of action.\(^{453}\)

Pakistan now for the first time was faced with the prospect of a true break in the relationship. The US government also withdrew its invitation to the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, to retain some semblance of respectability in the Pak – US alliance which would obviously have looked as good as dead if only President Ayub was denied the visit.\(^{454}\) The step was also meant to convey US annoyance over the continued military cooperation between the Indians and the Soviets.\(^ {455}\) It actually diminished any hopes of India falling into the Western orbit, as the US planners had hoped.

Yet India at this stage despite its developing security relations with the Russians fitted much better in the US global security calculus than Pakistan:

> “A common fear of China had forged a strong sense of shared interests between India and the United States, much as a profound cleavage over China policy had pulled Pakistan and the United States apart.”\(^ {456}\)

The strong arm tactics did little except confirm and strengthen the Anti-American sentiments in Pakistan and reinforce the perception among the masses that the

\(^{453}\) (Johnson to Ayub, April 14, 1965, NSC HySA, NSF, LBJL)  
\(^{455}\) (Barnds W. J., 1972, p. 197)  
\(^{456}\) (McMahon, 1994, p. 251)
Americans were unreliable friends. The impression in Pakistan was that the US wanted to use the aid as a means to shape Pakistan’s foreign policy\(^{457}\).

**The Rann of Kutch Conflict**

In this backdrop, clashes erupted between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch, an area of low lying marshes in the extreme south of the Pakistani province of Sind. Though the military actions were tactical in nature, yet the political fallout was quite grave, especially for Pakistan. The Johnson Administration immediately laid an embargo on the use US supplied military arms on both the countries\(^{458}\). This was a disconcerting decision for Pakistan for two very important reasons:-

1. The American Government failed to live up to Pakistan’s expectations that it would support Pakistan against Indian aggression. This effectively exposed the hollowness of the alliance relationship. It should have left no doubt in any of the Pakistani leaders mind that the US support against India was not even a remote possibility.

2. The arms embargo meant that Pakistan, which had been relying on US arms primarily for defence was now in a serious quandary. It had only one real enemy, which had now developed sufficient common ground with America that they were prepared to stop the arms pipeline to Pakistan at the most crucial time. From the American perspective the

\(^{457}\) (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 316)

\(^{458}\) (Barnds W. J., 1972, pp. 198-199)
US President’s reluctance to take a more proactive role in the conflict stemmed from two reasons:-

i. The US Government was getting increasingly sucked into the Vietnam Conflict, which reflected a more immediate and pressing situation for the Administration. Pakistan and India did not figure out much in this new strategic development. President Johnson was not satisfied with the return on the substantial military and economic aid being channelled into both India and Pakistan. Both countries were reluctant to support the American stance either diplomatically or in any other meaningful manner.

ii. The Rann of Kutch conflict was the reality check that the Pakistani leadership could have used for a serious and dispassionate reappraisal of its foreign policy options. It had confirmed their worst fears and highlighted the dangers of over reliance on a single patron. Yet even under these circumstances, the alliance was still not dispensable for Pakistan, at least in the near term. It was relying too heavily on the US economic assistance to break away abruptly without serious consequences. Thus, there was a need for a careful reappraisal and very calculated moves with regards to India. Unfortunately, emotions and miscalculated adventures worsened the situation in the coming months.
The conflict instilled a false and somewhat misplaced sense of superiority in the Pakistan Army, with the general impression that the Indians had been routed and that they were somehow inferior. This assessment unfortunately was overly optimistic. As William Barnds points out “The Rann of Kutch conflict left Pakistan dangerously overconfident and India dangerously frustrated.” Similar views have been expensed by Altaf Gauhar “For all his realism and prudence, Ayub’s judgement did get impaired by the Rann of Katch in one respect: His old prejudice that ‘the Hindu had no stomach for a fight’ turned into belief …… which had decisive effects on the course of events.” There was a general euphoria in Pakistan, over defeating the Indians.

The conflict also reflected the true status of Pak-US security relationship. Ayub Khan should have been amply clear that he could not rely on any moral or material support from the Americans in any military conflict with the Indians. The Americans for all their involvement in the region did not even mediate in the conflict but in fact left it to their junior partner, Britain to take the lead. The cease fire was signed in London on June 30, 1964. In this scenario, it is all the more difficult to comprehend why the Pakistani Government opted for the 1965 adventure.

**Postponement of the Pakistan Aid Consortium - July 1965.** The Rann of Kutch conflict signaled the beginning of a new low in the security relationship

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459 (Cloughley, 2001-2002, p. 61)  
460 (Barnds W. J., 1972, p. 200)  
461 (Gauhar, 1996, p. 237)  
462 (Ahmed B. (., 1967, pp. 69-70)  
463 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 325)
between the US and Pakistan. The aspect that was not fully comprehended by the Pakistani leadership was that now the US had much larger stakes with India and it would not like a regional conflict that would divert focus from the anti-communist/anti-Chinese orientation.

Pakistan’s statements in the SEATO conference at London in May 1965, soon after the cancellation of Ayub’s visit to the US, reflected this dip in the relationship between the two countries. Pakistan expressed its reservations on the ongoing conflict in Vietnam, and expressed hope for restoration of peace in “accordance with the existing Geneva agreements”\(^{464}\). This was not taken well by the US administration. This new stance was reflected in the economic arena. The US Government postponed the World Bank consortium in which future assistance package for Pakistan was to be decided\(^{465}\). The US Government offered to discuss “certain other problems” in the intervening period, before the aid consortium was again assembled on 27 September. This was a stark reminder to Pakistan that the US still could affect Pakistan in many ways\(^{466}\). This action was designed to send a warning to Pakistan that the US support could not be taken as granted.

The reaction in Pakistan was quite furious. Anti American demonstrations were held in major cities. President Ayub, in a speech declared that the US Government was

> “It is our right to normalize relations with our neighbors, however different our ideologies might be, and that right will not be allowed to be

\(^{464}\) (Sherwani, 1967, pp. 138,139)
\(^{465}\) (Khan R. A., Forty Years of Pakistan - United States Relations, 1990, p. 44)
\(^{466}\) (13 July 1965, p. 1326)
compromised. It was in that context that I said we are looking for friends not masters."\(^467\)

An assessment by the State Department's Intelligence Bureau correctly identified that: "Pakistan apparently considers the postponement of the Consortium pledging session as a major crisis in US-Pakistani relations, and Ayub has probably come to believe that the US intends to use economic aid as a lever to force modifications of Pakistan foreign policy."\(^468\).

The step, far from chastening Pakistani leadership, resulted in further estrangement between the two countries. This is worth understanding, as the US did not leave any doubt as to its stance on the India Pakistan conflict as well as their response to Pakistan’s developing relations with China\(^469\). There were anti US rallies in many parts of the country. In one of these rallies, the police had to resort to tear gas to protect the US Information Center in Dacca.\(^470\) This US move to postpone aid consortium effectively closed the channels of communication with Pakistan. The US was clearly looking for Pakistan to explain what benefits it would get from further aid to Pakistan.\(^471\). In this situation, there were three things very obvious from the security relationship perspective. The US Government did not contemplate any preferential treatment to Pakistan in a conflict situation with India; The US Government was very averse to the Chinese factor in the Indo-Pakistan equation; Under these circumstances any military venture by Pakistan would be sans US

\(^{467}\) (Sherwani, 1967, pp. 138,139), (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 316)
\(^{468}\) (McMahon, 1994, p. 253)
\(^{469}\) (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 316)
\(^{470}\) (Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 316)
\(^{471}\) (New York Times, 30 August 1965)
diplomatic/military support and any Chinese involvement in the region would be unacceptable to the US.

1965 Indo-Pakistan War (August-September 1965)

The war owes its origins to the Kashmir conflict. Pakistan had not been able to achieve any breakthrough in the efforts to rekindle the Kashmir issue through the UN. India on the other hand had been steadily consolidating its position in the valley through optics of assembly elections and different resolutions, designed to provide legitimacy to their control over the disputed territory. Pakistan also was wary of the increased military buildup of the Indian armed forces that would widen the gap further between the two countries. Additionally, the strong reign of Nehru in India had finally ended, leading to the Shastri Government, a man who erroneously was considered to be a relatively weak person by the Pakistani leadership. After Nehru’s death, both Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Foreign Minister and Brigadier Riaz Hussain, the Director of the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI), tried to convince Ayub that “moment for decisive intervention had arrived”. The solution to the impasse, proposed by Foreign Minister Bhutto, was to instigate an armed rebellion in Kashmir, by sending in raiders from West Pakistan. This proposal was based on two assumptions. First assumption was that Kashmiris were waiting to be liberated, and the second one was that India would not escalate the conflict beyond Kashmir. The war once initiated

472 (Barnds W. J., 1972, p. 201)
473 (Gauhar, 1996, p. 167)
474 (Riza M. G., 1984, pp. 18-20)
took a much different course than that anticipated by the Pakistani leadership, escalating into a full blown military confrontation across the borders of West Pakistan. From the US Pakistan Security Relationship perspective, it was a defining moment. All the inconsistencies and incongruities now came to the fore, much to the disappointment of both the parties, especially Pakistan. The basic issue for Pakistan was the promise of US military support in case of a threat to its security. Since the US cut off all military aid to the country at the start of the war, it was taken as abandonment of a trusted ally in times of crisis by the Pakistani leadership and the public. In terms of convergence and divergence of interests, this war provides the most interesting insight into these two aspects.

**State of security relationship at the commencement of hostilities.** It is ironic that Pakistan decided to initiate a conflict with India, when its relations with its superpower patron were at the lowest ebb. A gradual decline precipitated by the Indo-China conflict had now led to a situation that the two countries were maintaining a mere pretence of military cooperation. The situation at the eve of the 1965 War was that US had almost cut off military and economic aid to Pakistan and the US President had personally conveyed to the Pakistani Ambassador that his Government would review the security relations if Pakistan continued to forge closer ties with China. The diplomatic relations could not have been any worse, with anti American sentiment running high in Pakistan and the Pakistani leaders criticizing the US openly on their policies towards India. The US side was equally miffed, and had conveyed its

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475 (Barnds W. J., 1972, p. 197)
annoyance in the strongest possible terms by canceling the visit invitation to President Ayub.

**The military conflict.** A series of strategic and military miscalculations and false assumptions by the Ayub Government led to a situation that India was knocking at the doors of Lahore, with Pakistan Army barely managing to keep it at bay. The War in the context of the security relationship can be considered as a watershed event. It exposed all the inconsistencies and anomalies in the Pak-US security relationship and effectively destroyed it for good. It also ended the best period of stability and growth that Pakistan had enjoyed, thanks to a relatively stable government and US economic assistance.

The hostilities commenced on 5 August 1965, when Pakistan infiltrated commando units into Kashmir, ostensibly to give a fillip to the secessionist tendencies there and forcing India to the bargaining table. This operation was codenamed “Gibraltar”, linking it to the successful landing at Gibraltar, by Tariq bin Ziyad, which led to the conquest of Spain by the Muslims many centuries earlier. This operation was based on the assumption that the Kashmiri people were ready to be liberated, so an infiltration operation with commandoes would give the movement the desired momentum. It was also assumed that the Indians would restrict their response to Kashmir only, and not open up hostilities across the international border. The prime mover of this concept was foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who not only convinced Ayub despite his reservations but also painted a bright picture of Chinese

\[4^{76}\] (Cloughley, 2001-2002, p. 64)
military and political support. “The crux of Bhutto’s argument was that under international law Indians would be restricted to their response only to the “disputed territory” of Kashmir”\textsuperscript{477}.

Interestingly there was no calculation of US response, on which Pakistan depended for bulk of its military equipment.

Unfortunately the operation took a much different course than that anticipated. The infiltrators managed to get into the valley but they were picked up by the Indian Army and isolated/taken out with relative ease\textsuperscript{478}. Not only this, but the Indians also started

\textsuperscript{477} (Kheli, 1982, p. 21)

\textsuperscript{478} (Barnds W. J., 1972, p. 70)
advancing towards the Pakistani held positions on the Line of Control and were able to push back the Pakistani forces at a few strategic locations, the most significant being the Hajipir Pass, which was captured by the Indians\textsuperscript{479}. At the stage the Kashmiri people had little interest in revolt and the infiltrators were unable to stir up rebellion as perceived by Bhutto\textsuperscript{480}. Pakistan now had lost the initiative and was threatened with losing even some of those parts of Kashmir, which were in its possession since the 1948 War. Till this time Pakistan had relied upon volunteers and selected commando personnel for incursions into the disputed territory.

Faced with this dire situation, the President General Ayub Khan, who was also the commander of the Armed Forces, decided to up the ante by launching conventional military operations across the border, in order to cut the main Indian artery into Kashmir valley. This operation was codenamed “Grand Slam”. It was an armored thrust to capture the Indian town of Akhnur, lying on the only road link to the Kashmir Valley. Launched on 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1965, it was significant from the security relations perspective as it involved the use of US supplied Patton tanks by the Pakistan Army. This move did not achieve the desired result. The thrust petered out short of Aknur\textsuperscript{481}. This attack was likely to produce only one response, i.e a full scale battle across the international borders; however the strategists somehow contended that by launching a major military operation in the lower fringes of Kashmir, they could somehow restrict it only to Kashmir. Militarily and politically it was not a

\textsuperscript{479} (Riza M. G., 1984, p. 108)  
\textsuperscript{480} (Cloughley, 2001-2002, pp. 64-65)  
\textsuperscript{481} (Cloughley, 2001-2002, pp. 61-66)
sound assessment, and the Indians did not “play ball”. General Shaukat Riza writes:-

“Our attack through Chamb (Operation Grand Slam) was made to ease pressure on 12 Division (Deployed in Kashmir, responsible for Operation Gibraltar). The only way India could react to this threat was to attack Sialkot and Lahore. Somehow we convinced ourselves that our tactical compulsions were holier than those of the Indians”.

The Indians escalated the war by launching full scale military operations across the international border, aiming to capture the city of Lahore, on 6th September. Since the Pakistani leadership had discounted the possibility of an all out war, therefore neither the political nor the military establishment was prepared for it. The Air Force and the Navy had not even been kept in the loop. Most importantly the Army itself was not prepared for a major conflict. “There were six moth eaten divisions to defend 2200 kms of border against the Indian Army”.

At this critical juncture, with the Pakistan Army trying to fend against multiple Indian thrusts across the border, the US Government announced an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan on 8th of September. This embargo was absolutely crippling for Pakistan as it relied almost exclusively on US supplied equipment and hardware.

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482 (Riza M. G., 1984, pp. 110,111)
483 (Riza M. G., 1984, p. 111)
484 (Riza M. G., 1984)
485 (Nayak, 1984, p. 131)
Indians were much better placed, as they had a larger army, greater war stamina and other sources of military equipment, chief amongst them, the USSR.\textsuperscript{486}

The arms embargo effectively closed any chances of Pakistan continuing the war effort for long. At the start of the war UN Secretary-General U Thant issued an urgent appeal for a cease-fire. Arthur Goldberg, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, also endorsed this appeal, signaling the American desire for termination of hostilities at the earliest.\textsuperscript{487} Pakistan was fighting a defensive war after 6\textsuperscript{th} September, barely managing to keep the Indians at bay. The Indian offensive in Sialkot and Lahore was halted by some tenacious defence by the Pakistan Army and support from the Pakistan Air Force.\textsuperscript{488} The situation was of a precarious stalemate, with Pakistan Army on the defensive and fast losing its war fighting stamina.

**Chinese Ultimatum to the Indians.** The Chinese sent an ultimatum to the Indians on 17 September to dismantle a string of border outposts on the disputed Sikkim border, within twenty four hours, “Otherwise the Indian Government was to bear responsibility for the grave consequences arising there from.”\textsuperscript{489} Whether it was in response to Bhutto’s request to influence the situation on Pakistan’s behalf or as a means to put some extra pressure on their adversary, this Chinese ultimatum caught the American Administration by surprise. The possibility of Chinese joining the conflict posed serious threats to the US interests and influence in the Sub-continent. In

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\textsuperscript{486}(Rizvi H.-A., 1986, p. 128)
\textsuperscript{487}(Shivaji, 1990, pp. 121-123)
\textsuperscript{488}(Choudhury G. W., Pakistan’s Relations with India 1947-1966, 1968, p. 296)
\textsuperscript{489}(Arif, America-Pakistan Relations - Volume One, 1984, p. 85)
\end{flushright}
words of Secretary Dean Rusk, “If Pakistan decided to play its China card the Indo-Pakistani war could be converted "into a Free World-Communist confrontation". In the view of American planners, it would seriously hurt the US credibility worldwide. Thus the Johnson Administration embarked on a vigorous and renewed effort to bring about a ceasefire under the UN auspices. Their aim was to retain some sort of influence in the Sub–Continent and prevent Chinese ingress into this area in any manner. This difference in perception highlights the inconsistencies in the security partnership, built on false assumptions. The major disadvantage of this inconsistency basically was felt by Pakistan as it needed US support both politically and militarily to continue the war effort. The inability of the Pakistani leadership to properly gauge and factor in American response meant that now they were sitting on the opposite side of the ideological divide, with their principal backer USA strategically aligned with their much stronger adversary India. The US Ambassador McConaughy, met President Ayub in the wake of Chinese ultimatum and forcefully pressed him to accept a ceasefire brokered by the UN. Ayub despite his reservations was faced with an unenviable choice. He had lost the best opportunity to influence the outcome of the conflict in the early stages of the war. Both the infiltration in Kashmir and the thrust in Jammu had been thwarted by the Indians. The Pakistan Army had barely managed to keep the Indian Army from capturing Lahore. This factor was further accentuated by the stoppage of the US military assistance. He had flown to Beijing on 19/20 September to discuss the situation with Zhou En Lai.

490 (Choudhury G. W., Pakistan's Relations with India 1947-1966, 1968, p. 296)
and Marshall Chen Yi. The Chinese promised support if Pakistan could sacrifice a few cities and continue to wage a protracted war. Ayub had not counted on, or planned for a prolonged struggle\textsuperscript{492}. Reluctantly, he agreed to a UN ceasefire on 22 September.

In any case the Chinese contribution to the outcome of the battle was negligible\textsuperscript{493}. The Chinese ultimatum remained a threat only and it was again extended on 19 September. It, in fact, increased the pressure on Pakistan to stop the war. The US and allies tended to believe that there was some sort of collusion between China and Pakistan, which actually aggravated their fears of the conflict becoming wider in scope\textsuperscript{494}. “Chinese overreaction had encouraged the collusion theory and tended to damage what remained of Pakistan’s good relations with the US”\textsuperscript{495}. It also raised expectations of the common Pakistani, as to the final outcome of the conflict, without understanding the larger strategic picture\textsuperscript{496}.

**Analysis of divergence.** There are two key questions from the security relations perspective. Firstly; Why did the US not support Pakistan in the war diplomatically and militarily? and secondly; Was the stoppage of military aid a breach of the alliance commitments by the USA?

\textsuperscript{492} (Gauhar, 1996, p. 237)  
\textsuperscript{493} (Syed, 1974, p. 122)  
\textsuperscript{494} (Barnds W. J., 1972, pp. 207-208)  
\textsuperscript{495} (Syed, 1974, p. 124)  
\textsuperscript{496} (Daily Time, 10 June 2005)
Looking at the US stance on the war, the conflict was a serious threat to their regional and international interests. The conflict presented the US administration with two distinct problems:

Both India and Pakistan were recipients of massive US military and economic aid, thus any conflict between these two would be construed as a failure of US policies in South Asia. These sentiments can be understood from the statement of one prominent US politician, Congressman James A. Haley, who was amongst many that joined in condemning US policies in the region.

"The situation as it stands today has made us look ridiculous in the eyes of the entire world. The blunt truth is that the hundreds of millions of dollars we have given these countries has equipped them to mount war against each other."  

The US Administration was fearful of the Chinese intervention in the conflict, which could escalate the conflict beyond its local dimensions. On Sep 15, 1965 the US Ambassador to Poland warned the Chinese to stay out of the war. Thus China was a diverging factor in the US Pakistan equation at this critical juncture.

The stoppage of aid to both countries can be best understood in the backdrop of these two factors. But then the important question that Pakistan was an ally bound to the US with three different security agreements. Was it abandoned by the US? As Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s foreign minister at the time had correctly concluded:

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497 (Barnds W. J., 1972, p. 205)  
498 (McMahon, 1994, p. 255)  
499 (Sherwani, 1967, p. 140)
“If international events are looked at from one angle only, the United States’ decision to terminate military assistance to Pakistan would seem to be an abrupt and arbitrary act. If, however world issues are objectively analyzed, not in the context of bilateral relations but globally, the decision appears to be neither abrupt nor arbitrary.\textsuperscript{500}

From the security relations perspective, the war starkly reflected the diverging priorities of the two allies, Pakistan expected a straightforward support, both political and especially military based on the formal security agreements and numerous assurances given by different high ranking officials of the US Administration that the US would support Pakistan in case of Indian aggression\textsuperscript{501}. President Ayub pointed out to the US Ambassador in a meeting on September 29, a few days after the ceasefire that the US had reneged on solemn pledges to defend Pakistan and in fact acted as a bully in trying to force its will on the country\textsuperscript{502}.

The US Government on the other hand, owing to the developing relationship with India, did not even contemplate military or diplomatic assistance to Pakistan. In fact during the entire period leading up to, during and immediate aftermath of the war, their focus remained on chiding Pakistan on its China policy and forcefully asking Pakistan to revoke these contacts. In fact during the later stages of the war, when the Americans felt that Pakistan may draw China into the conflict, the US Ambassador met President Ayub and made it clear in no uncertain terms that “Pakistan now faced a critical choice: if it should directly or indirectly encourage Chinese entry into the

\textsuperscript{500} (Bhutto Z. A., The Myth of Independence, 1969, p. 4)
\textsuperscript{501} (Sherwani, 1967, p. 140)
\textsuperscript{502} (McMahon, 1994, pp. 255-256)
conflict, Pakistan would alienate itself from the West, perhaps permanently. This was not a threat, McConaughy stressed, but a reality. A look into the US decision to halt aid to Pakistan underscores the key differences in the strategic vision and priorities of the two countries.

The US administration considered this was a threat to US interests in South Asia. The country which stood to gain from this confrontation seemed to be China, the very threat for which US had been beefing up the Indian military since last three years. The US administration especially the State Department felt that, in a broader context, the war would produce undesirable fallout. This could include India acquiring nuclear capability if it felt let down by the US. In case of Pakistan, their lack of perceptible support may also discourage other allies the Turkey and Iran, over the veracity of the US security assurances. Thus the US was caught in a very tight situation. Under these circumstances the Johnson administration opted for a detached approach, whereby they cut off aid to both the countries and let the UN Secretary General U Thant, take a lead role in the conflict termination initiatives.

In a more legalistic and restricted context, the three agreements between the two countries did not specifically mandate the US to come to Pakistan’s support in case of a war with India. The main thrust of the two agreements, SEATO and CENTO, was support against the communist aggression and not against Indian aggression. The mutual security agreement of 1959 mandated the US Government to come to Pakistan’s aid in case its territorial integrity was threatened. This in a way was true.

504 (McMahon, 1994, pp. 254-257)
when the Indians attacked across the international border. Here the US interpretation was that the Indian offensive was a response to the Pakistani incursions into Kashmir and not a blatant act of aggression in isolation.\(^{505}\)

They also argued that the alliances were primarily against the communist threat. “Moreover, under the 1959 agreement the US was committed to help Pakistan only against communist aggression.”\(^{506}\) Notwithstanding the semantics, the fact of the matter remained that it was against the US interests to support Pakistan and they did what was best for their interest.

Why then the Pakistan government failed to predict this response, is the real question. The divergence of interests should have been realistically factored into the planning for such a serious undertaking as a war against a much larger and stronger neighbor. It appears that Ayub had grown overconfident by the Rann of Kutch conflict, and swayed by the rosy picture painted by his intelligence agency and the Sauve Zulfiqar Ali Bhorro.\(^{507}\) Some of the aspects that seem to have been glossed over by the leadership are as under:-

1. The geopolitical situation did not favor Pakistan. India enjoyed the strategic advantage of being more closely allied with US anti-communist agenda specifically containment of Chinese influence. India was the strategic ally, having fought a war just three years ago against US arch nemesis of the time –China and was getting massive support, both military and economic, from the US to stand up to the

\(^{505}\) (Tahir-Kheli, 1998, p. 35)
\(^{506}\) (Khan R. A., Forty Years of Pakistan - United States Relations, 1990, p. 46)
\(^{507}\) (Riza M. G., 1984, pp. 18-20)
Chinese communist threat\textsuperscript{508}. Quite clearly the US global agenda coincided perfectly with the Indians in this regard.

2. As opposed to this, Pakistan, which had been co-opted in the US regional alliance system specifically for opposing the communist threat, was trying to build relations with the Chinese, much to the annoyance of the Johnson administration\textsuperscript{509}. This was at a time when China was seen as the major threat to US objectives in Asia, an aspect highlighted by the worsening US fortunes in Vietnam. Far from being helpful, the Chinese factor was actually detrimental to the Pakistani interests as any Pakistani gain, with Chinese support, would mean humiliation for the US supported India against the communists, which was totally unacceptable for the US/West. The mere threat of Chinese involvement put Pakistan under increased US pressure to end hostilities. The China factor practically guaranteed for India the single most important strategic objective, i.e divorcing Pakistan from its superpower patron. The other superpower Soviet Union still remained a loyal backer for the Indians, both militarily and politically.

3. India itself, did not present any significant vulnerability that could be exploited by Pakistan. It in fact had grown in military strength, with military aid from the West and having learnt the bitter lessons from the conflict with China. Thus the initiation of hostilities against India was

\textsuperscript{508} (Adeeb, 1987, p. 331)
\textsuperscript{509} (Barnds W. J., 1972, p. 206)
wrought with the danger that the conflict could spiral out of control⁵¹⁰.
The failure of the two military initiatives in Kashmir left the Pakistan
government in very weak position at the bargaining table. Tashkent
Declaration just confirmed that Pakistan had not won the war, just
achieved as stalemate⁵¹¹.

4. Pakistan on the other hand did not have much to offer except
partnership in two alliances that had little value except symbolic, and
the provision of base facilities to the US. Thus Pakistan neither had a
pull over the US policies owing to some political or military factor nor
did its annoyance pose any threat to US strategic interests.

5. Pakistan did not consult the US before initiating hostilities in Kashmir,
thus banking on their support without their prior consent, which in
terms of international relations can be termed as naïve. This is amply
highlighted by the statement of the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk
when asked for assistance by the Pakistan Ambassador, in wake of the
Indian attack across the international border. He remarked that the US
was “Being invited in on the crash landing without having been in on
the take-off”⁵¹².

6. Pakistan Government apparently assumed the best case scenario only.
The “What if” questions were never asked. Some of the questions that
should have been answered before the initiation of hostilities were;

⁵¹⁰ (Khan M. A., 1979, p. 95)  
⁵¹¹ (Riza M. G., 1984, pp. 288-290)  
⁵¹² (Tahir-Kheli, 1998, p. 35)
What if the Indians respond across the whole border and not just in Kashmir? What is the US likely to do in case of a war between India and Pakistan? Can Pakistan expect the US to support the war effort, given the recent estrangement in the political and diplomatic spheres? Can Pakistan fight a war with India sans US diplomatic and military support? What would be the US response to any Chinese involvement in the conflict, given the intense pressure on Pakistan to refrain from forging closer ties with them in the recent past? Is the venture really worth the risks, given Pakistan’s military potential and the likely fallout on the economy and internal security situation, especially the simmering discontent in East Pakistan? Apparently, Bhutto’s assurances that the Indians would restrict the conflict to Kashmir and of the tacit support by the Chinese led Ayub to take this bold venture.

7. It was at best a gamble, based on false assumptions and poor reading of the international situation. There seems to be no preparatory diplomatic maneuver to garner support for the initiation of hostilities in Kashmir. The only indication is assurance of tacit support by China, to Foreign minister Bhutto, which in any case could not be good for Pakistan as it would inevitably lead to US chagrin. *(This however is not the first and the last time. Almost thirty years later, the Kargil Conflict bore many)*

513 (Khan M. A., 1979, p. 75)
514 (Jayarmu, 1987, p. 160)
similarities to Operation Gibraltar in conception, execution and final outcome. Though this time the result was not an all out war, but the Americans were once again brought in at the last minute for a face saving by the Pakistan leadership.)

8. The Pakistan Government relied on a piece of paper (1959 Mutual Support Agreement) to claim support from the US^515. This highlights the underlying poor reading of the US political system and the various power centers in the US i.e the two houses of legislature, media, think tanks etc that influence the US Administration policies. Pakistan Government, as Dr Shirin Tahir Kheli points out, had very little ingress into the middle level decision makers in the US^516. The contacts were more limited and thus when estrangement occurred, as in the Johnson presidency, there was an almost complete break in contacts. It also reflected poorly on the political acumen of the Ayub Administration, who seemed to be quite isolated from the reality. It appears that Bhutto’s persuasiveness overcame whatever doubts there were in the political hierarchy. Perhaps Ayub’s recent electoral victory and his successful trips to China and the USSR also may have contributed to the feeling that Pakistan could do it alone. However, common sense demands that a businessman consult his banker before a major/risky venture. This was not done at all.

^516 (Kheli, 1982)
9. Another aspect that could have played into this decision was a gross underestimation of the adversary’s capability and will. The Indians had been beaten by the Chinese but they had learnt from their mistakes and constituted concrete measures for improvement. On the other hand Pakistan Army and public had developed a myth of their own superiority, not matched with capability development commensurate with the ambitions.

The Effects of 1965 War

It was a political, diplomatic and military failure with far reaching consequences for Pakistan. What really stood out as the most serious diverging factor in the Pak-US relationship was the US’s assumption, cultivated and nurtured by successive Administrations that with sufficient amount of aid and military assistance, it could utilize both India and Pakistan as cold war assets against a communist threat:

“After a combined investment of $12 billion in the two countries, ostensibly against communist threat, the US administration could not achieve a common strategic vision with the two countries. In fact Pakistan stood at complete divergence to the US policy goals in Asia, with its developing relations with China. Herein lay the basis for the fallacious

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517 (Interviews with retired military officers)
assumption at both ends that a small third world country shared the lofty
goals of fighting communism with the World’s reigning superpower"519.

What Pakistan really wanted was security from India and US support in resolution of Kashmir dispute. Having realized the folly of relying on the US alone, in the aftermath of the U2 incident, and the limited success on Kashmir issue, the Ayub Government had been steadily moving closer to China, which offered a much better regional alternative to dependency on the US. Shared enmity with India offered additional incentive to both countries. Successive US administrations, tried with very limited success, to resolve the differences between the two countries. With their inability to forge a consensus between the two countries over the Kashmir issue, recourse to the military option was a last desperate attempt by Pakistan to gain control over the disputed territory520.

An issue that might have raised Pakistan stock with the US was support on Vietnam. Vietnam was increasingly becoming the major military and diplomatic preoccupation of the Johnson administration. Here the Pakistan Government did not offer much. This annoyed the US President who felt that its major anti communist ally in Asia should support US polices against a communist menace in the region. The Pakistani rapprochement with China, considered by US as the principal threat in Vietnam conflict rankled the US Government even more. Thus, the Pakistani leadership found itself in a very awkward situation where it risked losing its principal economic and military backer, owing to diverging policy objectives. That it decided to initiate a

519 (McMahon, 1994)
520 (Barnds W. J., 1972, p. 200)
military conflict with India in this hostile political environment speaks of misplaced faith in the nominal security relationship and blatant disregard to the clear indicators that the US was not likely to support Pakistan in the advent of a war with India. Thus Pakistani leadership managed to end a fruitful relationship which even if short on military side, had provided great financial stability. The country lost its most valuable source of funding for economic and social development. It exposed the fallacy of US support, which if nothing else might have continued to remain a factor in Indian calculus while contemplating any venture against Pakistan. It strengthened and emboldened India both politically and militarily. Now India could easily contemplate taking on Pakistan sans the US support. It shook the foundations of the Ayub regime, which had by far been the most stable and productive in terms of the country’s development. Ayub now faced the prospect of dissent and competition from different quarters especially from his firebrand foreign minister Bhutto who openly decried the Tashkent agreement as a sellout to the Indians. The country now stood on the verge of another tumultuous political period. Ayub who was easily one of the leading third world leaders, with a strong grip on his country before the war, emerged as weak and defeated leader.

Despite the claims of victory, fed to the unsuspecting public, the war was a military fiasco, with Pakistan failing to achieve any tangible gains in Kashmir. The initiation of hostilities was a political and military blunder. As Brian Cloughley highlights:

522 (Barnds W. J., 1972, p. 213)
523 (Gauhar, 1996, pp. 274-276)
“Pakistan Army was not ready to fight any war in 1965, never mind a war against an enemy smarting from previous defeats, anxious for revenge, well equipped and with enormous reserves of material, ammunition and manpower. The fact that Pakistan Army fought the Indians to a standstill, is amazing.”

The war should have resulted in soul searching and dispassionate analysis of the nation’s objectives in the region, with special focus on relations with India, which had emerged resilient and strong and held its own in Kashmir despite popular belief in Pakistan that Kashmiris were waiting to be liberated. Instead it spawned a dangerous game of political point scoring and infighting. Ayub relied on suppression of press and opposition to stifle the reaction as well as awkward questions on the strategic vision for the whole war. Bhutto, despite being the chief architect of the Kashmir invasion, which ultimately led to the war, portrayed Ayub as weak and ineffective leader who had given away hard won military victories at Tashkent. There were actually no victories, just a stalemate, with Pakistan the initiator of the conflict, failing to achieve the chief objective, i.e Resolution of the Kashmir Problem on favorable terms.

This could only mean a further weakened Pakistan divorced from the ground realities. Pakistan failed to apply the corrections in its relations with India as well as make its public understand the real situation regarding Kashmir. Thus the stage was set for an even bigger disaster a few years down the road.

525 (Cloughley, 2001-2002, p. 125)
526 (Barnds W. J., 1972, pp. 213-214)
527 (Riza M. G., 1984, p. 20)
The depth of disenchantment and disillusionment between the two allies can be gauged from the fact that the US readily accepted the Soviet offer to mediate in the conflict. The US let its principal adversary take the initiative in the region reflecting a resignation to the thought that the US policies in the region had been counterproductive and that there was nothing much to be gained from an intimate involvement. The US Secretary of State Dean Rusk later recalled that the administration encouraged the Soviet initiative because "we felt we had nothing to lose. "It was time to let the Soviets "break their lance" in the subcontinent."

The war effectively ended the existing security relationship. In the first meeting between the US and Pakistani heads of states after the war, President Johnson bluntly told President Ayub that the relationship was over. He linked future levels of economic and military cooperation on the direction of Pakistan’s policy towards China. It reflected a poor understanding of Pakistan’s security predicament, as China had been by far the only reliable country in the time of crisis, offering both political and military support. Thus asking Pakistan to sever this connection meant the end of the security relationship as it had existed.

Another major impact of the war was on the situation in East Pakistan. During the war East Pakistan was virtually undefended. The East Pakistani perhaps also realized that they were not part of the strategic vision of the country, nor were they part of the government’s decision making process, dominated by a select group of West

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528 (Sattar, 2007, p. 98)
529 (McMahon, 1994, p. 258)
530 (Cloughley, 2001-2002, p. 133)
531 (Cloughley, 2001-2002, p. 133)
Pakistani elite, under the leadership of a military dictator. There were renewed demands for autonomy in East Pakistan from the opposition politicians, who capitalized on the 1965 War to show that they were not taken on board by the West Pakistani leadership. Belief in the efficacy of a common defence had been an important factor in maintaining the union of East and West Pakistan. The war shattered this belief and ripped the fabric of Pakistan’s unity and national integrity. Within six months of the War, Shiekh Mujib Ur Rehman presented the six point formula, a document that later became the basis for the separatist trends in the East Pakistan.

The gamble in Kashmir had effectively resulted in a weakened and politically fractured Pakistan, an alienated and detached superpower patron and an emboldened India who could now more easily contemplate aggressive designs against its chastened neighbor.

Analysis of the Alliance Relationship

The alliance relationship effectively culminated in the wake of 1965 War. Though Pakistan remained a nominal ally, through its participation in SEATO and CENTO agreements, it was no longer a vibrant partnership. It would therefore be useful to review the alliance relationships, before moving onto the next major event, the 1971 War. A dispassionate analysis of the areas of convergence and divergence...
reveals some important trends in the security relationship. These are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

The alliance can be considered in retrospect when few key aspects are clearly synthesized. Primarily, it was designed for defence of Middle East against Soviet threat. It actually had nothing to do with the security environment in the Indian Sub-continent.

It was based on the fallacious assumption that Pakistan could somehow contribute towards the defence of Middle East against a growing Soviet threat\(^{535}\). The assumption was fast dispelled due to the weak state of Pakistan; militarily and economically. The local problems with India effectively precluded any worthwhile military contribution outside Pakistan’s borders. Thus, the alliance never went beyond rhetorical support against communism. Pakistan despite being regarded as a staunch anti communist ally did not in actuality ever contribute any forces against the communist threat outside its borders.

It was not rooted in, and related to the realities of South Asia, where Indo Pak conflict over Kashmir dominated the security paradigm. Thus the priorities of the two allies ie Pakistan and the US never really coincided\(^{536}\). The US attempts for resolving the Kashmir dispute but none of them carried any real weight. They were easily rebuffed by India and thereafter the US did not pursue them any further\(^{537}\).

The key diverging issue that emerged in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian conflict was the US military aid to India. It was shaped and conditioned by US perspectives on the

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\(^{535}\) (McMahon, 1994, pp. 269-271)
\(^{536}\) (McMahon, 1994, pp. 269-271)
\(^{537}\) (Khan R. A., Forty Years of Pakistan - United States Relations, 1990, p. 35)
ongoing struggle against the communist threat. Pakistan soon found its regional etente with China at odds with the US global imperatives. This complicated the alliance and proved detrimental for Pakistan\(^{538}\). Here the national priorities of the two partners were totally divergent. Thus all the subsequent US moves to counter China through India were strongly resented by Pakistan.

The alliance, for most of its duration was in essence a quid pro quo relationship with Pakistan furnishing intelligence gathering and base facilities and political support to the US global objectives, in return for military and economic aid. The factor that could have cemented the relationship i.e shared objectives was essentially missing from the relationship.

Pakistan’s inherent political and economic instability meant that the US had to step in and resolve many additional issues such as the economic situation and Indus Water dispute.

Due to different priorities, in actuality the US helped in some ways to make the Pakistani structure weaker by a lopsided military assistance that was incompatible with the nation’s ability to sustain on its own and at the cost of other essential national developmental projects.

From the US perspective, the Americans had hoped for a staunch and willing regional ally. They actually wound up supporting a weak and fractured nation plagued with internal political strife and simmering disputes with its larger neighbor. Resultantly instead of pursuing anti communist agenda jointly, the Americans found their ally

\(^{538}\) (Rose R. S., War and Secession Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, 1992, p. 52)
looking towards them for everything from wheat to mediation on Kashmir. In Mc Mohan’s analysis:

“The alliance unavoidably fostered a patron-client relationship between Washington and Karachi that proved satisfying to neither side. ---- it bound the United States awkwardly to the fate of one of the Third World's most troubled and least stable nations, and made Pakistan dependent on the largesse of a distant and not always reliable superpower for its very national survival”539.

From Pakistan’s perspective it did not provide enough leverage to get the issue of Kashmir settled on its desired terms, though it prevented India to force a solution540. The result was an arms race and a period of constant tension that finally resulted in the Pakistani effort for a military solution in 1965. India quickly counterbalanced the strategic balance by courting USSR, which much to the chagrin of the US administrations were too happy to oblige. Additionally, their support to India came through much strongly and unconditionally as opposed to the US support for Pakistan, which was always calibrated and delicately balanced to avoid throwing India into the communist orbit.

The natural strength of India, due to its size, population and economic and military potential gave it a regional importance that could not be overcome by Pakistan’s formal alliance relations with the US.

539 (McMahon, 1994)
The alliance remained subject to larger American interests with Pakistan being expected to understand and adjust its national priorities accordingly. “Under the emerging equations of world politics, Pakistan-US relations were likely to lose the warmth and closeness of the 1950’s”\textsuperscript{541}

The first indication came in the wake of Soviet overtures to India in 1955, when Eisenhower administration attempted to curb the Communist influence in India through huge economic incentives. Subsequently, the militarily inconsequential Sino-Indian war of 1962 provided India with a strategic windfall, with the US going to extra length to shore up India militarily and economically. Pakistan on the other hand felt betrayed and let down, resorting to the only logical option of building ties with China. This just alienated the Americans further who viewed the Chinese as a major threat especially in the wake of growing US difficulties in Vietnam. Thus Pakistan’s alliance with the US was buffeted by factors beyond the control of its leaders\textsuperscript{542}.

From Pakistan’s perspective, Kashmir issue was the real test of friendship. Each successive US President from Truman to Kennedy played some role in trying to resolve the dispute, but the fact that the US wanted to maintain some sort of parallelism between the two countries meant that they always stopped short of the kind of pressure required to bring India to an acceptable solution. The best chance was perhaps in the immediate aftermath of the 1962 War, but here the US strategic interests came first and the Kennedy administration did not go far enough as to make the military aid to India conditional on a settlement of the Kashmir issue. Instead

\textsuperscript{541} (Khan R. A., Forty Years of Pakistan - United States Relations, 1990, p. 47)
\textsuperscript{542} (Mahdi, India and Regional Developments through the Prism of Indo-Pak Relations, 2004, pp. 154-156)
Pakistan was convinced by the Kennedy administration to remain neutral, with the promise that Kashmir would be pursued at the termination of the conflict. Pakistan did oblige, but ended up feeling betrayed that the United States did not reward such restraint\textsuperscript{543}.

The Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 finally exposed all the inconsistencies in the relationship and ended an estranged relationship.

Conditional aid, constant arm twisting and goading on some rational and essential foreign policy decisions like that of building ties with China undermined the value of US aid and the goodwill amongst the masses for the US. It also eroded the credibility of US support in critical times\textsuperscript{544}.

Notwithstanding the realpolitik involved, the alliance did not live up to the Pakistani expectations and fell much short of the US objectives. The major contribution to this result was the vague assumptions, which tainted the relationship and gave rise to negative sentiments in both countries.

The US assumptions that China posed a real threat to the security of South Asia and that India could act as a counter balance to China tainted its vision towards Pakistan, helping drive the Pakistani leadership into a corner. Pakistan’s genuine quest for a more balanced regional policy did not pose any material threat to the US interests, yet the Johnson administration’s intransigent approach and arm twisting tactics just exacerbated the difficulties for Pakistan and alienated a friendly regime.

\textsuperscript{543} (Tahir-Kheli, 1998, p. 34)
\textsuperscript{544} (Barnds W. J., 1972, pp. 205-210)
Pakistan’s assumption that alliance relationship with the US somehow mandated the superpower to resolve its regional dispute with India over Kashmir, missed the geopolitical reality that US did not share the same priorities.

“The explosive Jammu and Kashmir dispute which was central to its relations with its big neighbor, but which to the US was only a local issue”\textsuperscript{545}.

Kashmir was central to Pakistan’s security but not for the US. It also did not take into account the fact that India with its newfound value against China was in a much better strategic position vis-a-vis Pakistan when it came to the US support.

**Analysis – Areas of Convergence and Divergence**

**Shared vision for the Alliance.** The security alliance lacked a shared vision. The core objectives of the two countries were divergent from the very beginning. Pakistan was only looking for security assistance to strengthen itself against India. The US was looking for an anti-communist ally in the Middle East as well as to establish a security cordon around the USSR. The Pakistani government convinced the US administration of its usefulness and eagerness to become a partner in the anti-communist alliance in order to gain much needed military and financial assistance. However, as the alliance progressed, this basic divergence in the core objectives created serious and irreconcilable differences between the two countries. Dr Rais contends that “The divergence of perception was known but ignored. This caused

\textsuperscript{545} (Shahi, Pakistan's Security and Foreign Policy, 1988, p. 157)
many misunderstandings later on”546. The same aspect has been highlighted by Dr Tahir Kheli as “The fundamental dichotomy between the U.S. and Pakistani perceptions of the source of threat was irreconcilable. Diplomatic niceties, though temporarily useful, sowed the seeds of serious discord in the future”547.

Once the US realized that the Pakistan was incapable of providing strong military for the intended purpose, the size and scale of the military package became controversial. From the US perspective, it became more of an inducement for ensuring the availability of base facilities in Pakistan as well as diplomatic support by Pakistan on the US policies. In addition it was used by the US to shore up friendly regimes in Pakistan548. From the Pakistani perspective it looked like the US was intentionally backtracking on the commitments it had made earlier. Pakistan’s military buildup carried out with the US money was not in consonance with the US’s intended objectives, and was unable to add to the US anti communist war effort. Thus it was never supported by them wholeheartedly. This reflected through bureaucratic delays in delivery of agreed upon equipment and approval of additional equipment as asked for by Pakistan. Pakistan could not offer any forces for the anticommunist effort throughout the alliance years.

The security pacts and alliances between the two countries were entered for preservation of their core objectives. In case of the US it remained the anti communist alliance. The US ensured that the alliances remain focused on the anti-communist

546 (Khan R. A., Forty Years of Pakistan - United States Relations, 1990, p. 34)
547 (Tahir Kheli, 1982, p. 25)
548 (Mahdi, India and Regional Developments through the Prism of Indo-Pak Relations, 2004, pp. 156-157)
agenda. This did not provide Pakistan any significant leverage in using them as a platform against India. The shape and nature of the alliances SEATO, CENTO, Mutual Security Agreement thus did not suit Pakistan. India was not covered specifically in any of the pacts. At the critical time these alliances were of little use to Pakistan. SEATO and CENTO did not give any advantage either military or political during the Rann of Kutch conflict or the 1965 War. “The SEATO did not even meet for consultations and the CENTO was not activated.” This caused consternation as the Pakistan government had expected some reward for siding so openly with the West in all international forums. This factor became a major source of resentment in Pakistan. But in all fairness the Pakistan Government failed to educate the public about the limitations of the alliance relationship. The alliance relationship further strained Pakistan’s relations with its immediate neighbors, India and Afghanistan, and allowed them to use the Soviet assistance to counter Pakistan’s US links. In the post alliance period, the Russians openly sided with the Indians and Afghans on the issue of Kashmir and Pashtoonistan. Bhutto gives a useful overview of the alliances insofar as their usefulness is concerned “Time has shown that the alliances were harmful to Pakistan, even when they carried the advantages of military assistance. When Pakistan became a member of CENTO on the pretext that the Cold War had entered the sub-continent, Jawahar Lal Nehru repudiated his country’s pledge on Kashmir. Taking CENTO to be an affront to its security, the Soviet Union punished Pakistan with its veto in the Security Council. To further punish Pakistan,

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549 (Ahmad D. S., 1996, p. 66)
550 (Sattar, 2007, p. 97)
the Soviet Union extended its support to Afghanistan on its irredentist claim on Pakistan’s territory\(^551\).

There was a major disconnect between the public opinion and the Government stance in Pakistan. The public could not understand why the Government was supporting the US in the Middle East, often remaining lukewarm in backing the Egyptians, whom the public supported wholeheartedly against the Israelis. This was because Pakistan Government had enlisted in the US cause without taking due cognizance to the sentiments and natural leanings of its own people. In absence of shared security interests, this became a serious issue and caused pulls at different times, starting from the Middle East crisis in 1956, which resulted in large scale anti American demonstrations in Pakistan.

**Global agenda of superpower versus regional compulsions of a third world country-Tying up detrimental to Pakistan.** The relationship was tied inextricably to the US global agenda of confronting and containing the spread of communism. Any change in the global scenario, meant change in the nature of the relationship. This change occurred in the mid fifties when the Soviets, instead of purely military alliance, adopted a more flexible approach towards the non-aligned nations of the third world, offering them soft loans and financial assistance, free of conditionality associated with Western aid. Thus India once again became very important to the US and its allies in the context of maintaining its pro-west leanings.

\(^{551}\) (Bhutto Z. A., Pakistan and the Alliances, p. 55)
India could thus comfortably use assistance from both camps, to the detriment of Pakistan.

Pakistan’s core security concerns were linked with the peaceful settlement of Kashmir dispute and maintaining strong deterrence against India. Both these suffered in the period because the US could not afford to alienate India by supporting Pakistan whole heartedly on the Kashmir issue.

In the global anti communist effort, China appeared as a threatening and dangerous opponent for the US, starting with the Korean conflict and increasing in intensity after the Indo-China War, reaching the status of the most dangerous adversary by the time Vietnam conflict unfolded fully in the mid sixties. The Korean War of 1952 pitched the Chinese and US forces against each other directly, though the major confrontation was between their respective proxy regimes of North and South Korea. The 1962 India China War alarmed the US and its allies about the Chinese intentions to dominate the region, prompting massive military aid to India. However the US and its allies became completely fixated with China after their reverses in Vietnam, which necessitated increasingly costly and unpopular military involvement by the Johnson administration. This had two distinct effects; Pakistan’s contacts with the Chinese were viewed with skepticism and soured the relationship to the extent of an almost complete breakup by mid 1965, when the US delayed the Aid Consortium for Pakistan, cancelled the President’s visit and made further economic aid to Pakistan contingent upon change in Pakistani policies toward China. The second impact of the global imperative of the US government was that now India, more than Pakistan was a strategic ally against China. This took away whatever remaining influence that
Pakistan had over the US, regarding Kashmir. It also meant that during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, the prospect of Chinese involvement against the Indians compelled the US government to ask Pakistan to refrain from bringing China into the conflict and threaten Pakistan with complete break in relations with the West if it did not comply with this demand.

**Economic/ military Assistance and Base Facilities—Contributary Factors for stabilizing the Alliance.** These two aspects remained the desirable by products of the security relationship for both countries and for much of the alliance period remained a stabilizing factor in the relationship. Pakistan obtained substantial military and economic assistance from the US. The US also gave assistance for important projects such as the resolution of Indus Water Dispute, through the Indus Water Treaty and subsequent funding for the construction of dams and canals through a consortium. Pakistan’s heavy reliance on the US aid to maintain its armed forces as well as the national economy was the major factors that it did not even leave the alliances openly after 1965 War, despite the US arms embargo and total failure of the SEATO and CENTO alliances in coming to Pakistan.

From the US perspective the intelligence facilities and the air bases were considered very valuable by the Defence Department. The US was prepared to continue an otherwise unfruitful military assistance primarily to retain the use of these facilities.

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553 (Zaman, 1987, pp. 56-59)
554 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005 A Concise History, 2007, p. 73)
This also allowed Pakistan to bargain for a better deal and get supersonic fighter AC, which otherwise were not likely to be given by the US.

The US Image in Pakistan. Since the security relationship did not have shared objectives and the wholehearted support of the Pakistani public, it produced an undesirable effect, as it became linked to and a source of strength for the ruling elite, who did not have strong roots. Thus despite a large and very productive investment in Pakistan’s economic and military development, the US remained generally unpopular with the masses.

Enhanced Role of Military and bureaucracy in National Affairs

The security alliance, which also brought in economic aid, enhanced the role of unrepresentative elements i.e military and bureaucracy. This led to the weakening of other national institutions, stifled the growth of representative political parties and strong democratic traditions in the country, vital for its long term viability, keeping in view the unique geographical divide between the two wings of the country. This eventually led to the breakup of East Pakistan. The final breakup of the country cannot be blamed on the security relationship, though it did have a contributory role insofar as perpetuating the role of military in political affairs. (Had Pakistani leadership understood the limitations of the relationship and kept realistic hopes and circumscribed goals, there could have been some real and sustainable development

and chances of balanced growth of the institutions of the country. It may also have helped the leaders to have a more realistic stance towards the contentious issues related to the neighbors, especially India. They focused on building the army when the real need was to strengthen the unity and the internal cohesion of the country through dialogue and participation. If someone has to take a lion’s share of the blame for eventual dismemberment of Pakistan, it must go to Ayub Khan. His military takeover and prolonged stay at the helm of affairs for these crucial and formative years of the country led to the estrangement of East Pakistani population, leading to eventual breakup of the country).

The Aftermath of 1965 War

President Ayub visited the US in December 1965. The US president again reiterated the stance that “if Pakistan wanted close relations with the US, there could be no serious relationship with India.” President Johnson urged Ayub to send troops to Vietnam, even if under the SEATO umbrella, which the Pakistani President declined, stating the Indian threat. The result was infusing as far as the convergence of strategic priorities was concerned. In the aftermath of 1965 War, the security relationship lost much of its sheen. President Ayub, after signing the Tashkent Declaration sponsored by the Soviets lost much of his popular support. The 1965 War

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556 (Choudhury G. W., 1988, p. 29)  
had been portrayed as a sort of victory by the Pakistani media. President Ayub was primarily blamed for not getting any thing out of the Tashkent Agreement.

The Tashkent declaration signed in January 1966 reflected the lowest ebb of US-Pakistan relationship. Pakistani major security crisis was being mediated by the USSR, not the US, as people would have envisioned after years of close alliance relationship. Pakistan failed to get anything tangible from the Tashkent declaration with little to bargain for, as the Indians had captured comparable areas in Sind and Kashmir, Ayub Khan had to settle for a status quo in fact the inability to achieve the desired ends state in “Operation Gibralor” foreclosed any meaningful advantage on the negotiation table. An important political fallout of the Tashkent Declaration was the immense loss of prestige to President Ayub. He was held responsible for the debacle. This thought was propagated by none other than Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the original mastermind of the flawed “Operation Gibraltor”. The difference between Ayub and Bhutto widened in the aftermath of Tashkent, and he was finally sacked as the Foreign Minister in 1966. The US turned on the economic aid tap in February 1966, during a visit to the Sub-Continent by US Vice-President Hubart Humphery. It was however, nothing compared to what Pakistan had been enjoying earlier. This was a small loan of 50 million US dollars. The arms supply embargo on Pakistan was however, not lifted, even after the 1965 War. Pakistan complained bitterly that it was unfair to equate her with India, as the Indians had diverse sources of military supplies.

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while Pakistan was solely dependent on the US. Even some US officials conceded that the arms embargo was unfavourably poised against Pakistan\textsuperscript{561}. The only sales made to Pakistan during the period were those of “non-lethal” military equipment and spares\textsuperscript{562}. The Pakistani defence expenditure had been consistently high during the Ayub period, touching an average of over 50% throughout the 1960’s. This had an obvious effect on the neglect of other important social and developmental projects\textsuperscript{563}. Since the military buildup had primarily been in response to Indian hegemony and intransigence over Kashmir, the feelings in East-Pakistan over this issue was much different in East-Pakistan which felt much closer to the Kashmir problems\textsuperscript{564}.

**Ayub’s Decline and Departure.** President Ayub could not survive the political fallout of the 1965 War. Though, he remained in power till 1969, his popularity graph plummeted with the preceding months and years. There was a lot of resentment in the country against the ruling class and the “22 rich families”, who had amassed most of the wealth in the country under Ayub’s tutelage. His own Son Gohar Ayub Khan, a retired Captain from the Army, had become a millionaire in just a span of few years\textsuperscript{565}.

\textsuperscript{561} (New York Times, 13 April 1967)
\textsuperscript{562} (Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army Wars and Insurrections, 2001-2002, p. 136), (Pakistan Horizon, 2nd Quarter 1967, Prov)
\textsuperscript{563} (Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army Wars and Insurrections, 2001-2002, p. 137)
\textsuperscript{564} (Choudhury G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan, 1974, p. 133)
Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman, who had been held in custody since 1967, for conspiring with India was released by Ayub in 1969, as the agitation against his government picked up momentum. Mujib openly decried Pakistan and presented his six point agenda for a greater autonomy for East Pakistan. President Ayub was under considerable pressure in the period between 1966-1969. During 1969, the agitations picked up momentum. He offered not to stand for re-election, after his current term expired. However, the joint pressure and agitation against his government mounted both in East and West Pakistan. A Democratic Action Committee was formed by all “out of office” politicians, looking for the ouster of Ayub, Bhutto and Mujib both were active participants. The economy had never recovered in the aftermath of the 1965 War, while monsoons had wrecked havoc with the crops and agriculture output. On 26 March 1969, Ayub conceded defeat and handed over power to the Army Chief General Yahya khan, who once again imposed Martial Law. Ayub came to power when the country was beset with political difficulties and mis-management by corrupt politicians was threatening social disorder. Ironically, eleven years later when he departed, the country was mired in even greater problems, and East Pakistan stood on the verge of civil unrest and anarchy. Pakistan having forged a close security relationship with the US, had by now been disillusioned, chastened and disappointed after the 1965 misadventure.

566 (Saddiqui, 1972, p. 122)
567 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1990, p. 398)
568 (Saddiqui, 1972, p. 122)
569 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allied, 2001, p. 175)
571 (Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army Wars and Insurrections, 2001-2002, p. 143)
Nixon and Yahya – the China Rapprochement. The last days of Ayub Khan had been insignificant with regards to the US-Pakistan security relationship. This was about to change, with the arrival of President Nixon in the White House. The Nixon policy toward the Sub-Continent essentially remained unchanged from Johnson Era. It was to avoid “adding another complication to our (US) agenda”\textsuperscript{572}. The Nixon government wanted to focus on Vietnam, and achieve a disengagement which did not reflect total failure or defeat\textsuperscript{573}. President Nixon visited Pakistan in August 1969, as part of a six day tour to the Sub-Continent. During his meetings with the Pakistani President, he requested Yahya Khan to help in opening up relations with China. The secret negotiations, agreed to by the Pakistani President lasted till July 1971, when Nixon made a historic trip to the Chinese Capital Beijing. The Nixon aim was:-

“To bring China into the family of nations, reversing two decades of US efforts to isolate Beijing and to improve US-China relations could be used as a lever with Moscow to press for US-Soviet Detente”\textsuperscript{574}. The US policy as far as South Asia was concerned, remained essentially `unchanged. It was to ensure that no other power including China or Soviet Union should gain a dominant position in the region\textsuperscript{575}. This development had an impact on Pak-US security relationship, as President Nixon,

\textsuperscript{572} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 179)
\textsuperscript{573} (Kux, The United Sates and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allied, 2001, p. 179)
\textsuperscript{574} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 182)
as a gesture of good will, allowed the sale of 50 million dollars aircraft spares and
300 armoured personnel carriers to Pakistan.

The East Pakistan Crisis and the 1971 War. East Pakistan, separated from West Pakistan by more than one 1000 miles of hostile Indian territory had been simmering for almost two decades, with discontent. However, the largely West Pakistan dominated government, bureaucracy and Army had opted to ignore the political dissent relying on martial laws and heavy handed tactics instead. As S.M. Burke writes, “while East Pakistanis suffered from an acute sense of inferiority, West Pakistanis were intoxicated with an arrogant feeling of superiority”. The area was backwards; less developed and had largely been left out of the loop, during the initial year of economic development. In the two decades leading up to the Bengali Revolt in 1971, there had been many indications of discontent and unrest that were ignored by the West-Pakistan dominated government. The first issue was that of language. Bengalis had a great affinity for their language and as early as 1948, Mr Dhirendranath Dull, Hindu members of Bengali Assembly moved an amendment to propose constitutional Package, asking for Bengali to be included as a national language. This demand was regretted by Quaid-e-Azam when he declared “Urdu and Urdu alone will be the language of the Pakistan”. The simmering of discontent however remained, on 22 Feb 1952, riots broke out in Dacca University on the language issue.

576 (US Resumes Arms sale to Pakistan*, New York Times, 9 October 1970)
577 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 397)
578 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 397)
579 (Matinuddin, 2002, p. 49)
580 (Matinuddin, 2002, p. 49)
resulting in death of two students. This becomes a rallying call for the Bengali nationalists there after. Sheikh Mujib, a relatively unknown politician at the time, took up the cause of Bengali language and soon emerged as a national hero\(^{581}\). At the political level also, the persecution of Bengalis, continued. In the March 1954 elections, the ruling Muslim League was beaten in the election, by United Front comprising of East Pakistani parties. At this stage they presented a 21 point agenda, which will be termed as a precursor to Mujib’s 6 points later. In they demanded, amongst after things:-

> “Secure all subjects, including residenary, except Defence, Foreign Affairs and Currency, for East Bengal which shall be fully autonomous and sovereign as envisaged in the Lahore Resolution”\(^{582}\).

With the ascent of Ayub Khan into the helm of affairs, the sense of non-participation and estrangement of the Bengalis continued to rise. Ayub decision to convert the Eastern and Western wings of the country into a province each for his own political expediency also disillusioned the Bengalis, who saw it as a ploy to deny them the right to use the numerical superiority\(^{583}\). In the wake of 1965 War Mujib exploited the issue of relative defencelessness of East Pakistan against India and the neglect of the Bengalis. President Ayub responded once again with threats of strong action, instead of dialogue and reconciliation\(^{584}\). As Kamal Matinuddin highlights “Errors

\(^{581}\) (Matinuddin, 2002, p. 51)  
\(^{582}\) (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 399)  
\(^{583}\) (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy An Historical Analysis, 1973, p. 399)  
\(^{584}\) (Dawn, 21 March 1966)
kept multiplying, emotions kept rising, demands and their suppression kept growing till it was too late to prevent the dismemberment of the country, aided and abetted by a hostile neighbour\textsuperscript{585}. This was the background, on the eve of Ayub departure and Yahya’s Martial Law in 1970. The country had been drifting towards disintegration, imperceptibly in the first two decades of its existence. Even as Ayub forged close links with the US, for safeguard against the Indian external threat, the country was breaking apart at the seams.

It is therefore, not justified to blame the East Pakistan debacle and the breakup of the country on the lack of US support. The causative factors for the unrest were entirely local and had more to do with short-sighted policies of successive Pakistani government rather than the United States support or lack of support thereof.

**Elections, Unrest and Crackdown.** The events unfolded very rapidly in the aftermath of Yahya’s ascent to power. He announced the elections for December 1970. He conceded to the Bengali demand for “one man, one vote” which was a landmark decision\textsuperscript{586}. The elections were held on 7 December 1970. Mujib ur Rehman’s Awami Party swept the electorate in Bengal gaining 167 out of 169 seats in Bengal and an overall majority in the 300 seats National Assembly of Pakistan\textsuperscript{587}. Mujib had been openly preaching the idea of Bangladesh during his election

\textsuperscript{585} (Matinuddin, 2002, p. 47)
\textsuperscript{586} (Choudhury G. W., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers, 1975, pp. 85-87)
\textsuperscript{587} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 184)
campaign. The nexus between India and the Bengali independence movement was also growing steadily. As Dr GW Choudhry points out:

“Indian money and arms were being sent to East Pakistan both for the success of the Awami League and for the eventual confrontation with the Pakistan Army”.

The election resulted in Bhutto gaining majority in West Pakistan and Mujib in the East Pakistan, as well as overall majority. Although Bhutto had won only 81 Seats as opposed to Awami League’s 167, yet he emerged as the main political contender from West Pakistan. After the elections, there was a political deadlock, as both Bhutto and Mujib failed to concede their respective positions. Apparently, Mujib hardened his stance on the six points, which essentially meant disintegration of Pakistan if implemented, in the wake of his election victory. The major demand in six points was of loose confederation, that would effectively spell an end to Pakistan, as it existed.

Bhutto on the other hand capitalized on this and instead of compromising, pressed Yahya not to yield to Awami League demands. The final negotiations to break the deadlock took place on 15 March 1971. They also failed to produce a result. On 25 March Yahya ordered the army to crackdown on Awami League supporters. The military was systematically seeking out and killing Awami league leaders and members, including student leaders and University faculty. “Operation Searchlight” as it was named, was a disaster, as it ignored the depth of the Bengali sentiments and

588 (Choudhury G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan, 1974, p. 98)
589 (Choudhury G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan, 1974, p. 99)
590 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1990, p. 398)
591 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 18)
managed to stoke further violence and hatred\textsuperscript{593}. On the other hand Mujib by now had gained almost complete control over the media. He had appointed Colonel Usmani as the leader of “Revolutionary Forces” and the East Pakistan Rifles as well as police from the province also showed their allegiance to him\textsuperscript{594}. The US response was to wait and see. Unknown to the observers was that within the US, President Nixon wanted nothing to scuttle the diplomatic process being facilitated by Yhaya. In an environment of apparent repression against Bengalis, there was media outcry in the US, asking for much tougher stance by the US\textsuperscript{595}. A much stronger reaction was witnessed from the US House of Representatives. There was a major concern with regards to Pakistan Army using US supplied equipment to suppress the Bengali resistance\textsuperscript{596}.

Under pressure from US congress, the Nixon Administration imposed a ban on all military sales to Pakistan in June 1971\textsuperscript{597}. The brutal manner and botched handling of the uprising by General Tikka Khan, the commander in Dhaka, caused an international uproar. There were many accounts of atrocities committed by the Pakistani troops in the world media. As per one of these reports, 200 students were killed in the Dhaka University alone\textsuperscript{598}. Though the army was able to restore peace in Dhaka, it was termed as “peace of the graveyard” by Dr G.W Chaudhry\textsuperscript{599}. By now the “Mukhti Bahini” was fully operative, under the guidance and tutelage of the

\textsuperscript{593} (Choudhury G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan, 1974, p. 171)
\textsuperscript{594} (Choudhury G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan, 1974, p. 164)
\textsuperscript{595} (An interview Malter (additional), April 21 1971)
\textsuperscript{596} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 189)
\textsuperscript{597} (New York Time, June 23-25 1971)
\textsuperscript{598} (Choudhury G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan, 1974, p. 185)
\textsuperscript{599} (Choudhury G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan, 1974, p. 186)
Indian Armed forces and Security Agencies. Dr GW Choudhry, himself a Bengali, writes "without India’s arms and sanctioning, Bangladesh might have remained a distant dream for Bengali nationalists for many years to come. Just as Pakistan Army’s brutal atrocities can never be condoned, similarly India’s role, which was contrary to all the basic principles of the UN Charter and international law."

Yahya’s handling of the crisis left much to be desired. One author describes it, “Yahya and his immediate group of advisors well doomed by their lack of understanding of the situation.” These views were also expressed by the UN secretary of the State Henry Kissinger, when he met Yahya, on a return from a trip to India in July, 1971.

He writes in his memoirs that Yahya “Did not believe that India might be planning for war, if so (Yahya) was convinced that they could win.” It is quite unfortunate for Pakistan that there was an inept, debauch and characterless lot at the helm of affairs, Yahya being the leader. As the country drifted towards eventual break up, Yahya and his team seemed oblivious to the Indian threat building up on the East Pakistan front, in conjunction with the Bengali separatists. At the diplomatic front. India sent out delegations to all major Muslim countries, usually headed by Muslim leaders. The theme was that it was not another. India-Muslim conflict but a conflict between Muslim communities of East and West Pakistan.

What they failed to comprehend was the likely outcome of the situation where a whole region’s sentiments had been turned against the Army and the government.

600 (Choudhury G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan, 1974, p. 187)
602 (Kissinger, 1979, pp. 861-862)
603 (Interview with senior retired Army officers)
604 (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 204)
East Pakistan was separated from the rest of the country by a hostile enemy, seven times larger and stronger, ready to seize the opportunity that had been offered by years of neglect and the recent inept handling by the Yahya regime. New Delhi was now actively involved in training and sustaining the “Mukt hi Bahni” from its bases in Calcutta and other points of Indian province of Bengal. During the period leading up to the war and invasion of East Pakistan, the Indians were busy in carrying out meticulous preparations and making grounds for the military action one of the by steps was signing the “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” with the Soviet Union on 9 August 1971 which gave India much more international diplomatic strength. During the period, the US had been trying to “induce political compromise in Pakistan and military restraint in India”. Kissinger however put his assessment to the US president that India was most likely going to attack, Yahya was unlikely to resolve the crisis by political means and that the US should aim for an “evolution that would lead to eventual independence of East Pakistan”.

The 1971 War. The Indian Army had been preparing for many months, for a swift military operation in East Pakistan. The attack was launched on 4 Dec 1971. It was a multipronged threat, directed towards Dhaka. The Pakistani forces had prepared

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606 (international Herald Tribune, December 14, 1971)
607 (Kissinger, 1979, p. 863)
fortified positions at the main towers and routes leading to Dhaka. Some are bypassed, others brushed aside as the Indians swiftly moved towards Capital City\textsuperscript{608}.

General Niazi the commander of the Pakistani forces had lost touch with reality and allocated tasks that could not be carried out by forces available. The Defence of East Pakistan was so poorly planned that defeat by vastly superior Indian Forces was inevitable\textsuperscript{609}. It is quite apparent that the ineptitude displayed by Yahya at political level also permeated to his military commander. There were some great, heroic battles by individual units, but the Pakistan Army, in the East Pakistan, badly equipped, poorly, led, vastly outnumbered and most fighting for importantly an area,

\textsuperscript{608} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 203)
\textsuperscript{609} (Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army Wars and Insurrections, 2001-2002, p. 191)
whose people itself had turned against it, did not really have a chance. Niazi and his
defence plan faltered, and he asked for surrender through the US-Counsel General Mr
Spirack on 14th December. This was immediately agreed to, by the Indian
Commander Sam Maneckshaw. There the military resistance came to an end with
General Niazi surrendering 90,000 Pakistani troops to General Maneckshaw in the
Dhaka Race-course. A small incident narrated by General Rao Farman Ali, who
was present at the occasion reflects the mindset of General Niazi at this grave and
shameful time for any military commander. When Niazi met the Indian General to
discuss the terms of surrender; “He was behaving in a boisterous manner telling filthy
jokes to Indians as if they were old chums610. The same mindset existed with his boss,
General Yahya Khan, who being the President of Pakistan, also retained his slot of the
Commander-in-Chief611. Under there circumstances, the inevitable breakup of
Pakistan cannot be justifiably attributed to outside forces including the response by
US during the crisis. The situation that Pakistan got itself into in 1971, was primarily
of its own making. It has been contended by some authors that Pakistan decision to
act as a bridge between US and China, infuriated the Soviet Union and helped India
secure the treaty of friendship and cooperation with them at a initial time612. They
contend that US should have done more, but congressional opposition hampered

610 (Khan R. F., 1992, p. 152)
611 (Discussions/ Interviews) with retired General officers)
2001, pp. 189-208)
Nixon from extending any worthwhile military and economic support. The treaty was a major boost to India. Article 9 of the treaty stated:

“In the event that any of the parties is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting parties (India and USSR) will immediately start consultation with a view to eliminating this threat.”

The overconfidence of Yahya Khan, and his opinion that India could be dissuaded from war by the UN and the US, proved to be faulty. It was termed as a policy of prudence by Yahya, but others viewed it as numberless and paralysis.

The informed press in the country voiced serious concern about the Indo-Soviet treaty, they correctly identified this treaty as Indian safeguard against Chinese intervention on Pakistan behalf.

The US support that Yahya erroneously banked, upon could not be exploited as that of the Soviet Union, given the complex nature of US involvement in the region and its interest with both India and Pakistan. As Dr Henry Kissinger highlights, “Our relation with Pakistan were marked by a superficial content that had little concrete Content.” During the peals of crisis, the CIA pointed out to a new and more threatening situation for Pakistan. It claimed that India would not restrict its actions in the East Pakistan, rather it would look to capitalize on this victory by consolidating

613 (Khan R. F., 1992, p. 160)
614 (Pakistan horizon, Karachi, volume XXIV, No 4, P, 165)
615 (Khan R. F., 1992, p. 229)
616 (The Pakistan Times, 11 August 1971)
617 (Kissinger, 1979, p. 849)
and expanding its hold on Kashmir. This report was taken seriously by the Nixon Administration and it decided to pressure Indians to contain its actions against Pakistan, by involving Soviets. On 9 December, 1971, the Soviet Agriculture Minister Vladimir Matskevich who was on a visit to the US, was invited by President Nixon and asked to convey to his leadership that if the USSR did not influence India in stopping the military aggression, the US and USSR would be drawn into a confrontation:

“We must inevitably look towards a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union has a treaty with India, we have one with Pakistan.”

The US Government also asked for an assurance from the Indian Ambassador DC Jha, that India had no intention of attacking West Pakistan or any territory in Azad Kashmir. The Indian Ambassador assured that there was no such intention against East Pakistan but he was not clear on the issue of Kashmir. President Nixon, in order to emphasize the significance of this demand also ordered the US nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise to sail to the Bay of Bengal. This step was to re-emphasize the point that the US would not accept an attack on West Pakistan. Nixon’s support helped in casing pressure on West Pakistan. The Indians were looking to capitalize

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618 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allied, 2001, p. 200), (Sherwani, Pakistan, China and America, 1980, p. 188)  
620 (Kissinger, 1979, p. 908), (Rose R. S., War and Secession Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, 1992, p. 262)  
621 (Sherwani, Pakistan, China and America, 1980, p. 187)
on these opportunity to capture territory in Kashmir, which could be bargained for a "durable settlement". It is interesting to note the assessment by Henry Kissinger, on the outcome of an Indian attack on West Pakistan. He concluded, while talking to Huang Ho, the Chinese Ambassador, that “if nothing is done to stop it, East Pakistan will become a Bhutan and West Pakistan a Nepal”. This was an apt assessment of the likely satellite country role that India wanted Pakistan to assume after it had been suitably cut to size. The US had not helped Pakistan militarily in any way so far. It had in fact cut off all aid to the country in this time of crisis. Why then this urge to protect West Pakistan? A likely answer is found in President Nixon’s discussions with the French President Pompidou in Azores. The US president contended that “If India and the Soviet Union succeeded in destroying Pakistan as a political and military entity, this could only have a devastating effect in encouraging the Soviet Union to use the same tactics elsewhere. This would very definitely change, the balance of power in Asia”. Thus the US key interest in the conflict was to prevent West Pakistan from crumbling. As far as East Pakistan was concerned, there is no indication that the US intended to help Pakistan against the Indian military offensive in East Pakistan. It is therefore quite surprising that Pakistan leaders believed in some sort of military support, as there is no evidence in any of the conversations, of such a possibility.

With its forces vastly outnumbered and fighting isolated from any support from the

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622 (Sherwani, Pakistan, China and America, 1980, p. 186)
625 (Sherwani, Pakistan, China and America, 1980, p. 191)
Western Wing, the outcome of the military situation was quite predictable. Indians had a vice like grip over the military situation and full diplomatic and military support of the USSR. A Security Council Resolution against the Indian aggression in the Security Council was vetoed by the Soviets. The Resolution was jointly sponsored by Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua and Sierra Leone, on 5th December 1971.

After almost two decades of being a US ally and most vociferous supporter, the Pakistani government had not been able to obtain the very basic objective of any military alliance i.e support at the time of need. Even at this critical stage the US and the Pakistani objectives did not coincide. The US government had not contemplated an all out support for Pakistan, at any stage. This was especially true in the case of Pakistan’s gaiting fortunes in East Pakistan. The US was least concerned with the survival of West Pakistan. “East Pakistan was presumed to be lost, and there was not much sympathy for Pakistan or concerns over US interests there in Washington”.

The US Government had been more interested in finding a political solution to the problem. They had also broached the possibility of the likely Indian offensive, with President Yahya, as early as July 1971. However, there is no indication that any substantive discussions took place on the prospects of such an eventuality, and the likely joint course of action in case it materialized. In fact it appears that Kissinger, a shrewd politician, had gleaned from his discussions with the Indian counterparts that such a situation was quite likely in the coming months, however when he broached

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626 (Sherwani, Pakistan, China and America, 1980, pp. 190-191)
627 (Sherwani, Pakistan, China and America, 1980, p. 193)
628 (Rose R. S., War and Secession Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, 1992, p. 262)
the subject with Yahya, he found him to be quite oblivious to the threat. Kissinger also did not pursue the matter further, as he was more involved and interested in the actual mission, which was to pursue the opening of diplomatic relations with China, for which Yahya was acting as a facilitator. The failure to comprehend and factor in the likely developments in East Pakistan in the discussions with the American leadership remains with the Pakistan Government. Yahya seemed to be stumbling from crisis to crisis. He did not show any foresight as far as the developments in East Pakistan were concerned. There seems to be a lack of understanding by the Pakistani leadership, about the likely impact of military actions against civilians in the US public as well as the Congress. This adversely affected the military relationship, as the US government stopped all military aid to Pakistan, following the public outcry against Pakistan Army’s actions against civilian population. It appears that the Pakistan leadership tended to take the military alliance in isolation, whereas, it is under any circumstances, an extension of the political and strategic imperatives of the two countries. Herein lay the basic cause for divergence. There seems to be little if any effort by the Yahya administration to weigh in the effects of the rapidly worsening situation in relation to the expected support from US in different emerging scenarios. Since even such a basic exercise was not conducted internally, it was wishful to assume that the US would respond in accordance with Pakistan’s strategic imperatives.

In this entire episode, the man who emerged unschathed was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Though the situation that emerged in East Pakistan owed a lot to his intrasingence to accept the result of the popular vote and allow Sheikh Mujib to form a government, he
thorough his fiery speeches at the United Nations, emerged as one popular leader who had the pulse of the public opinion. His last performance was at the United Nations Security Council debate in New York on 15 December, when he decried the Indians and the Soviets for their role in the Bangladesh crisis, while praising the US for a principled stance. As he had upstaged one military ruler in the last war in 1965 (Ayub Khan), this time also Bhutto was able to have the better of Yahya Khan. On his return he found the situation favorable. Yahya was blamed for the entire mess and had to resign. He handed over powers to Bhutto, who now became the President as well as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Pakistan as a result of the war lost much of its strategic clout, losing the entire eastern wing and more than half of its population.

With regards to the US Pakistan security relationship, Bhutto acknowledged the role US had played in supporting Pakistan. He met the American President and Secretary of State on 18 December, in Washington. He remarked that Pakistan was “completely in debt of the United States in the recent trying days”. The US President assured him of economic and humanitarian support however made it clear that the military support would be contingent upon congressional approval which was not very likely in the near future.

In conclusion, the 1971 War reflected the problems with a lopsided relationship, which had already been rocked by the 1965 War. This latest episode only reaffirmed

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629 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 204)
630 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 120)
632 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 204)
633 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allied, 2001, p. 204)
the perception in Pakistan that the US was not a reliable security partner. One major problem area was the US worldview as compared to Pakistan’s immediate concern. The Nixon administration felt that the Indians were out to threaten West Pakistan, in addition to their military offensive in East Pakistan and most of the diplomatic effort was directed towards preventing this eventuality. They were more concerned with the wider repercussions of an Indian victory that completely overwhelmed Pakistan. This perception was not shared by senior Pakistani diplomats who felt that the core Indian objective was to dismember Pakistan, humiliate it and eventually cut it down to size. They did not share the view that India had any intention of attacking West Pakistan. In any case, the key issue remained the gap in the perceptions of the two countries’ leadership. Thus despite a fairly proactive and positive stance towards Pakistan, the US stature in the country suffered further diminution.

The Aftermath of 1971 War

Pakistan in the aftermath of 1971 War was a chastened, defeated and demoralized country. As Shahid Amin, a veteran diplomat writer “The decline of Pakistan started with self-inflicting 1965 War and nadir was reached in with its ignominious defeat in 1971 War”634. Many observers and influential US figures, including US Ambassador to India, Mr Galbraith, advocated a “North American Solution”, referring to the relative subservient role of Mexico, Canada, to the US dominance in the region, as he
felt that India was now in a similar dominant position in South Asia. The Pakistani nation wanted to know how it could have happened. Yet there were no easy answers. Bhutto was now firmly in-charge. Now the fire breathing politician, who had often ostracized the US, sent more positive signals as even he understood the need for support in this crucial time. Bhutto concluded the Simla Agreement with India, in July 1972 that allowed for the return of 5,139 square miles of Pakistani territory captured by the Indians in West Pakistan. The Prisoners of War were not released by the Indians. Bhutto agreed to convert the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir to the “Line of Control”, and accepting to solve all the outstanding issues on a bilateral basis. Thus in essence he recognized the status quo in Kashmir, however since the issue was not fully resolved, it left the door open for future confusion and acrimony later. At this juncture the Indian contention was that Bhutto had agreed to accept the ceasefire line as the de-facto border, but did not accept it openly as he feared public outcry over any such decision. However there is nothing in the Simla declaration to support this contention.

An important result of the Simla agreement was that the US now also accepted the basis of the settlement as mutual agreement between Indian and Pakistan rather than the UN resolutions that had originally been at the heart of any resolution efforts. Thus India effectively de- internationalized the Kashmir conflict, by reducing it to a bilateral issue and gaining Pakistan’s acceptance through the Simla Agreement. This

635 (Sattar, Pakistan Security and Foreign Policy, 2007, p. 120), (Amin S. M., 2000, pp. 72-73), (Choudhury G. W., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers, 1975, p. 224)
637 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 120)
practically sealed the fate of Pakistan’s ambitions for getting the Kashmir valley through international pressure on India for a free and fair plebiscite. Although Bhutto’s shrewd negotiations saved them from the ultimate ignominy of accepting an Indian solution to the Kashmir conflict, it left the core issue of Kashmir unresolved.

The US resumed its limited assistance package in the aftermath of the Simla Agreement. The first high level visitor to Pakistan was Secretary of Treasury John Conollay, who promised to continue support for Pakistan. An important development for Pakistan was the re-election of President Nixon, who had been favorably poised towards the country, during his first term in office. The first tangible action by the Nixon administration was the resumption of limited supply of military equipment to Pakistan. It was in the shape of spares and non lethal equipment worth 24 million dollars in March 1973.

Bhutto was able to forge a new constitution for Pakistan on 14 August in 1973, a landmark achievement which had the support of all major political parties. As a result of the adoption of this constitution, he became Pakistan’s Prime Minister in August 1973. In the following month, he embarked on his first visit as premier to the United States. From a security relationship standpoint he requested for the resumption of the military aid and also asked the US to consider development of a naval base at Gwadar, in Balochistan province. The aid was not resumed by the US Government because of the Congressional opposition. As for the base, the US Government did not consider it further as it had the potential of riling up the Indians, Afghanistan and Russia. They instead opted for Diego Garcia. This offer by Bhutto does underscore

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one interesting aspect. He also felt the need for the US support, despite being one of the most vocal opponents of the security relationship during earlier years when he was not in power\textsuperscript{640}. The joint statement issued by President Nixon and Bhutto on 20 September 1973, reiterated the “strong US support for Pakistan’s independence and territorial integrity”\textsuperscript{641}.

Bhutto now embarked upon an effort to rehabilitate Pakistan. He looked towards the Islamic countries to give Pakistan the kind of recognition and importance that could heal some of the scars of defeat in 1971. His efforts culminated in a summit of Muslim countries in Lahore, where Pakistan also formally recognized Bangladesh. The period was however uneventful from the US-Pakistan security relationship perspective. There was nothing of strategic significance in the region, that could warrant the US to pay extra attention to the region. The US was preoccupied by the Middle East. The 1973 Arab Israel War and subsequent oil embargo by the Arab countries remained the focus of attention. Additionally, Pakistan’s ardent supporter in the 1971 War, President Nixon, quit the White House, following the infamous Watergate scandal, in August 1974.

In Pakistan’s context, there was a major shift in the foreign policy thrust lines of the country. Pakistan now adopted a much closer stance towards the Muslim countries. More importantly, it established a closer security relationship with China, which emerged as a much more reliable friend in the aftermath of the two conflicts with India. The security cooperation with the Chinese was enhanced, based on this

\textsuperscript{640} (Jain J. P., 1974, pp. 230-231)
\textsuperscript{641} (Jain J. P., 1974, p. 223)
newfound strategic cooperation and due to the fact that the US had almost completely cut off the arms pipeline to the country. The Chinese supplied Pakistan with 60 MIG-19 Aircraft, 100-T54-T-55 tanks and other hardware, effectively taking over from the US as Pakistan’s main arms supplier.\footnote{Choudhury G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan, 1974, p. 223}, (New York Times, 3 June 1972), (Wriggings, May 1973)

The Nuclear Factor Beginning of an Irritant – 1974 onwards

The Indian nuclear explosion in the Pokhran, Rajhistan, added another more threatening and sinister dimension to the tenuous security situation in the region. These tests conducted on 19 May 1974, were dubbed as peaceful tests by the Indians. But on the Pakistani side, already smarting from a massive military defeat from the hegemonic neighbor, they were considered anything but peaceful.\footnote{Rizvi H.-A., 1986, p. 204} The test was ironically nicknamed “Smiling Budha”. It was a device of 10-15 kilotons.\footnote{Matinuddin, 2002, p. 64} It is important to note that the US and Western countries took a mild view of the Indian tests. There was no major penalty on India except cutting off nuclear cooperation.\footnote{Matinuddin, 2002, p. 66} In the coming years, Pakistan’s quest to match this Indian strategic capability put the country squarely against the US non proliferation agenda. This factor for the first time introduced a negative feature in the security and strategic relationship between the two countries. Now Pakistan became a point of attention for the US policy makers solely for the purpose of coercing the country to abandon its nuclear ambitions. As Dennis Kux points out:-

\footnote{Rizvi H.-A., 1986, p. 204}
\footnote{Matinuddin, 2002, p. 64}
\footnote{Matinuddin, 2002, p. 66}
“Once Washington became aware that Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions were not mere rhetoric, thwarting Islamabad’s attempt to match India’s capability would become a top policy goal- and the principal source of bilateral friction between the United States and Pakistan for the remaining years of twentieth century”646.

Bhutto can be rightly given the credit for starting the nuclear programme despite Pakistan’s enormous financial, technical and political difficulties. He had been an ardent supporter of acquiring this capability in order to match the Indian conventional and nuclear capability647. His perception was strengthened by Pakistan’s setback in Kashmir in 1965 and humiliation in the 1971 War. The US Arms Embargoes in both the wars also reinforced this perception648. As early as 1965 he had, in an interview commented that Pakistan would “eat grass” if necessary but would match the Indian capability649.

The US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited India and Pakistan in October 1974. He, during his visit to New Delhi, described India as the preeminent power in the region650. This was in fact an acceptance by the United States of the new strategic equation in the region. India had now asserted its dominance, by reducing Pakistan to half of its former size in population, by orchestrating the breakup of the Eastern Wing of the country. During the Kissinger visit to Pakistan, the main issue of interest to

647 (Spector, 1984, pp. 76-77)
648 (Matinuddin, 2002, p. 83)
Pakistan remained the lifting of the arms embargo\textsuperscript{651}. Though no breakthrough was achieved on the official level, Prime Minister Bhutto was upbeat about the prospects in the near future. Another source of satisfaction was the invitation extended by the US government to visit Washington. This was an opportunity for the Pakistan Prime Minister to establish a direct rapport with the new US President. The visit materialized in February 1975. During the talks, the US President and the Secretary of State gave positive signals regarding the lifting of the arms embargo. A formal announcement was made on February 24, 1975. This decision lifted the arms embargo that had been imposed by the US Government almost 10 years ago on the eve of the 1965 Indo–Pakistan war. It was however not Pakistan specific. The decision also affected India, though it was not as significant for them as they had a close security relationship with the Soviet Union, enabling it to continue with arms buildup and upgradation, irrespective of the US sanctions. The decision to lift the arms embargo was different to the post 1965 arrangement between US and Pakistan. This was more of a straightforward purchase of arms permission rather than the concessional arms sales as had been the norm during the alliance heydays of the 50’s and 60’s\textsuperscript{652}.

During Bhutto’s visit there was another significant concession by the US. Pakistan was provided 65 million dollars worth of wheat and some 78 million dollars as developmental loans by the US government\textsuperscript{653}.

\textsuperscript{651} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, pp. 217-218)
\textsuperscript{652} (Washington Post “South Asia Prospect”, February 27, 1975 )
\textsuperscript{653} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 219)
French Reprocessing Plant Controversy. With regards to the nuclear issue, the State Department had started receiving reports that the Pakistan government was eagerly pursuing options to commence this program. The first concrete development in this regard was the deal between Pakistan and France for a nuclear reprocessing plant. The US was also concerned by the Pakistan governments desire to obtain a heavy water production plant from West Germany, another crucial ingredient in the nuclear chain. The US government now redoubled efforts to prevent Pakistan from acquiring the nuclear capability. The US president in March 1976, in a letter to Prime Minister Bhutto, asked Pakistan to desist from going for the heavy water and reprocessing facilities. To strengthen the demand, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Pakistan in August 1976. His visit was aimed at persuading Prime Minister Bhutto to drop plans for the nuclear facilities in return for enhanced conventional military capabilities. The US secretary of State offered Pakistan A-7 Attack aircraft if a “successful resolution of the reprocessing issue was brought about”. There was a lot of goodwill on both sides, but Kissinger was unable to glean any productive result from Pakistan on the nuclear issue. The Pakistan Government felt, with benefit of hindsight (The 1971 War) that the US assurances could in no way compensate for the security possible through acquiring a nuclear deterrent to match India. This meeting reflected the growing differences over the nuclear issue. Kissinger warned the Pakistan Government of possible ramifications of pursuing nuclear program, which could include cut off in aid and financial assistance to the country. The Pakistani

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(Spector, 1984, p. 78)
preparedness to risk such measures as the cost of pursuance of the nuclear program reflected a clear understanding that integral security capability in the shape of nuclear deterrent was the only way to survive in the Indian neighborhood.

**Balochistan Unrest – 1973-1976**

Another development in the region that would have far reaching effects on the US Pakistan security relationship, was the developing struggle for influence in Afghanistan. The hard-line regime of Sardar Daud, with active Soviet support had been fostering unrest in Balochishtan province in Pakistan in addition to reigniting the Pakhtoonistan issue. The insurgency in Balochistan had been put down by Bhutto, by employing army against the insurgents. The insurgency enjoyed active Soviet support, through the Iraqi Government. One of the startling revelations was the seizure of large quantity of arms, ammunition and communication equipment from the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad.⁶⁵⁵

On the internal front, Bhutto expected an easy victory in the general elections of 1977. His Pakistan People’s Party won 155 out of 200 seats nationwide. However, the election results were widely seen as rigged in PPP’s favor.⁶⁵⁶ There were widespread disturbances in the country, with the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a collection of the opposition parties organizing mass protests across the country. As the protests spread, Bhutto had to call upon the Pakistan Army to quell the riots. The Army Chief General Zia ul Haq though supportive asked Bhutto to resolve the issue through

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⁶⁵⁵ (Rizvi H.-A., 1986, p. 201)
⁶⁵⁶ (Wolpert, 1993, pp. 278-279)
dialogue. At this stage Bhutto was increasingly skeptical of the US involvement in the situation. He went as far as commenting on the floor of the National Assembly on April, 28 1977 that the US wanted to get him removed from office because of his support to the Arabs against Israel and his insistence to continue with Pakistan’s nuclear program657.

Bhutto is Removed in a Coup- Back to Military Rule in Pakistan

The political impasse between Bhutto and his opponents continued, with the Saudi Government also chipping in the negotiation process, trying to bring about some agreement between Bhutto and the PNA. The negotiations were often close to fruition but frustrated by mutual distrust. In the meanwhile the Army had been preparing to take over the country in case the situation became more tenuous. In General Zia’s reckoning, this was so on 12 July 1977. He took over control of the country, arresting and jailing Bhutto and his key companions. The military government promised general elections within three months. This however could not happen as the military found that Bhutto retained most of his public appeal and charm. He received a tumultuous welcome when he was released658. In the cities of Lahore and Karachi, mammoth crowds turned out to participate in his rallies. More discomforting for the military regime was his reaction to the martial law and his promise to take all those who had imposed the martial law to task, once he was back

658 (New York Time, 30 July 1977)
On 3 September 1977 he was jailed once again, and murder charges brought against him. The elections that had been planned for October 1977 were postponed indefinitely. Bhutto’s trial lasted for one and a half years. He was convicted by the Lahore High Court and sentenced to death. His appeal was then taken up by Supreme Court of Pakistan. In February 1979, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court. There was a chorus of appeals from different world leaders to President Zia to grant clemency to Bhutto. The US President also conveyed requests for clemency through Ambassador Hummel. However, President Zia resisted all the pressures and Bhutto was hanged in April 1979. This brought to an abrupt end the life and career of arguably one of the most charismatic leaders of Pakistan. It was widely believed that President Zia could not afford to let Bhutto off the hook, because Bhutto could pose serious difficulties for him at any time. With the threat of being taken to the courts over charges of high treason and military coup, this left very little practical options for the military ruler.

With regards to the security relationship, the departure of Bhutto from the scene was not altogether unwelcome, as he during his last days in office had been overly critical of the US involvement in the country. It was also widely believed in many circle that Bhutto’s overthrow had some linkages to the US Government. This was however explicitly denied by the US government. Much of the blame for mishandling the

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659 (Wolpert, 1993, p. 308)
662 (Mahdi, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1971-1981, 1999, p. 154)
situation rested with Bhutto himself\textsuperscript{663}. However, the new US Administration of President Carter did not share the warmth of the previous Ford Administration. The Indian Government had also changed hands. Indira Gandhi had been forced out of office by popular vote and now Murar Ji Desai’s Janata Party was in power. The Carter Administration did not look at the military regime in Pakistan with any favor. This was apparent when the US President invited the Indian Prime Minister to Washington in July 1977. This was followed by a visit by the US President to India in January 1978. More importantly for Pakistan he did not include the country in his itinerary, a sharp rebuke to the military regime in the country\textsuperscript{664}.

**Pakistan continues Nuclear Program despite Change in Government**

Despite Bhutto’s ouster, Pakistan’s nuclear program remained largely on track; the US Government once again renewed effort for its winding up\textsuperscript{665}. The nuclear issue was once again brought up by the Carter Administration. The US State Department Nuclear Specialist, Joseph Nye was sent to Pakistan in September 1978. He informed the Pakistan Government that if they did not back out of the French Nuclear Reprocessing Plant Project, the country would be subjected to sanctions under the Glenn Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. This amendment prohibited economic assistance to those countries which had not signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and still pursued nuclear fuel reprocessing. President Zia did not accept

\textsuperscript{663} (Matinuddin, 2002, p. 90), (Akhund, 1997, pp. 319-327)
\textsuperscript{664} (Kux, Estranged Democracies India and the United States 1941-19191, 1993, p. 352)
\textsuperscript{665} (Spector, 1984, p. 81)
these demands and resultantly for the first time in the security/strategic partnership, Pakistan was slapped with economic sanctions by the US Government\textsuperscript{666}. Just as the Chinese factor had soured relations in the last decade, this aspect now looked to be the major irritant in the relationship in the future. The US assistance which at that time amounted to approximately US $50 Million dollars was suspended. In addition the US Government also pressurized the French to back out of the proposed reprocessing plant Project. They met greater success here. President Villary Giscard D Estaing agreed to terminate the project in 1978\textsuperscript{667}. The US Government, satisfied with these new developments, announced resumption of economic aid for the next financial year. But the nuclear controversy did not go away. There were leaks in the British Press and discussions in the Parliament that Pakistan was trying to procure ‘inverters’, an important component of the uranium enrichment process. Though the British Government imposed a ban on the export of these inverters, the US Government was not satisfied. The US Ambassador, Hummel broached the subject with President Zia in July 1978, putting across the available intelligence. President Zia flatly denied that Pakistan was pursuing any nuclear enrichment program\textsuperscript{668}. The controversy failed to go away and in April 1979, a few days after Bhutto’s execution, the US reimposed the aid sanctions against Pakistan. This time the US Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher had stopped over in Islamabad and held discussions with the Pakistan President Zia on the issue. The American Government wanted President Zia to give

\textsuperscript{666} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 235)
\textsuperscript{667} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 217), (Steve Weissman and ---Islamic Bomb p. 165)
\textsuperscript{668} (Matinuddin, 2002, p. 81)
an explicit assurance that the country would not conduct nuclear tests and open its facilities to international safeguard and inspection. A key issue of contention was the development of Kahuta nuclear facilities, which Zia declined to cancel. The new sanctions were to the Pakistan Government and the public, quite discriminatory. The US while chiding and penalizing Pakistan was actively involved in providing arch rival India with nuclear fuel for its Tarapur Atomic Reactor. The US also displayed no concern about Israel’s nuclear program. Thus Pakistan seemed to be targeted specifically. This issue would remain contentious and act as a major source of divergence in the coming years. The Carter Administration viewed the Pakistan Nuclear program with great concern and this issue dominated the whole range of bilateral relations. In October 1979, Pakistan’s foreign minister Agha Shahi visited Washington. His visit was overshadowed by the US concerns about the nuclear program. The US Government wanted assurances that Pakistan would refrain from technology transfer to other countries, open its facilities to nuclear inspections and not explode a nuclear device. The foreign minister of Pakistan did not give any assurance except that Pakistan would not transfer any nuclear technology. The US Secretary of State Vance, even arranged a meeting between Agha Shahi and the US nuclear expert Gerard Smith, who lectured Agha Shahi on the dangers of nuclear weapons. Shahi’s response was that the “value of nuclear capability lies in its possession not in the use.”

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669 (Spector, 1984, p. 83)
670 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 239)
671 (New York Time, 9 April 1979)
Regional Developments Force the US to Adopt a Softer Approach towards Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear program could have come under greater pressure, but for regional developments that forced the US Government to adopt a softer stance. These developments were the violent change of governments in the two neighboring countries Iran and Afghanistan. The removal of America’s staunch ally Shah of Iran in a violent Islamic revolution denied the US its longstanding ally in the region in January 1979. Earlier, in April 1978 the Afghan regime of Sardar Daud had also been toppled by the communist backed elements. Thus the US was left with little choice but to work with President Zia of Pakistan. The US started with the first two tentative steps to counter the Soviet influence in Afghanistan. The first step was beefing up Pakistan’s intelligence gathering facilities. This time the US did not send in dedicated personnel for these facilities as in the case of previous arrangements at Badaber and Murree during the Ayub era. The development of the capabilities in Pakistan was to overcome the void created due to the change in regime in Iran, which had denied the US any use of its facilities there. This was followed by a small CIA funded program to support the Afghan resistance, for which the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence Agency was used. Thus despite reservations about the nuclear program and Pakistan’s undemocratic leadership, the US government enhanced its engagement in the country.

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673 (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, pp. 40-44)
674 (Herrison, 1995, pp. 33-35)
675 (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 44)
Sacking of US Embassy – A Setback to US Pakistan Relations. The relations however suffered a setback on 21 November, 1979, when an angry student mob attacked the US Embassy compound, in the wake of an attack on the Holy Kaaba, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. It was rumored that the US and Isreal were involved in the incident. The crowd torched the embassy building and the incident resulted in the deaths of four staff members. The Pakistani Army units were sent to the scene but they reached much after the crowd had done the damage and dispersed. The incident brought the relations between the two countries to a new low. Though Pakistan expressed its regrets through a statement by Information Secretary, Major General Mujib-ur-Rehman, yet this incident created a very bad feeling the in US. However once again it was providence that came to the rescue of the Pakistan government.

Soviet invasion for Afghanistan – State in Set for a Renewed Security Relationship

On 24 December 1979, the Soviet Army entered Afghanistan to topple the regime of Hafizullah Amin and installed in its place Babrak Karmal, an ardent communist. With this development the Pakistan Government assumed enormous significance for the US. This was reflected in the changed stance of the American Government. The US President Jimmy Carter rang up President Zia and reaffirmed support through the

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676 (The Muslim, 29 November 1979), (Economist, 1 December 1979)  
1959 Mutual Security Agreement. The US also promised to strengthen Pakistan’s security against the communist threat\textsuperscript{678}.

Conclusion

The period between 1962 – 1979, saw the security relationship deteriorating from close intimacy to estrangement and finally breakup. The period provided a valuable insight into diverging strategic priorities of the United States and Pakistan that resulted in disappointment and disillusionment for the smaller partner, Pakistan. An attempt has been made to analyse these diverging perspectives, to synthesize the core issues that led to estrangement. The chapter also identifies the new irritant in the security relationship, Pakistan’s nuclear program, which set the tone for US Pakistan security dialogue in the coming years. It was only the changing geo-political scenario in the region, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which once again brought about a convergence of security interests of the two countries.

\textsuperscript{678} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 245)
CHAPTER 3
THE AFGHAN CONFLICT (1979 - 1988)
PAKISTAN – A FRONTLINE ALLY

Introduction

This chapter deals with one of the most important periods of security cooperation between the US and Pakistan. It is also significant from its lasting impact on the regional geopolitical situation, as well as Pakistan’s internal security dynamics. The security situation during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in fact, is a precursor of the percent security dilemmas being faced by Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the current US military involvement in region. This chapter tackles the prevailing environment in the region, with special focus on Pakistan’s geopolitical and security compulsions at the start of the Afghan conflict. It analyses the strategic imperatives of both US and Pakistan in forging a close military alliance, with a large covert component in the shape of ISI-CIA cooperation. The convergence of interests in Afghanistan also resulted in the US’s mellowed down stance on Pakistan’s other important security concern i.e Nuclear programme. It is important to note the US stance towards Pakistan’s nuclear programme, once competing US interests dictated turning a blind eye to concerns about proliferation. The chapter also analyses in detail, the gains in conventional military capability, accrued by Pakistan through the fruitful security alliance with the US. The chapter also looks into the cost benefit-analysis of the relationship, covering both the military and economic gains from the partnership,
as well as the fallouts of the Afghanistan War. This period is as excellent example of a security relationship between a superpower with global interests and a third world country with more immediate and regional concerns. The convergence of interests is transitionary in nature, which is eventually detrimental to the smaller partner.

**The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan**

**Background.** At the birth of Pakistan, out of the most problematic issues, was the issue of the border between the newly born country, and its Western neighbour Afghanistan. The long 1400 kilometers stretch of mountainous border between the two countries, which was demarcated in 1893, by Sir Mortima Durand. This boundary did not take into account the ethnic makeup of area and un-naturally divided many tribes and their lands between the British India and Afghanistan. Though agreed upon by Amir Abdul Rehman of Afghanistan, it did not do well with the tribes, even during the British era, there were numerous incursions and trouble emanating from Afghan side, into the British India.\(^{679}\)

\(^{679}\) (Barton, 1939, pp. 291-292)
At the time of partition, the future of NWFP (North West Frontier Province) was decided by a referendum. At this stage both the Afghan Government, and its sympathizers Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Khan Abdul Wali Khan of the Congress, added new complexity to the situation by asking for an option of independent NWFP or joining its “Motherland” Afghanistan. Though the referendum in NWFP, conducted on 17 June 1947, under Lieutenant General Sir Robert Lockhart, was a resounding “yes” for joining Pakistan, yet the Afghan Government and the Khan Brothers did not abandon their opposition, not withstanding the fact that the princely

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states in the area, i.e Dir, Swat and Chitral have also joined Pakistan, by signing the instrument of accession\textsuperscript{681}.

Two aspects of the Afghan situation stood out very early. One, the Afghan Government was not comfortable with the new country, and in collision with the Congress Party and its sympathizers, looked to undermine Pakistan. Secondly the Durand Line had certain inherent flaws, one of them being the inability to clearly delineate the boundary between the two countries along with some well established ethnic lines, with tribes living on both sides of the border, it just could not be taken as definitive borders in practice. Additional complicating factor was the nature of the tribes in their bordering region. These included nominally controlled tribal agencies, where the British Government had been forced to launch successive military operations throughout their stay, in order to keep them pacified. They maintained “what was famed as” “three fold frontier”. This included the “outer edge directly administered territory”, followed by “indirectly administered” and then lastly the “outer edge of area of influence”\textsuperscript{682}.

The Pakistan right from the outset, had a problematic neighbour, contending the existing border, and a porous, difficult border that was inhabited by nominally controlled tribes with affiliations on both sides of the border. After independence, as Pakistan looked towards the US for economic and military aid, the Afghan Government approached both the US and the Soviet Union for economic and developmental assistance. Though the US also provided some aid initially, it petered

\textsuperscript{681} (Cheema P. I., Pakistan’s Defence Policy 1947-1958, 1990, p. 51)
\textsuperscript{682} (Cheema P. I., Pakistan’s Defence Policy 1947-1958, 1990, p. 51)
down, after the conclusion of security pacts with Pakistan. The USSR, however, gained influence in the country with every passing year. Initially, 1950’s saw a massive inflow of capital and expertise both from Russia and to a lesser extent, USA into the Afghan development projects. The Soviet built dams, airfields schools and irrigation schemes, while the US was involved in some major irrigation projects in the South, chiefly the development of agriculture along Helmand River. Ironically, the Kandahar Airport was also developed by the US. In August 1961 during the Ayub period, the Pakistan Government was forced to close the border with Afghanistan, owing to Sardar Daud’s insistence on the question of Pashtoonistan. In 1964, Sardar Daud was asked to step down by the king, and a new constitution was promulgated, which offered more liberal freedom than Daud’s strong and authoritarian regime. Though the new constitution had little impact on the countryside and the 90% illiterate population of the country, yet it did allow communist sympathizers to gain strength. The Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded in 1965, with active KGB involvement, under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Tarakai. The Afghan king, Zahur Shah was deposed in the bloodless coup in 1973, by Sardar Daud, as he was visiting Italy. He was supported by the PDPA. However, on resumption of powers, he tried to reduce the communist influence in the country, which by now had increased manifolds. Daud’s downfall started from the rather un-diplomatic sojourn to Moscow in 1977. He was

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683 (Asian Leader, p 521, 1955)
684 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1990, p. 207)
685 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 228)
686 (Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1990, p. 209)
invited by Leonid Brezhnev, with a red carpet welcome. The Soviet leader was concerned about Afghanistan’s alliances with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other non-communist countries. Daud’s criticism of Cuba and Ethiopia, both communist allies of the Soviet Union, did not go well with the communist leader. More importantly for Pakistan, he had been making bold moves to reconcile years old Pashtoonistan issue with the Eastern neighbour. Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had visited Afghanistan in Jan 1976. He then received Sardar Daud on a return visit in the same year. The Daud visit to the Soviet Union was marked with an acrimonious exchange between the two leaders, where he reportedly slammed his fists on the table, once chided by Leonid Brezhnev on his overtures towards non-communist countries and his ignoring of the communists in the Kabul Government’s inner circles. The trigger for Daud’s change was an assassination of a communist leader Mir Khyber Ali, in 1978. The ensuing communist reaction was much more than Daud’s expectations. The communists turned out in large number to mourn the death. Daud’s efforts to suppress the communists resulted in an even more violent response. On 27 April 1978, his palace was surrounded by communist backed troops. The rebels were also able to capture Kabul Airport, and used MIG-21 Aircraft to straff the Palace. Daud’s loyal forces were quickly overwhelmed, and he, along with his entire family was murdered. This bloody revolution was named the “Saur” (April) Revolution. The revolution was quickly followed by arrival of a large nucleus of Soviet experts. Nur Muhammad Tarakai took over the reins of power in Afghanistan. As the new

[688] (Bradsher H. S., 1985, pp. 63-66)
[689] (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 230)
Government unveiled its Marxist agenda, resistance began to grow in different parts of the country. Some of the measures constituted by the government, directly contradicted the traditions and cultural norms of the largely agrarian and tribal Afghan Society. There were land reforms, which included distribution of land and control of irrigation channel by Ministry of Water and Energy. However the cooperative system envisaged by the Government relied on extensive system of loans, provision of fertilizer and seeds etc. This did not actually materialize because of the poor organization and lack of funds. Resultantly, instead of improving, the Decree No 8, by the communist government actually exacerbated the living conditions of the peasants all over the countryside.

Another decree with equally devastating effects was Decree No 7, which “ensured” equal rights to men and women in the fields of civil law, with a view to transforming the traditional status of women in Afghanistan. According to the law, parents could not arrange marriage of their girls, instead mutual consent was a must. This again was something very difficult to digest in a male dominated tribal society. As Dr Rasul Bukhsh points out “The rural peasant society regarded the social reforms as atheist and unwarranted intervention in family affairs”. The two significant disadvantages for the Communist regime were the apparently “Un Islamic” nature of the reforms, and their active backing by Soviet Regime, which was not received positively by the tribal populace. The reforms were widely denounced, setting in

690 (Holliday, 17 November 1979)
691 (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 55)
692 (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 96)
693 (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, pp. 56-57)
motion revolts and resistance countrywide, especially in the Kunar, Badakhsan and Central Hindukush regions, which became a hotbed of anti-government resistance. Thousands of Government soldiers deserted, taking their weapons and equipment along with them. The events continued on a downward curve for the Communist Regime in 1979, setting the stage for Soviet invasion. In February 1979, the American Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolf Dubs was kidnapped. He was killed in a botched rescue attempt later, when the Afghan forces tried to force their way into the compound where he was being held. The CIA believed that Hafizullah Amin was behind this thinly veiled assassination. In March, the Afghan Army used massive fire power and air support to quell a rebellion in the city of Herat, which resulted in more than 5000 casualties. Though the casualties were mostly civilians, yet the killing of more than 100 Soviet advisors and their families in the city, followed by a public display of decapitated Soviet heads on poles, enraged the Communist leadership in Moscow. The wave of violence spread across the country, rapidly. In August the communist regime forcibly quelled a rebellion in Kunar Valley with tanks, helicopter gunships and indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians. The scale of fire used and the level of casualties was horrendous. Alarmed at the developments, the initial Soviet response was to replace Nur Muhammad Tarakai with Hafizullah Amin. He, however, could not arrest the negative trends and it became apparent that the communist revolution in Afghanistan was on the verge of failure. In December 12,
1979, meeting of the Politbureau, the select group of Kremlin’s leadership, took the fateful decision of sending in the Red Army to prop up the faltering Communist Revolution. The Soviets took lead from their successful interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968

However in the larger, cold war context, the invasion was much more than an effort to bolster a tottering regime. The region had seen a tumultuous change just a few months earlier, with Ayatullah Khomeni ousting US’s most trusted ally, the Shah of Iran. In one full swoop, the US had lost its most credible ally and intelligence bases in the region. Now it would surely attempt to regain control over the region through other means. Concurrently, the Islamic fervour emanating from Iran, could have negative fallouts for the Soviet Union’s own Central Asian Islamic Republics. Thus the survival of a pro-Moscow regime in the strategically vital Afghanistan became a major priority. As one commentator points out:

“To the Soviet leadership, the war against the PDPA regime in Afghanistan could take more than a tribal uprising. The CIA was surely seasoning the stew and American military now had Iran as a pretext to arrive in theatre in full force”.

There is a common assertion that Russian wanted to reach the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and Afghanistan was the logical first step, which would automatically be followed by invasion of Pakistan’s Balochistan province. Apparently, this Tsarist period ambition of reaching the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, often touted by

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698 (Janne, p. 234)
699 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 234)
700 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 234)
Pakistan leadership, did not have as much strength, as the earlier augment for intervention in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{701}. A more circumscribed view of the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan, links it to two main purposes. The first was to protect the credentials of a communist regime in Afghanistan, and thereby protect long and costly investment of the Soviet Union in the country, which had started as early as 1919. Secondly Amin, the current ruler, had proved ineffective and unpopular. His replacement by a fresh face could “wipe the slate” clear of all the negative fallouts of last one year of the mismanagement and government atrocities. In essence he could be made scapegoat for the failed communist government. The Soviets feared that Amin might establish closer links with the US\textsuperscript{702}. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan was thus a major new development in the cold war rivalry in a region that had been left largely untouched earlier. It presented a tantalizing set of vulnerabilities and opportunities to both US and Pakistan, albeit for their own respective interests. From a US perspective, the physical move of Soviet Forces into Afghanistan presented a new level of threat, not seen since the Soviet incursion of Czechoslovakia. American prestige and influence already shattered by the Iranian revolution, further diminished by the success of this revolution. For Pakistan it could give the country a chance to revitalize its relations with the United States, as the resolve to counter “Communist threat”, which had now supplant nuclear proliferation in the hierarchy of American priorities\textsuperscript{703} related to Pakistan. As one communicator points out “Zia ul Haq was quick to understand that by allying himself with the West, he would protect his

\textsuperscript{701} (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 186)  
\textsuperscript{703} (Grare, 2003, pp. 18-20)
country from the East against India. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan presented Pakistan with an opportunity to break out of its isolation and more importantly reverse the order of the US government, which had been heavily biased towards the Indians in the last decade.

During this period, three separate but significant regional developments took place. The first of course was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which brought the US anticommunist agenda to the region. Second important development facilitating the US–Pak strategic partnership was the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which denied the Americans their most ardent and trustworthy support in the region, the Shah of Iran. He had been looking after the US interest, keeping his country in the US led Central Treaty Organization and was a major source of oil for the US and West when the Arab countries had placed an embargo on oil exports in the wake of Middle East Conflict in 1974. Thus at the crucial juncture of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the US had little choice but to look towards Pakistan. It was a win-win situation for General Zia, who not only gained international acceptance, but also substantial economic aid, that helped give his regime stability against pro-democracy forces in the country. Pakistan emerged as the focal point in the US sponsored strategic consensus in the region.

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704 (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-85, 2003, pp. 27-28)
705 (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-85, 2003, p. 29)
706 (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 236)
707 (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 239)
The Pakistan interests in the Afghan Conflict, flowed from its geopolitical compulsions, being sandwiched between India, a constant threat and belligerent neighbour on the East, and Afghanistan, which had been inimical to Pakistan’s interest right from the inception in 1947. The Durand Line, was a source of contention for the Afghan regimes, who wanted that the Pashtun tribes living in the area now forming part of Pakistan, should either form part of Afghanistan or be converted into an independent country “Pashtoonistan”. This demand was covertly supported by India and the Soviet Union. Thus, very early into its existence, Pakistan faced an openly hostile India on one front and a covertly, sometimes even overtly hostile Afghanistan on the other front.\(^708\)

**Border Between Pakistan and Afghanistan**

\[^708\text{(Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 226)}\]
During the coming decades, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan fluctuated between cool and hostile, but never friendly. At the time when Pakistan was forging closer security relations with the US, joining in the SEATO and CENTO alliances, the Afghan Government also looked towards either of the superpowers for military and economic aid. Since it did not figure out prominently in the US strategic calculus, it did not receive much encouragement from the US. The Afghan Prime Minister Sardar Daud also looked towards the Soviet Union for military and economic aid. The Soviet Union provided more than 1 billion dollars in military aid and 1.25 billion dollars in economic aid over the next two decades. In the process, the Soviets invited a large number of Afghan students, technicians and other people from the intelligentsia to study and visit Moscow, thereby increasing their influence in country. Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan soured further in 1961, during president Ayub’s time, when the border of the two countries was closed, owing to Sardar Daud’s support for Pashtoontan. During Bhutto’s time in the aftermath of the 1971 East Pakistan debacle, Afghanistan once again figured out as irritant for Pakistan’s internal security dynamics. The Balochistan insurgency in 1973 instigated by the Baloch Sardars, was actively supported by Afghanistan. Some of these Baloch leaders and their supporters were welcomed by Sardar Daud, and provided base and living facilities within Afghanistan. Bhutto in response also gave refuge to Daud’s opponents. Bhutto made an attempt in 1976, to placate the Sardar Daud regime and to get an assurance

709 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 226)  
711 (Ghaus, 1988, p. 120)
from the Daud regime on the sanctity of the Durand line\textsuperscript{712}, as well as cessation of Afghan Government support to the separatist Pashtun elements in Pakistan. These talks appeared to have made some progress, but before they could reach fruition, both Sardar Daud and Bhutto were ousted in coups\textsuperscript{713}. The new regimes in Pakistan and Afghanistan could not maintain the little momentum that had been created during the Bhutto – Sardar Daud Governments. On the eve of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan, which had been a victim of Afghan meddling and constant hostility for 32 years, found the prospects of a superpower, sitting on its border, supporting a hostile regime, which had clear connections with India, a worst case scenario from a security perspective. It, for the first time opened up the prospects of a two front war, which for the resource constrained, economically weaker country, was a very difficult proposition. This put Pakistan’s Balochistan Province right into the path of further Soviet expansion. Thus the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed a serious security dilemma for the country.

\textbf{Strategic Imperatives for Pak – US Security Co-operation}

The Afghan War brought about a major convergence of interest between the Zia regime and the Reagan Administration. The US interest in the Afghanistan, for which they needed Pakistan’s support were as follows:-

1. Prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the region, with special focus on protecting Middle East Oil.

\textsuperscript{712} (Sattar, Pakistan Security and Foreign Policy, 2007, p. 154)
2. Make the Soviet invasion costly and unproductive, thereby converting Afghanistan into a Vietnam like venture for the Soviet Union.

There was a concern that the Soviets wanted to continue their expansion till the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. Even the Carter Administration felt that the Russian invasion of Afghanistan was watershed event and that the US needed to respond with a much “broader strategy”.

It is important to note that Pakistan’s security situation was enhanced by the wide-ranging global support to the Afghan Resistance. This, however, was largely dependant and conditional to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the prime mover behind all US initiatives to bolster Pakistan. Thus Pakistan could not take the massive military and economic aid for granted. Since it was based on, and necessitated by a certain environment and set of conditions, it was but natural that US would scale down the aid, once these conditions were perceived to be no longer in existence. Thus, in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, the security partnership was likely to be scaled down. That it was ended so abruptly was largely due to competing US policy objectives, primarily non-proliferation, which had been relegated in case of Pakistan, due to the primacy of the anticommmunist struggle. As soon as the Soviet withdrawal had been accomplished, the pressure on US administration, to grant tacit acceptance to Pakistan’s nuclear program were removed. Thus the Pressler Amendment was invoked by President Bush. The feeling in Pakistan that it had been used like a “Kleenex” and discarded, though not off target, was a hard fact of international relations, where nations have interests and not

714 (Brzezinski, 1987, pp. 1-7)
716 (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 236)
friendships. Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais highlights the point “As the fundamental shift in Soviet Policy towards Afghanistan removed the most compelling reasons for US economic assistance towards Pakistan, the issue of nuclear proliferation returned to the dominant place it once occupied on the US Pakistan bilateral agenda”\textsuperscript{717}.

At the strategic plane, Pakistan fell short of the most important objective, i.e. stability in Afghanistan. The Soviet withdrawal precipitated a civil war, with competing interests of regional powers. India went for alignment with anti Pakistan Rabbani - Masood Alliance. On the other, Pakistan had been backing Taliban. This practically guaranteed constant tussle in Afghanistan between Pakistani – backed forces and the Indian backed opponents. In this backdrop, Pakistan’s failure to get a broad based interim government installed in Kabul, as a part of the Geneva Peace Accords, stands out as a major miscalculation, which cost the country very dearly in the coming years. One of the most important consequences was the inability of Pakistan to reap any benefits from Soviet withdrawal, and subsequent fall of communism, which suddenly opened up enormous prospects for trade and economic cooperation with the Central Asian States. Without stability in Afghanistan, which formed a vital “bridge” between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics, this potential trade and economic bonanza remained a pipe dream for Pakistan\textsuperscript{718}.

The Reagan Doctrine. Another key influencing factor in the American support in the Afghan struggle against Soviet occupation was the “Reagan Doctrine”.

\textsuperscript{717} (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 241)
\textsuperscript{718} (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, pp. 235-245)
President Reagan had been even before his election, a strong exponent of challenging the Soviet influence and incursions in different parts of the world. The Reagan Doctrine was different to his predecessor Carter in one significant way. It had a broader objective to roll back Soviet backed regimes, who had come to power in different third world countries. The Reagan administration responded strongly to Soviet overtures in different parts of world. In 1982, they provided aid and support to the Said Barre Government of Somalia, against a Soviet backed incursion by Ethiopia. Another significant anti communist operation was much closer to the US soil, where an airborne division was employed in Granada, to overthrow a communist regime there in 1983. The Reagan administration also expanded the CIA’s role to support anti communist movements in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Angola and Nicaragua. Reagan was convinced that “Communism is a sad bizarre chapter in human history, whose last pages even now are being written.” In this backdrop, Afghanistan was not merely another third world country, taken over by communists, but one of the major theatres of cold war, now being fought vigorously by the Reagan Administration. In this case, the presence of a supportive country, Pakistan, with longstanding though inert, traditional military ties with the US, a relatively vulnerable military regime and presence of Afghan resistance with long and successful history of opposing foreign interference, provided an ideal setting for this battle to be waged.

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720 (Robert, 1990, p. 262)
721 (W.Rodman, 1994, p. 265)
722 (Shweizer, p. XIV)
723 (Norton, 1987, p. 671)
Reagan was convinced that the west will not only contain communism, but transcend it 724.

**Pakistan Strategic Interest and Security Perspective.** While the US interest have been discussed at length, now a look at some of the strategic imperatives for Pakistan, in joining this partnership. President Zia’s strategic imperatives to side with the US are well-explained by his statement “Our main & primary objectives are to keep out the Soviet Union and Afghanistan in the North and to safeguard the security and safety of Pakistan from the East”725. The Pakistan Government was also wary of the Afghan meddling in the country, its support to Pashtun nationalists and its constant antagonism to Pakistan 726. The issue of Durand line which was often contested by the Afghans also stood out as a major concern for Pakistan.

**Security Perspective of Pakistan.** The presence of the Soviets on Pakistan’s western borders meant that the traditional buffer between the giant Tsarist and subsequently communist superpower, the Soviet Union, and the Indian sub-continent, had disappeared. As one of Pakistan’s leading newspapers commented, “while a traditional buffer state has disappeared, a superpower has emerged as our next door neighbour”727. The Soviet – Indian cooperation in the fields of security, as well as their convergence of interests in Afghanistan, posed a unique and very tricky security challenge for Pakistan. Indian’s pre-eminent desire was to attain unquestioned

725 (Dawn News, 23 March 1983)
726 (Ispahain)
727 (Kabul and After, (Editorial),, 25 Feb 1980. p. 4)
hegemony in the region\textsuperscript{728}. The Afghan - Indian – Soviet Nexus had been a source of trouble for Pakistan, especially in relation to the Pashtoonistan Movement, and the unrest in the tribal areas of Balochistan\textsuperscript{729}. Provocations, impinging on Pakistan sovereignty, were often initiated by the Kabul regimes, with active backing of the Soviet Union and India. The celebration of Pashtoonistan Day in June 1980 and recognition of Balochistan Peoples’ Liberation Front, by the Soviet backed communist regime of Nur Muhammad Tarakai, were clear indicators of worse things to follow, for Pakistan\textsuperscript{730}.

**Policy Options for Pakistan.** The choices open to Pakistan, at the time of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, were quite limited, given its own political, economic and military vulnerabilities. With a belligerent India on the eastern borders. The last thing Pakistan could afford was, to open up another front on its western borders opposing the Soviet military might, with its meagre military and economic potential was out of question. Yet the predicament of being sandwiched between two hostile neighbours was not acceptable to the Pakistani leadership. In a high powered meeting chaired by President Zia, and attended by the top military and civilian leadership of the country, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, laid out three simple options for the participants. These were:-

\textsuperscript{729} (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 110)
\textsuperscript{730} (Ali T., 1983, p. 195)
1. Direct confrontations with the communists, by lending support to the Afghan resistance groups.

2. Accept the invasion as “fait accompli” and try to live with it, in other words a policy of appeasement.

3. Garner international support to oppose the intervention on political and diplomatic plane, but remaining away from direct confrontation.\textsuperscript{731}

The three options had their own implications for Pakistan. An overt resistance was well beyond the capability of Pakistan, both politically and military. Accepting the fait accompli risked the possibility of a permanent hostile presence of Soviet forces or communist regime on its western borders. This would put Pakistan in a real bind, as it did not have sufficient military strength to even defend the borders with India. The prospects of further communist ingress into Pakistan, support to the simmering discontent in Balochistan and revival of the Pashtunistan issue, all factor mitigated against adopting this option. The third option, which depended solely on the world opinion, could not be expected to offset a real and present danger. Thus the Pakistani government opted instead to go for a combination of overt diplomatic support, and covert assistance to the Afghan resistance, while maintaining plausible deniability.\textsuperscript{732}

The prime concern of the Government in Pakistan remained the protection of the country’s western frontiers, yet by all reckoning, an equally important reason was the possibility of increased political, economic and military support, something vital for

\textsuperscript{731} (Shahi, Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy, 1988, p. 50)

\textsuperscript{732} (Wirsing R. G., Pakistan’s Security Under Zia. 1977-88, 1991)
the country’s key strategic concern, which remained security against India\textsuperscript{733}. The major advantage of a renewed alliance with the west would be tacit recognition of the military regime of General Zia, giving his role a degree of international acceptance and credibility. As Dr Wirsing put it, “Pakistan was eventually to transform itself from international rogue to good Samaritan\textsuperscript{734}. The military agreement between Pakistan and US, was a sequential outcome of the preliminary contents established during the Carter Era. Pakistan Government, had clearly identified its priorities in relation to Afghanistan, well before the military agreement was inked with the United States. The Pakistan support to the Afghan resistance had started during the Carter Era, with a modest CIA funded program for the Afghan resistance\textsuperscript{735}. There is clear evidence that the Pakistan Government did not visualize an automatic Soviet ingress into its territory, yet the Soviet presence in the neighbourhood could not be tolerated\textsuperscript{736}. The Zia regime adopted a well considered, pragmatic approach towards the issue. It relied on gaining international support, through the UN and OIC, for the condemnation and opposition to the Soviet Invasion\textsuperscript{737}. The Zia Strategy was also based on a well calculated and carefully calibrated response to the Soviet intervention. Pakistan’s response was not to antagonize the Soviets to the extent that they contemplate brash, direct provocations. Yet it was expected that Pakistan would be at the receiving end of the wrath of a superpower. For this, the security alignment with the US, and associated military and economic aid, would provide the requisite

\textsuperscript{733} (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-85 , 2003, pp. 25-28)  
\textsuperscript{735} (Bradsher H. S., 1983, p. 221)  
\textsuperscript{736} (Wirsing R. G., Pakistan’s Security Under Zia. 1977-88, 1991)  
\textsuperscript{737} (Wirsing R. G., Pakistan’s Security Under Zia. 1977-88 , 1991)
The strategy provided Pakistan with the flexibility of remaining focused on the actual threat, India, without getting overly committed in Afghanistan. In essence the Pakistani government wanted to neutralize or reduce the Soviet threat, while remaining viable and responsive to the Indian threat on its Eastern borders. As one observer points out, Pakistan’s policy success would be to re-orientate American towards the country due to Afgh an conflict, thus enabling it to strengthen its security against the traditional adversary India.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan - Pakistan becomes a Front Line State.

The Soviet invasion in 1979 changed the geopolitical landscape of South Asia overnight. Pakistan, under pressure for its nuclear program and military regime, suddenly became the focus of attention for the Jimmy Carter Administration. The contacts established during this period, though small, laid the foundations for much larger and wide ranging security cooperation in the Reagan Administration. The following period of almost a decade (1980-1988) witnessed a period of intimate security relationship between the two countries. It provides a fascinating study of the convergence of interests as well as compromise on the issues that were divergent for the two parties.

The Soviet Invasion brought about a confluence in the strategic imperatives of the two countries in a way as it had never happened previously. During the Ayub Era, Pakistan had joined the anti communist alliance but it did not face an imminent threat

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739 (Duncan, 1989, p. 110)
740 (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985, 2003, pp. 77-99)
from the Soviet Union. Now with the Russian tanks spearheading a regime change in the neighboring Afghanistan, this threat was perceived to be much more real and immediate. Pakistan’s Government concluded that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan posed a threat to Pakistan’s security. They felt that the next step in the Soviet advance could well be Pakistan. General Zia opted to oppose the invasion, despite the prospects of increased Soviet meddling in the Balochistan province, something that had been done previously through the Afghan proxy regimes. The Pakistan Government, after due considerations issued a sharp criticism of the Soviet Invasion. On the other hand, the Carter Administration stung by the event looked to bolster Pakistan against the Soviets as well as gather support against the communist takeover in Afghanistan.

**Carter Era – Tentative beginnings of a new Partnership.** President Carter’s statement on January 4, 1980 laid out the US imperatives for Afghanistan:-

“We will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat from the North” 741. This confluence of interest had another interesting facet. It provided legitimacy to the military regime that had been under pressure to hand over power early to elected representatives. President Zia had yet to hold the promised elections. This could now be postponed. The Pakistani Government was suddenly relevant for the US Administration. For the US administration,

a return to democracy was not that urgent now. In addition, dealing with a regime that did not have to answer to the electorate was in a way convenient for the US Administration.

The US Government quickly worked out an assistance package for Pakistan. This package essentially consisted of 400 million dollars military and economic aid over a period of two years. This package and the related details were discussed in a meeting between the Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shahi and US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Washington\textsuperscript{742}. The US support for Pakistan essentially revolved around four major aspects; Firstly to make the Soviet presence in Afghanistan difficult by raising the cost of intervention; Secondly to develop security cooperation with Pakistan on the basis of 1959 Mutual Security Agreement, without going into any new security arrangement; Thirdly provide Pakistan with 400 million dollars worth of military and economic assistance, but not the F-16 Fighter Aircraft that Pakistan had requested; Finally to maintain US concerns about Non-Proliferation\textsuperscript{743}. This offer was officially announced on 4 January 1980, by the State Department\textsuperscript{744}. While the Pakistani side was on board as far as opposing the Soviet invasion was concerned, there was divergence of views on certain other key issues. One was the size of the aid package. The amount was considered too less when compared to the cost of standing up to a superpower like USSR, which was now in Pakistan’s close proximity. This was evident from President Zia’s remarks, when he dismissed this initial aid offer as “PEANUTS”. He claimed that the amount of aid was not commensurate with the

\textsuperscript{742} (Shahi, Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy, 1988, p. 210)
\textsuperscript{743} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Discencahauted Allies, 2001, p. 48)
\textsuperscript{744} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Discencharated Allies, 2001, p. 249)
magnitude of the threat\textsuperscript{745}. He felt that this aid would not offset the disadvantage of facing the Soviet wrath once Pakistan openly sided with the US\textsuperscript{746}. Secondly, Pakistan wanted to procure F-16 Fighter Aircraft from the US, something it considered vital for bolstering its own security against India, as well as a show of the US goodwill and sincerity to the new security partnership. Pakistan was also queasy about the nuclear non-proliferation issue.

This is an interesting period in the US–Pakistan Security Relationship. As opposed to past instances, here one could see that the core US interests were at stake in the region, with Pakistan emerging as a necessary and valuable partner in the fight against communists. President Zia also shrewdly realized this and was prepared to raise the ante, driving a hard bargain.

**President Carter’s Response to Soviet Invasion.** The US Government’s determination to prevent the Soviet influence expanding in the region was evident from the State of the Union Address by President Jimmy Carter. He gave out his doctrine to counter Soviet Aggression, terming it as the Carter Doctrine. According to this doctrine, a Soviet attack against the Persian Gulf would be regarded as an attack on the US vital interests. The American President also reaffirmed support for Pakistan, stating “The US will take action---- consistent with our laws --- to assist Pakistan resist any outside aggression”\textsuperscript{747}. As Stanley wolpert highlights, the Soviet

\textsuperscript{745} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 159)
\textsuperscript{746} (Kux, The United Sates and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allied, 2001, p. 249)
\textsuperscript{747} (Kux, The United Sates and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allied, 2001, p. 250)
Invasion catapulted Pakistan back to the top of US agenda in South Asia, superseding India, for the time being.\footnote{Wolpert, 1993, p. 187}

The US Government dispatched a high level delegation which included the National Security advisor Zbignew Brzezinski and the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, to Pakistan in February 1980. This delegation was tasked to convince the Pakistani Government that the package offered was the best deal under the circumstances. The improved aid package was 500 million dollars. It was higher than the initial offer of $400 million. As for the continuation of aid package beyond two years, the team offered assurances but nothing concrete. These two factors meant that the aid package was not what President Zia and his associates had been looking for.\footnote{Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 159}

The Pakistani leader rang up President Carter and informed him that discussions had failed to bridge the gap between the two countries.\footnote{Kux, The United Sates and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allied, 2001, p. 251} The US Government was surprised by this rather firm stance by the Pakistani Government. The Carter Administration however continued efforts to get the requisite approval from the Congress for an aid package. These efforts were brought to an end in March 1980, when the Pakistan Government publicly declared that it was not interested in any aid from the US. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, declared that the security package in the present shape “would detract from rather than enhance our security”.\footnote{Pakistan Foreign Minister Rejects $400 million aid as harmfulNew York Times, 6 March 1980}

This was a major rebuff for the Carter Administration, but they decided instead to focus on other measures to enhance Pakistan’s position. One step which both the
governments agreed on was the rescheduling of Pakistan’s debt. This was also a special favour by the US Government as such measures had only been allowed previously when some country was on the brink of default. One factor which could have helped this decision was the initiation of covert cooperation between the intelligence agencies of the two countries, aimed at bolstering the Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation. The CIA had been authorized by President Carter in a top secret Presidential Finding in December 1972 to conduct covert operations inside Afghanistan. Most importantly it was not “Unilateral”, as some of other programs were, but in “liaison” with Pakistani intelligence, thus establishing basis for ISI-CIA cooperation. The security package remained on the drawing board during the last few months of the Carter Presidency. President Zia played his cards very well. He held out on the proposed aid package but still allowed his intelligence agency to forge closer cooperation with the Americans as far as covert operations against the Soviets were concerned. In the process he received international recognition as well as easing of pressure on his handling of the domestic affairs in Pakistan. He was able to comfortably ward off the fallout from Bhutto’s hanging and postponement of elections. In October 1980, he was invited to the White House by President Jimmy Carter. This visit was a reaffirmation of his growing significance with the US Administration. The American President offered to throw in the F-16’s in the security assistance package to sweeten the deal, but the Pakistan President shrewdly commented that the discussions could wait as the US President was committed in the forthcoming elections. He could sense that the US Government might change hands.

752 (Stave, 19-20 July 1992)
Thus any agreement at this stage would be reviewed anyway by the new administration. There was also a possibility of getting a better deal from the Republicans.

**Reagan Administration- Beginning of an enhanced Security Relationship.** The Presidential elections of 1980 augured well for the security cooperation between the US and Pakistan. President Ronald Reagan had, during his campaign pledged a more vigorous response to the Soviet encroachment into Afghanistan. This automatically elevated Pakistan’s position in the strategic calculus of the United States. The new US Administration including key figures like Secretary of State Alexander Haig, and Secretary of Defence William Casey were favorably poised toward Pakistan. The US government was also cognizant of the fact that Pakistan viewed the US policies as unreliable. The new US administration put together a new and much improved security assistance package of $ 3.2 billion dollars spread over five years. This time the package was discussed by the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Hummel, with the Pakistani leadership, before unveiling it publicly. This was to avoid the gaffes of the previous administration that ended up being embarrassed by assuming that Pakistan would accept whatever was offered.

It is important to note that the Pakistan Government was very cautious in approaching this new relationship. They wanted explicit assurances on issues like nuclear program,

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753 (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 256)
754 (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 59)
755 (Sattar, Pakistan Security and Foreign Policy, 2007, p. 159)
US reaction to the internal issues of Pakistan which essentially meant a tacit support for the military regime. The US Government assured the Pakistan leadership that they were willing to look the other way as long as Pakistan did not actually explode a nuclear device. As for the internal affairs of the country the US Government committed itself not to be too vocal about the restoration of democracy. As Secretary of State, George Shultz briefed President Regan “We must remember that without Zia’s support the Afghan resistance, key to making the Soviets pay a heavy price for their Afghan and resistance, is effectively, dead”. The Pakistan Government was also keen to ensure that the arrangement worked out for supporting the Mujahideen with the Carter Administration should continue. This would allow the ISI to remain the point of contact for the Americans, allowing it to channelize the funds and resources to the concerned Afghan groups. This demand was agreed to by the US Administration.

As for the aid package, Pakistan was able to get the approval for obtaining F-16 fighter AC, a concession by the Reagan administration, which was intended to assuage concerns in Pakistan about the seriousness of the American Government. The US Government was put to some inconvenience to adjust the delivery schedule of these Aircraft as these were still in the process of induction in the US Armed Forces and NATO partners. Pakistan also requested for latest avionics and other features, which was agreed to by the US administration after some initial reservations. The issue was sorted out in a meeting between the Pakistani officials and US Under Secretary of State for Security Affairs James Buckley and the final decision

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757 (Martin, 2002, p. 158)
758 (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 13)
announced in September, 1981. The Zia Government adroitly managed its relative importance by getting substantial concessions from the US Administration. The F-16’s gave the Pakistan Government a visible symbol of potency of the new found partnership with the world’s leading power. The Reagan Administration, in accordance with the understanding reached with the Pakistan Government, initiated legislative action in the US Congress for approval of the aid package.

**India Remains a Viable Security Threat – An Incentive for US Military Aid**

The situation emerging in the Eastern Neighbourhood of Pakistan, also impacted the decision making process in Pakistan. The bitter lessons of 1971 war, that resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan was still hardly forgotten in the country. India’s policy of supporting Afghanistan on its persistently nagging claim related to “Pashtunistan” and its support to the belligerent stance of successive Afghan Governments against Pakistan was a constant irritant for Pakistan. To Pakistan, it appeared that India was working on the policy of Chanakya Kutalya that “your enemy’s neighbour is your friend”. Based on this analogy, Pakistani establishment felt that Afghanistan was being cultivated by India to create pressure on Pakistan. Now an overtly communist regime in the country was an unpalatable proposition. The Pakistani perception of war further strengthened, when Indra Gandhi’s representation Birjish Mishra, remarked that the communist takeover in Afghanistan was purely an internal matter, and a reaction to the “anti Afghan” forces, a veiled reference to
Pakistan\textsuperscript{759}. The other factor that played in the minds of Pakistan’s decision makers was the fact that after a short stint by the relatively benign Morar Ji Desai coalition, the forceful and strong Indra Gandhi was once again back in power in 1979. Her attitude towards Pakistan, specially the manner in which she orchestrated the Indian Politico-Military might to set the stage and finally exploit, the East Pakistan crisis to maximum advantage, left little doubt in the minds of Pakistan leaders that the Indian stance towards Pakistan would once more be belligerent and aggressive. The conclusion of 1.8 billion dollars military equipment deal with the Soviet Union in 1980 was yet another source of concern for the Pakistan’s military establishment. In the absence of an assured source of arms supply to match or even maintain a credible conventional deterrence, the Pakistani leaderships was in an uneasy position\textsuperscript{760}. Maintenance of Pakistan’s conventional capability necessitated purchase of arms and up-gradation of existing weapon systems. The presence of an Army Chief in uniform, Zia Ul Haq, as the Head of Government in Pakistan, gave impetus to the requirement. Thus while the Afghan situation was precarious and threatening, Pakistan’s pre-occupation with the Indian threat and its desire to regain military potent vis-a-vis India played a vital role in accepting the US help in the Afghan war\textsuperscript{761}. This opened the door for renewed military cooperation. As evident from Presidents Zia’s first demand to the US i.e request for the latest hi-tech F-16 Fighter Aircraft, it can be easily concluded that the Indian threat was the foremost with Pakistani strategic planners, even as Soviet troops were consolidating their positions in Kabul and other

\textsuperscript{761} (Grare., 2003, pp. 28, 99)
Afghan cities. Given a history of bitter enmity with India and Indian contacts with Afghanistan and Soviet Union, this new development could not be taken lightly by Pakistan. The threat of Soviet Union trying to reach out for the warm water coast of Gwadar in Balochistan, coupled with the prevailing conditions of Economic and social deprivation in the province was, constantly bothering the Pakistani policymakers. Generals Zia’s policy was accepted in Pakistan as most people did not support the communist ideology as well as the Soviet – Indian nexus.

**Siachen Conflict 1984 – Pakistan’s Security Dilemma is accentuated.**

It is important to note that even during the 1980’s as Pakistan was involved in a very close security relationship with the US, its security situation vis-a-vis India did not improve in any meaningful way. In fact the insecurity grew even further, as the conflict in Kashmir moved to “new heights” in a literal way. This dispute involved contradictory claims by both parties, to the glaciated Northern part of the line of control in Kashmir, which constituted the Siachen Glacier and high mountain terrain right upto the Chinese border. Though the Indian incursions into the area, and its occupation of the two strategic passes, “Bila Fond La” and “Sia La” secured the entire length of the Glacier for India, yet the Pakistani response, in occupying remaining heights and positions opposite the Indian’s posts meant that the Kashmir conflict now moved into the hitherto uncharted domain of glaciated warfare. With

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763 (Shahi, Pakistans Security and Foreign Policy, 1988, pp. 8-9)
765 (Shahi, Pakistan Security and Foreign Policy, 1988, pp. 8-9)
permanent positions at heights ranging between 10,000 to 22,000 feet, this is the highest and one of the costliest battle-grounds in the world. Pakistan had to spend enormous amounts of money, to support its troops on such heights. The real cost of the conflict was not so much in terms of money, as the aggravation of the perception that India was an untrustworthy neighbour, who would use all available resources, and any opportunities offered to undermine Pakistan.  

Nuclear Factor in the US – Pakistan Strategic Partnership

**US Stance on Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.** Pakistan’s nuclear program and its development during the Afghan War period is a classical example of overcoming the US strategic concerns specific to Pakistan. Before the Soviet invasion, this was the single most thorny issue. After the invasion, and renewed security cooperation between US and Pakistan, the US government decided to let Pakistan “off the hook” as long as it did not come out openly with its nuclear status. President Zia, very shrewdly used the window of opportunity provided by the US need to Pakistan’s support in Afghanistan, to vigorously continue and substantially enhance Pakistan’s nuclear program. It is to be noted that there was no convergence of interests or views on the issue, which is a core security issue for Pakistan, but a matter of concern for the US administration. It was kind of an interlude in the tug of war between the two countries, with Pakistan trying to go nuclear and the US applying pressure and sanctions to prevent it doing so. A soon as the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan was achieved, the situation returned to “status quo ante”. The US immediately applied sanctions on Pakistan and cut off all military aid.

**Strategic Imperative for Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.** The Afghan conflict proved to be a great opportunity for Pakistan to pursue its nuclear program without US interference. It was because of US strategic interests in Afghanistan, and not because of any shared concern about Pakistan’s security against India. It is quite evident that the US did not share Pakistan’s genuine security, vis-à-vis India. That is why the Pakistan’s leadership opted for a unilateral policy of development of nuclear
capability, despite US resistance. It is also evident that the issue of Pakistan’s nuclear program was such that it united all segment of the political divide. The humiliation of 1971, followed by India’s intransigent attitude and constant threat from the hegemonic neighbours, saw to it that Pakistan’s resolve only strengthened with the passing years. This strong view on the nuclear issue can be linked to Pakistan’s experience with the lesson of last security partnership with the US, when it lost half of the country, primarily because of an Indian backed insurgency, followed by Indian invasion of East Pakistan in 1971. Though the situation is East Pakistan was largely a political one, yet the Indian military offensive provided the real catalyst for Pakistani military defeat and eventual acceptance of Bangladesh. This was at a time when President Yahya Khan, in his own reckoning had done a great favour to the US by playing a key role in US - China rapprochement. Thus the US aid stoppage, and subsequent neutrality, as Indian forces surrounded Dhaka, forcing an ultimate capitulation by Pakistan, all played very heavily on Pakistan’s public opinion and perceptions about reliability of the strategic partnership with the USA. As Robert Wirsing points out “The frailty of its (Pakistan’s) allies commitments and the worsening conventional balance conspired to move Pakistan in this (nuclear) direction”.

In addition to Pakistan’s genuine need for the nuclear capability there existed an element of resentment against the apparent discriminatory policies of the west, particularly the US, in dealing with Pakistan. While Pakistan was slapped with country specific nuclear sanctions, and coerced with threats of further punitive

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767 (Cohen S., The Pakistan Army, 1984, pp. 154-155)
actions, no such policy was displayed by the US administration towards India. Under such circumstances, adherence to non-proliferation would entail accepting a conventionally dominant India, along with a nuclear superiority, in the neighbourhood. Given India’s hegemonic, intransigent attitude, this was an unacceptable proposition to the decision makers in Pakistan. The bottom line, that Pakistani decision makers did not want to accept, was “second – rank” regional status in relation to India. As highlighted by Robert Wirsing:

“Acquisition of nuclear capability was and remains an imperative of Pakistan’s security policy, not really because Pakistan’s leaders were enamoured of its long range prospects but because the alternatives proposed were not utterly unpalatable.”

This issue remained a source of divergence, during the Afghan War, although US Government did not push Pakistan too far. There was a basic divergence of strategic interests between two countries. While India was accepted as a major power in South Asia, a potential counterweight to China, Pakistan did not have any such long term significance for the US Administration. The additional concerns regarding non-proliferation, keeping in view Pakistan’s fragile domestic political and economic environment, made this prospect even less appealing to the US decision makers. The perception in Pakistan also remained predominant that US decisions in this regard were also swayed by the Israeli – Indo Nexus, working feverishly to contain any possibility of an Islamic bomb, through hype, propaganda and Pakistan specific

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770 (Cohen S., The Pakistan Army, 1984, pp. 157-58)
sanctions in the US legislature\textsuperscript{772}. Such discriminatory sanctions if adhered to would leave Pakistan defenceless in face of Indian aggressions.

**President Zia’s Visit to the US – December 1982.** The Pakistan President was invited to Washington in December 1982. His visit was a big success for the military leader who was enthusiastically courted by the US Administration. The Pakistan President had a meeting with the US Secretary of State George Schultz. The main issue of concern for the US administration was the Pakistan nuclear program. As the Secretary of State put it, the program could seriously undermine Pakistan’s relations with the US\textsuperscript{773}. During the Pakistani President’s visit there were many awkward questions on Pakistan’s nuclear program, which he parried with smiling denials. The issue of Afghanistan remained the mainstay of discussion, providing relief to the Pakistani leader from other more thorny issues. His role was much appreciated. It was apparent from the visit that Pakistan had relevance for the US administration allowing it to ward off tough questions on the nuclear program. Additionally the Pakistan leader was also quizzed on the future of democracy in Pakistan. He gave some vague commitments to the law makers about return to democracy, but did not commit to any specific date for holding the elections. Later he postponed the elections once again.

The US Government seemed to have decided to overlook the nuclear issue for the time being, owing to greater interests at stake in Pakistan. Washington Post


reported in Jun 1981 that Pakistan was “developing triggering package for nuclear explosive devices”. In October 1981, IAEA Director General Sigraid Eklund confirmed that Pakistan had developed the capability to “fabricate its own nuclear fuel”\textsuperscript{774}. Despite these revelations, when President Zia visited the US in 1982, he got away easily, with regards to the nuclear issue.

The US Secretary of State George Shultz visited Pakistan in July 1983. He was taken to one of the Afghan refugee camps on the outskirts of the border city of Peshawar. During his visit and on return, he praised the Pakistan President Zia ul Haq and his team for the deft handling of the Afghan situation. He was followed by Secretary of State Casper Weinberger in late 1983. The Defence Secretary also praised the Pakistan leadership and promised enhanced security assistance against the perceived Soviet thrust towards Pakistan and eventually reaching the Persian Gulf. The US Vice President George W Bush followed Weinberger in May 1984. In addition to the usual visit to Peshawar, the main question under discussion was the Pakistan nuclear program. On this issue, the Pakistan President reiterated his stance that the nuclear program was strictly peaceful and that his country had no intention of exploding a nuclear device. The US Vice President warned against the further enhancement of Pakistan’s nuclear program as it could seriously affect the security relationship\textsuperscript{775}.

The US Congress and the Administration were not satisfied with the Pakistani assurances. In September 1984, the US President wrote a letter to President Zia. The main point in this letter was that Pakistan should not pursue the enrichment of

\textsuperscript{774} (Spector, 1984, p. 93)
\textsuperscript{775} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 273)
Uranium to weapons grade level otherwise the issue could have serious consequences for Pakistan\textsuperscript{776}. The Pakistan reply to the US President’s letter was delivered by the Pakistan Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan in October 1984. This response however failed to assuage the concerns at Washington. The Pakistan government, owing to its key role in the Afghan war was in a position to withstand some of these pressures. With the aid package for the forthcoming years coming up for approval in the US Congress and the Senate, the US administration decided to lower the tolerance threshold further. Two major initiatives were undertaken in this regard.

\textbf{Pressler Amendment.} The first initiative was a proposal by Senator John Glenn, in which he demanded that there should be an amendment to the Foreign Relations Act 1961, through which the US President should certify that Pakistan neither possessed nor was developing a nuclear weapon\textsuperscript{777}. This was to be made a precondition for any aid package to Pakistan. The proposal was initially approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but it was opposed by the Reagan Administration who wanted it to be toned down. The watered down version was more generalized and it demanded that the US President should give an annual waiver that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device and that the US assistance was advancing non-proliferation goals. Though this amendment was passed, yet it was evident that Pakistan was sufficiently important at the time for the US administration so as not to alienate the country. This amendment was sponsored by Senator Larry Pressler. Thus

\textsuperscript{776} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 276)

\textsuperscript{777} (Saez, 2005, p. 8)
the Pressler Amendment was born. At the time there was not much reaction in Pakistan, as the aid package was continuing and this seemed to be an internal legislative matter in the US.

**Solarz Amendment.** There was also another amendment in the Foreign Relations Act, this time sponsored by Senator Stephan Solarz. It was directed against the second US concern on the nuclear issue, i.e. the clandestine purchase of nuclear related material from the US. This endeavour was in light of indications that Pakistan was trying to build up its nuclear program by purchasing different components from open market sources. The Solarz Amendment was not as binding as the Pressler Amendment as it had the provision for a Presidential waiver. However, taken together, these two amendments reflected a clear determination at the US Administration level that Pakistan should not be permitted to proceed unchecked with its nuclear program.

The nuclear issue again came up in the meeting between President Zia and the US National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane in November 1985. This was during Zia’s visit to the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. It appears that a tacit understanding was reached in the meeting with regards to the nuclear program. The US Government wanted that Pakistan should not test nuclear device\(^{778}\). The recent amendments in the House of Representatives and the Senate amply highlighted the concerns in the US policymaking circles about Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. President Zia assured the US National Security Advisor that the program would not

\(^{778}\) (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 278)
“embarrass” the US Pakistan Relations. He did not however out rightly negate the presence of a nuclear development program. It was a departure from his usual stance that the program was purely for peaceful purposes. Apparently the shrewd leader had assessed that he could stretch the US tolerance to the limit where they would be willing to look the other way as long as the issue did not come out in the open. Kamal Matinuddin, a retired General and senior defence analysis contends that by 1989, Pakistan had already “cold tested” an atomic device.

**Muhammad Khan Junejo’s visit to US in July 1986.** The nuclear issue once again came under discussion when the Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo visited the US in July 1986. During the visit, the US administration promised another six year $4 billion dollars package for the next six years. They were however quick to point out that the package would be conditional to Pakistan’s response on the nuclear issue. The Pakistan Prime Minister stuck to the official stance that his country’s nuclear program was strictly for peaceful purposes. He also reaffirmed that Pakistan would not enrich uranium beyond the 5 percent level, considered to be a benchmark for weapons grade. The Pressler Amendment came into play for the first time in October 1986, when the Reagan administration certified that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon and that the US aid significantly reduced the risk of Pakistan acquiring it. The issue however did not die down so easily. There was a leak in the US press that Pakistan

780 (Matinuddin, 2002, p. 83)
was very close to actual production of an atomic device. The report was from a respected journalist Bob Woodward of the New York Times. This created quite an uproar over the country’s nuclear ambitions. The administration stepped in to deny these rumors. Apparently there were intelligence reports but with the Afghan situation still not resolved, the Pakistani Government still enjoyed some immunity from sanctions. Perhaps what they failed to factor in their calculation was the likelihood that this relief was going to be conditional and short lived.

Another incident that indicated Pakistan’s seriousness on the nuclear issue was the military standoff with India in 1987. The Indian Exercise “Brass Tacks” in January threatened the tenous peace of the Sub-Continent in a way as never since the 1971 War. During the crisis the military forces of India were amassed in a tense standoff with Pakistan, across a border stretching for more than 2000 kilometers. The conventional disparity between the two countries meant that Pakistan was at a serious disadvantage in any military confrontation. At this juncture it appears that the Pakistani Government decided to bring in the nuclear factor to shape the conventional environment. The father of Pakistan’s nuclear program Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan who had rarely been seen in public, let alone give interviews, granted a rare interview to the renowned Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyer \(^{781}\). In this interview, the Pakistani scientist claimed that Pakistan had achieved a nuclear capability. Though this was officially denied by the Pakistan Government, yet the message went across that Pakistan was not as vulnerable as the Indians had perceived. A few weeks later the

\[^{781}\text{Matinuddin, 2002, p. 93}\]
Pakistan President reaffirmed the same contention to the Time Magazine “You can write today that Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes.” The US Government did not raise too much furor over the issue at the time. The situation however became more complicated when in February 1987, a Pakistani born Canadian citizen Arshad Pervez was caught by the FBI in Philadelphia as he was attempting to purchase “maraging steel” a key component in the manufacture of nuclear bomb casings. In the wake of this incident Richard Armacost, the Under Secretary of State for the region, undertook an emergency trip to the country. Though the Pakistani Government denied any official involvement in the incident, yet it also rebuffed the US request for inspection of the Kahuta Laboratories, reportedly the main nuclear research facilities of the country. The US Congress increased the pressure on Pakistan in late 1987 by reducing the duration of the waiver for two and a half years as against the initial six years sought by the Reagan Administration. The fact that Arshad Pervez was convicted in December 1987, only added to the woes of Reagan Administration. Now the US President was obliged to stop military aid to Pakistan. This time the President used his powers to waive off sanctions, as these could hurt the US national interests at the time. It was apparent that with every passing day, as the situation in Afghanistan moved towards an eventual Soviet withdrawal, this flexibility would be further tested.

782 (Time Magazine, 1987)
783 (New York Times Buisnessman Convicted in Pakistani Nuclear Plot, 1951)
The 1987 Indo-Pak Escalation. The first time Pakistan used its developing nuclear capability to tone down India belligerence was during the Indian mobilization on the country’s borders in 1987. This threatening development, in the garb of an exercise, was codenamed “Brass Tacks” by the Indian military establishment. This episode, in which bulk of the Indian Army was poised close to the Pakistani borders, ready to strike across the borders at short notice, it was not just Pakistan’s conventional military capability, but the threat of a viable nuclear capability which dampened the Indian rhetoric. Many Pakistani analysts, including the architect of Pakistan’s nuclear program, DR A.Q Khan gave clear indications that Pakistan possessed the retaliatory capability, in order to put some pressure on the Indian decision makers, during the “Brass Tacks” military build-up by India in 1987. There was a widespread belief in Pakistan that the threat of a Pakistan nuclear capability had thwarted Indian aggressive designs in 1987. In past Soviet withdrawal period, the pressure on Pakistan’s nuclear program was renewed once the Afghan situation seemed to be out of the way. Pakistan Army Chief General Aslam Beg visited the US at the start of 1989. He was also confronted on the nuclear issue by senior US military and civilian officials.

Pakistan’s nuclear program and its development during the Afghan War. The period of Afghan war was not without serious efforts by the US Government and the US legislature to curb Pakistan’s nuclear program. The Pressler

784 (Nayyar, 3 March 1987)
Amendment and the subsequent Solarz Amendment are a case in point. There were strong suggestions that the US Government should manipulate the leverage provided by the aid package to force Pakistan to acquiesce on the nuclear issue. Yet the counter leverage, with Pakistan i.e the support to the Afghan resistance, with little alternative to the US administration, provided it with an equally effective counter balance to the US pressure. President Zia clearly realized that as long as the US was interested in Afghanistan, he could keep the Pakistan’s nuclear program alive with relative impunity. Yet it was apparent that the convergence of interests, that allowed this window of opportunity to Pakistan, was transient and could not be expected to last indefinitely.

Pakistan’s quest for a nuclear capability remained largely on track throughout the Afghan war period. Two key organizations were involved in the program. The first was the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, headed by Dr Munir A. Khan, and the second was the more secretive Kahuta Research Laboratories, headed by Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan. The Zia regime can be credited with taking the window of opportunity provided by the Afghan Conflict and exploiting it fully to develop a credible nuclear deterrence for Pakistan. Though the basic infrastructure for nuclear program had been established by Bhutto, yet the major development, though classified, appeared to have been made in the Afghan war period. This can be corroborated from the revelations and intelligence estimates over the years, that pointed towards the development of an advanced and sophisticated nuclear weapons

program. As opposed to the Carter Administration’s demands that asked Pakistan to participate in non-proliferation, the argument at the end of cold war was that Pakistan should not operationalize its nuclear weapon program. Intelligence leaks during this period suggested that Pakistan was “few screw turns” away from a nuclear device. The Pakistani leadership did not deny such assertions, rather in a guarded manner, supported them. A case in point is the 1987 border escalation with India, when Pakistan all but openly stated that it had a functional nuclear capability. A detailed look at the developments from the initiation of the programme upto the application of Pressler Amendment in October 1990 highlights the basic divergence in the strategic perspective of the two countries, and how Pakistan managed, through fortune and utilization of its new-found influence in the region, to continue and develop its nuclear program.

The Covert War in Afghanistan – A Costly Victory for Pakistan

Pakistan’s support of the covert war in Afghanistan is perhaps one of the most enthralling episodes in the US-Pak Security Relationship over the last few decades. During the period of Soviet invasion, and on the specific issue of defeating the communists, there seemed to be an apparently complete convergence of interest. Yet beneath the screen, there were certain underlying basic differences in the strategic vision and the national objectives of the two countries. While the US administration looked at the Soviet incursion as part of the great global communist – free world conflict, Pakistan saw these as an additional threat to its security, complementing the potent threat emanating from India. This difference in perception did not generally
affect the conduct of the Afghan War against Soviet Forces in Afghanistan. It did, however, affect the negotiation process at Geneva and the final outcome of the conflict, where the US Government was quite happy to declare success once the Soviet had pulled out from Afghanistan. For Pakistan this was way too short of its desired objectives, i.e a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. Thus, two key factors, emanating from the Afghan Conflict, seriously affected the contours of the security environment in the succeeding years. The first was Pakistan’s efforts to achieve the desired peace and stability in Afghanistan, through the proxies and the Afghan War infrastructure created with the US help. The second was impact on Pakistan’s internal security dynamics, from the Afghan War, which left behind a legacy of violence, religious intolerance and polarization in the Pakistani society. This would be a major factor, impacting the US-Pak security relationship in the post 9/11 scenario. Thus the study of the joint struggle against the Soviet occupation and the conduct of the Afghan resistance is invaluable to understand the convergence/divergence of US-Pak interests.

CIA’s Funding and Support of the Mujahideen. The CIA commenced a clandestine operation to organize and support Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation by involving the Pakistani intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) during the Carter Administration, which was substantially enhanced in the later years. This program involved organizing, funding and supporting Afghan Groups from Pakistani territory. The ISI acted as a conduit for the funds and facilitator for these operations. This was an important precondition by Pakistan as it did not want
the CIA to establish its own bases and influence in the country. The modus operandi was agreed upon and the Mujahideen started receiving large scale military assistance for opposing the Soviets. Another important aspect was the US insistence that the Saudi regime also chip in with money to support the Afghan resistance. The Saudi Government agreed to provide a matching amount as provided by the US administration.  

The covert operation started in the Carter era, was expanded considerably by the Reagan Administration, under the stewardship of William Casey, CIA, Director. This effort involved provision of quality arms and ammunition to the Afghan resistance groups, through the ISI conduit. The purpose of the CIA’s involvements was to make the war in Afghanistan ever more costly for the Soviets. The CIA Director maintained a close relationship with General Akhtar Abdul Rehman, the ISI Chief in Pakistan. Some of the areas in which CIA assisted the Afghan resistance included latest satellite imageries of Soviet bases and facilities in Afghanistan. These operations were conducted in different parts of the country and targeted critical infrastructure and logistic facilities like ammunition depots, fuel dumps and bridges etc.

The CIA, after the change in the Administration at the White House, started in earnest to enhance the level of resistance against the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan. The CIA director William Casey was an ardent anticomunist and had the full support of the American President, who included him in the cabinet, enhancing his stature and say

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787 (Gates, p. 148)
788 (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 64)
789 (New York Times. 7 July 1985)
in security matters quite considerably. The new US policy termed as the “Reagan Doctrine”, was aimed at opposing the growing influence of the Soviet Regime in South Asia, Africa and Central Asia. In this context, Afghanistan presented a lucrative opportunity. There were signs of growing resistance against the Soviet occupation and the exodus of refugees from the country underscored the inherent distaste for foreign occupation as well as the rapidly worsening situation in the country. An additional advantage was the presence of a military regime in the neighboring Pakistan, which shared many of the US strategic concerns about the communist expansion. Pakistan was also interested in the US arms supply that it felt was vital for maintaining a conventional deterrence against India. The inherent need for an unelected regime for credibility also played a part in the building of close security relations. The CIA’s covert operations in Afghanistan thus found a fertile breeding ground in Pakistan. President Zia’a Islamic leanings and his ongoing efforts to introduce Islamic laws within the country had already endeared him to the religious parties. Now the slogan of Jihad against the Soviet occupation was eagerly taken up by the populace. The humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan, and the rapidly increasing tales of atrocities against the population charged the public, many of whom were devout conservative Muslims. Another interesting part of this developing situation was the presence of Pakistan’s tribal areas adjacent to the Pashtun belt in Afghanistan, which had historical affinity with the Afghan Pashtuns across the Durand Line. These areas provided ideal training grounds and sanctuaries for the Afghan resistance fighters.
## Afghani Mujahideen Training Camps in Pakistan

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<tr>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of Area</td>
<td>Qty</td>
<td>Name of Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bannu</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chgai</td>
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<tr>
<td>Batgram/Batkhela</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Zhob (Fron Sandeman)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chitral</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Naushki</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chrat</td>
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<td>Pishin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dir</td>
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<td>Sibi</td>
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<td>Kohat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mastung</td>
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<td>Warsak</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wazistan</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
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### Expansion of Covert Program – 1982

The CIA under William Casey, in 1982, rapidly expanded the covert program in Afghanistan, set up initially during the Carter Presidency. Now that the US and Pakistan had agreed to expand the security cooperation and on the basic contours of support to the Afghan resistance, this program had the full support of the Pakistani Government. The CIA procured arms and ammunition from different sources across the globe, ensuring that these were of the Soviet make and type so that they could not be tracked back to the source. These arms were shipped to Karachi from where they were taken further North by the ISI and distributed amongst the Afghan resistance groups in Peshawar and Quetta. From these locations onwards it was shifted on camels, donkeys and horses across the

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790 (Hilali, US - Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 122)
border to the Afghan fighters. The size of the military aid package for the Afghan resistance was around $30 million dollars from the US, complemented by a similar amount by the Saudi Government. At this stage the main interest of the Pakistan Government was to continue the resistance in Afghanistan, but at a tempo that bled the Soviets, yet remaining within their tolerance threshold. This was to ensure that they did not invite massive retaliation from the Soviets.\footnote{791}{Coll, 2004, pp. 57-60}

Another important aspect of this partnership was the increased reliance on religious parties in Pakistan to recruit and train these Mujahideen. For this purpose there was a rapid spawning of religious schools commonly known as Madrassas across the country. From the time President Zia took over in 1977 to the time he was assassinated in 1988, these Madrassas increased from 2893 to 10308.

### Religious Institutions in Pakistan, 1980-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deobandi</th>
<th>Barevi</th>
<th>Ahle Hadith</th>
<th>Shi’a (Jafri)</th>
<th>Agha Khan: Bohri, Zakri, Ahmadi &amp; Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>2560</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>1440</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>180</td>
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<td>Sindh</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>145</td>
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<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azad Kashmir</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>5212</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>2056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: \footnote{792}{Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 216}
Thus while these Madrassas supported the Afghan Jihad, they also laid the foundations of radicalizing the Pakistan society, which would become a major problem for the country a few decades later. But at that time the US Government wanted nothing more than to avenge the defeat in Vietnam and the Mujahideen were highly appreciated.

**Pakistan Establishes Afghan Cell.** On the Pakistan side, the Zia government established an Afghan cell to coordinate Pakistan’s participation in Afghanistan. This cell consisted of Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, who had replaced Agha Shahi, Ghulam Ishaq Khan who was the finance minister, General Akhtar Abdul Rehman, the ISI Chief and President Zia’s Chief of Staff General Khalid Mehmud Arif. The US Government’s main point of contact for the covert effort in Afghanistan remained the CIA. The practical details were handled by the CIA station chiefs in Pakistan, in coordination with the ISI. The principal staff in the US embassy headed by Ambassador Spiers was kept in the loop. Howard Hart, the CIA Chief in Pakistan and General Akhtar Abdul Rehman established a good working relationship. They met regularly at the ISI Headquarters in Islamabad, to coordinate the covert effort and sort out details of funding and support to the Mujahideen. The CIA were only allowed to meet the Afghan Mujahideen through the ISI. All Mujahideen training was conducted by ISI operations, trained by the CIA.\(^{793}\)

The CIA’s methodology of sustaining and maintaining the Afghan resistance had long lasting effects on the region as a whole and Pakistan in particular, long after the

\(^{793}\) (Coll, 2004, pp. 64-65)
culmination of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. At this juncture of course, the Zia Regime in Pakistan fully supported the modus operandi and provided all possible assistance to the CIA. This covert program, one of the most elaborate ones in the agency’s history, was designed to develop and maintain incessant pressure on the Soviet Forces through guerrilla tactics. The Afghan resistance groups constituted through the joint efforts of the CIA and the Pakistan ISI, were ideal recruits for such a war. Quarrelsome and rebellious by nature, these tribesmen were hardy, with little economic incentives except those offered by the foreign donors. The fact that Russians increased the resentment by indiscriminate bombings and killings, further assisted the CIA in carrying out further recruitments. By 1982, the program, though small, had been organised on a sound footing. The CIA provided fund which jumped substantially from a meagre $ 40 million in 1980 to $ 50 million in 1981. With the arrival of Reagan Administration, this aid rose significantly from $ 80 million in 1983, $120 million in 1984, $ 250 million in 1985, right up to $ 630 million in 1987. The conduct of Afghan War saw a rapid increase in US assistance package, as the fortune of the Mujahideen soared.

The Conduct of Afghan War (1979 - 1988)

The Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation commenced immediately after the “Saur Revolution in 1978”, however it gained strength and outside support in a large way, after the Soviet tanks rolled into Kabul in December 1979. Pakistan – US

794 (Khalilzad, p. 186)
795 (Coll, 2004, pp. 101-102)
security relationship primarily revolved around defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, through covert guerrilla operations funded and supported jointly by the two counties. One of the important aspects of this war effort was the covert nature of operations, which substantially enhanced the role of CIA and Pakistan’s counterpart ISI in the Afghan War. Since such operations relied heavily on support from non–state actors such as militia, warlords, religious groups and sometimes even criminals, these all elements gained prominence and unprecedented importance during the Afghan War. Since Pakistan had allowed its territory to be used for waging the war effort, so all the negative effects of lawlessness, increased militarization and religious parties gaining prominence, were felt in the country in the aftermath of the struggle796, 797, 798, 799. Additionally, the mode of waging war through select group of Afghan resistance parties also influenced the outcome of the conflict and the ensuing problems in the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal. The conduct of Afghan War by the CIA- ISI Nexus was a classic example of proxy war in which Afghans and volunteers from different countries were funded, trained and sent into Afghanistan, while Pakistan and United States maintained that they were not directly involved in the conflict, except for humanitarian purposes800. Simultaneously, Pakistan obtained from the US, a hefty military and economic aid package, primarily designed to bolster it economy and strengthen its military potential against “India”. Thus it was a mutually beneficial

796 (Jalalzai, Taliban and the Post Taliban Afghanistan, Terrorism, Al-Qaeeda and the Qila-e-Jhangi Massacre, 2003, p. 26)
797 (Jalalzai, The Holy Terror, Al-Qaeeda, Taliban and Vivlence in Pakistan, 2002, pp. 30-33)
798 (Dawn, 26 December 1998)
799 (28 January - 3 February 1995, p. 37)
800 (Coll, 2004, pp. 58-60)
relationships but one which was necessitated by the Soviet invasion and whose future largely depended on the progress of the Afghan War.

**Military Operations inside Afghanistan.** Pakistan in collusion with the United States, specifically CIA, provided the main support to the Afghan resistance. The bulk of support base and training infrastructure was based in Pakistan. The Mujahideen groups were supplied with weapons and equipment from many different countries, including Egypt, China and US, amongst other. Although there were allegations even before the communist invasion of Afghanistan, about Pakistan allowing the guerrillas to operate from its soil, yet the invasion triggered a massive response from Pakistan. The networks of camps increased rapidly thereafter.\(^{801}\) There were also assertions that Pakistani commandoes and regular soldiers were involved in assisting and guiding the Mujahideen in such operations.\(^{802}\) This may have been true to some extent but practically any such involvement, over an extended period of ten years was not likely to go on secretly, given the chances of being captured in any one of such operations. However, undeniably the resistance groups were fully supported and trained within Pakistani territory. The Inter Services Intelligence remained the major point of contact for the Afghan resistance and CIA. The ISI was led by General Akhtar Abdul Rehman, a close confidant of President Zia.\(^{803}\) The allegations that Pakistan was diverting upto 50% of the aid for personal/ national use surfaced in 1987

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801 (Bradsher S. H., 1985, pp. 221-222)
in the Newsweek. This caused a degree of concern amongst US lawmakers. Yet the overall euphoria of growing sense of victory overcame these in concerns. There is however little doubt that ISI and Pakistan Army specialists took a lead role in training, arming and supporting the Afghan resistance from their bases in the border towns of Pakistan. There seemed to be complete unity of thought, with the CIA, over the process of training and supporting the Mujahideen. One of the key Mujahideen leaders supported by CIA and Pakistan was Gulbadin Hekmatyar. He was however not known for being very scrupulous, and many instances of his ruthless tactics and methods came to fore. More importantly he seemed to have little regard for other Mujahideen groups and often let his followers loose on fellow Mujahideen. Other groups, supported to varying degrees, included Jamat-i-Islami Afghanistan, led by Molvi Younis Khalis, Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, led by Abdul Rasool Sayaf, National Islamic Front led by Professor Mujadeddi, and National Islamic Front for Afghanistan led by Gilani. An issue of significance, which was not that visible during the resistance years, was the internal squabbles and rivalries of these groups. Although there have been allegations that Gulbadin Hekmatyar was the more favoured leader from the Pakistani perspective, getting the lion’s share of the military aid yet, based on the covert nature of support, these cannot be substantiated. However, Hekmatyar’s selection as the Prime

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804 (23 March 1987, pp. 32-33)
807 (Helm, 1985, p. 67)
Minister of Afghan Interim Government by Pakistan through negotiations mediated by the ISI, lent support to some of these assertions. Further more his intransigent attitude and subsequent infighting which led to his forces surrounding Kabul and indeterminately running rockets on Kabul, did little to help the Afghan cause. The Afghan conflict degenerated from a spirited, well funded war against the Soviets, into a messy, confusing and out of control third world civil war. The conduct of the Afghan War era a period spanning almost a decade reflects the incremental increase in the tempo of the conflict, largely due to massive support provided by US, Saudi Arabia and other like minded countries, to the Afghan resistance. From a security relations perspective, the conduct of Afghan war and the fortunes of the Mujahideen resistance directly impacted the level of security cooperation between US and Pakistan. A look at the conduct of the military operations will further amplify the point.

**The Afghan Conflict – Spiralling Cost for the Communist Forces.**

The first Soviet troops landed in Afghanistan on the Bagram Air Base, North of Kabul on December 24th, 1979. The next day, 357th and 66th Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRD) of the Soviet Army entered Afghanistan from Kushka, Turkmenistan. Simultaneously the 360 and 201 Motorized Division crossed the Amu Darya, the traditional buffer between Tsarist Russia and Imperialist Britain, and entered Afghanistan from Termez in Uzbekistan. As per the plan, the Soviet elite commando, “Sptesnaz”, attacked the Palace of Afghan President Hafizulla Amin, dressed as
Afghan soldiers. Amin was killed on 27 December 1979. As per the plan, his death was hailed by the Soviet and Kabul media, promising an end to the butchery and destruction of the last years.

Now Babrak Kamal was introduced as the Saviour of Afghan people, who declared that he had asked for the Soviet assistance, as per the 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness. Along with the control of Kabul, the Soviet Forces secured the major bases at Bagram, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Shindad and Herat. The major cities were taken over, and within the first week of invasion more than 80,000 Soviet troops had been positioned in Afghanistan. However, the sheer size of the undertaking, the

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810 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 237)
811 (Jalalzai, Taliban and the Post Taliban Afghanistan, Terrorism, Al-Qaeeda and the Qila-e-Jhangi Massacre, 2003, p. 74)
812 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 237)
extreme ruggedness of the terrain and the nature of Afghan people, who had been fiercely independent and ready to fight for their cause, all vitiated against an early success. Thus while the invasion went relatively smoothly, the stage was set for a protracted guerrilla struggle. This would be the incentive for the US to intervene covertly. The first and most significant impact of the Soviet invasion was declaration of Jihad against the invaders, by Mullahs “instilling a grim determination in the age – old warrior culture of the countryside”\(^\text{813}\). The resistance against the Soviets, in the very early days of the conflict took the shape of “Jihad” This infused a religious fervour and opened up endless possibilities of Pan-Islamic cooperation, something which would greatly influence the US-Pak covert war in Afghanistan, in the coming years. The Soviet 40\(^{th}\) Army could not possibly take control of the large country side, owing to the nature of the terrain of the rudimentary communication infrastructure. This left the “Mujahideen” as now the loosely associated resistance called itself, in control of the Afghan countryside. Afghan terrain is ideally suited for the guerrilla warfare. To further accentuate the Soviet problems, their troops, though very impressive, were neither trained nor equipped for fighting against lightly armed guerrillas who could strike and melt in the background just like shadows or ghosts. The motorized troops were largely contained to major cities and metalled roads only. The Soviet military restricted itself to its base camps, which were heavily fortified, well protected by mines and had adequate security zone around to prevent attacks by 81 mm Mortars, the only worthwhile long range equipment held by the Mujahideen

\(^{813}\) (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 237)
till that point of time. The Mujahiden resorted to ambushes, raids on isolated posts and convoys. The few pitched attacks that they made, were largely unsuccessful and suffered heavy casualties. The prime purpose of this rather disjointed opposition was to deny credibility to the Soviet backed regime, by keeping control of the countryside and maintaining armed resistance. The effective control of territory did not figure out in the Soviet military strategy. Within the first year of occupation, the Soviet military had realized that quick victory was not possible. This assessment was also influenced by the relative ineffectiveness of the Afghan Army, raked by defections and low morale.

The Soviets by the end of first year changed their strategy and instead of merely holding cities and towns, configured their military capability to strike out at Mujahideen camps and bases in the countryside. For this, they radically enhanced the air assault & air force component of their Armed Forces. Helicopters were inducted in a large way, taking their strength to upto 300. Fighters and heavy bombers were also moved into bases in Turkmenistan from where they could be employed against the Afghan resistance. Now the Soviet strategy hinged on operating from secure bases and striking into the Afghan hinterland, with their air power. The Soviet configured their ground force along similar lines, developing them into Airborne, Air Assault and Air Reconnaissance troops. These Airborne and Air Assault units were used by the Soviets to carry the battles deep into Mujahideen held territory. In 1981, one of the

814 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 246)
815 (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 96)
816 (Asia Week, 30 May 1980)
817 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 248)
818 (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 97)
major Soviet operations was an offensive against Ahmed Shah Masood in Panjsher Valley, which failed due to stiff resistance. They fared slightly better in the operations between Kabul and Jalalabad, where 106 MRD took out some Mujahideen bases, with the help of the newly constituted helicopter borne troops and air strikes. The peace and scale of covert operation also increased correspondingly. By 1982, the Mujahideen were being supplied with AK-47s, RPG7, 14.5 mm Anti tanks rifles etc. However, they still remained extremely vulnerable to air attacks. The wide range of weapons and equipment required to sustain the Mujahideen against improved and more lethal Soviet attacks were funnelled though Pakistan, having been procured by the CIA, from manufactures and supplies around the world.

The Soviet operations were further intensified in 1982. One of the major assaults was again directed on Ahmed Shah Masood in Panjsher Valley. This time the attack was preceded by heavy bombing and gunship helicopter attacks. The 3000 strong Mujahideen were under intense pressure from the lethal flying fortresses, M1-24 helicopters, equipped with a range of weapons. In addition the Soviets also employed SU-25 ground attack aircrafts, while simultaneously launching a ground offensive with 15,000 troops. Despite the overwhelming odds against them, Masood’s fighters used the terrain to block the entry of Soviet troops and were able to repulse the attack.

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819 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 249)
820 (Khan R. M., 2005, p. 15)
821 (Lamb C., 1991)
822 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 254)
By this time another more sinister component of the Soviet military strategy began to appear in Afghanistan. This was the concept of “migratory genocide”. Massive reprisals against town and villages harbouring Mujahideen, were aimed at uprooting the local population and curtailing the Mujahideen mobility. These operations were conducted against all Mujahideen strongholds. In April 1984, more than 1000 civilians were killed in a massive artillery barrage against Herat. There were reports of use of chemical weapons, fire bombings, and extensive mining activity by the Soviet Forces, as part of the “Scorched Earth Policy” in 1984. This tactics had extremely devastating effects on the villages and the countryside. Typically, the M1-24 Hinds would blow entire villages to smithereens before the “Spetsnaz”, Soviet Commandoes could land and search the villages for weapons. Mines were laid along entire valleys, and crops and orchards scorched by Napalm bombing. As a result most of the Afghan countryside was laid waste. By mid – 1984, pressure on Pakistan had further mounted, as more than 3.5 millions Afghans, left their wrecked homes and took refuge in Pakistan. The strategy was aimed at denying Mujahideen safe havens and friendly adobes by simply destroying the habitation and villages that could provide them with sanctuary. By this time, the Soviet leadership was also in transition. Leonid Brezhnev had died and had been replaced by Yuri Andropov, who himself died a year and a half later to be replaced by Constantire Chernenko. However, Chernenko instead of moving towards pacification, gave a new impetus to the fighting in 1984. The Soviet now took out all steps. Huge quantities of “butterfly

824 (Khan R. M., Untying The Afghan Knot, 2005, p. 87)
825 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 255)
“mines” was dropped out of Soviet Aircrafts. These were designed to decapitate and maim, rather than kill. The purpose was to cause maximum damage and harassment to Mujahideen, and whatever hapless population that still remained on ground. More significantly they also dropped mines disguised as toys, to maim and kill young children. Another major offensive to dislodge Ahmed Shah Masood was launched by the Soviet in 1984, this time by Soviet 108 Motorized Division. The offensive met a similar fate as the earlier Soviet efforts. The offensive dubbed as “Panjsher 7” started with a carpet bombing of the entire valley. It was followed by a ground offensive by the 108 Motorized Division. Simultaneously, as the Mujahideen left the main valley and withdrew further into the mountainous offshoots, a surprise airborne attack was launched by elite airborne battalions, which established blocking positions on the side valleys and offshoots of the Panjsher valley. This assault, promising at first, petered out, as the months progressed. Masood retained his fighting strength and resilience despite all odds. Ahmed Shah Masood had by now gained a legendary status, often being referred to as “Lion of Panjsher”. The same pattern of ground and aerial bombardment was repeated in Logar, Kunar, Paktia and other provinces. The overall effect of the 1984 campaign by the Soviet Forces was not much different from their efforts in the previous years. However, it now appeared that despite the most extreme, inhuman and barbaric measures, they would not be able to quash the Afghan resistance. The safe havens and free flow of arms and equipment from Pakistan kept the resistance at a level that it could sustain the Soviet onslaught.

826 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 257)
827 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 265)
828 (Khan R. M., Untying the Afghan Knot, 2005, p. 87)
without completely crumbling. Pakistan, with the CIA’s help had now been able to support and sustain the Afghan resistance, against the might of a global superpower. With the improved fortunes of the resistance, Pakistan’s intimate security relationship with the US also witnessed a strengthening and further improvement. More favourable for Pakistan was the wellspring of support and sympathy for the cause, in the US legislature. These operations had two major effects. The first one was that Soviet had thrown the proverbial “Kitchen sink” at the Mujahideen and still had not been able to break the resistance. The second was that now increasingly the Mujahideen and their backers in Pakistan’s ISI and CIA seemed confident that they could sustain the resistance. Thus there were increased clamour for stepped up monetary aid and better weapons for the Mujahideen. This coincided well with the Reagan Doctrine, which called for not just opposing the Soviet incursion in third world countries, but rolling them up with their determined performance on the battle field, the Mujahideen had won bipartisan support in the US legislative. Some of the ardent Mujahideen supporters included Senator Paul Tsongas, Charlie Wilson and Gordon Humphery.829 These figures were instrumental in lobbying for increased US-Pak cooperation for the Afghan Resistance. The US assistance package for 1984 reflected their shift in the priorities. The allocation of $280 million dollars in November 1984 was more than the cumulative allocation for the preceding four years from 1980-1984830. More importantly, William Casey, the CIA Director, who had by now assumed a much more significant position in the US decision making, decided to

829 (Khan R. M., Untying the Afghan Knot, 2005, p. 88)
830 (Gieb, 28 November 1984)
further enhance the US aims in Afghanistan. In a classified memo on 6 December 1984 he wrote to his staff “Unless US policy is redesigned to achieve a broader attack on Soviet vulnerabilities, it cannot restore independence to Afghanistan” 831. In addition to the resistance, Pakistan was also provided with latest Sidewinder Air to Air missiles and Stinger Missiles by the Reagan Administration in July 1985. This was to help Pakistan protect itself against increased Soviet and Afghan air violations in the border regions of Pakistan. This was an important development and precursor to an even more monumental decision, the supply of Stingers to Mujahideen a year later. One of the major Mujahideen vulnerabilities had been their inability to effectively counter the Soviet air threat. Initially SA-7 missiles were provided to Mujahideen which had not been of much use to the Afghan Mujahideen, as the Soviets easily countered them by employing flares. The Mujahideen were given another alternative, the British Guided missile “BLOW PIPE”, but this made them vulnerable to counter attacks, as the firer had to stand in the open to guide the missile to the target. The kill ratio of the Mujahideens with traditional Chinese Type 74, 14.5 mm anti aircraft guns and the Swiss 20 mm Cannons and some cloned versions of the SAM-7, was around 20 aircraft per years832. The Congress approved more than $2 billions dollars for the Afghan resistance, till the Soviet withdrawal in 1988833. Despite the fact that countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and most importantly US, funded and trained the Afghan Mujahideen, it was basically Pakistan who brought it all together and made the long,

831 (Coll, 2004, p. 102)
832 (Aaron Kamp, September 1987, p. 40)
833 (Christian Monitor, p.7, 13 March 1990)
protracted and finally successful guerrilla war possible\textsuperscript{834}. As the Soviet military surge in Afghanistan in 1985 took effect, the Mujahideen came under increased pressure. The Soviets employed special troops, air power and helicopter gunships to maximum effect. The arms and weapon supply line from Pakistan came under increased pressure\textsuperscript{835}. The Soviets at this stage appeared to be in a position to break the back of the Afghan resistance in a decisive manner\textsuperscript{836}.

The year 1985 was also significant from the point of view of another development. Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. Though he had a reforms agenda, he did not wish to antagonize the Soviet military machine, and practically gave them a free hand to persecute the Afghan War in his initial year in office\textsuperscript{837}.

The Soviet offensive in 1985 was much large, aimed at clearing the Mujahideen strong holds in different parts of the country. They advanced, along with the Afghan Army, up the Kunar Valley North of Jalalabad and reached the town of Barikot, to relieve an Afghan garrison besieged by the Mujahideen. In the summer of 1985, there was a large scale Soviet offensive towards Khost, south of Kabul. Here the Soviets met stiff resistance from the men of Gulbadeen Hekmatyar and Abdul Rasool Sayaf. The Soviets aimed at capturing Zhawar, a major base for the Mujahideen. However, stiff resistance forced them to abandon the effort by end of September 1985\textsuperscript{838}. As the year came to a close, the Soviet were no close to defeating the Mujahideen than they had been at the start of the year. Moscow’s new commander in the country,\textsuperscript{834} (Rais R. B., War Without Winner , 1994, p. 214) \textsuperscript{835} (Hilali, US Paksitan Relationship, 2005, p. 169) \textsuperscript{836} (New York Times , 19 Jun. 1986) \textsuperscript{837} (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 263) \textsuperscript{838} (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 264)
General Mikhial Ziatsev had failed to break the stalemate\textsuperscript{839}. The Mujahideen Groups, now better funded and organized than before, received another form of assistance in great numbers. This was the steady stream of volunteers from other Muslim countries, who had been trained and indoctrinated under the ISI and Jammat-e-Islamic tutelage in Pakistan. The first year of Gorbachev’s premiership had witnessed an upsurge in fighting in Afghanistan, under a new general, but with little tangible results. The communist leader was forced to concede that Afghanistan has become a “bleeding wound” for the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{840}. In May 1986, the Afghan leader Babrak Karmal was also removed from office and replaced by the Chief of Afghan Intelligence KHAD, Dr Najeeullah\textsuperscript{841}. During the later half of 1986, the move to equip Mujahideen with a potent air defence system finally succeeded. President Reagan allowed the CIA to ship the latest anti-aircraft missiles of the day, to the Mujahideen. The CIA and the US administration at this critical juncture, decided to substantially raise the level of military assistance in Afghanistan, in orders to prevent the entire effort from collapsing\textsuperscript{842}. These missiles, worth US 65 million dollars, were purchased by the CIA and supplied to the Afghan Mujahideen through the ISI. At the time, Stingers were widely regarded as the most advanced anti-aircraft missile in the world. They could target a low-flying aircraft upto a distance of three kilometres and did not have the disadvantage of exposing the firer, as these were built on the “fire and forget” technology. On 9\textsuperscript{th} September 1986, first consignment of missiles reached

\textsuperscript{839} (Khan R. M., Untying the Afghan Knot, 2005, p. 89)  
\textsuperscript{840} (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 265)  
\textsuperscript{841} (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002)  
\textsuperscript{842} (Gates, p. 429)
the Mujahideen. It consisted of 250 launchers, and 1000 missiles. The first toll of the missiles was on 25th September 1986, near the Jalalabad airfield, when three dreaded M-I 26 Hind gunship helicopters were shot down in one go by five missiles fired by the Mujahideen. The Stringers took away from the Soviets their most potent capability in the war, i.e. air supremacy. The Mujahideen could now move and operate with relative ease, while the same became increasingly difficult for the Soviet Forces. As Steve Coll describes:

“Apprehensive Russian and Afghan aircrews ascended as often as possible above the Stinger’s affective ceiling of about 12,500 feet, severely diminishing their ability to carry out low flying attack raids. Soviet Forces stopped evacuating the wounded by helicopter, demoralizing frontline officers. Within months Bearden (CIA Chief) had cabled Langley (CIA Headquarters) to declare that Stringers had become the war’s “Most significant battlefield development”.

With almost one aircraft being shot down per day, the cost of war and the chances of success became increasingly remote for the Soviet leadership. The introduction of Stingers and enhanced level of logistics support to the Mujahideen from Pakistan swung the initiative to their side to quite an extent. One of the most audacious actions by the Mujahideen was the attacks across the Oxus River, into Soviet territory, in March – April 1987, They targeted the town of Pyandzh. Steve Coll contends that the attack was carried out by Mujahideen trained by the ISI, in concert with William

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843 (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 169)
844 (Coll, 2004, p. 150)
Casey’s plan to take the battle to the Soviet Soil. The Soviet responded very strongly and threatened the “Security and integrity of Pakistan”. This was the most serious threat by the Soviets till that point of time. The teams were promptly withdrawn.\footnote{Coll, 2004, pp. 161-162} It is though interesting to note the coincides, that just about the same time, Indian military exercises, “Brasstacks”, one of the most intensive and threatening in recent years, were being staged on Pakistan’s Eastern borders. Though the Soviet carried out stern reprisals against the Afghans in Kunduz province, yet the Mujahideen newfound confidence underscored growing strength of the Afghan resistance.\footnote{USIA, 24 April 1987, p. 15} In an interview with Rahimullah Yousafzai, a renowned Pakistani journalist from the newspaper Muslim, the Afghan leader, Dr Najibullah conceded that 80% of the countryside was in the Mujahideen hands, in 1987.\footnote{Muslim. Islamabad, 1987} The Stingers turned the tide in the Mujahideen favour a big way. The Soviet had to alter their entire counter insurgency strategy. Not only did this remove the most potent advantage available to Soviet forces, it also impacted other operations. The Mujahideen, now emboldened, increased their attacks on the Soviet forces. The combat incidents increased from air average of 200 to 400 per month.\footnote{Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 265} By January 1987, Gorbachev had openly declared his willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan. Hereafter the Soviet forces ceased all offensive combat operations against the Mujahideen, except one major operation against the Mujahideen to relive the beleaguered garrison in the border town of Khost, in November-December 1987. Though the Mujahideen had achieved the extraordinary
feat of fighting the Soviet forces to a stalemate, yet they were not well organized and equipped to capture or hold any major town or communication centre. The Soviet and Afghan forces had fortified all major towns and ensured that none would fall to the Mujahideen. Thus on the eve of Soviet withdrawal, although Mujahideen controlled the major chunk of Afghan countryside, they did not have control of any major town of significance\(^{849}\). It would take more fighting and brutal civil war to dislodge the Soviet proxy regime of Dr Najibullah. The final Soviet withdrawal was on 15 Feb, 1989, when Commander of the Russian 40\(^{th}\) Army, General Boris Gromor crossed “Friendship Bridge” into the Soviet Union\(^{850}\). The Soviet continued their arms & supply to the Najibullah regime even after withdrawal, which sustained the Najibullah regime in face of growing Mujahideen attacks\(^{851}\). The Najibullah regime lasted till 15 April, 1992, when it collapsed primarily due to the worsening situation in Moscow following the disintegration of USSR in December 1991\(^{852}\). This made continued supply of arms & ammunition and logistics impossible to maintain to the Communist Regime in Kabul\(^{853}\).

**Major resistance groups in Afghanistan and their Control.** President Zia ensured two things. One that the military support to the resistance was carefully monitored and controlled by the ISI. Secondly, he did not let it go beyond a level

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\(^{849}\) (Khan R. M., Untying The Afghan Knot, 2005, p. 90)  
\(^{850}\) (Tanner S., Afghanistan, 2002, p. 270)  
\(^{851}\) (Jang, 8 August 1989)  
\(^{852}\) (Rais R. B., War Without Winner, 1994)  
\(^{853}\) (New York Time, 16 Apr 1992)
which he perceived as the threshold of the Soviets in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{854}. As Riaz M Khan writes “Zia believed in keeping the pot boiling but not let it spill over”\textsuperscript{855}. The US – Pakistan support to the Afghan resistance primarily centered around three critical aspects.

The first was organization and coordination of the resistance from Pakistan’s territory. This was largely left to the Pakistan Government and the ISI to manage and orchestrate. Though it did not figure out as a major source of discord during the Soviet occupation yet in the later part of the Afghan struggle, there appears to be a divergence in the views of the intelligence establishments, of the respective countries as to the best party to support in the post Soviet withdrawal period. The major divergence in the Pak – US perceptions over the issue occurred years later when Pakistan backed the fundamentalist Taliban.

The second aspect was funnelling military supplies and logistic support to the Mujahideen groups. This again was done, as per the agreement between the two governments, by Pakistan’s ISI. It amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars a year and involved shipments and supplies arranged by CIA from all over the world. In this once, there were many issues of disagreement, though muted. The first one was Pakistan Governments preference for certain parties ever the others. The second one was a serious charge of mismanagement and pifrerage of funds and equipment meant

\textsuperscript{854} (Khan R. M., Untying the Afghan Knot, 2005, p. 77)
\textsuperscript{855} (Khan R. M., Untying the Afghan Knot, 2005, p. 78)
for the Mujahideen. This caused a degree of concern in the US government circles, especially the US legislative\textsuperscript{856}.

The third aspect that was critical to the Afghan Jihad, was the import of thousands of religious zealots from different Muslims countries to Pakistan, under the CIA’s arrangements, in order to be trained and inducted into the Afghan Jihad\textsuperscript{857}. These Arab volunteers were often at divergence with the Afghan fighters already fighting the Soviets in their own country. Their religious zeal, fanaticism and stress on the “wahabi style” of Islam did make them an irritant for most of the Afghan fighters. As indicated by one of the Afghan Commanders comments to the CIA Chief in Pakistan “they (Arab Mercenaries) say we are dumb, and we do not know the Koran, and they are more trouble than they are even going to be worth”\textsuperscript{858}. This was a prophetic statement, when seen in the hindsight. Interestingly, this was quite acceptable to General Zia. He facilitated these volunteers by organizing their indoctrination in Maddarassas and by facilitating their move and logistics into Pakistan. It was only years later, when the Afghan conflict degenerated into a civil war, and Mujahideen lost their favoured status, that the activities of these Jihadis became a major source of friction between Pakistan and the United States. In the post 9/11 scenario it has in fact became the one of the most important bilateral security issues. The origins and subsequent flourishing of this extremist element of Afghan Jihad, undertaking by an initial collusion of the two countries, is therefore an

\textsuperscript{856} (Coll, 2004, pp. 58-60, 150-152)  
\textsuperscript{857} (Coll, 2004, pp. 150-152)  
\textsuperscript{858} (Coll, 2004, p. 153)
important aspect, which needs to be understood, in order to assess its impact on the
security relationship in the succeeding years.

The Afghan resistance, as discussed earlier, very early in its development, gained an
Islamic identity. This is primarily due to the kind of opposition that naturally arose in
Afghanistan, to the “Saur Revolution”. The Saur Revolution was inspired by
communist ideology, thereby absorbing many of the features of this ideology, which
were at odds with the Islamic traditions and culture prevalent in Afghanistan\(^{859}\). The
clergy was especially targeted by the Revolutionary Governments as they were
considered close to the people and could possibly galvanize public support against the
ambition and controversial agenda of the communist regime \(^{860}\). The Amin
Government declared in May 1978 “Those who under the sacred name of Islam, plot
against the April revolution are in service of the enemies and will be considered as
traitors”\(^{861}\). One of the most inflammatory actions of the new Afghan Government
was to change the Afghan flag to the Communist Red Colour, while simultaneously
removing all references to Islam\(^{862}\).

This was followed by the mass execution of Muslim clergy. One of the most
respected families, the Mujaddedi’s, was killed to the last man, Sibgatullah
Mujaddedi, who had escaped to Pakistan earlier, survived\(^{863}\). The Afghan resistance
therefore was greatly influenced by the clergy, as they turned out to be one or the
most persecuted lot. Incidentally, even before the communist Revolution of 1978,

\(^{859}\) (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985, 2003, pp. 77-99)
\(^{860}\) (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985, 2003, pp. 60-61)
\(^{861}\) (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985, 2003, p. 93)
\(^{862}\) (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985, 2003, p. 78)
\(^{863}\) (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985, 2003, pp. 77-80)
there was a core group of Afghan resistance, harboured by Pakistan since the 1975. This included some of the most prominent figures of the resistance movement, including Gulbadin Hekmatyar, Professor Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masood. They had escaped the Daud regime, who after his coup in 1974, went after the clergy as “Islamists and not the orligarchial monarchist group” were the main targets of his regime\textsuperscript{864}. Although these religious groups were given refuge in Pakistan by an apparently socialist Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, yet this had largely to do with Pakistan’s own issues with the Daud regime, rather than any ideological dimension. Since the Daud Government had openly supported the Pashtoonistan issue, and the tribal insurgency in Balochistan through the National Awami Party (NAP)\textsuperscript{865}. Bhutto also provided refuge to exiles from Afghanistan\textsuperscript{866}.

Hekmatyar and Masud planned and conducted limited guerrilla activity inside Afghanistan in Panjsher Valley and Paktia provinces respectively in 1975. These efforts were however not very fruitful, as they lacked organization and local support. Subsequently, Bhutto reduced the level of intimacy and cooperation with the groups, as it appeared that Sardar Daud was willing to soften his stance on the Pashtoonistan issue in 1976. The Saur Revolution however, changed the entire content of Afghan struggle. Now these groups, based in Pakistan, once again brought their resistance groups to prominence. These groups were involved to varying degrees in the Afghan Jihad against the communist regime. Their ethnic makeup, leadership and activities largely defined the course of the Pakistan based Afghan resistance. A brief look into

\textsuperscript{864} (Rais R. B., War Without Winner, 1994, p. 168)
\textsuperscript{865} (Harrison, 1981, pp. 21-46)
\textsuperscript{866} (Rais R. B., War Without Winner, 1994, p. 168)
each of these groups and its activities will help explain the impact it had on the conduct of US – Pakistan sponsored Afghan War and subsequent developments in the wake of Soviet withdrawal.

The Pakistan Government, in the immediate aftermath of the communist Revolution, moved ahead to consolidate and organize the Afghan Resistance. One distinct advantage of having General Zia at the helm of affairs turned out to be his personal knowledge and experience of such situations. He had been part of the Pakistan’s contingent in Jordan and had seen the fallouts of an uncontrolled guerrilla movement on the host country, firsthand. He was therefore very clear about the need to carefully control and guide the resistance movement\textsuperscript{867}. Pakistan Government made it a point that it was involved in all major decisions related to the Afghan resistance\textsuperscript{868}. Pakistan was able to manage the major Afghan resistance groups, which totalled seven in numbers. A brief look at the activities of the groups is a follows:-

**Jammat-e-Islam.** This group was led by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik, belonging to Northern Afghanistan. He and Hekmatyar had split up in 1975, over a variety of factors that included ethnicity, social background and leadership ambitions. Though they participated in the Afghan resistance yet their differences only temporarily subsided, but never went away. In the ensuing struggle for supremacy, after the Soviet withdrawal, they were the two main antagonists. Since Pakistan preferred Hekmatyar over Rabbani, he decided to side with the alliance of non-

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\textsuperscript{867} (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985, 2003, pp. 77-80)
\textsuperscript{868} (Wienbaum, 1991, pp. 71-85)
Pashtun parties and resultanty also went into the Indian backed camp. This was however in the later years. During the heyday of the Afghan struggle, he was a part of the seven party alliance, patronized by Pakistan\textsuperscript{869}. The Jamiat had some of the most prominent and charismatic military leaders, which included Ahmed Shah Masud of Panjsher, Zabiullah and Ismael Khan of Herat\textsuperscript{870}. The party and its affiliates fought a very successful and potent guerrilla campaign in the provinces of Badaktishan, Takhar, Kunduz, Baglan and Mazar-i-Sharif\textsuperscript{871}. This party also formed the nucleus of the Northern Alliance in the later years, pitching it directly against the Taliban and its Pakistan’s backers in 1990’s and beyond.

Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Society). This party was led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar. He harboured strong goodwill for the Iranian Revolution, and believed in establishing an Islamic Government in Afghanistan on similar lines\textsuperscript{872}. Amongst the seven Islamic parties, he was the most favoured by Pakistani establishment. A Pashtun from the Kunduz province, he was one of the most hardline Islamic group leaders in the Alliance. His party gained the lion’s share of arms and supplies from Pakistan during the long Afghan struggle. It is, however, a puzzling contradiction that despite receiving the major share of arms and equipment, his party did not figure out prominently in the actual combat against Afghan Soviet Forces (Fredric Grare, in an interview with General Hamid Gul (ISI Chief) asked about this apparent dichotomy. General Gul’s response was that there was three criteria for supporting the Afghan

\textsuperscript{869} (Canfield, 1989 Autumn, pp. 635-648)
\textsuperscript{870} (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 183)
\textsuperscript{871} (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 182)
\textsuperscript{872} (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 183)
It appears that the Pakistani establishment only looked towards the first two criteria, when supporting the Hekmatyar group. Some researchers argue that Hekmatyar, instead of fighting the Soviets, concentrated on establishing strong bases in lightly held areas, preferably close to the Pakistani border. He stockpiled huge caches of arms and ammunition, which as later events proved, were not used in fighting the communist, but saved for the eventual power struggle which ensued after the Soviet withdrawal. Despite these accusations, the Hizib-e-Islami, during the Afghan War, was able to organize an urban insurgency in major Afghan cities, including Kabul. Their operations were mainly in the provinces of Kunduz, Kanar, Lagman, Ningarhar, Kabul, Pagman and Kapisa. Hekmatyar was also notorious for his brutality and his inability to work with other groups. His group was often accused of ambushing and killing other rival faction members in bitter turf wars. It was one such incident in 1989, where his followers killed 30 guerrillas of Rabbani’s Jamiat, which triggered an open confrontation between the two groups. It also scuttled the fragile interim Government, set up by Pakistan in 1990, after the Soviet withdrawal. It appears in retrospect that Pakistan Government’s dependence on Hekmatyar proved counterproductive for the overall goal of achieving lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan. Over reliance on intelligence agencies, in particular ISI,
for dictating Pakistan’s preferences and policies in Afghanistan may have been responsible for this costly mistake.

**Hizb-e-Islam.** This party was led by Molvi Younis Khalis, a religious scholar from Nangarhar province. He was a Pashtun, who brought under his fold many of the deserters from the Afghan National Army.\(^7\)

**Islamic Unity for Liberation of Afghanistan.** This group was led by Professor Abdul Rasool Sayaf. He had strong Wahabbi connections, which he used effectively to gain a lot of support from the Middle Eastern countries. Though he did not have an effective political and organizational structure for his party, he was involved in funding and arming many small groups/factions. According to Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais, his actions contributed towards emergence of many small, independent groups who proved counter productive later.\(^8\) Another equally alarming development, also attributed to his group, was the induction of thousands of Arab fighters in the Afghan Jihad.\(^9\) These foreign fighters, proved to be extremely troublesome in long term. During the Jihad, whatever their contribution, they stayed on in Afghanistan and Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Most of them were outcasts from their own societies and were not welcomed in their home countries after the Afghan War. Without a home and without a cause, they were ideal recruits for the new message of Al-Qaeeda in the mid 90’s.

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\(^7\) (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 186)
\(^8\) (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 186)
\(^9\) (The Time Mujahideen Foreign Legion, 17 April 1989)
In addition to these main resistance groups, there were three other parties, largely built around prominent Islamic clerics, schions of eminent religions families of Afghanistan. These included “Mahaz-e-Milli Islami”, of Pir Syed Ahmed Gilani, “Jabah-e-Nijat-e-Milli – Afghanistan” (National Liberation Front of Afghanistan) led by professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi and “Harkat-e-Inqalab-i-Islam” led by Muhammad Nabi Mohammandi, a religious leader with standing in South Eastern Afghanistan. These parties were more tradionalist is approach. They unlike the other groups, declared Jihad after the Soviet intervention.

**Milli Islam’s Mahaz (National Islamic Front).** Syed Ahmed Gilani, the first of these leaders migrated to Pakistan in 1978. He had a large following in Paktia, Ghazni and Kandahar provinces. He had a lot of say in the higher circles of the pro-communist regime, but during the Afghan struggle, he could not organize any worthwhile guerrilla movement. He received substantial financial support from Saudi Arabia and US. He accepted the post of Foreign Minister in the Interim Government in 1982.

**Jahad Nijat-e-Milli (National Liberation Front).** Professor Mujadeedi was more of a figurehead during the Afghan resistance. He was also opposed to the “Islamist Political ideology”, which he thought was not in sync with the Afghan.

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880 (Hyman, 1987, pp. 21-33)
882 (Economist p, 52, 28 January-3 February 1995)
Society and tribal culture. A moderate personality, he had widespread acceptance, but little practical role in the Afghan resistance movement.

**Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islamic (Islami Revolution Movement).** Headed by Molvi Nabi Muhammadi a religious scholar from Logar, this party was responsible for the Afghan resistance against Soviet in the Logar Province. The party gained support from Madarras.

All these seven parties were organized under the ISI to form the Seven Party Alliance, that remained relatively intact and viable till the end of the Soviet occupation. It is important to note that none of the Shia parties joined this resistance based in Peshawar. They were all aligned with Iran, who controlled and supported their actions. The few attempts by the Peshawar based parties to include the Shia parties in the resistance umbrella failed, primarily because of the Iranian interests in maintaining its direct influence over them. Thus the resistance in Afghanistan never really achieved a broad based support, as the Shia community maintained their own sources of funding and power base through Iran. The alliance relationship allowed the ISI to control and channelize the flow of arms and money into Afghanistan. It also allowed them to maintain relatively strong grip over the actions of these disparate parties. The organizational structure of the Alliance included a six member advisory council. This body, with equal representation from all the groups,

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883 (Ulbont, p. 190)
884 (Rais R. B., War Without Winner, 1994, p. 183)
was entrusted with the task of joint policy making\textsuperscript{887}. The leader of the alliance was elected for one year term, and was called the President. Leaders of the respective parties were the Vice-Presidents.

In 1985, as the war in Afghanistan escalated, these parties formed a grand coalition “Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen”. This was to enhance the cooperation between different parties in pursuance of the common objective i.e eviction of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. President Zia maintained a close contact with the Alliance\textsuperscript{888}. Though Pakistan was able to present a fairly united front for the Afghan resistance during the resistance years, the internal differences in these parties came into the open, once the Soviet withdrew. The parties, despite Pakistan’s best efforts, failed to elect a “Shura” and agree on any common candidates for the leadership of the new Afghan setup. When the Shura did convene in Feb 1989 in Islamabad, it finally agreed to make Professor Sibgatullah Mujaddidi as the President and Abdul Rasul Sayaf as the Prime Minister\textsuperscript{889}.

Though Pakistan succeeded in getting an agreement, it lacked broad based support, especially amongst those who had actually fought the Soviet in Afghanistan and braved all the hardships. The interim government failed to show its strength in Afghanistan, by capturing any important city. It later suffered a further setback, when Gubadin Hekmatyar pulled out due to differences with the Rabbani group in 1990. Perhaps the real cause of failure of these parties to achieve anything substantial, in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal, was the fact that USA withdrew its support and

\textsuperscript{887} (Rais R. B., War Without Winner, 1994, p. 197)
\textsuperscript{888} (Rais R. B., War Without Winner, 1994, p. 198)
\textsuperscript{889} (Dawn, 26 December 1998)
basically “washed its hand” of the Afghan problem. Despite many pleas by the CIA station chief to intervene and help in establishing a broad based government, the US Administration rapidly scaled down its involvement after the Geneva Accords. “The CIA forecasted repeatedly during this period that postwar Afghanistan was going to be a horrible mess, nobody could prevent that. Let Pakistan sort out the regional politics. This was their neighbourhood”\textsuperscript{890}. Unfortunately, Pakistan did not have the wherewithal to handle such a complex regional conflict. This would be to the detriment of both USA and Pakistan. It is interesting to note that the Soviet leadership approached the US counterparts very loud and highlighted their fears of rise of a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist government in Afghanistan, to compound the problems already being faced by the US due to the presence of a Shia fundamentalist in Iran. However, it appears that at that time, both the US decision makers did not give this aspect much attention\textsuperscript{891}. In a unique one on one meeting between Robert Gates, the acting CIA director and his Soviet counterpart at KGB, Vladimir Koyuchkov, the Soviet spy master remarked “You seem fully occupied in trying to deal with just one fundamentalist state”\textsuperscript{892}.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{890} Coll, 2004, p. 169
\bibitem{891} Coll, 2004, pp. 168-169
\bibitem{892} Gates, pp. 424-425
\end{thebibliography}
The Geneva Negotiations

Pak – US Convergence of Interest, Strategic US interest in prolonging the War. The UN started negotiating between Pakistan and USSR through Puez De Cuellar in 1981, who later was elevated to the post of Secretary General. The UN then appointed Diego Cordvez as the Chief negotiator for Afghanistan. In 1983, he came up with a hopeful proposal for the Soviet withdrawal. This did not materialize. It appears that in Pakistan, there was a general perception, that the Soviet forces were not likely to leave Afghanistan. President Zia was quoted on a member of occasions, as saying that “it would be a miracle if the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan”. This thought process, in a way suited the military regime as it gave them influence and leverage with the US policymakers. There seems to be a distinct convergence of perception and interests between the US Administration and the Pakistan Government with regards to the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the mode of conduct of the Afghan Jihad. This point has also been advocated by some scholars, with some credibility that the US and Pakistani governments were not interested in a Soviet pull out in 1983, owing to their own interests. As far as Pakistan was concerned President Zia was firmly in chair, enjoying relative immunity from criticism both at home and abroad, due to his key role in the Afghan resistance movement. As far the US administration, the Reagan Administration wanted to bleed and humiliate the Soviets as much as possible, so that

893 (Khan R. M., Untying the Afghan Knot, 2005, pp. 46-47)
Afghanistan could be made Russia’s Vietnam. Although there is no clear evidence that the US-Pakistan alliance intentionally scuttled any efforts towards early resolution, yet the magnitude and scale of support to the Afghan Mujahideen suggested that the US was preparing for a long struggle to achieve the desired objectives in Afghanistan.

As for Diego, the UN Chief Negotiator, in charge of the dialogue with Soviet leadership, there were clear indicators in 1983, pointing towards a Soviet willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan. This proposal was put forth to the Pakistani Leadership as well as the US Administration. There are clear indicators that this proposal, even though it may not have been a sure prospect, was fairly genuine and could have been followed up. However, it was rejected both by Pakistan and the US Administration, as neither the CIA nor the ISI believed that the Soviet offer for withdrawal was anything more than mere political stuntmanship. The underlying interest in Pakistan to continue a fruitful relationship and in the US to bleed the Soviets, in order to avenge the Vietnam debacle, appeared to play a significant part in this decision. However, it appears that an opportunity for serious negotiation, which could lead to the Soviet withdrawal, was let go off in 1983. At the same time, the covert effort was being substantially enhanced by the CIA. The primary focus of this effort was in three key areas:

1. Expanding the range and scope of the Mujahideen operations against the Soviet Forces.

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894 (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 78)
2. Providing more and better weapon systems to support this expanded war effort.

3. Enhancing and expanding CIA operations in Pakistan to support their objectives in Afghanistan.

All the three areas of emphasis were designed to seriously embroil the Soviet forces in the Afghanistan, thereby making the war costlier for them.

The Afghan resistance that had braved the Soviet onslaught was now beginning to raise expectations in the American administration as well as the lawmakers and the public. Though there were some signs of movement towards an agreement. The negotiations by the UN envoy Cordovez during 1982 seemed to make some headway and it appeared that the Soviets were willing to consider a withdrawal, provided the Pakistani government agreed to stop what they termed as “outside interference”. Yet apparently the more hardline approach prevailed on both sides and in the meetings at Geneva in June 1983, between the Pakistan Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan and the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the two parties did not find common ground. Gromyko reiterated the Soviet hardline stance that Pakistan should stop allowing its territory for attacks on Afghanistan. There was yet another possible explanation for the impasse. Amongst the opposition to the Soviet occupation, there seemed to be a realization that the Soviets were starting to suffer and that the Afghans were hard to suppress. This opened up many exciting possibilities for the hardliners both amongst the US Administration and the Pakistani side. In any case the talks produced little in terms of progress. The talks continued till 1986, when Soviet’s

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895 (Khan R. M., Untying The Afghan Knot, 2005, p. 102)
readiness to withdraw from Afghanistan energized the peace process once again. However by this time, Pakistan and US had differing perspectives on the Afghan situation, which led to complications and differences between President Zia and the US Government.\(^{896}\)

**Differences Emerge on the Issue of Soviet Withdrawal – 1987.** There emerged a clear difference between the US and Pakistan interests in the wake of Soviet decision to pull out of Afghanistan. The US Administration was quite content with a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which at that stage indicated a clear victory over the communists. The US Ambassador to Pakistan Arnold Raphael clearly hinted at\(^{897}\) this factor, commenting that “Zia and ISI felt that after eight years of war, Pakistan was entitled to run its own show in Kabul”. This was in divergence to the US perceptions on the issue. The Pakistan Government suddenly found itself to be under considerable pressure from the Americans. Richard Armacost visited Pakistan in Mar 1998 and during his meetings with President Zia, impressed upon him the need to sign an accord, irrespective of the state of Afghan Government formation, in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal.\(^{898}\) The President of Pakistan General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and his team were quite wary of the modalities of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. At this critical juncture, there emerged serious differences between the President and the Prime Minister over the method of approaching the settlement at Geneva. The draft of the

\(^{896}\) (Khan R. M., Untying the Afghan Knot, 2005, pp. 166-167)
\(^{897}\) (Lordorey and Hurisson, p. 259)
\(^{898}\) (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 287)
proposed withdrawal of Soviet Forces, appeared to have been hammered out by late 1986, according to Diego Cordovez, the Chief UN negotiator\textsuperscript{899}.

The idea of a coalition government came up in, when Najibullah, the communist president proposed a coalition government in September 1987. This could include the PDPA, and the seven Mujahideen parties forming the alliance under Pak-US tutelage\textsuperscript{900}. This proposal was however rejected by the alliance, as they felt strong and getting closer to eventual victory over the Soviet – Communist alliance.

It is interesting to note that in February 1988, President Zia ran into difficulties, when he asked for the formation of a broad based Government, as a pre-condition for Pakistan’s signing of the Geneva Accord. He expressed these views, in a meeting with the visiting Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Yoronstov. The Russian diplomat was not impressed. He rejected President Zia’s proposed outrightly. Apparently the formation of a broad-based government could delay the prospects of signing of the Geneva Accord and eventual pull out of the Russian troops. Under the increasingly hostile military environment in Afghanistan, escalating cost of war and the changed perspective of the Gorbachev Regime, the Soviets wanted to achieve a clean break from Afghan quagmire. The war had already cost the Soviet Union 13,000 killed, 35,000 wounded and more than 100 billion rubles\textsuperscript{901}. The Geneva Accords promised to their a relatively honourable exit\textsuperscript{902} and a face saving. It also allowed the Najibullah Regime to stay in Kabul and mandated Pakistan to stop

\textsuperscript{899} (Sattar, Pakistan Security and Foreign Policy , 2007, p. 163)
\textsuperscript{900} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 163)
\textsuperscript{901} (Sattar, Pakistan Security and Foreign Policy , 2007, p. 167)
\textsuperscript{902} (Sattar, Pakistan Security and Foreign Policy, 2007, p. 165)
support to the Mujahideen. Though it is not well documented, the one possible explanation for Gen Zia’s insistence on getting a broad-based regime could be his assessment that in the post Soviet withdrawal period, Pakistan may be left with an unstable situation in Afghanistan, with the Mujahideen groups unable to break the deadlock. Such scenario would defeat the very purpose of supporting the Afghan resistance for so long. However, he did not find support for this argument in his own government, led by Prime Minister Junejo or the major superpower ally USA. The Pakistani Prime Minister, in defiance of President Zia’s stance convened an All Parties conference in March 1988, in which the participants agreed upon an early withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, irrespective of the state of the Government in Afghanistan. Zia’s efforts to get the Mujahideen into some sort of arrangement with the Najibullah Government also suffered a setback, as they were not interested in negotiating with the Najibullah Regime. The Mujahideen groups in Peshawar rejected the Geneva negotiation. Left with little room for manoeuvre and opposition from all quarters, President Zia retracted his demand for bunching the Soviet withdrawal with the formation of an interim Government. Though his insistence found little support from any quarter at the time, the developments in the later years proved that this decision by the US Government left the door open for further strife and conflict and indirectly resulted in the rise of Taliban. Had a negotiated settlement been reached between different stakeholders at the time of withdrawal of the Soviet Forces, the situation in Afghanistan might not have

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903 (Ellaine Sciolino schullz said to Bade Pakistan on Afghan Coalition Regime, February 29 1988)
deteriorated to an extent that a group with such primitive ideology as Taliban could have found space for support.

The accords were signed between representatives of four countries, US, USSR Pakistan and Afghanistan in April 1988. Significant amongst them, was the agreement for withdrawal of Soviet Forces within nine months of the signing of the accords.905 These accords, mediated by Diego Cordovez, the special UN negotiator, took 6 long years to materialize, though there were false starts in between especially during 1983, when Cordovez surprised many by declaring that there existed a possibility of breakthrough. From Pakistani perspective, the most significant aspect of the Geneva negotiations and final settlement, apart from the Soviet withdrawal, was the formulation of a stable government in Kabul, which represented the best chance for a lasting peace. Only then could Pakistan expect the four million refugees to go back to their homes. This would also provide Pakistan with an opportunity to reap some benefits from the decade long, costly war effort. The important fourth part of the agreement, dealing with interrelationships, which would actually bind together the agreement, did not fare very well. The final part of the agreement, which practically scuttled any early chances of conflict resolution was the provision in the agreement which allowed Moscow to supply arms to its proxy communist regime. Though the Reagan Administration also retracted its initial stance and decided to continue the support for Afghan Mujahideen, yet the main issue of concern for Pakistan remained the future Afghan Government, which was not addressed in this accord. It was

905 (US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Agreement on Afghanistan, Selected Documents No-26, April 1988)
expected that end of the foreign intervention would help achieve internal peace and suitable environment for the return of the Afghan refugees\textsuperscript{906}.

A key area of concern for Pakistan was the management of the Afghan resistance, in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan had been actively supporting the resistance throughout the long struggle, now clearly there was a difference in Pakistani and US perceptions on the Afghan issue. There was also a clear difference in the perceptions of General Zia and the Junejo led civilian government\textsuperscript{907}. Pakistani’s concerns were quite genuine. President Zia felt that unless the Mujahideen leaders were involved in the final settlement, it would neither be lasting, nor it would ensure peace and the ultimate return of the refugees\textsuperscript{908}. These is another school of thought, on the issue, that argues that General Zia was looking for some kind of Islamic renaissance, through the Afghan Mujahideen\textsuperscript{909}. It is argued that he was looking to install a plaint regime in Kabul. A more circumspect opinion of the Zia insistence, on asking for a broad based Government, was the realization that the fractured and squabbling Mujahideen leadership may not be able to dislodge the communist regime, once the Soviets had withdrawn and the Americans had pulled the plug on the military support\textsuperscript{910}. There seemed to be a big divide amongst the various resistance factions, on the shape and contours of the new Afghan Government. The entire Pakistan effort, for the eight years of bloody conflict, had been essentially to achieve peace and security on the Western Front, an elusive goal denied since the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{907} (New York Time. PA 1)
\item \textsuperscript{908} (Wirsing R. G., Pakistan’s Security Under Zia. 1977-88, 1991, p. 67)
\item \textsuperscript{909} (The Muslim, 7 March 1988)
\item \textsuperscript{910} (Shahi, Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy, 1988, pp. 103-104)
\end{itemize}
birth of the country, due to inimical regimes. Now with the imminent withdrawal of
the Soviet forces, this goal did not appear any closer. Without a comprehensive
settlement, the only difference in the situation on ground would be that instead of two
major powers supporting opposing warring factions, it would be an even more
muddled and messier situation911. In all fairness, Pakistan’s Afghan policy, its support
to the Afghan factions and its ability to sustain this massive logistic and
administrative burden were primarily due to the US aid and support. Now that the US
would most likely withdraw this support, Pakistan would be left with a bigger
headache than the time when the communists had seized control in Afghanistan a
decade earlier. Thus Zia’s insistence on a regime change seems to be in line with
Pakistan’s strategic interests912. Yet, here the issue of divergence of core interests and
the lop-sidedness in the security alliance stood out. Since the US Administration’s
primary goal remained defeat of the Soviet Union, and a roll back of the communist
expansion, the interests of an impoverished, third world ally, did not really matter in
the US strategic calculus. Thus the claims in the Pakistani circles, that the US had
abandoned Pakistan, having gained its own core objectives in Afghanistan, are not too
much off target. There seemed to be a great rush to achieve the Soviet pullout from
Afghanistan. The US State Department led by George Shultz did not want to
complicate matters by bringing in an unpredictable factor of interim government,
which could possibly complicate or perhaps delay the Soviet withdrawal913. However
the aspect that needs to be considered here is the reality that Pakistan and US had

911 (Coll, 2004, p. 158)
912 (Coll, 2004, p. 175)
913 (Coll, 2004, pp. 172-173)
created a lethal, well equipped, highly motivated group of people, who had been battle hardened by fighting one of the most formidable fighting forces, the Soviets, in an inhospitable terrain. They had been indoctrinated in the name of Islam. Without an acceptable conclusion to the war, how would these groups react and what would be its impact. This was not area of considerable debate amongst Pakistani and US policy makers, at the time of the Geneva Accords. It was a costly omission, the price for which is still being paid by both the parties.

**Geneva Accord – Aftermath.** The US-Pakistan relationship however, lost the sheen in the aftermath of the Geneva Accord. Though the unravelling of alliance took a little longer, the underlying factors for convergence were largely removed from the partnership, in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. Perhaps the Pakistani leadership did not anticipate the gravity of the US concerns about the country’s nuclear program, held at bay because of US strategic interest in Afghanistan\(^9\text{14}\).

**Changed Geopolitical Scenario after the fall of Berlin Wall.** An aspect that influenced the strategic equation between the two countries, turned out to be the fall of the Berlin Wall, and emergence of US as the predominant global power after the collapse of Soviet Union. This development though recent, would significantly impact the Pak-US Security Relationship in the coming years. The special affinity and consideration developed in the US legislature for Afghan resistance and the Pakistan support for the war effort; now did not carry the same impact. The world was moving

\(^9\text{14}\) (Matinuddin, 2002, p. 95)
on, US emerged victorious after decades of Cold War against the communists. In this context Afghanistan no more carried the same importance. The developing situation in Iraq, which resulted in the Gulf War and a resounding diplomatic/Military victory, all contributed towards undermining the significance of the Afghan conflict, relegating it to a be third world forgotten civil war.

**Supporting the Mujahideen After Soviet Withdrawal.** The issue of further support to the Afghan resistance groups also gained prominence at this stage. The Geneva Accord stipulated that Pakistan should stop all aid to the Afghan groups within 30 days of the withdrawal of Soviet Forces. At this stage, Pakistan found a sympathetic backer in the shape of Congressman Charlie Wilson, who had been in the forefront of congressional backing to the resistance groups all through the turbulent period of the Afghan Conflict. He, along with other Mujahideen supporters in the US legislature insisted upon continuation of aid to the Mujahideen. President Reagan also endorsed this view and conceded in an interview in December 1987, “You can’t suddenly disarm the Mujahideen and leave them prey to other Government”. This statement however contradicted the terms of agreement, which stipulated otherwise. There were further hectic negotiations between the US diplomats and their Soviet counterparts. Finally an understanding was reached that the two sides could continue to support to their respective friends, which was termed as “Positive Symmetry” or they could alternatively terminate their assistance at any time, which was termed as

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916 (Rodman, More Precious than Peace, 1094, p. 345)
“Negative Symmetry”\textsuperscript{917}. This arrangement was also quite acceptable to President Zia. The arms supply to Mujahideen however, suffered a setback, when on 10 April 1988; the huge arms dump at Rawalpindi, in the close vicinity of Islamabad International Airport was blown up by a series of explosions causing extreme panic in the city and a loss of more than 100 lives. The Pakistan Government suspected Soviet or Afghan involvement. The explosion apparently occurred due to poor stacking and handling of such a large quantity of ammunition, yet the timing was very suspicious. A small explosion, with similar results also occurred in Nowshehra, a city located close to Peshawar, the main base of the Afghan resistance groups. The ammunition and weapons were any where between 100 to 130 million dollars worth\textsuperscript{918}. The Ojhri Camp incident had another fall out, as it developed into a tussle between President Zia and Prime Minister Junejo. The Prime Minister, quite rightly was angry at the ISI chiefs, present and past, for keeping the ammunition dump right inside the thickly populated area. He wanted Gen Akhter Abdul Rehman, the previous ISI Chief and (then Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee) and the current Chief, Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, to be sacked. Instead, to his surprise and to the surprise of many outsiders, it was Junejo himself who was unceremoniously bundled out by General Zia. He used his presidential powers under the 8\textsuperscript{th} Constitutional Amendment to dismiss Junejo’s Government on charges of mis–management and corruption. Although Junejo’s dismissal came in the wake of the blasts at Rawalpindi, the differences between the President and Prime Minister had been brewing for quite

\textsuperscript{917} (Coll, 2004, p. 177)
\textsuperscript{918} (Kux, The United Sates and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allied, 2001, p. 289)
some time. President Zia, now again assumed all the powers in the country. This development was not very favourably received. Zia’s death was followed by an eventful political period in Pakistan. The Army Chief General Aslam Beg opted to stay out of politics, and let the Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Senate Chairman to hold elections in the country. These elections in the fall of 1988 resulted in a resounding victory for Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who ironically had been overthrown by General Zia eleven years earlier. The new US Ambassador Robert Oakley played an active role in this period, stressing upon various parties to continue on the path to democracy. Now with the Afghan issue apparently settled in the US favour, democracy way once gained more prominence, with the US Administration.

**President Zia Dies in a Mysterious Air Crash – End of an Era.** The sense of uncertainty in Pakistan, in the wake of Junejo’s removal, was compounded on August 17 1988, when President Zia was killed in a mysterious air crash, while returning to Islamabad from the southern desert city of Bahawalpur. The C-130 plane carrying Zia also carried a number of senior military officials including General Akhtar Abdul Rehman. The US Ambassador to Pakistan Robin Rapheal and Defence Representative Herbert Wassen were also part of the fateful entourage, invited by Zia to join at the very last moment\(^919\). There have been many conspiracy theories in the aftermath of Zia’s death, but none was ever proved. The inquiry that followed was not conclusive. The Joint Pakistan – US investigation report was not published however, a

\(^919\) (Hilali, US Paksitan Relationship, 2005, p. 291)
shorter summary was made public. This report reflected a differencing perspective. While the Pakistani side suspected sabotage, the US investigators concluded that it was a technical failure. However, Zia’s death brought to an end, an era of unparalleled cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. He was able to manage a crafty balancing act between Pakistan’s strategic objectives and the US interests in the region. This allowed him to cling to power for eleven long years, continue Pakistan’s nuclear program unchecked despite the occasional hiccups and modernize the Pakistan Armed Forces against the Indian threat.

Unfortunately for Pakistan, General Zia’s death took away a consummate and experienced leader, who could have steered the country through this transition. He was replaced by the newly elected, young daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; Benazir. The military ISI power center grew stronger in the presence of a weak, relatively ineffectual Benazir Government. In any case the greedy politicians, denied the corridors of power for more than 10 years, went into their job with gusto, reaching new levels of corruption and mismanagement. Amidst all the chaos, the re-alignment of Pakistan’s strategic policy over handling of Afghanistan never really occurred. The Pakistani administration was therefore caught unprepared, when the Bush Administration turned off the aid tap in 1992. Instead of a gradual shift in policy, it was a rather abrupt termination of the close relationship of the 1980’s. Buoyed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collages of communism in Eastern Europe and the stunning victory in the Gulf, Pakistan was dismissed from the US radar screen as an

insignificant blip. Yet the chaos caused in Afghanistan due to massive CIA – ISI funded Jihad, grow more by the day. San’s US support, Pakistan’s attempts to cobble an alliance and create some sort of government in Afghanistan were ineffectual. Thus the stage was set for an impending crisis, one that shocked the Americans, on September 11, 2001.

The focus for the US-Pak strategic/security relationship during the Soviet invasion turns out to be that the job started together, must be finished together, with mutual understanding, giving due consideration to Pakistan’s genuine security concerns, as it has to co-exist in the region, as opposed to its superpower ally. The present US involvement in Afghanistan and partnership with Pakistan in the war against Al-Qaeda and Taliban also has many parallels to the situation in 1980s. Both countries would do well to learn from the mistakes of the past.

**Soviet Withdrawal and the Issue of Afghan Government**

The Soviet forces finally withdraw from Afghanistan in February 1989. At this stage however, there emerged serious differences within the Pakistani establishment as well as between Pakistan and the United State over the future course in Afghanistan. The absence of General Zia, who had previously coordinated all aspects of Pakistan’s foreign policy, was major setback for the country. Though Benazir Bhutto had won the Prime Minister’s post, yet this was the first stint at power for the young woman, who was dependent on the military and the ISI for the Afghan Policy. The ISI,  

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921 (Jalalzai, Taliban and the Post Taliban Afghanistan, Terrorism, Al-Qaeda and the Qila-e-Jhangi Massacre, 2003, p. 111)
which had grown powerful over the years, thanks to enormous amounts of US aid, wanted to see their protégés, the Afghan Mujahideen taking over the reins of power in Afghanistan. They were at this stage confident that the Najibullah regime would not be able to stand up against the Mujahideen, after the Soviet withdrawal. An Afghan Interim Government was set up in Peshawar, with the active assistance of the ISI. This did not however enjoy broad based support as it did not include the Shia groups or the communists. At this stage, it appears that the ISI in particular and Pakistani establishment in general, failed to appreciate the consequences of these developments. First was the unabated violence in Afghanistan, which would ultimately have its negative fallouts on Pakistan. Second was the impact of presence of hardened veterans and fighters from across the globe, who had been brought in so enthusiastically to defeat the Soviets. Now with this cause almost gone and the source of funding i.e US money, about to dry up, what would be the future of these people? Apparently, these factors, which in retrospect look quite obvious, were not that clear to the Pakistani establishment then. Another very important aspect that should have figured out was the fact that Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, became an international playground for competing interests. All the regional countries, other than US, Pakistan and Soviet Union, had some level of interest and corresponding involvement in the country. These included Iran, India and China to some extent. The Soviet forces had been withdrawn, yet the Communist Regime was with still intact. Thus, the stage was set for more wrangling, manoeuvrings and fighting, which could offset any political benefits achieved through the Soviet forces withdrawal from the country. As far as Pakistan was concerned, the key factor which the establishment
failed to appreciate fully, was that the success in Afghanistan had been achieved with US help and resources. Now that the US seemed to be wary of further involvement, what was Pakistan’s capacity to handle such an enormously complex situation? Given its dependence on US aid, a fractious political dispensation, slowly emerging from the shadow of eleven years of military rule, the odds seemed quite high.

**Strategic Environment – Post Afghan Conflict.** Pakistan’s concerns at the prospects of a renewed alliance’s relationship with the US remained the fickleness of such alliance commitments in 1965 and 1971. There was a widely held belief that US had abandoned an ally on both these occasions. From the moment Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, America’s nuclear non-proliferation policy took a back seat. Some observers have tried to establish a connection between the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and the relative immunity to Pakistan’s nuclear program, because of this factor. There is also a contention that war in Afghanistan was a “stroke of luck for Pakistan”.

Grare contends, with some justification that prior to the Soviet invasion, India was the strategic partner for United State, a bulwark against communist China, while “Pakistan was an ally of strategic importance, and even irksome one”. India remained a strategic priority, while Pakistan was significant, but not on the same scale. The Afghan invasion put Pakistan on the “front page”. Pakistan was not only able to procure

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922 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 159)
923 (Grace, 2003)
924 (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985, 2003, p. 158)
925 (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985, 2003, p. 159)
substantial arms and equipment but also able to develop its nuclear programs with relative immunity, bearing aside the occasional chastening by the US administration. Whether General Zia actually worked towards prolonging the conflict in Afghanistan, in order to continue the lucrative aid relationship, is not well established. However, there can be little doubts that the military ruler was shrewd enough to get a good deal from the US. He participated in the Afghan War, largely on his own terms. He also maintained and substantially enhanced Pakistan’s nuclear program, taking it to a stage, whereby in 1987-88 Pakistan was actually having the possession of a credible nuclear capability, in Zia’s own words “A few screw turns” away from a functional weapon system.

The security relationship between US and Pakistan during the Zia period helped address Pakistan’s two main strategic concerns “a severe imbalance of power relative to India and heavy dependence on international material and political support”.

It is important to note that the strategic environment in the wake of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan changed dramatically, rather overnight for Pakistan. As Dr Wirsing points out, this necessitated substantial adjustment in Pakistan’s regional threat assessments. Pakistan could no longer realistically expect the same inflated levels of military aid, that it had been receiving prior to the Soviet withdrawal. It would also be required to review its nuclear program and some US writers also argued that after the Soviet had withdrawn, Pakistan should be asked to review its support for a fundamentalist regime change in Afghanistan. There was also a general

926 (Rais R. B., War Without Winners, 1994, p. 197)
understanding that India would once again emerge as US’s strategic partner in the region.

The Soviet Withdrawal- Partnership Withers. The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan had resulted in an overnight courtship between the World’s leading democracy and a military regime in Pakistan. Shared interests in defeating the Russians kept the relations at even keel in the coming years, with Pakistan obtaining substantial military and financial assistance in addition to being allowed to continue relatively unchecked with its nuclear program as long as there was a hint of plausible deniability. This was now under threat as in 1987; there were growing signs that the Soviet Government was seriously considering withdrawal. In December 1987, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced publicly that the Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan within one year, as soon as there was an agreement on the fate of the aid to Mujahideen groups from across the border, implying covert aid through Pakistan and other countries.

US Loses Interest after Soviet Withdrawal - Divergence in Strategic Objectives. The US, after the withdrawal of the Soviets, wanted little to do with Afghanistan. This seems to be a disconnect in the US policy, in the wake of president Reagan’s departure from the White House. Having helped create a festering wound, with money weapons and paid fighters from all over the world, the US

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administration apparently decided to disassociate from the Afghan situation, as soon as the primary policy objective of defeating the Soviet forces in Afghanistan had been achieved. In contrast, their junior partner Pakistan, which had primarily got into the proxy war on the US behest and support, was left almost on its own. This short sighted policy reflected the divergence of interests between a global power and a regional partner, with transitionary significance. Although the inability to achieve lasting peace in Afghanistan subsequently also hurt the US global interest, yet at the time it was Pakistan which was left on its own, to deal with the fallout of Afghan Conflict. President Musharraf comments on the issue:-

“America simply abandoned Afghanistan to its fate, ignoring the fact that a wretchedly poor and unstable country, armed to its teeth with the most sophisticated weapons and torn apart by warlords, could become ideal haven for terrorists”929.

**US Raises the Bar on Nuclear Proliferation.** In 1989, there were indications that Pakistan’s special status was now no more guaranteed. The nuclear issue once again haunted the Pakistani leadership. During the Army Chief’s General Aslam Beg’s visit, he was bluntly told by National Security Advisor Brent Snowcroft “President Bush will certify as long as he can, but he will not lie. Pakistan stands very close to the line”930. This policy stance was reiterated by President Bush in a meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, at Tokyo, on the funeral of Emperor

929 (Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 2006, p. 209)
Hirohito. The same aspect was highlighted by the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, in a meeting with the three top leaders of the country, i.e. the President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and the Army Chief General Beg. “If you take any action and go past the line, Bush will invoke Pressler”\textsuperscript{931}. Apparently, the new understanding reached between the US and Pakistani administration was that Pakistan could continue to receive military and economic assistance, if it froze its nuclear program and did not go for further uranium enrichment. It also appears that the Pakistani leadership decided to comply with the US demands, hoping to retain the favourable status that their country had enjoyed prior to the termination of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In wake of apparently successful visit, the US President issued his certification of the Pressler Amendment. The US also promised to sell 60 F-16 Fighters and continue the economic aid, close to $600 million annually\textsuperscript{932}. The visit of Benazir Bhutto seemed to have allayed the fears that the security relationship was tottering. Yet it was not long that the aid was indeed frozen.

**Pressler Amendment Applied Sep 1990 – The Partnership Collapses.**

In September 1990, Robert Oakley, the US Ambassador informed the Pakistan’ government that the US President would not certify the Pressler Amendment. The US arms sales and aid was suspended in October 1990, when President Bush decline to certify according to Section 620 E (e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, that Pakistan did

\textsuperscript{931} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 300)
\textsuperscript{932} (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 302)
not possess nuclear weapons\textsuperscript{933}. The impact of the aid stoppage was immediate and substantial for the Pakistan defence establishment. They lost almost 300 million dollars worth of arms and military supplies. Even more importantly, the F-16’s, for which Pakistan has been paying premium amount, were held back by the US administration. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, went to Washington, in the immediate aftermath of the sanctions. His visit in October 1990 was aimed at exploring ways to circumvent the Pressler Amendment. The US apparently had decided to raise the bar for Pakistan, now that it did not enjoy the special status of the Cold War Ally. Now the demand was to “Roll back” rather than to freeze the capability. Notwithstanding the semantics, it was quite apparent for all those in Pakistan, that the US had once again discarded the country after it had no further use for it. These views were shared by the Pakistan Army Chief General Beg and other senior officials\textsuperscript{934}. Shahid Amin, a veteran Pakistani diplomat writes “This cynical behaviour is characteristic of the policies of realpolitiks pursued by the US and indeed by most other countries”\textsuperscript{935}.

**Pressler Amendment – Different Perspectives.** It is important to note that the real divergence in the views of the two countries on the issue was that Pakistan felt US Administration was now asking for much more than previously agreed upon. The US administration on the other hand, did not want to get into this debate. They laid out the new rules, as it suited the US policy objectives, and asked Pakistan to comply or face the sanctions. This was quite apparent, when the US Under Secretary

\textsuperscript{933} (Hilali, US Pakisitan Relationship, 2005, p. 204), (Sa'es, 2005, p. 9)  
\textsuperscript{934} (Hilali, US Paksitan Relationship, 2005, p. 311)  
\textsuperscript{935} (Amin S ., 2000, p. 99)
of State Reginald Bartholomeow visited Pakistan in November 1991. In his meeting with Pakistan’s President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, he was briefed by the Pakistani President on the history of Pak-US Dialogue on the nuclear issue, explaining Pakistan’s position and highlighting the assertion that US was asking for more than what it had agreed upon earlier. To the surprise and consternation of the Pakistani President, the US diplomat simply remarked “We cannot change our policies, you have to change yours” 936. The absence of any tangible binding force in the relationship was the key factor in the US stance. Without strategic interests at stake, the Pakistani initiatives to rekindle the fruitful relationship were bound to flounder. As the Pakistan Ambassador to the US, Syeda Abida Hussain commented that in the post-cold war era, “The United States had about as much interest in Pakistan, as the Maldives” 937.

The real source of divergence was Pakistan’s inability to remain relevant to the US policy goals and objectives in the post cold war period. This would essentially remain unchanged for the next ten years, till the 9-11 incident; when suddenly Afghanistan and resultantly Pakistan came back on the US priority list. During this period, Pakistan and US did not share much common ground on core security issues, as they affected Pakistan. From Pakistan’s perspective these security issues were Afghanistan, Kashmir, Nuclear program and US military assistance to the Pakistan Armed Forces. In all these areas, there was a decline in US support and cooperation

in the coming years. Pakistan found itself increasing isolated on these issues of vital national concern.

**The Pressler Amendment and F-16 Issue.** The first casualty of the Pressler Amendment was Pakistan’s F-16 Aircraft, being procured from General Dynamics Corporation. To add insult to injury, the US Government insisted that Pakistan continue to pay for the aircraft that had been mothballed in the Arizona Desert, following the invoking of Pressler Amendment Pakistan paid several hundred million dollars to the General Dynamics Corporation, in the hope of delivery, after some eventual agreement. The payments were finally suspended in 1993.\(^{938}\) Having lost the special favoured status, Pakistan was now finding out the problems of dealing with a superpower.

**The Pakistan Navy Suffers.** The US, while imposing sanctions displayed complete disregard for the services rendered by the Pakistani Government in supporting the Afghan War. A much resented example of high handedness was the insistence on return of six frigates, leased to the Pakistan Navy. These formed the mainstay of the Navy’s fighting potential. Not only were these frigates taken back, but the US administration also ensured that Pakistan pay for the transit to Singapore, where these frigates were to be scrapped eventually.\(^{939}\) In Pakistan this treatment validated the assertion that US was not a reliable and long term friend. It also

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\(^{938}\) (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 313)

\(^{939}\) (Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 323)
reinforced the perception that Pakistan must diversify its sources of defence procurement and move towards indigenization.

Cost Benefits – Analysis – Afghan War Security Co-operation

Pakistan Gets Military Aid in Return for Support in Afghanistan.

One of the major beneficiaries of the Afghan war, was the Pakistan Armed Forces. Having been dependent on the US military equipment in a big way, the Armed Forces had been left with a large inventory of aging equipment, after the crippling sanctions in 1965, which never really were removed later. In the succeeding years, the Armed Forces had received a little trickling of US spares and arms, which were far less than the requirement to keep peace with Indian military development. With a General at the helm of affairs (Zia ul Haq), one of the first demands to the Americans, at the commencement of the new security partnership was to demonstrate its sincerity, by accepting Pakistan’s demand for the latest F-16 Air Craft. This demand was met by the Reagan Administration, by making adjustments in the delivery program to its NATO Forces, Subsequently, during the fruitful years of partnership until the 1992 sanctions, Pakistan obtained a whole range of military hardware, for all the three Forces, i.e Army, Navy and Air force. It is important to note, that even during the Afghan conflict, the primary objective for Pakistan was to obtain US military aid, to bolster its defence against India, and not against the communist regime in Afghanistan. The Pakistan Government was able to obtain these F-16s, with latest

940 (Hilali, US Paksitan Relationship, 2005, p. 195)
avionics, instead of the F-5’s which had been initially proposed by the US Administration. The $343 million package not only included the F-16’s, but also the latest Sparrow and Sidewinder Missiles. The Sidewinder Missiles were the advanced AIM-9L version. In the overall context, the Army greatly benefited from the military aid. The 21 Cobra Gunship helicopters and latest TOW Antitank missiles formed a crucial component of the Army’s defence capability against a growing Indian mechanized capability on the eastern borders. This was the time that the Indian Army was also involved in a massive reorganization/modernization plan, initiated by the Army Chief General Sunderji. Aptly named “Sunderji Doctrine”, it envisaged large scale mobilized forces undertaking deep manoeuvres inside Pakistani territory, with intimate air and artillery support, in order to capture large chunks of territory and strategic objectives of psycho-social importance. Given Pakistan’s limited depth (less than 500 kilometres) and the vulnerability of its main communication artery, the National Highway which runs perilously close to the international border (within 100 km at most places), this strategy was a source of major concern for the policymakers in the Pakistan Armed Forces. As one author describes it “At one point during the exercise (In November 1986), India placed its Armed Forces in such a way that they could cut Pakistan in half”. There the US military aid which included tanks, self propelled artillery, radars, anti tank and anti aircraft missiles, gave some potency to the Pakistan Army. In addition, the enhanced military to military cooperation once

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941 (Kux, Estranged Democracies India and the United States 1941-19191, 1993, p. 299)
942 (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 194)
943 (Bajpai, 1995)
944 (Cohen S., The Pakistan Army, 1984, p. 151)
more allowed Pakistani officers to obtain training from the US, an aspect that had almost died down in the preceding years. These contacts were not only important from a purely military point of view, but in fact constituted the only real intimate association between any US institution and their Pakistani counterparts. It is therefore not coincidental, that Pakistan has always been relatively more popular with the Defence Department, as compared to the State Department or the US Legislature.

**Economic Aid to Pakistan.** The benefits of the strategic cooperation also extended to the economic sector. Pakistan received a hefty inflow of more than $7 billion US dollars in the 1980s. Pakistan was also able to achieve a 6.3 percent growth rate in the Zia years, which was two points higher than the preceding Bhutto regime. In this period, Pakistan was elevated to 4th place, amongst the largest recipients of the US aid, globally. It was only preceded by Israel, Egypt and Turkey. This aid was further enhanced in 1985, when US approved another hefty aid package of $4.02 billion ($670 million annually). This catapulted Pakistan to second position just behind Israel. The US aid was instrumental in improving Pakistan’s energy, agriculture and social services sectors.

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945 (Hilali, US Paksitan Relationship, 2005, p. 195)
946 (Hilali, US Paksitan Relationship, 2005, p. 195)
947 (Hilali, US Paksitan Relationship, 2005, p. 196)
The Charges of Proliferation in Military Aid - A Source of Discord.

Although the Afghan war a highpoint in the security cooperation between US and Pakistan, yet there were certain issues which created a lingering bitter after taste. One such issue was the charge of corruption / mismanagement by the Pakistani agencies. As mentioned earlier, the two countries had agreed upon the modulation of military aid disbursement quite early in the relationship. This involved ISI in a key role, being the sole distributor of the military hardware, procured through different sources by the CIA. There were reports that some of the weapons destined for Afghanistan, were finding their way back to Pakistan, and were being sold in the tribal areas and other markets. There were also rumours that many senior and mid ranking officials which included army officers, Afghan leaders and ISI operatives, gained financial advantage.

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948 (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 197)
949 (The Nation, 31 July 1987)
950 (The Economist, 8 December 1984)
from the aid/resources intended for the Afghan resistance\textsuperscript{951}. This kind of pilferage was estimated to be anything between 20-30\% of the $600 million dollars plus announcement of weapons, being pumped in by the CIA\textsuperscript{952}. In addition to charges of pilferage, another issue of serious discord was the US concern that Pakistan might supply the military equipment to a third party. This was especially true to the sophisticated anti air craft missiles, “Stingers”, that were considered to be the most advanced at the time of their induction. Some US newspapers and sources alleged that these weapons were sold to the Iranians\textsuperscript{953}. There were also allegations by some quarters that the Ojhri Camp Disaster in Rawalpindi in April 1988, was a cover up by the Pakistani officials, to avoid getting into an embarrassing stock taking of the 100 million dollars worth of equipment and ammunition, which had been supplied by the CIA\textsuperscript{954}. However, an interesting counter conspiracy counter theory, often discussed in military circles was that it was a closure operation by the CIA itself, which found such huge amount of unused equipment, in Pakistani hands, not to their liking, as the purpose of supplying weapons to Afghan Mujahideen had largely been achieved by this time. This incident was also linked with Zia’s mysterious death in an air crash four months later in August 1988. One senior Pakistani diplomat has even theorized that US was not too unhappy with Zia’s death, as he had outlived his utility and was now becoming a hurdle to the US objectives in the region, looking instead for a larger

\textsuperscript{951} (Christina, p. 243)
\textsuperscript{952} (October 1995, pp. 25-35)
\textsuperscript{953} (Khan R., Summer 1988)
\textsuperscript{954} (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 99)
Pak-Islamic role, in the wake of his perceived success\textsuperscript{955}. Zia during the last four months before the Geneva Accord had fallen out with the American stance on the issue of withdrawal of the Soviet forces, linking it to the formation of a broad based government. Yet both these conspiracy theories are largely unproven.

**Negative Fallouts of the Afghan Conflict.** The Afghan conflict opened up many new problems for Pakistan. The first and most immediate one, was the influx of more than 3 million refugees into Pakistan\textsuperscript{956}. These refugees created multiple problems for the Pakistani society. These refugees, who came to the country from 1978 onwards, did not go back in any great numbers. Since the Afghanistan situation never really stabilized, even after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, most of them opted to stay in Pakistan. Additionally, the lax policies on refugees by the Zia government meant that they spread out into the length and breadth of the country, instead of being confined to the border areas or few select refuges camps. The refugees were a major source of increased violence, gun running, drug trafficking and general lawlessness in the country\textsuperscript{957}. Most of the refugees did not stay long in the 386 camps, setup for them in the province of Balochistan and NWFP. It is little appreciated fact that Pakistan became a hotbed for terrorists, primarily because of its support to the Afghan resistance\textsuperscript{958}. In 1987, alone, according to authentic US Government figures, 90% of

\textsuperscript{955} (Amin S. M., 2000, p. 99)  
\textsuperscript{956} (The News, 15 May 1997)  
\textsuperscript{957} (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 199)  
\textsuperscript{958} (Rizvi H. A., 2006, p. 215)
the approximately 777 acts of terrorism, worldwide, occurred in Pakistan alone. Pakistan suffered more than 2000 air violations in the period.

Refugees Influx and Lawlessness. The refugees spread to all major cities of Pakistan, especially in the Punjab and the NWFP. The province of NWFP alone had almost 2.5 million refugees. This huge number caused a lot of friction and resentment amongst the local population, who blamed them for an increasing level of violence and lawlessness. Another negative fallout of the Afghan refugee influx, was the phenomenon of bombing at public places, targeting innocent people indiscriminately. The tactics was apparently adopted by the communist backed intelligence agencies to exert pressure on the Pakistani government, for its pro west policies and support to the Afghan Mujahideen. In the province of Sind, these refugees were involved in gun-running and drug trafficking, although they did not migrate to the province in as large numbers as Punjab. Karachi, the largest city of Pakistan, witnessed some horrific bombings, in busy markets, which resulted in scores of dead and wounded. These incidents caused panic and fear, with the side effects of maligning the Afghan refugees. On the whole these refugees were a negative influence on the security environment, adding to the growing difficulties of law-enforcement agencies and local administration, overburdened by the burgeoning

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959 (16 December 1987, p. 3)
961 (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 201)
962 (Frontier Post, 22 February 1987)
population\(^\text{963}\). Even in the province of NFWP, these was no great sense of comradeship, despite the linguistic bonds with the Pashtuns from Afghanistan. However, despite this, the population of Pakistan generally accepted these refugees in a benign manner\(^\text{964}\). In the province of Balochistan, the delicate balance between the Baloch and Pashtun nationalities was tilted due to the huge influx of Afghan refugees, totalling more than eight million\(^\text{965}\). These refugees came into the areas close to the capital city of Quetta and the border city of Chaman, which had a predominantly Pashtun makeup. The influx of Afghan refugees in Pakistan’s Balochistan and NWFP provinces, their taking over of many of the traditional Pashtun occupations, like transportation, labour and the influx of drugs and gun culture while greatly reduced the charm of Pashtunistan, which existed prior to the Afghan conflict\(^\text{966}\).

**Radicalization of Society.** One of the major fallouts of the security partnership was its impact on Pakistan’s internal dynamics. One aspect was the internal security environment, which saw a deterioration during the eight years extended period of the Afghan War. The second aspect was increased levels of violence and polarisation within the Pakistani Society. The third aspect was an authoritarian regime that stifled genuine political participation in the national affairs, promoting cronyism and tailor made political dispensation that could only help perpetuate the military regime. Fifthly, the policy of supporting Afghan resistance inculcated a religious fervour in

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\(^{964}\) (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 202)

\(^{965}\) (Ahmed, 1986, p. 171)

\(^{966}\) (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 195)
the society, when the regime allowed a free hand to Mullahs, religions organizations and Madrassas to spawn a generation of religious zealots, who had limited vision and fixed ideas about religion and life. These factors, through somewhat necessary at the time, adversely affected country in the coming years. Increased polarization of society on religious, ethnic lines, prevalence of guns and violence and a general weakening of the government control over the affairs of hundreds of religious seminaries and Jehadi organizations laid the foundations of the crisis that the country witnessed in the aftermath of September, 11 terrorists attacks. At later stages, it was virtually impossible to undo the damage caused to the social fabric and the internal security dynamics of the country, without major and extremely painful military actions. The entrenched Jehadi groups and their infrastructure was very difficult to dismantle at this stage. Thus the Zia regime’s support to the Afghan resistance had a hidden price tag, with delayed effects. Interestingly, this policy would also became a major source of divergence in the security relationship, as now Pakistan’s support/acceptance of these extremist organization was unwelcome to the US, in view of its changed security concerns in the region. The US, instead of the Soviet Union, became the declared enemy of the Jehadis. It is therefore necessary to understand the imperatives and reasons for their acceptance during the Afghan war and how they contained the potential for being a source of discord in the later years.

Rise of the Ethnicity and Religious Intolerance. One of the most significant fallouts of the security relationship during the Afghan War was the rise of

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967 (Weaver, Pakistan in the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan, 2002, p. 9)
This included an increased importance and nuisance value of the religious parties, growth of the religious militant groups and an overall increase in the level of religious intolerance in the country. All these three factors had long lasting implications and effects on the future of Pak-US Security relationship as well on the internal dynamics of the country. One of the main purposes of the Zia’s regime security and intelligence apparatus was to break the power of the main political parties especially the Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP), whose leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had been ousted by the military ruler. This necessitated supporting ethnic/regional parties to erode the PPP power base, especially in the province of Sind. The Muhajir Qami Movement (MQM), a party based on ethnic lines, representing the Urdu-speaking migrants from India, who had settled in large numbers in the city of Karachi, was one such party created through the collusion of intelligence agencies. This party was later involved in violence, acts of terror and virtually took the city hostage to its criminal tactics, till its terror cells was broken up by the PPP Government in 1990’s. However, the party has still retained its grip as a major power broker in the country and retains the capability to influence government decisions and bring Pakistan’s industrial hub to a standstill, as and when required. The rise of sectarian and ethnic rifts in Karachi was a direct outcome of this official patronisation of sub-nationalist parties by the Zia regime. Zia’s insistence and reliance on Islam as a means of prolonging and justifying military rule, made him

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968 (Naqvi, Pakistan at the Kmp's Gadege, 2010, p. 40)
969 (Discussion with Military Officers who operated on Internal Security Duties in Karachi during the period)
970 (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 208)
vulnerable to the machinations of religious parties and Jehadi organizations\textsuperscript{971}. They were not only supported but also patronized by the ISI. The rise of Jammaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat-Ulema-Islam (JUI) and a host of small and large religious organizations was phenomenal. The Madrassas, in Pakistan, which were less than 200 in 1950’s, mushroomed to more than 50,000 by the end of 1988. This was coupled with an abundance of all sorts of weapons in Pakistan.

**Religious Teachers and Students, 1980-1988**

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<tr>
<th>Province &amp; Other Areas</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nazeerah</td>
<td>Hifz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>769,868</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>186,295</td>
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<td>85,236</td>
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<td>23,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern Areas</td>
<td>8,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azad Kashmir</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>25,670</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>5,780</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** \textsuperscript{972}

It was commonly described as “Kalishnakov Culture”. The tribal areas of N.W.F.P, which even before the Afghan war, had nominal government writ, now became safe havens for gun-running and drug trafficking. In fact these two factors complemented and strengthened each other. The level of lawlessness and violence in the country increased considerably\textsuperscript{973}.

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\textsuperscript{971} (Naqvi, Pakistan at the Kmile's Edge, 2010, p. 88)
\textsuperscript{972} (Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 215)
\textsuperscript{973} (Buray, 31 July 1991)
Security fallouts of the Pakistan support to the Afghan Resistance.

General Zia’s decision to support the Afghan resistance was not without its logical fallouts. By siding openly with the west, in particular US, and allowing its territory to be used for Mujahideen training camps, logistic bases and hideouts, Pakistan provided a reason to the Soviet and Afghan intelligence agencies to launch clandestine operations within Pakistan. The Soviet efforts were aimed at pressurizing the Zia regime by increasing the activities along the Durand line, by instigating terrorist attacks within Pakistan and by keeping up diplomatic and political pressure through the Kabul - New Delhi nexus. The terrorist attacks took a huge toll on the Pakistani population. These was complemented by incessant air raids and artillery shelling in areas adjacent to the Pak – Afghan borders. The total estimated casualties were more than 10,000 in the period between 1980-1988. These included fatalities of 5775 persons, from a combination of the above mentioned factors. The bombings were in all major cities of Pakistan, causing harassment and panic. In Rawalpindi, there was a spate of mysterious killings, in one of the low income, workers dominated areas. This involved a gang of criminals, who would mercilessly bludgeon entire families to death at night, with no obvious reason or purpose. It was known by the name of Hathoro Group (sledge hammer group) the bombings and killings was obviously intended to raise the ante for the Pakistan Government. General Zia’s death was also

\[^{974}\text{(Hilali, US Paksitan Relationship, 2005, p. 203)}\]
\[^{976}\text{(Interview with officer operating in the area)}\]
attributed by some to the Afghan – Soviet intelligence agencies, who felt that he was becoming a major hurdle in the settlement at Geneva.977

Conclusion. The purpose of this discourse is to highlight the point that security cooperation by the US was predicated by the Afghan War, specifically the Soviet invasion. This was the prime reason for supporting Pakistan. Once the factor was mitigated, Pakistan was likely to lose its relevance in the US security/calculus once again. The convergence of interest was transitionary, and did not in essence address Pakistan’s core security concern, which was to bolster its security against India. That was incidental, and conceded to by the US, in order to gain Pakistan’s support for the Afghan War effort. The joint purpose of defeating the Soviet in Afghanistan also influenced the security relationship, but it was secondary consideration, not the primary one, for Pakistan.978 Similarly the US’s massive aid program to Pakistan was necessitated by the need for continued Pakistan’s support for the covert war in Afghanistan, which could not be fought otherwise. Thus as soon as their primary motive was achieved in 1988, in the wake of Soviet withdrawal, all the original concerns of the US Government related to Pakistan i.e nuclear proliferation, human rights, drug trafficking issues, re-surfaced and the aid tap was quickly turned off. Pakistan, under Zia managed to gain a lot of US support during the Afghan war, yet in the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal, could not maintain or develop any significant value/relevance that could have allowed for continuation of the beneficial

978 (Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-85 , 2003, p. 28)
relationship, albeit at a reduced scale. One aspect which clearly stood out was the nature of the partnership. It was as one observer termed it “Opportunistic” as well as “Unequal”\(^{979}\). This partnership was therefore predicated to wither, as soon as Pakistan lost its relevance to the US Strategic Objectives in the region. Thus the alliance was inherently “transitionary” in nature.

\(^{979}\) (Hilali, US Pakitan Relationship, 2005, p. 187)
CHAPTER 4

PAKISTAN – A PARIAH STATE

1990 - 2001

Introduction

This chapter deals with Pakistan-US security relationship in a strained environment. Three major issues are being discussed. Firstly, the Afghanistan situation, which continued to fester, setting the stage for September 11, 2001. In this context, the divergence in Pakistan-US Security perspective, caused by lack of close interaction as well as different core strategic objectives, figures out.

The second aspect is related to India and the freedom struggle in Kashmir and US role. Here the core divergence was in the perception of the freedom movement. It was viewed as a terrorist activity by the Indians, a view largely shared by the US administration as well. In the backdrop of a joint struggle against communism, Pakistan found this US stance rather unfair. Things however, did not go out of control, till the US realized that Kashmir freedom groups were also linked to Arab terrorists, working against the US interest’s world wide. It was at this juncture that the true divergence in strategic priorities took place.

The third aspect is related to Pakistan’s nuclear program, which remained the main source of estrangement between the two countries. The security relationship during this period was negative rather than positive. Without shared interest, the US actually treated Pakistan like a Pariah State and tried to
stop/delay its acquisitions and development of technology, required to match the growing Indian military might. This aspect highlights the basic diverging fact in the security relationship, which remains that Pakistan’s security issues and regional imperatives do not have any natural cohesion with the US agenda in the region. Thus these imperatives viewed primarily in the context of an impoverished third world Muslim country, striving to achieve sensitive military technology, is never viewed favourably in Washington. Pakistan also does not enjoy the same kind of grass root support and strength in the powerful US Congress and Senate, vis-a-vis it’s adversary India.

**Gulf War – 1991 The Lost Opportunity for Enhancing Security Co-operation**

Saddam Hussain’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 had evoked a strong response from the US. It moved quickly to garner international support, gather a coalition of friendly forces and was poised to launch a major military offensive against Iraq. At this juncture, Pakistan Government sided with the US-led coalition and even despatched troops to Saudi Arabia. However, there seemed to be a disconnect in the Pakistani policy on the Gulf Crises. Having sent the troops to Saudi Arabia, the Pakistan Army Chief, General Aslam Beg, openly criticized the US bombing campaign and the overall strategy in the Gulf. This stance was in contravention to the Nawaz Sharif Government’s stance on the issue and quite obviously disliked by the US. This internal squabble did not auger well for improving Pakistan’s chances of resolving the differences over the Nuclear Issue. The Pakistani foreign office had
advocated strongly to support the anti-Saddam coalition, particularly in the backdrop of Saddam’s support and links with India and his lack of support to Pakistan on the Kashmir Issue. However, General Aslam Beg seemed to be playing to the gallery, as the general public in Pakistan was favourably inclined towards Saddam. This was mainly because he appeared to stand up to the US – Jewish nexus and had lobbed a few missiles onto Israel, which had negligible affect, but seemed to win him the adoration of millions of Muslims, who looked at him as the champion of the Islamic Cause. General Beg also seemed to have an inflated view of the military powers of Saddam’s forces, especially his air defence and the dite Republican Guards. This was a gross miscalculation, as the war unfolded. However, more important for Pakistan’s security interest was the fact that the Pakistan’s brigade sent to Saudi Arabia, was not allowed to join the coalition. The divergent views in the Pakistani establishment i.e. the military and the bureaucrats, as well as mounting public support for Saddam Hussain resulted in a strange compromise. The Pakistan’s forces were kept in Saudi Arabia but only to protect the “Holy places i.e. Mecca and Medina”. They were not part of the coalition effort to oust Saddam from Kuwait, the real mission of the entire coalition. As one eminent journalist explains the situation “Nobody knew for certain where Pakistan stood, and nobody was more irritated than the Government of Saudi Arabia”. Though this policy may have helped to win some points in the media while on the streets it did not help much as far as the strategic interests of the country were concerned. Pakistan’s two principal donners and supporter during the last two 

980 (Amin S., 2000, pp. 135-137)  
981 (Amin S., 2000, pp. 135-137)  
982 (Weaver, 2002, p. 142)
decades – Saudi Arabia and United States-wanted much more intimate participation from their principal ally. This did not happen and on the contrary, countries like Egypt stepped in to offer troops for the Kuwait offensive. Though their employment remained symbolic as the brunt of the fighting was undertaken by the US and the British troops, yet their participation was in stark contrast to the subdued and often divergent policy of the Pakistan Government. This episode reflected two important trends, and may have contributed towards making Pakistan irrelevant in the emerging global/regional situation.

With regards to the trends, firstly it demonstrated that Pakistan was literally incapable of supporting US goals / policies in the region. It was a repeat of the 1956 Gulf Crisis, when Pakistan Government and the public did not share the same national perceptions about the strategic partnership with the US. Evidently the general public had no problem with getting US aid and military support, however, whenever it conflicted with the touchy Palestinian Issue or involved a Muslim country, the public was not prepared to back the government policies in supporting the US. In this case the country was Iraq, which interestingly had never supported Pakistan on its core issue of Kashmir.983

Second trend, equally significant, was the emergence of a very strong and diversified religious front, consisting of many small and large religious groups, professing many different brands and versions of Islam, spawned and nurtured by 11 years of General Zia’s Regime under US patronage. These had been an invaluable asset in the Afghan Jihad, however, now that the Jihad was over; they were “loose cannons”. The Islamic

983 (Amin S., 2000, pp. 135-137)
parties and groups vocally supported Saddam, making Pakistan’s decisions more difficult.

An important aspect not fully appreciated at the time, was the lost opportunities by the Pakistani Government, in remaining relevant to the US strategic objectives and priorities, in order to retain the special relationship forged during the Afghan War. Apparently this aspect did not receive the kind of importance, it should have. With the US now emerging as the sole superpower, the Gulf War was a reflection of the changed global order, where the US was able to gather an impressive coalition against Saddam, primarily to retain and improve its core strategic objectives in the Persian Gulf/ Middle East. Here, Pakistan, one of the largest recipients of the US aid over the last decade did not have anything worthwhile to offer. Therefore, it is not surprising that the security cooperation between the two countries was bound to dry up rapidly. An issue of divergence in the relationship, that had also plagued it during the past, now emerged as a major influencing factor. This was the perceived anti-Islamic stance of the US, deeply resented by the masses in the country. This factor has the most significant impact on Government Pakistan’s ability to take decisions in the best interest of the country, rather than vague perception of Pan – Islamism. The overall result of Pakistan’s lukewarm and watered down participation in the Gulf Coalition was that on one hand, it lost the special military relationship with the Saudis, who had, in the previous years, kept an entire Pakistan armoured brigade for the defence of the country. Post Gulf War, Pakistan Armed Forces had much reduced presence in

\[984\](Amin S., 2000, pp. 135-137)
\[985\](Discussion with senior retired military officers)
Saudi Arabia. On the other hand the US Security Assistance, which had kept the country in a position to match India’s growing military potential, also dried up, and issue of nuclear proliferation, previously overlooked by the US administration, emerged as a major point of disagreement between the two countries.

**Afghanistan is Forgotten After Soviet Withdrawal**

The Afghan Conflict is widely seen by the West in general and America, in particular as a struggle against the Communist menace, soon degenerated into a third world’s, forgotten civil war, in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal. The “negative symmetry” agreed upon tacitly by the USSR and USA at Geneva, in 1989, came into affect in September 1991, when the two countries decided not to support their respective proxies in Afghanistan. The accord was signed between the US Secretary of State James Baker and his Russian counterpart Edward Shivardnadze. This was soon followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Central Asian Republics, landlocked and subservient since centuries of Russian occupation, found themselves independent overnight. This enhanced the significance of Afghanistan, which could be used by these Republics to gain trade access to the Arabian Sea. Afghanistan is a landlocked country with only access either from Pakistan or via Iran. However, situation within Afghanistan was far from stable. The Najibullah Regime had clung to power, despite massive military onslaught by the Mujahideen. The dreams of an early victory after the withdrawal of Soviet Forces had remained unfulfilled. Now with this new development, things changed rapidly. The Najibullah Government fell in April 1992 and was replaced by a coalition led by Pashtun leader Gulbadin Hekmatyar,
sharing power with Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masud, both Tajik leaders. This Government, however, did not succeed, and fighting continued unabated. The country was now divided into Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara territories, with bloodthirsty Afghan warlords, unleashing the fury on to each other that they had displayed against Soviets.

The Afghan situation did not improve meaningfully for Pakistan in the period following Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani’s takeover in Kabul. In fact the situation in Afghanistan got more complicated. Pakistan did not see any tangible rewards of the Afghan struggle, as the Tajik regime maintained close ties with Pakistan’s arch rival India. The instability in Afghanistan did not present any meaningful possibility of developing the country as a trade and energy corridor for the Central Asian Republics, something which could be beneficial for Pakistan, which was by now feeling the need for energy itself, thanks to a growth rate in excess of 3% per annum. The unscrupulous and ruthless attitude of Burhanuddin’s opponent, Gulbadin Hekmatyar, who continued to surround Kabul keeping it under incessant rocket attacks only worsened the situation for all concerned, especially the helpless population, who did not see any difference between the Soviets, and these blood thirsty warlords.986

The situation in Afghanistan saw another twist, when the “Taliban” emerged as a force in Afghanistan, in the late 1994. These “Taliban”, or students, were the product of religious seminaries, established by the predominantly “Deobandi” Sect in the Balochistan and NWFP provinces of Pakistan. These young zealots, product of the fundamentalist Madarassas, had been the main recruits for the Mujahideen groups.

986 (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 158)
These Taliban had little formal education. They were primarily product of a Madarassas system that taught the basics of Islam, instilled an intense hatred for the “infidels” and left little room for logic or reason. The Taliban were to become a major source of divergence in US-Pakistan relations, in the coming years. A look at their meteoric rise, and their collusion with Pakistan thus assumes great significance in the context of Pak-US security relationship.

**Rise of Taliban; The Divergence Grows.** The story of Taliban starts from an off quoted incident, wherein two teenage girls were abducted and raped by some local warlord outfit in the outskirts of city of Kandahar in 1994, in the neighbourhood of Sangesar. Reportedly Mullah Omar, along with 30 companions attacked the base, and got the two girls released, while simultaneously administering their own brand of justice, hanged the guilty commander by the barrel of a tank. Apparently the utter disregard for human rights and basic social order by the warring warlords had created an environment, where justice, in even such raw form was welcomed by the helpless population of Afghanistan. The immediate and more tangible reason for the sudden rise of Taliban is linked to the effort by General Nasirullah Babar, Benazir Government’s Interior Minister, who had been tasked by the Prime Minister of Pakistan to explore the possibility of opening up a route to the Central Asian Republics, through Southern Afghanistan. By this time, Pakistan Government had been quite frustrated by their protégé Gulbadin Hekmatyar, who had been unable to

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987 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 184)
988 (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 177)
gain control of Kabul. His reputation as a barbaric warlord, amplified by his indiscriminate missile barrage of Kabul, only strengthened the common sentiments against him. The Pakistan’s Afghan Policy, now largely being handled by the ISI, lacked the clarity and vision of the Zia Years. A weak and ineffectual political Government, only strengthened the hands of the veterans of Afghan Jihad, who were still convinced that somehow they could salvage something from the wreckage of a forgotten conflict. Benazir Bhutto, re-elected to office in 1993, relied on the veteran General Nasirullah Babar to achieve some breakthrough in Afghanistan, that could allow Pakistan Government to commence trade with the Central Asian Republics. Nasirullah Babar had previous experience of dealing with Afghan resistance, in his earlier stint as the Inspector General Frontier Corps in the early 70’s during Benazir’s father Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s premiership. Nasirullah Babar, a bold, maverick commander, eagerly took the task, personally arranging a huge convoy of trucks, to be taken along the route from Quetta in Pakistani’s province of Balochistan to Kandahar, Herat and onwards to Ashkabad, the Capital of Turkmenistan. At this stage an interesting event occurred, which enhanced the stature of the Taliban in the Pakistani decision making circles. The border town, opposite Quetta, on the southern route in Afghanistan was Spin Boldek. This was held by Hekmatyar’s men, who posed difficulties for free movement, extracting taxes from all traffic enroute. A group of 200 Taliban on 12 October, attacked this post of Spin Boldek, ostensibly to clear it for

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989 (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 177)
990 (Jalalzai, Taliban and the Post Taliban Afghanistan, Terrorism, Al-Qaeeda and the Qila-e-Jhangi Massacre, 2003, pp. 249-250)
991 (Jalalzai, Taliban and the Post Taliban Afghanistan, Terrorism, Al-Qaeeda and the Qila-e-Jhangi Massacre, 2003, p. 125)
the convoy movement. In the process they met unexpected success, routing the Hekmatyar troops and capturing sizable quantities of arms and ammunition\textsuperscript{992}. On its capture, the convoy of 30 trucks was moved by General Babar into Afghanistan. However they were once again held up by a group of warlords outside the city of Kandahar. Again the Taliban were called in for the rescue. They attacked the commander holding up the convoy, routed them on 3 November 1994, and once again hung the commander of the abducters from by the barrel of a tank, a tactics now becoming Taliban trademark\textsuperscript{993}. Even more unexpectedly, the Taliban moved onto the city of Kandahar, where they met little resistance and within two days had captured the city, along with the strategic airport and a number of fighter aircraft and helicopters. The sudden and unexpected fall of Afghanistan’s second most important city was an altogether new development, little anticipated by Taliban sponsors, the ISI. At this stage it seems, the strategy took a backseat to tactics, as far as Pakistan’s policy towards the situation was concerned. The larger implications of supporting an obscurantist, little educated band of fighters were overshadowed by the ecstasy of watching them routing one warlord after another. The Taliban set up their own toll system and allowed for the passage of first convoy of trucks all the way from Turkmenistan to Quetta, carrying a cargo of cotton. The success of Taliban proved to be a rallying point for all the students of Madrassas inside Pakistan, which had been originally set up to support the Afghan Jihad. Backed and run by ISI and Mulana Fazl-ur-Rehman’s JUI (Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam), these Madrassas had been providing

\textsuperscript{992} (Rashid A. , Chaos, 2007, p. 180)
\textsuperscript{993} (Rashid A. , Chaos, 2007, pp. 180-181)
the “gun fodder” for the warlords. Now the eager students rushed to join the new “Knights in Shining Armour”, the Taliban. They were seen as an embodiment of the medieval concept of Islam, taught feverishly in the Deobandi Madrassas, all across the border areas of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa Province. Little educated in the subjects of modern day, they were steeped in very rigid concepts of Islam, further tainted by the limited understanding of the Mullahs in the tribal areas of Pakistan, who themselves belonged to one of the most backward, quarrelling tribal areas of Pakistan. The Taliban’s view about women, governance and society was a kind of tribal mixture of one of the most backward areas in the Sub-Continent with extremely rigid, medieval concepts of Islam not accepted or practised in any other Muslim country.

The Taliban were relentless, after their surprise victory at Kandahar. Within three months of the city’s capture, they had taken over 12 of the 31 provinces in the country, and were knocking at the doors of Kabul and Herat. Their numbers had been strengthened by inclusion of almost 20,000 students from Pakistani Madrassas. Ahmed Rashad gives an incisive analysis of the mindset of these fervent students:

“They were literally the orphans of war, the rootless and restless, the jobless and economically deprived, with little self-knowledge. They admired war because it was the only occupation they could possibly adapt to. Their simple belief in a messianic, puritan Islam which had been drummed into them by

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994 (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, pp. 20-27)
995 (Discuss with officers who have operated in FATA and Swat)
996 (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 148)
simple village Mullahs, was the only prop they could hold onto and which gave their life some meaning.”

Many of these Taliban had seen little family life, having been raised in Madrassas, male dominated and having little knowledge of the value/contribution of women in making and developing a viable society. These faulty constructs about life and society were now forcibly enforced in the newly conquered areas of Afghanistan. Following on their lightening advance, the Taliban focused their attention on Kabul. In February 1995, they attacked the forces of Gulbadin Hekmatyar, who had been surrounding Kabul, but with little results. They captured Hekmatyar’s stronghold at Charasyab on 14 February, 1995. President Rabbani, and his military commander Ahmed Shah Masood, now surrounded by Taliban as well as Hazaras and Tajiks, decided to negotiate with them. Taliban were asked that they be allowed to keep forces in Kabul, while the rest of the parties could form part of the interim government. Mehsud, a strong military commander, who had defied even the Soviets in their long quest to subdue Afghanistan, opted to go for military action. He launched an attack on the Taliban, and for the first time, made them suffer heavy casualties and retreat. Mehsud also employed massive air power to thwart Taliban advance towards Herat. The Taliban suffered horrendous casualties, as they had little logistic infrastructure and were mostly lightly armed. The Taliban were now reduced to controlling 8 out of the 12 provinces captured initially. Ismael Khan was the commander of Herat, an ex-Afghan Army officer and a hardened veteran of many battles. He had been helped by

997 (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 177)
998 (Jalalzai, Taliban and the Post Taliban Afghanistan, Terrorism, Al-Qaeda and the Qila-e-Jhangi Massacre, 2003, p. 126)
the Rabbani - Masud Government in retaining control over Herat. Now in August 1995, he launched a massive attack on Taliban, hoping to defeat them decisively after their mauling at the hands of his forces on the outskirts of Herat. This time around, however, the Taliban were a renewed force. They had rebuild their stocks and recouped their losses, with the help of Pakistani and Saudi support. They mustered up more than 20,000 fighters and attacked his forces instead. He could not sustain the Taliban pressure, and by 5th September 1995, Taliban captured Herat, forcing Ismael Khan to flee to Iran. As a reaction to the Taliban victory, a pro-government mob attacked the Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul, while Rabbani accused Pakistan of using Taliban as a proxy to oust his regime. At this stage it was clear that regional powers had taken the Afghan Conflict to a new pitch, through their respective proxies. The battle lines were clearly drawn between Indo-Iranian backed Rabbani - Ismael - Ahmed Shah Masood forces and Saudi-Pakistani backed Taliban. Thus incrementally and inadvertently, the Taliban had now emerged as the major proxy for Pakistan. Yet a factor not recognizable yet, but one which would grow in intensity over the years, was the degree of control Pakistan had over its proxy. Unlike traditional, regional/ ethnic militias who are controlled through goading, bribes, arms twisting and sometime outright threats, these Taliban has a streak of stubbornness, stemming from a faulty interpretation of Islam, which gave their views a rigidity that their Pakistani backers would later find to be maddening and out rightly stupid. The Taliban nominated Mullah Omer as “Amir-ul-Momineen” Commander of the Faithful, in

999 (Rashid A., Taliban, 2000, p. 39)
1000 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, pp. 180-181)
April 1996\textsuperscript{1001}. His formal ascent to the Taliban leadership reinforced the extremist leanings of the movement, as all suggestions of relaxing laws for women were brushed aside. Even the basic right for education was denied, deferring the decision to a point when Afghanistan had a “legitimate government”\textsuperscript{1002}.

Pakistan tried to cobble together a broad-based coalition in February 1996, inviting the Hizb-e-Wahdat and Jalalabad Shura leaders to Islamabad. Conspicuous from their absence, it was the Taliban who flatly refused to deal with “communist infidels”. This was despite frantic pleas from their mentors, General Nasirullah Babar and Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman, the leader of the JUI. In the meanwhile, the Rabbani government embarked upon an ambitious new effort to garner support from neighbouring countries. The Afghan President travelled to Iran, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The countries visited were those quite unhappy with the rise of a fundamentalist Pashtun force in Afghanistan. The three major players India, Russia and Iran, all supported Rabbani and funded substantial military aid and technical assistance to bolster his regime\textsuperscript{1003}. The Russian concern was the growing ingress of fundamentalists into the Central Asian Republics, and the fear of Islamic extremism spreading further. Iran was peeved because of the hardline anti-Shia stance of the Taliban, and their victory over pro-Iran Shia leader Ismael Shah at Herat. India had traditionally been supporting the communists, who worked against Pakistan, thus adding pressure from the Western Borders. Now the Burhanuddin - Mehsud coalition

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\textsuperscript{1001} (Jalalzai, Taliban and the Post Taliban Afghanistan, Terrorism, Al-Qaeeda and the Qila-e-Jhangi Massacre, 2003, p. 124) \\
\textsuperscript{1002} (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 176) \\
\textsuperscript{1003} (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 176)
\end{flushright}
offered them such prospects. Thus all the there major regional players aligned themselves squarely against the Taliban.

The pace of arms supply to Taliban also picked up in the wake of these developments. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia provided logistic support and equipment/vehicles to make up for deficiencies.

**US Relations with Afghanistan – The Pipeline Politics**

At this point, the Americans who had been conspicuous by their absence, also stepped in to take part in the negotiations. The US Congressman Hank Brown was the first American diplomat to visit the country after almost six years of the American absence. He was looking for ways to convene an all parties conference in Washington, for resolution of the ongoing Civil War. The renewed US interest was largely due to the proposed gas pipeline, to be laid by the US oil giant UNOCOL. In this connection the Assistant Secretary of State Robin Rapheal visited Pakistan and Afghanistan in April 1996. Now the convergence seemed to be around the US strategic interests to exploit the oil and gas reserves of the Central Asian Republics, in which peace in the landlocked Afghanistan was a major precondition to be met. The US intended goal was to gain acceptance of the project from all the warring factions, which would allow the oil giant to commence its operations. In this scenario, the stakes were very high for the regional players, especially Iran, Russia and India. From the Russian perspective, any such project

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1004 (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 156)
1005 (Coll, Ghost Wars, 2004, pp. 302-305)
would reduce the grip it had maintained over the Central Asian Republics and their vast natural resources. It would also be unacceptable to Iran, as it did not favour any developmental effort, which sidelined the country in favour of Pakistan. Interestingly, these objectives coincided perfectly with those of India, whose prime motivation remained that Pakistan should not reap any strategic, political or economic rewards from the Afghan situation. Though, the US organized a first ever UN debate on Afghanistan in nearly six years on 10 April 1996, followed by Congressional Hearings in Washington from 25-27 June, there was no tangible outcome on the Afghan Issue. This initiative petered out for a variety of reasons, one being the election year in US itself, where no one was willing to embroil in the Afghan situation, so close to the elections. On the Pakistani side, the Government of Pakistan wasted this great opportunity for tangible gains, primarily due to the fact that their proxy, the Taliban displayed rigidity and inflexibility in dealing with opponents and potential allies. Even one of Pakistan’s longstanding allies, Gulbadin Hekmatyar went over to the other side, accepting the Prime Minister’s slot and a host of cabinet positions in June 1996. General Dostum also made truces with the Rabbani Government and allowed passage of transport on the strategic Salang Highway, linking the capital to the North.

**Taliban’s Success and Isolation of Pakistan Internationally.** The Taliban went on offensive in July 1996, with swift moves first towards Jalalabad and then towards Kabul. The head of Jalalabad militia, Haji Abdul Qadeer fled the city,
reportedly having been given a huge bribe for complicity. Following close on the Jalalabad victory, the Taliban moved straight onto Kabul and the advance guard entered the city on 26 September 1996. The first act of barbarism was against the deposed Afghan President Najibullah, who had been living in exile in the city since 1992, having handed over power to Rabbani and despatching his family to New Delhi. Ahmed Shah Masod retreated with his forces to his traditional base, the Panjsher Valley. There once again, he rebutted all attempts by the Taliban to dislodge him. Meanwhile the Taliban enforced their strict brand of Sharia on Kabul. By this time, the Taliban had alienated most of the Western and Muslim countries, primarily because of their skewed views about Islam, and their rigid interpretation, much to the detriment of Pakistan, who was their principal backer. As Abdul Satter points out.

“The narrow and extremist interpretation of Islam by the Taliban Chief who was proclaimed head of Muslims (Amir ul Muslimeen) offended even Muslim countries who felt mocked and humiliated by the Taliban parody of their great faith”

In October 1996, the UN Security Council joined the chorus of condemnation against Taliban. The Security Council condemned discrimination against women, an end to supply of arms form outside and resumption of political dialogue.

The discriminatory acts included banning all women and girls educational institutions and ordering all women to wear rids and desist from going to any jobs. The capture of Kabul by the Taliban was received with consternation by the Central Asian

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1007 (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 152)
1008 (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 153)
1009 (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 181)
Republics and the Shia supporters. The next year saw some bloody and treacherous battles for the strategic city of Mazar-e-Sharif. A stronghold of the Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the city was a major bastion of the anti-Taliban coalition with little affinity to the Pashtun dominated Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban offensive in 1997 took the city with the help of Dostum’s Deputy General Malik in May 1997\textsuperscript{1010}. There once again the Taliban’s lack of flexibility and unwillingness for power sharing resulted in alienation of Malik, who had helped them secure the city. In addition, the Taliban again tried to impose their own brand of Sharia on the modern, multiethnic city, a base to Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek communities, who shared little with the Taliban and the Pashtuns in terms of culture and traditions. The result was that within five weeks of the Taliban arrival in the city, the local population revolted against them. On 28 May 1997, they were ousted from the city, after losing more than 500 men in bloody fighting. This defeat also spurred other anti-Taliban forces, and they were once again pushed back from Bamyan Valley and Hazarajat by the resurgent Hazara tribesmen. The Taliban lost more than 3000 fighters, their worst defeat in the war so far\textsuperscript{1011}. As a response to this crisis, Madrassas were closed in Pakistan and bordering regions of Afghanistan and another crop of upto 5000 students rushed in to bolster the Taliban ranks. By this time, Pakistan had closed in ranks behind the Taliban, banking on them to be the country’s main proxy. On the northern borders of Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics, alarmed by the increasingly violent fighting on their borders, asked Russia to take [\textsuperscript{1010} (Jalalzai, Taliban and the Post Taliban Afghanistan, Terrorism, Al-Qaeeda and the Qila-e-Jhangi Massacre, 2003, p. 131) \\
\textsuperscript{1011} (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 138)]
over the responsibilities of border security. Close to 30,000 Russian troops took up positions on the Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmenistan borders with Afghanistan. Iran also stepped up its support to the anti Taliban coalition, flying in more than 22 flights a day, carrying arms and supplies\textsuperscript{1012}. In June 1997, the anti Taliban efforts coalesced in the shape of “United Islamic and National Front for Salvation of Afghanistan”. The coalition with Burhanuddin Rabbani as President and Ahmed Shah Masood as the Defence Minister, once again reasserted itself. They advanced to within 20 miles of Kabul and encircled the city from two directions. Bitter fighting ensued, in which both sides committed horrendous atrocities, killing prisoners in cold blood and exacerbating the divide between mainly Pashtun Taliban and their non-Pashtun opponents. The Taliban also resented fact that despite controlling bulk of the country, they were not permitted to occupy the Afghanistan seat in the UN. This was still held by Burhanuddin Rabbani, thus denying legitimacy to the Taliban. Similarly the only countries besides Pakistan, who had recognized the Taliban regime were the Saudis and UAE. Thus Pakistani protege lacked international legitimacy and wide acceptance, primarily due to their lack of tact, intransigence and an extremist ideology, totally in conflict with other ethnicities in the country. Due to its support to the Taliban, Pakistan Government had managed to create a very strong anti-Pakistan nexus, that included the usual partners India and Russia, but also more importantly, Iran and the Central Asian Republics. The Central Asian Republics feared the “aggressive designs” of the Taliban\textsuperscript{1013}. This was a major strategic setback, as Iran

\textsuperscript{1012} (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 138)
had traditionally been favourably poised towards Pakistan. Especially during the Shah period, the two countries had been members of the US alliance under the CENTO umbrella. The two countries were also members of RCD, along with Turkey. Subsequently, during the long Afghan Conflict, both countries had supported the Afghan resistance, albeit their own proposed Mujahideen groups. However, due to Taliban’s mistreatment of the Hazara minority, Iran was antagonized\textsuperscript{1014}.

**Courting Taliban – Pakistan’s Imperatives.** The rise of the Taliban offered Pakistan an opportunity to gain the kind of stability it was looking for, in order to reach the Central Asian Republics. Initially the US Government also welcomed this development\textsuperscript{1015}. The first convoy of vehicles bound for Central Asian Republics was led by General Nasirullah Babar himself, in October 1995. It was destined for Turkmenistan, having commenced its journey from the Pakistan’s border city of Quetta\textsuperscript{1016}. At this juncture, the American Ambassador to Pakistan John Monjo, was present at the border to see off the convoy. The Taliban were quite successful in helping this convoy reach its destination, despite numerous check posts and warring faction dominated areas enroute. At this point, the Burhanuddin Rabbani led Government in Kabul was seen in Pakistan as an extension of the Soviet – Indian nexus, that had dominated the scene in Kabul for the last so many years. Pakistan Government therefore whole heartedly supported the Taliban offensive. It is widely

\textsuperscript{1014} (Jalalzai, Taliban and the Post Taliban Afghanistan, Terrorism, Al-Qaeda and the Qila-e-Jhangi Massacre, 2003, p. 239)

\textsuperscript{1015} (Rais R. B., War Without Winner, 1994)

\textsuperscript{1016} (Jalalzai, Taliban and the Post Taliban Afghanistan, Terrorism, Al-Qaeda and the Qila-e-Jhangi Massacre, 2003, p. 239)
accepted that they received guidance and advice from the ISI. It is important to note that at this point of time, there appeared to be no major difference in the Pak-US Stance towards this group. In fact US was also looking for some stability in Afghanistan, which could allow exploitation and transportation of the vast gas reserves of Turkmenistan and other Central Asian Republics towards the South, i.e. Pakistan-India-Arabian Sea as opposed to the traditional routes, which passed through Russia. One such project under active consideration was the UNOCOL Gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan\textsuperscript{1017}. The US retracted its initial tacit approval of the Taliban. As far as Pakistan was concerned, this was the beginning of the parting of ways, that finally culminated in an ultimatum by Secretary of State Colin Powel, on the eve of the 9/11 bombings, when he asked Pakistan President Musharraf to decide “Are you with or against us”. However the five years between Taliban’s takeover and the Twin Tower destruction was a period in which the two countries gradually drifted apart in their approach towards Afghanistan. It is an important and strategic development, which had far reaching impact on the subsequent course of events in the region. Pakistan’s approach towards the Taliban takeover was much more positive than other regional countries. It was quick to recognize the regime. In fact besides Pakistan the only other countries to recognize the Taliban were Saudi Arabia and UAE. At this stage Pakistan’s security imperatives for recognition of the Taliban regime were quite evident. It had been part of the covert effort against communist backed regimes for the entire 80’s decade. Pakistan had suffered economically and

\textsuperscript{1017} (Jalalzai, Taliban and the Post Taliban Afghanistan, Terrorism, Al-Qaeda and the Qila-e-Jhangi Massacre, 2003, p. 250), (Dobbs, 28 September 1996)
politically, by taking on the Soviet Union’s enmity and associated problems of a civil war in its immediate neighbourhood. The huge influx of Afghan refugees, which were over 3 million, had put an enormous burden on the country’s economy, as well as the law and order situation. A commonly used term “Kalashnikov Culture”\textsuperscript{1018}, which implied free and abundant availability of guns and drugs, and associated ills of crime and lawlessness were a direct outcome of this conflict\textsuperscript{1019}. In addition Pakistan Government had allowed mushrooming and massive funding to different religious organizations, which had grown in strength and nuisance, in the garb of supporting the Afghan Jihad. The polarization of the country on sectarian lines and rise of inter sect rivalry was also an indirect outcome of this loosely controlled environment. The tribal areas of Pakistan, already nominally under government control, were now hotbeds of Madrassas, foreign fighters, abundant weapons and turf of different competing groups and intelligence agencies. This environment was a sure recipe for troubles ahead, as a massive potential for mischief and unrest lay in existence\textsuperscript{1020}.

**Taliban Consolidate in Afghanistan.** By the middle of 1998, Taliban had consolidated their hold on Afghanistan. They had even captured the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, the traditional stronghold of General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Uzbek commander. In the Hazara areas, they had ousted the Shias from Bamyan. The only military commander still in a position to resist their relentless onslaught was the

\textsuperscript{1018} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 185), (Naqvi, Pakistan at the Kmie’s Edege, 2010, p. 89)  
\textsuperscript{1019} (Weaver, 2002, p. 251)  
\textsuperscript{1020} (Naqvi, Pakistan at the Kmie’s Edege, 2010, p. 89)
resilient Ahmed Shah Masood. Holed up once again in his traditional stronghold, the
Panjsher Valley, he remained the only viable military force in the country. However
as it is said that politics makes strange bedfellows, now the same Ahmed Shah
Masood, who had been a constant irritant for the Russians, throughout their presence
in Afghanistan, was turning out to be their most reliable ally. He emerged as the only
commander on which both the Russians and Indians could pin their hopes, for
safeguarding their interests in Afghanistan. As the ISI backed Taliban consolidated
their position, the issue of Taliban nexus with the radical Arab groups, operating
terror networks in other countries, became more serious. The rise of the Taliban gave
hitherto a new dimension to the prevailing situation. Power now shifted from the
likes of Gulbadin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and other warlords of the Afghan
Jihad, to the more rigid, fundamentalist Taliban, whose fanaticism, and fixed ideas
about religion and governance was at odds with most of the other groups. While
Pakistan Government supported the Taliban, new dilemma soon arose. This was the
issue of Arab terrorist groups, using their links with the Taliban, and the space
provided by the lawlessness in Afghanistan.

Taliban’s Connection with Extremists in Pakistan. There is yet another
worth noting sinister connection between the Taliban and the Sunni extremist group
from Pakistan. The “Sipah-e-Sahaba” an anti Shia group in Pakistan, was part of the
party rolling into Mazar-e-Sharif, where they not only killed local Shia Hazaras, but
also had the audacity to round up and kill eleven diplomats of the Iranian government.
This was “after” Iran had asked Pakistan to ensure protection of their diplomats, as
they knew that Pakistani advisors would be accompanying the marauding Taliban. Though the Iranians had been openly supporting the anti Taliban forces; providing them with advice, arms and ammunition, yet the massacre did not conform to the established norms of fighting. Even though Pakistan was not directly responsible, it further strained the already declining relationship between the two countries.

The dangers of “Talibanization” or at least radicalisation of Pakistan was itself syntase downplayed by those incharge of the Afghan policy. With a burgeoning population, poor economic growth, social injustice and wide gap between the corrupt elite and poor common man, the conditions could not be better for the cause that the Taliban style leadership conveyed. The new kind of “Sharia and Islamic laws-were, and are enough to sway large segment of Muslims, who do not read into the other ills associated with the fundamental and extreme brand of Islam propagated by these radicals.

Taliban’s Influence Spreads in Pakistan. The policy also unleashed new radicals from within Pakistan. In 1995, Maulana Sufi Muhammad took control of the Swat airport and some parts of the valley, with thousands of his Taliban style militants, asking for enforcement of “Sharia Law”. It was after a division level Frontier Corps military operation, that Pakistan Government was able to retake the valley. Much credit for achieving this victory, goes to Major General Fazl-e-Ghafoor, a very shrewd and intelligent commander of the Frontier Corps, who exploited the
terrain and understood the psyche of the troubled valley\textsuperscript{1021}. Similarly within Pakistan there was growing tensions between Shia’s and Sunni groups. Some of the most violent and militant Sunni outfits like Sipah-e-Sahaba, and Lashkar-e-Jangvi spread intolerance and violence in the country. They had strong connections with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Thus as the handlers of Pakistan’s Kashmir and Afghan policy harboured visions of greatness, the country was descending into chaos, fast losing its relevance to an erstwhile supporter, the US. Not only was it becoming irrelevant but increasingly, Pakistan was becoming part of the problem related to the global Islamic terrorism, now closely being associated with Osama Bin Laden, and his hosts the Taliban. It is therefore not surprising that on the eve of September 11, 2001, Pakistan found itself on the wrong side of international sentiment and asked to make the toughest of choices “Are you with us or against us”\textsuperscript{1022}. Even uncharitable remarks, attributed to Richard Armitage, while asking Pakistan’s President Musharraf to decide were that “The US would turn the country (Pakistan) to Stone Age if it did not cooperate in the war against Taliban\textsuperscript{1023}. The Pakistan policy on Afghanistan, commencing with the 1995 support to Taliban and thereafter continuing to support them, even as they lost international recognition and credibility landed the country in a most awkward position in 2001. This problem was further compounded by Pakistan’s inability to read the growing strength of global Jihadis, based in Afghanistan, who could bring negative attention and severe criticism into the entire Afghan policy. By letting Pakistan’s Kashmir struggle “intermingle” with these

\textsuperscript{1021} (Interview with General Ghafoor, September 1995)
\textsuperscript{1022} (“Jonathan Schell, “Pakistan, Bush and the Bomb”, 15 November 2007)
\textsuperscript{1023} (“We’ll Bomb you to Stone Age, US told Pakistan”, 22 September 2006)
unsavoury elements, Pakistan also set the stage for eventual condemnation of the entire Kashmiri struggle as a terrorist activity. However, most importantly, the covert operations emboldened and strengthened new power groups and militants within Pakistan, jeopardizing the country’s own integrity and long term cohesion\(^{1024}\). In the period after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988, leading up to the September 11, 2001 bombing of the Twin Tower in New York, the Pak-US security relationship moved from a most intimate and well coordinated effort to a point where both the partners were having divergent strategic objectives.

**Supporting Taliban – Pakistan’s International Isolation Increased.**

Pakistan found itself increasingly isolated in relation to its Afghanistan Policy\(^{1025}\). As a result of the Tanzania and Kenya bombings, the Saudi Government, which had been the only major Taliban supporter, also withdrew its staff from the country and terminated all funding for the regime. As a further blow to the Taliban, UN Security Council passed a resolution on 8 December 1998, threatening to impact tough sanctions against the fundamentalist regime for harbouring international terrorists, and violating the basic rights of women and condemned the Taliban regime. It also chided the Taliban for their intransigence in accepting a ceasefire\(^{1026}\). The Taliban did hold talks with Ahmed Shah Masood in Ashkhabad, the capital of Turkmenistan in March 1999. However these talks were inconclusive, as both parties only used the period to prepare for the forthcoming battles. Masood opened the offensive and

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\(^{1024}\) (Weaver, 2002, p. 251)

\(^{1025}\) (Jalazia, 2004, p. 270)

\(^{1026}\) (Rashid A., Taliban, 2000, p. 165)
recaptured Bamyan. The Taliban counterattacked, and in a pattern now becoming all too familiar, a large number of civilians were killed. The fighting continued in the year 2000, as the battle lines moved to and fro with little signs of any relief to the helpless population caught in the crossfire. One thing was quite evident. The troubles in Afghanistan showed little signs of subsiding. The fissures in the Afghan society had widened in the years following the rise of the Taliban. Pakistan, through its short sighted policy of supporting this single group in the mid-nineties had brought itself to an end where it had run out of better choices. All its allies of the Cold War were now unfavourably poised. The US wanted Pakistan to influence the Taliban in handing over terror suspects. In addition to official contacts at Government level, David Schroen, the CIA station Chief, met ISI Chief General Zia ud Din, asking him to step up action against Bin Laden. The CIA suspected that Pakistan intelligence agencies were in co-operation with Bin Laden on Kashmir cause and on the agenda of defeating Ahmed Shah Masood 1027. Iran was completely alienated, thanks to the Taliban’s faulty religious beliefs and their mistreatment of the Hazaras and Shia population 1028. Saudi Arabia had become vary due to the Arab terrorist factor, now becoming a major concern. On the internal front, unknowingly, the ISI and Pakistani establishment had opened up a Pandora box by funding and supporting Madrassa students from the tribal areas. As they grew in power and influence, the fragile power balance in the tribal areas of Pakistan, suddenly shifted from the traditional Maliks to the Mullahs and the Taliban commanders. With little ingress and even less influence

1027 (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 440)
1028 (Jalazia, 2004, p. 270)
in these traditionally wild and unruly areas, these developments were alarming and very threatening for the future peace and security of Pakistan itself. Yet at the initial stage, when the country was involved in two major covert efforts in Afghanistan and Kashmir, there was no stable and firm hand at the helm of affairs. Pakistan had entered into a “musical chair” of Prime Minister’s with a governments in less then a decade. As Ahmed Rashad puts it “with such deep crisis of identity, political legitimacy, economic mismanagement social polarization, the elite had nevertheless indulged in the worst example of imperial overstrike by any third world country in the latter half of this century. A major flaw, in the Afghan policy of Pakistan was that it did not, relate to the interests of USA or any of the major players. Without capacity for pursuing such a costly undertaking on its own, and without adequate internal safeguards to prevent the flames of fundamentalism, (now being exported) from engulfing its own cities and towns, Pakistan was playing a very dangerous game indeed.

**Taliban Divide Pak – US Strategic Interests.** From a US-Pakistan security relationship perspective, Taliban stood about to be a divisive factor, as their influence and power grew in Afghanistan. Three questions are important in this regard.

1. What were the imperatives for the Pakistani government to back the Taliban?

2. Why did the US not support the Taliban, which essentially were the product of the same Jehad’ war machine, set up by CIA in collusion with the ISI?
3. Why did Pakistan Government not influence Taliban for a more balanced policy, specifically in relation to support to Arab Extremists?

The answer to the first question, is the relative vacuum in strategic direction of the Afghan policy in Pakistan, as well as the incremental nature of association of Pakistani establishment with the Taliban, as they grew in influence and power. It appears that the sudden rise of Taliban even surprised their most ardent supporters in ISI and Pakistan. It is also evident that the Afghan policy of the Pakistan Government was largely defined by the ISI, whose prolonged involvement with the covert effort had conditioned and restricted its objectives to gaining control of Kabul, regardless of the means of achieving this end and its wider strategic and political implication.\textsuperscript{1029}

When asked about Pakistan’s policy in Afghanistan, one commented that it was in a totally wrong direction and expressed his surprise as to why Pakistan was continuing to support Taliban. The contention here is that Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan, in the specific context of Taliban’s rise to power, lacked strategic direction and vision. The fact that there was no US involvement in any significant manner meant that Pakistan was basically doing it alone, thus increasing the chances of policy conflict in the succeeding years. These are also clear indications that Pakistani establishment was tempted to use the Jehadi network for training and manpower support to the Kashmir insurgency. Though the Government of Pakistan did not concede to this assertion, yet there were credible intelligence reports that non-governmental religious organizations had links across the border, in Afghanistan and were working with the Afghan guerrilla groups for training to fight both in Kashmir and in Afghanistan. One

\textsuperscript{1029} (Talk by Dr Maleeha Lodhi at Command and Staff College Quetta, 1999)
classical example in support to Harkat-ul-Ansar, a group declared as terrorist by US, with links to both Usama Bin Laden and Kashmir freedom movement. The group was declared as a terrorist organization by the US in 1998, after a spate of terrorist attacks\textsuperscript{1030} and killings of westerners in Kashmir. It then changed its name to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. Its prominent leader, Masood Azhar, was released by India, after a hijacking of Indian Airline, which was orchestrated by the group. The exchange took place at Kandahar Airport\textsuperscript{1031}. An other person linked to the group was Ahmed Omar Sheikh, who later gained notoriety, when convicted of the murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist. This aspect had sinister fallout, not appreciated and considered at the time. Basically, by jumping together in the two efforts, Pakistan had brought in all the negative aspects of the Afghan situation, into the Kashmir freedom movement. Thus at a later stage, when one (Afghanistan) was discredited, the other (Kashmir) had also to be abandoned by Pakistan. This happened in the wake of the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001. Since the global environment had changed radically after the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York, the Kashmir freedom movement was also seen in a negative light. Audacious attacks on a sovereign country’s parliament thus, received widespread condemnation. At this stage the major flaw in Pakistan’s Afghan and Kashmir policy, i.e. tacit reliance on Jehadi organizations for achieving state objectives, was fully exposed and discredited. President Musharraf had to come on National TV and denounce “Terrorism”, a repudiation of the entire Kashmir policy, which had relied heavily on private parties to go inside Kashmir and participate in the

\textsuperscript{1030} (Rashid A., Chaos, 2008, p. 113)
\textsuperscript{1031} (Weaver, 2002, p. 251)
Kashmir’s resistance\textsuperscript{1032}. This “U-turn” though politically expedient at the time, left Pakistan with a new headache, i.e now to pacify and dismantle the huge covert operations infrastructure; establishment with the assistance of intelligence agencies for more than two decades. This is a problem that the country is still grappling with, today and is a major source of concern in the US-Pakistan strategic relationship. This brings us back to the basic question. Why did Pakistan support Taliban?

It appears that the frustration of years of fruitless support to the squabbling warlords had brought the Pakistani government to the point that they wanted anyone who could break the logjam. It is also quite apparent the in an unstable political environment, where Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto were busy trying to oust the other one from power, the Pakistani political hierarchy lacked the vision and the capacity to handle such complex and intricate undertaking. It was thus left largely in the hands of those who had been already dealing with it, the ISI. Taliban were a product of the joint CIA-ISI manoeuvrings of the earlier decade. Their sudden rise and seemingly miraculous victories thrilled supporters in Pakistan.

The Pakistan Government’s decision to recognize the Taliban in 1997 was not received well by the international community. Though one justification, given by the policymakers was that Pakistan needed to conduct business with the party controlling a huge chunk of Afghanistan\textsuperscript{1033}, yet this act put Pakistan in an awkward position. This act alienated Pakistan from all the other major ethnic minorities of Afghanistan, namely the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. As Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s veteran diplomat

\textsuperscript{1032} (Kale, 2009, pp. 296-297)

\textsuperscript{1033} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 246)
recalls “As the only friend of Taliban, Pakistan was blamed for their policies”\textsuperscript{1034}. This single decision alienated Pakistan from almost all the regional countries, including Iran and central Asian States of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The major international organizations including UN, OIC and ECO did not recognize the Taliban, adding additional pressure onto Pakistan.

It is also important to note that Taliban, despite Pakistan’s financial, military and moral support, defied all expectations of cooperation. They were in fact involved indirectly in exacerbating Pakistan’s internal fissures by regular contacts with extremist and fundamentalist parties, even giving refuge to criminals and terrorists, who crossed over into Afghanistan\textsuperscript{1035}. Transparency International declared Pakistan as the second most corrupt country in the world in 1999\textsuperscript{1036}.

\textbf{“Public Opinion versus Government Policies”}. The security calculus of Pakistan is shaped not only by its external threat dynamics but also in a large measure, by its domestic political environment. As Dr Wirsing highlights that “Pakistan’s domestic political weaknesses have compounded the problem by making the country less appealing to its allies”\textsuperscript{1037}. This complicated the process of formulation and subsequent pursuance of a long-time strategic security policies for the country. Pakistan’s inability to capitalize on Korean war, by sending in troops for the UN Mission, and similarly in 1990 Gulf War to capitalize on an opportunity to gain

\textsuperscript{1034} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 227)
\textsuperscript{1035} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007)
\textsuperscript{1036} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 228)
political and economic mileage by contributing to the coalition, once a lot to this compulsion. Even during the current war in Afghanistan, there is a large segment of the population that has remained vocal and vociferous in opposing the Government policies. This includes the fairly prominent politicians and parties’ leader like Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s Jamaat-i-Islami and Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf.

**Taliban View on Human Right – New Source of Concern in West.**

Taliban’s viscidity, especially with regards to the treatment of women, endeared them to none. In September 1997, the Taliban police arrested and detained for three hours, the European Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs, Emma Borino and her group of 18 while on a tour of female hospital wards funded by the EU\(^\text{1038}\). The treatment of women alone was enough to alienate Taliban in major western capitals. In a world pudlly amenable to gender equality and female right, such behaviour stood out at complete divergence with widely accepted world-views. Similar views were expressed by Madeline Albright, the US Secretary of State, during a visit to Pakistan in November 1997 “We are opposed to Taliban because of their opposition to human rights and their despicable treatment of women and children and great lack of respect for human dignity”. This statement was a clear indication of the divergence in views between US and Pakistan on the issue of supporting the Taliban. Even in Pakistan the intelligence was not 100% favourably poised towards these barbaric fighters, who within a short span of three years had presented a perverted, and widely condemned brand of religion, and in the process alienated themselves from both East and West, a

\(^{1038}\) (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 176)
rose feat. In the process, more importantly for Pakistan, it was left supporting an ally, which had become increasingly unpopular, and had failed to deliver the single most important objective in Afghanistan, which was establishment of peace and security. Only this could also to Pakistan to reap the economic benefits of access to the Central Asian Republics. Instead, Pakistan was confronted with the unenviable choice of supporting a regime which had very little acceptability and which carried with it some additional negative baggage, that was becoming more evident by the day. This was the support and provision of sanctuary to Arab and Middle Eastern Fundamentalist groups, whose activities in their native countries and in other parts of the world was attracting the attention of the US Government and affected nations.

**UN Role in Mediation.** The UN also tried its hand in mediation. Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Brahimi, a veteran UN representative to negotiate a settlement between Taliban and their opponents in August-September 1997, after a hectic shuttle diplomacy, involving Afghanistan's six neighbouring countries (Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, China) plus the US and Russian. The Brahimi mission urged all the parties to stop fuelling the conflict. A report on the issue to the Security Council, by Secretary General Kofi Annan, severely criticised Pakistan and Iran for fomenting the conflict. However, instead of moving towards consensus and reconciliation, the Taliban embarked upon an aggressive strategy to conquer the remaining portion of the country. They had laid siege to Bamayan, the traditional stronghold of the Hazara community. Once again both the opposing sides were stocked up with more weapons, and equipment by their
respective backers. In July 1998, the Taliban, once again marched towards the Dostum stronghold of Mazar-e-Sharif. Fighting and bribing their way to the city, the Taliban spared no opponent, unleashing brutality on the Uzbeks and Hazaras, in revenge for the killings inflicted in the past years. During this brutal, inhumane warfare, all laws of warfare and Islamic injunctions of compassion and mercy to the defeated were put aside by the Taliban. Even after brutal killings and massacre, the corpses were not allowed to be buried. (This tactics would be again on display in the tribal areas of Pakistan, a decade later, much to the dismay of Pakistan’s establishment, which had supported and perpetuated these barbaric, ill educated and misguided zealots). The massacre was followed by such unreasonable demands to the Shia community as “Convert to Sunni Islam, Leave for Shia Iran, or Die”1039.

**Taliban and Arab Terrorist – Nexus Source of Divergence in US – Pakistan Relationship.** From the perspectives of Pak US Security Relationship the signs of a developing terrorist threat from these regions, involving the remnants of struggle against Soviet occupation, were visible very early. As the US assumed the role of pre-eminent global power, in the aftermath of collapse of Soviet Union, criticism of its policies in the Middle East especially the outright support to Israel increased rapidly in the Muslim World. At this juncture, many of the extremist groups, who had been taken rigorously to the Afghan Jihad, setting up bases inside tribal areas of Pakistan and in Afghanistan looked towards the US as an enemy. The hotbed attempt to bring down the World Trade Centre in 1993 and the bombing of

1039 (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 156)
Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan in 1995, all were linked to foreign extremist groups, based in, or having links with groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As the intelligence about these activities piled up, the US administration became increasingly concerned about the lawless tribal areas and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which was becoming synonymous with the terrorist threat against the US. The Pakistan and US strategic partnership which had waned in the years after the Soviet withdrawal, now turned into a more serious strategic gulf, where Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, was at tangent to the US strategic interests in the region. This gulf widened, as the links between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda became more apparent in the coming years. Thus Pakistan’s support to Taliban, in the hope of achieving a stable environment in Afghanistan, was linked with an undesirable element. This was the Taliban’s links and hospitality extended to Al-Qaeda and related organisations, whose lodging in Afghanistan was parochial. They harboured a global terrorist agenda, specifically targeting the US, which was bound to bring Pakistan into confrontation with the superpower at some point of time.

The US Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited Pakistan in November 1997. In this visit Pak-US differences over different issues were quite evident. One important aspect where the US did not share Pakistan’s perception was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Madeline Albright, during a visit to one of the Afghan refugees camp near Peshawar, openly criticized the Taliban for their treatment of women.

**Al-Qaeda – The New Scrouge for Pakistan.** The name, Osama Bin Laden suddenly cropped up in the media. His name was associated with a number of terrorist
attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Interestingly Osama Bin Laden was himself product of CIA’s effort to garner support from amongst the Arab countries, for the war against Soviets in the 1980’s. He had found a safe haven in the Taliban led Afghanistan, where they had allowed him sanctuary and complete freedom to carry out planning and training for his extremist agenda. One of the major initiatives of the Afghan War, by CIA and ISI, was to recruit Muslim radicals from around the globe and bring them to Pakistan – Afghanistan to participate in the Afghan Jihad. This was an opportunity for many radicals to full fill their cherished dream of Jihad against infidels. Radical organizations like Muslim Brotherhood, World Muslim Leage etc sent their cadres, who were received and trained by ISI and Jamaat-e-Islami with major funding coming from Saudi Arabia\textsuperscript{1040}. It is estimated that the number of foreign fighters mushroomed in the period between 1981 and 1992 to almost 30,000. These included Yemenis, Qatari’s, Jordanians, Sudanese, amongst others. As many as 5000 had been invited by Jamait-e-Islami\textsuperscript{1041}. They were from all over the Muslim world. Osama Bin Laden, a scion of one of the strong and influential families of Saudi Arabia, had also been brought as part of this global jihad. He returned to Saudi Arabia in 1992. The Gulf War, which saw a huge influx of US military in Saudi Arabia, and a permanent presence even after the conflict terminated, riled the radical Bin Laden. He was a staunch opponent of the US presence on Saudi soil and caused for removal of these alien troops from the holy land. He did not have much headway and in 1992, went to the unstable Sudan, where he found much more

\textsuperscript{1040} (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 138)
\textsuperscript{1041} (Rana, 2010)
condusive environment for his radical ideas. In Sudan, Bin Laden’s organizations became more viable, as many of the veterans of the Afghan War and now practically castouts in their own countries, joined him. In 1994, he was described by the New York Times as “a wealthy Saudi financier who bankrolls Islamic Militant groups from Algeria to Saudi Arabia”\textsuperscript{1042}. By 1996, Bin Laden was back in Afghanistan under the patronage of newly emerging Taliban, comfortably settled in Jalalabad. By now he had links with Islamic fundamentalist movements in all the Muslim world trouble spots, including Yemen, Somalia, Egypt and Sudan, besides Afghanistan\textsuperscript{1043}. By 1998, the Bin Laden tirades against US involvement in Iraq and its policies in the Middle East were becoming more potent and vibrant. In 1998 he issued a Fatwa to kill the Americans and British\textsuperscript{1044} (During his years of exile from 1991-1996, in Sudan, he is reported to have placed all his wealth, reported to be around $300 million dollars, at the disposal of militant groups). The US offered a $5 million reward for his capture in November 1998. After the Tomahawk attacks, the US administration’s attention on Bin Laden increased sharply. In Yemen, the kidnapping of 16 western tourists was attributed to Bin Laden, 1998\textsuperscript{1045}. There were also reports of Bin Laden’s group being involved in fomenting unrest in Algeria, where the violence suddenly sparked in the aftermath of the victory by Islamic Salvation Front, which was denied by the Algerian Government. Even in Bangladesh, the Government accused in February 1999 that a fundamentalist group named Harkat-ul-Jihad, had links with Osama Bin Laden and

\textsuperscript{1042} (New York Times, 4 September 2007)
\textsuperscript{1043} (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 177)
\textsuperscript{1044} (24 January 2000, p. 32)
\textsuperscript{1045} (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 177)
wanted to introduce Taliban style rule in Bangladesh. The real crunch came onto Pakistan Government, which was by now under increasing US pressure to rein in the Taliban and assist in apprehension of Bin Laden. The assertion, that Bin Laden was indirectly involved in Kashmir Jihad, by funding and training the Harkat-ul-Ansar, a Kashmiri freedom group, essentially of Pakistani origin, further complicated the situation for Pakistan\textsuperscript{1046}. Taliban not interested in peace at all, and showed little interest in governance on rebuilding\textsuperscript{1047}. The understanding in Washington was that guerrillas for fighting the proxy war in Kashmir were also selected from the same talent pool of JUI seminaries “Madrassas”, which were supplying fighters for the Taliban against the Rabbani - Masud Alliance. Thus the apparent collaboration between Bin Laden, Taliban and ISI was based on their own respective motives. It is also asserted that the ISI, in order to avoid detection by Indians, placed some of the training camps for Kashmir struggle, in Afghanistan. The same training camps were used by Bin Laden for his preparations for an Islamic Jihad against the US and its allies\textsuperscript{1048}. In an interview with renowned Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yousafzai for the Time Magazine in January 1999, the Al-Qaeda leader accepted that he had ordered attack on the US targets worldwide “If the instigation for Jihad against the Jews and the Americans in order to liberate the Holy Ka’aba has never been under west’s influence considered a crime, then let history be witness that I am a criminal”. More embarrassingly for Pakistan, he clearly accepted having links with certain segments in the Pakistan’s intelligence community, he condemned the government in

\textsuperscript{1046} (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 441) \textsuperscript{1047} (Shifferdecker) \textsuperscript{1048} (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 441)
general, remarking “some government departments (Pakistani) fall into the infidel trap, we pray to God that they return to the right path”\textsuperscript{1049}. As they were fearful of the experience of his close connections with some of the members of the Royal Family. When Mullah Omar refused to accede to Prince Turki AL Faisal’s request for handing over Bin Laden, they preferred to withdraw their financial and political support to Taliban, and suspended their diplomatic relations with the regime.

\textbf{Pakistan’s Limited Leverage over Afghanistan.} In case of Pakistan it was not as simple, Afghanistan remained a neighbour and Pakistan could not simply disassociate itself. It was also becoming quite evident by now that Pakistan and US strategic interests were moving in a divergent direction. The Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy, largely dependent on fuelling homegrown insurgency through trained fighters from within Pakistan, depended largely on the contributions made by the same groups which were supported by the ISI. Some had links with the Taliban and some like Harkat-ul-Ansar even trained at the same place as Bin Laden’s other fighters. Thus it was very difficult for the ISI to wind up one part of the infrastructure, without adversely affecting the others. The fact that Taliban, despite getting military aid, financial support and logistic backup from Pakistan, still did not accept the directions of the Pakistan’s establishment. They maintained a headstrong approach, while extracting maximum benefits from Pakistan. The basis of this attitude is well explained by Ahmed Rashid.

\textsuperscript{1049} (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 138)
“The Taliban’s deep connection to Pakistani state institutions, political parties, Islamic groups, the Madrassas network, the drug mafia, the business and transport group came at a time when Pakistan’s power structure was unravelling and fragmented. That served the Taliban who were not beholden to any lobby such as the ISI. Whereas in the 1980’s Mujahideen leaders had exclusive relationships with the ISI and the Jamaat-e-Islami, they had no links with other political and economic lobbies. In contrast the Taliban had access to influential lobbies and groups in Pakistan more than most Pakistanis”\textsuperscript{1050}.

By trying to wage costly proxy wars in both the neighbouring countries simultaneously, at a time when Pakistan was without the backing and support of the US, the Pakistani establishment, particularly the ISI had created a massive strategic dilemma for Pakistan. Far from achieving any tangible gains, this short sighted, policy had fractured the country internally, creating many strong entities within the country, which were militarized, well funded and retained an almost semi-independent status. The level of ingress into the society had reached a point, where in bakeries and shops one would find boxes for contributions to various Mujahideen outfits. Their boards and placards adorned many markets. Many non-descript religious scholars and leaders of the past, were now a price in themselves, moving with huge entourages of tinted SUV’s and armed bodyguards. In an urge to gain success in Kashmir and

\textsuperscript{1050} (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 189)
Afghanistan, the establishment had badly exposed the Pakistan society to militant inferences, and shadow organizations.\footnote{Personal Observation}

The Taliban exploited this self-created vulnerability of the Pakistani Government. By providing bases for the training of Kashmiri Mujahideen, they could easily rebuff many other rational demands, with full appreciation that Pakistan needed their support to continue Kashmir insurgency. This self created vulnerability was a direct outcome of Pakistan’s vague and often little controlled Kashmir policy, that relied heavily on the ISI. It appears that tactical considerations and the short term gains of being down hundreds of thousands of Indian troops in the Kashmir valley, far outweighed other important strategic considerations. Since there are no authentic documents available on this part of Pakistan’s decision making process, one can conclude from the chain of events that Pakistani policies on Afghanistan and Kashmir lacked strategic direction. “Pakistan became a victim, not only of its strategic vision but of its own intelligence agencies”\footnote{Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, p. 180}. Could Pakistan afford to let a major chunk of its population get radicalized and militarized, without looking into the long-term consequences for the internal stability and cohesion of the country, defies common sense. It is also mind boggling that Pakistan Government allowed the ISI to establish training camps in Afghanistan, under Bin Laden’s tutelage, thereby practically guaranteeing US opposition\footnote{Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 441} and ultimately torpedoing the entire Kashmir cause. Tactical decisions in Kashmir and Afghanistan, forced the Pakistan’s Government’s hands at the strategic level. Visions of an Islamic Government in Afghanistan, and an
insurgency that would consume India in Kashmir, harboured by the veterans of ISI and the establishment\(^{1054}\), overlooked the changing global environment where the room for proxy wars was shrinking rapidly. They also glossed over the critical facts that it was not Pakistan alone, but the might of a superpower, USA, that had enabled victory in the Afghan War against the Soviets.

**US Strike at Bin Laden’s Camp 1998 – Pakistan Under pressure.**

The Clinton Administration, in August 1998, retaliated against Osama Bin Laden, by launching Tomahawk Cruise Missile Strikes on his suspected training camps in Afghanistan, from their ships stationed in the Persian Gulf.

It was in the same time frame that the activities of another Taliban “guest”. Osama Bin Laden, gained prominence internationally. The two US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were simultaneously targeted in August 1998, by Al-Qaeeda operatives. The death toll was 224. Though Bin Laden was not hurt in the attack, but Pakistan was embarrassed, as many of those killed in the attacks were Pakistani and Afghan Mujahideen training for the Jihad in Afghanistan\(^ {1055} \). President Clinton’s statement on the CNN was quite explicit “There will be no sanctuary for terrorists”. He commented that these attacks, launched simultaneously against suspected terrorist bases in Sudan and Afghanistan were part of “a long ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism”\(^ {1056} \). The US Defence Secretary, William Cohen commented that the camps were being run to train hundreds if not thousand of “terrorists”. The Taliban

\(^{1054}\) (Rashid A., Chaos, 2008, p. 111)  
\(^{1055}\) (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 441)  
\(^ {1056}\) (CNN.20, August 1998)
denounced this strike, reiterated that they would not hand over Bin Laden and termed the attack as a reflection of the “enimity” towards the Afghan people. Thus, with Bin Laden’s actions, Pakistan’s complete Afghan and Kashmir strategies were maligned in one go. What India had been professing all along i.e the insurgency in Kashmir was Pakistan sponsored, and with its bases in Afghanistan, gained acceptability in the US decision making circles\textsuperscript{1057}. Not only this but it has also coincided the US and the Indian strategic interests in the region, to the detriment of Pakistan, hereafter, instead of gaining any political or strategic mileage from its Taliban connections, the Pakistan Government was forced onto the defensive, being asked repeatedly to moderate the stance of its proxy regime in Kabul and being asked to convince the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden and his associates. Since Taliban resisted these demands, Pakistan’s relations were further strained with the US on the issue. It also practically sealed the fate of the Kashmir struggle, as now even the US, which had been objecting to Pakistan’s involvement earlier, but in a subdued manner, became more vocal and forceful in demanding from Pakistan, the winding up of terrorists infrastructure. The missile strikes, instead of softening the Taliban stance, seemed to have further cemented the bond between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda\textsuperscript{1058}. The US intelligence turned this new development an “unsettling triangle” between “Harkat-ul-Ansar” a Kashmir Liberation Group based in Pakistan, the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The US embassy in Pakistan claimed that both the Harkat-ul-Ansar and Bin Laden, granted sanctuary

\textsuperscript{1057} (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 441)  
\textsuperscript{1058} (1998 Missile strikes on Bin Laden may have Backfired. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No 253. 20 August 2008)
inside Afghanistan, had established terrorist camps inside Afghanistan\textsuperscript{1059}. The Taliban, instead of reconciliation, launched another massive attack on Bamyan, the Hazara stronghold, which fell to them in September 1998. In yet another act of religious and political insensitivity, the Taliban blew up the heads of 2000 years old Bhudda Statues, carved in the mountains. It was a great historical and archaeological loss, as these were revered by Bhuddists around the world. So now in addition to the neighbours, the Taliban also managed to alienate such far away nations as Japan.

The Tomahawk Strikes on Bin laden’s bases in Afghanistan were unable to get the leader himself but caused quite a commotion within Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pakistan Government was put at ease, at the nick of time, by the US Vice Chairman Joint Chief’s of Staff General Ralston who was despatched by the US Administration to allay Pakistani fears about missiles flying over southern territory on their way to Jalalabad. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif hurriedly denounced the strikes, but in actual Pakistan could do little. Apparently, the Pakistan’s Government was unable to influence the Taliban or the US in any meaningful way. This aspect stood out as a source of strain in the relationship, as Pakistan, by aligning itself with the Taliban regime and providing them formal recognition, had in a way been held responsible for their actions. Another aspect of strain in the relationship was the understanding, now taking root in US administration, that there was a nexus between the Taliban, Al-Qaeeda and the Pakistan based groups, who were involved in the Kashmir freedom struggle. This inability of the Pakistan Government, to delink Kashmir freedom struggle from the Afghan Conflict, especially the Al Qaeeda network was very

\textsuperscript{1059} (US Embassy, February 6, 1997)
crucial. Though at the time this did not figure out significantly, yet the Indian rhetoric was creating effects in the decision making circles at Washington. At the strategic level, Pakistan’s core security concerns, ie a stable government in Afghanistan and keeping the Kashmir issue alive, were both drifting away from the developing thought in Washington. This could spell disaster for the carefully crafted, long term effort, put in by Pakistan. Pakistan had invested a lot in these two efforts, but it appears that the Government and decision makers were out of Signe with the developments at the strategic level. Cross border infiltration into Kashmir and its linkages with Afghanistan, was increasingly under the US scrutiny. The linkage of the Kashmir movement with Bin Laden and Arab extremist groups tainted the cause substantially. The Taliban further alienated by themselves by continuing to resists all calls for Bin Laden’s handover. In the process Pakistan Government also came under increasing pressure. In a visit to the US in 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif faced tough questions when he visited White House\textsuperscript{1060}.

**The Controversy over Pakistan’s Missile Program.** Another issue of controversy between the US and Pakistan in the early nineties was Pakistan’s missile program. The Indians had been making good strides in this field and Pakistan, obliged to counter this developing threat, worked towards achieving a credible response. At this juncture, the US and Pakistan interest again saw a diverging trend. Since Pakistan did not at the time enjoy any special relationship, it was subject to close scrutiny of its missile program, and in 1991, Pakistan was confronted with charges that it was

\textsuperscript{1060} (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 431)
developing missile technology, based on Chinese M-11 missiles. As per the Missile Technology Control Regime the export of such a technology, which involved missile capable of going beyond 300 kilometers, and able to carry a payload of over 500 kg, was prohibited. Although both China and Pakistan were not signatories of the treaty, yet as per US laws, they could be subject to sanctions, if found in violation of the treaty. The US Government imposed sanctions on Chinese and Pakistani firms\textsuperscript{1061}. These sanctions remained in force till February 1992, when the US Government lifted them, apparently after receiving confirmation from the Chinese that the terms of MTCR were not being violated. In a meeting in July 1993, with Chinese Foreign Minister, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned of sanction against China if it continued to supply Pakistan with missile technology. This warning was soon followed up by actual sanctions on August 25, 1993. This was a two years trade ban on selected export to China. It involved transactions with almost one billion US dollars\textsuperscript{1062}. Pakistan on its part denied that the transaction violated the MTCR, as the specifications of the technology obtained, was far less than those stipulated by the MTCR, ie, 500 kg (t) payload and range in excess of 300 kilometers\textsuperscript{1063}.

The missile controversy took another twist, when in 1996, the US intelligence agencies concluded that Pakistan was setting up a factory to manufacture M-11 missiles, near the capital, Islamabad\textsuperscript{1064}. This latest information placed the Clinton administration in somewhat of a bind. It could mean tougher sanctions against Pakistan, at a time when the

\textsuperscript{1062} (Elaine Sciolino, July, 20, 1993)
\textsuperscript{1063} (Lodhi, 24 August 1993)
\textsuperscript{1064} (Time Wiene. US Says it suspected China is helping Pakistan with Missiles”, 26 August 1996)
relations were expanding an upward trend after the passage of Brown Amendment. The Clinton Administration down played the significance of these intelligence reports and did not press ahead with tough sanctions. It is important to note that at this stage another vital US interest, beside the nominal improvement of relations with Pakistan, was at stake. It was the growing US trade with China. If such sanction were contemplated, it could means ban on export of valuable commodities and equipment to China, worth billions of US dollars, that could seriously hurt the US companies dealing with China. The Pakistan’s nuclear and missile program was let off rather lightly, due to considerations not related directly to US-Pak security cooperation.

In April 1998, Pakistan tested the Ghauri missile, which had a range of 900 kilometer. This new found relevance for the country allowed for some space, with regards to the contacts between the two militaries and marginal improvement in defence relations.\textsuperscript{1065} The US Administration imposed sanctions on the Khan Research Laboratories, claiming that the missile had been developed with the collaboration of North Korea, and was based on the “Nodong” Missile.\textsuperscript{1066} Pakistan claimed this was an indigenous effort, with no links to the North Koreans.\textsuperscript{1067} Soon after the Ghauri tests, the scenario in the subcontinent changed dramatically, with Indian nuclear tests in April 1998, followed by Pakistan’s tests a month later. This actually took the international concerns to a new level, with the missile technology being a corrolary to the larger nuclear proliferation issue.\textsuperscript{1068}

\textsuperscript{1065} (Amin S., 2000, p. 180)
\textsuperscript{1066} (Tim Wiener. US says North Korea Helped Develop Pakistan’s Missile, April 11 1998)
\textsuperscript{1067} (Vajpayee Govt came to office in March 1998)
\textsuperscript{1068} (Amin S., 2000, pp. 179-181)
**Renewed Military Co-operation with US.** The military to military contacts between the US and Pakistan, along with the sale/transfer of arms had come to a grinding halt in the wake of imposition of Pressler Amendment. This step meant that the close relationship, forged between the two militaries suffered badly. The Defence Department, under Secretary William Perry, was keen to re-invigorate some of these old contacts, as it considered Pakistan Army a valuable ally in the burgeoning military peacekeeping commitments in different parts of the world. The role of Pakistani peacekeeping in Somalia, especially during the 1993 Mogadishu incident, when US helicopters were shot down and troops had to be rescued, was much appreciated by the US military and administration. Pakistan was also one of the major contributors in the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia, with almost 6000 troops. Pakistan was also involved in the important peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, where the US had taken a lead role in the international peace keeping efforts.

The US Secretary of Defence visited Pakistan in January 1995. This was the first high ranking visit by any US administration official, dealing with the security relationship between the two countries. Pakistan, with its contribution in the US led peacekeeping missions and its prospective role as a moderating force in the Muslim world, had regained some relevance in the US strategic calculus. This was reflected in the Secretary Defence’s statements who promised to “make things better” as far as the security relationship between the two countries was concerned. The US Defence Secretary also showed sympathy and understanding towards Pakistan’s longstanding

1069 (Prish, January 11 1995)
complaint regarding the stranded F-16s that had been paid for, but not received by Pakistan.

**Brown Amendment.** The US administration asked Senator Hank Brown, a Republican, who was favourably poised towards Pakistan, to propose an amendment to the Pressler Ban. The amendment was put up for Senate approval. It faced stiff opposition from known Pakistani opponents, and Indian sympathizers, prominent amongst them Senator Larry Pressler, the originator of the Pakistan specific sanctions, Senator Denial Patrick Manyihan, an ardent Indian lobbyist. However, at the end the Brown Amendment went through in the Senate by a margin of 55 to 45 votes. This amendment was passed on 21st September 1995. The amendment essentially allowed for some economic assistance in US funding agencies like Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Export Import Bank. It also allowed Pakistan to get military equipment that had been frozen due to the Pressler Amendment. However more importantly it did not include the F-16’s, the most expensive and contentious part of the military supplies being blocked by the US. The Brown Amendment also made no changes as far as ban on military to military contacts and sales of arms to Pakistan was concerned. It was however, a symbolic victory for Pak US Security Relations, as for the first time, the US lawmakers agreed to ease sanctions that were widely seen in Pakistan as discriminatory. The Brown Amendment provided a way out of the F-16 impasse, by allowing the sale of these aircrafts to a third party and reimbursement to Pakistan. The country selected by Clinton Administration was

\[1070\] \textit{(Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies, 2001, p. 329)}
Indonesia\textsuperscript{1071}. However by the close of 1996, the Clinton Administration backed out of the proposed sale, due to Indonesia’s track record against political opposition\textsuperscript{1072}.

**Military Co-operation.** In June 1995, the US Pakistan consultative group met in Washington, five years after the last meeting in 1990. It was decided to restart military to military contacts\textsuperscript{1073}. The Pakistan Army and Naval Units conducted joint exercises with the US forces, thus re-establishing some of the broken links after the Pressler Amendment. In February 1996, President Clinton signed the Foreign Operations Appropriation Act for 1996 (PL 104-107). This Act substantially reduced the restriction on economic assistance to Pakistan. It also allowed for the release of $568 Million dollars worth of military equipment, paid for by Pakistan, but stranded in the US, due to sanctions\textsuperscript{1074}. Pakistan also obtained State Department sanction to obtain spare parts for the F-16 Aircraft and Cobra Gunship Helicopters, already held by Pakistan, but suffering maintenance problems due to lack of spares. These licences were worth $100 Million dollars\textsuperscript{1075}.

**Nuclear Issue – Pakistan’s Strategic Priorities at odds with US Non-Proliferation Agenda**

The Pakistan Government made several attempts to rekindle the security relationship. In June 1991, the Nawaz Sharif Government sent a senior diplomat, Akram Zaki, to

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\textsuperscript{1071} (Washington Post, 12 April 1995) \\
\textsuperscript{1072} (Myers, September 6 1996) \\
\textsuperscript{1073} (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 204) \\
\textsuperscript{1074} (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 204) \\
\textsuperscript{1075} (Clinton Administration and Pakistan, 23 June, 1996) \\
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the US, in order to explore ways for ending the sanctions. Since the nuclear issue was the main stumbling block, Pakistan reiterated its position that it was prepared to halt the nuclear program, but would not roll it back. This was not acceptable to the US Administration. Thus there was no development on the issue. The US administration of President Clinton launched another nuclear non-proliferation initiative in March 1994. This involved an approval to deliver the F-16s, already paid for by Pakistan, if it consented to inspection of its nuclear facilities. The desired end state was that Pakistan should freeze its nuclear program, an approach different to that which required a rollback. However Pakistan Government opted not to go for this option, as it involved compromising its nuclear program, a strategic priority for Pakistan. Pakistan Army Chief General Abdul Waheed, one of the key personalities involved with the Pakistani nuclear program, declared openly “Pakistan is not bargaining nuclear program for F-16s or anything else”. The nuclear problem was again discussed during Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visit to the US in April 1995. She was looking towards the US for easing sanction imposed through the Pressler Amendment and resumption of the military aid. The US President offered to agree to lifting sanctions if Pakistan allowed inspection of its nuclear facilities. This was not agreed and nuclear controversy again erupted when the US intelligence agencies conceded that that Pakistan had obtained ring magnets, a key component of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium, from China. Along with this information, the US Intelligence Community also concluded that Pakistan had restarted the program of

1076 (Maleeha Lodhi, 1994)
1077 (Smit, March 23 1994)
1078 (Hussain M., Army and the Nuclear Issue, April 3 1994)
uranium enrichment. A senior official of the US Administration Samuel Berger was despatched to Islamabad for consultations on the issue in January 1996. He warned of the negative impact of the new development on the Brown Amendment\textsuperscript{1079}. However at this stage the Clinton Administration did not press ahead with more sanctions. Two factors were crucial in this regard. One was the fact that the Administration wanted to strengthen the Benazir Bhutto Government, who was considered by senior policy makers like Assistant Secretary of State Rabin Rapheal as a good perspective US ally. Secondly, the Pakistani government had gained some relevance by showing its willingness and ability to make headway on the UNOCOL gas pipeline project, being pursued actively by the Clinton Administration. The possibility of Pakistan playing a pivotal role in creating suitable conditions in Afghanistan for the proposed pipeline may have influenced a softer stance on the nuclear issue\textsuperscript{1080}. The US Government, in March 1996, implemented the Brown Amendment, by releasing to Pakistan $368 million dollars worth of military equipment, paid for by Pakistan and stranded in the US due to the Pressler Amendment\textsuperscript{1081}.

**Pakistan Responds to Indian Nuclear Tests – The Ambiguity Resolved.** On May 11, India conducted five underground nuclear tests at the desert site of Pokhran, Rajhistan. Apparently the Vajpayee Government had decided well in advance that they would go overt with the Indian nuclear capability. President

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\textsuperscript{1079} (Wiener, February 8 1996)\\
\textsuperscript{1080} (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 299)\\
\textsuperscript{1081} (Ban, March 1996)
\end{flushright}
Clinton termed these tests as a terrible mistake\textsuperscript{1082}. It is interesting to note that at this crucial juncture, the US Government sent Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to Pakistan. He offered the supply of stranded F-16’s and resumption of military and economic aid to Pakistan. Apparently the US administration was out of sync with Pakistan’s strategic compulsions and need to respond to the Indian nuclear tests. At this stage no amount of cajoling or coercion could overcome Pakistan’s need to match the Indian capability. As is apparent from the national mood and sentiment, Nawaz Sharif had little choice in this regard. He risked losing his job, if he did not come true at this critical juncture.

The nuclear issue between Pakistan and US came to a head, in the aftermath of nuclear explosions by India, in April 1998. The Bhartya Janata Party led Indian Government, headed by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee after coming to power, on the wave of strong nationalist, Hindu revivalist agenda, decided early in its tenure to go for overt nuclear tests. The precise motives for going for overt nuclear tests are not clear however; apparently the US Government was caught by surprise. As soon as the tests were conducted, the natural outcome in Pakistan was of extreme concern and uncertainty. The strong and vibrant rhetoric, emanating from Hindu leaders egged Pakistan to accept the new realities in the Sub-continent. In the aftermath of the Indian tests there was unified public outcry to respond to the Indian tests. From the perspective of Pakistan Government, led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, there was little room for wriggling out of this situation. Pakistan had faced crippling economic and military sanctions, as well as political isolation, in order to maintain its nuclear

\textsuperscript{1082} (Benet, May 14 1998)
program. In the aftermath of the 1971 debacle and the perceived fickleness of its superpower ally United States, reinforced by the country’s abandonment after the Afghan Conflict, there was little doubt in the minds of decision makers as well as the general public that nuclear capability was the only answer to the country’s security predicament against a hegemonic, belligerent India. The Clinton Administration, on the other hand, had been trying, though with limited success, to restrict Pakistan from proceeding ahead with its nuclear program. The US global agenda for non-proliferation was now at stake, in the aftermath of India’s nuclear tests. The Clinton administration moved swiftly to work on Pakistan not to go ahead with its tests. However, their response to the Indian tests and failure by the G-8 members to take any meaningful stance encouraged Pakistan Government. Pakistan moved ahead with its nuclear program. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister and senior diplomat Abdul Sattar explains the country’s motivation for defying the international appeals for restraint as “Pakistan’s sole motivation for the response to Indian tests was security, which has, in fact, the rationale for the pursuit of its nuclear option”\(^{1083,\ 1084}\).

**Pakistan Conducts Nuclear Tests.** Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests on 31 May 1998, in the Chaghai area of Balochistan Province\(^{1085}\). The nation was ecstatic across the length and breadth of the country, there were jubilation and celebrations. Pakistan’s scientists had come good, despite all the odds, over the years. The Clinton administration condemned the tests, though in a muted form. President

\(^{1083}\) (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 202)

\(^{1084}\) (Khan S. A., 1999, pp. 132-133)

\(^{1085}\) (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, pp. 202-204)
Clinton showed great understanding of the strategic compulsions on Pakistan, in the wake of the Indian tests. Pakistan’s nuclear tests were also “approved” by the UN Security Council, which urged the country to take steps to reduce the threat of nuclear war along with its arch rival India. Despite Pakistan’s nuclear tests, it did not fare too badly due to sanctions. This was partly due to the understanding of the peculiar circumstances involving the decision and partly because of US’s own interest in not imposing sanctions. As it happened, Pakistan was in the process of importing 350,000 tons of wheat from the US. So more from self interest rather than any special favour to Pakistan, the US legislature noted to exempt Pakistan from Agricultural sanctions. It is interesting to note that the US legislature also voted to allow the US President to waive off sanctions, including those imposed by the Pressler Amendment. The US Government also eased up pressure on the IMF and allowed it to strike a deal to support Pakistan’s sagging economy, growing under the burden of $30 billion dollars loan, and years of corruption. Pakistan was provided $1.2 billion dollars credit for structural adjustment by the IMF. Saudi Arabia also chipped in with 100,000 barrels of oil a day, which amounted to $500 million dollars worth of oil a year, to support the country’s sagging economy.

The Indian lobby in the US House of Representatives is a major pressure group in the US policy making circles. With more than 120 members, it has often successfully lobbied to get the US policy discussions favourably tilted towards India, as in the case

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1086 [Greanteges, June 5, 1998]
1087 [House Passes Bill to lift nuclear sanctions : New York Times, July 15, 1998]
of removal of sanctions, following India’s nuclear tests in 1999\textsuperscript{1089}. In contrast Pakistan suffers from a lack of any distinct pressure groups in the US legislature. The economic and military sanctions against Pakistan were put on the table by the Indian supporters, on the first chance, when there were leaks about possible collusion between Pakistan and China on the transfer of military missile technology\textsuperscript{1090}.

\textbf{India – Kashmir, the Terrorism Controversy}

\textbf{Kashmir is Linked to Terrorism – Differences in Perception}. The ISI had developed, in the 1980s, a strong network and worthwhile capability to organise and support clandestine military operations. The capability was now put to good use in Kashmir, which by all reckoning was close to the Pakistani hearts than Afghanistan or any other issue. Volunteers poured in from all parts of the country, along with huge donations, from the general public. The guerrilla training camps, set along the Afghan border inside Afghanistan\textsuperscript{1091}, near Peshawar and other border areas, were already teeming with thousands of young, fanatic fighters, in search of a cause. An important point to note, during this period, was the religious organisations from Southern Punjab and Central Punjab. These organisations took a centre stage for recruiting and funding missions into Kashmir. With the insurgency in Kashmir looking strong, and the Indians in a bind, this strategy seemed to be working. The Indian Government approached the US, with evidence that these operations were being sponsored by

\textsuperscript{1089} (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 171)
\textsuperscript{1090} (The New York Times, 17 March 1991)
\textsuperscript{1091} (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 411)
Pakistan. The CIA, Director, James Woolsey responding to these allegations, warned that “Pakistan stood on the brink” as far as supporting terrorist was concerned. This US stance was inexplicable for many Pakistanis, as the same guerrillas, when fighting for US interests in Afghanistan had been eulogised by the US administration and public alike. Now when it came to Pakistan’s core interest, they were being branded as terrorist. In April 1993, Pakistan’s Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, Akram Zaki travelled to Washington. In his meeting with Secretary Warren Christopher, he promised to curb the ISI involvement in Kashmir. The US concern went beyond just the Kashmir involvement. They were more concerned about the foreign fighters, living inside Pakistan and Afghanistan, who had links with other hard-line Islamic groups across the globe. Pakistan Government took certain steps to reduce the ISI involvement in the Kashmir insurgency. Lieutenant General Javed Nasir an ardent supporter of the Kashmir cause was replaced as Director General of the ISI. The Armed Forces also replaced a large number of long time ISI mid-level officers who had been intimately involved with the Afghan Jihad, and were now reportedly working to ferment the Kashmir insurgency. However, these changes did not affect the overall Pakistan stance on the Kashmir issue. The support for Kashmir, and the training just moved into the hand of religious groups, funded and backed by the ISI. The problem, not foreseen by Pakistani establishment was that what

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1092 (Thel, April 23 1993)
1093 (Gargan, April 2, 1993)
would happen to the internal security environment of the country, with unchecked militarization and guerrilla warfare training being imparted to so many young people.

**Kashmir Freedom Struggle – Pakistan’s Support not Enough to Bring India to the Negotiation Table.** Pakistan’s Kashmir policy of the 1990’s with overt diplomatic and covert military and logistics support to the Kashmiri freedom fighters was passionate, widely supported and jointly owned by all the governments and military/intelligence agencies throughout 1990’s. The insurgents, achieved great effects inside the valley, by attacking Indian Army units and hence, making the Indians deploy more than 500,000 troops in the valley to control insurgency. This policy was based on the initial framework established by General Zia during the 1980’s for the Afghan War. Small groups of Mujahideen would be trained inside Pakistani territory, then infiltrated into Afghanistan, carry out raids ambushes and then merge in the population, or melt away in the rugged countryside only to appear somewhere else. General Zia had conceived a special plan for it “to keep the pot boiling”. It eventually meant that enough pressure be maintained on the adversary that he remains uncomfortable and seeks some solution, without really crossing his tolerance threshold. The insurgency which began in the early 1990’s was able to achieve something close to this intended objective. Marry Ann Weaver contends that Zia’s formula was applied effectively by Pakistan in Kashmir, to give
religious overtones to an essentially nationalistic struggle\textsuperscript{1096}. Yet India with its massive economic, military and diplomatic prowess was able to mount a fairly robust response. It tackled the insurgency through all elements of national power. Politically, the Indian used their influence in the US, especially the powerful pro-Indian lobby in the US Congress and Senate to brand Pakistan as a rogue state, and as a state sponsoring terrorism the Indians almost succeeded in achieving this. These efforts continued with the propaganda that Pakistan was sponsoring global terrorism, with the help of its proxies, the Taliban in Afghanistan. In addition to this, India was able to forge a renewed strategic alliance with Iran & Russia, over the issue of opposing the Taliban. Thus Pakistan lost Iranian support, something which had remained constant during the Raza Shah Pehlvi regime. With regards to the purely military effects of the insurgency, the Indians had to pay a price, but by infesting the small 70x40 miles Kashmir Valley with more than half a million troops, it made sure that despite heavy cost, the insurgency could never reach a level where it threatened total Indian control over the valley\textsuperscript{1097}. At the same time the Indian troops across the Line of Control in Kashmir, engaged Pakistan almost daily in artillery and small arms duels, causing heavy casualties. Thus, as the conflict progressed into its second decade, there were no signs of India coming towards a negotiated settlement. Instead, the antics of Taliban in Afghanistan, and growing signs of US frustration with them over the harbouring of Al-Qaeeda network, strengthened Indian claim of collusion between ISI - Taliban and Al-Qaeeda Terrorists in Afghanistan. Thus, while Pakistan had

\textsuperscript{1096} (Weaver, Pakistan in the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan, 2002, p. 251)

\textsuperscript{1097} (Kale, 2009, pp. 298-299)
managed to tie down Indian troops in the Kashmir Valley, it was not any closer to getting a Kashmir settlement in 1999. It was at the stage that the military hierarchy launched the Kargil Operation, which would effectively doom the Kashmir cause internationally.

**Kashmir under Spotlight Due to Taliban Connections.** Another issue of discord was the training and logistic infrastructure, established by the ISI, with US help for Mujahideen during the Afghan conflict. As the insurgency in Kashmir gained strength, India accused Pakistan of using the same infrastructure for training the Mujahideen involved in the Kashmir insurgency. Though the Pakistani Government vehemently denied these charges, this was something not very pliable for the Americans. They had been part of exactly the same strategy, in collusion with Pakistan, for supporting the Afghan insurgency. Now the venue had changed to Afghanistan, the modus operandi and the players largely remained unchanged. This aspect was initially overlooked by the US, despite Indian claims that Pakistan was using the Afghan War network to sustain and support insurgency in Kashmir. But as time progressed, and it became apparent that many of the attacks against American assets were originated by Afghan based terrorist groups, even the Kashmir freedom struggle, which was a major concern for Pakistan, came under criticism and scrutiny from the US. Thus in the short period following a victorious struggle against Soviet Union, the two partners of the Cold-War stood at cross-roads. It appears that within the Pakistani establishment, not much thought was given to the negative fallouts of

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1098 (Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 2006, p. 136)
this policy of support to the Taliban. The developing nexus between Taliban, Arab terrorists and Kashmir freedom struggle not only through the ISI, but also through other powerful organizations such as Jamaat-e-Islami, was largely ignored in the policy making circles of Pakistan\textsuperscript{1099}. Many Arabs belonging to fundamentalist organizations such as Akhwan-ul-Muslimeen, Egypt, had started playing an active role in the Afghan Jihad\textsuperscript{1100}. It is also apparent that there seemed to be no clear end state, with regards to the insurgency in Kashmir, being fuelled and sustained by Pakistan, though largely home-grown, initially. Pakistan’s Government policy with regards to Taliban also seemed to be at tangent to the perceptions of the regional and global powers and was devoid of a well thought out end state. Taliban’s rigid interpretation of Islam was at tangent to the generally acceptable norms of culture and governance prevailing in most of the Muslim countries. In addition their linkage with Arab terrorist groups meant that they would be involved in fallouts of any action, undertaken by these organizations using Afghan soil, as their base. Though the predominantly Pathan Taliban controlled most of Afghanistan, yet their inability to include the Shia, Tajik and Uzbek communities in the Afghanistan, despite Taliban control, would continue, as all the warring factions had not been taken on board\textsuperscript{1101}. With India, Russia and Iran supporting their proxies in the region, there was little hope of a stable Afghanistan, which could be of real value to Pakistan. Thus Pakistan’s support to Taliban was predicated with lot of dangers, with little possibility of strategic gains. Yet at this time, it appears that the massive ISI infrastructure,

\textsuperscript{1099} (Weaver, Pakistan in the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan, 2002, pp. 202-203)
\textsuperscript{1100} (Rana, 2010, pp. 14-15)
\textsuperscript{1101} (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 430)
dominated mostly by veterans and sympathizes of the Afghan freedom struggle was uni-focused towards supporting Taliban. The larger strategic and political implications of this support were not factored in Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan. The ISI also used the Saudi funds, still coming strongly through Prince Turki Al-Faisal to build up the Jehadi network in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s estrangement with the US over the nuclear issue and Pressler ban meant that there was no longer a close working relationship between the two countries, over the Afghan Policy. This was a source of major concern for Pakistan, once the September 11 bombings of the twin towers, brought the US into Afghanistan.

Kashmir Struggle is Tainted by Charges of Terrorism. The effect was also seen in the context of Pakistan’s support to the freedom struggle of the people of Kashmir. The US administration warned Pakistan in January 1993, that the country would be placed under “active continuing review” so that it could be ascertained whether Pakistan was providing support to terrorism in Kashmir. This was important, as Pakistan could be placed on the list of state, sponsoring terrorism, under Section 6 (J) of Export Administration Act of 1979. What really peeved the Pakistani officials and annoyed public was the perceived duality in the US stance. The same kind of support, when extended to Afghan resistance previously, was encouraged and actively supported by the US Government and the law makers. Now if Pakistan was supposedly trying to rekindle the forlorn hope of bringing India to a bargaining position in Kashmir by supporting the freedom struggle, it found itself in the wrong.

1102 (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 296)
corner of the ring. Another issue of discord, connected to the Kashmir freedom struggle, was the presence of large number of foreign fighters on Pakistan’s soil, these groups of fighters, brought in by the CIA and Arab countries to fight the Afghan war, had stayed in the border belt of Pakistan and certain regions of Afghanistan. Many countries complained to Pakistan, that these fighters were involved in terrorist activities in their native countries. These included Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Russia and Philippines. Such assertions lent strength to the Indian claims that Pakistan was using the Afghan war infrastructure and manpower to fuel violence inside Indian Held Kashmir. The massive blasts which rocked the city of Bombay in 1993 were claimed by the Indian Government to be Pakistan sponsored. They contended that these blasts were conducted by the militant groups inside Pakistan, with active support of the ISI. This was not proven, however Indians did pick up the habit of blaming Pakistan for almost every act in their country. Another theme which gained currency in the Indian lobbying was to term Pakistan as the breeding ground for terrorist activities in general. This term was further refined by the Bhartya Janta Party Government after the attacks on Indian Parliament, calling Pakistan “Epic Centre of Terrorism”. However in the early and mid nineties, the situation had not deteriorated to this extreme. In order to ward off activism and avoid further damaging actions by the US Administration, in 1993 there was a major shake-up of the ISI. Many of the key operatives and veterans of Afghan Jihad were either transferred back to Army and

1103 (Hilali, US Paksitan Relationship, 2005, p. 199)
1104 (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, pp. 296-297)
1105 (Hilali, US Paksitan Relationship, 2005, p. 200)
1106 (Hilali, US Paksitan Relationship, 2005, p. 200)
other services, or retired. The Nawaz Sharif Government also took certain actions to report foreign fighters still residing in major cities of Lahore, Karachi, Multan and Quetta\textsuperscript{1107}. However, there appeared to be no cohesive strategy with regards to dismantling the massive organizational infrastructure for Afghan Jihad, most of it under nominal government control. Thus the 1990’s were a period of neglect with regards to the growing security threat, posed by these elements within Pakistan. Pakistan did take a few steps to rein in the growing strength of these militants within the country. In 1994, the Benazir Bhutto concluded an extradition treaty with Egypt and also refused to extend the visas of many foreign Afghan war veterans residing in Pakistan. In 1995, Pakistan had its first taste of the new breed of militants, when a suicide bomber, rammed an explosive laden truck into the Egyptian Embassy, in Islamabad’s Diplomatic Enclave, less than one mile from the President’s House\textsuperscript{1108}.

The horrific blast shook the twin cities of Rawalpindi – Islamabad. Though not comprehended and realized at the time, the monster that Pakistan had created, in collusion with the US, had now started becoming unruly, taking on its own masters. The flexible, easily accessible diplomatic enclave, in the foothills of Margalla Hills, was transformed overnight into a barricaded compound, with police manning the checkpoints and entry points. The side effects of a covert war, now more or less uncontrollable had already started affecting Pakistan. The US FBI was sent to help in the investigation of the terrorist attacks on the Egyptian embassy, which resulted in 16

\textsuperscript{1107} (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 200)

\textsuperscript{1108} (Eyewitness account of the incident)
deaths\textsuperscript{109}. It would be another six years before the US would also be shocked by its own protege, Osama-Bin-Laden. In Pakistan; there was still a feeling that these people were an asset. A key difference in the superpower support to insurgencies and proxies in other parts of the world vis-a-vis Afghanistan needs to be noted here. The bulk of insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in South East Asia did not involve strong religious indoctrination. Thus the warlords, supported and funded by the US money, waned in popularity and strength, once they lost the support and funding from their superpower patrons. In case of Afghanistan, the strategy was different. The CIA and General Zia, banked on the Islamic radicals, collected from all over the Muslim world. They were provided sanctuary and funding. In addition, a whole breed of fundamentalists was spawned in the religious seminaries, established all over Pakistan (more thus 5000). These were funded and supported by a diverse range of Muslim countries, each with its own hidden agenda. These included Libya, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, to name a few\textsuperscript{110}. This volatile mix of religious fanaticism, once unleashed, attained a life of its own. Unlike simple guerrilla groups, fighting against oppression, these fanatics were motivated by thoughts of renaissance of Muslim heydays, overthrow of regimes, whom they saw as puppets of the US/Israeli nexus and fighting the “Satan”, which was now USA. Therefore, the Afghan war strategy had unleashed a force and an ideology, far more difficult to counter than the force it had been created to defeat communism\textsuperscript{111}.

\textsuperscript{109} (Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 2005, p. 200)
\textsuperscript{110} (October 1995, p. 25)
\textsuperscript{111} (Weaver, Pakistan in the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan, 2002, p. 251)
Kargil Conflict – 1998-1999. At a stage when the Kashmir freedom movement was already under spotlights, Pakistan blundered into an ambitious, ill conceived and badly timed misadventure in Kargil, Northern Kashmir. This operation launched in secrecy, in the winter of 1998, arrived at capturing some of the dominating heights across the Line of Control.

These heights were usually vacated by the Indians in winter, as they were considered logistically untenable in the harsh terrain and environment. Interestingly, the Kargil Operation was launched in 1998, just as Pakistan and India were engaged in strategic dialogue to improve bilateral relations. Amongst much fanfare and hype, the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee travelled by bus through the Wahga Border to Lahore. His visit was characterised by goodwill and promise of better relations. The environment surrounding the decision to launch the Kargil Operations, its approval by the Prime Minister and assessment of its validity as well as inherent risks, remain shrouded in mystery. Both Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief at the time, General Musharraf have different views on the issue. Regardless of these circumstances, the Kargil Conflict unfolded in an unnoticeable manner initially but soon snowballed into
a full scale military engagement, which alarmed the entire word community and put Pakistan in a very uncomfortable and untenable position. The conflict though tactical in nature and restricted to the disputed territory of Kashmir had major implications for Pakistan’s policy and stance on Kashmir. Though the operations were launched by regular army units, these were done in a most shoddy manner, without complete logistic back up and adequate fire support to sustain against a determined reaction by the enemy, once it came to know about the incursion. Once the Indians found out the extent of penetration and implications of Pakistani incursions on the strategic Kargil-Leh Highway, which was now threatened by the positions occupied by Pakistan, they responded with full might.

**Incursions by Pakistan Army.** During the winters of 1998, Pakistani Units were ordered to go across the line of control, and occupy the dominating heights overlooking the strategic Dras-Kargil Highway. As Gen Musharraf himself describes it “By end of April the unoccupied gaps along seventy five miles (120 kilometers) of the line of control had been secured by over 100 new posts of 10-20 persons each”\(^{1112}\).

The first confrontation between the Pakistani and Indian troops took place in the first week of May, 1999. The Indians built up forces very quickly, bringing in a regular division and a heavy artillery of the static formations (traditionally kept for launching massive offensive against Pakistan, in select location, in case of an all out war).

Once the Indian started attacking these positions, they employed both heavy artillery and state of the art Mirage 2000 aircraft to target the makeshift Pakistani

\(^{1112}\) (Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 2006, p. 90)
bunkers on forbidding heights. The troops fought valiantly, often to the “last man last bullet”. Yet there was hardly any logistics or artillery support and the air was completely dominated by the Indians. With well coordinated Brigade-sized operations, the Indians gained ground. General Musharraf writes “As few as five battalions in support of freedom fighter groups, were able to embroil more than four Indian divisions. The Indians were also forced to mobilize their entire national resources, including their air forcer. By July 4 they achieved some success, which I would call insignificant”\(^{1113}\).

**India Reacts Strongly.** The BJP Government’s reaction to the incursions was that of surprise, anger, sense of betrayal and finally a determined, cohesive military response. The speed of mobilization of formations to evict the Pakistani incursions, the synergy between the Indian Armed Forces i.e army and air force, and the massive support to the military effort at the national level, defied all assessments done by the establishment in Pakistan. To add insult to injury, the Pakistan Government denied the misadventure and termed the infiltrators as Mujahideen\(^{1114}\). This single decision was not only against the basic norms of war fighting but also denied the troops fighting across the LOC, any meaningful support by the Pakistan Air Force. In contrast, the Indians brought their regular mountain divisions, top quality BOFORS Artillery Guns and Mirage 2000 fighter aircrafts to take on the lightly held, poorly stocked, hastily constructed positions by Pakistan Army units, across the Line of Control. The battles soon turned ugly for the Pakistani troops, who were badly outnumbered and could not be sustained across the inhospitable terrain. This was ironically, the very reason that Indians considered such a

\(^{1113}\) (Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 2006, p. 93)
\(^{1114}\) (Interview with officer operating in the area)
venture unlikely in the first place. The assumption that India would not respond forcefully and the absurd contention that the infiltrators were Mujahideen and not Pakistani troops, both defied logic and common sense. As far as the first contention was concerned, how could a BJP government, which came to power on the back of hate politics against Muslims and the destruction of the historic Babri Mosque in Ayudhea, leave an opportunity to confront Pakistan. This at a time, when they had just lost the majority and were waiting for the elections in October 1999. The BJP could not have asked for a better cause to improve their sagging political fortune.

As far as Pakistan’s second claim, that the infiltrators were Mujahideen and not regular troops, no power in the world would accept such a baseless claim. How could ill equipped, untrained Mujahideen go across a heavily defended Line of Control, manned by Pakistan’s troops, carrying logistics and ammunition and occupy positions 10-12 kilometers inside Indian held Kashmir. This was not possible. How could these insurgents be supported by artillery fire from Pakistan’s gun position. How could they carry makeshift stores and build bunker and fighting positions on heights ranging between 10000 – 20000 feet? It just did not add up. In the age of satellite surveillance and global positioning systems, it was not much of a job for the world powers to assess that was a clumsy attempt by Pakistan to cover up for a military action across the Line of Control. It just reduced the credibility of the regime. In his own words, General Musharraf described the imperatives for the Kargil conflict as:-
“We both (General Musharraf and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif) wanted to put Kashmir firmly on the world’s radar screen, politically as well as militarily. The Kargil initiative succeeded in doing so”\textsuperscript{1115}.

This is true to an extent, as the issue became an instant international concern. But beyond this, whether it actually helped Pakistan is debatable. Most of the authentic news and information channels considered Kargil an Indian victory\textsuperscript{1116}. The only thing that was really debated on the Indian side was as to why India let the Pakistani incursions go unnoticed.

**Kargil Analysis.** Notwithstanding the bravery and the extreme scarifies at the tactical level, the Kargil Operation was an operational blunder and a strategic fiasco. The Indian’s extracted maximum political mileage from the apparent “backstabbing” by Pakistan. Vajpayee and his Government claimed with some justification that the hand of friendship extended by India through the Lahore visit had been responded by Pakistan in the shape of Kargil incursions. The envoys, hurriedly despatched to friendly countries, could not even secure an audience with respective heads of states, on certain occasions\textsuperscript{1117}. Pakistan tried to do some damage control and garner international support on its principled stance on Kashmir. However the effort failed as dismally as the operation itself. There was a broad consensus that the “Sanctity of Line of Control” should be maintained. The incursions were not acceptable to even the most ardent Pakistan supporters such as Saudi Arabia. Pakistan was further

\textsuperscript{1115} (Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 2006, p. 136)  
\textsuperscript{1116} (Mazumdar, September 27, 1999)  
\textsuperscript{1117} (Amin S., 2000, p. 271)
isolated when the traditionally supportive Chinese Government also did not support its stance. ¹¹¹⁸

Having tested the nuclear weapons and gaining a famed moral victory over India, Pakistan now was in an unenviable position, where the world opinion was badly tilted against Kargil. India was making significant military gains in the conflict zone and apparently the entire Indian nation felt euphoric and vindicated. The “fillup” that Pakistan was looking for, never occurred in the way anticipated. Both the Mujahideen operations inside Kashmir and the status of Line of Control came under negative spotlight. India obtained through Kargil, what they had been long working for. Finally, the world community, including the US, criticised the incursion across the Line of Control and asked Pakistan to withdraw the infiltrators to its own side of the Line of Control. The aspect of inviolability of Line of Control was also brought up, negating Pakistan’s long standing demand that this was a temporary line which had to be reviewed, in the light of Pakistan’s principled and just stance on Kashmir. Thirdly Pakistan’s image suffered as the issue of infiltration across the Line of Control, in the presence of Pakistani troops, was widely criticised. The response of Clinton Administration was quite helpful, despite the environment surrounding Pakistan’s ill fated adventure. He gave time to the Pakistani Prime Minister, despite a hectic schedule of 4th of July celebrations. The US Government then moved to diffuse the tension, based on the agreement by Pakistan to withdraw its forces behind the Line of Control and the cease fire took effect. The long conflict ended, but on a very

¹¹¹⁸ (June 19, 1999, p. 25)
sour note for Pakistan. One of the fallouts of the conflict was the rift created between the Army Chief and the Prime Minister.

Another aspect of significance was the timing of the Kargil incursions. The BJP Government had just lost the majority in the Indian Parliament in April 1999, as was now in a caretaker capacity, till the election later that year. Under these circumstances, as the Kargil situation unfolded in May 1999, there could not have been any better prospect for winning over public support and inciting nationalistic fervour, than going after Pakistani backed insurgents. A victory in Kargil could mean a sure election success for the BJP. A party that had been losing its touch; suddenly was presented with an issue which could re-invigorate its political fortune. Another equally compelling reason for a strong response was the failure of Indian military and intelligence community to detect such large scale incursions into the Indian held Kashmir. They were equally keen to regain lost pride by retaking the heights occupied by the insurgents. The Kargil operation had repercussion much beyond the military embarrassment for Pakistan. The public was indeed demoralized by the Indian TV showing pictures of victorious Indian troops planting the Indian flag on the famous “Tiger Hill” a strategic peak overlooking Kargil, which was retaken by the Indians after costly and fierce fighting. As the Indians celebrated, there was despondency and gloom in Pakistan, especially the Army units, as they knew better the real truth about the imaginary “Mujahideen”. The poor soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry Battalions who had been sent across the Line of Control had been left to the mercy of Indian military might, which included precision strikes by the Mirage.

\[11^{119}(Amin\ S.,\ 2000,\ p.\ 271)m\]
2000 Aircrafts, wave after wave fresh motivated Indian troops, backed by massive artillery and logistics support. To add insult to injury, Pakistan kept towing the absurd line that it was Mujahideen and not regular soldiers fighting across the Line of Control. Ironically the body of Captain Kernal Sher Khan, whose bravery and heroics even the Indians acknowledged, was handed over by the enemy. He was posthumously awarded the Nishan-e-Haider, highest military award in Pakistan, though at the time Pakistan did not accept that soldiers was operating across the Line of Control. The conflict was also significant from another perspective. It provided India with a sense of pride, re-asserted their superiority, which seemed to have been compromised after Pakistan’s successful nuclear tests just a year ago. It also gave BJP a new lease of life, as the party was able to comfortably win the national elections in the fall that year. More importantly the Indians were not only able to portray themselves as the victims but also were able to portray the entire freedom struggle in Kashmir, and Pakistan’s support to Mujahideen in a negative way. Rather than providing a fillip to the freedom struggle, this ill-conceived operation badly hurt Pakistan’s cause in Kashmir. Another significant fallout of the Kargil Conflict was the realization in India, that a limited conflict was still possible with Pakistan, despite the nuclear overhang in the Sub-Continent. Thus Pakistan opened up a new door for Indian military adventurism by committing itself to this operation.

Apparently in an environment of nuclearized South Asia, such a military venture was unacceptable to the US and West Thus a tactical operation with strategic

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1120 (interviews with participants of the conflict)
1121 (Amin S., 2000, p. 271)
consequences, Kargil, did some harm than good to the Kashmir cause. It also allowed India to think about conventional military operations, even under a nuclear overhang. This aspect is now being crystallized in the shape of “Cold Strat Doctrine and Proactive Operation Strategy”, which envisages shallow military strikes, across multiple locations on the international border, to capture sensible territories and cause more destruction and embarrassment, while remaining short of Pakistan’s nuclear threshold\textsuperscript{1122}.

**Kargil – US Role.** The US Government response was that of alarm and concern. Nawaz Sharif was told by President Clinton on telephone to withdraw these forces. He also reinforced this call by sending General Anthony Zinni, CENTCOM commander to reinforce the American demand. A local conflict turning into a full scale war between now two declared nuclear states was not a welcome prospect for the US Administration.

The Kargil Conflict once again brought the US Government on the centre stage. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reached to the US, to request President Clinton to intervene in the conflict for an amicable solution.

The US President met Nawaz Sharif on the 5\textsuperscript{th} of July, 1999, the US Independence Day. He persuaded the Pakistani Premier to agree to a resolution, whereby Pakistan would “urge” the “Mujahideen” to withdrawn across the Line of Control, as a sweetener, the US President agreed to take an active interest in the Kashmir problem.

\textsuperscript{1122} (Talk by General Ashfaq Kayani Command and Staff College, 30 June 2010), (Muhammad, 2009)
The fact that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif rushed to Washington to request President Clinton to intervene, on the US Independence Day is indicative of the fact that Pakistani military situation was far from satisfactory. That such a situation was allowed to develop when five lightly armed battalions with little logistics or air support were made to fight four fresh Indian divisions supported by full might of the Indian Air force, is indicative of the fact, that Pakistan badly miscalculated the speed and intensity of Indian response. The ceasefire was signed on July 4 under “intense international pressure”\textsuperscript{1123}. This itself is indicative of the fact that ill timed venture did not enjoy international acceptance. Since Pakistan was the initiator, the international pressure to ceasefire and accept the sanctity of Line of Control weakened rather than strengthen its claim. The mere fact that discussing Kargil was a taboo during Musharraf’s long tenure and that there has been no open official inquiry, suggests that the hierarchy felt that the issue should be shelved and forgotten.

The world reaction to the Kargil incursion was quite negative and basically against Pakistan. Pakistan and India’s overt display of nuclear capability had heightened the risk of conventional conflict in the sub-continent. This further heightened the concerns of the US administration about miscalculated military adventurism. The US Under Secretary of State for South Asia, Karl Inderfirth highlighted this as “There is always the possibility of events spinning out of control. Clearly the ingredients are there for miscalculation”\textsuperscript{1124}. The US Congress even passed a resolution, recommending a suspension of loans to Pakistan, from international financial

\textsuperscript{1123} Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 2006, p. 94
\textsuperscript{1124} Shenon, May 30, 1999
institutions until it withdrew all the armed personnel from across the Line of Control. The G-8 and the European Union asked for the immediate withdrawal to Pakistani “intruders” and more significantly asked for Pakistan to “respect the Line of Control”. Kargil conflict displayed growing difference in the perceptions and priorities of Pakistan and the US. Despite the rhetoric at home, by Musharraf Government in the later years, it portrayed Pakistan as reckless and irresponsible. It also gave the Indians an upper hand, as they could tell the world that Pakistan was involved in scuttling a peace process, in which the Indian Premier Atal Behari Vajpayee had taken the initiative and travelled to Lahore, to extend the hand of friendship.

**Kargil – Reaction by World Community.** Kargil once again highlighted the increased intolerance in the US and the west, about operations of the Kashmiri freedom fighters into the Indian Held Kashmir. Since these had been the prime mover of the insurgency in Kashmir for the last decade, Kargil actually helped seal the fate of Kashmir freedom struggle. By not adhering to the Zia adage “Keep the pot boiling”, the Kargil adventure, raised the stakes to a level where Kashmir was scene of a large scale military confrontation which could probably spread across the international borders. This was unacceptable to the international community. It was also something which Pakistan had neither planned for, nor anticipated. Thus its Armed Forces were unprepared for it. In such circumstance, recourse once again to the United States to

1125 (Ahmed S.)
intervene was the only option. The mere fact that the withdrawal was unilateral and unconditional, reflected Pakistan’s weak standing, both politically and militarily.

The G-8 statement on 20 Jun 1999 read, “We are deeply concerned about the continuing military confrontation in Kashmir, following the infiltration of armed intruders which violated the Line of Control. We regard any military action to change the status quo as irresponsible”\textsuperscript{1126}.

**Kargil Fallout – Rift Between the Prime Minister and the Army Chief, Musharraf’s Takeover.** An important fall out of the Kargil Conflict was growing rift between the Prime Minister and the Army Chief. As had happened twice earlier, the victor in this battle was the Army Chief. On October 12, 1999, Nawaz Sharif made a, botched attempt to remove Musharraf, who was on an official visit to Sri Lanka. He appointed the ISI Chief, Lieutenant General Zia ud Din as the new Army Chief and re-directed Musharraf’s plane, which was on its way to Pakistan, towards Karachi. Unfortunately for him, the Army did not share this change. Musharraf safely landed in Karachi and was escorted by loyal generals and troops, while in Rawalpindi the same army units employed for the security of the Prime Minister and other senior officials, swiftly took control of the state buildings and put Nawaz Sharif under arrest thus ended Pakistan’s latest experiment with democracy which had lasted 11 years and had seen power brokering, corruption and mounting frustration with both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir, Both having two terms in Government did not bring much economic development, internal stability or relief to

\textsuperscript{1126} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 239)
the common man. Though General Musharraf takeover was apparently not premeditated, and appeared to be an act of self-preservation, yet Pakistan once again was under a military ruler\textsuperscript{1127}. Following the precedence set by General Ayub, Yahya Khan and later General Zia ul Haq, General Musharraf was the fourth military leader to takeover reins of the country. This time however, the takeover came not due to any political or social unrest, but as a result of power struggle, which resulted in the ouster of an elected Prime Minister. Musharraf, on assuming office unveiled an impressive seven point agenda, for putting the country back on track, and addressing some of its administration and governance problems. With regards to the US-Pak Security relation, there was not substantial development. Pakistan was under pressure now, in the aftermath of Kargil, to rein in the Mujahideen groups in Kashmir. The BJP led government was extremely sceptical of the Musharraf Regime, whom they regarded as the architect of the Kargil Conflict. Musharraf’s stance on the Kashmir issue was much more vocal and direct, somewhat to the dislike of Indians.

**Kargil – Reaction from Within.** Dr Maleeha Lodhi characterised the Kargil conflict as “The original political blunders of approving a strategically flawed and unsustainable plan of guerrilla action was compounded first by diplomatic and political mishandling and then by sudden and inadequately explained *volte face*\textsuperscript{1128}. The “volte face” as Dr Maleeha termed it may have been surprising for political observers, but for those overseeing the incursions, it was amply clear, despite denouncements to the

\textsuperscript{1127} (Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 2006, pp. 102-103)
\textsuperscript{1128} (Maleeha Lodhi, Newsline, July 1999)
contrary, that the massive Indian offensive would gradually overwhelm the remaining positions across the Line of Control, despite all the tactical brilliance and bravery of the officers and soldiers on ground. It was because they had not been given the requisite logistic backup or fire support to hold onto the positions against massed conventional attacks, from the Indians. Thus despite claims that military situation was good, it was far from satisfactory, when Nawaz Sharif was sent to Washington to seek a ceasefire.

Abdul Sattar, an eminent Foreign Minister of Pakistan has turned Kargil as “An impulsive adventure undertaken without forethought”\textsuperscript{1129}. Abdul Sattar also lays out the effects of these ill conceived operation on the Kashmir struggle “Misconceived policies and actions not only isolated Pakistan internationally, they also gravely damaged the heroic freedom struggle of the Kashmiri people”\textsuperscript{1130}.

**Clinton Visits Pakistan – Tense and Frank Dialogue.** On 9\textsuperscript{th} January 2000, President Clinton embarked on a trip to South Asia. He faced a difficult choice with regards to Pakistan. With a military dictator in charge, the administration did not want to accord recognition and credibility to a military regime. Yet visiting India and totally ignoring Pakistan would weaken the little influence and interaction that existed between the two countries\textsuperscript{1131}. Also concerned about the state of Indo-Pakistan relationship, the US president decided to have a brief stop-over in Pakistan. The visit to Pakistan was preceded by a very lively and positive five day tour of India. From the perspective of Pakistan’s key security concerns, i.e the issue of Kashmir, President

\textsuperscript{1129} (Sattar, Pakistan Security and Foreign Policy, 2007, p. 232)
\textsuperscript{1130} (Sattar, Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005, 2007, p. 233)
\textsuperscript{1131} (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 511)
Clinton gave an unequivocal support to the Indian claims that Pakistan should stop cross border incursions and clamp down on “terrorist” networks harbouring violence in Kashmir. Pakistan was also asked once again to respect the sanctity of the Line of Control. The Clinton visit to Pakistan on 25 March 2000, was a very sombre affair. The twin cities of Islamabad-Rawalpindi looked deserted, as extensive security arrangements preceded the US President’s visit. The discussion with President Musharraf focused on the issues of Kashmir, need to control the terrorist groups, and in the context of Afghanistan the need to influence Taliban to handover Osama Bin Laden. The US president also touched upon the issue of nuclear non-Proliferation.

President Clinton’s visit, the first since Richard Nixon’s 1969 trip to Pakistan, was marked with an air of growing differences, under the veneer of apparent cordiality. It reflected how much two the countries had diverged from their close relationship of the 80’s. President Musharraf’s apparent inability to address US concerns about Bin Laden and the Afghan situation reflected the helpless situation Pakistan had put itself into, owing to flawed Afghan and Kashmir policies. As Pakistan president put it himself “After Taliban came to power, we lost much of the leverage, we had with them”. It would take a 9/11 to correct this direction, but would involve an extremely painful transition.

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1132 (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 511)
1133 (Coll, Ghost War, 2004, p. 511)
1134 (Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 2006, p. 203)
CHAPTER 5
PAKISTAN – FRONTLINE ALLY IN WAR ON TERROR
2001 – ONWARDS

Introduction
This is the final chapter of the thesis. As per the mandate, it was to cover the period from 2001 to 2006. However since a lot more has happened since then, with regards to US-Pakistan security relationship, it would have been rather inconclusive if the discussion was to be terminated at events in 2006. In order to gain a better insight into the dynamics of US-Pak relationship especially after the departure of both President Bush and President Musharaff, a brief overview of the subsequent events has also been included, in order to draw relevant conclusions.

The chapter essentially tackles the post 9/11 scenario. It looks at the strategic compulsions of the US and the choices open to Pakistan, in the wake of Taliban’s decision not to hand over Osama Bin Laden to the United States. President Musharraf’s decision to side with the US is analysed at length. Thereafter the major issues in the renewed security relationship are tackled one by one. The US invasion of Afghanistan, which toppled the Taliban regime, resulted in new security challenges for Pakistan. Pakistan was asked to go after Taliban and Al-Qaedaa operatives hiding in the inhospitable environment of FATA, which had little government control in the past. The main issue discussed here, is the war against Taliban and Al-Qaedaa sympathizers in FATA, and how it has shaped the security relationship. The effects
of Pakistan’s alliance with the West, especially on the internal security dynamics has been discussed. The relationship with India, in this re-defined strategic setting has also been analysed at length. Two border escalations that raised the spectre of war between the nuclear armed rivals, and US role in stabilizing the situation figures out in the period. Kashmir issue and its likely contours in the future have been touched upon. Another key security issue for Pakistan, its nuclear program, has been dealt with, taking into account the redefined security partnership and its impact on the nuclear program. Other aspects such as military sales and cooperation during the period have also been touched upon.

This chapter is followed by a conclusion which assesses the broad shape and contours of the security partnership, based on the historical trends of convergence and divergence, gleaned from the analysis of different periods of closeness and estrangement between the two erstwhile partners. It then takes each of these major issues of mutual concern and attempts at visualizing the future course of action, and the direction of the security relationship in the coming years. It also attempts at isolating those factors, which have contributed towards mutual distrust and estrangement in the past and offers some recommendations for building a mutually beneficial, stable and long-lasting partnership by addressing the trust deficit and its contributory factors that have soured the security/strategic relationship in the past.
US Strategic Imperatives for Renewed Security Assistance from Pakistan

The US-Pakistan relationship has been termed by one observer as “an excellent example of opportunistic relationship between two unequal powers, based on self interest, rather than mutually congruent objectives”\textsuperscript{1135}.

The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center shook America and the Bush Administration. The sheer scale of disaster and the audacity of the attacks on US at a time when US was undoubtedly the pre-eminent global power in the world, shocked the superpower. This attack on its own soil, with a loss of the most potent symbols of American prestige and economic power was extremely embarrassing. How could the world’s most advanced nation, with one of the best security and intelligence networks, let such a thing happen on its own soil? Not since the infamous attack on Pearl Harbour, had the US been attacked so successfully on its own turf. Given this analogy, no one could fully encompass the enormity of this occurrence, as Pearl Harbour was almost 3000 miles from mainland US. This attack on the World Trade Centre caused more casualties and embarrassment than any single attack during the entire last one century, on the mainland US. Even during US’s involvement in World War I, World War II, Korean, Vietnam and Gulf Wars, the continental US had never been subjected to hostile action so effectively. Its geographical location, far from these theatres of military operations assured that the US population at home did not suffer the miseries of war, as those nations in Europe and Asia whose homelands had

\textsuperscript{1135} (A.Z Hilali, September 11, 2001)
been the battlegrounds for protracted conflicts. Thus the US, despite participating in almost all major conflicts, and paying a price in terms of cost and casualties had never really seen such adversity and disaster on its own soil. Therefore 9/11 attacks were not just damaging from the prestige point of view, they also destroyed the myth of the US security and isolation. Terrorists had successfully brought the war to the US soil, and now the security environment could never be the same.

In this backdrop, the US Government needed to quickly identify the assailants and act decisively and forcefully to restore confidence and pride of the American people. Since the attacks were not perpetrated by a nation state, as a part of a declared war, the sense of anger and clamour for response was were more than it would be in a war-like situation.

The US intelligence community feverishly worked to identify the source of attack. It was not long before the intelligence indicators pointed towards Osma Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeeda Network. This network had been scrouge of the US intelligence community and the Clinton administration during last three years. The US had launched Cruise Missile strikes against suspected Al-Qaeea targets in August 1998, in response to bombing of its embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. This time, however, the attack had been on a scale and level totally unprecedented. The response would also be more than proportionate. Given the US’s loss of prestige, the Administration was hard pressed to reassert its power and potency, both in front of its own public and the international community. The presence of a hawkish, aggressive team, led by President George W. Bush in the White House, only added impetus to the calls for immediate and aggressive response.
As the US intelligence community zoomed onto the Al-Qaeda, the country long forgotten by the US Administration, Afghanistan, once more sharply came into the focus. There were credible reports that Al-Qaeda was based in Afghanistan, using the country as launch pad for its attacks against the US. The US administration had been trying since 1998, to urge the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden. The CIA had even launched clandestine operations to nab the Al-Qaeda leader but with little success. Pakistan had also been asked several times to use their influence with the Taliban, to facilitate the handover of Bin Laden. These efforts had not been successful. Now however, the urgency of the situation, and the scale of the US efforts were entirely different. This was a direct attack on the American soil, as against some peripheral establishment in another country. Within 24 hours of the attacks, the US had received a UN Security Council Resolution 1368. It called on all states to work together in bringing to justice the organizers, perpetrators and sponsors of the terrorist attacks and authorized the use of force. NATO, another US affiliate invoked its Article 5, authorizing the use of force. The Taliban were asked to hand over Bin Laden, or face the consequences. Pakistan was also in the eye of the storm. Being the principal backer of the largely un-recognized Taliban Government, it was asked to use its influences to facilitate Bin Laden’s handover. The ISI Chief, General Mehmood, who incidentally was in the US, during the 9/11 attacks, was briefed by the US administration officials, on the mounting evidence implicating Al-Qaeda in the attacks. He was also asked to convey US demands to the Pakistani Government, for

1136 (Coll, Ghost Wars, 2004)
1137 (Coll, Ghost Wars, 2004)
1138 (Collins, 16 May 2008, p. 5), (UN Security Council Resolution 1368, 12 September 2001)
assisting in Bin Laden’s handover. In addition to this effort, the US simultaneously prepared for a visible, massive military effort against the Taliban and Al-Qaeeda. The aim was to punish Al-Qaeeda and its supporters in Afghanistan, while ensuring that the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks are either killed or captured swiftly. Pakistan was therefore critical to the success of the US plans. This was for three main reasons:-

Firstly, Pakistan had a history of association with the Taliban. It was generally accepted that they had been supported and logistically supplied through Pakistani territory. Being a largely Pashtun group, they had roots in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Pakistan maintained official contacts with the Taliban leadership of Mullah Omar.

Secondly the landlocked country of Afghanistan could only be approached for military action from the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf, from either Iran or Pakistan. The other route was from the Central Asian Republics, which was less practical, as they were themselves landlocked and needed access through Russia. As the map indicates, the US military and naval presence in the Indian Ocean would need direct access through Pakistan, both for the naval support, logistics for a ground offensive and the fighter/bomber raids expected to be generated from the ships in the Indian Ocean and the US bases in Diego Garcia. Since Iran was not a viable option, owing to US – Iran
rift, Pakistan’s acquiescence to the US became even more critical\textsuperscript{1141}. In this regard, hectic diplomatic effort was launched by the US State Department\textsuperscript{1142}. Thirdly the US Government had credible intelligence that many of the terrorists suspected of involvement in the terrorist attacks, had links to the different organizations/ non-governmental agencies located in Pakistan. Even the ISI had been under constant US pressure to assist in Bin Laden’s capture\textsuperscript{1143}. The US strategy during the initial period is described by an author as “coercive” in nature and a combination of “carrot and stick policy”\textsuperscript{1144}. This assertion is also validated by the account given by Pakistan’s military leader, General Pervez Musharraf who describes his first conversation with US Secretary of State Collin Powel as rather undiplomatic. As per General Musharraf’s account Secretary Powel

\textsuperscript{1141} (Collins, 16 May 2008, p. 5)  
\textsuperscript{1142} (Burns, 24 November 2001)  
\textsuperscript{1143} (Collins, 16 May 2008, p. 5)  
\textsuperscript{1144} (Collins, 16 May 2008, p. 5)
said “you are either with us or against us”\textsuperscript{1145}. He further adds that the US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, was even more blunt:–

“Armitage told the Director General of ISI, (General Mehmood) that we had to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the terrorist, we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age”\textsuperscript{1146}.

In Pakistan, the US Ambassador, Wendy Chermerlain reinforced the US requirements, through direct contacts with Pakistani officials\textsuperscript{1147}. The specific US demands to Pakistan, as conveyed by the US Ambassador were total seven in number. Those demands were as follows\textsuperscript{1148}:

1. Stop al Qaeda operative at your borders, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, and end all logistical support for Bin Laden.

2. Provide the United State with blanket overflight and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations.

3. Provide territorial access to the United State and allied military intelligence as needed, and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrators of terrorism and those that harbor them, including the use of Pakistan’s naval ports, air bases, and strategic locations on borders.

\textsuperscript{1145} (Musharaff, 2006 p. 201)
\textsuperscript{1146} (Musharaff, 2006 p. 201)
\textsuperscript{1147} (Burns, 24 November 2001)
\textsuperscript{1148} (Musharaff, 2006 pp. 204-205)
4. Provide the United States immediately with intelligence, immigration information and data bases, and internal security information, to help prevent respond to terrorist acts perpetrated against the United States, its friends, or its allies.

5. Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of September 11 and any other terrorist acts against the United States or its friends and allied, and curb all domestic expressions of support [for terrorism] against the United States, its friends, or its allies.

6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits, including volunteers en route to Afghanistan, who can be used in a military offensive capacity or to abet a terrorist threat.

7. Should the evidenced strongly implicate Osama Bin Laden and the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan and should Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbor him and his network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, end support for the Taliban, and assist the United States in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama Bin Laden and his al Qaeda network\textsuperscript{1149}.

It is important to note that these demands were conveyed to Pakistan on 13\textsuperscript{th} of September, i.e within 4 days of the bombing. As is apparent from the tone and the substance of the demands, the US looked towards Pakistan for complete compliance

\textsuperscript{1149} (Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 2006, pp. 204-205)
to its set of demands. This essentially was coercive diplomacy which left little room for Pakistani establishment.

**Pakistan’s Strategic Compulsions and Imperatives to Join the Alliance**

Pakistan, in the wake of September 11 attacks, was faced with one of the most difficult security challenges in its history. The incidents brought Pakistan, a traditional US ally, at a crossroads. It could either support the Taliban, and be targeted along with them, or make a radical policy shift to avoid disaster. President Pervez Musharraf came to know of the 9/11 incident from the CNN, as most of the other world leaders.\(^{1150}\) The Pakistan President was quick to express his support for the US people and its government. He went on the national TV on the same day and announced that:-

“We condemn this vile act, that we are against all forms of terrorism and stand with America at this appalling time, and that we would assist it in any way we could”\(^{1151}\).

Quite apparently, this announcement was inspired partly by the fact that Pakistan was the only country that recognized the Taliban regime.\(^{1152}\) Thereafter the events unfolded very rapidly. President Musharraf received the “famous” telephone call from the US Secretary of State, asking him to decide which side his country was on. The issue of controversy here is that whether Musharraf only agreed on the

\(^{1150}\) (Musharaff, 2006 p. 200)

\(^{1151}\) (Musharaff, 2006 p. 200)

\(^{1152}\) (Musharaff, 2006 p. 200)
broader level cooperation, or as some observers have commented, he caved in to the specific demands right there and then, thus foreclosing any options for a better negotiated deal.

Though there is sufficient doubt pointing to the first assertion, yet taking President Musharraf’s account of the events as a basis, one can still analyse the imperatives, which according to him, made him to take this decision. An aspect that could have definitely played an important role in his decision was the level of legitimacy enjoyed by his regime. Having ousted a democratically elected Government in a military coup, and having assumed all powers in an almost dictatorial style, he was neither a popularly elected leader, nor answerable to an elected parliament. This had two distinct implications. Firstly he was not answerable to anybody. Therefore the need to consult party or parliamentarians, before taking a major policy decision, did not really exist. Secondly being a dictator, he was also hampered by the lack of objective counsel. As he writes himself “It is at times like these that the leader is confronted by acute loneliness”\(^{1153}\). It is also quite apparent that he did not consult even his cabinet before making the decision, from the statement “Having made my decision, I took it to my cabinet. As expected there was some concern from the ministers that they were not consulted”\(^{1154}\). The assertion that President Musharraf accepted the demands on Secretary Collin Powel telephone call is validated by the 9/11 commission report which says:

\(^{1153}\) (Musharaff, 2006 p. 201)

\(^{1154}\) (Musharaff, 2006 p. 206)
“Pakistan made its decision swiftly. That afternoon Secretary of State Collin Powel announced at the beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistan President had agreed to every US request for support in the war on terror”.

The next day, the US embassy in Islamabad confirmed that Musharraf and his top military commanders had agreed to all seven demands”\textsuperscript{1155}. Quite clearly President Musharraf had made the decision and accepted all requests, before the US embassy gave the demands formally to his government. This quick decision, some observers believe, took away the flexibility of negotiating a better deal with the US\textsuperscript{1156}. Notwithstanding the timing of General Musharraf’s decision, his logic and argument for supporting the US was in his own words, based on following main considerations:-

1. General Musharraf concluded that confronting the US military was not an option. The country did not have the military strength, economic prowess or the support at national/grassroot level to sustain such an undertaking \textsuperscript{1157}. Military confrontation with the reigning global superpower would spell disaster for Pakistan.

2. More importantly he looked into the possibility of India – US co-operation, in case Pakistan refused to co-operate. This would be more alarming for Pakistan’s long-term strategic interests. India could, by providing over flight right and bases “gain a golden opportunity” in

\textsuperscript{1155}(9111p. 331)  
\textsuperscript{1156}(Raja, 2010)  
\textsuperscript{1157}(Musharaff, 2006 p. 201)
Kashmir\textsuperscript{1158}. The Indo-US collusion could result in a situation where Pakistan might be denied its rightful claim and Kashmir Line of Control be turned into a permanent border\textsuperscript{1159}.

The decision, though literally thrust upon Pakistan, is generally regarded as prudent and suitable under the prevailing hostile environments. It also meant that Pakistan would have to radically alter its policy towards Afghanistan and Kashmir\textsuperscript{1160}. It was however a calculated response, based on a cost-benefit analysis\textsuperscript{1161}. Based on the gravity of the situation, and the danger in non-compliance, this was arguably the only safe course available to the country’s leadership. Pakistan’s Afghan policy had been in place many years prior to General Musharraf’s take over. Although he recognized the problems associated with continued support to Taliban, he had not been able to decisively shift towards a better alternative. The 9/11 incident just brought him face to face with a critical decision. Given the circumstances, it was a prudent decision to align the country with the US. The second aspect was security and protection of Pakistan’s nuclear capability. As General Musharraf puts it “It is no secret that the United States has never been comfortable with a Muslim Country acquiring nuclear weapons”\textsuperscript{1162}.

The nuclear capability achieved through decades of hard work, provided the only credible deterrence against the Indian hegemony. Another consideration was that of economy and infrastructure. Any war or even short confrontation with the US,

\textsuperscript{1158} (Musharaff, 2006 p. 201)  
\textsuperscript{1159} (Hilali, 2005 p. 134)  
\textsuperscript{1160} (A.Z Hilali, September 11, 2001 p. 135)  
\textsuperscript{1161} (A.Z Hilali, September 11, 2001 p. 136)  
\textsuperscript{1162} (Musharaff, 2006 p. 202)
would have a devastating effect on Pakistan’s otherwise rudimentary infrastructure. In case Pakistan decided to support the US, it would at minimum, be able to avoid the fallouts, as mentioned above. Additionally the US support would allow the Government to make a much needed correction in the foreign policy, with regards to Taliban. Pakistan could now tackle, with the US help, the growing militancy and sectarianism within the country, largely due to the mushrooming of religious and sectarian organizations in the last two decades. And lastly the country, which had been “an outcast nation”, following the nuclear tests in 1999, would again become relevant to the reigning global power. General Musharraf claims that self preservation and self interest of Pakistan was the basis of his decision. This is also partly true for the US, as their self-interest required Pakistan to be on board at this article time. It has otherwise viewed Pakistan mostly in terms of how much it can serve the US strategic interests at a given point of time.

Despite the sense of urgency and the thinly veiled threats, Pakistan’s decision to support the US in the war against Taliban-Al-Qaeda, was a welcome step for both the countries. The US once again obtained the willing cooperation of an old ally. It was rather convenient and smooth to re-establish old contacts between the two militaries, something vital for the forthcoming major campaign in Afghanistan. But before the campaign could begin, Pakistan was asked to use its influence with the Taliban for arranging the handover of Osama Bin Laden. As one Indian author describes it, “Pakistan, curiously, was first off the blocks in offering assistance to the

1163 (Musharraf, 2006 p. 203)
1164 (Musharraf, 2006 p. 203)
1165 (Nanda, p. 111)
US. This enabled the country to once again gain qualified US attention\(^{1166}\). Many Indians felt peeved at the ease and speed with which Pakistan once again became relevant to the US. This was primarily due to a timely and decisive re-orientation of policy by President Musharraf. A useful advantage, coming out as a by product of this co-operation was the legitimacy and newfound importance for the Pakistan leader, who had been under international pressure and sanctions due to his military coup\(^{1167}\).

**Analysis – President Musharraf’s Decision**

In the cost benefit analysis, the first advantage to Pakistan was to avoid being grouped with Taliban, and thereby incur the wrath of a superpower, bent upon finding a suitable target and pummelling it. This was avoided by President Musharraf’s quick and complete acceptance of the US demands\(^{1168}\). Secondly Pakistan stole a march on India by promptly offering its territory for bases and overflight rights, thus foreclosing the most dangerous possibility of Indo-US security cooperation\(^{1169}\). Thirdly Pakistan gained tangible concessions from the US on economic, nuclear proliferation and security related issues. The US not only lifted sanctions related to Pakistan’s nuclear tests, but also those related to President Musharraf’s military takeover. Secondly the country’s economy, tottering due to a huge foreign debt of almost US $43 billion,

\(^{1166}\) (Kaul, 2003 p. 27)
\(^{1167}\) (Kaul, 2003 p. 57)
\(^{1168}\) (Rehman, Winter, 2004 p. 21)
\(^{1169}\) (Musharraf, 2006 pp. 200-202)
dollars\textsuperscript{1170}, received a major boost. Within first three years of the renewed cooperation, the US extended $1 billion in grants, wrote off $1 billion in debt, and sanctioned $1.2 billion in arms sales and almost $3 billion for economic aid and security assistance\textsuperscript{1171}. US assistance to Pakistan from 2001 to 2006 is substantial as is evident from the data below:-

**U.S. Assistance to Pakistan, Fiscal Years 2001-2006 (in millions of dollars)**

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<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
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<td><strong>494.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>387.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>437.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>698.2</strong></td>
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\textsuperscript{1170} (Sattar, June 6, 2005)
\textsuperscript{1171} (Cohen S. P., March 2005, p. 132), (Liam Collins United States Diplomacy with Pakistan Following 9/11 A case study in coercive diplomacy 16 May 2008 WWS 547: The Conduct of International Diplomacy p. 5)
On the downside, Pakistan’s complete reversal of its foreign policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan had a major domestic fallout. To the man on streets, its was akin to abandoning an old friend in time of crisis. The religious community was especially unfavourably poised towards the decision. This was just the start. As the US engagement in Afghanistan prolonged, and the Indian pressure on Jehadi organizations mounted, in the wake of Mumbai attacks, this internal schism widened considerably. In essence the decision to side with the US opened up the Pandora’s box of sectarianism, Jehadi organizations, unruly tribal areas, and a deep divide between the forces of moderation and extremism within the country. The fact that this decision was taken by a military leader, further fuelled the resentment of the religious and sectarian parties. More over the Al-Qaeeeda declared goals of putting pressure on Israel, resonated with religious and some segments of society in Pakistan.

The security relationship between the US and Pakistan, necessitated by the 9/11 incident, once again opened up many new promising prospects as well as troubles for Pakistan. In such an unequal partnership, it is often the interests of the stronger party,

\[\text{P.L. 480, Title II: emergency and private assistance food aid (grants)}\]

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\[\text{Section 416(b): Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus donations)}\]

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<th>85.1</th>
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\[\text{Total} \quad 94.5 \quad 2212.8 \quad 1007.9 \quad 798.8 \quad 875.2 \quad 1396.4\]

\[\text{1172 (Rehman L. C., Winter 2004, pp. 19-22)}\]
which prevail\textsuperscript{1173}. An aspect which lent urgency to this renewed co-operation, was
that US wanted to initiate immediate action against the perpetrators of 9/11. Thus the
entire process was in a compressed time frame. Additionally the Bush administration
showed decisiveness and clear resolve to pursue a military option\textsuperscript{1174}. The
proceedings of the key US National Security Council meeting, chaired by Condolezza
Rice concluded that “anyone supporting Al-Qaeeda would risk harm”. It also
concluded that “if Pakistan decided not to help US, it too would be at risk”\textsuperscript{1175}.

Though there were dissentions and certain amount of opposition from the
religious quarters, the intelligencia, media luminaries and influential persons from the
border areas adjoining Pakistan, generally agreed with the decisions of President
Musharraf. The notable exception was the religious leaders and Mullahs\textsuperscript{1176}.

**US Invades Afghanistan – Operation Enduring Freedom**

The US Government went through hectic political, diplomatic and military
preparations simultaneously. The first step was an ultimatum to the Taliban, to hand
over Bin Laden, or face the consequences\textsuperscript{1177}. The US President “wanted the US to
strike the Taliban, step back, wait to see if they got the message, and hit them hard if
they did not”\textsuperscript{1178}. The deadline was set at October 7, 2001. President Musharraf

\textsuperscript{1173} (Hilali, 2005 p. 135)
\textsuperscript{1174} (Hussain, October 10, 2001), The 9/11 Commission Report 'Final report of the National
Commission on Terrieuat Attacks upon the United States), (Liam Collins United States Diplomacy with
Pakistan Following 9/11 A case study in coercive diplomacy 16 May 2008 WWS 547: The Conduct of
International p 5)
\textsuperscript{1175} (9111p. 331)
\textsuperscript{1176} (Sattar, 2007 pp. 245-246)
\textsuperscript{1177} (9111p. 332)
\textsuperscript{1178} (9111p. 332)
despatched senior officials to Afghanistan in a bid to convince Mullah Omer to hand over Bin Laden. The negotiations were fruitless, primarily because of the firm and rigid religious and traditional beliefs of Mullah Omar. President Musharraf describes these negotiations in following words:

“It was like banging one’s head against a wall. We have two entirely opposite worldviews. Whereas I believe that one should exhaust every avenue to avoid war and the death and destruction it entails. Omar thinks that death and destruction are inconsequential details in a just war.”1179

The US Government meanwhile, was busy preparing options for military campaign inside Afghanistan. The National Security Presidential Directive Number 9, titled “Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States” was drafted in October 2001. It aimed at elimination of all terrorist networks, dry up their financial support and prevent them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The goal was the “elimination of terrorism as a threat to our (American) way of life”1180. This directive and the US thinking process at the time opened up the new chapter in US Global Strategy named, “The war on terror”, which not only encompassed Afghanistan but also hooked in Iraq as a potential base/support for terrorism1181. The US President addressed the American nation on September 20th, declaring:-

1179 (Musharaff, 2006 p. 206)
1180 (9111p. 334)
1181 (9111p. 334)
“Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them. Every nation in every region has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”1182.

The “Operation Enduring Freedom” as the invasion of Afghanistan was codenamed, unfolded as follows:

**OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM**

![Map of Operation Enduring Freedom](image_url)

In Phase 1 the United States and allied countries moved their forces towards the countries bordering Afghanistan i.e Pakistan and Uzbekistan, to be in a striking range of Afghanistan. In Phase 2, joint CIA and special operations teams were deployed to support all major Afghan factions opposing Taliban. Chief amongst them was the

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1182 (9111p. 337)
Northern Alliance. This was complemented by massive US air strikes, which commenced on October 7, following Mullah Omer’s decision not to hand over Bin Laden. The massive bombing, in support of the Northern Alliance, obliterated the Taliban defensive positions. In Phase 3, “decisive operations” were launched, including all elements of national power, utilizing ground troops to topple the Taliban regime and dominate Al-Qaeeda sanctuaries in Afghanistan. The key city of Mazar-e-Sharif was captured on November 9. By the 13th of November, Taliban had vacated Kabul and the Northern Alliance, whom Pakistan had so vociferously opposed over the years, entered triumphantly in Kabul. On 22nd December 2001, Hamid Karzai was installed as the new President of Afghanistan.

In this war effort, Pakistan provided substantial logistic support. More than 28,000 air sorties were flown over the Pakistani airspace in the first five months of war. Pakistan also provided bases at Jacobabd, Pasni, Shamsi and Dalbandin.

One major effect of the Northern Alliance victory was a completely reversed and altered situation in Afghanistan, as far as Pakistan’s foreign policy was concerned. Yet it opened up new prospects, as Pakistan had an opportunity to undo past mistakes and retain a constructive involvement in subsequent events. This in actuality proved much more difficult, owing to Pakistan domestic opposition to the new policy, both from the Taliban supporters, in the religious parties and the ISI. It was also difficult due to Northern Alliance ties with India and Russia, which made

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1183 (9111pp. 337-338)
1184 (Sattar, 2007 p. 247), (Liam Collins United States Diplomacy with Pakistan Following 9/11 A case study in coercive diplomacy 16 May 2008 WW5 547: The Conduct of International p 5)
1185 (Rehman L. C., Winter 2004, p. 21)
1186 (Rashid A., Chaos, 2007, pp. 77-79)
the new Afghan Government inimical to Pakistan, despite overtures of friendship and cooperation. It also meant that the war was far from over, as the later events would prove\textsuperscript{1187}. The Northern Alliance capture of Kabul was termed as “worst nightmare for Pakistan”. The fate of Mullah Omar was an enigma setter, as he was known to have escaped from Kandahar on a “Honda Motorcycle”.

The US forces launched a major operation against Al-Qaeda operatives in the Tora Bora Hills in late 2001 and Operation Anaconda in Eastern Afghanistan’s Shah-i-Kot Mountains in March 2002.

**OPERATION ANACONA – TORA BORA HILLS**

![Map of Tora Bora Hills and Anaconda Area of Operations]

There were many rumors, most of these without any real basis, that Pakistani intelligence had helped some of these groups. Much to the consternation of Pakistan,
such allegations often involved Indian inspired sources\textsuperscript{1189}. There were many reports, repeated over the time, that Mullah Omar was hiding in border areas of Pakistan. Some reports even claimed that he was in the city of Quetta\textsuperscript{1190}. Osama Bin Laden escaped capture in the Tora Bora mountains. It was also claimed, that Osama Bin Laden escaped from the Tora Bora into the tribal regions of Pakistan. “When Osama Bin Laden escaped into FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan) in December 2001, the place was so inviting that he never strayed far”\textsuperscript{1191}.

**Afghanistan Conflict – Spill Over and Connections with FATA**

One of the major fallouts of the US invasion of Afghanistan was the spread of militancy, violence and terrorist outfits into the adjoining relatively safer areas. The tribal belt of Pakistan, known as FATA turned out to be the ideal location for these fugitives. Though it is not known how many such fighters actually escaped into Pakistan, yet, the tribal areas did provide safe havens and excellent hiding grounds for the militants. Old connections of Afghanistan war, presence of Taliban sympathizers, madrassas, and an ungoverned vast territory, all contributed towards this phenomenon. Ahmed Rashid describes it as follows:-

“FATA became a multilayered terrorist cake. At its base were Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen, soon to become Taliban in their own right, who

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{1189}{(Sands, January 4, 2002)}
\footnotetext{1190}{(Musharaff, 2006 p. 217)}
\footnotetext{1191}{(Rashid, 2007 p. 265)}
\end{footnotes}
provided hideouts and logistics support. Above them were the Afghan Taliban, who settled there after 9/11, followed by militants from Central Asia, Chechnya, Africa, China and Kashmir, and topped by Arabs who forged a protective ring around Bin Laden. FATA became the world’s “terrorism central”.

Related to the war on terror, this issue would develop into a major source of bickering between the US and Pakistan on one hand and the Afghan and Pakistan Governments on the other hand. FATA dynamics and military operations will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent paragraphs.

(Rashid, 2007 pp. 85-88)
**Afghanistan remains Unsettled after the Karzai Government**

The US military operations in Afghanistan were swift, massive, and gained quick victory over the Taliban militia. Routing the Taliban turned out to be the easy part. It was establishing the writ of the government and eliminating the Taliban influences from the countryside, which has remained elusive for the US led coalition, even after nine years of occupation. This is turning out to be a quagmire which the Bush team had not anticipated in 2001. In this context, Pakistan has gained more significance, as any solution to the Afghan situation, and any respectable withdrawal of the US troops from the country is contingent upon support and assistance of the Pakistani government.

Two main issues have become pronounced in US-Pak relations with respect to Afghanistan. First is the repeated assertion that the insurgency in Afghanistan, primarily by the resurgent Taliban, is being conducted from bases inside Pakistan’s tribal areas. These include fighters of the Huqqani network and those of Gulbadin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami. The white Paper of the Interagency Policy Group Report on US Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan claims that the ability of extremists in Pakistan to undermine Afghanistan is process, while insurgency in Pakistan feeds instability in Afghanistan*. The same views have been expressed by Admiral Mike Mullen, the US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, who contends that

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*Siddique, October 2006*
Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked in a common insurgency that crosses the border between them\textsuperscript{1194}.

The Obama Government is looking at reducing the expectations in Afghanistan and achieving some degree of government control, along with elimination of safe havens for terrorists inside Afghanistan and Pakistan\textsuperscript{1195}. The problems facing the US-led coalition after ousting Taliban is that the country is unstable, the government is widely regarded as corrupt and incompetent. The security situation has worsened, with the Taliban and militias expanding their influence. The force levels in Afghanistan, are already touching close to 65,000 international troops, with more than 35,000 US troops deployed in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{1196}. The additional troops sent by President Obama, as part of the surge recommended by then Commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McCrystal do not seem to be having any significant effects. Much like the Soviets two decades ago, the US and its allies are largely restricted to main cities and Kabul, while the countryside is the happy hunting ground of the Taliban. A sharp increase in violence levels indicates increased influence of Taliban.

**Afghanistan’s Role in Fermenting Insurgency/Unrest in Balochistan in Collusion with India**

The second issue of contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which affects Pak-US strategic partnership is the presence of Indians in the areas bordering

\textsuperscript{1194} (Burns, 24 November 2001)
\textsuperscript{1195} (Burns, 24 November 2001, p. 3)
\textsuperscript{1196} (Burns, 24 November 2001)
Pakistan. They have been repeatedly accused of fermenting unrest in the province of Balochistan. Pakistan Army’s recent operations in the tribal areas of Bajaur, Waziristan and Swat in 2008-2009, have unearthed many proofs of Indian involvement in supporting and funding the insurgents and terrorists.

The issue was raised at the highest level by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani in a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the Egyptian resort town of Sharm-Al-Sheikh. The same issue was also highlighted by Pakistan’s Army Chief in a meeting with the EU leadership in Brussels in 2009. This aspect has the potential to adversely affect the US-Pakistan cooperation in the security domain. As Bernett Rubin and Abu Bakar Siddique point out:
“Pakistan sees the United States increasingly favouring India…… and faces an Afghan Government whose rhetoric has become more confrontational. As a result Pakistan sees no strategic advantage in eliminating the Taliban…….The ability of Pakistan-Based group to destabilize Afghanistan sends a massage that Islamabad, not Delhi or Kabul, is the key to stability in the region”\textsuperscript{1197}.

The Indian ingress into Afghanistan in the shape of economic activity, advisors and engineers constructing roads is something the Pakistan Administration is prepared to accept as long as it does not directly affect Pakistan. The alignment of the Afghan regime, and its preference for India is also not unacceptable\textsuperscript{1198}. What Pakistan is not willing to accept is Afghanistan acting as a base for Indian covert designs against Pakistan’s restive Western border regions, particularly Balochistan. This point has been recognized by Bernett Rubin and Abu Bakar Siddique in their report, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan stalemate”. They conclude that India and Afghanistan must address the issue of insecurity in the border regions, if they expect Pakistan to play a major role in resolving the military problem in the border regions. This would require US to play an active part, as it is in a position to dictate terms to the Karzai Government which is surviving purely because of US led military presence in Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{1197} (Siddique, October 2006)
\textsuperscript{1198} (General Ashfaq Kiyani, talk in Command Staff College Quetta, 2010)
Pakistan’s Role in the Future of Afghanistan and Successful US Military Withdrawal from the Region

The Obama Administration, since its arrival in 2009, has been looking for a suitable exit strategy from Afghanistan. Pakistan, which had been considered in some quarters as part of the problem in Afghanistan, is now increasingly being viewed as a key to the solution in the country. This is largely due to Pakistan’s recent successes in tackling the growing militancy in Swat and the Tribal Areas, as well as a such clearer stance on the Afghan situation. Pakistan has expressed its willingness to let the Afghan people decide the future of the country, without foreign involvement, as long as it does not impinge on Pakistan’s security and internal stability, especially Balochistan and FATA. In this backdrop there is a growing realization in the US Administration that any successful conclusion to Operation Enduring Freedom, and timely withdrawal of US forces, will be contingent upon whole-hearted support from Pakistan.

The security objectives of the two countries are congruent as far as peace and stability in Afghanistan is concerned. The Peace Jirga, held in Kabul, on 12 August 2007, attended by President Hamid Karzai and Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan also concluded that both countries needed to work together for peace and stability, which would not only address their internal issue, but also facilitate the larger US-policy goals in Afghanistan. Some of the major recommendations of the Peace Jirga were as follows:-

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1199 (Rashid, 2007 p. 404)
1. Afghanistan should help promote traditional leadership amongst the Pashtuns.

2. The war against terror should be accelerated, along with the pursuance of peace and reconciliation.

3. Both the countries should not allow their territories for commission of acts of terror. Information sharing should be carried out in this regard.

4. Pursue a dialogue process for peace and reconciliation with the opponents\textsuperscript{1200}.

The wide spread perception in Pakistan’s border that it is Americas region War\textsuperscript{1201}, and in Afghanistan that the US has done very little to improve the quality of life of the Afghan people\textsuperscript{1202} are the two major stumbling blocks in the achievement of a lasting settlement to the Afghan conflict. Both these issues require active US involvement. The $750 Billion Dollar FATA initiative, if carried through by the Pakistan and US Government, could be very helpful.

The resistance to US military presence in Afghanistan has weathered the most intense military operations, and almost nine years of military presence. The Haqqani Group, Hizb-e-Islami and Taliban factions resisting the US clearly see a weariness setting in, as well as an urge to pull out, reflected by President Obama’s decision to reduce troop levels from 2011 awards. Under such circumstances, many observers recommend a dialogue and reconciliation\textsuperscript{1203}.

\textsuperscript{1200} (Aziz, January / March 2008 pp. 101-102)

\textsuperscript{1201} (Burns, 24 November 2001, p. 5)

\textsuperscript{1202} (Hippel, 2007)

\textsuperscript{1203} (Karin Von Hippel, October 17, 2008)
Unless the Pashtuns are given a larger share and stake in the Afghan Government, the situation is not likely to improve. The map clearly indicates that large swath of Afghan and Pakistan territory, both sides of the Durand line is inhabited by Pashtun. They cannot be ignored or sidelined. The US reliance on Northern Alliance dominated Afghan Government has failed to deliver. More participative approach is required for a lasting peace. Another key area of US involvement is to involve, convince and cajole the regional powers which include Russia, India, China and Iran, to engage constructively in Afghanistan and let Afghan people decide their own future, without outside interference. Pakistan, as discussed earlier has equally high stakes in the stability and peace in Afghanistan. How the US is able to bring all or

1204 (Aziz, January / March 2008 p. 102)
1205 (Aziz, January / March 2008 p. 103)
most of these countries on board, keeping in view the greater ambitions for the control of Central Asian Oil and Gas reserves, is a big question mark. Without the support of the regional players, the insurgents and splinter groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue to receive funding for mischief and terrorism from interested parties. This would greatly hamper any chances for confidence building, reconstruction/rehabilitation of the tribal/ border areas of the two countries devastated by years of neglect and military operations. Without a hope for better future, there is little likelihood that Pashtun on both sides of the Durand Line will lay down their arms. The US and Pakistan interests are closely intertwined in relation to the Afghan situation. By addressing Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns vis-a-vis stability in Afghanistan and non-interference in Balochistan by Indo-Afghan nexus, the US can gain Pakistan’s support in achieving the elusive peace and stability in Afghanistan.\footnote{Burns, 24 November 2001}

**The Military Operations in FATA – 2001 to 2010**

The military operations in FATA, since the September 11 policy decision by General Musharraf to side with the US, have been increasing in intensity and ferocity over the years. The most intense period of conflict was 2008-2009, when major operations against hardened strongholds of the Taliban fighters were conducted under the guidance of the new Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani.\footnote{Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 130}
A major change in the pattern of operations has been due to the fact that till 2007, the ownership of the anti-militant campaign did not rest with the political Government. General Musharraf was widely viewed as pursuing an American agenda, in order to perpetuate his own stay in power. Even within the Army, the level of commitment towards the campaign against terrorism fluctuated, with individuals sometimes not very clear about the objectives and the reasons for going against the tribal population.

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1208 (Pakistan Reject US Military Action against Al Qaeda; More Support bin Laden than President Musharraf: Result of New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Pakistan Terror Free Tomorrow)
Yet Army being a trained and professional outfit, executed the orders and the tasks assigned. The presence of General Musharraf at the helm of affairs, and his handling of the Chief Justice in 2007, resulted in widespread discontent against the incumbent regime. In this backdrop, Pakistan Army was viewed as the main reason for his continuous clinging to power. The Army image was at its lowest ebb. This also reflected in the low morale and confusion during the operations. Lack of clear direction and absence of national support resulted in some embarrassing incidents, one amongst them being the capture of an entire infantry battalion by the Taliban in 2008, in Waziristan.

The Lal Masjid operation against holed up militants in Islamabad in 2008 added yet another negative mark on the Government’s handling of the situation. It resulted in a wave of suicide bombings and attacks against military targets. Yet the Musharraf Government, owing to its pre-occupation with the political drama with the Chief Justice and lack of credibility with the public, could not respond meaningfully. This all changed, with the arrival of an elected government in 2008, and more importantly the ascension to the Chief of Army Staff post, of General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani. With political backing, public support and a comprehensive strategy, the Pakistan Army was able to reverse the growing trend of Talibanzation. Especially noteworthy were the operations in the Swat Valley, where militants had taken complete control and were involved in horrendous atrocities against innocent people and women/children in the name of Islam. Swat can rightly be termed as the turning point.

1209 (Interview with the new Commanding Officers of the Unit)
point in the long and ardous struggle against growing militancy. It gave the
government and the army some breathing space, which if properly exploited, can lead
to a reversal of the trends prevalent in the tribal areas since the US-led invasion of
Afghanistan in 2001. Swat and its follow up operations in South Waziristan, for the
first time demonstrated to the US and the West, that Pakistan not only owns its own
war against growing militancy and terrorism, but its Government and Armed Forces
are capable of undertaking very tough, complex and multi-dimensional operations
successfully. An aspect which stands out in last two years is the use of all elements of
national power to fight the growing militancy in Pakistan. The operations in Swat and
Waziristan were preceded by a political consensus and government’s ownership.
They involved not only the Army, but for the first the time Pakistan Air Force in a big
way. The strategy of “Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer”, enunciated by the new Army
Chief has been quite effective. An area which is still not fully conversed is the post-
operations actions by local administration and political government, which involves
building and strengthening the civilian government infrastructure to address the
governance, administrative and developmental issue of the areas cleared by the
military. This is where Pakistan is looking for the US to provide capacity building
assistance and financial support to rebuild the tribal areas, provide employment and
job opportunities to the youth, bring education and health facilities and develop basic
infrastructure. This is a long term co-operation that will be vital to ensure that
militants and terrorist are denied public support vital for their existence.

What Pakistan’s security forces have been able to achieve is space and
opportunity for the politico – economic measures to kick-in. Real success will only
come once the tribal areas have been brought under firm writ of the government and
the uplift measures start taking effect and changing lives of the people.

A brief review of the military operations from the year 2001 onwards provides
a useful insight into the complex interplay of US and Pakistan security imperatives
and the results achieved on ground. The US, having provided massive military aid for
the specific purpose, had been for a long time asking the Pakistan Government to “do
more”. Now with the strategic objectives better aligned, due to a realization that
Talibanization poses a real threat to Pakistan’s internal security and cohesion, this
demand has largely been met. Yet the tribal areas are far from pacified. North
Waziristan still is considered to be a hotbed of terrorists and Afghan Taliban,
operating across the border with the US forces unable to control the Afghan country
side. With and the growing influence of Taliban, there are increased demands on
Pakistan to step up its efforts against the militants. This requires even more
resources and troops. Pakistan Army, weary from years of involvement and heavy
fighting is already stretched to capacity, to meet the existing challenges, not to
mention the ever-present threat on the Eastern Border. Internal security situation in
other parts of the country also drains the meagre resources.

With the US looking for an exit strategy for its military forces in Afghanistan,
the pacification of the restive FATA will become a major pre-requisite in the coming
years. It holds the key to peace in Pakistan and conducive environment for stability in
the neighbouring Afghanistan. Now let us take a look at the salient military

[1210] (Nicoll, 2009 International Institute For Strategic Studies, p. 2), (Cordesman, September 14, 2008,
p. 6)
operations and the related peace deals and agreements in the FATA region, that have shaped the security environment in the areas, as well as in Pakistan. They have also been instrumental in shaping the tone and substance of the security dialogue and military cooperation between the US and Pakistan.

**Taliban and Arab Fighters Flee to FATA - In the Wake of US Invasion in Afghanistan.** In the immediate follow-up to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters found Afghanistan too inhospitable. There was reportedly a massive exodus of the fighters to Pakistan’s tribal areas, where they could escape the bombing raids and coordinated ground action by the US-Northern Alliance forces\(^ {1211}\). Ahmed Rashid claims that during this period, thousands of Al-Qaeda and Taliban from Afghanistan were allowed to move into Waziristan, where they created bases and settled, to start operations against the new leadership in Afghanistan\(^ {1212}\). Some of the Mehsud and Wazir tribesmen who guided and provided sanctuary to the Arab fighters, became wealthy from the payments they received for their services. It is important to note that the honour code of Pashtunwali, the tribal code for honour and behaviour, encompasses “melmastia” or hospitality, “nanawati”, the notion that hospitality can never be denied to a fighter,\(^ {1213}\) played an important part in this process. It is also worth noting that a more mundane reason for the provision of these services was money. The Arabs doled out large sums of money both for getting into these mountain sanctuaries and for enjoying

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\(^{1211}\) (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 69), (Rashid, 2007 p.265)  
\(^{1212}\) (Rashid, 2007 p. 268)  
\(^{1213}\) (Rashid, 2007 p. 265)
the safety and hospitality of the tribals. Though not much advertised, this has been a major source of income for the tribesmen for a very long time. During the Afghan war, they gained money for the bases and transportation of guns/equipment across the border. Even otherwise, the unruly tribal areas, with little writ of the national government often provide refuge to criminals and common thugs escaping from justice. They are also notorious for car thefts, smuggling and kidnapping for ransom. With little industry, limited agriculture, a few other sources of income, these people do not find such activities abhorrent. Thus the newfound opportunity for making easy money was grabbed immediately by the tribesmen.

\[1214\text{ (Interviews with officers operating in the FATA)}\]
Pakistan Government established check posts (a total of 186), on the Pak-Afghan border. However, the rugged mountain terrain, absence of a natural barrier between the two countries, and the impossible task of sealing such a long and porous border, made the effort quite futile.

South Waziristan Agency was widely recognized as the immediate adobe of the Al-Qaeda fighters. The Al-Qaeda were reportedly in strength in the area of Angoor Adda, from where they conducted operations against the coalition forces. An aspect that badly hampered Pakistan’s ability to concentrate forces against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban in the crucial time was the military escalation on the Eastern borders with India. This followed the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament after which the Indian Government massed their troops on Pakistan border, in the biggest military buildup to date. Under such circumstances, the Pakistan Army units were rushed to their battle locations. Already facing a major force differential, the Army could not opt to keep any major outfit away from its battle location. This distraction provided an excellent window of opportunity to the militant to re-group and assert themselves in the tribal areas. Army units who went to the area later in 2002-2003, found that the Al-Qaeda and their supporters had by now established themselves firmly in the area. Taliban leader Jalaluddin Haqqani and Tahir Yaldashov of IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) firmly entrenched themselves in the local populace. An aspect, with far reaching impact was the killing of tribal

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1215 (Rashid, Chaos, 2007, p. 269)
1216 (Interviews with Military Commanders)
elders and leaders, who were considered as spies for the US. This slowly changed the dynamics of FATA. Instead of just being fugitives, the Taliban and their sympathizers literally took over the tribal areas in selected locations.

Apparently there was not much military activity in the FATA region till 2004. However, during this period, two successive suicide attacks on President Musharraf, just a few miles from his official residence, rattled the Pakistani leader. These attempts on December 14 and December 25, 2003, came very close to getting their intended target. The investigation, headed by General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, then Corps Commander at Rawalpindi, revealed close links of the perpetrators with Al-Qaeda and Jaish-e-Muhammad led by Maulana Masood Azhar. One of the suicide bombers, Jamil belonged to Azad Kashmir (Kotli). He had gone to Afghanistan in 2001, to participate in the war against the US forces. There he was made a captive and stayed there for two years, till his father paid money for his release. He was deeply embittered by the incident and vowed to take revenge by assassinating President Pervez Musharraf, who was known as closely associated with the US’s war effort. The information gathered from the investigation showed terrorists links with Omar Sheikh one of the kidnappers of the ill-fated US Journalist Danial Pearl, Abu-Faraj, Al-Libbi, a key Al-Qaeda operative and some personnel from Special Services Group (SSG), the elite commando units, to which President Musharraf also belonged in his younger days were also involved. The investigation

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1217 (Kaufman, January 25, 2003)
1218 (Musharaff, 2006 p. 247)
1219 (Musharaff, 2006 p. 249)
later led to the capture of Abu Faraj, Al Libbi in December, 2005 1220. The investigation, however, revealed disturbing signs of things to follow. It revealed many supporters amongst Pakistanis for the Al-Qaeda, both in the civilian and military setups. It also showed that these Al-Qaeda operatives could move, hide and operate freely in major towns such as Rawalpindi, Abbottabad, Hasan Abdal and Quetta, without being detected. The link to South Waziristan were also unmistakable1221. From 2002 till 2008, when President Musharraf finally handed over power to General Kiyani, there were series of operations in the tribal areas. Unfortunately none of them proved decisive and most were never taken to the logical end. As a result, the Taliban and militants, who opposed the military, gained confidence, while the Army not only suffered from lack of confidence and low morale but often was accused of not doing enough1222.

The first military operation against Al-Qaeda fighters was conducted by the Pakistan Army in South Waziristan Agency on June 25, 2002. It was named Khaza Punga operation. The operation was launched against Al-Qaeda operatives believed to be hiding in the area, along with their families. The terrorists tricked the force commander, reflecting innocence, once the force had surrounded the compound. As the search party entered, without much precautionary measures, they were sprayed with a hail of bullets. All the terrorists, except two that were killed in the exchange of fire, managed to escape. The security forces lost 10 lives. It was a botched operation, showing little understanding of the dynamics of frontier operations and of the psyche.

1220 (Musharraf, 2006 p. 260)
1221 (Musharraf, 2006 pp. 249-260)
1222 (Interview discussions with officers participating in various operations during the period)
and motivation of the militants. It also reflected badly on the level of preparedness of the security forces\textsuperscript{1223}.

President Musharraf calls the operation a turning point and writes that it highlighted the magnitude and seriousness of the threat\textsuperscript{1224}. Based on the observations of the Khaza Punga operation, Pakistan requested the US Government to provide assistance for creating a special air-mobile unit, on the lines of Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) in the US Army. The arrangement coordinated for this force was to have aerial surveillance capability from unmanned drones, flown by US handlers, human intelligence from local sources and air mobility. However, the night flying capability did not materialize till one year later. The helicopters also arrived, but in 2003\textsuperscript{1225}. In the meanwhile, most of the operations conducted were inconclusive. By now the Musharraf Government was realizing that Al-Qaeda and affiliates were much more entrenched in the tribal areas, than they had originally estimated. Most of the airmobile operations conducted during the period failed to nab any worthwhile target. The tribals with their excellent communication arrangements, would give timely information of the incoming troops, whose ability to operate was hampered by the daylight flying hours and the predictable timings of operations. The main aviation base in Rawalpindi, used for launching such operations, was at Dhamial, about 5 miles from the Army General Headquarters. These helicopters would be collected from different bases around the country, to provide sufficient lift capacity. This would take at least one or two days preparation, prior to the operation.

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\textsuperscript{1223} (Musharaff, 2006 p. 265)  
\textsuperscript{1224} (Musharaff, 2006 p. 265)  
\textsuperscript{1225} (Musharaff, 2006 p. 266)
The troops would also move to the base, with their equipment and weapon, through small, crowded streets all in the full view of the general public. Then on the day of operations, due to day flying limitations, the helicopters would take off early. Refuelling enroute, picking up interpreters from Miranshah or some other location in FATA, who also had to be informed at least a day prior, all mitigated against achievement of surprise. The actual operational hours were just a few and the time bracket could be deduced with little common sense.1226

The air mobile operations were substantially improved by mid 2003, as new equipment including Bell-421 helicopters and night vision equipment arrived from the US in 2003. In 2003, a video was released of Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Osama Bin Laden, on the Al Jazeera TV. This video included a Fatwa by the Al-Qaeda leader, calling for action against President Musharraf1227. Pakistan Government was now realizing that the scale of the problems was much more than earlier anticipated. Yet there was no broad consensus on the need for military operations or the scale of the effort required1228.

The next major operation, launched in October 2003, was named “Baghar China”. This operation was quite successful, resulting in the death of two important militants, a Jordanian named Samarkand, with a bounty of $5 million and a Chinese named Huzan Masoom, who was also the leader of East Turkistan Islamic Movement. In addition 19 people were arrested, out of which 8 were foreigners. Now the Musharraf government accepted the fact that South Waziristan had become a hotbed

1226 (Intertwines without operating in the area/personal observation)
1227 (Rashid, 2007 p. 270)
1228 (Rashid, 2007 p. 270)
of foreign militants\textsuperscript{1229}. Following these operations, there was a futile attempt at placating the tribals holding “Jirgas” and asking them to refrain from hostile actions and expelling the militants amidst them. This attempt failed miserably\textsuperscript{1230}.

**Wana Operations – 2004.** Wana Valley, which by now had been identified as a major bastion of terrorist, was subjected to another major military operation in March 2004. This operation, launched by the Frontier Corps, on reaching Wana found that they had been cleverly trapped in the valley by more than 2000 militants occupying the surrounding ridges. With the FC under intense and accurate fire, Army units were called in to rescue them. More than 6000 troops, helicopters, heavy artillery and aircrafts were used in the operation. The operation costed the security forces sixty four dead and 58 injured. The terrorists lost 63 persons\textsuperscript{1231}.

The operation exposed the lack of coordination within the intelligence agencies and the security forces, as well as between the Pakistani and the US forces. President Musharraf complained that Pakistan forces had been denied helicopter support by the US, despite a squadron of Drug Enforcement Agency being available in Pakistan. He also claimed that the real time intelligence, requested by Pakistani Armed Forces was not provided by the US. The blame game was not restricted to

\textsuperscript{1229} (Musharaff, 2006 p. 267), (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 71), (Rashid, 2007, 270)
\textsuperscript{1230} (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 236)
\textsuperscript{1231} (Musharaff, 2006 p. 268)
Pakistan. Many observers passed negative judgement on the level of commitment of the security forces and the role of ISI in the entire episode.\textsuperscript{1232}

The Wana operations were further extended to Shakai Valley. There were reports that terrorists had fled to the valley and were re-organizing themselves there. This time the Army inducted two additional brigades and established major blocks on the roads to Wana. The scale of operations was massive, involving more than 10,000 troops, FC and SOTF. The outer cordon around Shakai Valley was established by more than 3000 troops. This was followed by precision strikes by the Pakistan Air Force. SOTF were airdropped at selected locations, suspected of harboring the terrorists.

\textsuperscript{1232} (Rashid, 2007 p. 271)
terrorists. Simultaneously, a ground manoeuvre was launched to link up with the SOTF. The operations were fairly successful and were able to secure the Shakai area primarily dominated by the Wazir Tribes. The battle now moved to the Mehsud area, which now was the new refuge of the militants.

The Army, in the wake of successful operations was ordered to stop further military operations, and instead a peace deal was struck with the militants. This was called the Shakai Agreement\textsuperscript{1233}.

**Shakai Agreement – Frittering Away the Gains**

The Shakai Agreement, signed on the heels of an apparent successful military operation, with the militants and tribal elders, was a strange compromise. Its terms, agreed after quite a bit of haggling and bechering, included the following main clauses\textsuperscript{1234}:

1. The security forces would evacuate the area, after the signing of the agreement.
2. The Government would pay compensation for the loss of life and property of the tribes during the operation.
3. The Government would release all the “innocent people” arrested during the operation.
4. The Government would give a deadline of one month for the foreigners to surrender or pledge to start leading a peaceful life after getting themselves registered.

\textsuperscript{1233} (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 73)
\textsuperscript{1234} (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 73)
5. The tribesmen would never conduct any violent activity inside Pakistan.

6. The tribes would never allow the use of their territory against any other country.

Interestingly, the Militant commander, Nek Muhammad, who had opposed the security forces, emerged as a hero from the Wana operations and the Shakai Agreement. His thoughts were quite evident from his talk to the gathering to which he said that “he loved the government but would pick up weapons again if persecuted”\(^{1235}\). Despite President Musharraf’s assertions to the contrary, there was a widespread belief that Taliban had emerged as winners in their contest, as their leaders were not only pardoned, but given recognition by conducting talks\(^{1236}\). Nek Muhammad was so cocky, he actually announced a pardon for the military officers who had taken part in the operations\(^{1237}\). The agreement had many negative fallouts. Firstly, it displayed a lack of clarity on the part of Musharraf government, with regards to the ultimate objectives of the anti-terrorist campaign, in FATA, as well as the strength and ingress of Al-Qaedaa and their affiliates in the tribal areas. Another negative fallout of the deal was the impact on the resolve and determination of the security forces. It is rather absurd to expect people to put their lives on the line, to capture craggy tops and unruly tribals, only to see them freed and roaming on the streets, a few days later\(^{1238}\). As Ahmed Rashid points out:-

\(^{1235}\) (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 75)
\(^{1236}\) (Rashid, 2007 p. 272)
\(^{1237}\) (Mughal, May 4, 2004 p. 77)
\(^{1238}\) (Interviews with officers)
“Failing to adopt a serious counterterrorism strategy, the Army swung between using military means one day and signing peace agreements next day, confusing the population, Pakistani public and the international community”\(^{1239}\).

Another extremely negative fallout of the agreement was provision of breathing space and time for re-grouping to the militants. The agreements also went against the historical precedent of dealing with the tribals, as described by inspector General of Frontier Corps, General Saleem Nawaz

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\text{“you only talk and negotiate with the tribal, when he has been beaten, on the ground, and bleeding. Any negotiation other then that, is taken as a sign of victory by the tribesmen”}^{1240}.\]

Nek Muhammad had been actively involved in operations on both sides of the border. He had been a major helper for Tahir Yaldashus, the Uzbek militant leader, as well as Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban leader, who had sought refuge in South Waziristan. The agreement did not enjoy the support of the US and coalition forces. Both General David Bruno, the military commander, and Zalmay Khalilzad, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan opposed this peace deal\(^{1241}\). Despite Pakistan’s effort to curb the cross – border movement, the Afghan regime expressed concern that “militants trained in Pakistani territory cross into Afghanistan, to carry out terrorist attacks against Government forces there”\(^{1242}\).

\(^{1239}\) (Rashid, 2007 p. 273)
\(^{1240}\) (Talk by General Saleem Nawaz at Command and Staff College, Quetta, 2010)
\(^{1241}\) (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 77)
\(^{1242}\) (Kronstadt, CRS Report for Congres Pakistan-U.S Relations, 24 August 2007, p. 6)
**Shakai Operation.** The peace agreement did not last long, as the government did not get any of the results, it wanted. No foreigner surrendered and neither did any come up for voluntary registration. In April 2004, 8000 troops were moved into the Shakai area to flush out the Al-Qaeda militants reportedly hiding in the area. The roads leading to Shakai were blocked and massive operation was launched once again. An unexpected success came through with the help of US drone attack, which killed Nek Muhammad as he met a group of Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives, in the remote area on 18 June, 2004. This however, only provided a temporary advantage to the military, as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda quickly closed ranks again.\footnote{Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 79}

In the ensuing period, the Security Forces used intelligence tentacles and religious leaders to once again try for resolution of the situation through negotiations. They also tried economic blockade of the area. Brigadier Mehmood Shah, the Secretary of FATA, went into a lengthy negotiation process with the militants, through members of National Assembly, belonging to the FATA. The militants were asked to lay down their arms and surrender. After protracted negotiations, the discussion was unsuccessful.

In the second half of 2004, the operations spread to Mehsud areas, as now the militant were reported to be hiding in this part of the Waziristan Agency. Areas such as Karwan Manze, Makeen and Ladha, now sprung into prominence.
The Mehsuds also appeared to be now joining the Taliban band wagon. A treacherous ambush at Sarwakai left 12 soldiers dead. Another group leader now emerged amongst the Taliban ranks. He was Baitullah Mehsud. He organized a number of attacks against the Army in Shakai and Sarwakai areas. Amazingly many units were ambushed on the same valley routes and gorges, where the British troops had suffered casualties almost a hundred years ago. It reflected the poor state of training and little preparation by the Army, before sending troops into such an inhospitable area, against hardy guerrilla fighters, adept at using the terrain and

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1244 (Interview with Major General Mir Haider)
conditions to their maximum advantage. These ambushes, raids, and skirmishes did a great deal of damage to the Army’s reputation and morale.\(^{1245}\)

An aspect which may have contributed to the lacklustre performance of the military was the way it was being led, right at the top General Musharraf had decided to cling on to power, despite pledges to shed away his uniform by 2004. He felt secure till the time he remained both the Army Chief and the President of Pakistan. His continuation at the helm of affairs caused widespread resentment in the public. Since it was widely believed that he had taken this decision with US consent, and that his regime was doing US bidding, the public support for military operations was quite low. Another factor which affected the military’s performance was the fact that General Musharraf remained the Army Chief, but in actual had little time for Army affairs. He did not give much leverage and flexibility to his subordinates and himself remained more pre-occupied with national political scene. The result was that the Army lacked a firm grip and clear vision, as well as presence of a viable and effective leader in this crucial time. Units and formations in FATA fought their battles and suffered enormously, while just a few hundred kilometres away in Islamabad, things went on as nothing had changed. Those selected for Waziristan and FATA had neither the motivation nor the training to undertake such difficult operations.\(^{1246}\)

Pakistan Army’s morale was on an all time low. The public in markets and shops openly decried people in “Khaki”, the traditional uniform of Pakistan Army. It was

\(^{1245}\) (Interviews with officers and who participated in operations Rah-e-Rast)

\(^{1246}\) (Author’s personal observation as Staff officer at General Headquarters Rawalpindi)
evident that the Bush Administration’s reliance on supporting an individual than the country itself was producing negative fallouts.

**Abduction of Chinese Engineers Working on Gomal Zam Dam.** In October 2004, two Chinese engineers, working on the Gomal Zam Dam project, were kidnapped by men belonging to Baitullah Mahsud’s outfit. A raid by Pakistan Army’s elite Special Services Group, was able to get one of the Chinese, but the other was killed in the exchange of fire. This action by the militants added a new dimension to the conflict. Now it appeared that developmental projects were also being targeted. Killing of the Chinese also spelt an end to the Chinese activities in the region; a blow to the Government efforts to involve the Chinese in projects of national importance.\(^{1247}\)

**Sararogha Accord.** In February 2005, the Government signed yet another accord with the militants. Baitullah Mehsud now emerged as a clear hero for the tribesmen. The terms of the accord, much similar to those signed just a little less than a year earlier at Shakai, gave complete liberty of action to the terrorists once again. The Army’s hard won victories were once again given away, by allowing the Taliban to reassert their influence. A damaging and now increasingly familiar pattern of reprisals against military informants and government sympathizers was repeated. Such people were brutally murdered. “The militants would send the suspected

\(^{1247}\) (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 88)
informant a Rs 1000 banks notice and a needle – to suggest that his death was imminent and that he should arrange for his own funeral. The informant would be killed 24 hours later. The Sararogha Peace Accord provided the militants a free hand to enforce their own brand of Islam. This time the Government did not just suffer a territorial disadvantage. The real damage come from a complete breakdown of the existing social order. Now the emboldened Taliban went a step ahead by establishing a Parallel “Islamic Government”. The same Taliban style rules, i.e all men to grow beards, “Sharia Court” and the title of “Amir-ul-Momineen” for Baitullah Mehsud. Undeterred by this growing threat, the Musharraf Government went ahead to sign another peace agreement with Taliban in the North Waziristan.

The North Waziristan Peace Accord. This peace accord was signed on 5 September 2006 between the Government and the local Taliban leadership. The main force behind the Government initiative was Lieutenant General (Retired) Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai, the Provincial Governor. Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai belonged to the Orakzai Agency, another tribal area, which gained notoriety a few years later. He had been maintaining close contacts with the Taliban and looked to a political settlement of the issue, to avoid damage and bloodshed. The agreement between General Orakzai and Molvi Nek Zaman, a tribal leader of the area, who was also a sitting member of the National Assembly of Pakistan read:-

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1248}}\text{ (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 89), (Weekly Nida-e-Milat (Urdu, April 23, 2005)}}\]
1. Militants would not carry out any activity across the border into Afghanistan.

2. The Government will not undertake military action against the militants.

3. The Army check posts would be removed from the area, to be replaced by levies and Khasadars.

4. Foreigners residing in the area would either leave North Waziristan, or abide by the law of the land.

5. The militants and Army would return each others weapons, equipment and vehicles captured during various operations.

6. Militants would not establish a parallel administration or carry out target killings in the area.

7. The Government would compensate the tribals for their losses\textsuperscript{1249}.

As the terms of the Agreement indicated, the Army only received vague assurances, where as it was compelled by the agreement not only to give up hard won territory, but also release hardened criminals/terrorists and return their weapons and equipment. It is important to note that before signing the agreement “the Government virtually agreed to all demands of the militants”\textsuperscript{1250}. The Taliban, obviously viewed this as a success, whatever spin the Government might give for public consumption. After the agreement, they quickly settled into the area.

\textsuperscript{1249} (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, pp. 92-93)

\textsuperscript{1250} (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 93)
Problems with Conduct of Military Operations

The pre-requisites for any successful operation.

These all factors are necessary for making any military organization capable of understanding a new challenge. Pakistan Army had never operated in the FATA, in a big way before. This area had been the sole domain of the Frontier Corps, who had relied on traditional support from the Maliks/Elders, the FCR to establish the writ of the government. The dynamics of FATA changed radically in the wake of 9/11. A lot of Al-Qaeda money and resources were now pumped into the area. Simultaneously the Al-Qaeda and their cohorts went after the traditional leadership, killing and torturing the Government affiliates and functionaries, and replacing them with a new command structure which responded to their decisions. Under such environment the efficacy of the Frontier Corps, was severely reduced. Additional pressure on the FC troops was due to the fact that most of them are recruited from the same tribes. These affiliations made their efficacy and even loyalty at times doubtful. Army officers involved in FATA operations during the last 3-4 years have informed at numerous talks about FC complicity with Taliban and the fertility of relying on FC
pickecuts and support during movement and conduct of cordon and search operations\textsuperscript{1251}.

Keeping in view these adverse environment, and the history of tribal fighters, who had defied the might of the British Empire in the earlier centuries, using terrain and their guerrilla tactics to full advantage, the Army needed to formulate a comprehensive strategy, followed by proper training, motivation and resourcing for the FATA operations. Instead as the events unfolded in the year 2002-2007, the operations were often undertaken by hastily inducted units and formations, many of whom had no idea of the operating environment and peculiar challenges of the FATA.

\textsuperscript{1251} (Interview with officers who participated in “Operation-Al-Mizan”, in Waziristan)
The Miranshah agreement, by withdrawing the Government demand for registration of the foreign militants, granted them a major concession, as now they were only required to “abide by the law of the land”. The Taliban now re-grouped and reorganized as a cohesive and effective force. After signing the agreement, the local Taliban simply denied the presence of foreign militants amidst them. There was also no let up in the terrorists attacks on the security forces and a record increase in the terrorist attacks throughout the country.\textsuperscript{1252}

\textbf{The Taliban Scrouge Spreads to Pakistan’s Settled Areas and Beyond.} There were also reports that the “potential” suicide bombers were coming from region as far away as North Africa and Europe to join the Al-Qaeda fight in Afghanistan, through Peshawar, the border city in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{1253} The overall casualties both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan in the year 2008-2009, witnessed a sharp increase.

Another very significant development in Pakistan, in the aftermath of the 2006 agreement, was the spread of militancy to other tribal regions as well. In addition the Taliban influence also spread to districts of Bannu, Kohat Karak, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan.\textsuperscript{1254} The Taliban nexus with “Jehadi” organizations like Sipah-e-Sihaba and Laskkar-e-Jangvi also increased significantly, giving rise to the new form

\textsuperscript{1252} (Basit, Militant Landscape After the Miranshah Agreement: in, Dynamic of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, p. 98)
\textsuperscript{1253} (Rashid, 2007 p. 287)
\textsuperscript{1254} (Sial, 2010, p. 180)
“Punjabi Taliban”. This refers to the Taliban sympathizers in the Maddrassas and extremist organizations of Southern Punjab, who are a volatile blend of sectarain outfits, Kashmir Jehad outfits and outright criminals. Many are now also suspected to be linked to foreign intelligence agencies\textsuperscript{1255}. The attacks on Sri Lankan Cricket Team at Lahore, which caused a major embarrassment to the Pakistan Government, in 2008, were attributed to these organizations.

Another emerging trend has been the attacks on the NATO supply convoys moving through Pakistan on both the main routes i.e Quetta – Kandahar and Peshawar – Kabul. Only in December 2005, there were 19 attacks on the NATO Convoys. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is reported to be behind most of these attacks\textsuperscript{1256}.

Another alarming development was the concern by Pakistan’s major regional ally, China, that Taliban are also involved in supporting and grooming the extremist elements from Chinese’s restive Xinjiang Province\textsuperscript{1257}.

**Destruction of the Existing Social order and Civic Infrastructure.** The damage done by the militants to FATA goes well beyond the visible signs of damage and destruction. They have in fact altered the traditional social hierarchy radically retarded the development and growth of the area, which was already much lesser than the developed areas of Pakistan. They have taken the area many decades back in terms of civic amenities and infrastructure. This will only further enhance the

\textsuperscript{1255} (TV, 2008)

\textsuperscript{1256} (Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 181)

\textsuperscript{1257} (Sial, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 181)
potential for discontent and dissatisfaction in the future, less the Government is able to pump in enough funds for sustained development.

Militants in FATA exhibited another dark side by specifically targeting schools and women. In most places, women health workers are no longer able to move and operate freely. Many schools have been dynamited by militants in FATA.\footnote{1258 (Last of conflict” in FATA Planning and Development Department at FATA Secretariat, April 2009)}

The loss to the region, due to destruction, infrastructure damage and loss of business/trade is estimated at almost $2 billion by the FATA Secretariat.\footnote{1259 (Dawn, 25 May, 2009)} Most of the business centres in major towns of FATA have remained closed for the last five years. The Waziristan and adjoining agencies were a source of off-season vegetables and fruit to the settled areas of Pakistan. Largely due to the Taliban insurgency, all such activity has been reduced to a trickle. This has adversely affected the livelihood of the farmers. This in fact, helps the Taliban to gain new recruits.\footnote{1260 (Basit, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 192)} FATA has almost 80,000 young individuals, between the age of 18 and 25. These are ideal recruits for Taliban, in absence of better and viable alternatives.\footnote{1261 (Aziz K., April-June 2007)} The Taliban have purposefully gone after and destroyed the age-old, well-established institution of “Malik” and replaced it with the Mullah, who can exhort people to vile acts of terror, in the name of Islam.\footnote{1262 (Basit, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 198)} This has on one hand strengthened the Taliban hold on the area, and on the other hand increased government’s woes. Even when an area is cleared by the military, there is a vacuum in the administrative machinery in the area.
Many of the Malik and elders who had supported the military in the offensives in 2004-2005, have been ruthlessly eliminated by the Taliban, following the Army’s withdrawal from the area, as a result of peace agreements. There are many sad, unfortunate narrations of Maliks and tribal elders, associated with the Army operations, asking for protection, only to be stonewalled later due to constraints of peace treaties\textsuperscript{1263}. This has lowered the prestige of the security forces, making people more cautious of openly supporting them.

The peace treaties with militants and Mullahs have given Taliban sense of power and credibility within their communities. They have set up parallel administrations, almost every time the security forces have engaged in a peace agreement\textsuperscript{1264}. More than the traditions, now the religious, and specifically the Saudi sponsored brand of Wahabi Islam. “The puritanical interpretation of Wahabi has undermined the Pashtun traditions in FATA”\textsuperscript{1265}. With an area that has more than 60\% population living below the poverty line, and “perpetuation of a cycle of underdevelopment”, the environment is ideal for growth of religious fundamentalism and militancy\textsuperscript{1266}.

In the context of US – Pakistan security cooperation, specially with regards to FATA there are few main conclusions:-

\textsuperscript{1263} (operations)
\textsuperscript{1264} (Centre for Strategic and International Studies p.26-27, January 2009), (Shuja Nawaz, FATA – A most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenges of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan)
\textsuperscript{1265} (Basit, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 187)
\textsuperscript{1266} (Basit, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, 2010, p. 186)
1. The Musharraf Government’s actions in the period between 2002-2007, allowed the militants to gain strength and influence in FATA. This was due to a combination of poor strategic direction, week resolve and incremental hesitant application of military force, often punctuated by tactical retreats and concessions that further exacerbated the situation and strengthened the militants.

2. The space and opportunity provided by the Government to the militants, allowed them to alter the very basics of the tribal society and culture. They have altered the traditional balance between the Mullah and the Malik, literally replacing the Malik with the Mullah. Now there is a leadership/ administrative vacuum in the area.

3. The FATA region, already backward and underdeveloped, has been further damaged by the years of conflict and systematic destruction/degradation of government. This would take massive injection of funds to redress, which are beyond the capability of the Pakistan Government and without replacing the Taliban with an effective administrative machinery, developmental and employment projects. There can be no little positive outcome from the military operations. The Army has only created some space for the administrative machinery to be employed in the area for reconstruction rehabilitation. If this prong of the strategy does not deliver, and conditions for insurgency are not mitigated, these military actions
alone will not be able to eliminate terrorism and militancy from FATA\textsuperscript{1267}.

Based on these conclusions, the US Government FATA initiative is probably the best hope for the region in the long run.

There are likely to be many more military actions, as the militants shift bases, try to re-group in places out of the control of security forces. Success will not come easily and in short term. It is expected to be a long drawing protected struggle, that would require all elements of Pakistan’s National Power i.e diplomatic, military, international and economic. Yet success will largely be contingent upon US involvement over a long period. It will be closely linked to the development in Afghanistan. In case the Afghan Government is able to develop broad-based support amongst the Pashtun population, then space for Taliban would be curtailed. There will undoubtedly be a small hardcore component which remains detract, yet even if some one weaned away, this will reduce the influence and nuisance value of the hardcore militants.

**The Red Mosque Incident - Islamabad.** In July 2008, an incident fuelled the growing militancy in FATA and gave opportunity to the radical elements to rally crowds around them. This was a ten day siege and storming of the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) by the security forces. This Mosque is located in the heart of Islamabad, just a few miles from the Parliament House. The Red Mosque, led by Maulana Abdul Aziz, had, for the last two months, been issuing sermons against the

\textsuperscript{1267} (Talk by General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani, Command and Staff College, 30 June 2010)
establishment. The women wield students holding long wooden stick had been acting as the moral police, going around and telling people in the vicinity as to how to behave and live. More significantly, they had taken over nearby government library, detained local police officers and threatened to launch an anti government campaign, unless Sharia Law was introduced. There were hundreds of male and female radicals inside, including, reportedly, a number of foreign militants. The negotiations, conducted between the government functionaries and the clerics, led by Maulana Abdul Aziz’s brother, Maulana Rashed Ghazi, appeared to be making headway. However, on the dawn of 10th July, the elite commandoes who had surrounded the compound, were ordered to storm the Lal Masjid. In Pakistan’s history, this was the first occasion that Security Forces launched a full scale military operation against a main mosque. The commandoes faced stiff resistance from the barricaded and holed up terrorists. The sight of armoured personnel carriers and military barricade, in the most exclusive and pristine sectors of Islamabad, just few miles from the Presidency, beaming across live within Pakistan and abroad, was an unsettling sight. The area was cleared with 10 casualties, including the Commanding officer of the SSG Battalion. More than 60 miscreants were killed, and an unknown number of women and children. In Pakistan, the outcome of the siege was much different to what the President might have expected. There was a widespread resentment that the episode had ended in bloodbath. Many believed that the President had intentionally let the

1268 (Geo News, Urdu News Channel, Live Coverage, of the unfolding saga, 4-10 July)
1269 (Kronstadt, CRS Report for Congress Pakistan-U.S Relations, 24 August 2007, p. 6)
issue to fester to gain political mileage in the West\textsuperscript{1270}. The fact that many women and children, most of them belonging to poor areas of Swat and FATA, were also in the compound, added to the anger against the Musharraf Government. Another aspect which could have helped fuel the resentment was an ongoing controversy between the President and the deposed Chief Justice, Iftikhar Choudhry, which had considerably eroded the President’s prestige. Since the two clerics and the mosque had been a major base for the resistance in Afghanistan, during the Afghan Jihad in the 90’s, this action added to the peoples resentment, especially those associated with the Afghan Jihad\textsuperscript{1271}. The result was that militancy received a major boost in FATA and Swat, where Maulana Fuzlullah, commonly known as MFU, cashed in on the resentment to further consolidate his grip on the Swat Valley. This event thus set a stage for a much bigger confrontation in Swat next year\textsuperscript{1272}.

**Operation Rah-e-Rast (Swat Valley) – 2009**

The situation in Swat Valley, a pristine tourist haven, just a few hundred kilometres from Islamabad had been deteriorating rapidly over last two years. Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM), led by Maulana Fazl-ullah, had been gaining prominence in the area, setting up a parallel administration and dispensing their own brand of justice and laws.

\textsuperscript{1270} (Kronstadt, CRS Report for Congress Pakistan-U.S Relations , 24 August 2007, p. 5), (Interviews with senior retired officials)
\textsuperscript{1271} (Interviews with ex ISI operatives)
\textsuperscript{1272} (Interview with officers/ individuals belonging to Swat)
Maulana Fazl-ullah (MFU) is the son-in-law of Maulana Sofi Muhammad, responsible for the original upsurge in militancy and still regarded as the spiritual leader of the movement. Following initial military operations by the security forces against growing militancy in Swat Valley, the Army went on the defensive, being ordered not to conduct aggressive military operations in 2008. During the following months, as the Army was restricted to their camps, owing to peace agreement, Maulana Fazl-ullah and his supporters implemented their version of Sharia Law on the territory, torching and blowing up girls schools, asking people to grow beards, carrying out public floggings and summary executions. According to the military officers operating in the area, each village/community was run by a small group of militants. At the highest tier were the hardcore militant commanders, selected by Maulana Fazl-ullah. They were followed by the petty criminals, thugs who became willing recruits from the local population, who sometimes even included young boys. They asked people to send their young boys or face persecution at gunpoint. A quick reaction force, comprising hundreds of veterans, was kept on wheels, at a few central locations. They would be directed to any village/locality by Maulana Fazl-ullah, where he got information of dissent or apposition to his control. Many of the local elders and notables, who had sided with the Army’s initial offensive, were brutally killed and their corpses intentionally thrown into the streets. This happened at a time, when the Army was stationed in some of the camps/towns nearby.\textsuperscript{1273}.

\textsuperscript{1273} (Interview with officers)
At about the same time, President Musharraf was facing widespread opposition to his machinations to gain yet another Presidential term by manipulating the legislative and the political system. Unfortunately for him, this time his extra-constitutional manoeuvres and his efforts to curb the media backfired\textsuperscript{1274}. Under pressure, he finally gave up the one thing that had maintained his grip on the country, the post of the Chief of Army Staff. On 12 November 2007, General Ashfaq Kiyani was appointed as the next Army Chief. While the President retained his Presidential slot, his powers and influence was substantially curtailed. He further suffered a setback in the February 2008 elections, when his handpicked, “kings party”, the Pakistan Muslim League suffered defeat in the National Assembly elections. Benazir

\textsuperscript{1274} (Caroline Wadhams, November 2008 Washington DC, p. 7)
Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party was buoyed by the sympathy vote, due to her 27 December 2007 death in a suicide attack attributed to the Taliban, but blamed on Musharraf Government lax security measures. To add to Musharraf’s woes, the party of Mian Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan Muslim League, also gained victory, especially in the province of Punjab, where it formed a majority government. This was another blow to Musharraf’s acceptance and prestige, as he had unceremoniously removed Nawaz Sharif in a coup in October 1999.

Though Musharraf tried to still cling on to power, by offering to remove all corruption cases against politicians through the controversial National Reconciliation Ordinance, which offered blanket pardon to select criminals and defaulters, under the garb of re-conciliation, yet by this time he had lost the support of almost all segments of the population. The conservatives were deeply disappointed by what they saw as appeasement policy towards the US. The Lal Masjid incident was taken as an example of this attitude. A large segment of general public, though not altogether unhappy with the economic growth of the initial year, saw a plummeting economy owing to the distractions and mismanagement in Musharraf’s Government, as he tried to fight the challenge from the Chief Justice, which had turned into a country wide Anti-Musharraf movement. The Army’s prestige was at an all time low, primarily because it was seen as the major reason for Musharraf’s perpetuation of rule and clinging to power. Additionally, his frequent “U turns” in the operations against militants had left the Army in most awkward position. Deployed in trouble areas and Swat, they were asked to stand by, as atrocities were perpetrated by militants. This led to such embarrassing situation that even logistic and supply convoys were allowed
to move by explicit permission of Maulana Fazl-ullah in Swat\textsuperscript{1275}. His FM radio stations spewed a militant messages, threatening to decapitate who dared to differ.

Musharraf finally resigned in August 2008, not due to any moral compunctions, but simply because he ran out of any further tricks and options, having done everything possible to cling on to power, including dismissing the Chief Justice, suspending the constitution, and granting blanket amnesty to opponents in the hope of retaining the President’s slot. An important development in NWFP, as a result of February election, was the election of Awami National Party (ANP) to the Government, replacing the religious coalition MMA, who had been responsible, in collusion with Musharraf for the growth of militancy in FATA and NWFP.

The ANP embarked on a conciliatory note and offered a deal to the TNSM\textsuperscript{1276}. This deal was viewed with certain scepticism, especially abroad, as it was seen as a capitulation to the Taliban, who had now moved into Buner and adjoining districts of Peshawar. The international community expressed grave concerns and alarm at the growth and spread of militancy. At this juncture, an event greatly shaped the perceptions of the Pakistani public. Maulana Sofi Muhammad was released by the ANP Government after serious negotiations. On his return, he held a mammoth rally in Swat. In this rally, which was covered by the national media, he openly renounced Pakistan’s Constitution and judicial system. The pronouncement received widespread condemnation across the country. The public opinion in the country swung against the militants, whose obscurantist views were, for the first time, fully exposed by the

\textsuperscript{1275} (Interviews with officers participating in the Swat Operations)

\textsuperscript{1276} (Frederick Barton, May 2008, p. 20)
media. In the wake of the pronouncements and the renewed surge of militants into the districts adjoining Swat, Army was asked to undertake operations to clear the area. This time, under the leadership of General Ashfaq Kiyani, and the presence of a popular elected government, fully committed to the resolution of the issue, it was a different strategy altogether. The Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani appeared on the National TV and explained to the Pakistani nation about the need for tackling this menace. This was followed by a massive, coordinated military operation named “Operation Rah-e-Rast”. In this operation more than 25,000 troops, Special Services Group, Air Force and Frontier Corps troops participated. In a series of synergized, ground and air-mobile thrusts, the Swat Valley was surrounded and attacked from multiple directions. An important feature was the deliberate avoidance of collateral damage by asking the local population to leave, before commencement of the offensive. More than two million people left the Valley, a human exodus of massive proportion. Yet this was managed, along with the military operations. This time the Armed Forces decisively shattered the Taliban myth. They were roundly defeated and thrown out of the area, with thousands either captured or killed.

The Swat Operation, conducted within two months, over a hilly area, the size of Belgium, clearly demonstrated the national commitment in tackling insurgency. It also provided a major boost to the Pak – US security relationship, as for the first time the Pakistani Security Forces had taken on the militancy in such a wholesome and decisive fashion. It has set a new tone for the security dialogue, with Pakistan now not

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1277 (Hyat, 26 June 2008)
1278 (Interviews with officers and who participated in operations Rah-e-Rast)
being badgered to “do more”, as often as it was before. It also has set a new direction for the fight against militancy, while Pakistan Army is now operating in FATA, with renewed vigour and active support of the nation and media1279. It is however, likely that in FATA in the foreseeable future “a long bitter conflict stretching over some years is in prospect”1280. An important consideration that remains is the issue of preventing this anti-Taliban effort becoming a war against the Pashtuns. Avoidance of collateral damage by Pakistan Army, as well as reconsideration of done attacks by the US, would be vital in this regard1281. Similar views have also been expressed by Selig Harrison, a renounced expert on the region, who contends that US and Pakistan must be wary that the war in FATA and Afghanistan does not become a war against Pashtuns, as opposed to Taliban. This is likely to be a major challenge for US-Pak Security cooperation1282.

**Confronting Militancy and Instability in Settled Areas of Pakistan.**

This is another area of security partnership, that is expected to be a major force of attentive in the while the future. Pakistan Army has been quite successful in removing the militants from some of their traditional strongholds in FATA, there is a growing US concern about other areas, where the security and stability of the country is threatened. “These are law enforcement, judicial process and education1283”. All these contribute towards a sense of instability and the growing influence of

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1279 (Harrison S. S., April 2009, pp. 55-64)
1280 (Rogers, 2008)
1281 (Aziz K., Can Peace be Won in NWFP, 20 April 2008)
1282 (Harrison S. S., April 2009, pp. 55-64)
1283 (Masellis, 8-9 October 2009 p. 4)
fundamentalist outfits in the country. Taliban influence in Southern Punjab has significantly expanded over the last few years. The US Government would want the Madrassas and their influence to be reduced in Pakistan. Pakistan’s Government needs both military and economic support, as well as capacity building in key areas of governance, education, health and justice to tackle the complex, interlinked problems threatening the country’s internal security.

Nuclear Issue

One of the major benefits to Pakistan, from the renewed security partnership, has been the continuation and development of the country’s nuclear program. This aspect, clearly highlighted by the Pakistan’s President, in his key address to the nation, following the September 11 attacks, has been a success story for Pakistan, in its security relationship with the US. As one Indian author grudgingly admits:

“The interesting and also alarming part of the entire US-Pak romance is that US is again choosing to ignore Pakistan nuclear capabilities and intentions as it had done earlier.”

Pakistan has primarily benefited in three ways with regards to its nuclear program:

1. The timely alignment with the US after 9/11 secured the Pakistan nuclear assets and facilities from aggressive military action.

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1284 (Masellis, 8-9 October 2009 p. 4), (Interview with District Police Officer Rahim Yar Khan District, 2008)
1285 (Washington Post, 27 March, 2009)
1286 (Kaul, 2003 p. 39)
2. The US did not actively pursue a restrictive regime on Pakistan’s nuclear capability development. This has allowed the country to institutionalize and operationalize the deterrent capability. Pakistan has created strategic Plans Division, which is responsible for the entire nuclear program. Along with this, the Army Strategic Force Command is now the operational arm for this strategic capability. Developments of the facilities, related to the nuclear program, have also often been reported by the intelligence agencies and world media. This has not however invited the same criticism and hard response as was seen during the previous decade of the 1990’s. A case in point is the development of the Khushab Nuclear Reactors\footnote{Maples, January 11 2007}.

**The AQ Khan Network.** The AQ Khan network has been one of the most embarrassing episode in an otherwise proud and indigenous nuclear program by Pakistan. It has also been main source of US concern, related to Pakistan’s nuclear program in the last decade.

The nuclear scientist, a metallurgist, is widely believed to be the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program. He was brought to Pakistan, by the Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to develop Pakistan’s nuclear program. In a country where even most of the cars are still made from imported parts, this was indeed a monumental task. The subsequent development of Pakistan’s nuclear program is shrouded in

\footnote{Maples, January 11 2007}
mystery. With most of the world powers, including the US, bitterly opposed to any nuclear development, and intelligence agencies looking to the minutest signs of technology transfer, the quest for nuclear weapons would obviously have been extremely difficult for the people working on Pakistan’s nuclear program.

General Musharraf writes that he had little clue of the nuclear capability of Pakistan, till he assumed the appointment of the Chief of the Army Staff in October 1998. The first reports that Dr AQ Khan was involved in some “behind the scene” dealing, was a report to General Musharraf that some Korean nuclear scientists had arrived in 1999, to get briefings on Pakistan’s centrifuge. Dr AQ Khan, when asked by Pakistan’s military intelligence, denied these charges. General Musharraf created the Strategic Plans Division, to oversee the entire nuclear program in February 2000. After the creation of the new setup, Dr AQ Khan’s activities came under close scrutiny. Some of the issues, which raised concern amongst the Pakistani leadership, were the clandestine cargo flights, with undeclared cargo to Iran and North Korea. Though spot checks did not reveal any suspicious cargo, yet the consistency of intelligence reports raised concerns in the Pakistani leadership. President Musharraf removed Dr AQ Khan from his post as the boss of the KRL (Kadeer Research Laboratories) in 2001. He was however, elevated to the more ceremonial position of Advisor, with the Status of a Federal Minister, in order to maintain the facade of respectability in the public eye, for whom Dr AQ Khan remained a national icon.

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1288 (Musharraf, 2006 p. 286)
1289 (Musharraf, 2006 p. 287)
1290 (Musharraf, 2006 p. 289)
1291 (Musharraf, 2006 p. 289)
In the aftermath of the 9/11 incident, there was mounting pressure on Pakistan, regarding security and safe custody of its nuclear arsenal. The possibility of Al-Qaeda getting hold of some nuclear material was very disturbing. Although Dr Khan had been sidelined, the US Government kept receiving intelligence reports linking Dr Khan to both the Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. The most startling revelation came in 2003, when according to General Musharraf, he was confronted by drawings of Pakistan’s centrifuges, by CIA Director George Tenet. The Pakistan President took those drawings back and started a full-scale investigation. The investigation revealed that Dr Khan had been running his own side show since 1987. He had been selling sensitive nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya, through middle men in different locations, including Dubai.\(^{1292}\)

The Pakistan President asked Dr AQ Khan to come on the national TV, admit his guilt publicly in order to qualify for a pardon, that he had asked for, after being confronted with all the incriminating evidence. There was an implicit involvement of more scientists in the Khan network.\(^{1293}\) Since Dr AQ Khan’s public admittance, he has been under varying degrees of house arrest and detention. Though many in Pakistan still believe that he is a national hero.

**US Assistance to Pakistan for Nuclear Safety.** The US Government, during the period following the 9/11 attacks, has helped Pakistan to ensure the safety and stability of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Reportedly, the US has provided

\(^{1292}\) (Musharaff, 2006 p. 292), (William J Board, 12 February 2004)  
\(^{1293}\) (Kronstadt, CRS Report for Congres Pakistan-U.S Relations, 24 August 2007, p. 30)
almost 100 million dollars in assistance to Pakistan to improve the physical
security of nuclear weapons with the help of “permissive action links” or PALS
technology. “Pakistan status as a nuclear state underscores the importance of its
long term stability”\textsuperscript{1294}. This technology is vital to ensure that weapons are not
detonated without authorization\textsuperscript{1295}. The US has been critical of Pakistani nuclear
program expansion. The development of nuclear reactor near Khushab,
considered to be plutonium reactors with advance technology in 2003, has been
viewed with concern \textsuperscript{1296} but not vociferously opposed, Pakistan however,
maintains that it will continue to develop the different stages of its nuclear
program and the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure that it can maintain credible
deterrence.

Despite these steps, an aspect that has been constantly under negative media
propaganda and hype, has been the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Concerns
were raised in the relative anarchical situation following the death of Benazir Bhutto
in 2007 December, about the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into
terrorist hands. Yet these were dispelled by senior US Government officials. Admiral
Mike Mullen, the US Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff commented that “I don’t see
any indication right now that security of those weapons is in jeopardy”\textsuperscript{1297}.

\textsuperscript{1294} (Partnership for Progress, Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region P. 25, November 2009), November 2008)
\textsuperscript{1295} (Broad, November 18, 2007)
\textsuperscript{1296} (Partnership for Progress, Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region P. 2, November 2008)
\textsuperscript{1297} (Partnership for Progress, Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region P. 26, November 2008)
Despite the assurances by high level government functionaries in US, there is a persistent fear in Pakistan, that the US would want to de-nuclearize Pakistan, due to the fact that it has the “Islamic Bomb”, and the US fear this technology will fall into the terrorist hands. There is also a constant egging and pressure from the Indo-Israeli nexus. These concerns are heightened by sporadic reports that US had already made contingency plans for “taking over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal” in case of a threat of fundamentalist taking over some storage site or nuclear facility.  

From Pakistan’s perspective, the nuclear capability is non-negotiable. All governments from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to Pervez Musharraf have ferociously guarded this capability despite all US pressure and sanctions. Now that the Pakistani capability is out in the open and the US has granted tacit recognition to the country’s nuclear status, this issue seems to be at a lower level of concern for the US administration. However, it has the maximum potential to sour future relationship, if the US feels at some stage that the Pakistan nuclear arsenal is not safe and asks for more intrusive safeguards or goes for outright military action to seize the nuclear arsenal. Much will depend on Pakistan’s ability to maintain internal security and stability and reduce the level of militancy in the country. The sight of “Jehadis” riding Toyota Pickups and imposing their barbaric version of Islam in Swat Valley, just a few hundred kilometres from Islamabad was enough to alarm western capitals regarding the safety and future of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. It is largely upto the Pakistan Government to send a clear message that it can overcome this visible but

1298 (Partnership for Progress, Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity nd Stability in Pakistan and the Region P. 26, November 2008), Masellis, 8-9 October 2009 p. 1)
small minority. The subsequent success of Operation “Rah-e-Rast”, launched by Pakistan Army in Swat allayed many of the unfounded fears of Taliban takeover and reduced the level of concern about Pakistan’s nuclear program. The issue will however remain influencing factor in the security in the coming year.

India

In the post 9/11 scenario, one of the major shifts in Pakistan’s policy occurred in relation to India. The Kargil Conflict in 1999 had almost brought the two countries on the verge of an all out war. Now in the aftermath of September 11, the Indians felt vindicated that their assertions regarding the nexus between Taliban and Kashmiri freedom struggle was justified. In case of Pakistan, the newfound partnership with the US gave strength to the country’s leadership. India on the other hand “viewed 9/11 as a major opportunity to persuade United States to declare Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism”1299. The Bush strategy of pre-emption also fitted in well with the Indian hawks, who had been supporting the idea of hot pursuit operation against militants inside Pakistan’s territory.1300

The opportunity occured on 13 December, 2001, when five militants tried to storm in the Indian Parliament. The Indians immediately raised a ruckus and within days the Indian Army was mobilized and moved towards the Pakistan border. Pakistan had to respond quickly, in order to man the defences over a frontier.

1299 (Rashid, 2007 p. 115)
1300 (Rashid A. , Chaos, 2007, p. 115)
stretching well over 2000 kilometers. Units were moved into battle locations overnight\textsuperscript{1301}.

However, more important from the Pak-US security cooperation perspective, the units and formations earmarked to seal the Pak-Afghan border, also had to be moved to occupy their defensive locations on the Eastern Border. The US Government was quite concerned. The fact that Pakistan had abandoned the anti-Taliban military actions and instead focused on India, meant that Taliban and Al-Qaeda would not be under the same sort of military pressure as they could have been, had this escalation on the border not taken place.

The US Government was also concerned about the future prospects of the bases and logistics support, being provided by Pakistan\textsuperscript{1302}. Another factor complicating the situation was the nuclear capability of both the countries, which made any confrontation extremely unpredictable. In this backdrop the Bush Administration embarked upon a hectic “shuttle diplomacy” to diffuse tensions between the two nuclear armed rivals. Secretary Collin Powell, Under Secretary Richard Armitage all made frequent contacts with both sides to diffuse the situation\textsuperscript{1303}. The Bush Government realized soon that the Indians were not going to reduce the tensions on the border, unless Pakistan made significant concessions. President Bush gave a statement in January, saying “I think it’s very important for

\begin{footnotesize}
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    \item[\textsuperscript{1301}] (Interviews with Senior Military Officers Personal Experience)
    \item[\textsuperscript{1302}] (Rashid, 2007 p. 117)
    \item[\textsuperscript{1303}] (Kronstadt, CRS Report for Congres Pakistan-U.S Relations, 24 August 2007)
\end{itemize}
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President Musharraf to make a clear statement to the world that he wants to crack down on terror"\textsuperscript{1304}.

The embattled Pakistani President, apparently in a tight corner due to the largest Indian mobilization in history, with close to a million men deployed on the border, decided to strike a conciliatory note. It was dubbed as another “U turn, a significant climbdown”, given his strong rhetoric at the Agra Summit in May 2001, with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee. General Musharraf in his speech on January 12, 2002, clearly rejected terrorism, Jehadi organizations and for the first time openly committed to ensure that Pakistan would not allow its territory to be used for terrorism. He pledged that, “No organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir”\textsuperscript{1305}. General Musharraf also banned for the first time, five Jehadi organizations. This enraged many supporters of the Kashmir cause in Pakistan, however the move largely helped to de-escalate the tension on the borders. The Indian mobilization achieved its purpose to the extent that they gained an assurance from Pakistan on not supporting the Jehadi organizations. As one Indian writer points out “India utilized the military build up as part of its coercive diplomacy with some positive results”\textsuperscript{1306}.

The crisis however highlighted the heightened American concerns in the region, as now much more was at stake than just Pakistan’s security against India. The renewed security relationship helped Pakistan in gaining active US involvement

\textsuperscript{1304} (Rashid, 2007 p. 117)
\textsuperscript{1305} (Rashid, 2007 p. 117)
\textsuperscript{1306} (Vek, Dealing with Big Brother” in Pakistan After 9/11 edited by Shreedar, p. 329)
in its continuing differences with India\textsuperscript{1307}. As one the Indian author grimly acknowledges “Musharraf deserves full marks for making the best of a grim situation confronting his regime”\textsuperscript{1308}.

### Indian’s Cold Start Doctrine and Proactive Operations Strategy

The standoff though beneficial for India, did not go entirely to the liking of the Indian Armed Forces. There was a widespread belief that mobilization lost its value, as the Indian Government under international pressure, failed to go for a war, when the Armed Forces had been mobilized\textsuperscript{1309}. The fact that Pakistan was now a nuclear armed power, also mitigated against use of massed formations, going for deep strategic objectives. An additional problem, identified during “Operation Parakaran”, as it was named, was that Indian offensive formation took too long (approximately 2-3 weeks) to move and concentrate from their peace locations, to their intended operational areas on the Pakistan border. This gave the Pakistan Armed Forces sufficient time to move to their battle location, prepare defences, lay minefields and raise 2\textsuperscript{nd} line troops to augment the defences.

In order to overcome this limitation Indians devised a new strategy commonly known as proactive strategy. This concept would form the failure of the Indian Arty to achieve all the desired objectives of “Operation Parakaram”. This new doctrine aims at harnessing the massive potential of the Indian Armed Forces in a manner that they

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\textsuperscript{1307} (Vek, Dealing with Big Brother” in Pakistan After 9/11 edited by Stneedar, p. 325)
\textsuperscript{1308} (Vek, Dealing with Big Brother” in Pakistan After 9/11 edited by Shreedar, p. 323)
\textsuperscript{1309} (Vek, Dealing with Big Brother” in Pakistan After 9/11 edited by Stneedar, p. 329)
\end{flushleft}
are ready to be employed at the shortest notice, without lengthy build up and warning period for Pakistan. It also reflects a paradigm shift from a full scale war to a limited war. This is meant to stay below the nuclear threshold, while causing maximum damage to Pakistan’s infrastructure and its Armed Forces. It aims at capturing shallow objective of psycho-social importance. Instead of a “mobilize and hit” concept, the Indians are looking to “hit and to mobilize”. The cardinal features of this doctrine are that it would “achieve strategic surprise” without giving a warning time to the Pakistan to prepare or international community to intervene¹³¹⁰

**Military Assistance to Pakistan – A Source of Strength.** Pakistan has gained substantial military assistance from the US in the post 9/11 scenario. This has been a major area of security cooperation between the two countries. The military hardware has been in the domain of counter terrorism equipment, whereby sophisticated night vision sights and helicopters have been provided to enhance the capability against Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters in the FATA and aid joining areas. Pakistan has also been able to purchase significant amount of conventional equipment, more suited for its defence needs against India. The finding in terms of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has been to the tune of $ 1.9 billion. Pakistan has also been given equipment as “Excess Defence Articles” (EDA).

The training of Pakistani officers in the United States and those of Frontier Corps in Pakistan has also been a major part of the new security cooperation.

¹³¹⁰ (Kapita, 15 January 2010), (Khan M. G.)
In this emerging threat scenario, Pakistan has been forced to radically review its defence strategy and organizational and equipment imbalances to meet the emerging threat. While the Armed Forces have been busy in reconfiguring their response, the US military assistance, due to the security partnership, has been instrumental in enhancing Pakistan’s conventional defence capability against Indian military buildup.

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<th>Military-Related Funding to Pakistan, FY 2002-2008</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dollars in thousands</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>State Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>Defence CSF</td>
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<td>Reimbursements</td>
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<td>Counterterrorism Fellowship Funding</td>
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<td>Section 1206 Funding</td>
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<td>Frontier Corps Train and Equip Authority</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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Source: GAO analysis of budget documents provided by the State Director of Foreign Assistance.!

1311 (Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan's Border Area with Afghanistan page 18, February 2009)
It is also important to note that bulk of the US assistance to Pakistan (70.4%) has been for the military related activities. Only 26% is directed at development/economic activities. This trend may not be constant in the coming years, as the forces shifts from purely kinetic operations against militants to developmental activities aimed at rebuilding the tribal areas and other affected areas of the country.

**Mumbai attacks – India Pakistan Rapprochement is Jolted.** The India Pakistan had been making some progress, at least in the sense that there was a structured, high level contact between the two countries. This once again came to an

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1312 (Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan's Border Area with Afghanistan page 17, February 2009)
abrupt halt on 26 November, 2008, when an audacious group of terrorists, targeted the iconic Taj Hotel in Mumbai, along with some other establishments. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, incidentally was in India at the time, holding talks with his Indian Counterparts. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, India once again suspended that peace process and asked for Pakistan to arrest and put on trial, the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack. As per the Indian investigation, these attacks had been carried out by members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group banned in Pakistan, but operating under a different name. The Indian Government claimed that this attack was perpetrated by Hafiz Saeed. The Pakistan Government after some initial confusion, had to accept the fact that the sole survivor of the terrorist attacks, Ajmal Kasab, was indeed a Pakistan citizen.

Though there was much acrimony at the political level, Pakistan conceded to putting the culprits on trial, if sufficient evidence was provided.

While all this was happening, the Indian media and government functionaries once again hyped up the talk of air strike, and punitive action against Pakistan. With bulk of the Pakistan Army deployed on the Western border and in FATA, operating against militants and the country suffering from a spate of terrorist attacks and suicide bombings, this was a challenging time for Pakistan. Some units and formations were immediately moved to the border, in anticipation of the Indian expected move and to thwart any surprise attacks.

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1313 (Ahmed I., 7 January 2010, p. 1)
1314 (Zehra, 7 January 2009), (Hussain I., 31 December 2008)
1315 (The Hindu, 23 November 2009)
1316 (Interview / Discussion with Senior Military officers)
On the diplomatic front, the Pakistan Government, after receiving information from the Indian Government, put some members of Lashkar-e-Taiba on trial, under the Anti Terrorism Act. This could not fully satisfy the Indian requirement, as they were mainly looking for Hafiz Saeed to be put in the docks. However, after a short period of home arrest, he was released as there was no incriminating evidence to proceed, further against him\textsuperscript{1317}. The Pakistani High Commissioner to India, Shahid Malik also re-iterated the same contention, while talking to Indian Anchor Karan Thapar in an interview on 20 December. He remarked that India-Pakistan estrangement were strengthening the hands of those not interested in the cause of peace. Pakistan, while trying to respond to Indian demand to rein in the militant groups, has also been asking Indians to stop interfering in Balochistan through their consulates in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{1318}.

A prime Ministerial Summit at Sharm-e-Skeikh Egypt, between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, took place on 16\textsuperscript{th} July, 2009. This was an important thaw in the relations, after a considerable period of tension, following the Mumbai attack. Although Pakistan was under pressure to respond to the Indian request for clamping down even harder on domestic terrorist network, the Pakistani Prime Minister raised the issue of Indian involvement in Balochistan\textsuperscript{1319}. Though both Governments agreed to continue dialogue, yet neither country appeared to be satisfied with the concrete action from the other side.

\textsuperscript{1317 (Ahmed I., 7 January 2010, pp. 1-2)}
\textsuperscript{1318 (Ahmed I., 7 January 2010, pp. 2-3)}
\textsuperscript{1319 (Dawn, 17 July 2009)}
The peace process, launched with great effort and US assistance, was shattered by one terrorist incident. Indian’s intentions may be benign, but the capabilities are not. Indian’s military build up, organizational changes and even relocation of its maximum Armed Forces, bulk of whom are poised against Pakistan, cannot be ignored. As the Pakistan Army Chief pointed out, capabilities are what really matter; Intentions can change overnight.

Mumbai incident has highlighted that such a possibility exists, notwithstanding diplomatic dialogue between the two sides.

Under these circumstances, Pakistan is forced to maintain vigil on the Eastern Borders. This is somewhat disconcerting for the US, as it still needs Pakistan’s full support to counter the growing influence of Taliban and affiliates in the troubled border regions of FATA. There has been a debate at strategic level, whereby Pakistan has been asked to reconsider its threat perceptions i.e instead of being India centric, it should focus on internal stability issues and the growing Talibanization/radicalization within the country. With the unresolved issue of Kashmir and the simmering problems in Balochistan, linked to Indian involvement, it appears unlikely that the process of dialogue would be enough to achieve any substantive breakthrough in the historically inimical relationship between the two countries. Pakistan’s internal problems, which include worsening economic situation, an increasing water crisis and energy shortfall, have made its bargaining position weak. The additional setback has been the Taliban insurgency in FATA and adjoining areas, which has necessitated

1320 (Talk by General Ashfaq Kayani, at Command and Staff College Quetta, 30 June 2010)
1321 (Talk by General Ashfaq Kayani Command and Staff College, 30 June 2010)
deployment of substantial military forces to maintain a semblance of peace and security. Under such conditions, there is little possibility that India would agree to grant major concessions on any of the key bilateral issues. Such a situation can strengthen the hands of extremists within Pakistan.

The country needs a lot of support to come out of this multi-dimensional crisis. Once again the US will be a major source of support. This time, however it is not Pakistan keeping the US in fight against communism; it is in fact an embattled Pakistan fighting for survival against extremism, anarchy and economic meltdown. The country has seen the worst kind of domestic terrorism and violence. In 2008, Pakistan topped the list of countries, in the number of suicide attack casualties, with over 1059 people killed and over 2100 injured. The country’s leadership grapples with enormous challenges, which require a wholesome US involvement. This is not only for Pakistan’s sake, but also for the sake of regional and global security, as the country of 170 million plus, can either be a source of stability and security in the region and the Muslim World, or degenerate into a weak fractured state, where extremists, non-state actors and other trouble makers flourish, to the detriment of Pakistan as well as the global community.

Future of US-Pakistan Security Relationship

Despite a chequered history and many ups and downs in the last six decades, the US-Pakistan security relationship has been a major influencing factor in
Pakistan’s foreign policy, as well as its international orientation. It has also been the major reason for US economic and development assistance to Pakistan. Some of the best periods of development and growth in the country have clear and direct linkage with Pakistan’s intimate security cooperation with the United States. These include the heydays of Ayub Khan from 1958-1964, the stable economic growth during Zia era from 1980-1988, and the massive inflows of military and economic aid 2001 onwards when Pakistan again joined the US effort against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Yet many of Pakistan’s internal problems today, chief amongst them the growing of extremists and fundamentalists in the country, in the wake of the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union, also have direct linkage with the decision to give its all out support for the clandestine, religiously motivated war against the Soviet occupation. Shoukat Aziz, Prime Minister of Pakistan “Pakistan US Relations, Building a Strategic Partnership, 21st Century”, speech at council of Foreign Relations1324. Yet blaming the US for all of Pakistan’s internal woes would not be right. The decision to use the some Afghan war connections and underground network for insurgency in Kashmir was solely that of Pakistan. Similarly the radicalization of society and spawning of Madrassas and religious parties was also done by the active support and involvement of the Zia regime and remained unchecked during the subsequent periods. Bad governance, mismanagement, and corruption by successive governments, in the aftermath of Zia’s death and the return to democracy, has left the country in a morass of problems, each now complementing the other and further complicating solutions. Growing internal violence, weak governance and deteriorating economy, have been

1324 (New York, 18 January 2006)
identified as three major issue confuting Pakistan, by a report of center for American Progress\textsuperscript{1325}.

Unlike olden days, when US wanted Pakistan to help against communist threat, today it is less of that and more to save Pakistan itself from further degeneration into chaos. The US aid country assistance strategy for Pakistan (2010 – 2011) on providing humanitarian assistance in region affected by military operation, and in strengthening government of Pakistan capacity in providing services to its citizens\textsuperscript{1326}. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a most recent visit in July 2010 has unveiled a wholesome package of assistance, that is mainly looking to address those concerns like energy, water, communication and education/health that affect Pakistan’s well being and if not resolved, will lead to further unrest and instability in the country\textsuperscript{1327}.

The US objective of a successful pullout from Afghanistan and stability in the region also hinges on Pakistan’s support, especially the Army’s effort against Taliban influence and safe havens in FATA and adjoining areas. This also has linkage to the growing influence of militants in Punjab and their nexus with Jehadi organizations who have roots in many parts of the country. Pakistan needs to defeat this twin threat, for which it would require long term commitment and assistance from the US Government. Thus the need for a long term wide ranging support to shore up the law-enforcement machinery, as well as help the country and strengthen the democratic institutions, judiciary and beaureoucratic setup. This can help in mitigating the root

\textsuperscript{1325} (Caroline Wadhams, November 2008 Washington DC, pp. 1-2)
\textsuperscript{1326} (US Pakistan Development Coordinaiton – A New Beginning, 20 July 2010)
\textsuperscript{1327} (US Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, tier – into , 19 June 2010)
causes of discontent and assists the country develop viable and vibrant institutions and capacity of the government functionaries. The Kerry Luger Bill is an excellent example of this fresh approach, as it is a wholesome, wide-ranging package, rather than a purely military oriented support package\textsuperscript{1328}.

It is quite evident that Pakistan’s major security threat is not just conventional threat from India, but all the negative factors associated with breakdown of law and order, social justice, economy, radicalization, burgeoning population, shortage of energy and poor governance.

The Pak-US security cooperation in the future, is expected to be less military centric and more wholesome, as the new threat paradigm indicates \textsuperscript{1329}. This cooperation would however be contingent upon Pakistani leadership’s actions and decisions in the coming months and years. Bitter experiences of the past indicate that partnerships last only till the time interests of the two parties coincide. Today Pakistan is vital to the US in its fight in Afghanistan and its concerns to curb growing militancy and extremeness both regionally and globally. Much will depend on how Pakistan Government maintains its relevance and importance in this security calculus\textsuperscript{1330}. This may require tough, unpleasant and unpopular domestic decisions and policies and is likely to face a lot of resistance from vested religious groups and Taliban sympathizers. Pakistan needs to adopt a coherent and consistent policy, and stay the course till these objectives are achieved\textsuperscript{1331}. The long-term viability and stability of

\textsuperscript{1328} (Sheikh, 12 January 2009)
\textsuperscript{1329} (Securing Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with Afghanistan, February 2009)
\textsuperscript{1330} (General Ashfaq Kiyani, Talk at the Command and Staff College, 30 June 2010)
\textsuperscript{1331} (Lodhi D. M., 13 May 2009)
the country itself is at stake. The US can assist Pakistan in overcoming these enormous handles. Pakistan will have to pay the price for faulty decisions in the past. Without a consistent and firm policy, backed up with concrete action against militarism and religious extremism, not only in FATA but also in other parts of the country, it is will not be possible to achieve internal security, or sustained security cooperation with the United States. As highlighted by a report of the Pakistan Policy Working Group in September 2008:-

“The US cannot afford to see Pakistan fail, nor can it ignore the extremists operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (and past nuclear proliferation), Al-Qaeda and war in Afghanistan keep US national security firmly anchored in Pakistan\(^{1332}\).

The main areas of convergence and divergence in US-Pak security cooperation that have figured out in the past and are likely to shape the future contours of the relationship will be discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

The same message has been echoed by President Obama when he commented “In the past, we too often defined over relationship with Pakistan narrowly, those days are over”\(^{1333}\).

### Need to Reduce Trust Deficit and Ensure Long Term Commitment by the US.

The most significant and persistent issue in the security partnership over

\(^{1332}\) (The Next Chapter, The United States and Pakistan, September 2008)

\(^{1333}\) (Nicoll, 2009 International Institute For Strategic Studies, p. 2)
the years has been the concern in Pakistan that US is not a “time tested” friend. As highlighted by a report by Center for American Progress:-

“The US engagement in Pakistan has been inconsistent, transactional and reactive for decades. The United States has suspended aid, imposed sanctions and then intermittently renewed contacts, depending on the paramount strategic concerns at the time”\textsuperscript{1334}.

On three occasions in the past, Pakistan has felt let down because the US withdrew its support at a critical juncture. This was in 1965 War, the break up of West Pakistan in 1971, and in the wake of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1990, when the US invoked the Pressler Amendment and cut off all aid to Pakistan. Though each of these instances has been discussed in detail in the previous chapters, taking into account the US imperatives for the decision, yet the perception in Pakistan remains strong that US will dump the country once again, after it has achieved its purpose in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the US would obviously want to see tangible result from its huge financial support to Pakistan. This leads to the conclusion that the trust deficit can be reduced by following:-

1. The US engagement with Pakistan in a sustained manner, where there are stable high and mid level contacts between the two-countries, focussing on substantive issues of mutual concern. The initiation of the process of Strategic Dialogue is a welcome step that addresses many of these concerns. Its viability and continuity, will shape the future

\textsuperscript{1334} (Partnership for Progress, Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region, November 2008)
contours of the strategic security partnership. This aspect was highlighted by General (Retired) David Bruno, in a US Senate Hearing on Afghanistan, in February 2009 as:

“Essential to our long term prospects with Pakistan is building a strategic partnership with Pakistan, that takes us beyond today’s what I call use and above relationship ……. We have to have a vision of long term of long term relationship there that allow there to believe in the sustained presence and sustained involvement of US in the region”1335.

2. The US must not deal with individuals, but strengthen the political process and institutions of the country. Reliance on President Zia, then Musharraf led to political unrest, dissent and resentment within the country, and tarnished the US image, despite its military and financial support. “No single Pakistan’s leader can or should be the linchpin of that country’s fight against Al-Qaeda and Taliban1336. As the events in the follow up to Musharrafs departure have indicated, the militancy and other related problems are much better tackled by elected governments, with full backing of the military in the “background” rather than “in the lead”. The report by Pakistan Policy Working Group also emphasizes on the

1335 (Bruno G. (., February 26, 2009)
1336 (Innocent, April 13, 2009, p. 17)
need to “maintain neutrality toward Pakistan’s internal political situation, focusing on democratic institutions and reforms”\(^{1337}\).

3. Pakistan needs to develop a better understanding of the US role and policies at the public-grass root level. The Pan-Islamic, “Champion of Islam”, vision of Pakistan has to be replaced by a more pragmatic and practical approach. It is the education system and media, who along with the government and politicians, must play their role in educating the people about the Pakistan-US Security relationship and near to Iraq de-link Pakistan’s issues from those of Palestine and Iraq every other country where perceivably “Islam” is being threatened by the US. The people must accept the reality that they are not in a position to influence the global policies of a superpower.

4. A participative approach is needed in the formulation of US initiatives and policies towards Pakistan. The Kerry Luger ‘Bill’ intended to support Pakistan, has been widely renounced initially in Pakistan, owing to its language, and clauses which are considered too intrusive, i.e civilian oversight over military promotion, Pakistan’s right to budget its nuclear force quotas / allocation of funds\(^{1338}\).

5. There is a need to gear up public diplomacy between the two countries. Misperceptions on both sides have to be addressed. Pakistan’s image in the US and vice versa, both suffer from gross misperceptions. As one

\(^{1337}\) (The Next Chapter, The United States and Pakistan, September 2008, P. 35)
\(^{1338}\) (Masellis, 8-9 October 2009 p. 6)
observer highlights, much damage is caused by “irresponsible and
distorted press reporting and ill-informed political pundits”, on both
sides\textsuperscript{1339}. This makes even viable initiatives by the US look biased. A
case in point is the Kerry Luger bill. Similarly US assistance to
Pakistan is never highlighted enough by the government, for the
common man on the streets of Pakistan to understand, how much the
country is being assisted by the US\textsuperscript{1340}. This can be linked with
limited coverage of US assistance in the Pakistani media and
public\textsuperscript{1341}. Similarly while there is “significant operational cooperation
between the two countries”, it is not visible, as was the case with US
assistance to Pakistan in the 2005 earthquake\textsuperscript{1342}.

6. Pakistan needs to reassure the US about the security of the nuclear
weapons and associated facilities and infrastructure\textsuperscript{1343}. This is
possible through stringent measures to ensure proof security and
visible gains against Taliban and their sympathizes. Even a symbolic
attach on the nuclear facilities can have major repercussions for
Pakistan’s nuclear program and country’s relations with the US and
West.

\textsuperscript{1339} (Akhtar, USAWC Class of 2008, p. 16)
\textsuperscript{1340} (Security Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with Afghanistan, February 2009)
\textsuperscript{1341} (Dietz, 21 Sep 2007, p. 7)
\textsuperscript{1342} (Dietz, 21 Sep 2007, p. 7)
\textsuperscript{1343} (Akhtar, USAWC Class of 2008, p. 16)
7. One of the major concerns in the US over the last 9 years has been the level of transparency in Pakistan, the utilization of US aid. A mechanism needs to be instructed, whereby such are alloyed.\footnote{Ibrahim, July 2009}

**Afghanistan and FATA.** This aspect is likely to dominate Pakistan-US security partnership in the foreseeable future. “Afghanistan cannot succeed without Pakistan and vice versa”\footnote{The Next Chapter, The United States and Pakistan, September 2008}. There is little doubt on either side, as far as the need for stability and peace in the region is concerned. However, there are differing concerns of both parties, which will have to be met through a continuous engagement and dialogue, in order to ensure that the desired end state is achieved.

1. The US Government looks towards Pakistan for strong, determined and sustained actions to root out Al-Qaeda and their Taliban supporters from FATA, and put an end to cross border infiltration\footnote{Masellis, 8-9 October 2009 p. 3}. This goal is also linked to reducing the influence of militants and their brand of Islam in other parts of the country.

2. The planned withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, and the future stability of the country will be dependent on the way Pakistan manages to secure the troubled Pashtun belt. President Obama has commented on December 1, 2009 at West Point Military Academy, “Our Success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with
Pakistan\textsuperscript{1347}. In this regard, there are persistent concerns in the US Government and military commanders in Afghanistan, that Pakistan has a soft corner for the Haqqani and other Afghan Taliban, based in Pakistan. Centre for strategic and International Studies report of September 2008 also alleges ISI involvement in supporting the Haqqani network and Hizbe-Islami forces of Gulbadin Hekmatyar. It also contents that Balochistan is being used by Mullah Omer’s network as a base for operations inside Afghanistan\textsuperscript{1348}. These concerns have a lot to do with the kind of future Afghanistan that is perceived by both parties. Pakistan is interested and concerned about post-US withdrawal Afghanistan. In case the pro-India, Northern Alliance dominated, Karzai Government continues its policies, then Pakistan may be confronted with an unsettled Pashtun belt, a hostile Afghanistan in the West and belligerent India along the Eastern border. This ‘two front war scenario’\textsuperscript{1349} is not acceptable to Pakistan. It may be noted that even most Afghan don’t believe that Afghan Government will win the present conflict may as 33% expect some kind of negotiated settlement. Unclear the circumstances, it is likely that Pakistan mat be asked to play a role in such negotiations in the future.

\textsuperscript{1347} (Nicoll, 2009 International Institute For Strategic Studies, pp. 1,3)
\textsuperscript{1348} (Cordesman, September 14, 2008, p. 58)
\textsuperscript{1349}
Afghan Gov’t Will Win
Both Sides Negotiate
Fighting Will Go On
Taliban Will Win

33% 33% 19% 8%

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Most Likely Outcome of War

3. The US Government will need to allay Pakistan’s concerns with regards to Indian involvement in Pakistan through Afghanistan.

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\(^{1350}\) (Cordesman, The Afghan-Pakistan War: Status in 2009, 12 April 2009, p. 25)
\(^{1351}\) (Innocent, April 13, 2009, p. 13), (Khan B. M., Summer 2009, p. 69)
With more than $1 billion invested in Afghanistan, including the building of road between Iran and Afghanistan, the Indians have established their presence in the country in a big way. Indian consulates in Jalalabad, Kandhar, Mazar-e-Sharif are seen as the staging posts for RAW operations inside Pakistan\textsuperscript{1352}. This has been a major concern for Pakistan and an impediment in developing close relations with the Karzai regime.

The US has been working hard to build a working level relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Officials of the two countries have met often in Kabul and Islamabad with active US involvement\textsuperscript{1353}. The US has also involved Turkey in a trilateral dialogue, bringing together Pakistan and Afghanistan in a “Joint Working Group” to discuss bilateral issues\textsuperscript{1354}.

These measures will be helpful, provided the core concerns of each country are addressed. It appears that on the Afghan front, there will be some friction and some progress in the coming years. Much will depend on how the US employs its immense political and diplomatic clout to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a turf for settling regional rivalries. This issue can be source of convergence in the long term security relationship as the instability in Afghanistan and FATA is a “combined problem” of the US and Pakistan\textsuperscript{1355}.

\textsuperscript{1352} (Partnership for Progress, Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region p 17, November 2008)
\textsuperscript{1353} (Partnership for Progress, Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region p.21, November 2008)
\textsuperscript{1354} (Turkey steps in for Pakistan Afghanistan Relation’s Turkish Daily News, September 18, 2006)
\textsuperscript{1355} (Sheikh, 12 January 2009, p. 7), (Jalali, Spring 2009)
India and Kashmir

Pakistan’s security partnership with the US, in a large part has been predicated by the security concerns stemming from presence of India on its Eastern borders. Most of the disappointments have also been in relation to India, when Pakistan found the US support wanting at critical times. In the post 9/11 scenario, the US has helped diffuse tension twice between the two countries, once in 2001-2002 and then more recently in 2008, following the terrorist attacks on Mumbai Taj Hotel.

US strategic nuclear deal with India, its substantial trade and economic links with the country and the emergence of India as a major military and economic power, preclude the possibility of US playing any significant role in resolving the outstanding Kashmir dispute. As one researcher indicates, “past US support to India-Pakistan conflict has been to offer its “good offices” but not “pushing”, and more crisis management oriented\textsuperscript{1356}.

This has not happened in the past, when US had much more leverage against India, and would be highly unlikely in the changed global scenario, where India is considered to be a “strategic ally” as against Pakistan which is considered to be a “transitional partner” by many observers, despite the recent emphasis on strategic partnership.

India is expected to remain a Major Determinant in US-Pakistan Security Relationship. The fact the Pakistan was faced with an antagonist neighbour, India, has helped shape the security paradigm for the country.\textsuperscript{1356} (Gorden, p. 14)
excited, by far the strongest pull on Pakistan’s foreign policy options and its quest for external security assistance\textsuperscript{1357}. Added to this is the argument that India, unlike China does not believe in “Soft power”, it has in the past, repeatedly demonstrated that it is willing to cower down and subdue its neighbors, rather than adopt a big-brother, conciliatory approach. This “hard power” tactics has been demonstrated most significantly by the intransigent attitude towards the Kashmir issue, and other bilateral concerns such as sharing of water, Siachen, Sir Creek disputes etc. In the last one decade, the Indian stance has seen yet another shift, emboldened by its Kargil experience and the developing economic and political nexus with both US and Israel, the Indians have taken this coercive tactics to a new level. The escalation of 2002 – 2003, when it amassed more than a million troops on Pakistan’s border, demonstrated a new level of hostility and aggression. The Indian’s have apparently reduced their tolerance threshold to the level that any incidence of violence in their country, even remotely linked to Pakistan based organizations, as in the case of Mumbai attack on a hotel in 2008, evokes a disproportionate response. Given Pakistan’s serious domestic problems, growing insecurity and levels of violence, and engagement in the war on terror, such incidents, perpetrated by rogue/ splinter extremist groups cannot be ruled out in the future also. However the new Indian Military Doctrine, which has been developed exclusively against Pakistan, leaves little opportunity for Pakistan, to seek international mediation or mount a diplomatic offensive to reduce the chances of a major confrontation, fraught with grave risks, as both the countries are nuclear armed. In such an environment of perpetual coercion and threat in being, specifically

targeting Pakistan, there is little room for manoeuvre. The history of dialogues between the two countries does not reflect an enviable trend. The first serious negotiations, on the issue of Indus water, dragged on for a decade, before an agreement could be reached, through the auspices of World Bank and the active support and monitory assistance by the US Government. Since then the only agreement of any significance, has been the international arbitration on Rann of Kutch, again involving third party mediation. All the pending issues like Kashmir, trade, Sir Creek Dispute and Siachen, have seen little progress. The process of comprehensive dialogue, initiated in the aftermath of the Indo-Pak escalation of 2001-2002 has been good optics, but of little substance. India has scuttled the talks on the slightest pretext. In 2008, where Pakistan was itself facing one of the most horrific and sustained urban terrorism campaign, with bombs and suicide attacks occurring with regularity all over the country, one incident in India was enough to undo the entire dialogue process. Indian’s immediately started talking about punitive strikes and war, moving their troops to the border. This was at a time, when a large number of Pakistani troops were committed on the western borders, trying to dismantle the same terrorist infrastructure in FATA. Indian approach towards Pakistan, through the last six decades, reflects hostility, dominance and intransigence. There seems to be little room for a more pacifist, friendly approach. Though it can be argued that Pakistan’s unwillingness to accept Indian hegemony, despite losing the 1971 War, and a part of the country, has added to Indian frustration. Additionally Pakistan’s support to the Kashmir freedom struggle and its relatively soft stance towards some of the Jehadi organizations, based on its soil antagonizes the Indian’s. Yet it can be
safely concluded that the history of conflict and the muted success of dialogue between the two countries points towards a strained relationship in the years ahead. It is also likely that the conventional military capability gap between the two countries will increase substantially in the coming years. India with its projected two digit growth rate and booming economy is looking to radically upgrade its military potential in the coming years. On the other hand Pakistan is plagued with problems of governance; acute energy shortage, stunted economic growth and increased levels of domestic violence. An internally weak, economically drained Pakistan is expected to continue looking for US support, to offset the Indian dominance. This, like in the part is expected be dominant force behind Pakistan’s security imperatives in the future. However since it is not a shared interest, and will often clash with US strategic imperatives vis-à-vis India, there the military and economic assistance to Pakistan will be conditioned by US policies in relation to India. This contention is supported by historical precedent\textsuperscript{1358}.

This is in essence a recurring theme in the Pak-US security relationship. Pakistan does not have long term shared interests and strategic affinity with the US. It pops into prominence, once the US policy objectives coincide temporarily with those of Pakistan, as in the case of Afghan war, or when the US needs Pakistan in the context of its overall global agenda, as in the case of anticommmunist alliance of the 1950’s and 1960’s. Pakistan has been unable to maintain a lasting relevance to the US policy goals. An aspect that could have helped it was the sheer size and potential of the country as one of

\textsuperscript{1358} (Buzan, 1986, p. 15)
the strongest and largest Muslim countries. This could have been an element of strength and stability, if finely in the context of security relationship; Pakistan could provide support and strength to the stability in Middle East and South Asia. Unfortunately the vagaries of geography which have placed Pakistan in the middle of an unstable and geopolitically important region, its longstanding disputes with India and more importantly its burgeoning population with a huge component of the populace not positively inclined towards the west; do not allow the country to assume such a role. In contrast, Turkey has been able to maintain a relatively stable and fruitful security relationship with the US, despite being close proximally to the potentially destabilizing Arab-Israel conflict. This has a lot a do with strong state control over religious extremism, and Turkey’s secular leanings, that allow flexibility to the Government to take relatively unpopular, yet strategically beneficial decisions.

This, all combined, means that the nature of security cooperation and its extent is often dictated by strong US interests with Pakistan, which are non-permanent in nature like Afghan War. Such relationship is characterized by a wave of cooperation, assistance and good will, followed by complete disinterest and withdrawal by the superpower, leaving Pakistan to sort out the mess, feeling dejected and let down. Perhaps the most important lesson for the Pakistan, from the study of US - Pak security relationship is, that it should never be treated as a panacea for all ills, and that Pakistan should be pragmatic enough to realize the limits of cooperation and the likelihood of discontinuation of assistance, once the US objectives in the region have been met. Pakistan also needs to maintain its relevance to the US strategic/ global perspective. This may require going beyond its borders, in supporting causes, which may not directly affect its own security. Pakistan as
a strong and vibrant Muslim country, which has moderate views and willing to share US global initiatives will provide the country with the kind of leverage necessary for a long lasting and fruitful strategic partnership.

In this backdrop, Pakistan should maintain circumscribed goals with regards to US involvement in settlement of Indo-Pak disputes. Where Pakistan has been more successful lately, is the need for an improved conventional deterrence against India, in order to maintain the existing balance of power in South Asia. Owing to India’s massive economic power, and growing military might, Pakistan may be compelled to “lower the nuclear threshold, replacing conventional forces with increased nuclear deterrence”\(^\text{1359}\).

This, when combined with India’s new concept of war fighting doctrine, the “Cold Start Strategy”, which advocates simultaneous thrusts at multiple sensitive points into Pakistan, at the shortest possible notice, makes for an alarming scenario. Surprising a nuclear armed neighbour may not be the right option for India, given the long history of hostility and bitterness between the two countries.

Under the circumstances, while the US may not be in a position to resolve the long standing Kashmir dispute, it can help Pakistan maintain a credible conventional deterrence, thus reducing the chances of Indian military adventurism, which could escalate beyond expectations. The recent induction of Block-52, F-16s, in PAF

\(^{1359}\) (Masellis, 8-9 October 2009 p. 2)
despite stiff resistance by Indian lobby, is a step which will enable Pakistan to maintain credible conventional deterrence.\textsuperscript{1360}

The second area, where US-Pakistan relationship can help, is by addressing the Pakistani concerns about Indian involvement in Afghanistan. These are primarily viewed to encircle Pakistan. The Indian intelligent agency RAW’s role in fermenting unrest in Balochistan\textsuperscript{1361} is also something Pakistan looks towards the US to resolve\textsuperscript{1362}.

The harsh reality that Pakistan cannot use American support as a lever to influence India, has been confirmed through historical precedence. It is a trend repeated through the “highs and lows” of the security partnership. Pakistan should look beyond this approach, to accept that its priorities and compulsions vis a vis India do not necessarily coincide with those of the US. At best Pakistan can hope to gain sufficient military, economic and diplomatic support that allows it to “keep its head above the water”. Where the US can help both countries is to maintain and build up the composite dialogue. US interaction with India will remain a major influencing factor in the relationship in the coming years\textsuperscript{1363}.

\textbf{Military Cooperation and Military to Military Contacts}

Military cooperation has been the basis of Pak-US security partnership, since its inception in 1951. The architect of this cooperation was General Ayub Khan.

\textsuperscript{1360} (Talk by Air Chief Marshall, Rao Suleman Qamar, Command and Staff College, Quetta, June 2010)
\textsuperscript{1361} (Innocent, April 13, 2009, p. 13)
\textsuperscript{1362} (Raja, 2010, p. 3)
\textsuperscript{1363} (Rose C. B., 21 Apr 2004, p. 18)
Over the year, when the relations between the two countries were strained, as in the 1970’s and the 1990’s, this area of cooperation has not been completely shut off. This area is expected to remain a vibrant and mutually beneficial part of the security relationship between the two countries. From a mere one to two officers attending military course in the US, in the aftermath of Pressler Sanctions, now this number has increased to many hundreds per year. A whole generation of officials had grown in service, without exposure to the most formidable military in the world. Recent contacts can create a large pool of officers who have better insight into the working of the military and government machinery, as well as a better understanding the US culture, and style of business which often seems abrupt and rude to some who do not have prior exposure to it. The war against Al-Qaeda and Taliban is not going to be very short-lived. This area of cooperation between the two countries has yielded maximum goodwill and mutual understanding. It to can help enhance the performance of the Pakistan military and develop a softer, better image of the US in the minds of future leadership of the Armed Forces, and vice versa. Pakistan Army and security form would require continuous support and assistance form the US in this vital area of cooperation. A lot of close cooperation and good will exists military level which can be future enhanced.

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1364 (Gilani, 10 March 2006, p. 16)  
1365 (Khan M. , 1, 2010, p. 2)  
1366 (The News international, 17 May 2009)  
1367 (Bruno, 26 June 2008, p. 5)
Conclusion. The Pak-US Security Relationship has seen many ups and downs over the last six decades. An attempt has been made to analyse the areas of convergence and divergence in this complex, long-standing relationship. These issues have varied during various decades as per the dictates of the global/regional security environment and the US strategic priorities at the time. Yet some issues have remained constant. Pakistan’s security concerns vis-à-vis India and the chronic dispute over Kashmir have been a major influencing factor in the relationship and is likely to remain a major influencing factor in the future. This aspect has now gained added importance in the wake of the nuclearization of the sub-continent, making it a potential nuclear flash point. In the recent decade, the US involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role in stabilizing the border regions of FATA, has gained significance in the US-Pakistan strategic partnership. This is likely to remain the major driving force behind the relationship, till the time US achieves its strategic objectives in the region. There has been a genuine concern in Pakistan, based on the past experiences that US interest in the country is transitionary. Addressing this concern and the contributory factors of the trust deficit would be a major challenge for the viability of the security relationship.

Now, in the 21st century, when terrorism and instability plague Pakistan, the country’s internal security and well-being also has gained more importance with the US strategists. The world’s 5th most populous country, beset with a host of problems, while also being a nuclear power, is a major security concern for the world’s leading power. It is here that the long term security interests of both Pakistan and the US coincide. A stable, moderate and prosperous Pakistan can be a source of strength and
stability in the region and the Islamic World. Pakistan has a lot at stake. A mutually beneficial security relationship, with clear understanding of each others limitations can be helpful in achieving the long-term goals of the two countries in the coming years.
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